john heil (wu, st louis): aristotelian supervenience

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John Heil is professor of philosophy at Washington University in St Louis and Honorary Research Associate at Monash University. His work centers on topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. He is interested in the extent to which medieval and early modern approaches to metaphysical issues might shed light on contemporary debates over the nature of substances, properties, and relations (especially causal relations), and truthmakers for modal truths. Many of these themes are addressed in his most recent book, The Universe as We Find It (Oxford, 2012).

e d i t o r i a l n o t e

The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author’s permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Issue No. 1, Volume CXV (2015). Please visit the Society’s website for subscription information: www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk.

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a r i s t o t e l i a n s u p e r v e n i e n c e 1

j o h n h e i l

Three matchsticks could be arranged on a table so as to form a triangle. Were you to place a lump of sugar into a cup of hot tea it would dis-solve. You might never have been born. Such assertions express modal judgments and, as we suppose, truths about the universe. But if modal judgments can be true, what features of the universe make them true? Thanks largely to the efforts of David Lewis, philosophers nowadays find it natural to appeal to alternative worlds to explicate modality. Something is possible if it occurs in at least one alternative world. A subjunctive conditional is true if, in the ‘nearest’ worlds in which its antecedent is true, its consequence is true. This paper includes a discus-sion of Lewis’s ‘Humean’ ontology, the role alternative worlds play in Lewis’s account of modality, and an Aristotelian alternative.

Metaphysicians have argued that this idea [of a plurality of possible worlds] is perfectly respectable, indeed, that it is implicit in our prephi-losophical thinking about modal matters; and they have claimed that it provides the tools for clarifying not only the concept of de dicto modality (the notion of necessity or possibility as ascribed to a proposition), but also of de re modality (the notion of a thing’s exemplifying a property necessarily or contingently). (Loux 2002: 176)

I think that the possible worlds methodology has more than paid its dues. (Jackson 1998: 11)

We have come to think of the actual as one among many possible worlds. We need to repaint that picture. All possible worlds lie within the actual one. (Goodman 1955: 77)

The impact of the deployment of possible worlds has been a disaster for the philosophical ecosystem comparable to the aftermath of the introduc-tion of cane toads in Queensland. (Anon.)

i. preamble

WE ROUTINELY judge that something is possible or not, that something might have occurred or failed to occur, that, were something to happen, something else would happen. The italicized terms express modal con-

1 I am grateful to participants in my 2013 NEH Summer Seminar, ‘Metaphysics and Mind’, for inspiring this paper and particularly to Elizabeth Miller for perceptive com-ments on an earlier draft. My discussion of D. C. Williams owes much to Anthony Fisher and I am indebted to Daniel Nolan for help with David Lewis.

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john heil aristotelian supervenience

cepts. We deploy such concepts extensively and unselfconsciously in sci-ence and in everyday life. In so doing we seem often to express truths, modal truths. It is true, for instance, that, were you to drop this fragile vase it would shatter. It is true that you and I might not have existed. But if such assertions are true it is fair to ask what makes them true, to ask what the truthmakers might be for these and other modal assertions.

In what follows, I shall discuss modality and modal truths from two contrasting perspectives. I begin with an influential conception of modal discourse promoted by David Lewis. Lewis’s conception stems from a non-negotiable ‘Humean’ starting point, a picture of the universe as alto-gether lacking metaphysical connections among ‘distinct existences’. Such a universe would seem to want the resources needed to make modal truths true. In response to this deficit, Lewis introduces the apparatus of possible worlds or, as I prefer, alternative universes.2

You might think that Lewis intends these alternative universes to pro-vide truthmakers for modal assertions: modal truths concerning our uni-verse are made true by goings-on in other universes. It is unlikely that this is the best way to understand Lewis, however. Rather, truthmakers for modal truths generally are to be found here in our universe: the universe. Appreciation of this point will, I hope, lead to a clearer understanding of the liabilities of the Humean picture and pave the way to an appreciation of an Aristotelian alternative.3

ii. alternative universes

Few philosophers have had a greater impact on contemporary metaphys-ics than David Lewis. This is especially so for the metaphysics of modality. Philosophers today find it entirely natural to say that something is possible if it occurs in at least one alternative universe, necessary if it occurs in all, or all pertinent, universes. It is true that, had you dropped the vase you are clutching it would have shattered if, in the ‘nearest’, most similar uni-verses in which you (or someone very like you) drops the vase (or a very similar vase) it shatters. There is an infinity of universes. In some, laws of nature differ from those in our universe; in some, donkeys talk; in some, you and I were never born; in some, Old 97 makes it into Spencer on time.

A minority of philosophers who invoke alternative universes side with Lewis in regarding the alternatives as fully real. Most do not. Most regard

2 Talk of ‘possible worlds’ carries with it the illicit thought that the alternatives are merely possible, that they have a kind of attenuated existence that bestows ontological inno-cence.3 The alternative is Aristotelian in the way Lewis’s is Humean.

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john heil aristotelian supervenience draft paper

talk of alternative universes as a façon de parler useful, even indispensible, in regimenting modal concepts, but not to be taken literally. For these philosophers the you who drops the vase in a ‘nearby’ universe is the you who forbears dropping the vase in this universe, the ‘actual’ universe. For Lewis, in contrast, there is just the one you. Other universes include ‘coun-terparts’ of you and the vase, intrinsic duplicates of you and the vase, the careers of which closely resemble yours and the vase’s or so do for a time, then diverge.

Notice first that none of Lewis’s alternative universes, including ours, could have been other than it in fact is. Each alternative universe is a de-terminate four-dimensional ‘Humean mosaic’ of qualities. The universe we inhabit, one universe among many, is what it is. It could not have been otherwise. As Yogi Berra might put it, had our universe been otherwise, it would not have been our universe.

The difficulty now is to accommodate modal discourse, which evident-ly serves us well both in science and in everyday life, and to do so in a way that makes modal assertions something more than mere projections, to do so in a way that makes modal assertions objectively true or false. Might the laws of nature have been different? Might you have failed to exist? If the universe simply is what it is and is so of necessity, such questions could make no sense. Yet they seem to make sense. Indeed they seem to admit of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. How could this be so? Lewis provides guidance for those who accept a Humean ontology.

iii. humean modal discourse

In part owing to the influence of Lewis, philosophers today regard con-tingency as easy. Contingency rules. The universe is contingent provided there is at least one alternative universe.4 A constituent or feature of the universe is contingent provided there is at least one alternative universe that differs from our universe with respect to that constituent or feature. Given that there is no shortage of alternative universes, near universal contingency is assured.

This picture of unrelenting contingency, however, must be understood in concert with Lewis’s doctrine of ‘Humean supervenience’.

Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of neces-sary connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast

4 Might our universe have failed to exist? More dramatically, might there have been noth-ing – no universe at all – rather than something? Not according to Lewis (1986a: 73). The absence of the universe is literally an empty possibility. See also Heil 2013.

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mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing after anoth-er. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local matters are mental.) We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio–temporal distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or æther or fields, maybe both. And at these points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that. (1986b: ix–x)

So, on Lewis’s view, all the truths about the universe are made true by this Humean mosaic. Notice that there is no mention here of alternative universes. This is because modal truths, truths about what might have been, or what could or couldn’t be, are made true by the actual arrange-ment of qualities and the similarity or dissimilarity of this arrangement to alternative arrangements. This point will be important in what follows.

The passage quoted above echoes a sentiment voiced by one of Lewis’s teachers at Harvard, D. C. Williams, who puts it this way:

The world whole, I take at least as a working hypothesis, absolutely all there is, is a four-dimensional plenum of qualia in relations, eternally actual through and through. Its fundamental pattern, which all other structure presupposes, is that of whole and part: the Big It is not merely infinitely divisible, or virtually infinitely, but infinitely divided in the sense that it is the sum of countless actual parts, countlessly including, overlap-ping, and excluding one another, each part and each whole as genuinely real and individual, in the cardinal logical and ontological respects, as any whole which includes it, right up to the World All, and as any part which is included in it, right down to the ultimate indivisibles which have no proper parts, if such there be. Each of the parts thus intrinsically individuated, identical with itself and distinct from everything else, each thing, is related to each other part or thing, and to itself, in two fur-ther fundamental ways, by location, that is, the distances and directions which compose the four-dimensional spread, and by resemblance (with the proviso, in default of a better inclusive word, that ‘resemblances’ cov-ers both likeness and unlikeness).5

On such a view, there are no metaphysical constraints on possibility. The only sense in which something is possible or impossible is its being logically (or ‘linguistically’) possible or impossible. On such a view, there are no ‘grades’ of possibility or necessity. Modality is univocal—and su-premely unrevealing as to the nature of the universe, which is what it is, neither more nor less.

5 Williams 1959, 2–3. In the course of discussing possibilities in various places, Williams is even happy to invoke ‘possible worlds’; see, for instance 1953: 3, 7, 8 (1966: 74, 78, 80).

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The difficulty now is to find room for ordinary modal discourse. We commonly distinguish what is logically possible, what is consistently stat-able, from what is really possible, what is in fact possible. You could think of Lewis as aiming to provide a viable account aimed at making sense of these, and various other, modal distinctions within a Humean framework.

Lewis’s proposal is that we can distinguish logical from natural pos-sibility via the thought that something is naturally possible when its dif-ference from what is the case falls within acceptable limits. The limits are set by, among other factors, entrenched scientific theories. This, he thinks, accords with ordinary ways of thinking about possibilities.

Earlier I noted that few philosophers who appeal to alternative uni-verses in discussing metaphysical topics regard the alternatives as real. Multiverses aside, few think of the universe we inhabit as merely one among many. Lewis, in contrast, professes ‘modal realism’, according to which alternative universes are as real as the one in which we happen to reside: ‘I advocate a thesis of a plurality of worlds…which holds that our world is but one among many’ (1986: 2). The doctrine has struck most philosophers and all nonphilosophers as eccentric and unappealing. I am going to propose a way of understanding Lewis that might make modal realism, or something in the neighborhood of modal realism, more palat-able, even – for a Humean interested in accommodating modal discourse – attractive.

Suppose you followed Lewis’s Hume in thinking that there are no nec-essary connections in the universe. Considered four-dimensionally, the universe is an arrangement of pixel-like qualitative bits, each wholly in-dependent of the rest. The universe and everything in the universe is what it is. Everyday and scientific discourse, however, is rife with modal locu-tions. We speak of what would happen if you were to drop the vase or an electron were to move into the vicinity of another electron. We recognize what might have happened had Steve backed off Old 97’s throttle on ap-proaching the Danville trestle. We ponder what could and could not occur, and we distinguish logical possibility or impossibility from what is in fact, or really, or naturally possible or impossible. What in the universe could make such locutions true or false? What resources does the universe pro-vide to justify modal assertions? Modal discourse reveals something about the universe, but what?

We accept, reasonably it would seem, that you could have failed to ex-ist, or had different hair color, or been a different height. The elusiveness of truthmakers for these claims, however, apparently calls them into ques-tion. One possibility is that such claims are rarely, if ever, warranted. A second possibility is that the claims are engineered to express, not modal

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facts—there are no such facts—but facts about similarity. This is Lewis.

There is, as well, a third possibility. When you assert that you might have had another height, for instance, you do not take yourself to be call-ing on details of the circumstance of your genetic and biological devel-opment. Rather you are calling on causal–dispositional features of your developmental milieu. You tell a companion that the ball would roll if you nudged it. In saying this, you are expressing a belief about the ball’s capacities or powers. More precisely, your belief concerns the ball’s pow-ers and its circumstances as those circumstances bear on manifestations of the ball’s powers.

I mention this possibility in order to set it aside for the moment. In embracing Hume, Lewis forgoes powers. Truthmakers for assertions such as ‘the ball would roll’ could not be powers possessed by balls. What is the alternative? If you are a Humean, your only appeal is to similarity: the ball resembles similar balls known to have rolled when nudged in similar circumstances. Lacking powers, similarity is all you have. When, on a particular occasion, you think, ‘There but for the grace of God go I’, you recognize that the circumstances that led to the plight of some unfortunate are disturbingly similar to your own.

Enter alternative universes. Think of the space of logical possibilities as comprising universes differing from ours and from one another in one or more respects. The structure of this space is a wholly objective affair. It is what it is and its constituents are what they are quite independently of any thoughts you might have about it or its constituents. You can consider things being less or more different from the way they are. This provides an ordering of circumstances, an ordering of universes across a similarity space of universes.6

Now when you think, ‘Were I to stir this sugar into my cup of hot tea, the sugar would dissolve’, you are expressing your confidence that sugar dissolves in hot tea, a confidence based on the similarity of the envisaged occurrence to ones with which you are already familiar, either from per-sonal experience or by hearsay. Here is what Lewis says:

The character of our world…makes the counterfactual true. But it is only by bringing the other worlds into the story that we can say in any concise way what character it takes to make the counterfactual true. The other worlds provide a frame of reference whereby we can characterize our world. (1986a: 22)

So the role of alternative universes is to provide a ‘frame of reference’.

6 Williams speaks of ‘attribute spaces’; see Williams 1959, 1963, and Fisher, forthcoming.

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More generally, appeals to alternative universes equip us to spell out what we are doing when we make modal assertions about the universe as we find it.7

What of Lewis’s trademark ‘modal realism’, his assertion that the al-ternative universes are as real as the universe in which we find ourselves?

When I profess realism about possible worlds, I mean to be taken liter-ally. Possible worlds are what they are, and not some other thing. If asked what sort of thing they are, I cannot give the kind of reply my questioner probably expects: that is, a proposal to reduce possible worlds to some-thing else.

I can only ask him to admit that he knows what sort of thing our actual world is, and then explain that possible worlds are more things of that sort, differing not in kind but only in what goes on at them. (Lewis 1973: 85)

Put yourself in the place of someone with Humean sympathies self-consciously advancing a modal claim. In entertaining thoughts of alterna-tive situations, you are not thinking of purely imaginary or fictitious situ-ations, you are not thinking of Oz or Middle Earth, but of situations in a perfectly objective similarity space of situations that includes your own.

Lewis accepts that modal assertions have associated truth conditions and that it is perfectly objective whether these conditions obtain. But the role of the alternative universes is not to serve as truthmakers for modal statements. The truthmakers are to be found among features of the uni-verse we inhabit. These features are objectively similar or dissimilar to various alternative situations. If you tie realism to truth, then this is real-ism, or a kind of realism, about the alternative situations.

Is this all-out modal realism? Probably not. But it is close. Once you have the universe, the ‘actual’ universe, the alternative universes are fixed, their standing as more or less similar counterparts to the universe is per-fectly objective. If you consider just the space of alternative universes, the status of our universe in that space of alternatives is in no way privileged. From this perspective, in this frame of mind, all the universes are on a par: modal realism on the cheap, painless modal realism.8

7 David Armstrong (2004: 445–6) makes a similar point.8 I am borrowing the expression, ‘painless realism’, from Keith Campbell (1990: 43), who introduced it in a discussion of D. C. William’s conception of universals.

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iv. real contingency

Moving Lewis’s Humeanism temporarily to the back burner, reflect once more on contingency and on the fact that it is commonly supposed that contingency is easy, necessity hard. An ordinary truth about the universe is contingent until proved otherwise.

Recall two examples mentioned already: you might not have been born, the laws of nature might have been different. You and the laws of nature are contingent. But why think that? Could you have failed to be born? That is hard to say. For you not to have been born, the universe would have had to be different in myriad ways. But could it have been dif-ferent in all, or even very many of those ways? Do not say that the answer is easy: there are alternative universes, ‘possible worlds’ in which you were not born. That would just be to assert that your birth is contingent, the very point at issue.

What of the laws of nature? Are the laws contingent? I have no idea. The question is a broadly empirical one, not something a philosopher is in a position to ascertain just by imagining things’ behaving differently than they do. Claims about contingency must earn their keep. This is especially so when something’s being contingent plays a substantive role in a philo-sophical argument (see Heil 2013).

My first point, then, is that our access to truthmakers for modal truths pertaining to the universe is apparently fallible, no less so than our ac-cess to truthmakers for ordinary non-modal truths about the universe. A second point concerns the character of relations among distinct states of the universe. Scores of influential philosophers and their disciples fol-low Lewis and Lewis’s Hume in thinking that distinct entities are ‘entirely loose and separate’. Even philosophers who doubt that this is always so, exhibit a bias in favor of contingency: although the claim that A and B are necessarily connected requires defense, the claim that A and B are only contingently related is awarded a free pass.

When you engage in serious ontology, however, there are no free pass-es.

Philosophers of a Humean bent point to causal relations as obviously, paradigmatically contingent: causes and effects are clearly loose and sepa-rate.

Really? Although I will not endeavor to argue the point in detail here, I believe there are excellent reasons to think that causation is robustly non-contingent, at least if causal relations are understood as bringings about.

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Suppose A’s bring about B’s, but only sometimes. It would be natural to think that when an A does bring about a B, the A does so with the help of some third factor, C, missing in cases in which B fails to occur. So it is really A together with C that brings about B. But suppose this is not so, suppose that A’s bring about B’s on some occasions, but not others. When they do, there is no further factor, no hidden variable. When an A occurs, accompanied by a B, nothing differs from a case in which A occurs in the absence of a B. In what sense, then, could an A be said ever to bring about a B?

I regard cases of this latter sort as close to incoherent.9 You will not be impressed if you are used to characterizing causation in terms of coun-terfactual dependence, or in terms of probability-raising. If you want to replace causal talk with talk of counterfactuals, however, I invite you to explain what you think the truthmakers are for the pertinent counterfac-tuals. If you think of causality as probability raising, I suspect that you are thinking of very complex cases in which it is difficult or impossible to comprehend endless contributing factors. If not, then I invite you to ex-plain what happens when a cause does bring about an effect.

Doesn’t physics tell us that physical processes, or some physical pro-cesses, are non-deterministic? When a radium atom decays, it does so non-deterministically. There is no cause of its decaying when it does. Let this be so. In that case, what physics tells us is that some occurrences are sponta-neous, some events are uncaused, some movers unmoved.

Here we arrive at a source of genuine contingency: spontaneity. If the decay of a radium atom at a particular moment is spontaneous, it is con-tingent that the atom decayed at that moment. If the Big Bang was in fact the result of a spontaneous fluctuation in the vacuum, then the universe is contingent. (At least the universe is contingent provided a distinct sponta-neous fluctuation would have spawned a distinct universe.) Notice, how-ever, that whether any of these things is so is not something that could be ascertained by conjuring alternative universes. There is a fact of the mat-ter, although perhaps one we could never be in a position to discern.

Let me pull the preceding comments together. Suppose that causation is flatly non-contingent. Start with the idea of the causal structure of the universe as a vast network of causal interactions, an evolving three-dimen-sional web, not a one-dimensional chain. Nothing within this causal web is contingent. Now introduce here and there spontaneous—genuinely con-tingent—occurrences. Contingency, in the form of uncaused causes and 9 And so might a Humean, not because the imagined case makes bringings about mysteri-ous, but because causal relations are instances of true universal generalizations, and this one is not.

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their effects proliferates throughout the system. If the Big Bang was itself spontaneous or if it was the product of some spontaneous occurrence, then the universe as a whole is contingent. The contingency in play, however, is not unconstrained, anything goes contingency. Roughly, something—your birth, for instance—is contingent if the conditions responsible for it include spontaneous elements.

Is it contingent that you were born? If the universe is contingent, if the Big Bang was spontaneous, then everything in the universe would inherit the universe’s contingency. It is another question whether laws of nature are contingent and whether, given the Big Bang, given the universe, an oc-currence in the universe is contingent. If physics is right, if spontaneous occurrences are ubiquitous, and if such occurrences breed contingency, it is a good bet that your birth is contingent. It does not follow, however that features you appear to possess accidentally—your determinate height, your hair color, your tastes and talents—are contingent in the sense that you might have been different in these respects. That will depend on features of the unimaginably complex causal matrix from which you emerged.

You might suspect that my harping on contingency misses the point. The universe is what it is, to be sure, but there could have been another, perhaps very different, universe, or even no universe at all.

But what warrants this thought? What reason do you have for think-ing some other universe could have existed in place of this one? Whether that is so is not something you can simply eyeball or stipulate. What con-straints does being place on universes? Our best attempts to answer this question are going to require appeals to fundamental physics, but there is no guarantee that answers will be forthcoming. Under the circumstances, the appropriate attitude is a suspension of judgment and a recognition that contingency must be earned.

So much for the ontological preliminaries. Much more would need to be said to make any of this fully respectable. Perhaps, however, you will at least agree that, if modal truths are made true by features of the universe, truthmakers for these truths are going to be elusive: difficult or, at times, impossible to pin down.

But now we face an apparent puzzle. We seem happy to endorse coun-terfactual claims and accept the contingency of all sorts of conditions that could easily turn out to be anything but. Modal discourse plays an im-portant role in everyday and scientific descriptions and explanations of goings on around us. We are apparently justified in many of our modal assertions, we accept many such assertions as true, but it is hard to see how this could be so, or how we could ever be warranted in thinking it

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so, given what I have said about the elusive character of truthmakers for modal truths.

For a Humean, modal discourse must be founded on similarities. Ear-lier I briefly mentioned one non-Humean alternative according to which modal discourse is made true by powerful ways the universe is. The time has come to look more closely at this alternative.

5. aristotelian modal realism

Suppose I am right, suppose contingency is not easy. The thought that the universe or some feature of the universe is contingent expresses a substan-tive thesis in need of defense. Physics gives us reason to think that some occurrences are uncaused, spontaneous. Spontaneity, I suggested, is one source, perhaps the only source, of genuine contingency.10 The universe is contingent if the universe resulted from a spontaneous occurrence—a cataclysmic uncaused fluctuation in the quantum vacuum, for instance. The universe might or might not be contingent. The jury is still out.

Even if the universe were not contingent, particular features of the universe would themselves be contingent to the extent that they issue from spontaneous occurrences—the spontaneous decay of unstable elements, for instance, or spontaneous fluctuations in the vacuum, or in space itself. If this is right, the answer to the question whether the universe or some particular feature of the universe is contingent would be nontrivial.

Let us suppose, what we cannot but suppose, that the universe includes substances and properties. Properties are fully particular ways substances are, and every substance is some way or other. Substance and property are correlative categories. This much we know. What we do not know, or know with certainty, is what the substances and properties are. For this we need fundamental physics, which remains a work in progress.

Williams’s and Lewis’s properties are particular inert qualities. On the rival Aristotelian conception, properties are powerful qualities, qualities of substances that empower those substances in distinctive ways. The die is cubical. In virtue of being cubical, the die would tumble or slide (not smoothly roll) down an incline, would make a concave square impression in the carpet, would look cubical, would feel cubical. The die’s cubic-ity is a quality, but not merely a quality. The die’s cubicity is a powerful quality. What the die would do in various circumstances depends on its entire compliment of powers and on powers possessed by everything with

10 There is a theological option. The universe might be contingent if it were the result of God’s free choice. Even here, however, the choice in question would need to be spontane-ous and not, for instance, an inevitable consequence of God’s divine nature.

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which it interacts. The die’s powers would manifest themselves in particu-lar ways with particular kinds of reciprocal power. Such manifestings are continuous, symmetrical affairs.

Think of a spoonful of sugar dissolving in a cup of hot tea. The sugar and tea interact cooperatively to yield a dissolving. The dissolving is the mutual manifesting of powers of the tea and the sugar working together. Every manifesting of this kind constitutes a causal nexus. To the extent that causings are bringings about, causing is continuous and symmetrical. There is a before and an after. The sugar must be placed in the tea before a dissolving occurs. Once the dissolving occurs, the sugar is dissolved in the tea, the tea sweetened. There is the state of the universe prior to the dissolving, the dissolving, and the state of the universe once the dissolving has occurred.

A power’s identity depends on what the power is a power for. In most cases, a power is a power for different kinds of manifestation with differ-ent kinds of reciprocal manifestation partner, different kinds of reciprocal power. Suppose that A is a power to manifest itself in way M with a B: M is a mutual manifestation of A and B. Then, if you have A and B (suitably related: the sugar is in the tea), you have M. This means that the manifest-ing of powers is internally related to those powers: if you have the relata, you have the relation.

The case is underdescribed and on that account likely to mislead. It seems possible to introduce additional factors that will block or prevent A and B from yielding M. By adding a particular chemical to a cup of tea, you might prevent the sugar’s dissolving: you have A and B, but no M. You do not have nothing, however. The addition of new powers yields a different kind of manifestation, one that does not include the sugar’s dis-solving. Given the powers on hand, however, you have a particular kind of manifestation.

Instead of thinking of the universe as a four-dimensional distribution of impotent qualities, think of it as a distribution of powerful qualities. The universe unfolds as the powers mutually manifest themselves, yielding new distributions of powers that mutually manifest themselves, yielding in turn new distributions of powers. Now stir in a measure of spontane-ity by including powers the manifestation of which requires no recipro-cal partner. Once spontaneous manifestings enter the picture, contingency propagates throughout the system. The universe so considered provides all the truthmakers you need for the truths that have truthmakers. This is Aristotelian supervenience.11

11 Why supervenience? I use the term because Lewis does, and I am offering an alternative to Lewis. In fact talk of supervenience in this context is a potentially misleading substitute

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Whither modality? For Lewis and Williams, given that the universe is as it is, its features are in no way contingent. For this universe to exist is for it to have these features, features it could not have failed to have. The Humean universe as a whole is contingent if its existence is a brute fact.12 Given the universe, however, its features are contingent only in being in-dependent of one another. No feature itself necessitates or is necessitated by any other feature.

The alternative is to allow internal connections among features of the universe. This is what happens when you replace impotent qualities with powerful qualities. Now features of the universe cease to be independent. Successive states of the universe are determined by their predecessors: if you have the states, you have their successors.

Except when you don’t. Physics tells us that some powers manifest themselves spontaneously. The occurrence of spontaneous manifestings of powers infects the whole with contingencies.

6. aristotelian modal discourse

I have sketched a way of understanding Lewis’s deployment of alternative universes that yields a Humean understanding of the semantics of everyday modal discourse, and I have offered an Aristotelian competitor. The Aris-totelian option, however, appears to require a kind of ‘two level’ account of modality. On the one hand, there are the ‘deep’ modal truths made true by ways the universe is. On the other hand, there are the everyday modal truths the aim of which is more modest. Such discourse expresses beliefs about the contributions various powers make to their possessors.

You might think that a ‘two level’ conception of modal discourse would be a liability: Lewis has just the one, supremely parsimonious level. But is this right? On Lewis’s view, the deep truth about the universe is that it is as it is. Against this background Lewis offers a semantics for everyday modal discourse grounded in similarity.

As I see it, the difference between the modal picture offered by Lewis and the alternative sketched here, lies in their respective ontologies of the universe as it we find it. Lewis’s universe comprises a de facto distribu-tion of simple, impotent qualities. The alternative is a universe of power-

for talk of truthmaking. Thus construed, supervenience is not a relation among proper-ties or states of the universe. It is a cross-categorial relation between a representation, a truth bearer, and some way the universe is, the way that makes the representation true.12 The matter is nontrivial. For Lewis, if any universe exists they all do. The absence of a universe is not an option.

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ful qualities.13 Such a universe provides the resources to account for and make sense of both ‘levels’ of modal discourse. Lewis, of course, can do the same. It all boils down to the relative plausibility of the two compet-ing conceptions of the universe: the ‘Humean’ conception of a universe comprising inert, passive qualities, and an ‘Aristotelian’ universe of inter-related powers. And here, there is no contest.

Department of PhilosophyWashington University in St. Louis

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13 To my knowledge, Lewis does not discuss substances. One possibility is that Lewis’s qualities are qualities of space–time. That would make space–time the substance. An-other possibility is that he is thinking of qualities as Williams does: qualities are ‘tropes’, free-standing qualities contained in space–time. The difficulty for such a view, a difficulty well-recognized by the medievals, is that free-standing qualities are indistinguishable from substances. They are red, or spherical, or warm somethings. And a something that is red, or spherical, or warm is a substance.

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references

Armstrong, D. M. (2004) ‘Through the Open Door Again’. In J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, eds. Causation and Counterfactuals. Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press): 445–57.

Campbell, K. (1990) Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Fisher, A. R. J. (Forthcoming) ‘David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century’. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

Heil, J. (2012) The Universe as We Find It. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Heil, J. (2013) ‘Contingency’. In T. Goldschmidt, ed. The Puzzle of Exis-tence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? (London: Routledge): 167–81.

Jackson, F. C. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Concep-tual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis, D. K. (1973) Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sity Press.

Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Lewis, D. K. (1986b) Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press.

Loux, M. J. (2002) Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge.

Williams, D. C. (1953) ‘On the Elements of Being’. Review of Metaphysics 7: 3–18, 171–92. Reprinted as ‘The Elements of Being’ in Williams (1966): 74–109.

Williams, D. C. (1959/1986) ‘Universals and Existents’. A paper delivered to the Yale Philosophy Club and published posthumously in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1986): 1–14.

Williams, D. C. (1963) ‘Necessary Facts’. Review of Metaphysics 16: 601–26.

Williams, D. C. (1966) Principles of Empirical Realism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

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