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AN ISLAMIC EMIRATE FOR AL-QAEDA

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 25

Jennifer Cafarella

December 2014

JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIA


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Cover: Members of al Qaedas Nusra Front drive in a convoy as they tour villages, which they said they

have seized control of from Syrian rebel factions, in the southern countryside of Idlib, December 2,

2014. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi. Reproduced with permission.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing fromthe publisher.

2014 by the Institute for the Study of War.

Published in 2014 in the United States of America by the Institute for theStudy of War.

1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036www.understandingwar.org


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Jennifer Cafarella

JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIAAN ISLAMIC EMIRATE FOR AL-QAEDA


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ABOUT OUR TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS

ISW believes superior strategic insight derives from a fusion of traditional social science research and innovative technologica

methods. ISW recognizes that the analyst of the future must be able to process a wide variety of information, ranging from

personal interviews and historical artifacts to high volume structured data. ISW thanks its technology partners, Palantir

Technologies and Praescient Analytics, for their support in this innovative endeavor. In particular, their technology and

implementation assistance has supported creating many ISW maps and graphics.

Praescient Analytics is a Veteran Owned Small Business based in Alexandria, Virginia

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We currently oer a suite of software applications for integrating, visualizing and

analyzing the worlds information. We support many kinds of data including structured

unstructured, relational, temporal and geospatial.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jennifer Cafarella is a Syria Analyst and Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. In her research, she focuseon the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the al-Qaeda aliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), and Syrian rebel groups. She isthe author of ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria, Local Dynamics Shift in Response to U.S.-Led

Airstrikes in Syria, and Peace-talks between the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. In addition, she oversees theresearch for and production of weekly Syria Update maps and periodic Syria Control of Terrain maps. Ms. Cafarella has dealextensively with the media acting as a resource for NPRs All Things Considered, the Voice of America, the BBC, The New YorkTimes, CNN, Time, USA Today, and others. This is her rst full length report.Ms. Cafarella is a graduate of ISWs Hertog War Studies Program and is the Institutes rst Evans Hanson Fellow. ThiFellowship is for outstanding alumni of the War Studies Program and seeks to help build the next generation of nationalsecurity leaders. She received her BA from the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities in Global Studies with a focus on theMiddle East.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks to Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Jessica Lewis McFate, and Aaron Reese for their invaluable mentorship and brilliant

analytical insight. Special thanks as well to the ISW Syria team and to Valerie Syzbala, upon whose initial research this paperwas founded. Finally, a big thank you to Nichole Dicharry for outstanding graphics work, John Lawrence, and the entire ISWoperations team, without whom this report would not have been possible.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-prot, public policy research organization. ISW advancesan informed understanding of military aairs through reliable research,trusted analysis, and innovative education. ISW iscommitted to improving the nations ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieveU.S. strategic objectives.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 07

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 08

INTRODUCTION ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 11

IDEOLOGY AND GRANDY STRATEGY ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 12

JN STRATEGY FOR SYRIA ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 13

PENETRATION INTO REBEL RANKS ... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 15 JNs Complex Networked Structure ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 16 Tier 1 .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 17 Tier 2 .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 19

Tier 3 .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 19 JN Influence on Rebel Behavior .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 20

JNS SPECIAL FORCES MODEL ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 22 Structure and Composition ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 22

JN TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 23 Recruitment .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 24 Training ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 25

JABHAT AL-NUSRAS MILITARY CAMPAIGN SINCE AUGUST 2013.... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 27 Idlib and Hama ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 29 Failed attempt to push into NW Hama ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 31

JN carves out direct control in Idlib .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 32 Homs and Damascus ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 32 Aleppo ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 34 Deraa .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 36

JNS GOVERNANCE STRATEGY ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 37 Aleppo Sharia Commission ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 38 Eastern Sharia Committee ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 39 An interim shift in JNs governance in Syria .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 41

JNS FUTURE CALCULUS ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 41

CONCLUSION ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 43

AP PEND IX : JAB HAT AL -NU SRA TIMEL INE OF EVE NT S .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 46

NOTES ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 47

IMAGE FOOTNOTES ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 65

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MAPS & GRAPHICS

FIGURE 1. SYRIA OVERVIEW .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 10

FIGURE 2. JN MEMBER ADMINISTERS POLIO VACCINATION ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 14

FIGURE 3. JN MEMBER PREPARES DAWA MATERIALS ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 14

FIGURE 4. AL-FAROOQ INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 15

FIGURE 5. JABHAT AL-NUSRA REBEL ALLIES: DECEMBER 2014 ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 18

FIGURE 6. GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA

AN D AL LI ED FOR CES ... .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . 20

FIGURE 7. ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL OFFICE PREPARES ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .

COMMUNICATIONS.... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 22

FIGURE 8. TOP JN SHARIA OFFCIAL MUHAJIR ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 23

FIGURE 9. JN COMMANDER USING SAND TABLE ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 23

FIGURE 10. JN FIGHTER RECEIVING RADIO FREQUENCIES .... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 24

FIGURE 11. JN WEAPONS MANUFACTURE MANUAL ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 24

FIGURE 12. CHILD TRAINING CAMP ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 26

FIGURE 13. ALAWITE CLERIC BADR GHAZALS SENTENCING ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 26

FIGURE 14. CONTROL IN SYRIA: DECEMBER 2014 ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . 27

FIGURE 15. KEY JABHAT AL-NUSRA MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS IN ............. NORTHERN SYRIA SINCE AUGUST 2013 ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 28

FIGURE 16. KEY JABHAT AL-NUSRA MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS IN .............

SOUTHERN SYRIA SINCE AUGUST 2013 ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 29

FIGURE 17. JN FIGHTERS MASS IN PREPARATION FOR ATTACK ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 31

FIGURE 18. JN FIGHTERS PREPARING FOR MISSION IN HOMS ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . 32

FIGURE 19. HOMS CITY LOCATOR MAP ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 33

FIGURE 20. JN MILITARY CONVOY ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 35

FIGURE 21. CONTACT INFORMATION FOR JN MANAGEMENT

SERVICES.... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 39

FIGURE 22. JABHAT AL-NUSRA-LINKED SHARIA COURTS ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 40


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Acronym Name

AQ Al-Qaeda

AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian PeninsulaAQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

ASC Aleppo Shari'a Court

BMP Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Infantry Fighting Vehicle)

COA Course of Action

CW Chemical Weapons

FSA Free Syrian Army

HASI Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya

IED Improvised Explosive DeviceIF Islamic Front

IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISI Islamic State of Iraq

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

JAM Jaysh al-Mujahideen

JMA Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar

JN Jabhat al-Nusra

JU Jaysh al-UmmaKSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MOC Military Operations Command

MSC Mujahideen Shura Council

OPSEC Operational Security

RCC Revolutionary Command Council

SMC Supreme Military Command

SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

SRF Syrian Revolutionary Front

SVBIED Suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

TOW Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile

TTP Tactics, techniques and procedures

VBIED Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMSMIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 25 | JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIA | JENNIFER CAFARELLA| DECEMBER 2014

7WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG


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8 WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) is not the only Sala-Jihadist threat emanating from SyriaJabhat al-Nusra (JN), al-Qaedas (AQ) aliate in Syria, has also developed into a serious and expanding

threat both to the West and to the future of Syria. JN is not less dangerous than ISIS. Rather, JN sharesal-Qaedas aims and is working to achieve them. JN is gaining control of terrain in Syria even as U.S. forces

target ISIS with airstrikes.

JN is a threat to American national security in three ways. First, JN is a successful al-Qaeda aliatewhose victories support the overall mission of the global terror organization including the establishmenof a caliphate. Second, JN actively facilitates the Khorasan group, which is developing imminent plots onbehalf of al-Qaeda to attack the West from safe havens in Syria. Lastly, JNs success in embedding itself

within the Syrian opposition threatens the U.S. mission to eld a counter-ISIS force in Syria that is notinuenced by AQ or vulnerable to its aggression.

JN is pursuing an Islamic emirate in Syria as a component of a future al-Qaeda caliphate. The dierencebetween JN and ISIS are not in objective, but rather in methodology.

JN follows a more gradualist approach to state-building than that of ISIS. JN adheres to AQ leader Aymanal-Zawahiris methodology, which prioritizes social outreach and proselytization over direct conquest ofterrain and the immediate declaration of a state. JN does so as a part of its long-term strategy to gain popularacceptance. This strategy seeks to avoid popular backlash, characteristic of the Awakening movements thatundermined the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006-2007. JNs approach is increasing its traction with theSyrian population.

JN is engaged in a nuanced and carefully formulated state-building eort in Syria that is targeted tsecure the long-term establishment of Sharia law in a post-Assad state. If allowed to continue, JN is likely

to succeed in developing a proto-state in Syrias rebel-held spaces that is responsive to al-Qaeda.

JN brings important military capabilities to the ght against Bashar al-Assad. JNs unequivocacommitment to ghting the Assad regime attracts rebel groups that do not necessarily share its vision forthe future of Syria as an al-Qaeda emirate.

JNs strategy of working through networks of partnered or aliated rebel groups obscures the true extenof its activities in Syria and its aggregate level of inuence throughout rebel ranks.

JN serves as a force multiplier for other rebel groups. JN leverages small units of highly skilled ghters tcontribute an essential special forces-like capability to rebel military oensives. JN provides highly eectivecapabilities such as the deployment of suicide bombers to produce asymmetric eects against the regime.

JNs military operations are targeted to produce inuence within rebel ranks. JN complements thiinuence with a nonlethal campaign for local support within rebel-held Syria.

JN leverages both lethal and non-lethal approaches to inuence Syrias armed opposition in ways thamay translate into long-term power within rebel-led governance structures. These structures are at risk ofbecoming responsive to JN, and therefore AQ.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYMIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 25| JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIA | JENNIFER CAFARELLA| DECEMEBR 2014

Not all rebels are radicalized, nor are they all pro-JN in practice. There are tiers of pro-JN rebelrelationships, and some of these relationships are transactional. Therefore, there is a moderate oppositionin Syria that can be split from JN if conditions are properly set.

While a moderate opposition exists within Syria, its continued reliance on JN as a partner against Assadwill degrade the possible mechanisms whereby those rebels can reject JNs inuence in the long-term. TheUnited States has months, not years, to begin counterbalancing JNs leverage.

In order to deny al-Qaeda safe-haven in Syria, the United States must neutralize JNs campaign toinuence the population. This requires engagement with opposition forces, not simply airstrikes againstJN. A strategy limited to targeted airstrikes to disrupt ISIS and the Khorasan Group will not achieve thisgoal.

The U.S. must actually adopt an anti-Assad strategy in order to prevent JN from subsuming the moderateopposition. Opposition to Assad drives the recruitment and radicalization of jihadists. JN is ostensiblycommitted to ghting the regime, making them more attractive than both ISIS and the U.S. Furthermore, JNis capitalizing on a feeling of betrayal and resentment from the Syrian population toward the internationalmilitary coalition against ISIS to penetrate more deeply into rebel ranks and the fabric of Syrian society.

It is still possible for the United States and the West to contest control of institutions and split JN fromthe population and moderate opposition. If the U.S. makes it easier for the opposition to defeat the Syrianregime by bringing more asymmetric capabilities to the battleeld, most rebel groups are likely to followalong with the U.S. rather than preferring JN or ghting on its behalf.

JN is an insurgency competing for popular support and winning it. JN must be separated from thepopulation. It will be necessary for to compete for the trust and allegiance of the Syrian population and itsmoderate rebels in order to secure U.S. interests in the region, defeat ISIS, and mitigate the threat to theU.S homeland posed by AQ in Syria.

JN can become more dangerous over time. Al-Qaeda and ISIS are in a competition for leadership ofthe global, violent jihad. Its foreign ghter networks into Syria are robust. JN can further support thedevelopment of plots against the West and the U.S. homeland in order to prove al-Qaedas capacities andrelevance.

In the longer term, JN would also become more dangerous if it reconciled with ISIS, even at the unitlevel rather than the leadership level. JN leaders are pursuing such negotiations under the guidance of AQleader Zawahiri. The combined military power of JN and ISIS would constitute a large and lethal force.


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SYRIA OVERVIEW

10 mi

20 km

TURKEY

IRAQ

JORDAN

LEBANON

Latakia

Tartous

Homs

Hama

Aleppo

Idlib ar-raqqa

Damascus

As SuwaydaDeraa

Deir ez-Zour

Hasakah

Figure 1.



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JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIAAN ISLAMIC EMIRATE FOR AL-QAEDA

By Jennifer Cafarella


The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is not the only Sala-Jihadist threat emanating from SyriaIts prominence in U.S. policy has overshadowed a threat of similar magnitude from Jabhat al-Nusra(JN), the ocial al-Qaeda (AQ) aliate in Syria. JN rivals ISIS as a sophisticated, intelligent, strategicactor in the region and continues to enjoy a dangerous freedom to operate in Syria. The two groups sharecommon goals, including a revived Islamic Caliphate. JN, however, is pursuing its aims through a distinct,more patient methodology that is highly threatening despite its low signature. Whereas ISIS has announcedits state and tried to legitimize it by conquest, JN is following AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiris method offomenting a religious and social revolution by embedding itself within an indigenous insurgency. TheSyrian war has provided JN a nearly ideal environment within which to implement this strategy on behalfof al-Qaeda, and JN has enjoyed worrying success to date.

JN is more subtle and insidious than ISIS, and is thereforemore dicult to contain or defeat. While ISIS pursues direct,overt, and top-down control, JN leverages an elite militaryforce to win allies among the Syrian armed opposition andto sponsor locally tailored governance in ungoverned areasof Syria. JN has benetted from the lack of eective Westernintervention in Syria. It has further benetted from theradicalization of the Syrian opposition after September2013, when the decision by the U.S. not to intervene inSyria demoralized large segments of the opposition. JN has aow of foreign ghters and contributes asymmetric special

forces capabilities to opposition forces, securing prominentvictories for rebel campaigns through its contributions to

wider military eorts. The signicance of this contributionincreased in late 2013 and throughout 2014, as a lack ofinternational engagement in Syria increased the relativeimportance of JNs contribution to the ghting. As such,

JNs military campaign has earned it signicant leveragewith other rebel groups. At the end of 2014, the rise ofISIS changed the Syrian wartime environment and forcedmeaningful shifts in JNs disposition in Syria. These shifts,over time, may begin to impact its network of rebel allies.However, JNs success in establishing inuence within rebelranks has kept JN from losing popular support in the short-term, despite an increasingly aggressive stance. It is thereforeunlikely that JNs embedded position within rebel ranks willunravel without additional outside pressure.

JN originated as a Syrian oshoot of the former al-Qaeda inIraq (AQI) organization. It has evolved into a separate androbust al-Qaeda aliate, recognized by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the rst half of 2013.1The groups membershipincludes both Syrian and foreign ghters, and draws upon

the resources of the al-Qaeda core.2JN never downplayed itsSala-Jihadist orientation prior to its formal incorporationinto the al-Qaeda movement. However, in the early years ofthe revolution it refrained from disclosing its AQ aliationand its actual goals in Syria. This allowed JN to avoid alienatingthe local Syrian population, which was unlikely to tolerateits long-term objectives and hardline religious beliefs in theearly months of the war. JN instead propagated an image ofa nationalist Syrian opposition force, recruiting heavily toestablish a base of Syrian ghters and securing the supportof other rebel groups. The success of this strategy became

apparent in December 2012, when the U.S. designation ofJN as a terrorist organization provoked protests in supporof JN from within Syrias moderate opposition.3 Twenty-nine Syrian opposition groups signed a petition condemningthe U.S. designation of JN as a terrorist group. They wentso far as to announce we are all al-Nusra and urged rebelsupporters to raise the JN ag.4

JN is a military, religious, and political organization pursuingan armed campaign against the Syrian government in theinterest of the global al-Qaeda movement. As an avowed al-Qaeda aliate, JNs extensive penetration of Syrias rebelliondirectly challenges U.S. eorts to support a moderateopposition against ISIS and Assad. JN will ght against anyrebel group that it sees as a threat. Its growth also directlythreatens U.S. national security because it facilitates AQcells such as the Khorasan group that are engaged in activeplots against the West. As this report will demonstrate, JNseorts are not limited to armed opposition to Assad. JN isdeveloping robust grassroots governance structures acrossungoverned Syria. Through these structures, it graduallycultivates its vision of a post-Assad Syria governed by its own


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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 25 | JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN SYRIA | JENNIFER CAFARELLA | DECEMBER 2014

quickly established a reputation for its spectacular suicideattacks against hardened military targets at a time when theSyrian opposition was just beginning to formalize.

These early JN attacks placed the regime on the defensivein securing and defending its own critical urban terrain,thus creating an opening for JN to recruit in the Syriancountryside, conducted in cooperation with other groups.

Joulani notes, For example, when Damascus was attacked,the regime began to focus its attention on it and ignored therural areas. Therefore, we started recruitment and developingrecruits into brigades and things like that in the rural areas.Subsequently, we enter those cities, one after another Therefore, there must be an agreement with the other groupsand factions in the recruitment process [an agreement wasrequired]. JN also provided operating room for Syriasnascent rebel forces to grow, facilitating the evolution of thearmed Syrian opposition from protest movement to full civil

war in early 2012.

JN began to pursue more complex attacks with participationfrom rebel forces against hardened military objectives as thisopposition formalized in mid-2012.21Military activity on allof Syrias major battlefronts during this time indicated JNssuccessful diusion throughout all of Syrias earliest rebelstrongholds.22Through this eort, JN created inroads withlocal rebel groups and prominent commanders, includingFree Syrian Army (FSA) leaders such as Jamal Maarouf.23JNleveraged this inuence alongside a growing social outreachcampaign to establish a solid position within rebel ranks.

When the U.S. designated JN as a terrorist organization inDecember 2012, many people and groups conducted pro-JN

protests, demonstrating JNs early success in this campaignto gain legitimacy with other rebel groups.24Even at a time

when Syrias moderate opposition was strong, JN was ableto leverage its military eectiveness to secure support withinrebel-held Syria.

Yet JNs military operations are only one component of JNswider campaign to set conditions for the transformationof Syria into an Islamic state for al-Qaeda. Jabhat al-Nusraaugments these operations with an equally important social

welfare eort. JN leverages its hard and soft power toestablish and entrench goodwill among local populations andrebel networks, enabling the gradual establishment of Sharialaw within Syrias liberated terrain.

JN has been largely successful in portraying a humanitarian-minded face to the Syrian people. JN has acquired a roleof benefactor and guardian to a war-torn population,complementing and accentuating its role as the preeminentmilitary force against the regime. This charity work isconducted through a Relief Department called Qism al-Igatha25 that manages the distribution of food and other

desperately needed goods to vulnerable populations acrossSyria. According to Joulani, this social welfare campaignaimed to meet three basic needs: daily sustenance, securityand healthcare.26 JN seeks to publicize these eorts, ancreated a new media outlet in July 2013 named the Hemm

Agency in order to broadcast them to local populations

JN member administers polio vaccination in Deraa.i

JN member prepares dawa materials in Deraa. ii

The Hemm Agency immediately began issuing frequentvideo reports on these activities, illustrating the breadth oJN operations in Syria and propagating JNs humanitariannarrative (Figure 2).

Social welfare activities also serve a secondary objective of slowlycultivating support for JNs strict interpretation of IslamProselytization is typically conducted alongside the distributionof supplies, allowing JN simultaneously to establish relations

with the local community and take the rst step in seeking totransform the religious fabric of Syrian society. JN Dawa or outreach events have occurred in almost every provincetargeting both urban audiences under rebel control and themany Syrian camps for internally displaced persons.27 Theseevents are complemented by the distribution of religious

Figure 2.

Figure 3.


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propaganda through both compact disc recordings and printedmedia (Figure 3).28These eorts closely follow the AQ mandateof building a base of local popular support in pursuit of theeventual organic participation of those populations in buildingan Islamic State.

Through its social outreach and provision of humanitariansupplies to desperate Syrian civilians, JN established workingrelationships with civilians, local leaders, and rebel factionsthat facilitated a transition into more overt, formal governancestructures. As JNs humanitarian eorts began to take root,it established more formalized Islamic institutes and begandirectly providing essential services rather than supplementingneeds through charity.29 JN service activities vary by locality,but typically include water and electricity provision, roadconstruction, running our mills, and assuring the functionalityof hospitals.30Critically, JN conducts this service provision withrebel participation. JN capitalizes on this outreach, leveraging itsnetwork of rebel relationships to establish direct governance via

Joulani notes, The Al-Nusrah Front will not unilaterallylead the society even if we reach this phase. When Damascusis liberated, for example, when Damascus falls, or the biggestpart of the city, say 80 percent of it, is liberated, then Shariacommittees, Muslim elite, clerics, thinkers, people who madesacrices, contributions, and who have an opinion even if theyare from abroad, and the ulema of Al-Sham would meet andhold consultations. Afterward, they draft a plan for runningthe country. Of course, it shall be according to Islamic Sharia

where the law of God shall apply, shura [consultation] isfollowed, and justice is spread to the best of our ability. Acouncil would be established according to these controls andconditions, of which God has ordered us. If things take placethis way, our opinion will be one of the opinions and will beraised within this organized framework.31

JNs close adherence to al-Qaedas Dawa-centric form of jihadchallenges the assertion that JN is a nationalist organizationghting alongside the opposition solely to bring down the

regime and to restore peace to Syria. JN couches its pursuiof al-Qaedas objectives within a nationalist narrative ofchampioning the Syrian revolution. In doing so, JN hasbeen able to maintain a considerable base of support despiteclearly communicating additional objectives that contradictthe original stated goals of much of the Syrian oppositionIn late 2013, Joulani claimed that the norms of the Syriansociety have already changed, such that JNs vision is nowmainstream. This is the current general mood in Al-Sham. People in general and all factions are now within thisframework and this objective. Unlike what is being depictedthe Syrian society has indeed changed much. It is not thesame pre-revolution society. There will be a historical mark

of pre- and post-jihad in Al-Sham. This history will marka new birth for this society that completely diers from theformer society, in which there was great deal of goodnessbut it lacked the motivator, the guide, and preachers for

what is good.32Many in Syria believe that the Syrian peoplewill be both willing and able to reject JN if it does attempto take direct power, and therefore that JN should be treatedas an ally of convenience.33Joulanis commitment to societatransformation and his success so far make it questionablethat JN will be so easily outmaneuvered. If JNs trajectory isallowed to continue, it will become increasingly more diculto foster a political transition to any semblance of a secular or

democratic post-Assad government.

PENETRATION INTO REBEL RANKS

The central component of JNs strategy in Syria is the pursuiof a network of rebel relationships. Through this network, JNcan embed itself into the fabric of the Syrian opposition anduse its inuence to direct the evolution of rebel forces andgovernance activities. As will be discussed later, JN leverages

Al-Farooq Institute for Islamic Studies.iii

jointly governed Sharia courts. Through this phased strategyof rst building and later leveraging inuence, JN continuesto consolidate its role as an inseparable component of theopposition amid the humanitarian, political, and militarydimensions of the Syrian war.

JNs actual aim in Syria is best described as a gradualascent to power through a protracted conflict that sapsthe strength of Syrian secular civil society, allowing JNto reshape Syria into a component of a broader Islamic

caliphate. As Joulani stated, Dr Ayman [al-Zawahiri],may God protect him, always tells us to meet with the otherfactions. We are committed to this and this is a basic partof the principles of jihadist work in general, including

work by [al-Qaeda]. We will not impose a ruler on thepeople. We seek the implementation of Sharia and anyruler should be committed to the rules of the Sharia andqualified for that. We will then accept him. In this context,

we will accept what the people accept.

Figure 4.


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the high skill level of its own ghting force to contribute aspecial forces capacity to rebel oensives. This participationgarners considerable trust for and dependence on JN, furthercementing close relationships with rebel groups. Throughoutthe three years of conict, JN has interwoven itself throughoutmuch of the Syrian opposition. There are, however,important dierences in the nature of JNs interaction with

rebel groups from dierent areas of the religious spectrum. Itis therefore important to characterize the degree and natureof JNs complex penetration into rebel ranks in order to fullyunderstand the depth of its inuence in Syria.

Rather than overtly dominating the opposition as ISIS hasattempted to do, JN has developed the respect and dependenceof other rebel groups. In this way, JN has become a largely silentbut invaluable partner and manager of the resistance against

Assad. Joulani highlighted this methodology in his December2013 al-Jazeera interview, stating Preserving good relations

with the other groups and treating them well and turning ablind eye to their mistakes is the foundation in dealing with theother groups...as long as they dont change.34This statementhighlighted JNs prioritization offunctional relationships with Syrianrebels as a means through which toaccomplish JN objectives. Tellingly,it also foreshadowed the manner in

which JN would police the activities ofgroups for corruption throughout2014.

JN is reported to have earned alevel of legitimacy and a perception

of honesty that quickly outpacedthe deteriorating reputations of other rebel groups. JNsghters are reported to have a reputation for a high levelof discipline and strict code of conduct. This reputationcontrasted JN against the inghting and proteeringemerging among other rebel groups in the early years ofthe war.35 In addition to encouraging some ghters andbrigades to defect to JN, this reputation for dependabilityhas led many brigades to actively partner with JN and to relyon it to perform specialized operations. Beyond ideologicalgrounds, many are likely to have pursued allegiance with JNin order to benet from its protection, funds, and militaryexpertise.

For example, a rebel commander named Abu Zeid, wholed 420 men from his Damascus-based Syria Mujahideenbrigade to JN, stated in May of 2013, Since we joined I andmy men are getting everything we need to keep us ghtingto liberate Syria and to cover our families expenses, thoughghting with al-Nusra is governed by very strict rules issuedby the operations command or foreign ghters....There

is no freedom at all but you do get everything you want.3

This transactional relationship between JN and rebel forcescontinues to dene the dynamics of allegiance within Syriaand to inuence the behavior of rebel groups across theideological spectrum.

JNs force structure appears to accommodate the continuedcohesion of groups that were formed independently andsubsequently pledged allegiance to JN. Two rebel unitsabsorbed by JN reportedly maintain single-nationality non-Syrian membership, likely in order to overcome a naturallanguage barrier and to maintain the cohesion of ghtingunits accustomed to operation alongside their compatriotsThis includes the Seraya al-Tuaanisa from Tunisia37and aChechen battalion named Jaysh ul-Khilafa38 led at the timeby Sayfullah Shishani, a former ally of ISISs military emirfor North Syria, Omar al-Shishani.39The January 2014 reberevolt against ISIS40 created a windfall of such allegiancepledges to JN, notably including ISIS commander Abu

Ibrahim al-Masri, likely along with a number of ghters.41

Alarge number of groups in the Damascus suburb of EasternGhouta joined JN during this periodgreatly increasing its inuence in thearea.42

In addition, prominent examples ofSyrian rebel groups that defected to

JN after close battleeld cooperationinclude the Latakia-based Suqoural-Izz43 and the Idlib- and Hama-based Liwa al-Bitar from the

Authenticity and Developmen

Front,44 which formally joined JN inJuly and September 2014 following cooperation in major rebeoensives. Together, these acquired brigades likely participatein operations alongside organic JN units, and may furtherintegrate into JN ranks as their participation in the JN wareort deepens. These pledges are critical indicators of JNsmomentum. The incremental absorption of these groups alsodemonstrates that close JN partners may opt for direct JNmembership in the future.

JNs Complex Networked Structure

JN adjusts the nature of its cooperation with rebel groups tothe unique characteristics of a myriad of actors. This producesnuanced dierences in the way JN interacts with rebel groupsthat vary greatly in terms of their own methodologies,religious beliefs, and political objectives. It is possible toassess three general tiers of relationships between JN andrebel groups under JNs inuence. These three tiers constitutethree distinct types of relationships that JN maintains withdierent subsets of the Syrian opposition. The discussionthat follows will explain the nature of each relationship and

Since we joined I and my men are

getting everything we need to keep

us ghting to liberate Syria...Thereis no freedom at all but you do get

everything you want.

- Rebel commander


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provide examples of groups that t a given model in order toexemplify JNs complex web of interactions in Syria.

For large and independently powerful groups such as thosebelonging to the Islamic Front, it is likely that JN performsa less command-centric military role and instead facilitatestheir operations and augments their momentum. TheIslamist ideological foundations of these groups makesthem good partners in JNs desired end state of a jointlycontrolled post-Assad Syria that is ruled by Islamic law. Inturn, for smaller local groups with Salast ideologies, itis likely that JN creates value by aiding in directing theirmilitary operations. JN can thereby guide the evolutionof these groups to bring them deeper into the fold of itsideological agenda and methodology. While JN may seekto absorb these smaller groups, it may alternatively seekto allow these groups to retain independence of commandin order to minimize the obvious extent of its inuencein Syria. Finally, as will be documented, the continued

reliance of moderate and Western-backed brigades on JNsparticipation in military operations constitutes a third typeof relationship, and indicates JNs depth of penetration intorebel ranks. Taken together, JNs extensive relationships withrebel groups clearly illustrate the success of its engagementin Syria (Figure 5).

Tier 1

First, a set of locally-based Sala-Jihadist groups exhibit anatural alignment with JNs strategic vision in Syria. Thissubset of the opposition is dened by close ideological

similarities to JN, and exhibit structural similarities havingdrawn on foreign ghter ows into the conict.45It has alsobecome increasingly unied throughout 2014 amidst ongoingclose cooperation with JN across multiple battlefronts. Thispattern supports the idea that JN is pursuing increasedinuence over these groups. A number of these groups haveforeign ghters within their ranks, and some were on a shortlist of rebel groups cleared by the AQ core to mediate the JN-ISIS schism beginning in mid-2013. This role is indicativeof their close alignment with AQ in Syria.46 These groupshave not directly joined JN, possibly because their strengthand inuence permits them to remain independent. JN

may also not wish to absorb these groups into its covert,cellular organization. It is also possible that JN may seek toavoid dismantling the command structure and camaraderiethat makes them eective ghting units. Nonetheless, thecontinued independence of these groups serves as a forcemultiplier, allowing JN to project inuence into areas whereit lacks robust and direct military presence. JN may also havethe opportunity to dissolve into their ranks if JN is targeted byfuture Western counter-terror operations.

The most prominent Tier 1 JN ally is Harakat Ahrar alSham al-Islamiyya (HASI). HASI is a signicant Sala

Jihadist element of the Islamic Front with ties to the AQ centraleadership. A founding member of HASI was Abu Khalid alSuri. A close aide to Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Khalid al-Sur

was tasked by Zawahiri beginning in mid-2013 to mediate th

ISIS-JN schism and to negotiate JNs continued relationshipwith other Sala elements in Syria.47In addition to its ownAQ ties, HASI is widely known to cooperate intensely withJN,48and includes foreign ghters in its ranks that may bfunneled through similar pipelines as JN.49HASI announcedits withdrawal from military bases near civilian areas afterthe U.S. strikes against the JN-linked AQ Khorasan celin northwestern Syria on September 23, 2014.50JN Shariocial Abu Marea al-Qahtani explicitly referenced thetargeting of HASI ghters along with JN forces in this set oairstrikes.51 HASI targets also appear to have been hit in second round of U.S. strikes against the Khorasan Groupon November 6.52 These incidents provide highly crediblevidence of HASIs close connection to JN.

Another Sala-Jihadist group likely to be deeply undeJN inuence is the Aleppo-based Jabhat Ansar al-DinAnsar al-Din formed on July 25, 2014 as an umbrellgroup incorporating a number of local Salast element

with histories of cooperating with JN.53 The United StateDepartment of State designated Ansar al-Dins leadingcomponent, Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, as a specialldesignated terrorist organization alongside fellow membe

group Harakat Sham al-Islam in September of 2014. HarakaSham al-Islam is a Latakia-based group made up primarilyof Moroccan foreign ghters that is known to have beenled by at least two former detainees from Guantanamo Baythat have since died in combat in Syria.54This designationstates that the group has coordinated attacks and kidnappingalongside JN.55In addition, Sham al-Islam ghters have beeseen interacting closely with JN ghters away from the fronlines.56

An additional coalition made up of local brigades known tobe strongly inuenced by JN is the Idlib-based Alliance o

Muhajirin wa al-Ansar (no relation to Jaysh al-Muhajireenwa al-Ansar), which includes Jund al-Aqsa, Liwa al-Haqthe Omar Brigade, and Liwa al-Umma.57Finally individuagroups in this tier include the Deraa based Liwa al-Qadasiyyal-Islamiyya and the al-Muthanna Islamic Movement58 inaddition to the Idlib- and Latakia-based Kataib Ansar alSham59 and the Chechen-led Junud al-Sham.60 Junud alShams leader was also listed as a specially designated terroristlikely conrming the other evidence of his ties to JN. 61


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18

WW

W.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

JN

Jabhat Ansar al-Din

Green

Battalion

Jaish al

Muhajireen

wal Ansar

al-Fajr al-Sham

Islamic

Movement

Harakat

Sham al-

Islam

Junud al-Sham Alliance of Muhajirin wal-Ansar

Liwa al-

Haq in

Homs

Jund al-

Aqsa

Liwa al-

Umma

Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamiya Ahrar al-Sham al-Qadisiy

Sham Legion Ajnad al-Sham Suqour al-Sham Jaysh al-Islam

Harakat HazmLiwa Fursan al-Haq Jaysh al-Mujahideen Syrian Revolutionaries Front

Jabhat al-Nusra Rebel Allies: December 2014

Graphics: Nichole L. Dicharry

Figure 5.


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Tier 2

JN interacts with Islamist elements such as the pan-IslamistIslamic Front (IF) in order to ensure they fall more deeply

within JNs sphere of inuence over time. This set of groupstypically participates in joint Sharia governance eorts

alongside JN because of their broad footprint and wide localacceptance. They consist of groups with an Islamist visionfor Syrias future that is not necessarily hardline, but maybecome so the longer they are in contact with JN. As such,they constitute the subset of the opposition JN is currentlyattempting to elevate into a Tier 1 status. These groupsprominently include Faylaq al-Sham (al-Sham Legion) and

Ajnad al-Sham, which cooperate alongside JN across multiplebattlefronts. It also likely includes the large IF membersSuqour al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, which are known tooperate closely in military operations alongside JN.

While the depth of JNs inuence in the IF coalition remainsunclear, JN is known to engage with the high echelons ofIF leadership in addition to partnering closely with Ahraral-Sham.62 Furthermore, Suqoural-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam leaders

Ahmed Aisa and Zahran Alloush arereported to have shared the samecellblock in Sednaya prison withHASI co-founder Hassan Aboud.They are therefore likely to havecome into regular contact with AQ

facilitators such as al-Suri. WhileAbu Khalid al-Suri and Hassan Aboud have subsequentlybeen killed, JNs network of relationships was well establishedby the time of their deaths.63 These groups in some casesalso exhibit methodological similarities. Suqour al-Sham,alongside HASI, was known to conduct Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attacks earlyin the Syrian war, a tactic both may have acquired throughtheir relationships with JN.64Such groups are therefore likelyfacilitators of JN activities in the long-term, and as such arecritical sources of extended JN strength.

Tier 3

JNs third and nal tier of relationship is that of battleeldallies within the moderate Syrian opposition. High militaryeectiveness, along with JNs extensive inuence among theranks of Syrias Islamist rebels, has made JN an unavoidablepartner for moderate rebel groups. These moderate groupscontinue to suer from a lack of meaningful, sustained, andcoordinated external support. Moderate rebel groups that

regularly operate alongside JN include prominently Jayshal-Mujahideen and the FSA-aliated Harakat Hazm. Suchgroups may not be ideologically aligned with JN, but will

work alongside it because of the asymmetric capabilities JNis able to provide to rebel military operations. This relianceon JN to contribute battleeld eects that groups themselves

are unable to produce translates in many cases into anunwillingness to denounce JN as an al-Qaeda aliate withplans for Syria that oppose those of the moderate Syrianopposition.

Jamal Maarouf, leader of the FSA-aliated Syrian RevolutionaryFront (SRF), for example, told The Independentin early 2014 thathe ght against AQ was not our problem. He further explainedthat his ghters conduct joint operations with JN, oering theexample of the battle for Yabroud in March 2014.65Maarouf washowever, ousted from his stronghold in Idlib province by JN inlate 2014 after JN capitalized on local unrest toward Maarouf to

expand its direct control in the province.66This ghting reectJNs recent, more confrontational approach toward groups itperceives as too closely Western-backed. It also illustrates JNs

responsiveness to local sentiment andits ability to capitalize on rifts withinthe ranks of Syrias opposition andits relationship to local populationsNevertheless, Maaroufs early supporfor JN is indicative of the importanceof JNs battleeld contribution to rebemilitary oensives throughout the

2012 and 2013 rebel campaigns.

This relationship with moderate forces is not limited to JNcontribution on the battleeld, and extends to transactionarelationships during war. JN is engaged in regularinteractions with rebel leaders over weapons shipmentsand appears to have working relationships with some groupsin terms of supply distribution.67 For example, Maaroustated: If the people who support us tell us to send weaponsto another group, we send them.68 Furthermore, there havebeen indicators that such relationships have historicallyallowed JN to purchase directly weapons sent to other rebegroups. In October 2013, the Lebanese newspaper The Daily

Star reported that FSA and Jordanian sources, along withvideo evidence, conrmed that European-made anti-tank

missiles had been obtained, and in some cases sold, toJN. These weapons had been supplied to FSA battalionsacross the Jordanian border, likely in Deraa. Accordingto a source from the Supreme Military Command (SMC)quoted by the Daily Star, JN paid $15,000 each for anti-tankmissile within days of a Saudi shipment to the FSA. 69Such

weapons were subsequently documented in JN hands.70

Other unconrmed sources also indicate that JN and rebel

JNs achievement of a tiered,

networked structure of inuence

in Syria is a sign of the success

of its strategy to date.


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groups may have working deals for parceling out weaponsseizures from regime bases.71

JNs achievement of a tiered, networked structure of inuencein Syria is a sign of the success of its strategy to date. Thedierent tiers of its relationships with rebel groups is a naturaloutgrowth of JNs nuanced approach to the acquisition of rebelrelationships and indicates JNs high adaptability. As such,the exibility that forms the foundation of JNs methodologyin Syria is a crucial indicator of the groups lethality and ofthe importance to understand the reasons for and objectives

of its behavior in Syria in order to elucidate the signicanceof its varying relationships with rebel groups. At the time ofwriting, JNs aggregate network is optimized to enable JN topursue its short-term objectives in Syria without backing itinto a corner from which it cannot emerge.

JN Inuence on Rebel Behavior

JN reacts strongly when groups close to its sphere ofinuence stray too far from JNs tolerated path by accepting

Western guidance and command. JN expects a high level ocommitment and loyalty from groups with which it operatesclosely, and acts quickly and aggressively to stie any signs of

wavering commitment or betrayal. JNs eorts to ensure theloyalty of rebel groups also extend to protection of its allies. Forexample, JN and the security battalion of Jaysh Muhajireen

wa al-Ansar surrounded a Junud al-Sham headquarters inAleppo city on March 27, 2014 and demanded the surrenderof the headquarter combatants. The JN force arrested morethan 70 and referred them to a court under accusations thatthey were planning to attack rebel forces, possibly on behalf of

ISIS.72

JN concern with the security of its operations in Syriaand the loyalty of its military partners has increased since therise of ISIS and the initiation of the U.S.-led air campaignin Syria, resulting in a more hardline JN disposition towardrebel forces.73The ideological similarities maintained by JNTier 1 allies also make these groups potential sympathizersto the ISIS caliphate, a threat JN addresses by tightly policingthe behavior of its network.

JN is likely to react quickly to contain a growing threat to itsinuence within rebel ranks. Typically, harsh JN reprisals

Geographical Dispersion of Jabhat al-Nusra and Allied Forces: December 2014

JN stronghold until

July 2014

Tiers 2 & 3-

JN Military Presence

Tier 1- Groups deep within JN influence

Tier 2- Close battlefield allies with ideological

similarities

Tier 3- Moderate groups that rely upon JN militarily

KEY


Figure 6.


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occur when JN perceives groups to be accepting too muchoversight on their operations from Western backers. Thisaggression is likely to continue to increase if Western supportto the moderate opposition increases in the context of theU.S.led coalition campaign against ISIS. JNs relationships

with rebel groups in Deraa have been particularly reactiveto the level of Western inuence. Deraa is a focal pointfor the small-scale covert train-and-assist mission to theFSA conducted through the U.S.-led Military OperationsCommand (MOC) across the Jordanian border.74The headof the SMCs Deraa military council, Colonel Ahmad al-Nameh, declared the formation of the FSA Southern SyrianRevolutionary Front on May 1, 2014 claiming participationfrom 36 rebel groups.75 In the announcement, al-Namehdeclared that an organized free army would rule Syria andnot extremists, threatening to take on JN in the south.

A Western push for further rebel unication within theprovince, culminating in the establishment of the SouthernFront outside of the SMC structure a month prior, likely

drove this development and encouraged the bold statementby Nameh. However, a number of rebel groups quicklydenounced the fronts formation, likely the result of a fearof JN reprisal for association with al-Nameh. Two days lateron May 3, JN detained al-Nameh in addition to several othercommanders, referring them to the Sharia court underaccusation of surrendering the town of Kerbet Ghazala toregime forces.76

On May 6, 2014 a JN-linked Deraa Sharia Courtpublished a video confession by al-Nameh,77 in whichhe admitted to cutting supply lines to rebel forces insideKerbet Ghazala on orders from Jordanian authorities and

other supporting countries who wanted to counteractthe rising inuence of JN.78He went on to state that Wehave jumped from failure [sic] to the other, all because ofthe supporting countries who control us, carry out theiragendas and do not want our Islamic vision to succeed oreven for Islamic groups to exist. Namehs confession ishighly likely to have been coerced, but reects JNs intensedisapproval of and willingness to act against groups thatovertly cooperate with Western backers.

Rather than provoking deance, JN coercive behavior towardrebel groups has largely been successful in forcing thesegroups to alter their behavior in order to accommodate JNdemands. In May 2014, for example, HASI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen spearheaded the formation of a RevolutionaryCovenant to unite Syrias opposition. This covenantdeclared the revolution incompatible with fundamentalismand radicalism and rejected any type of aliation to foreignentities, an apparent reference to foreign ghters. Thesignatories included seven IF members in addition to JAM,as well as the Damascus Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, ShamLegion, and the Furqan Brigades.79 In response, JN issuedan immediate press release rejecting the covenant.80 Top

JN Sharia ocial Sami al-Aridi also denounced the pactstating that each principle of the charter is against the ruleof God and not based on the rule of Sharia, and accusedthe signatories of being complicit with the West. The JNcondemnation prompted leader of the IF Shura Council Abu

Abd al-Malik to issue an immediate statement of claricationdefending the charter point by point against JNs critiquesMalik gave assurances that the extremism of ISIS was the soletarget of the covenant.81

A second example occurred in early August 2014, after 18Syrian rebel groups announced the formation of the SyrianRevolutionary Command Council (RCC) with a stated purposeof building the united body for the Syrian revolution.8

This development followed repeated calls by the IF for anew collaborative structure to replace the Supreme MilitaryCommand, which it criticized as out of touch. After rumorscirculated that the councils formation constituted an eortto sideline JN, the council issued a clarication statement

on August 3, stating: We did not mention the subject of al-Qaeda ever during our meetings to discuss the initiative norin any part of its founding nor in our last statement and wedo not refer to it explicitly or implicitly.

Furthermore, the statement added the portrayal of theformation that it is in order to make war on ghtingformations such as Jabhat al-Nusra and others is untrue,but Jabhat al-Nusra had been invited and we have notreceived a response of approval or rejection since.83 Theimmediate clarication regarding the coalitions perceptionof JN indicates the continued relevance of JN within the rebellandscape and the continued prioritization of JN participation

by rebel groups from across the ideological spectrum. At theRCCs formal establishment following the conclusion of atwo-day conference in Turkey in late November 2014, nofurther clarication was oered regarding the stance of thenew council on JN.

JNs continued aggression toward military commanderperceived to be too subservient to Western backers likelyforeshadows future action by JN to mitigate the ability of theU.S. and its allies to leverage promised support to the Syrianopposition in return for action to sideline JN. Critically

JNs pressure on moderate rebels to date has not provokedrejection or hindered its ability to continue to partner withprominent rebel groups across the ideological spectrum inmilitary action against the regime. The responsiveness orebel coalitions to JNs demands indicates JNs ability to useits inuence and military capacity to coerce the behavior ofrebel groups. Furthermore, this penetration of rebel ranksillustrates that the level of support to the Syrian oppositionnecessary to disaggregate JN from within rebel ranks is likelymuch higher than initially visible.


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JNS SPECIAL FORCES MODEL

JNs highly eective ghting force has played a crucial rolein establishing relationships with other rebel groups. JN isa tightly controlled, formal military organization that servesas a force multiplier for other units. It is distinguished by a

level of professional operational leadership that provides aneciency in command and control that was absent from theSyrian opposition in the early years of the war.

Structure and Composition

The structure and composition of JNs elite military force areoriented toward JNs overall goal to transform Syrian society

JN pursues a network of rebel allies that will enable it to governa post-Assad Islamic state in Syria from within a wider rebel

structure. Although pursuing a military campaign againstthe regime, JNs highest priority remains its own integrationinto power structures and building local inuence. Thisprioritization creates a JN military posture that focuses onmaximizing JNs position within rebel ranks rather thanpursuing a countrywide strategy to defeat the Assad regime.

JN uses provincial military commands that operate withrelative autonomy. These commands are empowered to adjustheir footprint in order to adapt to changes in the battle orcomposition of rebel forces.86 JN has not formally declareda wilayat, or state, structure that subdivides Syria into locagoverning structures akin to that used by ISIS. However, JN

media apparatus is structured provincially and publicationsfrom these outlets have occasionally used the term wilayat.8

JNs nancial structure also allows for this provinciadisposition, using a central committee called the MuslimTreasury to collect funds and redistribute them to variousbattlefronts.88This command and control structure allows JNto adapt to the specic requirements of each battlefront. Thisin turn, facilitates a dispersion of JN forces across nearly allbattlefronts within Syria in a manner that maximizes theireconomy of force. In addition, this force structure permits JNforces to coordinate their operations with local rebel groupsand tailor their interactions to maximize the organizationsown inuence.

The extent to which Joulani himself issues commands downto regional commanders is unclear. JN senior leadershipappears, however, to circulate among the various ghtingfronts indicating a level of central coordination. Unconrmedbut credible reports of Joulanis presence on key battlefrontsthroughout the war indicate that the JN leader himself mayalternate his position in order to oversee delicate operations orto boost the morale of ghters on a dangerous front.89Joulanmay himself communicate more closely with certain regionacommands. Evidence of this can be found in a December2012 report in which Joulanis identity was vouched for by

the JN leaders of Idlib and Aleppo in a meeting with leadersof Sala groups HASI, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam (nowJaysh al-Islam), and several others.90

JNs use of military operations as a supporting eort for societatransformation creates a unique relationship between JNsmilitary and religious leadership. Sharia leaders reportedlyserve as advisors to JN military commanders.91This allows forclose integration between JNs complementary lines of eortproviding religious guidance to ensure military activity is

Figure 7. Electronic Technical Oce prepares handfuls of communications forstationed brothers in Hama. iv

JN is also notable for its operational security (OPSEC),with a well-disciplined rank-and-le and controlled

communications that permit operations to be plannedand executed secretly. While rebel forces have adapted andprofessionalized since the onset of the war, JNs respected

position within rebel ranks is in large part a consequence ofits continued ability to contribute this capability.

JN is unique in its ability to accomplish operational objectivesin pursuit of broader strategic goals against the Assadgovernment. JN typically conducts shaping operations thatcreate the conditions for success for larger rebel oensives.Unlike the conventional infantry-style operations conductedindependently by the ISIS military force, JN forces exhibitcharacteristics of a special operations force that augments theground forces of the Syrian opposition. JN ghters assumekey frontline roles alongside other rebel groups, and provideexpertise while other rebel units provide mass.84 JN forces

operate in small numbers and often conduct unconventionaltactical missions requiring a level of professionalism andexpertise lacking in the Syrian opposition. A September2014 interview by the International Crisis Group with aleader from rebel group Liwa al-Tawhid highlighted thisrelationship, stating al-Nusra isnt big enough to win battleson its own; rather groups like us provide the numbers, andthey provide what you might call the elite forces.85In doing so,

JN deliberately intertwines itself with other rebel groups andleverages its position and eectiveness to cement its inuence.


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A number of characteristic TTPs can be identied fromanalysis of JN self-published material regarding its militaryoperations. JN military commanders conduct some of thebest operational planning within Syria. Evidence shows planof attack developed using reconnaissance accumulated by JNghters.93As will be illustrated through an analysis of JNs2014 campaign, JNs operations contribute signicantly tothe success of the anti-Assad military campaign in Syria. JNexhibits an advanced ability to knit together small tactical unittasks in the pursuit of an operational objective. This planningexpertise is likely shared with other groups when conducting

joint operations, and JN has likely taken the lead in commandand control for operations involving larger numbers of rebelforces. Commanders have used sand tables, detailed mock-ups of terrain, to visually guide their ghters through thesteps of an upcoming operation (Figure 9).94In addition, JN-

produced videos and photos provide evidence that JN ghtersare disciplined in their use of radio communications. In a JN

video from within besieged Homs City in early 2014, a JNghter is shown distributing the radio frequencies for use toghters immediately prior to an operation (Figure 10).95Thistype of formal planning illustrates the professional natureof JN as a ghting force.

JN is also actively engaged in weapons manufacture andappears to have established a form of engineering corps asa specialized unit. This corps appears to be responsiblefor both the production of indirect re munitions andthe construction of Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive

Devices (VBIEDs). References to such a unit have appearednumerous times, largely in the southern province of DeraaFor example, in an interview broadcast on an FSA-aliated

YouTube channel, a JN leader in southern Deraa describedhow a JN engineer corps was instrumental in placing explosivesin order to breach an exterior wall of a regime building.96Inaddition, in a set of photos posted to Twitter in late May 2014by JNs Deraa account, members of what are referred to asthe engineering team unearth and examine an unexplodedbarrel bomb in Northern Deraa.97

properly targeted to the pursuit of JNs long-term objectives.These Sharia advisors likely provide guidance on all subjectsfrom the conduct of military operations to JNs relationships

with local rebel groups and the implementation of JN socialwelfare programs in rebel-held areas. High echelons of

JN religious leadership also appear to perform battleeldcirculation, as demonstrated by photos disseminated by JN onsocial media. For example, JN distributed photos of JN Shariaocial Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir on a critical battlefront inNorthern Aleppo in mid-September (Figure 8), and on a

battlefront in Idlib province weeks later.92This joint inuenceover JNs military campaign likely augments the adaptabilityof JN across Syrias dierent battlefronts. It further reectsdeliberate planning behind JNs operations and partnerships,ensuring that these activities are aligned with JN, and AQ,long-term goals.

JN TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed

by JN forces set it apart as an uncommonly eective ghtingforce within Syria. JN is therefore dangerous as both a highlycapable AQ aliate embedded within the Syrian oppositionand as a military threat in its own right. The training andbattleeld experience gained by JN ghters in Syria areinvaluable assets to the AQ organization. The security vacuumin Syria creates an opportunity for JN and for al-Qaeda as a

whole to sit at the crossroads of foreign ghter, armament,and humanitarian aid ows.

Figure 8. Top JN Sharia ocial Abu Sulayman Muhajir in

Sawran Azaz.v

Figure 9. JN commander utilizes sand table to guide ghters on upcomingoperation. vi


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of requisite materials during a military campaign (Figure 11)This is in contrast to the kind of lone-wolf mimicry manualsproduced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsulas (AQAP)Inspiremagazine. JNs successful eorts at weapons manufacturand its consolidation of institutional knowledge is a key aspecof the broader military threat to U.S. interests in the region.

The deployment of suicide VBIEDs (SVBIEDs) as shapingoperations against hardened military targets is a core JN tacticThe use of SVBIEDs provides for an economy of force; smallerunits can cause an outsized impact on the battleeld and setthe conditions for wider rebel operations. As such, it is also aprime example of the complexity of JNs operational planningMultiple axes of advance allow JN ghters to overwhelm theregimes defenses quickly and eciently. SVBIEDs are alsodeployed in close coordination with other attack types, as inone example in which JN used artillery re to help cover themaneuver of an SVBIED to its target.100 This prociency i

VBIED operations is a core skill likely acquired by veteran JN

forces during AQIs war against coalition forces in Iraq. Whileother rebel groups also developed the capability to design IEDsearly on in the conict, the scale of JNs IED production andits contribution of suicide bombers for the deployment o

VBIEDs are signicant strategic assets to the opposition.

An excellent example of many of these TTPs can be found inJNs self-reporting of its seizure of the town of Rahjan. Rahjanis located in northern Hama Province near a strategic regimesupply line northward to Aleppo province. The towns seizureis a rare example of JN conducting an operation alone, as theattack appears to have occurred without rebel participation

JN contested the town throughout June 2014, likely testing

and weakening the regime defenses in the area and acquiringintelligence. On July 11, 2014, JN forces launched a signicanoperation to seize the town. JN detonated an SVBIED thatallowed a penetration into the town, after which it quicklygained full control.101

After the attack, JN released a 15-minute video report and aformal military statement in which it reported the operationin detail. The video included a list of tactical targets insidethe city and explained the strategic location of the site nearthe regimes only supply line to Aleppo through Ithriyato Khanasser. The statement also details the invasionindicating two axes of advance from the southeast and fromthe northeast.102While by itself the town was not a particularlysignicant military victory, acquiring control of Rahjanpositioned JN forces to pressure regime supplies to Aleppothereby supporting other operations.

Recruitment

After its entry into the conflict, JN capitalized on thewartime environment in Syria to build an elite, flexible

On July 29, 2014 video footage uploaded by Saudi nationaland known JN supporter Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Muhisnirevealed the creation of an improvised Ababil artillerypiece. The weapon was reported to have a range of 12 km.98Furthermore, JN announced the establishment of the Baas

Foundation for Production and Military Development onMay 24, 2014 and has since published at least two how-toguides on weapons manufacture.99At the time of writing, theseappear limited to practical eld manuals for the production

Figure 10. JN ghter receiving radio frequencies prior to mission in OldHoms.vii

Figure 11. Screenshot of page from JN weapons manufacture manual. viii


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fighting force. Strict and tightly controlled recruitmentsought to augment a small initial cell of veteran AQfighters. According to Joulani, JN entered into Syria withno more than 7 or 8 men in late 2011, 103who were likely

joined by a number of high-value prisoners that had beenreleased by Assad from Sednaya prison in May and June2011.104They may have joined old comrades who returnedfrom Iraq to Syria. Additional old-guard AQI fighters mayalso have crossed the border after the August 2013 AbuGhraib prison break in Iraq conducted by a resurgent AQI,now rebranded as ISIS.105 These organized, disciplined,and armed AQ fighters had battlefield experience fromIraq and Afghanistan that allowed them to quickly garnerprestige through successful attacks against regime targetsas-yet impossible for the nascent Syrian opposition.106

JN recruiters leveraged these early successes, engaging withSyrian youth to compile a cadre of new ghters to augmentits seasoned, core members. JN built its strength by drawing

its rank-and-le from the Syrian population. A growingSyrian cadre of ghters allowed JN to present itself as anorganic, indigenous, Syrian element of the opposition. Thisrecruitment may have encouraged some Syrians to mobilize,but it also appears to have siphoned o ghters fromemerging rebel groups. Early defections to JN from withinthe opposition led some to speculatethat JN placed members within theranks of rebel groups to spot potentialrecruits.107

JN also recruited foreign ghters,including those from the Middle East

and North Africa as well as holdersof Western passports. According torebel commanders, as many as 800

Jordanians are ghting within JNranks across Syria108 and there havebeen cases of active JN recruitment as far away as Morocco.109

A separate line of eort to recruit and train Western passportholders to conduct attacks in the West for AQ is reported tobe underway by a cadre of veteran AQ ghters, known as theKhorasan Group, that appears to be coordinating with JNin Syria. The group, led by a senior AQ operative and closebin Laden associate Muhsin al-Fadhli,110is believed to havebeen dispatched by Zawahiri to capitalize on JNs uniqueposition in a security vacuum. From this arena, they canrecruit Europeans and Americans with passports in order todevelop plots to target the U.S. and European countries withsupport from the chief AQAP bomb-maker.111 Accordingto one U.S. ocial, this may include the establishment oftraining camps in Syria specically to train foreign ghtersholding Western passports, likely in order to deploy them totheir home countries.112

JN maintains tight operational security around its procesfor vetting recruits, and the recruitment of Westerners bythe Khorasan cell is almost entirely opaque. However a fewindicators have emerged that illustrate a rigorous physicaland religious standard applied to JN ghters. JN reportedlyrequires tezkiyya, or personal assurance, from two commanderon the front line that are willing to testify to the skills andreligious commitment of a potential recruit. The next stepis reportedly ghting on the front line, during which timethe recruit is evaluated for bravery and dedication to JN andits ideology.113In an interview with Time, a JN Sharia ocialnamed Abu Adnan further illustrated JN recruitment tacticshighlighting the prioritization of physical tness and mora

values in potential recruits. We pay a great deal of attentionto the individual ghter, stated Adnan, we are concerned

with quality, not quantity. Joulani himself acknowledged JNprioritization of a small cadre of highly skilled ghters duringhis al-Jazeera interview, stating that large numbers couldhave been an obstacle to us.

JNs style of recruitment is an important component oits military strategy, prioritizing smaller, elite units. Theselectivity apparent in JNs recruitment eorts supportsa force structure tailored to perform as a specialized andtightly controlled special forces actor within wider

rebel networks. Through its earlyacquisition of a Syrian-dominatedcohort, JN pursued alignment withthe organic Syrian and made initialinroads with the leaders of the Syrianrevolution. Nonetheless, the core

AQ cell that formed the nexus of JN

in Syria continues to dominate thefundamental nature of the groupdespite its eorts to propagate analternative narrative. JNs continuedsupport to the Khorasan Group is an

important indicator of JNs commitment to the pursuit ofAQ strategic objectives even while fully engaged in its Syriancampaign.

Training

The rigor of JNs recruiting supports a high average skill leve

of its ghting force. JN military training is designed to createsoldiers whose deployment serves JNs long-term objectiveof societal transformation. This training regimen seeks tomaximize the ability of JNs operations to serve both a militaryand a religious objective. JN is cultivating a military vanguardof a future Islamic State in Syria by diligently training recruitsin JN ideology and prioritizing the adherence to JN virtuesby its ghters. Furthermore, the high level of disciplineand strict code of conduct promoted through its trainingfacilitates the acquisition of relationships with rebel groups

JN is cultivating a militaryvanguard of a future IslamicState in Syria by diligently

training recruits in JN ideologyand prioritizing the adherence toJN virtues by its ghters.


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JN propagates the image of a benevolent and accountableactor that prioritizes the safety and security of Syrias civilianpopulation, making it an appealing partner.

JN provides military training through a number oftraining camps in Syria. In these camps recruits are furtherindoctrinated into JNs ideology, obtain weapons training,and undergo what appears to be a rigorous physical trainingregimen.114According to the JN Sharia ocial interviewed byTime, a potential JN recruit goes through a 10-day religious-training course to ascertain his understanding of religion,his morals, his reputation, followed by a 15-20 day militarytraining program.115While there is no credible evidence thatindicates the full scope of JN training, the skill level apparentin JN operations suggests that the complete training programis likely more extensive. Videos and images published by JN ofits training camps concentrate on photogenic hand-to-handcombat, clearing operations,116and physical tness, indicatedfor example by footage of long-distance running.117JNs AQ

ties are often highlighted in videos of these camps, with thefull JN ag that reads al-Qaeda in the Levant: Jabhat al-Nusra displayed in the background. However, still shots of

Assad and his advisors have also been included in at least onetraining video, indicating the continued importance of theSyrian resistance narrative to the organization.118

In addition to its regular recruitment and training, JN ispursuing a generational transformation of Syrian society

through the religious and military training of Syrianyouth. JN recruits children from programs within its sociaoutreach and governance activities. This begins with Dawaoutreach, from which children appear to be funneled intoa number of formal religious schools across Syria. Theseschools are occasionally publicized by JN on social media

where photos of children reciting the Quran and takingreligious examinations are distributed. In one example

JNs Idlib social media account disseminated pictures ofchildren receiving test scores on their knowledge of Islamand the Quran at the al-Farooq Institute for IslamicStudies.119A 50-minute-long video of a religious camp forchildren in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta wasalso released in February 2014.120 This religious trainingappears to transition into military training, and JNs sociamedia regularly distributes photos of JN training camps forchildren (Figure 12).121 Military training is a componentof a wider social engagement with children that includesactivities such as outings to local nature attractions.122

JNs recruitment of children is a component of AQs long-term and multigenerational campaign for the establishmenof a global Islamic Caliphate. JNs strategic engagement

with Syrias youth represents a dangerous forwardinvestment that supplements the groups consistent effortsto integrate itself into Syrian society on both a social anda military level. Through this training, JN normalizes theconcepts, tactics, and priorities of the AQ organization inthe worldview of Syrias youth. Rather than funneling childsoldiers onto front lines, JNs indoctrination of Syrian

youth is targeted to create a future generation of latencapacity that will one day form a part of its envisioned

Islamic State. A majority of armed groups within Syria usechild soldiers, where the war itself is cultivating an entirenew generation of fighters. The recruitment of childreninto the ranks of an AQ affiliate, however, poses anadditional danger of the early inculcation of JNs Salafi-

Jihadist ideology among Syrian youth.

Figure 12. Pictures released by JNs Deraa twitter outlet of Ibn Tamiya

child training camp.ixFigure 13. Photo of Alawite cleric Badr Ghazals sentencing released by JN. x


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deepen its inuence within rebel ranks. JN immediatelycapitalized on the propaganda value of striking back at theregime at a time when the international community wasrefusing to act. JN spearheaded a campaign across multipleprovinces titled an Eye for an Eye in an overt retaliationfor the Eastern Ghouta massacre.123This campaign includedthe direct targeting of Alawite civilians in Latakia, and JNbrazenly publicized its execution of a kidnapped Alawitecleric, Badr Ghazal, on August 26, 2013. 124 Such attacksconstituted a marked escalation of JNs sectarian agenda.

Continued war crimes by the Assad regime during thechemical weapons handover increased local support forhardline elements in the Syrian opposition such as JN anddeepened disillusionment with the international communityThe regime, now somewhat constrained in its use of chemical

weapons, began to utilize barrel bombs, huge improvised

JABHAT AL-NUSRAS MILITARY CAMPAIGN SINCE

AUGUST 2013

This report has described Jabhat al-Nusra as a disciplined andeective ghting force that seeks to leverage its success on thebattleeld to gain inuence over the landscape of oppositiongroups in Syria. Examining JNs military campaign clearlyreveals JNs increased eectiveness and success both in combatand in its mission of deeply intertwining its operations withthose of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian regimes August21, 2013 Sarin gas attack against the rebel-held Ghoutasuburbs of Damascus was a turning point in the Syrian war.In the aftermath of the attack, the U.S. opted not to interveneagainst the regime, instead pursuing a negotiated handoverof Assads chemical weapons stockpile. This action dismayedSyrian rebels and dashed hopes for Western assistance. Thus,the events of fall 2013 created an opening for JN to further

Regime Control

JN and Rebel Control

ISIS Control

Control in Syria: December 2014

ISIS, JN, and Rebel Control

KEY


Figure 14.


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August 2014.126In addition, the regime has been alleged touse weaponized chlorine gas against rebel hold-out positionsthroughout 2014. These attacks, alongside the continuedravages of the Syrian civil war, are likely to further civiliandisillusionment with the international community.127

This trend toward increased support for hardline elementsaccentuated JNs ability to establish inroads with the Syrianpopulation and to cultivate a network of close allies inSyrias Sala Jihadist opposition.JN military activity since

August 2013 has contributed to critical rebel gains against theregime in a period of low international engagement in Syria(Figure 15 and 10). JNs ocial Manara al-Bayda media outlet

explosives usually dropped from helicopters. These bombs,used against rebel-held civilian centers, were an attempt tocompensate for lack of sucient manpower. This campaignescalated in the beginning of November 2013 when theregime, with support from Hezbollah, consolidated analternate supply line to Aleppo City through al-Sara. Thisoperation involved the heavy use of barrel bombs to providean asymmetric advantage to regime forces. 125 Barrel bombuse by the regime increased throughout 2014, with the CarterCenter documenting a 450% increase in the frequency ofreported barrel bombings throughout Syria between Marchand April 2014. Over 100 attacks per month were observedin rebel-held areas of Aleppo province from May through

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jn final jabhat al-nusra in syria

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