john f. bonno, esq. (state bar no.: 125357) andrew …

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Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Damages

JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. (State Bar No.: 125357) RAFFALOW, BRETOI, LUTZ & STELE Attorneys at Law 9635 Granite Ridge Drive Suite Suite 210 San Diego,CA 92123 (858) 694-4174 E-Service Address: [email protected] Attorney for: Defendants, ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE; RITA L. STANDRIDGE Our File No.: 19-109980-19

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO – CENTRAL DIVISION – SAN DIEGO

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on a date and time to be set by Department C-69 of the above-

titled Court, located at 330 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA, 92101, with Notice to follow once the date

DUSTIN MCGEE, AN INDIVIDUAL, KATHERINA POKORNY BATISTA, AN INDIVIDUAL, Plaintiffs, vs. ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL; RITA L. STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL AND DOES 1 THROUGH 5, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

CASE NO: 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL; Hon. Katherine Bacal; Dept. C-69

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ UNVERIFIED THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ.; [PROPOSED] ORDER [Filed concurrently with Answer to Plaintiff’s Unverified Third Amended Complaint] IMAGED FILE

HEARING DATE: Pending HEARING TIME: Pending HEARING DEPT: C-69

Third Amended Complaint Filed: 02/18/2020 Trial Date: Not yet set

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and time are scheduled by the Court, Defendants, Andrew Michael Standridge, Keith A. Standridge,

and Rita L. Standridge, will and hereby do move this Court for an order striking language from the

Plaintiffs’ Unverified Third Amended Complaint for Damages.

Although Defendants understand that anything outside the “four corners of the pleading”

should not be considered in a Motion to Strike, in the interests of judicial economy, Defendants note

that there have been developments in the case since the filing of the Third Amended Complaint that

have resolved most of the issues that are the subject of this Motion. Plaintiffs’ counsel has stipulated to

waiving punitive damages; there has been a settlement between Defendant Keith Standridge and

Plaintiffs; and, a dismissal of Defendant Rita Standridge has been executed. These developments have

not been reflected in the Court’s record due to the COVID-19 crisis and will be addressed prior to the

technical portions of the Motion.

The dismissal of Defendant Rita Standridge, the settlement between Defendant Keith

Standridge and Plaintiffs, and the stipulation waiving punitive damages renders the Plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint inoperative. However, if these developments are insufficient, there are other

grounds for striking certain language in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.

Returning to the “four corners of the pleading,” Defendants seek to strike the following

language from the Plaintiffs’ Unverified Third Amended Complaint for Damages:

1. Paragraph 1: line 5 – “[. . .] was operating his car while under the influence of alcohol

or drugs and [. . .].”

2. Paragraph 11: line 9-11 – “[. . .] consume [sic] narcotics and alcohol, became

intoxicated, [. . .];” and the language: “[. . .] too intoxicated [. . .].”

3. Paragraph 13: line 16-17 – “[. . .] officers performed [sic] sobriety test and arrested

Michael. Michael was convicted of a crime. [. . .].”

4. Paragraph 15: “Defendants Keith A. Standridge and Rita L. Standridge knew their son

was or will become intoxicated when they loan [sic] their car to Michael Standridge.”

5. Paragraph 16: “DOE 1 to 5 served Michael drugs or alcohol before Michael got into the

car and drove.”

6. Paragraph 22: line 12-14 – “[. . .] with knowledge that probable serious injury would

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result to persons on the freeway, Andrew Standridge consumed drugs or alcohol, drove intoxicated, [. .

.].”

7. Paragraph 23: “Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to retain their

attorney Brad Nakase, and the Nakase Law Firm, Inc., to prosecute their civil claim; attorney’s fees

had been, or would be, incurred to bring this action for negligence and personal injury.”

8. Paragraph 24: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under the ‘tort of another doctrine.’

Specifically, when a plaintiff must bring an action against a third party as ‘the natural and probable

consequence’ of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensation for the

reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.

(Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620.) Unless

the parties have stipulated otherwise, a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the ‘tort of another’

doctrine cannot be asserted by a post-trial motion or memorandum of costs, but must be pleaded and

proved to the trier of fact. (Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 79.)”

9. Paragraph 25: “The Tort of Another doctrine, however, is not limited to real estate

transactions. In ([sic] Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc. (1972) 24

Cal.App.3d 410) [sic] a record company recovered attorney’s fees from a defendant who was

marketing unlicensed and unauthorized recordings of one of its artists.”

10. Paragraph 26: “The test for the adequacy of an allegation of malice in a vehicular

accident case involving driving while intoxicated, so as to support a claim for punitive damages based

on assertions of conscious disregard, as set out in the seminal case of Taylor v. Superior Court (1979)

24 Cal.3d 890, 892: “...the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of

‘malice’ under [Civil Code] section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a

conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”

11. Paragraph 27: “Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 also illustrates

the applicable standard. As in this case, the issue in Dawes was the adequacy of the Complaint’s

pleading for punitive damages against an intoxicated driver after a vehicle collision. The Dawes

plaintiff alleged that: ‘... with knowledge that probable serious injury would result to persons in the

area, Mardian ran a stop sign, and was zigzagging in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles

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per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone ....’ The court held that these allegations were sufficient, under

Taylor, to set forth a claim for punitive damages. The opinion specifically held that plaintiff:

‘...pleaded specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others may

reasonably be inferred.’ (Id., at 90.)”

12. Paragraph 30: line 27 – “[. . .] and 23152 (driving while under the influence of drug or

alcohol).”



.].”

14. Paragraph 34: “Plaintiffs seek their attorney’s fee against defendants under the ‘tort of

another doctrine.’ Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to retain their attorney Brad

Nakase, and the Nakase Law Firm, Inc., to prosecute their civil claim; attorney’s fees had been, or

would be, incurred to bring this action for negligence and personal injury.”

15. Paragraph 36: line 19-21 – “[. . .] The parents knew that their son has a history of drug

and alcohol abuse. On the date of the accident, the parents knew that their son, Andrew Michael

Standridge, was abusing drugs or alcohol. [. . .]”

15. Paragraph 37: line 23 – “[. . .] was abusing drugs or alcohol [. . .].”

16. Paragraph 38: “On information and belief, DOE 1 served Michael drugs or alcohol

before Michael got into the car and drove.”










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20. Prayer 3: “Punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial and award [sic] by the

jury or the court;”.

21. Prayer 5: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under ‘tort of another’ doctrine.”

This Motion will be made on the grounds that the above referenced language relating to

conscious disregard, drugs / alcohol / intoxication, and punitive damages constitutes conclusory

allegations that are not supported by sufficient factual allegations in the Complaint, and that the factual

allegations in the Complaint do not support a claim for punitive / exemplary damages. These naked

statements, without more, do not establish the malice that is required under California law.

This Motion will be made on the further grounds that the Plaintiffs’ varying theories of

negligence of the Defendants has not created the need to incur attorney’s fees to prosecute any other

cause of action. The only attorney’s fees being incurred are to prosecute this instant action for

negligence so the “tort of another doctrine” for recovery of attorney fees to prosecute another action

does not apply. This Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §435, §435.5,

§436, and §437, California Civil Code §3294, as well as relevant case law.

This Motion will be based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,

the attached Declaration of John F. Bonno, Esq., the pleadings and other documentary evidence

contained in the Court's file, and such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the

hearing of this Motion.

DATED: May 22, 2020

RAFFALOW, BRETOI, LUTZ & STELE

BY JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants, ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE; RITA L. STANDRIDGE

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION / STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

As declared in the attached Declaration of John F. Bonno:

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 31, 2019 on Interstate

5 south bound in Laguna Hills, CA. Defendant Andrew Standridge was operating a 2004 Lincoln

Navigator which sustained a flat tire and caused him to collide with the 2018 Toyota Camry operated

by Plaintiff Dustin McGee. Plaintiff Katherina Pokorny Batista and Colin Pokorny Batista, a minor

child, were passengers in the 2018 Toyota Camry. After the accident, Defendant Andrew Standridge,

was arrested for misdemanor DUI. Defendant Keith Standridge was the owner of the 2004 Lincoln

Navigator that was operated by his son, Andrew.

On March 10, 2020, the depositions of all three (3) Defendants were taken by Plaintiff’s

counsel of record, Brad Nakase, Esq. Defendants were represented at the depositions by their counsel

of record, John Bonno, Esq. During the deposition of Defendant Rita Standridge, Plaintiff’s counsel

stipulated on the record that Plaintiffs waived their claim for punitive damages as to all Defendants:

Q: Have you spoken with anybody besides your counsel, your attorney, and the insurance company concerning excess insurance coverage for plaintiffs’ injuries in this matter?

MR. BONNO: I’m going to instruct her not to answer. As soon as she answers, she waives the right to rely upon the Civil Code procedure that prohibits the discovery of financial information in a case where there’s punitive damages alleged, and, on that basis – and, counsel, again, we will have a discussion about this after the deposition, but for present purposes I’m instructing her not to answer.

MR. NAKASE: Counsel, if plaintiff waives exemplary and punitive damages, will you let the witness disclose this information?

MR. BONNO: Yes. MR. NAKASE: Yes? MR. BONNO: If the plaintiff waives punitive and exemplary damages,

yes. MR. NAKASE: Let’s go off the record real quick. Is that okay with you,

counsel? MR. BONNO: If you make a record that you’re not seeking punitive

damages, then I’ll instruct her – THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Are we going off the record? MR. BONNO: I’ll instruct her again. We’re off the record right now. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record. The time is 9:11 a.m.

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(Off the record.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record. The time is 9:20 a.m.

MR. NAKASE: The defense counsel and I had a discussion off the

record, and plaintiff McGee will waive punitive against Ms. Rita Standridge and

Keith Standridge.

Is that your understanding, counsel?

MR. BONNO: Punitive damages against all named defendants in this case.

MR. NAKASE: Okay. Sounds good.

MR. BONNO: Okay. And the defense accepts that stipulation, the waiver of

punitive damages in this lawsuit against all three named defendants.

Are we in agreement?

MR. NAKASE: That’s correct.

MR. BONNO: Go ahead. Fire away. (See EXHIBIT A: True and correct copy of Defendant Rita Standridge’s Certified Deposition Travel Transcript. See page 31, line 5 through 33:1. Emphasis added.).

Additionally, on April 16, 2020, Defendant Keith Standridge accepted both Plaintiffs’ Offers

to Compromise for $15,000.00 each and served the Acceptance of Offer on April 16, 2020 (See

EXHIBIT B: True and correct copy of Plaintiff Dustin McGee’s Offer to Compromise to Defendant

Keith Standridge dated March 12, 2020 with Defendant Keith Standridge’s Acceptance of Offer on

April 16, 2020. See EXHIBIT C: True and correct copy of Plaintiff Katherina Batista’s Offer to

Compromise to Defendant Keith Standridge dated March 12, 2020 with Defendant Keith Standridge’s

Acceptance of Offer on April 16, 2020. See EXHIBIT D: True and correct copy of April 16, 2020,

09:06AM Email from Myrna Estrada, Secretary to Attorney John F. Bonno, Esq. to Plaintiff’s counsel,

Brad Nakase, Esq., for e-service of Defendant Keith Standridge’s Acceptance of Offer to both

Plaintiffs.).

Furthermore, on April 19, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel served an executed Request for Dismissal

as to Defendant Rita Standridge (See EXHIBIT E: True and correct copy of executed Request for

Dismissal as to Defendant Rita Standridge. See EXHIBIT F: True and correct copy of April 19, 2020,

07:56AM Email from Plaintiff’s counsel Brad Nakase, Esq., to Ms. Estrada with the executed Request

for Dismissal as to Defendant Rita Standridge attached.).

The dismissal of Defendant Rita Standridge, the settlement between Defendant Keith



grounds for striking certain language in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.

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Defendants seek to strike the following language from the Plaintiffs’ Unverified Third

Amended Complaint for Damages:










car and drove.”



.].”














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alcohol).”



.].”







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II.

THE COURT MAY, UPON A MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 435

STRIKE OUT ANY IMPROPER MATTER INSERTED IN ANY PLEADING

California Code of Civil Procedure §435(b)(1) provides: “Any party, within the time allowed

to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof [.

. .] Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §435 (LexisNexis 2019).

Code of Civil Procedure §436 further provides: "The court may, upon a motion made pursuant

to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any

irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any

pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the

court" Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §436 (LexisNexis 2019).

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III.

PLAINTIFF HAS STIPULATED TO STRIKING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

At the depositions of the Defendants taken on March 10, 2020, there was a stipulation on the

record that Plaintiffs would no longer be seeking punitive damages. Given the stipulation, Defendants

respectfully request that the Third Amended Complaint be amended to remove the prayer for punitive

damages and all references to narcotics / drugs, alcohol, and intoxication, etc. (EX. A.).

IV.

THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT

AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAAMGES

In 1987, the California Legislature amended the provisions of the Civil Code that govern

exemplary damage claims. (See Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court,

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188.) At that time, the evidentiary threshold for Civil Code section 3294 was

raised so that punitive damages may now only be awarded if a plaintiff can prove by clear and

convincing evidence “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Id.)

An allegation based on information and belief is not enough to meet the clear and convincing

standard required for pleading and proving punitive damages. (See Woodring v. Basso, (1961) 195

Cal.App.2d 459, 464-465). In Woodring, the court in dealing with an allegation of fraud stated that, the

"allegations are upon information and belief, without a statement of the facts upon which the belief is

founded. Such a statement is required” (Id.; See also, Dowling v. Spring Valley Water Co., (1917) 174

Cal. 218, 162 P. 894: "It is not sufficient to allege fraud or its elements upon information and belief

unless the facts upon which the belief is founded are stated in the pleading" Id. at 896.).

When the Legislature amended section 3294, it also redefined malice. To establish malice, a

plaintiff must now demonstrate that the defendant acted not just with a conscious disregard of the rights

or safety of others, but also that the defendant willfully engaged in despicable conduct (Civil Code

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§3294(c)(1); College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 713.). Oppression is similarly defined as

“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that

person's rights” (Civil Code §3294(c)(2).). As the California Supreme Court noted in College Hospital,

the reference to “despicable” conduct is a substantive limitation on punitive damage awards because the

term refers to circumstances which are base, vile or contemptible (8 Cal.4th at p. 725.). In other words,

the bar for recovery of punitive damages under Civil Code §3294 is quite high.

The first step in getting over that bar is to plead sufficient facts in the complaint to justify the

imposition of punitive damages. Even before the threshold was raised, a plaintiff was required to allege

facts establishing malice or oppression, not just legal conclusions that defendant's acts were “wrongful”

or “willful” or “wanton” (Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-9, disapproved

on other grounds by Christensen v. Superior Court, (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868.). Moreover, unintentional

carelessness is not sufficient to support punitive damages (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc.,

(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 285-286; G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 31-

32.). For example, in Brousseau v. Jarrett, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 869, 872, the court held that

conclusory allegations that defendant “intentionally, willfully, fraudulently and with a wanton, reckless

disregard for the [. . .] consequences” engaged in certain alleged conduct was inadequate to support

punitive damages.

In the present case, no specific factual foundation is provided for the basis of Plaintiff’s "belief"

that Defendant, ANDREW STANDRIDGE was aware of the probable consequences of driving under

the influence and consciously disregarded those risks. Plaintiff’s conclusions that these are true with no

factual foundation is not properly pled and must be stricken from the Complaint.

///

///

///

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V.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

CASES WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PLEADING

Under appropriate circumstances, the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may

constitute malice (Taylor v. Superior Court, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.). In Taylor, the court stated: “The act

of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of malice under Section 3294 if

performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous

consequences” (Id. at p. 89, emphasis added.).

Although the court in Taylor directed the trial court to reinstate the portion of the complaint

which sought punitive damages, that complaint included allegations of the defendant’s history of

alcoholism, his prior arrests and convictions for drunk driving, his prior accident attributable to his

intoxication, and his acceptance of employment involving the transportation of alcoholic beverages,

among other things (Id.). While the court held that malicious intent warranting punitive damages can be

inferred from the above allegations, such is not the case in the instant matter.

Here, the underlying allegations stated in the Complaint lack specific factual reference to any act

or occurrence that would justify the imposition of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 and

pursuant to Taylor v. Superior Court, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890. The Complaint does not state specific facts

regarding how Defendant, ANDREW STANDRIDGE had “[. . .] knowledge that probable serious injury

would result [. . .]” (Complaint, paragraph 22, page 4, line 12-13) and does not specific facts how he

exhibited a “[. . .] conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences [. . .],” (Complaint

paragraph 26, page 5, line 8) as Taylor requires. The complaint in Taylor alleged that the defendant had

a long history of DUI's, DUI accidents, and alcoholism; this was the basis for the allegation that he had

awareness of the consequences of driving intoxicated and consciously disregarded those risks. (Id.).

Moreover, in Dawes v. Superior Court, (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, the Dawes court stated its

reasoning that a mere conclusory recital of “intoxication” is insufficient to support a prayer for the

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recovery of punitive damages by explaining: "[t]here is not and there never was one rule of law for

intoxicated driving cases and another rule of law for other types of cases. Cases are decided on the

basis of general legal principles not the categories into which particular cases might be pigeonholed.”

(Id. at p. 90 (emphasis added)).

VI.

THE PRESENT COMPLAINT IS NOT SUFFICIENT

Applying the foregoing principles to the case now before this Court, Plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages is not supported by specific factual allegations that would justify an award of punitive

damages. Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any factual information depicting specific “circumstances

which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences” of defendant’s conduct,

which is the prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 892.). The

Complaint before the Court in the present case does exactly what the Dawes court says, it is insufficient

by simply concluding that an allegation of intoxication equals punitive damages. In our present case, no

specific facts are alleged to support the conclusion that Defendant, ANDREW STANDRIDGE had been

made aware of the consequences of driving intoxicated and consciously disregarded those risks. The

Complaint simply concludes that Defendant, ANDREW STANDRIDGE “[. . .] has a history of drug and

alcohol abuse [. . .]” and concludes that his parents “[. . .] knew that their son, Andrew Michael

Standridge, was abusing drugs or alcohol” (Complaint, paragraph 36, page 6, line 19-21). What are the

facts of Defendant, ANDREW STANDRIDGE’s “history” of drug and alcohol abuse? What are the

facts of how his parents knew he was abusing drugs or alcohol? Compare Taylor and the detailed factual

history alleged. Here, Plaintiff alleges only conclusory allegations with no supporting facts nor any

foundation for the basis for such conclusions. As stated in Dawes, a conclusory recital of intoxication is

insufficient to support a prayer for the recovery of punitive damages (Dawes v. Superior Court, (1980)

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111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not establish the malice that is required

under California law.

As such, all references to punitive damages in this action are inappropriate and unsupported, and

thus should be stricken.

Additionally, all references to intoxication and driving under the influence should be stricken as

it is irrelevant and prejudicial.

VII.

THE TORT OF ANOTHER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY HERE

The Complaint fails to identify any other action that was necessitated by the negligence of the

Defendants.

This matter is the only action that has been filed arising out of or related to the March 31, 2019

motor vehicle accident between Plaintiffs and Defendant Andrew Michael Standridge. No other action

besides the instant action has been or will be required to be filed as is required for the application of

the “tort of another doctrine:”

When a paid escrow holder has, as in this case, negligently made it necessary for the vendor of land to file a quiet title action against a third person, attorney's fees incurred by the vendor in prosecuting such action are recoverable as an item of the vendor's damages in an action against the escrow holder. Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp.,

Alameda Division, 59 Cal.2d 618, 621 (1963).

In case at bar, all four (4) causes of action of the Third Amended Complaint for Damages are

for varying theories of negligence against the three (3) Defendants. There is no other cause of action

for the Plaintiffs made necessary by the negligence of Defendants. In Prentice, there were causes of

action for negligence against the escrow holder (North American Title), as well as for quiet title

against the buyers / lender (Hortons, Neal). The negligence of the escrow holder (North American

Title) caused the need for attorney’s fees to be incurred for the quiet title action, which is the basis for

the award of attorney’s fees under the “tort of another doctrine:”

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Plaintiffs then brought this action against the Hortons, Neal, and defendant. Plaintiffs' complaint contained various counts against defendants Horton and Neal, and the trial court granted relief against these defendants by a decree quieting plaintiffs' title against their claims. The counts against defendant were based purely on the ground of negligence. The trial court found that defendant had been negligent in closing the sale and awarded plaintiffs as damages the amount of attorney's fees incurred by them in the prosecution of the counts in the complaint against defendants Horton and Neal. Id. at 620-621.

Here, the varying theories of negligence of the Defendants has not created the need to incur

attorney’s fees to prosecute any other cause of action. Plaintiffs’ Complaint clearly states that this is

the only action being prosecuted and Plaintiffs are simply attempting to collect attorney’s fees for this

instant action, which is improper: “Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to retain their


had been, or would be, incurred to bring this action for negligence and personal injury” (Complaint,

Paragraphs 34, 41, and 48). According to Plaintiff’s Complaint itself, the only attorney’s fees being

incurred here are to prosecute this instant action for negligence so the “tort of another doctrine” for

recovery of attorney fees to prosecute another action does not apply.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants, respectfully request that this Court grant this Motion and

strike all references in Plaintiff’s Complaint to punitive damages, driving under the influence,

intoxication, the “tort of another doctrine,” and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do

not establish the malice that is required under California law for recovery of punitive damages.

Specifically, the following portions should be stricken:





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car and drove.”



.].”




















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alcohol).”



.].”













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The above referenced language constitutes conclusory allegations that are not supported by

sufficient factual allegations in the Complaint, and the factual allegations in the Complaint do not

support a claim for punitive / exemplary damages. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ varying theories of

negligence of the Defendants has not created the need to incur attorney’s fees to prosecute any other

cause of action. The only attorney’s fees being incurred are to prosecute this instant action for

negligence so the “tort of another doctrine” for recovery of attorney fees to prosecute another action

does not apply.

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Finally, although Defendants understand that anything outside the “four corners of the

pleading” should not be considered in a Motion to Strike, in the interests of judicial economy,

Defendants note that Plaintiffs’ counsel has stipulated to waiving punitive damages; there has been a

settlement between Defendant Keith Standridge and Plaintiffs; and, a dismissal of Defendant Rita

Standridge has been executed.

DATED: May 22, 2020


BY JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants, ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE; RITA L. STANDRIDGE

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DECLARATION OF JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ.

I, JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Raffalow, Bretoi, Lutz & Stele, attorneys for

Defendants, Andrew Michael Standridge, Keith A. Standridge, and Rita L. Standridge. I am a

member of the State Bar of California and licensed to practice before all courts of the State. I am the

attorney primarily responsible for the handling of this file and have reviewed its contents. The

following information is within my personal knowledge, except for that information that I allege upon

information and belief, and, if called upon to testify, I could and would testify competently hereto.

2. This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 31, 2019 on

Interstate 5 south bound in Laguna Hills, CA. Defendant Andrew Standridge was operating a 2004

Lincoln Navigator which sustained a flat tire and caused him to collide with the 2018 Toyota Camry

operated by Plaintiff Dustin McGee. Plaintiff Katherina Pokorny Batista and Colin Pokorny Batista, a

minor child, were passengers in the 2018 Toyota Camry. After the accident, Defendant Andrew

Standridge, was arrested for misdemanor DUI. Defendant Keith Standridge was the owner of the 2004

Lincoln Navigator that was operated by his son, Andrew.

3. On March 10, 2020, the depositions of all three (3) Defendants were taken by

Plaintiff’s counsel of record, Brad Nakase, Esq. Defendants were represented at the depositions by

your declarant. During the deposition of Defendant Rita Standridge, Plaintiff’s counsel stipulated on

the record that Plaintiffs waived their claim for punitive damages as to all Defendants. A true and

correct copy of Defendant Rita Standridge’s Certified Deposition Travel Transcript is attached hereto

and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT A. See page 31, line 5 through 33:1.

4. On April 16, 2020, Defendant Keith Standridge accepted both Plaintiffs’ Offers to

Compromise for $15,000.00 each and served the Acceptance of Offer on April 16, 2020. A true and

correct copy of Plaintiff Dustin McGee’s Offer to Compromise to Defendant Keith Standridge dated

March 12, 2020 with Defendant Keith Standridge’s Acceptance of Offer on April 16, 2020 is attached

hereto and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT B. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff

Katherina Batista’s Offer to Compromise to Defendant Keith Standridge dated March 12, 2020 with

Defendant Keith Standridge’s Acceptance of Offer on April 16, 2020 is attached hereto and

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incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT C. A true and correct copy of the April 16, 2020,

09:06AM Email from Myrna Estrada, Secretary to your declarant, to Plaintiff’s counsel, Brad Nakase,

Esq., for e-service of Defendant Keith Standridge’s Acceptance of Offer to both Plaintiffs is attached

hereto and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT D.

5. On April 19, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel served an executed Request for Dismissal as to

Defendant Rita Standridge. A true and correct copy of the executed Request for Dismissal as to

Defendant Rita Standridge is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT E. A

true and correct copy of the April 19, 2020, 07:56AM Email from Plaintiff’s counsel Brad Nakase,

Esq., to Ms. Estrada with the executed Request for Dismissal as to Defendant Rita Standridge attached

is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT F.

6. The dismissal of Defendant Rita Standridge, the settlement between Defendant Keith



grounds for striking certain language in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. Defendants seek to

strike the following language from the Plaintiffs’ Unverified Third Amended Complaint for Damages:

1. Paragraph 1: line 5 – “[. . .] was operating his car while under the

influence of alcohol or drugs and [. . .].”

2. Paragraph 11: line 9-11 – “[. . .] consume [sic] narcotics and alcohol,

became intoxicated, [. . .];” and the language: “[. . .] too intoxicated [. . .].”

3. Paragraph 13: line 16-17 – “[. . .] officers performed [sic] sobriety test and

arrested Michael. Michael was convicted of a crime. [. . .].”

4. Paragraph 15: “Defendants Keith A. Standridge and Rita L. Standridge

knew their son was or will become intoxicated when they loan [sic] their car to Michael

Standridge.”

5. Paragraph 16: “DOE 1 to 5 served Michael drugs or alcohol before

Michael got into the car and drove.”

6. Paragraph 22: line 12-14 – “[. . .] with knowledge that probable serious

injury would result to persons on the freeway, Andrew Standridge consumed drugs or

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alcohol, drove intoxicated, [. . .].”

7. Paragraph 23: “Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to

retain their attorney Brad Nakase, and the Nakase Law Firm, Inc., to prosecute their civil

claim; attorney’s fees had been, or would be, incurred to bring this action for negligence

and personal injury.”

8. Paragraph 24: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under the ‘tort of

another doctrine.’ Specifically, when a plaintiff must bring an action against a third party

as ‘the natural and probable consequence’ of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff is

entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s

fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. (Prentice v. North Am. Title

Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620.) Unless the parties have

stipulated otherwise, a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the ‘tort of another’

doctrine cannot be asserted by a post-trial motion or memorandum of costs, but must be

pleaded and proved to the trier of fact. (Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2009) 178

Cal.App.4th 44, 79.)”

9. Paragraph 25: “The Tort of Another doctrine, however, is not limited to

real estate transactions. In ([sic] Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records,

Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410) [sic] a record company recovered attorney’s fees from a

defendant who was marketing unlicensed and unauthorized recordings of one of its

artists.”

10. Paragraph 26: “The test for the adequacy of an allegation of malice in a

vehicular accident case involving driving while intoxicated, so as to support a claim for

punitive damages based on assertions of conscious disregard, as set out in the seminal

case of Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892: “...the act of operating a

motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under [Civil Code]

section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of

the probable dangerous consequences.”

11. Paragraph 27: “Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88

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also illustrates the applicable standard. As in this case, the issue in Dawes was the

adequacy of the Complaint’s pleading for punitive damages against an intoxicated driver

after a vehicle collision. The Dawes plaintiff alleged that: ‘... with knowledge that

probable serious injury would result to persons in the area, Mardian ran a stop sign, and

was zigzagging in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile

per hour zone ....’ The court held that these allegations were sufficient, under Taylor, to

set forth a claim for punitive damages. The opinion specifically held that plaintiff:

‘...pleaded specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others

may reasonably be inferred.’ (Id., at 90.)”

12. Paragraph 30: line 27 – “[. . .] and 23152 (driving while under the

influence of drug or alcohol).”




14. Paragraph 34: “Plaintiffs seek their attorney’s fee against defendants under

the ‘tort of another doctrine.’ Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to




15. Paragraph 36: line 19-21 – “[. . .] The parents knew that their son has a

history of drug and alcohol abuse. On the date of the accident, the parents knew that their

son, Andrew Michael Standridge, was abusing drugs or alcohol. [. . .]”


16. Paragraph 38: “On information and belief, DOE 1 served Michael drugs or

alcohol before Michael got into the car and drove.”




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20. Prayer 3: “Punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial and award

[sic] by the jury or the court;”.

21. Prayer 5: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under ‘tort of another’

doctrine.”

7. On April 03, 2020, your declarant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, Brad Nakase, Esq. in

order to “Meet and Confer” further regarding Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for Damages

given Mr. Nakase’s stipulation to waive punitive damages and the Court closure due to the COVID-19

crises. A true and correct copy of your declarant’s April 03, 2020 Meet and Confer Email is attached

hereto and incorporated by reference herein as EXHIBIT G. Unfortunately, there was no response to

your declarant’s attempts to Meet and Confer further with Mr. Nakase.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is

true and correct.

Executed this 22nd day of May, 2020, at San Diego, California.

__________________________________ JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. Declarant

£2w0

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[Proposed] Order

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO – CENTRAL DIVISION – SAN DIEGO

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

The Motion of Defendants, Andrew Michael Standridge, Keith A. Standridge, and Rita L.

Standridge to strike portions of the Unverified Third Amended Complaint for Damages of Plaintiffs,

Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny Batista, came regularly for hearing in Department C-69 of the

above-titled court, located at 330 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA, 92101. Appearances by Brad Nakase,

Esq. for Plaintiffs and John F. Bonno, Esq. of the Law Offices of Raffalow, Bretoi, Lutz & Stele for

Defendants.

///

DUSTIN MCGEE, AN INDIVIDUAL, KATHERINA POKORNY BATISTA, AN INDIVIDUAL, Plaintiffs, vs. ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL; RITA L. STANDRIDGE, AN INDIVIDUAL AND DOES 1 THROUGH 5, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

CASE NO: 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL; Hon. Katherine Bacal; Dept. C-69

[PROPOSED] ORDER

IMAGED FILE

HEARING DATE: Pending HEARING TIME: Pending HEARING DEPT: C-69

Third Amended Complaint Filed: 02/18/2020 Trial Date: Not yet set

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[Proposed] Order

Upon submission and consideration, and for good cause appearing, the Court makes the

following orders:

1. That the Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

2. That the following language is ordered stricken from Plaintiff’s Unverified Third

Amended Complaint for Damages:

1. Paragraph 1: line 5 – “[. . .] was operating his car while under the

influence of alcohol or drugs and [. . .].”

2. Paragraph 11: line 9-11 – “[. . .] consume [sic] narcotics and alcohol,

became intoxicated, [. . .];” and the language: “[. . .] too intoxicated [. . .].”

3. Paragraph 13: line 16-17 – “[. . .] officers performed [sic] sobriety test and

arrested Michael. Michael was convicted of a crime. [. . .].”

4. Paragraph 15: “Defendants Keith A. Standridge and Rita L. Standridge

knew their son was or will become intoxicated when they loan [sic] their car to Michael

Standridge.”

5. Paragraph 16: “DOE 1 to 5 served Michael drugs or alcohol before

Michael got into the car and drove.”




7. Paragraph 23: “Plaintiffs Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny had to




8. Paragraph 24: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under the ‘tort of

another doctrine.’ Specifically, when a plaintiff must bring an action against a third party

as ‘the natural and probable consequence’ of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff is

entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s

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[Proposed] Order

fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. (Prentice v. North Am. Title

Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620.) Unless the parties have

stipulated otherwise, a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the ‘tort of another’

doctrine cannot be asserted by a post-trial motion or memorandum of costs, but must be

pleaded and proved to the trier of fact. (Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2009) 178

Cal.App.4th 44, 79.)”

9. Paragraph 25: “The Tort of Another doctrine, however, is not limited to

real estate transactions. In ([sic] Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records,

Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410) [sic] a record company recovered attorney’s fees from a

defendant who was marketing unlicensed and unauthorized recordings of one of its

artists.”

10. Paragraph 26: “The test for the adequacy of an allegation of malice in a

vehicular accident case involving driving while intoxicated, so as to support a claim for

punitive damages based on assertions of conscious disregard, as set out in the seminal

case of Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892: “...the act of operating a

motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under [Civil Code]

section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of

the probable dangerous consequences.”

11. Paragraph 27: “Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88

also illustrates the applicable standard. As in this case, the issue in Dawes was the

adequacy of the Complaint’s pleading for punitive damages against an intoxicated driver

after a vehicle collision. The Dawes plaintiff alleged that: ‘... with knowledge that

probable serious injury would result to persons in the area, Mardian ran a stop sign, and

was zigzagging in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile

per hour zone ....’ The court held that these allegations were sufficient, under Taylor, to

set forth a claim for punitive damages. The opinion specifically held that plaintiff:

‘...pleaded specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others

may reasonably be inferred.’ (Id., at 90.)”

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[Proposed] Order

12. Paragraph 30: line 27 – “[. . .] and 23152 (driving while under the

influence of drug or alcohol).”









15. Paragraph 36: line 19-21 – “[. . .] The parents knew that their son has a

history of drug and alcohol abuse. On the date of the accident, the parents knew that their

son, Andrew Michael Standridge, was abusing drugs or alcohol. [. . .]”


16. Paragraph 38: “On information and belief, DOE 1 served Michael drugs or

alcohol before Michael got into the car and drove.”












20. Prayer 3: “Punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial and award

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[Proposed] Order

[sic] by the jury or the court;”.

21. Prayer 5: “Plaintiffs seeks [sic] attorney’s fee under ‘tort of another’

doctrine.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

_______________________________ HONORABLE KATHERINE BACAL JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

EXHIBIT A

€@sunu«aw c«our [} OF COURT REPORTTRS

SUL L IVANCOURTREPORTE RS .COM

PHONE 855.525.3860 I 323.938.8750

·1· · · · ·SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA·2· · · · · · · · · · COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO·3·4· · ·DUSTIN McGEE, an individual,· · ·)·5· ·KATHERINA POKORNY BATISTA,· · · ·)· · ·an individual,· · · · · · · · · ·)·6· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )· · · · · · · · · · · · ·Plaintiffs,· )·7· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )· · · · · · · · vs.· · · · · · · · · ·)· Case No. 37-2019-00024720·8· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )· · · · · ·-CU-PA-CTL· · ·ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE, an· · )·9· ·individual; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE, )· · ·an individual; RITA L.· · · · · ·)10· ·STANDRIDGE, an individual; and· ·)· · ·DOES 1 through 5,· · · · · · · · )11· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )· · · · · · · · · · · · ·Defendants.· )12· ·_________________________________)131415· · · · · · · · ·VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF16· · · · · · · · · · ·RITA STANDRIDGE17· · · · · · · · · SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA18· · · · · · · · · · · MARCH 10, 20201920212223· · ·Reported by:24· ·KATHLEEN S. McLAUGHLIN· · ·CSR No. 584525· ·No. 20-88834A

Page 2·1· · · · ·SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

·2· · · · · · · · · · COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

·3

·4

· · ·DUSTIN McGEE, an individual,· · ·)

·5· ·KATHERINA POKORNY BATISTA,· · · ·)

· · ·an individual,· · · · · · · · · ·)

·6· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )

· · · · · · · · · · · · ·Plaintiffs,· )

·7· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )

· · · · · · · · vs.· · · · · · · · · ·)· Case No. 37-2019-00024720

·8· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )· · · · · ·-CU-PA-CTL

· · ·ANDREW MICHAEL STANDRIDGE, an· · )

·9· ·individual; KEITH A. STANDRIDGE, )

· · ·an individual; RITA L.· · · · · ·)

10· ·STANDRIDGE, an individual; and· ·)

· · ·DOES 1 through 5,· · · · · · · · )

11· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · )

· · · · · · · · · · · · ·Defendants.· )

12· ·_________________________________)

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19· · · · · · VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF RITA STANDRIDGE,

20· ·taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs, at 2221 Camino

21· ·del Rio South, Suite 300, San Diego, California, on

22· ·March 10, 2020 at 8:44 a.m., before Kathleen S.

23· ·McLaughlin, CSR No. 5845, Certified Shorthand

24· ·Reporter, in and for the County of San Diego, State

25· ·of California.

Page 3·1· · · · · · · · · ·A P P E A R A N C E S·2·3· ·FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:·4· · · · · · BRAD NAKASE, ESQ.· · · · · · · NAKASE LAW CORP.·5· · · · · · 2221 Camino del Rio South, Suite 300· · · · · · · San Diego, California· 92108·6· · · · · · 619.550.1321· · · · · · · [email protected]·7· · ·FOR THE DEFENDANTS:·8· · · · · · · JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ.·9· · · · · · LAW OFFICES OF RAFFALOW, BRETOI,· · · · · · · LUTZ & STELE10· · · · · · 9635 Granite Ridge Drive, Suite 210· · · · · · · San Diego, California· 9212311· · · · · · 858.694.4174· · · · · · · [email protected]· · ·ALSO PRESENT:13· · · · · · · SCOTT TANAKA, VIDEOGRAPHER14· · · · · · KEITH STANDRIDGE1516171819202122232425

Page 4·1· · · · · · · · · · · · I N D E X·2· · · · · · · · · ·Index of Examinations·3· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·Page·4· ·Examination by Mr. Nakase· · · · · · · · · · · · · 7·5·6·7· · · · · · · EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION·8· · (All exhibits were premarked and presented to the· · · · · ·witness and not marked by the reporter.)·910· ·No.· · · · · · · · · · ·Exhibit11· ·Exhibit 1· · ·Traffic Collision Report· · · · · · · · · ·(McGee Bates No. 0001 through12· · · · · · · · ·0013)13· ·Exhibit 14· · Medical record prepared by· · · · · · · · · ·William Tontz, Jr., M.D. for14· · · · · · · · ·date of service 05/13/19· · · · · · · · · ·(McGee Bates No. 0063 through15· · · · · · · · ·McGee Bates No. 0074)16· ·Exhibit 20· · Color photocopies of color· · · · · · · · · ·photographs (three pages)17· · ·Exhibit 23· · Document entitled "Patient18· · · · · · · · ·Financial History - Pokorny,· · · · · · · · · ·Katherina" with attachment19· · ·Exhibit 25· · Responses to Form Interrogatories20· · · · · · · · ·of responding party Andrew· · · · · · · · · ·Michael Standridge21· · ·Exhibit 28· · Responses to Form Interrogatories22· · · · · · · · ·of responding party Keith A.· · · · · · · · · ·Standridge2324· · · · · · · · · · · · (continued)25

1· · · · · · EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION

·2· · · · · · · · · · · · (continued)

·3

·4· ·No.· · · · · · · · · · ·Exhibit

·5· ·Exhibit 30· · Responses to Form Interrogatories

· · · · · · · · · ·of responding party Rita L.

·6· · · · · · · · ·Standridge

·7· ·Exhibit 49· · Misdemeanor Complaint DA Case No.

· · · · · · · · · ·19HO4237

·8

·9

10

11· · · · · · QUESTIONS INSTRUCTED NOT TO ANSWER

12· · · · · · · · · · ·PAGE· · · · ·LINE

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Page 6·1· · · SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, March 10, 2020·2· · · · · · · · · · · · ·8:44 A.M.·3·4· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· Good morning.· Here·5· ·begins media No. 1 in the video recorded deposition·6· ·of Rita Standridge in the matter of Dustin McGee·7· ·versus Andrew Michael Standridge, et al.·8· · · · · · This case is in the Superior Court of the·9· ·State of California, County of San Diego.· The case10· ·number is 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL.· Today's date11· ·is March 10th, 20.· The time is 8:43 a.m.· This12· ·deposition is taking place at 2221 Camino del Rio13· ·South, Suite 300, San Diego, California 92108.14· · · · · · The videographer is Scott Tanaka here on15· ·behalf of the Sullivan Group of Court Reporters.16· · · · · · Would counsel please identify themselves17· ·and state whom you represent.18· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Brad Nakase for plaintiffs.19· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· John Bonno appearing on behalf20· ·of defendants Standridge.21· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· The reporter today is22· ·Kathleen McLaughlin with Sullivan Group of Court23· ·Reporters.· Would she please swear in the witness.24· ·/////25· ·/////

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·1· · · · · · · · · · ·RITA STANDRIDGE,·2· · · · · · Called as a witness by and on behalf of the·3· ·Plaintiffs, and having been first duly sworn by the·4· ·Deposition Officer, was examined and testified as·5· ·follows:·6·7· · · · · · · · · · · · EXAMINATION·8· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·9· · · ·Q· · Good morning.· My name Brad Nakase, and I10· ·represent Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny11· ·Batista.· Good morning.· How are you?12· · · ·A· · I'm good thanks.13· · · ·Q· · Could you state your name for the record,14· ·please?15· · · ·A· · Rita Standridge.16· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you understand that the17· ·court reporter has just sworn you in before your18· ·testimony?19· · · ·A· · Yes.20· · · ·Q· · And do you understand that this testimony21· ·you're giving here today is under penalty of22· ·perjury?23· · · ·A· · Yes.24· · · ·Q· · And do you understand that your testimony25· ·is given here today as though you're giving it in

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·1· ·court in front of a jury?·2· · · ·A· · Yes.·3· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Is there any reason why we cannot·4· ·have your testimony as fully accurate as possible·5· ·today?·6· · · ·A· · Say the first part.·7· · · ·Q· · Is there any reason why you cannot give a·8· ·full, accurate testimony here today?·9· · · ·A· · No.10· · · ·Q· · Okay.· So you can give us a full, accurate11· ·testimony?12· · · ·A· · Yes.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.14· · · · · · Without identifying specific, are you under15· ·the influence of any drugs or alcohol that would16· ·impair your ability to testify accurately here17· ·today?18· · · ·A· · No.19· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Did you have a good night's sleep20· ·last night?21· · · ·A· · I did.22· · · ·Q· · Good.· Did you have a good breakfast this23· ·morning?24· · · ·A· · No.25· · · ·Q· · Okay.

1· · · · · · And in the courtroom -- in the room here·2· ·today to your right, is that your attorney, John·3· ·Bonno?· To your left.· I'm sorry.·4· · · ·A· · Yes.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And also in the room here with us is·6· ·your husband here?·7· · · ·A· · Yes.·8· · · ·Q· · And his name is?·9· · · ·A· · Keith Standridge.10· · · ·Q· · And who else arrived with you here today to11· ·your deposition?12· · · ·A· · Andrew Standridge.13· · · ·Q· · And who is he?14· · · ·A· · He is my son.15· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Do you understand that you are a16· ·defendant in this matter where plaintiff, Dustin17· ·McGee, and Katherina Pokorny is filing a lawsuit?18· · · ·A· · Yes.19· · · ·Q· · And what do you know about this lawsuit?20· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Vague.· Calls for a21· ·narrative.22· · · · · · Do you understand the question?23· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· Yes.24· ·BY MR. NAKASE:25· · · ·Q· · Okay.

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·1· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Go ahead.·2· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·3· · · ·Q· · Generally.·4· · · ·A· · There -- there was an accident.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.·6· · · ·A· · And my son was -- got a DUI.·7· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And when you say "accident," are you·8· ·referring to a vehicle collision?·9· · · ·A· · Yes.10· · · ·Q· · Okay.· On what date did that occur?· Do you11· ·know?12· · · ·A· · Yes.· March 31st, 2019.13· · · ·Q· · And what is the basis of your knowledge?14· · · ·A· · That there was an accident.15· · · ·Q· · Yes.· How did you know that?16· · · ·A· · I found out after Andrew called and told17· ·us.18· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Where did Andrew call you from?· If19· ·you know.20· · · ·A· · Actually, he didn't call.· He came to our21· ·house the next day and told us.22· · · ·Q· · And what time did Andrew arrive to your23· ·home the next day?24· · · ·A· · It was approximately 8:00 that night.25· · · ·Q· · 8:00 p.m. that night?

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·1· · · ·A· · Yes.·2· · · ·Q· · 8:00 p.m. on March 31st, 2019?·3· · · ·A· · No.· It would have been April 1st.·4· · · ·Q· · So the next night?·5· · · ·A· · Yes.· The next day.·6· · · ·Q· · The next day.·7· · · ·A· · Night.·8· · · ·Q· · I understand from the collision -- the·9· ·police collision report the incident occurred on10· ·March 31st, 2019, at 3:00 a.m.· Is that your11· ·understanding also?12· · · ·A· · I don't know the time.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.14· · · · · · Could I invite you to Exhibit 30, please?15· ·There's a stack of paper in front of you.16· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· For the record, the Exhibit 3017· ·is a response to form interrogatory where the18· ·propounding party is Dustin McGee, and the19· ·responding party as stated on page 1, line 21 is20· ·Rita Standridge.21· ·BY MR. NAKASE:22· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, could I invite you to look23· ·at Exhibit 30?· And let me know if you recognize24· ·this document.· And specifically inviting your25· ·attention to --

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·1· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· There's no verification,·2· ·counsel.·3· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· We sent it under separate·4· ·cover, but I do have a copy on mine.·5· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Page 56.· Oh, I see.· It's·6· ·right there.·7· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· No problem.·8· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Yeah.·9· ·BY MR. NAKASE:10· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, Exhibit 30, page 56, is11· ·that your signature at the bottom between line 2212· ·and line 25?13· · · ·A· · Yes.14· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Do you recognize this document,15· ·Exhibit 30?16· · · ·A· · The entire thing?17· · · ·Q· · Yes.18· · · ·A· · Yes.19· · · ·Q· · Okay.20· · · · · · Did you review this response to form21· ·interrogatory in its entirety before you signed it,22· ·which is reflected on page 56?23· · · ·A· · Yes.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.25· · · · · · And could you identify where you live, your

1· ·residence?·2· · · ·A· · Yes.· 1818 Vista Marea, San Clemente,·3· ·California.·4· · · ·Q· · How long have you been living there?·5· · · ·A· · Twelve years.·6· · · ·Q· · Who lives there with you?·7· · · ·A· · Right now?·8· · · ·Q· · Sure.·9· · · ·A· · Keith and I and Andrew.10· · · ·Q· · And how long has -- have you and -- is it11· ·okay if I refer to Mr. Standridge as Keith because12· ·that's how you're referring to him?13· · · ·A· · Yes.14· · · ·Q· · How long have you and Keith been living15· ·there together at the residence?16· · · ·A· · Twelve years.17· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And how long have you and Andrew and18· ·Keith been living there at the residence together?19· · · ·A· · Andrew moved back in with us in April of20· ·2019.21· · · ·Q· · Could you help us understand the timeline22· ·when Andrew lived with you at the residence on23· ·1818 Vista Marea starting from 2009?24· · · ·A· · He lived with us for approximately a year.25· · · ·Q· · 2009 to 2010?

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·1· · · ·A· · No.· I'm sorry.· From two thousand -- we·2· ·moved there, I believe, in 2008.·3· · · ·Q· · Okay.·4· · · ·A· · He lived with us from 2008 to 2009.·5· · · ·Q· · And where did he move next?·6· · · ·A· · He moved out -- in with a friend·7· ·temporarily.·8· · · ·Q· · And what year was that?·9· · · ·A· · 2009.10· · · ·Q· · To what year?11· · · ·A· · I'm going to -- this is approximate.12· · · ·Q· · It's okay.13· · · ·A· · He lived with them just a short period.14· ·And then he moved to Pasadena.15· · · ·Q· · Do you know how many years he lived with16· ·the first friend?17· · · ·A· · Approximately three months.18· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Okay.· And then where did Andrew19· ·live next?20· · · ·A· · He lived in Pasadena.21· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And who did he live with?22· · · ·A· · He rented a room.23· · · ·Q· · By himself?24· · · ·A· · Mm-hmm.25· · · ·Q· · How long did he live in Pasadena, Andrew?

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·1· · · ·A· · Approximately two years.·2· · · ·Q· · Okay.· So that was from 2009 to 2011?·3· · · ·A· · Yes.·4· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And after that where did Andrew·5· ·live?·6· · · ·A· · I believe he moved back with us·7· ·temporarily.·8· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And what was that time frame?·9· · · ·A· · I'm going to say 2011 to maybe 2012.10· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And so Andrew lived with you from11· ·2011 to 2012?12· · · ·A· · I'm -- I'm --13· · · ·Q· · Just your best estimate.14· · · ·A· · Yes.15· · · ·Q· · Okay.· During this deposition you're not16· ·going to have precise recall of the dates or17· ·numbers, whatnot.· I'm going to ask you for your18· ·estimate.19· · · · · · Do you know what an estimate is?20· · · ·A· · Yes.21· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Perfect.22· · · · · · But just so we're on the same page, if I23· ·asked you to estimate, you know, the length of this24· ·table, are you able to do that?25· · · ·A· · Yes.

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·1· · · ·Q· · And what's the length of this conference·2· ·table in front of you?·3· · · ·A· · 10 feet.·4· · · ·Q· · Perfect.· And if I asked you to estimate·5· ·my -- my desk in my office, would you be able to·6· ·estimate?·7· · · ·A· · If I saw it, yes.·8· · · ·Q· · Okay.· But you didn't see it.·9· · · ·A· · No.10· · · ·Q· · So you can't.11· · · ·A· · Right.12· · · ·Q· · That would be a guess.13· · · ·A· · Yes.14· · · ·Q· · Okay.15· · · · · · And so from 2011 to 2012 Andrew moved back16· ·with you?17· · · ·A· · Yes.18· · · ·Q· · And where did Andrew live next?19· · · ·A· · He moved to Costa Mesa.20· · · ·Q· · And what year to what year?21· · · ·A· · 2012 to 2015.22· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And where did he live next?23· · · ·A· · He came back to our house until 2017.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And after that?25· · · ·A· · He moved to Colorado.

1· · · ·Q· · And was that in 2018?·2· · · ·A· · 2017 to 2018.·3· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And did Andrew eventually return to·4· ·live with you at all?·5· · · ·A· · No.· He moved to Iowa afterwards.·6· · · ·Q· · Okay.· In Des Moines?·7· · · ·A· · Yes.·8· · · ·Q· · And what was the year and month?·9· · · ·A· · I don't know.10· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And after that?11· · · ·A· · He moved back to California in 2019.12· · · ·Q· · And that was in April in 2019?13· · · ·A· · I don't know when.14· · · ·Q· · Okay.15· · · ·A· · But he moved in with friends.16· · · ·Q· · Okay.17· · · ·A· · And I don't know when.18· · · ·Q· · Okay.19· · · · · · And when did Andrew return to live with you20· ·and Keith at your residence at 1818 Vista Marea?21· · · ·A· · April of 2019.22· · · ·Q· · And from April 2019 to present --23· · · ·A· · Present.24· · · ·Q· · -- today he has continuously lived in your25· ·home?

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·1· · · ·A· · Yes.·2· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And that's Andrew?·3· · · ·A· · Yes.·4· · · ·Q· · Okay.·5· · · · · · Do you know if Andrew has been convicted of·6· ·any -- has any criminal convictions?·7· · · ·A· · I know that he had an issue, and he got in·8· ·trouble when he moved out in 2009.·9· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Anything else?10· · · ·A· · No.11· · · ·Q· · Did Andrew have a criminal conviction in12· ·Orange County in 2005?13· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Lack of foundation.14· ·Hearsay.· Calls for speculation.15· · · · · · If you know.16· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· I don't know.17· ·BY MR. NAKASE:18· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Your son's full name is Andrew19· ·Michael Standridge?20· · · ·A· · Yes.21· · · ·Q· · Born in 1990?22· · · ·A· · Yes.23· · · ·Q· · Okay.· December 2nd, 1990?24· · · ·A· · Yes.25· · · ·Q· · Okay.

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·1· · · · · · Did you know that Michael -- your son,·2· ·Michael -- had a criminal conviction on May 30th of·3· ·2007?·4· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of·5· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.·6· · · · · · If you know.·7· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.·8· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·9· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son, Michael (sic),10· ·has a criminal conviction in April of 2005?11· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Asked and answered.12· ·Hearsay.· Lack of foundation.· Calls for13· ·speculation.14· · · · · · If you know.15· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.16· ·BY MR. NAKASE:17· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son, Michael, had a18· ·criminal conviction on April 25th of 2007?19· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of20· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.21· · · · · · If you know.22· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.23· ·BY MR. NAKASE:24· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son, Michael25· ·Standridge, had a criminal conviction on

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·1· ·September 30th, 2007?·2· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hears.· Lack of·3· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.·4· · · · · · If you know.·5· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.·6· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·7· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son has a criminal·8· ·conviction in September of 2009?·9· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of10· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.11· · · · · · If you know.12· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· That could have been when he13· ·got in trouble when he lived with that friend.14· ·BY MR. NAKASE:15· · · ·Q· · And what was the circumstances that got16· ·your son, Andrew, in trouble in two thousand --17· · · ·A· · The family he was living with had stolen18· ·possessions.19· · · ·Q· · What stolen possessions?20· · · ·A· · Some electronic stuff that was in the21· ·house.22· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And your son was convicted of theft?23· · · ·A· · Yes.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.25· · · · · · Did you know that Andrew had a criminal

1· ·conviction in September of 2012?·2· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of·3· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.·4· · · · · · If you know.·5· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· I'm not sure.· I don't know.·6· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·7· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son had a criminal·8· ·conviction on or about April 2014?·9· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of10· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.11· · · · · · If you know.12· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· He got caught with possession13· ·of some drug paraphernalia.14· ·BY MR. NAKASE:15· · · ·Q· · Anything else?16· · · ·A· · Not that -- no.17· · · ·Q· · Did you know that your son has a criminal18· ·conviction on or about May 2019?19· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Hearsay.· Lack of20· ·foundation.· Calls for speculation.21· · · · · · If you know.22· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.23· ·BY MR. NAKASE:24· · · ·Q· · Did you know where Andrew -- did you know25· ·what Andrew was doing on March 29th, 2019?

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·1· · · ·A· · No.·2· · · ·Q· · Did you know what Andrew was doing on·3· ·March 30th, 2019?·4· · · ·A· · Yes.·5· · · ·Q· · What was he doing?·6· · · ·A· · He had -- was meeting up with a friend to·7· ·talk about a job potential.·8· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Who was that friend?·9· · · ·A· · I don't know.10· · · ·Q· · Is that a friend that you're familiar11· ·with?12· · · ·A· · No.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And what was the job potential?14· · · ·A· · It was working in a restaurant.15· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Was it the Cheesecake Factory?16· · · ·A· · I don't know.17· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Did you know what Andrew was doing18· ·on March 31st, 2019?19· · · ·A· · I do now.20· · · ·Q· · Okay.21· · · · · · On the evening of March 30th, 2019, did you22· ·know what Andrew was doing?23· · · ·A· · He was meeting up with a friend to talk24· ·about a job.25· · · ·Q· · Do you know where Andrew and his friend

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·1· ·met?·2· · · ·A· · Somewhere in Costa Mesa.·3· · · ·Q· · Was it a restaurant or a bar?·4· · · ·A· · I don't know.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Was it somebody's home?·6· · · ·A· · I don't know.·7· · · ·Q· · Okay.·8· · · · · · Did you loan Andrew the car on March 30th,·9· ·2019, before he went to go meet with his friend?10· · · ·A· · Yes.11· · · ·Q· · When Andrew left to go meet with his friend12· ·on March 30th, 2019, what time was that, that he13· ·received consent from you to drive the car?14· · · ·A· · Approximately 6:00.15· · · ·Q· · 6:00 p.m.?16· · · ·A· · Yes.17· · · ·Q· · And are you and your husband, Keith18· ·Standridge, the owner of the car that Andrew was19· ·driving that evening on March 30th, 2019?20· · · ·A· · No.· Keith is the owner.21· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And did you consent to Andrew22· ·driving the car?23· · · ·A· · I don't remember.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Did you know if Keith consented to25· ·Andrew driving the car?

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·1· · · ·A· · Yes.·2· · · ·Q· · And how do you know that?·3· · · ·A· · Because he told me.·4· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And who told you?·5· · · ·A· · Keith told me.·6· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And what did Keith say?·7· · · ·A· · Andrew asked if he could borrow the car for·8· ·a job, and Keith said yes.·9· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Does Andrew have his own car?10· · · ·A· · No.11· · · ·Q· · Does Andrew frequently drive Keith's car?12· · · ·A· · No.13· · · ·Q· · And what is the car that Keith owns that14· ·Andrew was driving?15· · · ·A· · Lincoln Navigator.16· · · ·Q· · And how do you know that?17· · · ·A· · Because it was in our driveway.18· · · ·Q· · Is that the family car?19· · · ·A· · Yes.20· · · ·Q· · Okay.21· · · · · · Some of the questions I ask just seem kind22· ·of, like, obvious, but I understand -- your attorney23· ·probably knows what I'm doing.· I'm just24· ·establishing a foundation.· That's all.25· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Sometimes we have to prove that

1· ·the sun was out.·2· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·3· · · ·Q· · Do you have homeowner insurance?·4· · · ·A· · Yes.·5· · · ·Q· · What's the company that insured your home?·6· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to object that this·7· ·is an inquiry as to the financial status of the·8· ·defendants in connection with punitive damages.·9· · · · · · Really, there is a code provision that's10· ·required to be satisfied in order for that inquiry11· ·to go forward.· I'm going to instruct her not to12· ·answer with regard to that.13· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· It's not for punitive damages.14· ·it's for insurance coverage.15· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Well --16· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· And for form interrogatory.17· ·Hold on a second.· Let me finish, please.18· ·BY MR. NAKASE:19· · · ·Q· · Inviting your attention to --20· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Should be 4.1.21· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Four what?22· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· 4.1.23· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.24· ·BY MR. NAKASE:25· · · ·Q· · Under 4.1 could I invite you to read

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·1· ·Exhibit 30, page 11, interrogatory 4.1?· Could you·2· ·read that aloud, please, starting on page -- line·3· ·19?·4· · · ·A· · "At the time of the incident, was there·5· · · · · · in effect any policy of insurance through·6· · · · · · which you were or might be insured in any·7· · · · · · manner (for example, primary, pro-rata,·8· · · · · · or excess liability coverage or medical·9· · · · · · expense insurance) for the damages,10· · · · · · claims, or actions that have arisen out11· · · · · · of the accident?" (as read)· "If so, for12· · · · · · each policy state:"13· · · ·Q· · Okay.· So I'm going to ask you again, and14· ·your counsel might object.15· · · · · · Was -- do you have homeowner insurance?16· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Go ahead.17· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· And I am going to object for18· ·the record under Civil Code Section 3295 with regard19· ·to exemplary damages being awarded in connection20· ·with punitive damages, the code is quite explicit,21· ·and the code indicates that the financial condition22· ·of the defendant, including Ms. Standridge here,23· ·indicates that no pretrial discovery by the24· ·plaintiff shall be permitted with respect to the25· ·evidence referred to in paragraph one and two of

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·1· ·subdivision A unless the court enters an order·2· ·permitting such discovery, and that hasn't happened·3· ·in this case.·4· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.· The question, counsel,·5· ·relates to damages and not exemplary damages.· So·6· ·we're entitled to know if an insurance policy,·7· ·including the excess policy, covers damages.·8· · · · · · And it says -- right here on Exhibit 30,·9· ·page 11, line 20, it says "pro-rata or excess10· ·liability coverage."11· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· And the answer given in written12· ·form by Ms. Standridge in her form interrogatories13· ·to interrogatory question 4.1 identifies her14· ·automobile liability insurance which identifies both15· ·the policy number and the coverage limits that16· ·should be sufficient for the purposes of your17· ·question.18· ·BY MR. NAKASE:19· · · ·Q· · Ms. Standridge, do you and your husband20· ·have excess liability coverage?21· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to object for the22· ·reasons previously stated and instruct her not to23· ·answer.24· · · · · · Under the circumstances of this case, your25· ·Third Amended Complaint alleges punitive damages.

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·1· ·And, I mean, we can't be oblivious to the fact that·2· ·that is an issue in the case.·3· · · · · · So I think what you're trying to do is·4· ·financial disclosure discovery that's not permitted·5· ·at this point.·6· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Are you instructing the·7· ·witness not to answer?·8· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Yeah.· I'm afraid -- and I·9· ·rarely do that.· But under these circumstances I10· ·will; however, I will reserve the -- let me just add11· ·this as a caveat.· You and I have worked well12· ·together and --13· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Go ahead.· I'll let you14· ·finish.15· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· You and I have worked well16· ·together, and I am open to a discussion about this17· ·issue at some later time, and after further18· ·discussion with you after this deposition we may19· ·revisit our instruction to the witness about the20· ·disclosure of this information.21· · · · · · But for present purposes I'm going to22· ·instruct her not to answer.23· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.24· ·BY MR. NAKASE:25· · · ·Q· · The question is very simple.· Are you going

1· ·to -- okay.· First of all, are you going to listen·2· ·to your counsel's instruction not to answer?·3· · · ·A· · Yes.·4· · · ·Q· · Okay.·5· · · · · · I have a very simple question.· The·6· ·question is:· Do you have excess insurance coverage·7· ·on your home?·8· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· And I'm going to instruct her·9· ·not to answer that for the reasons that I've already10· ·outlined.11· ·BY MR. NAKASE:12· · · ·Q· · Are you going to listen to your counsel?13· · · ·A· · Yes.14· · · ·Q· · Do you know what the name is for the15· ·insurance -- excess insurance coverage that covers16· ·you and Keith Standridge?17· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to instruct her not18· ·to answer.19· ·BY MR. NAKASE:20· · · ·Q· · Go ahead.21· · · ·A· · I'm listening to my attorney.22· · · ·Q· · Okay.23· · · · · · Have you made any claim to your excess24· ·insurance policy relating to this lawsuit?25· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to instruct her not

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·1· ·to answer.·2· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·3· · · ·Q· · Are you not going to answer?·4· · · ·A· · No.·5· · · ·Q· · Do you know if there is excess insurance·6· ·coverage covering this lawsuit and plaintiffs'·7· ·damages?·8· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'll instruct her not to answer·9· ·for the reasons outlined earlier.10· ·BY MR. NAKASE:11· · · ·Q· · Are you going to listen to your counsel?12· · · ·A· · Yes.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Sorry.· I have to do this.· Setting14· ·a record.· He knows.15· · · · · · Have you communicated with your son16· ·concerning excess insurance coverage for this17· ·lawsuit?18· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to instruct her not19· ·to -- vague, irrelevant.· Have you communicated to20· ·your son about excess coverage.· I think it opens21· ·the door to what we've been talking about.· I'm22· ·going to instruct her not to answer.23· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· The answer is just "yes" or24· ·"no."25· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· It may be, but I'm going to

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·1· ·instruct her not to answer.·2· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·3· · · ·Q· · Are you going to listen to your counsel?·4· · · ·A· · Yes.·5· · · ·Q· · Have you spoken with anybody besides your·6· ·counsel, your attorney, and the insurance company·7· ·concerning excess insurance coverage for plaintiffs'·8· ·injuries in this matter?·9· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'm going to instruct her not10· ·to answer.· As soon as she answers, she waives the11· ·right to rely upon the Civil Code procedure that12· ·prohibits the discovery of financial information in13· ·a case where there's punitive damages alleged and,14· ·on that basis -- and, counsel, again, we will have a15· ·discussion about this after the deposition, but for16· ·present purposes I'm instructing her not to answer.17· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Counsel, if plaintiff waives18· ·exemplary and punitive damages, will you let the19· ·witness disclose this information?20· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Yes.21· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Yes?22· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· If the plaintiff waives23· ·punitive and exemplary damages, yes.24· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Let's go off the record real25· ·quick.· Is that okay with you, counsel?

Page 32·1· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· If you make a record that·2· ·you're not seeking punitive damages, then I'll·3· ·instruct her --·4· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· Are we going off the·5· ·record?·6· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· I'll instruct her again.· We're·7· ·off the record right now.·8· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· Going off the record.·9· ·The time is 9:11 a.m.10· · · · · · · · ·(Off the record.)11· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· Back on the record.· The12· ·time is 9:20 a.m.13· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· The defense counsel and I had14· ·a discussion off the record, and plaintiff McGee15· ·will waive punitive against Ms. Rita Standridge and16· ·Keith Standridge.17· · · · · · Is that your understanding, counsel?18· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Punitive damages against all19· ·named defendants in this case.20· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.· Sounds good.21· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Okay.· And the defense accepts22· ·that stipulation, the waiver of punitive damages in23· ·this lawsuit against all three named defendants.24· ·Are we in agreement?25· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· That's correct.

1· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Go ahead.· Fire away.·2· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·3· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you have homeowner·4· ·insurance?·5· · · ·A· · Yes.·6· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And who is the insurer?·7· · · ·A· · Mercury Insurance.·8· · · ·Q· · And do you know the policy limit on that·9· ·homeowner insurance?10· · · ·A· · No.· Not off the top of my head.11· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· We'll provide it.12· ·BY MR. NAKASE:13· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you know if you have14· ·excess insurance coverage for your home for you and15· ·your husband?16· · · ·A· · Yes.17· · · ·Q· · And who is the -- and who is the insurer?18· · · ·A· · Mercury Casualty.19· · · ·Q· · And do you know the excess policy limit?20· · · ·A· · No.21· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· We'll provide it.22· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.· Do you have an23· ·agreement that --24· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· We will find it for you and25· ·give it to you.

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·1· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· The homeowner insurance policy·2· ·and the excess, counsel?·3· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Yes.·4· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·5· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you know of any other·6· ·insurance policy that might cover plaintiffs'·7· ·injuries in this case?·8· · · ·A· · No.·9· · · ·Q· · So you have the auto policy with Mercury10· ·that covers damages for this case.11· · · ·A· · Yes.12· · · ·Q· · And the homeowner insurance with Mercury13· ·that covers plaintiffs' injuries in this case.14· · · ·A· · Yes.15· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Is that your understanding,16· ·that it covers?· Do you know what the effective17· ·dates of the homeowner's policy are?18· · · · · · I shouldn't have said that.19· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· That's okay.20· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Go ahead.21· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· That's fine.22· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· Can you repeat that?23· ·BY MR. NAKASE:24· · · ·Q· · Did you have homeowner insurance --25· ·insurance coverage covering May 30th through

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·1· ·April 1st, 2019 (as said)?·2· · · ·A· · Yes.·3· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And that's with Mercury?·4· · · ·A· · Yes.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.·6· · · · · · And did you have excess insurance coverage·7· ·covering the period of May 29, 2019, through·8· ·April 1st, 2019?·9· · · ·A· · Yes.10· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And that's also with Mercury?11· · · ·A· · Yes.12· · · ·Q· · And will you agree to provide those two13· ·insurance policies, the homeowner and the excess?14· · · ·A· · Yes.15· · · ·Q· · Okay.16· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· If we can, we will get you a17· ·declaration page.· We'll provide those.· Is that18· ·okay?19· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Yes.· And the policy so --20· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· The jacket?21· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· So I know what the policy is.22· ·You know, if there's any exclusion.23· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· We'll work with you and we will24· ·cooperate.25· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.

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·1· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·2· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you know if the·3· ·homeowner insurance sent you a reservation of right·4· ·letter relating to this case?·5· · · ·A· · No.·6· · · ·Q· · No, they did not or, no, you don't know?·7· · · ·A· · I don't know.·8· · · ·Q· · Okay.·9· · · · · · Do you know if the Mercury excess insurance10· ·policy sent you a reservation of right letter11· ·relating to plaintiffs' injuries in this case?12· · · ·A· · No.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.14· · · · · · Do you know if your son was -- had been15· ·drinking at a bar on March 30th, 2019?16· · · ·A· · No.17· · · ·Q· · Earlier I said the period covering -- the18· ·insurance coverage period.· Did I say April or did I19· ·say March?20· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Court reporter, can you read21· ·it back for us, please?22· · · · · · THE REPORTER:· You said May 30th through23· ·April 1st.24· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· I need to clean up the record.25· ·I'm sorry.

1· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·2· · · ·Q· · Is that okay with you?· Okay.·3· · · · · · Mrs. Standridge, did you have homeowner·4· ·insurance coverage for the period of March 29th,·5· ·2019, through April 1st, 2019?·6· · · ·A· · Yes.·7· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And what company was that with?·8· · · ·A· · Mercury Casualty.·9· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And do you know the policy limit?10· · · ·A· · No.11· · · ·Q· · Okay.12· · · · · · Do you know if you and your husband and13· ·Andrew had excess insurance coverage for the period14· ·of March 29th, 2019, through April 1st?15· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Could I just interject --16· ·BY MR. NAKASE:17· · · ·Q· · 2019?18· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· -- for a second?· When you say19· ·excess policy, do you mean an umbrella policy?· Is20· ·that what you mean?21· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Some people call it umbrella;22· ·some people call it excess.· I distinguish them.23· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Because I have an umbrella24· ·policy with Mercury, and they call it an umbrella25· ·policy.

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·1· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Yeah.· Some people call --·2· ·some people use them interchangeably.·3· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· It's up to you.·4· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Yeah.· But I'm glad you raised·5· ·that.· I don't think they're one and the same.· But·6· ·let's just cover it.·7· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·8· · · ·Q· · So just going back, did you have excess·9· ·insurance coverage covering the period of10· ·March 29th, 2019, through April 1st, 2019?11· · · ·A· · No.12· · · ·Q· · No excess coverage?13· · · ·A· · No.14· · · ·Q· · Did you have an umbrella policy covering15· ·the period of March 29th, 2019, to April 1st, 2019?16· · · ·A· · No.17· · · ·Q· · Earlier you indicated that there was an18· ·excess policy.· What were you talking about?19· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Go ahead.20· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· We have one, but it didn't21· ·take effect until May of 2019.22· ·BY MR. NAKASE:23· · · ·Q· · May 1st, 2019?24· · · ·A· · May -- approximately the first week of May.25· ·I don't know the exact date.· But May of 2019.

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·1· · · ·Q· · Okay.· So did you obtain the excess·2· ·insurance policy after this accident?·3· · · ·A· · During.· We had been working on it for·4· ·several months before.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.·6· · · ·A· · And it just didn't take place until·7· ·afterwards.·8· · · ·Q· · Was that the first time you had excess·9· ·insurance coverage was in May of 2019?10· · · ·A· · Yes.11· · · ·Q· · And there was never any excess insurance12· ·coverage before May 2019?13· · · ·A· · No.14· · · ·Q· · Was there any umbrella coverage before15· ·May 1st, 2019?16· · · ·A· · No.17· · · ·Q· · Okay.18· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Counsel, is it okay with you19· ·if the witness produced the excess and/or the20· ·umbrella coverage?21· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Sure.· In respect -- you can22· ·look at the dates.· Yeah.· Sure.23· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· And the policy so I can read24· ·which exclusion is there?25· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· No problem.

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·1· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·2· · · ·Q· · Do you know if there was a retroactive date·3· ·for the excess insurance policy that became·4· ·effective in May of 2019?·5· · · ·A· · I'm not sure of that question.· Can you·6· ·repeat it?·7· · · ·Q· · Retroactive.· Insurance policy covering --·8· ·it covers before May 2019.·9· · · ·A· · No.10· · · ·Q· · And who is your broker for the excess11· ·insurance policy?12· · · ·A· · Pyle Insurance.13· · · ·Q· · Is there a name, contact name?14· · · ·A· · Whoever works there.15· · · ·Q· · Okay.· And where is Pyle Insurance located16· ·at?17· · · ·A· · In Glendora.18· · · ·Q· · Do you know if your son was drinking at a19· ·bar on March 30th, 2019?20· · · ·A· · No.21· · · ·Q· · No, you don't know?22· · · ·A· · I don't know where.· I found out he was23· ·drinking, but I don't know where he was drinking.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.25· · · · · · Does your son have a habitual -- a habit of

1· ·drinking alcohol, that you're familiar with?·2· · · ·A· · No.·3· · · ·Q· · You don't know?·4· · · ·A· · He doesn't have a habitual habit.·5· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Do you know if your son is a drug·6· ·user?·7· · · ·A· · No.·8· · · ·Q· · Inviting your attention to Exhibit 14,·9· ·please.10· · · ·A· · Where is that at?· In here?11· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· This is a separate document,12· ·Exhibit 14.· It would be in your pile here.13· ·BY MR. NAKASE:14· · · ·Q· · Mrs. Standridge, do you have Exhibit 14 in15· ·front of you?16· · · ·A· · Yes.17· · · ·Q· · And for the record, this is Dustin McGee's18· ·medical report at Coastal Medical Group.19· · · · · · Did anybody inform you that Dustin McGee20· ·suffered a serious injury in this accident?21· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Attorney-client22· ·privilege.· Objection.· Calls for speculation.23· ·Calls -- objection.· Hearsay.· Objection.· Lack of24· ·foundation.25

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·1· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·2· · · ·Q· · Go ahead.· Without -- I don't want·3· ·anything -- any communication between you and your·4· ·counsel.·5· · · · · · I'm just asking:· Did anybody inform you·6· ·that Dustin McGee suffered serious injury in this·7· ·collision?·8· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Same objections.· Hearsay.·9· ·Lack of foundation.· Calls for speculation.10· ·BY MR. NAKASE:11· · · ·Q· · Go ahead.12· · · ·A· · No.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.14· · · · · · Did anybody inform you that Dustin McGee15· ·suffered a serious spine injury in this car16· ·accident?17· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Same objections.· Hearsay.18· ·Lack of foundation.· Calls for speculation.19· ·Attorney-client privilege.20· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.21· ·BY MR. NAKASE:22· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Do you consider a spine injury23· ·resulting from an auto collision a serious injury?24· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Calls for25· ·speculation.· Irrelevant.· Calls for opinion

·1· ·testimony beyond the scope of her knowledge.·2· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.·3· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·4· · · ·Q· · And why is that that you do not consider a·5· ·spine injury from an auto collision not a serious·6· ·injury?·7· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Argumentative.·8· ·Calls for speculation.· Assumes facts not in·9· ·evidence.10· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· I don't know how serious it11· ·is.12· ·BY MR. NAKASE:13· · · ·Q· · Do you consider a five-millimeter disc14· ·bulge in the spine a serious -- serious injury?15· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Assumes facts not16· ·in evidence.· Calls for speculation.· Calls for17· ·opinion testimony beyond her -- beyond her18· ·knowledge.19· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· I don't know anything about20· ·that.21· ·BY MR. NAKASE:22· · · ·Q· · Okay.23· · · · · · Inviting your attention to Exhibit 14, page24· ·12, please.· At the bottom do you see where it says25· ·plan, the doctor's plan?· Do you see that?

Page 44

·1· ·Mrs. Standridge --·2· · · ·A· · Yes.· Yes.·3· · · ·Q· · Okay.·4· · · · · · MR. KEITH STANDRIDGE:· You were nodding.·5· ·Sorry.·6· ·BY MR. NAKASE:·7· · · ·Q· · Okay.· The court reporter can't take nods·8· ·and shakes, Ma'am.·9· · · · · · Can I invite you to read that three lines10· ·where it says "I recommend"?11· · · ·A· · "I recommend a second opinion regarding12· · · · · · anterior cervical discectomy and fusion13· · · · · · at C5 to C7 levels.· Total facility cost14· · · · · · and surgeon's fees is approximately15· · · · · · $150,000.· I will see the patient back16· · · · · · after the second opinion is obtained."17· · · ·Q· · Were you informed that Dustin McGee's18· ·injuries would cost $150,000?19· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Calls for20· ·speculation.· Objection.· Hearsay.· Objection.· Lack21· ·of foundation.· Calls for speculation.· Assumes22· ·facts not in evidence.23· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.24· ·BY MR. NAKASE:25· · · ·Q· · Do you believe that the person who injured

1· ·Dustin McGee in this car accident should be·2· ·responsible for paying Dustin McGee's medical bills?·3· · · ·A· · Yes.·4· · · ·Q· · And why is that?·5· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Argumentative.·6· ·Calls for a narrative.· Calls for a conclusion.·7· · · · · · Go ahead.·8· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· He was the one driving the·9· ·car.10· ·BY MR. NAKASE:11· · · ·Q· · And who is "he"?12· · · ·A· · Andrew Standridge.13· · · ·Q· · How old is your son today?14· · · ·A· · Twenty-nine years old.15· · · ·Q· · What's your soon's educational background,16· ·if you know, starting -- where did he graduate from17· ·high school?18· · · ·A· · Dana Hills High School.19· · · ·Q· · What year?20· · · ·A· · 2009.21· · · ·Q· · Did he go to college after that?22· · · ·A· · Temporarily.23· · · ·Q· · Did he have any type of formal education24· ·after high school?25· · · ·A· · No.

Page 46

·1· · · ·Q· · Did he graduate from college?·2· · · ·A· · No.·3· · · ·Q· · Did he receive any type of vocational·4· ·licenses or certifications?·5· · · ·A· · No.·6· · · ·Q· · Did you have to bail your son out of jail·7· ·relating to the collision in this matter?·8· · · ·A· · No.·9· · · ·Q· · Did -- do you know who bailed your son out10· ·of jail?11· · · ·A· · No.12· · · ·Q· · Were you there with him at court when he13· ·pled guilty?14· · · ·A· · No.15· · · ·Q· · Do you know if your husband was?16· · · ·A· · No.17· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Wait a minute.· That he was not18· ·there or that you don't know that he was there?19· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· He was not there.20· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.21· ·BY MR. NAKASE:22· · · ·Q· · Did your husband bail your son out of jail?23· · · ·A· · No.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.25· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· I am done with this witness in

Page 47

·1· ·terms of questions.· Counsel, do you want to ask --·2· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· No.· I'm good.·3· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.·4· · · · · · Mrs. Standridge, the court reporter is·5· ·going to send you a transcript of your testimony·6· ·here that you've given here today.·7· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Do you mind if I could just·8· ·interrupt just to hear myself say this?· It's per·9· ·code.· And we'll pay for our own copy.10· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· Okay.11· ·BY MR. NAKASE:12· · · ·Q· · The court reporter is going to send you a13· ·transcript, and I'm going to invite you to review it14· ·and make corrections, if any --15· · · ·A· · Okay.16· · · ·Q· · -- and sign the verification and return it17· ·to -- give it to your counsel and he'll give it back18· ·to us.19· · · · · · Is that okay with you?20· · · ·A· · Yes.21· · · ·Q· · Is there an email that you want the court22· ·reporter to send it to you, or do you just want them23· ·to send it to you by U.S. mail?24· · · ·A· · By mail.25· · · ·Q· · By mail?· Just one more question.· One more

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·1· ·subject.·2· · · · · · The -- when did you learn that you were·3· ·being sued in this case?· Your best estimate.·4· · · ·A· · Maybe the summer of 2019.·5· · · ·Q· · And summer was in June?·6· · · ·A· · June, July, approximately.· I'm not quite·7· ·sure.·8· · · ·Q· · And how did you learn about that?·9· · · ·A· · We received a letter, I believe.10· · · ·Q· · From who?11· · · ·A· · You know what?· I don't know.· I don't12· ·know.· I don't recall.13· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Was it a letter from an insurance14· ·company?15· · · ·A· · I don't recall how I learned about it.16· · · ·Q· · Okay.17· · · · · · Did you ever try to accept service of the18· ·Summons and Complaint in this case in the summer of19· ·2019?20· · · ·A· · We did receive something on our door.21· · · ·Q· · Okay.22· · · ·A· · He threw it up in the air and left it23· ·there.24· · · ·Q· · Okay.· Did you try to evade service?25· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Objection.· Argumentative.· The

1· ·Complaint has been answered and several amended

·2· ·Complaints have also been answered.

·3· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· It goes to mental -- it goes

·4· ·to mental anguish.

·5· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Of who?· You or your client?

·6· · · · · · MR. NAKASE:· The plaintiffs.

·7· · · · · · THE WITNESS:· No.

·8· ·BY MR. NAKASE:

·9· · · ·Q· · Okay.· All right.· Nothing further.· Thank

10· ·you so much for your time.

11· · · · · · MR. BONNO:· Okay.

12· · · · · · THE VIDEOGRAPHER:· This concludes today's

13· ·video deposition of Rita Standridge.· The number of

14· ·media used is one.· Going off the record.· The time

15· ·is 9:39 a.m.

16· · · · · · (The deposition concluded at 9:41 a.m.)

17· · · · · · (END OF PROCEEDINGS.· DECLARATION UNDER

18· ·PENALTY OF PERJURY ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE HEREOF.)

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Page 50·1· · · · · · I, RITA STANDRIDGE, do hereby declare under

·2· ·penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing

·3· ·transcript; that I have made any corrections as

·4· ·appear noted, in ink, initialed by me; that my

·5· ·testimony as contained herein, as corrected, is true

·6· ·and correct.

·7· · · · · · EXECUTED THIS _______ day of ____________.

·8· ·20___, at ______________, ___________________.

· · · · · · · · · (City)· · · · · · ·(State)

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10· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · _________________________

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·RITA STANDRIDGE

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Page 51·1· · · · · · ·DEPONENT'S CHANGES OR CORRECTIONS

·2· ·Note:· If you are adding to your testimony, print

·3· ·the exact words you want to add.· If you are deleting

·4· ·from your testimony, print the exact words you want

·5· ·to delete.· Specify with "Add" or "Delete" and sign

·6· ·this form.

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·8· ·DEPOSITION OF:· · · ·RITA STANDRIDGE

·9· ·CASE:· · · · · · · · MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE

10· ·DATE OF DEPOSITION:· MARCH 10, 2020

11

12· ·PAGE· · LINE· · CHANGE/ADD/DELETE

13· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

14· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

15· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

16· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

17· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

18· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

19· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

20· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

21· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

22· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

23· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

24· ·____· · ____· · ______________________________________

25· ·Deponent's Signature ___________________ Date ________

Page 52·1· · · · · · · · · · · CERTIFICATE OF

·2· · · · · CALIFORNIA CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

·3· · · · · · I, the undersigned, a Certified Shorthand

·4· ·Reporter of the State of California, do hereby

·5· ·certify:

·6· · · · · · That the foregoing proceedings were taken

·7· ·before me at the time and place herein set forth;

·8· ·that any witnesses in the foregoing proceedings,

·9· ·prior to testifying, were placed under oath; that a

10· ·verbatim record of the proceedings was made by me

11· ·using machine shorthand which was thereafter

12· ·transcribed under my direction; further, that the

13· ·foregoing is an accurate transcription thereof.

14· · · · · · The dismantling of this transcript will

15· ·render the reporter's certificate null and void.

16· · · · · · I further certify that I am neither

17· ·financially interested in the action nor a relative

18· ·or employee of any attorney of any of the parties.

19· · · · · · Reading and signing was requested.

20· · · · · · IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date

21· ·subscribed my name.

22

23

24· ·Dated: April 1, 2020· · · ·______________________

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · KATHLEEN S. McLAUGHLIN

25· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · CSR No. 5845

Deposition of RITA STANDRIGE

Exhibits

Standridge Exhibit 1 4:11

Standridge Exhibit 14 4:13 41:8,12,1443:23





Standridge Exhibit 30 5:5 11:14, 16,23 12:10,15 26:.1 27:8

Standridge Exhibit 49 5:6,7

$

$150,000 44:15,18

1

1 6:511:19

10 6:1 16.3

10th 6:11

11 26:1 27:9

12 4324

14 418, 12,14 43:23

1818 13:2,23 17:20

19 26.3

1990 18:21,23

1st 11.3 35:1,8 36:23 37:5, 14 38:10, 15,23 39:15

2

20 6:11 27.9

2005 18:12 19:10

2007 19:3, 18 20:1

2008 14:2,4

2009 13:23,25 14:4,9 15:2 18:8 20:8 45:20

2010 1325

2011 15:2,9, 11 16:15

2012 15:9, 11 16:15,21 21 :1

2014 218

2015 16.21

2017 16:23 17:2

2018 17:1,2

2019 10:12 11:2, 10 13:20 17:11, 12,21,22 21 :18,25 22:3, 18,21 23:9,12,19 35:1, 7,8 36:15 37.5,14,17 38:10, 15,21,23,25 39:9,12,15 40:4,8,19 48:4, 19

2020 6:1

21 11:19

22 12.11

2221 6:12

25 12:12

25th 19:18

29 35:7

29th 21:25 37:4,14 38:10,15

2nd 18:23

3

30 11:14,16,23 12:10,15 26:1 27.8

300 6:13

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31st 10:12 11 :2, 1 o 22: 18

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6

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8

8:00 10:24,25 112

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accurate 8:4,8,10

accurately 8:16

actions 26:10

add 28:10

afraid 28:8

agree 35:12

MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE March 10, 2020

agreement 32:24 33:23

ahead 10:1 26:16 28:13 29:20 33:1 34:20 38:19 42:2,11 45:.7

air 48:22

alcohol 8:15 41:1

alleged 31:.13

alleges 27:25

aloud 26:2

amended 27:25 49:1

and/or 39:19

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anguish 49:4

answers 31:1 o anterior 44:12

appearing 6:19

approximate 14:11

approximately 10:24 13:24 14:17 15:1 23:14 38:24 44:14 48:6

April 11 :3 13:19 17:12,21, 22 19:10, 18 21 :8 35:1,8 36:18,23 37:5, 14 38:10, 15

Argumentative 43:7 45:5 48:25

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arrived 9:1 o Assumes 438,15 44:21

attention 11 :25 25:19 41 :8 43:23

attorney 9:2 24:22 29:21 31 :6

Attorney-client 41 :21 42:19

auto 34:9 42:23 43:5

THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: $150,000-autoPage 53

Deposition of MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE RITA STANDRIGE March 10, 2020

automobile 27:14 call 10:18,20 37:21,22,24 concluded 49:16 18,25 207,25 21 :7, 17

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Complaints 49:2 criminal 18:6,11 19:2,10,

THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: automobile-drivewayPage 54


driving 23:19,22,25 24:14 45:8

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EXAMINATION 7:7

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explicit 26:20

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facility 44:13

fact 28:1

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insurance 25:3, 14 26:5,9, 15 27:6, 14 29:6, 15,24 30:5, 16 31 :6,7 33:4,7,9, 14 34:1, 6, 12,24,25 35:6, 13 36:3,9, 18 37:4, 13 38:9 39:2,9,11 40:3,7,11,12, 15 48:13

insured 255 26:6

insurer 33:6, 17

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interrogatories 27:12

interrogatory 11:17 12:21 25:16 26:1 27:13

THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: driving-interrogatoryPage 55


interrupt 47:8

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inviting 11:24 25:19 41 :8 43:23

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July 48:6

June 48:5,6

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THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: interrupt-payPage 56

Deposition of MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE RITA STANDRIGE March 10, 2020

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previously 27:22 49:13 spoken 31 :5 recommend 44:10,11 primary 26:7 room 9:1,5 14:22 stack 11:15 record 7:13 11:16 26:18 privilege 41:2242:19 30:14 31 :24 32:1,5,7,8, 10, s Standridge 66,7,20 7: 1 , 15,

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THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: paying-StandridgePage 57


26:22 27:12,19 29:16 32:15, 16 33:3,13 34:5 36:2 37:3 41:14 44:1,4 45:12 47:4 49:13

starting 13:23 262 45:16

state 69,17 7:13 26:12

stated 11 :19 27:22

status 25:7

stipulation 32:22

stolen 20:17,19

stuff 20:20

subdivision 27:1

subject 48:1

sued 48:3

suffered 41:20 42:6, 15

sufficient 27:16

Suite 6:13

Sullivan 6:15,22

summer 48:4,5,18

Summons 48:18

sun 25:1

Superior 6:8

surgeon's 44:14

swear 6:23

sworn 73,17

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table 15:24 162

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talking 3021 38:18

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terms 47:1

testified 7:4

testify 8:16

testimony 7:18,20,24 8:4,8,

1143:1,17 47.5

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thing 12:16

thousand 14:1 20:16

threw 48:22

time 6:11 1022 11:12 15:8 23:12 26:4 28:17 329,12 39:8 49:10,14

timeline 13:21

today 6:21 7:21,25 8.5,8,17 9:2,10 17:24 45:13 47:6

today's 6:10 49:12

told 10:16,21 243,4,5

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transcript 47.5,13

trouble 18:8 20:13, 16

TUESDAY 6:1

Twelve 135,16

Twenty-nine 45:14

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user 41 :6

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vague 9:20 30:19

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versus 6:7

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waive 32:15

waiver 32:22

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week 38:24

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working 22:14 39:3

works 40:14

written 27:11

V

year 13:24 148,10 16:20 17.8 45:19

years 13:5,16 14:15 15:1 45:14


THE SULLIVAN GROUP OF COURT REPORTERS - 323.525.3860 Index: starting-yearsPage 58

EXHIBIT B

€Iv090 ATTORNEY OR ARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address,) FOR COURT USE ONLY

Brad Nakase (SBN 236226) Nakase Law Firm, Inc.

2221 Camino Del Rio S. #300 San Diego, CA 92108

res+oe o (619) 550-1321 FAX NO. (Optional

E-MAI ADDRESS (Op onat rroweY ro over. Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny Batista

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Diego STREET ADDRESS 330 West Broadway

MALLING ADDRESS

CITY AND 2ZIP CODE San Diego, CA 92101 BRANCH NAME Central- Hall of Justice

PLAINTIFF: Dustin McGee et.al. DEFENDANT: Andrew Michael Standridge et.al.

[Z OFFER TO COMPROMISE AND CASE NUMBER

[] ACCEPTANCE UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 998 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL

Note: This form is designed to be used only in civil actions involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, where the offer and acceptance involves a money judgment. The court will file this offer to compromise and the acceptance only if accompanied by a judgment prepared for the court's signature and entry of judgment.

OFFER TO COMPROMISE

1. Plaintiff (namey Dustin McGee offers to have judgment entered under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 in favor of the plaintiff and against (name of the defendant): Keith Standridge

2 The judgment is to be (check and complete a orb) a [lite amount er $ 15,000.00

(1 [ Each party shall bear its own costs and fees (2) [ including costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees (3) [] Plus costs under Code ot civil Procedure section 1032. (4) [] Pus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees in the amount of $

(5) [l Plus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees allowed by law as determined by the court.

b.[]as follows (describe the terms and conditions of the judgment)

[ continued in attachment 2b. Date 03/12/2020

Brad Nakase, Esg. vie or »iRaaeras.av.aGGae,

3. Defendant (name): judgment stated in Items 1 and 2 above.

(SIGNATURE OF P

hereby accepts the offer for the ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

Date: 04/16/2020

(NAME OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY ACCEPTING OFFER)

Pa 1off

OFFER TO COMPROMISE AND ACCEPTANCE UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 998

EXHIBIT C

CIV 090 . ATTORANEY OR PARTY MTHOU'T ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address FOR COURT USE ONLY

_ Brad Nakase (SBN 236226) Nakase Law Firm, Inc. 2221 Camino Del Rio S. #300 San Diego, CA 92108

re.sroevo. (619) 550-1321 FAX NO. (Optional)

E-MAM ADDRESS (0Optional

rroevee Foe ow. Dustin McGee and Katherina Pokorny Batista SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Diego

STREET ADDRESS 330 West Broadway MALLING ADDRESS

CITY AND 2P CODE San Diego, CA 92101 BRANCH NAME Central- Hall of Justice

PLAINTIFF: Dustin McGee et.al. DEFENDANT: Andrew Michael Standridge et.al.

[ZJ OFFER TO COMPROMISE ANO CASE NUMBER

[_ ACCEPTANCE UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 998 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL

Note: This form is designed to be used only in civil actions involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, where the offer and acceptance involves a money judgment. The court will file this offer to compromise and the acceptance only if accompanied by a judgment prepared for the court's signature and entry of judgment.

hereby accepts the offer for the

ATTORNEY FOR PARTY MKING OFFER) (NAME OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY MAKING OFFER)

3. Defendant (name) judgment stated in items 1 and 2 above.

ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

Brad Nakase, Esq.

OFFER TO COMPROMISE

1. Plaintiff (name): Katherina Pokorny Batista offers to have judgment entered under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 in favor of the plaintiff and against (name of the defendant ) Keith Standridge

2. The judgment is to be (check and complete a orb) a [Z ne amount of $ 15,000.00

(t [z] Each party shall bear its own costs and fees. (2) [ including costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees (3) [ Plus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. (4) [] Plus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees in the amount of $

(5) [] pus costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney's fees allowed by law as determined by the court

b. []as follows (describe the terms and conditions of the judgment):

[] continued in attachment 2b. Date: 03/12/2020

Date:

04/16/2020 } w (NAME OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY ACCEPTING OFFER) (SIGNATURE OF ·Ty OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY ACCEPTING OFFER

Pa f off form Approved tor Optional Li.

Judicial Caunel at Cali fora CM.0g0 (New January 1, 20081

OFFER TO COMPROMISE AND ACCEPTANCE UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 998

Code et Cid Procedure,$ 99 wwwourtinto.ca.gov

EXHIBIT D

1

Vern Pendergraft

From: Myrna Estrada

Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 9:06 AM

To: 'Brad Nakase'

Cc: John Bonno; Jason Jestes

Subject: 998

Attachments: 998 Signed McGee.pdf

Good Morning,

Attached, please find signed 998 for both of your clients.

Thank you,

Myrna Estrada Secretary to JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. & MARK J. SERINO, ESQ.

Raffalow, Bretoi, Lutz & Stele

San Diego Legal

858-694-4177

EXHIBIT E

X

X

X

X AS TO RITA STANDRIDGE ONLY / Both parties mutually agree to a waiver of cost

SBN:

X

X

SAN DIEGO

37-2019-00024720

Hall of Justice Courthouse

330 West Broadway

Def., Andrew M. Standridge et al.


(858) 694-4180

JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. 125357

(858) 694-4174

BRAD NAKASE, ESQ.

Andrew M. Standridge et al.

Dustin McGee & Katherina B. Pokorny

330 West BroadwaySan Diego, 92101

9635 Granite Ridge Dr., Ste. 210, San Diego, CA 92123

CIV-110 ATTORNEY OR PARTY \II/IT HOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address).:

FOR COURT USE ONLY

TELEPHONE NO.: FAX NO. (Optional): E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional).

ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF STREET ADDRESS:

MAI LI NG ADDRESS:

CITY AND ZIP CODE:

BRANCH NAME:

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER:

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL CASE NUMBER:

A conformed copy will not be returned by the clerk unless a method of return is provided with the document.

This form may not be used for dismissal of a derivative action or a class action or of any party or cause of action in a class action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760 and 3.770.)

1. TO THE CLERK: Please dismiss this action as follows: a. (1)[_] th prejudice (2) [_] without prejudice b.(1)[] Complaint (2) [] Petition

(3) c=J Cross-complaint filed by (name):

(4) [ Cross-complaint filed by (name):

(s) [l Enre action of all parties and all causes of action (6) _l other (specify):°

on (date):

on (date):

(SIGNATURE)

Attorn or party without attorney for: [_l Plaintiff/Petitioner [l Defendant/Respondent [l cross-complainant

2. (Complete in all cases except family law cases.) The court [] id c=J did not waive court fees and costs for a party int (This information may be obtained from the clerk. If court fees and costs were waived, the declaration on the K f tijs fQt be completed).

Date:

cvee oR PRNr wAMe or [ trove [l PARrY wour A1oRe9

If dismissal requested is of specified parties only of specified causes of action only, or of specified cross-complaints only, so state and identify the parties, causes of action, or cross-complaints to be dismissed.

3. TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given.** Date:

aves oR Pawr awe or [ rroe«ex [ PARn wour romeo

f a cross-complaint -- or Response (Family Law) seeking affirmative relief -- is on file, the attorney for cross-complainant (respondent) must sign this consent if required by Code of Civil Procedure section 581 (i) or (j).

► (SIGNATURE)

Attorney or party without attorney for: [_] Plaintiff/Petitioner [_] Defendant/Respondent [] Cross-Complainant

(To be completed by clerk) 4. c=J Dismissal entered as requested on (date):

5 c=J Dismissal entered on (date): as to only (name):

6.[] 0smissal not entered as requested for the following reasons (specify):

7. a. [_] Attorney or party without attorney notified on (date): b []Atomey or party without attorney not notified. Filing party failed to provide [a copy to be conformed [ means to return conformed copy

Date: Clerk, by , Deputy

Page 1 of 2

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CIV-110 [Rev. Jan. 1, 2013]

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL Code of Civil Procedure, $ 581 et seq.; Gov. Code,§ 68637(c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1390

WestlawDoc &Form Builder www.courts.ca. gov

X

Dustin McGee & Katherina B. Pokorny Andrew M. Standridge et al. 37-2019-00024720

.

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER:

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:

CASE NUMBER: CIV-110

COURT'S RECOVERY OF WAIVED COURT FEES AND COSTS If a party whose court fees and costs were initially waived has recovered or will recover $10,000 or more in value by way of settlement, compromise, arbitration award, mediation settlement, or other means, the court has a statutory lien on that recovery. The court may refuse to dismiss the case until the lien is satisfied. (Gov. Code, § 68637.)

Declaration Concerning Waived Court Fees

1. The court waived court fees and costs in this action for (name):

2. The person named in item 1 is (check one below): a. D not recovering anything of value by this action. b. D recovering less than $10,000 in value by this action. c. D recovering $10,000 or more in value by this action. (If item 2c is checked, item 3 must be completed.)

3. D All court fees and court costs that were waived in this action have been paid to the court (check one): D Yes D No

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information above is true and correct.

Date: ------------

► (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF D ATTORNEY D PARTY MAKING DECLARATION) (SIGNATURE)

CIV-110 [Rev. January 1, 2013] REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL Page 2 of 2

EXHIBIT F

1

Vern Pendergraft

From: Brad Nakase <[email protected]>

Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 7:56 AM

To: Myrna Estrada

Cc: John Bonno; Vern Pendergraft; Legal

Subject: McGee v Andrew Standridge et al

Attachments: 2020.04.19 - McGee - Dismissal Rita Standridge..pdf

External eMail: Do not open attachments or click on links unless you expected to receive them from a trusted sender.

Hello Myrna,

Attached is the signed dismissal for Rita.

Best Regards,

Brad Nakase, Attorney

NAKASE LAW FIRM

2221 Camino Del Rio S. #300, San Diego, CA 92108

Tel: 619.550.1321 | [email protected]

______________________________________________ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or legal

privileged material. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the

sender and destroy all copies of the original message.

From: Myrna Estrada <[email protected]>

Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 11:34 AM

To: Brad Nakase <[email protected]>

Cc: John Bonno <[email protected]>; Vern Pendergraft <[email protected]>

Subject: Dismissal - Rita

Hi Brad,

Attached is the Dismissal for Rita, please signed and return to us. We will file with court once the court re-opens.

Thank you,

Myrna Estrada Secretary to JOHN F. BONNO, ESQ. & MARK J. SERINO, ESQ.

Raffalow, Bretoi, Lutz & Stele

San Diego Legal

858-694-4177

2

This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient, and may contain material that is privileged or confidential and legally protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient or have received this message in error, you are not authorized to copy, distribute, or otherwise use this message or its attachments. Please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail and permanently delete this message and any attachments.

EXHIBIT G

1

Vern Pendergraft

From: San Diego Legal

Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 11:25 AM

To: [email protected]

Cc: John Bonno

Subject: MCGEE v. STANDRIDGE

Attachments: ltr2pltf Meet and Confer 3d Amended Comp - 2020-04-03.pdf

Brad Nakase, Esq. Via Email Only

NAKASE LAW CORP. Email: [email protected]

2221 Camino Del Rio South

Suite 300

San Diego, CA 92108 RE: MCGEE v. STANDRIDGE Case No.: 37-2019-00024720-CU-PA-CTL Our File No.: 19-109980-19 Dear Mr. Nakase: Please allow this to serve as an attempt to “Meet and Confer” further and resolve issues regarding Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for Damages in light of recent developments in this case and the closure of the Superior Court of California County of San Diego due to the COVID-19 crises. Defendants’ responsive pleading(s) to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for Damages was due for service / filing on Tuesday, March 24, 2020. However, pursuant to the Superior Court of California County of San Diego General Order of the Presiding Department Order No.031820-34, “March 17, 2020, to April 03, 2020, inclusive, are deemed holidays for purposes of computing time for filing papers under Code of Civil Procedure §§12 and 12a.” Furthermore, the same order called for the closure of all courthouses and courtrooms for the same period, except for certain specified essential functions that do not apply to our case. Finally, according to the April 01, 2020 Statement from the Honorable Judge Lorna Alksne, Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, it is anticipated that the court will remain closed through April 30, 2020. Accordingly, Defendants hope to resolve issues with the Third Amended Complaint while the court is closed. At the Defendants’ depositions taken on March 10, 2020, there was a stipulation on the record that Plaintiffs would no longer be seeking punitive damages. Given the stipulation, Defendants respectfully request that the Third Amended Complaint be amended to remove the prayer for punitive damages and all references to narcotics / drugs, alcohol, and intoxication, etc. Furthermore, as previously discussed relating to prior versions of Plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendants believe the “tort of another doctrine” claim for attorney’s fees is inapplicable in this matter. This matter is the only action that has been filed arising out of or related to the March 31, 2019 motor vehicle accident between Plaintiffs and Defendant Andrew Michael Standridge. No other action besides the instant action has been or will be required to be filed as is required for the application of the “tort of another doctrine:”

When a paid escrow holder has, as in this case, negligently made it necessary for the vendor of

land to file a quiet title action against a third person, attorney's fees incurred by the vendor in

prosecuting such action are recoverable as an item of the vendor's damages in an action against

2

the escrow holder. Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division, 59 Cal.2d

618, 621 (1963). In our case, all four (4) causes of action of the Third Amended Complaint for Damages are for varying theories of negligence against the three (3) Defendants. There is no other cause of action for the Plaintiffs made necessary by the negligence of Defendants. In Prentice, there were causes of action for negligence against the escrow holder (North American Title), as well as for quiet title against the buyers / lender (Hortons, Neal). The negligence of the escrow holder (North American Title) caused the need for attorney’s fees to be incurred for the quiet title action, which is the basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the “tort of another doctrine:”

Plaintiffs then brought this action against the Hortons, Neal, and defendant.

Plaintiffs' complaint contained various counts against defendants Horton and Neal, and the trial

court granted relief against these defendants by a decree quieting plaintiffs' title against their

claims.

The counts against defendant were based purely on the ground of negligence. The trial court

found that defendant had been negligent in closing the sale and awarded plaintiffs as damages

the amount of attorney's fees incurred by them in the prosecution of the counts in the complaint

against defendants Horton and Neal. Id. at 620-621. In our case, the varying theories of negligence of the Defendants has not created the need to incur attorney’s fees to prosecute any other cause of action. The only attorney’s fees being incurred here are to prosecute this instant action for negligence so the “tort of another doctrine” for recovery of attorney fees to prosecute another action does not apply. Looking forward to discussing further and resolving this matter. Very truly yours, RAFFALOW, BRETOI, LUTZ & STELE John F. Bonno, Esq.

JFB/vcp

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PROOF OF SERVICE (1013A, 2015.5 C.C.P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ss. MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO ) I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California, I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 9635 Granite Ridge Drive, Suite 210, San Diego, CA 92123. I am readily familiar with the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in ordinary course of business. On May 26, 2020, I served the forgoing MOTION TO STRIKE 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT on the interested parties in this action, by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:

SEE ATTACHED MAILING LIST () (BY MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid at my place of business to be placed in the United States mail at San Diego, California. ( ) (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the office of the addressee(s). ( ) (BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) I also served by facsimile transmission, a true and correct copy of the above designated documents, on the office(s) of the addressee at the following facsimile number: ( XX ) (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Only by emailing the document to the persons at the email addresses listed based on notice provided that during the Coronavirus pandemic, this office will be working remotely, not able to send physical mail as usual, and is therefore using only electronic mails. Further more, this document is being served electronically pursuant to Emergency Rule 12 for California Rules of Court. No electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful was received within a reasonable time after the transmission. (XX) (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. ( ) (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. Dated: May 26, 2020

__________________________________ Myrna Estrada

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MAILING LIST

MCGEE V. STANDRIDGE Brad Nakase, Esq. NAKASE LAW CORP. 2221 Camino Del Rio South, Ste. 300 San Diego, CA 92108

john f. bonno, esq. (state bar no.: 125357) andrew …

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