john s. dryzek - deliberative democracy in divided societies-alternatives to agonism and analgesia

8/13/2019 John S. Dryzek - Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies-Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia

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Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and AnalgesiaAuthor(s): John S. DryzekSource: Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 218-242Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038413.

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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACYIN DIVIDED SOCIETIESAlternatives to Agonism and AnalgesiaJOHN S. DRYZEKAustralianNational University

For contemporarydemocratictheorists,democracy is largely a matterof deliberation. But therecent rise of deliberativedemocracy(in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever moreprominent dentitypolitics, sometimesin murderousorm in deeplydivided societies. Thisessayconsiders howdeliberativedemocracycanprocess thetoughestissues concerning mutuallycon-tradictoryassertionsof identity.After considering the alternative answersprovided byagonistsand consociationaldemocrats, he author makes the casefor a power-sharingstate with attenu-ated sovereigntyanda moreengageddeliberativepolitics in apublic spherethat is semidetachedfrom the state and situatedtransnationally.Keywords: deliberativedemocracy;consociational democracy; agonism; identitypolitics;ethnic conflict

I. DEMOCRACYCONFRONTS DENTITYCONFLICTSDemocracyis todaya near-universalvalidating principleforpolitical sys-tems. Andaccording o contemporarydemocratictheorists,at least since the

early 1990s, democracy s largely,though not exclusively, a matterof delib-eration. Democratic practice too has witnessed a range of deliberativeinnovations.The samedecade thatsaw the rise and rise of deliberativedemocracyalsosaw identitypoliticsprominent,sometimes in murderous orm.Identitypoli-

AUTHOR'SNOTE:Previousversionsof thisarticle werepresentedto theConferenceon Delib-erativeDemocracyandSensitiveIssues at the University OfAmsterdam,March25-26, 2003, theSocial and PoliticalTheoryProgramat AustralianNational University,and theDepartmentofPolitical Science at the Universityof North Carolina. For commentsI thankTjitskeAkkerman,John Forester,BoraKanra,Ilan Kapoor,StephenLeonard,ChristianList,GerryMackie,ClausOffe,BenjaminReilly,MarkWarren, nd Iris Young.POLITICALTHEORY,Vol.33 No. 2, April 2005 218-242DOI: 10. 1177/0090591704268372c 2005 Sage Publications218


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Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY 219

tics, including the murderousvariety,are hardlynew. But as the cold warworld orderfell apart,the political gap was often filled by assertions anddenials of identity. Religious fundamentalismsshowed renewed vigor, inoppositionto eachotheras well as whatBenjaminBarber alls McWorld. 'I considerhow deliberativedemocracycanprocesswhatarearguablythetoughest kinds of political issues, the mutuallycontradictoryassertions ofidentity that define a divided society. The assertions in question mightinvolve nationalism (Republicans and Unionists in NorthernIreland;anynumberof separatistmovements),combinationsof religiousand ethnic con-flicts (Palestinians versus Israelis), and religious versus secular forces(Islamic fundamentalismagainst Western liberalismon the global stage;IslamistsversussecularistsinTurkeyandAlgeria;Christianundamentalistsversusliberalism n theUnitedStates).Thebasicproblem n all these cases isthatone identitycan only be validatedor,worse, constitutedby suppressionof another.RadicalIslamistscannot live in or with a McWorld.A state thatwas no longera Jewish stateforged in strugglewouldbe anathemato manyIsraelis.Christianfundamentalistsregardthe politicalpresenceof gays andlesbiansnotjust as anirritantbutas a standingaffront o whothey are. A mul-tinationalsociety is notjust a policy opposedby militantSerbnationalists,itis a perceivedattackon theircore political being.Deliberationacrossdivided identitiesis hard.Onawidelysharedaccount,deliberation s whatBessette calls the mildvoice of reason 2-exactly whatis lacking in tough identity issues, at best an aspiration or how opponentsmight one day learn to interact once their real differences are dissolved.Deliberativedemocratsinfluenced by Rawls mightfollow him in excludingthe backgroundculture from the purview of public reason. But, asBenhabib points out, issues generated by the backgroundculture and itscomprehensive doctrines can be especially pressing.3 Gutmann andThompsonbelieve that deliberationcan be extendedto deepmoral disagree-ments, but the preconditionis commitmenton all sides to reciprocity, thecapacityto seek fair termsof cooperationfor its own sake, such thatargu-mentsaremade in termsthe otherside(s) can accept.4Again,mutualaccep-tance of reasonablenessis exactly what is lackingin dividedsocieties.Gutmannand Thompson require adoption by all sides of a particularmoralpsychology--openness to persuasionby criticalargument-that is infact not widely held, and explicitly rejectedby (say) fundamentalistChris-tians.5Moreover,they apply the reasonablenessstandard o the content ofcontributionsto debate, not just the motivationof speakers.Thus they arevulnerable to criticism from difference democrats such as Young, whoaccepts reasonablenessas a norm for motivationbut not for'the content ofstatements,because thatinvolves suppressionof alternative ommunicative


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forms.6Moreradical difference democratsand agonists see deliberation intermsof theerasureof identity,a form of communicationstuck in neutral hatdoes not recognize difference, partial in practice to well-educated whitemales, especiallywhen itprizestheunitarypublicreason advancedby Rawlsand his followers.Those assertingidentities for theirpart may feel insultedby the veryidea thatquestions going to their core be deliberated.Whattheywant is instead cathartic communication that unifies the group anddemandsrespectfrom others.7I arguefor a discursivedemocracythat can handledeep differences.Thekey involvespartiallydecouplingthe deliberativeand decisional momentsofdemocracy, ocatingdeliberation in engagementof discourses in the publicsphere at a distancefrom the sovereign state. I approachthis argumentbyexamining two very different responses to divided societies. The first isagonistic, seeking robustexchange across identities. The recent history ofagonism owes much to Hannah Arendt, William Connolly, and BonnieHonig,8butI focus on the work of ChantalMouffe, because she explicitlyadvocatesagonism againstdeliberativedemocracy in pluralsocieties. Thesecond response is consociational, seeking suppression of interchangethrough agreementamong well-meaning elites. I do not treatthese two asstrawman extremes between which a moderatepath should be sought.Indeed, I arguethat a defensible discursive democracyfor divided societiescan developelements of both.

II. AGONISMThe agonistic chargeis thatdeliberativedemocracy is incapableof pro-cessing deepdifference.Mouffearguesthatthemain taskfordemocracyis toconvert antagonisminto agonism, enemies into adversaries,fighting intocriticalengagement.9Deep difference is accompanied by passions that, shebelieves,cannotbe resolvedbydeliberation,committedas it is torationalisticdenial of passionandthepursuitof consensus that npracticeboth masks andservespower.Heralternative s agonistic pluralism nvolving a vibrantclashof democraticpoliticalpositions. '1 Theprimetask of democraticpolitics isnot to eliminatethe passions,.. . but to mobilise these passions towards thepromotionof democraticdesigns. Acceptance of the legitimacy of thepositions of others comes not through being persuadedby argument,butthrough opennessto conversionas a result of a particularkind of democraticattitude.12 he outcome is not agreementbut ratherrelationshipsthatcom-bine continuedcontestationwith deep respectfor theadversary-indeed it is


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noteasy to speakin termsof outcomes. Mouffe (likeGutmannandThomp-son) is vulnerable to questions about where exactly the required attitudeshould come from, especially where groups assertingidentity themselvesfeaturehierarchyandrepression. 'While acceptingMouffe's identificationof the needto transformantago-nism into, if not agonism, at least more civilized engagementas the primarytask for democracyin divided societies, I differ fromheron threegrounds.The first is in the content of critical interchange.Mouffe wants this inter-changeto be energized by core identities,otherwisepassionis missing. Yet,paradoxically, dentitiesfor Mouffe have to be fluid to the extent of enablingthoroughconversionin one group'sattitude o another.But if identities them-selves arehighlighted, exchange is more likely to freeze identitiesthan con-vert them. As Foresterpoints out, being respectfulof others is one thing;acceptingat face valueclaims thatpreferencesand interestsare in fact basicvalues is quite another,requiringa morechallengingorderof problemsolv-ing.14If interchangeis to move beyond confrontationand stalemate, then,Foresterargues,the focus should be on the specific needsof the parties,noton the articulationand scrutinyof generalvalue systems. His example con-cerns gay activists and fundamentalistChristiansmeetingover HIV/AIDScarein Colorado.The lastthingthat needs to be done is to reinforcemutuallyhostile identities;forexample,by debatingwhether t is legitimateto treattheHIV/AIDS issue in the moral termsfavoredby theChristians,as opposed tothe public health termsfavoredby the gays. But if individualscan listen toeachothers'stories,they mightat least acceptone another's pecific needs-which can be reconciled, even when value systems and identities cannot.This is a kind of reciprocalrecognition,butnot thekindof vibrantexchangeof passions proposedby Mouffe.A second departurerom Mouffe involvesthewaydeliberativenteractionis conceptualized.Mouffe may be right thatdeliberation n the image of aphilosophy seminar-dispassionate and reasoned-cannot handledeep dif-ference.However,it is possible to formulatean accountof discursive democ-racythat is more contestatorythanthis image, so morerobust in the face ofdeep difference.Third,Mouffe's interpretation f themain taskof democracyhas no obvi-ous place for collective decision making and resolutionof social problems.She scornsconsensus as acoverforpower,but at least consensusimplies thatdecisions can get made. When agonistic pluralismdoes attendto collectivedecisions, it is only to point to the need for them to be open to furthercontestation.I explore a way to combine criticalengagementand collectivedecision, but this requiresa differentiationof the ways politics can be con-


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ductedin differentsites. While Mouffe emphasizesthe varietyof sites (cul-ture, workplace, home, school, etc.), for her the content of politics isundifferentiated, verywhereagonistic.

III.ANALGESIA:CONSOCIATIONAL EMOCRACYA very different sort of criticism of deliberativedemocracy's ability to

process divisive issues follows fromarguments hatthey should be removedfrom contentious democratic debate altogether. From this perspective,Mouffe's assertionthat a well functioning democracy calls for a vibrantclash of democraticpolitical positions is naive,15or vibrantclashes riskdisintegration.Such is the basis of Lijphart'sclaims for consociationaldemocracy,an agreementbetween the leaders of each bloc to sharegovern-ment, involving grandcoalition, segmental autonomy,proportionality,andminorityveto. l6Lijphartbelieves consociationalism is theonly workabletype of democracyin deeply divided societies. 'Neither Lijphartnor hissympathizershave taken on deliberativedemocracyin these terms-illustra-tion of the chasm between democratic theoristsand studentsof real-worlddemocraticdevelopment.But it is not hardto deduce whatthey ought to sayabout deliberativepolitics.Lijphartpoints to success stories where a consociational approachhasdefused religiousand/orethnicconflicts, such as his own Netherlands,Aus-tria, Switzerland,Malaysia,SouthAfrica in the 1994 to 1996 transition romapartheid,andIndia.(Fewof thesecases actuallymeetall four of his definingcriteria for consociationalism.) But conflict resolution is achieved at theexpense of several dimensionsprized by democratictheorists,includingthedeliberativedimension. Elections have little meaning, as the same set ofleaders will govern rrespectiveof theresult.Moreover,contentiousdelibera-tion occursonly between the leaders of differentblocs, and even thenmostlyin secret(forfear of inflaming publics), rulingout much of a role for parlia-mentarydebate. The political communication of ordinarypeople is shep-herded ntowithin-blocchannels whereit can do littledamage.Thischannel-ing obstructsany kind of deliberative still less agonistic interaction acrossdifferentblocsbelow theelite level, because segmentalautonomy s basic.Consociation precludes any role that public deliberation construed associal learning might play in reconciliation in divided societies. But asKaufmanpointsout, ethnic hatredsare the productof symbolic politics inparticularpoliticalcircumstances.' As such, they arelearned,and so can beunlearnedor transformed,19hough that can be an uphill task in the face of


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persistentnegativeunderstandingsandmyths.In thislight,by freezing cleav-ages, a consociational regime may actually reinforceor, worse, create thekindof conflict it is designedto solve.20A deliberativedemocratwould hopethatreflection stimulatedby interactioncouldcontribute o less vicious sym-bolic politics, not tiedto mythsof victimhoodanddestiny.Segmentalauton-omy precludes such a politics, because deliberationconfined within seg-ments succumbs to Sunstein's law of group polarization. 21 ebate leadsonly to the groupposition's becoming moreextreme,as individualsget theirprejudicesconfirmedin talk with like-mindedothers.

IV TOWARDA DELIBERATIVE ESPONSEAgonists believe deliberativedemocracycannot dealwithdivisive issuesbecause it is too constraining in the kind of communication it allows.Consociationalistsbelieve deliberativedemocracycannotdeal with divisiveissues because it is too open to diverse claims and claimants. Deliberative

democracycan be defended against both sides, but it has to take them seri-ously, and be prepared o takeelements from each.On theface of it thisoughtto be impossible, given theirdiametricopposition.Thekey is a differentia-tion of political sites within a society that agonists and consociationalistsalikehave notcontemplated: he formerbecausetheyaddressonly politics inthe abstractrather hanits institutionalspecifics, the latterbecause they seeonly a politics tightly attachedto the state. Deliberativedemocracycan pro-cess contentiousissues in a politics of engagementin thepublicsphere,evenif it has problems doing so when it comes to deliberation within theinstitutionsof the state.In this light, a conception of discursive democracyin terms of a publicspherethat s home to constellationsof discoursescan bebrought o bear.22Adiscourse can be understoodas a sharedway of makingsense of the worldembeddedin language.Thusany given discoursewill be definedby assump-tions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities.These sharedtermsenable subscribersto a given discourseto recognizeand convert sen-sory inputsinto coherentaccounts of situations.These accounts can then beshared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion. Thus discourses featurestorylines, involving opinions aboutfacts and values. Familiarexamples ofsuch discourses include market liberalism (dominantin global economicaffairs) and sustainabledevelopment (ubiquitousin environmentalaffairs).The contentof collective decisions dependsstrongly(butnotexclusively) onthe relativeweight of competing discourses in a domain.For example, the


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content of criminal ustice policy varies with the weight of discourses stress-ing, respectively, hepsychopathologyof the criminalmind,rationalcalcula-tion of the costs and benefitsof criminal actsby perpetrators, nd the circum-stances of povertythat lead individuals to a life of crime. Theengagementofdiscourses and itsprovisionaloutcomes are democraticto thedegreetheyareunder dispersed nfluence of competent actors,as opposed to manipulationby propagandists, pindoctors,andcorporateadvertisers.The possibility ofcontestationand engagement means discourses have to be treated as lesstotalizing andconstrainingthan some followers of Michel Foucaultclaim.Discoursesmust be amenableto reflection,if only atthe margins.Therequi-site communicationis deliberation not agonism because it is oriented topersuasionrather hanconversion,and it retains some connection (howeverloose) to collective decision.Some recent reatmentsof deliberativedemocracydo, then,meet theago-nist's critique.23Agonists see deliberation as deadening and biased in thekind of communicationit allows. But the engagement of discourses canaccommodatemany kinds of communication beyond reasoned argument,including rhetoric, testimony, performance, gossip, and jokes. However,three tests mustbe appliedto secure theintersubjectiveunderstandingprizedby deliberativedemocrats.Once we move beyond ritualisticopenings, com-munication is requiredto be first, capable of inducing reflection; second,noncoercive;and third,capable of linking the particularexperience of anindividualorgroupwith some more generalpoint or principle.24The last ofthese three criteria s crucial when it comes to identity politics gone bad. Aharrowingstoryof (say) rapeand murder n a Bosnian village can be told interms of guiltof one ethnic group and violated innocence of another-fuelfor revenge.But thestorycan also be toldinterms of violation of basicprinci-ples of humanity hatapply to all ethnicities, making reconciliationat leastconceivable (thoughnot easy).How can this discursive approachbe applied to divided societies? Tobegin, takingidentities seriously means allowing different communicativeforms thatcan accompany particular dentities;this is Young's connection.However,thisrecognitionoften helps little when it comes to deeply dividedsocieties, because,as Moore points out, societies deeply divided in identityare often notdivided at all in culture.25Culturally, here are few differencesbetween Catholics and Protestants n NorthernIreland,and between Serbs,Croats,andtheworld's most secular Muslim communityin formerYugosla-via. Itis, then,amistaketo treat dentityconflicts as merelya matterof multi-culturalism.This treatmentof identity in terms of cultureextends even toBenhabib'sdefense of universalist deliberativedemocracy against cultural


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relativism.26 he acceptsthat culturehas become a ubiquitoussynonym foridentity,an identitymarkeranddifferentiator, 27ven as she pleadsfor rec-ognitionof the radicalhybridityandpolyvocalityof allcultures 28hatfacili-tates deliberation both within and across groups.29Identitiesare boundup with discourses. It is in this sense thatnations arein BenedictAnderson's terms imaginedcommunities, 30heproductof dis-courses, not genes, not culture.But how can reflectiveengagement acrossdiscourses move beyondthe vain hopes of agonists when identitiesareonlyasserted dogmatically and so relativistically,fueled by existential resent-ments?31

Engagement is less likely to end in hostility if the focus is on specificneeds (e.g., security, education) ratherthan general values. An examplecomes fromTurkey,whereheadscarveswornby youngIslamic women werelong a symbolic marker hatexcluded them from secular Turkish universi-ties. Beginning in 2002, a reframingof the issue in terms of the educationneeds of young women andthecharacterof educationas a basic humanrightgained ground, and the issue looked less intractable.Avoidanceof head-onconfrontationmeans the otherside is less easily accusedof a hiddenagendato capture he state,and one's own side cannotso easilyclaimalone to repre-sent thepeople or safeguardthe polity.32Deveaux worries that the emphasison particularneeds she advocates willbe rejectedby deliberativedemocrats because of its inconsistencywith uni-versalistpublic reason.33But particularneeds are often amenableto expres-sion intermsof moregeneralprinciples.Eventhe materialadvantageof (say)patriarchsn a culturalgroupcan be argued n termsof stabilityandcontinu-ity. And public reasonitself can be plural.34

A deeper problemin emphasizingneeds is thatsomeneedscan be manip-ulatedto justify hostility. Notably, advocatesof ethniccleansing in the for-merYugoslaviaarguedthat t was necessaryto ensurethebasicneed of secu-rity,at leastfor theirown side. Butsucharguments ouldresonateonly withintheirown ethnicgroup.Demagogues can manipulateneeds-talk n a destruc-tive direction,just as they can manipulateanyotherkind of talk. A focus onneeds is likely to contributeto conflict resolutiononly in the context of anengaged dialogue across difference, but not when communication issegmented within groups.Deliberativerituals and indirectcommunication(as opposed to confron-tation)also have roles to play in reconstructingrelationships.Foresterdem-onstratesthe importanceof (say) small talk between erstwhile opponentsover a sharedmeal with no explicit connectionto the issueathand.35Experi-ments with n-personprisoner'sdilemmas show thateven a periodof irrele-


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vantdiscussioncan increase theincidenceof subsequentcooperativebehav-ior.36 o evencheaptalkcanhelpmoderateconflict, though by itself such talkis insufficientto producethe requisite engagement across discourses.

V DEMOCRACYAND THE STATE N DIVIDED SOCIETIESI turnnow from the what o the where of deliberation,beginningby

pointingto thedesirabilityof loosening the connection between the delibera-tion and decision momentsof democracyin a divided society. Such loosen-ing resists one strongcurrent n deliberative democratictheory,which seesthe properhome for deliberation in the institutions of the sovereign state,such as legislatures,courts,public inquiries,committees, andadministrativetribunals.To see why a degreeof separation s desirable,consider whathap-pens when deliberationand decision arejoined in the context of divisiveidentity.Mainly,decision overwhelms deliberation-especially when decision istied to sovereignauthority.Since the peace of Westphaliain 1648, sover-eignty has had an all-or-nothingcharacter.Westphaliaestablished the normof noninterference n internalaffairs andtheprinciplethat thereligion of theprince s thereligionof the state.At thetime inEurope,religionwas themain,almost sole, identity that mattered. Later, identity came also to involvenationality,ethnicity,and class, but the idea of one identity per state per-sisted. Identity ssues could become intractable n the context of the politicsof the state:the game is all or nothing.The very worstrepressionof competing identities has often come fromactors'struggling o securetheirhold over the state,and the state's hold oversociety. As Rae demonstrates,episodes rangingfrom expulsion and forcedconversionof Jews in fifteenth-centurySpain to the Armeniangenocide inTurkey oethniccleansinginformerYugoslavia n the 1990s can all be attrib-uted tostate-building lites.37These elites pursue pathologicalhomogeniza-tion to secure a mass identityto accompanyandbolsterthe incipient state.ContraHobbes, it is leviathan under construction that creates murder andmisery,rather hancurbingthem.Electoraldemocracydoes not solve matters,and may exacerbate them.The game becomes one of ensuring that the state is defined to ensure thatone's favored dentitywill winkey votes. This definition caninvolvedrawingphysicalboundariesormanipulating he electoralsystem orgerrymanderingorusingsuffragerestrictions e.g., measures takento stopAfricanAmericansfromvotinginthe AmericanSouth,rangingoverpropertyqualifications, it-eracy tests, andexclusion of those with a criminalrecord).


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Despite these difficulties, Horowitz's and Reilly's analyses are a stepbeyond Schumpeterianminimalistaccounts of the establishmentof stableelectoral democracy. Przeworski argues that the stability of an electoraldemocracyrests on losers'acceptingdefeatin theexpectationthattheymightbe able to win in a subsequentelection,or becausetheyfear theconsequencesof the breakdownof order morethan those of defeat.44Horowitz andReillyshow exactly why such acceptance maybe facilitatedby voting systems thatdrawthe stingfrom defeatby inducing victors to moderation. Some kindofpreferentialvoting is clearly best for divided societies. My point is simplythatelectoralengineeringis not enough, because there is so much more topolitics thanelections.How else, then, might deliberative democrats respond to the challengeposed by adeadlynumbersgame?At one level they could pintheirhopes onthe civilizing force of deliberationto defuse conflict (and so provide oneessential precondition or preferentialvoting to work). But now the familiarscale problemarises: deliberation,at least of the face-to-face varietycon-nectedtightlyto stateauthority, anonly ever be for the few.Perhaps herearea few representativeswho mightbe so civilized, butin a politics of mass vot-ing tightlyconnectedto definitionof the sovereign state, theycanall too eas-ily be overwhelmedby demagogues. Thus in NorthernIreland,the Demo-cratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein still prosper at the expense of,respectively,the moremoderate Official Unionists and Social DemocraticLabourParty--even at a time whencompromiseis in the Northern rishair asneverbefore, andthe paramilitarieson both sides have laid down (most of)theirarms.

VI.LOCATINGDELIBERATIONN THE PUBLICSPHEREA moreradicaldiscursivedemocraticresponsewould askwhy democracyand deliberationmust be joined to head counting and sovereign authority.Consociationaliststake a step in this direction on the head-countingdimen-sion, because they suppressvoting's connection to collective decision. Butthey do notescape the difficulties associated with constructionof sovereign

authority by constitutional settlement. Consociationalism is thereforevul-nerableto Horowitz'spessimismconcerninganykind of institutionaldesign(including centripetalelectoral systems) in divided societies: So manyforces favorthe pursuitand exacerbationof conflict . .. thatanythinglessthan a coherentpackage is unlikely to provide sufficient counterweighttotheseforces,andyet only partialmeasuresthat aredoomed to fall shortof the


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coherentpackagestand a real chanceof adoptionmostof thetime. 45houghHorowitzrecognizes no limits to the reach of thisconclusion,his pessimismactuallyrefersonly to constructionof the formal institutionsof thesovereignstate.Contemplationof the informal communicativerealmmightsoften hisconclusion.Democraticdeliberation n apublic sphereatsome distancefrom(butnotcompletely unconnectedwith) thesovereignstate can makea majorcontributionhere.The desirabilityof locating deliberation n the engagementof discoursesin the public sphere in divided societies can drawon Mackie's observationthatpeople are rarely seen to change theirminds in deliberativeforums.46Evenif anindividual is persuaded, t is hard or him or herto admit t, for thencredibility s lost. Actually suchchangingof minds is commonin whatFungclassifies as cold deliberativesettings-where participantsare not parti-sans, and the forum is either unofficial or advisory.47Citizens' juries anddeliberativeopinion polls exemplify thiscategory,and itis normal o see sub-stantialopinion shifts therein.48n contrast,under hot deliberation, ied tocollective decision and involving partisans,participantshave morestronglyformedviews going into deliberation,andso cannoteasily change.

Deliberation tied to sovereign authority n divided societies is about ashot a setting as one can imagine.Mostconceptionsof deliberativedemoc-racy requirereflection and the possibility thatminds can be changedin theforum itself This is unlikely if one's position is tied to one's identity.Locat-ing deliberationin the engagementof discourses in thepublicsphereavoidsthis problembecause reflection is a diffuse process, takingeffect over time.Withtime, degree of activationof concernon particularssues can change.Individualscan shift from partisanshipto moderationto apathyand viceversa,andmay even come to adoptdifferentattitudes.Nothingas dramaticasthe kindof conversion Mouffe seeks is required.This situation s less fraughtthan that in hot deliberation, where reflection can take effect only in thechoices of individuals under the gaze of both opponentsand those with asharedidentity. As Mackie points out, deliberation-induced eflection caneventually lead an individual to change his or her mind. But he or she canmost easily admit thatin a differentsetting,at another ime andplace, withdifferent participants, where face and credibility associated with havingstaked out a position are no longer decisive. This considerationsupportsDeveaux's specification of a revisability principle.49A guarantee hatcon-tentious issues can be revisitedprovidesa way for those who have changedtheir minds to both save face (by not admitting it for the present) andcontributeto conflict resolution(by acceptinga changed position later).


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VII.INSTITUTIONALPECIFICSThe public sphere is sometimes conceptualized as an institution-freezone, butthatis not necessarilyright.Two sortsof institutions ocated in thepublic spherecan playroles in facilitatingdiscursiveengagement:networksand discursivedesigns, whose contributions now discuss. Inrelativelywell-behavedpoliticalsystems, the network form of organizationcan help estab-lish dispersed control over the content and relative weight of discourses,

facilitating negotiationacross difference. Schlosberg analyses environmen-tal justice networks in the United States in these terms.50These networksarosefrom a series of local actions and have no centralizedleadership.Theyinvolve individualsfromverydifferent race and class backgrounds, n somecases fromgroupsotherwisequite hostile to each other.Togetherthey suc-cessfully changedthe content of public discourse on environmentalaffairs,most importantlyby establishingthe very idea of environmental ustice as apublic concern. In societies more deeply divided, the developmentof net-worksacross divisions could be a greaterchallenge, given that such societiesare divided into blocs with dense within-bloc communication but littleacross-bloc communication. On the other hand, even in the United Statesthese networks developed across groups who otherwise lived in quiteseparateworlds,given the informalapartheidof American cities.Networks are at the informal nd of the institutionalcontinuum. Moreformalare the institutionsFungcalls recipesfor publicspheres. 'He has inmind designed forums such as citizens' juries, deliberativepolls, planningcells, policy dialogues, and participatoryproblem-solving exercises. Anysuch exercise is not in itself a public sphere, so Fung's terminologyis a bitmisleading.Rather,each is a micro momentin the macro ife of thepub-lic sphere.There aremanysuch discursivedesigns available.Some involvelay citizenspickedatrandom,some involve partisans.Some aresmall scale,some try to engage largernumbers of interlinked deliberators(such as theexercisessponsoredby the AmericaSpeaksFoundation).Some debatea spe-cific issue ordecision,othershaveabroaderremit.Sponsorscanincludegov-ernments,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs), academics,and founda-tions. A few have a direct link to policy making, most lack any such directconnectionfromrecommendation o collective decision.

Theircritics deridethegenerallack of direct influence on policy content,and theirsponsorsoften strive for such impact.But from the pointof view ofpromotingdialogueindividedsocieties, this absence of directpolicyconnec-tion maybe positivebecause it providesa space for exploratoryinterchangeacross difference.Forexample,in 2001 a deliberativepoll was conductedonthe issue of relationsbetween the indigenous and nonindigenouspeoplesof


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Dryzek DELIBERATIVEEMOCRACY 231

Australia.Deliberating groups were made up of oversampled Aboriginesselectedin consultation withindigenouscommunitiesandrandomlyselectednonindigenous others. Television coverage took the proceedings into abroaderpublic sphere. The results of the poll had no immediate or directimpacton public policy, butthe poll itself constituted one momentin a longprocess of reconciliation across a deep divide.

VIII.BAD CIVILSOCIETYAND ITS REMEDIESRecognitionof the centralityof engagementacross discoursesin thepub-lic spheredoes not mean thatthestateshouldbe conceptualizedas the sourceonly of problemsfor divided societies, and thepublic sphereonly as abenignsource of solutions. Public spheres can be segmented, the source ofinterethnicconflict,52andproneto Sunstein's law of group polarization findividualscommunicateonly withlike-mindedothers.53 olarizationcan beexacerbatedby segmented media such as right-wingtalk radioin the UnitedStatesand, most notoriously,Hutuhate radiopriorto the 1994 genocide in

Rwanda. (The latter was controlledby Hutuextremists associated with thegovernment,so not entirelya publicspherephenomenon.)The fact that sec-tariandemagogues can flourish therein is exactly why consociationalistsseek to silence the public sphere.Snyderand Ballentine believe that such communicative extremism is a

particularproblemin societies emergingfromauthoritarianism,specially ifthey lack any traditionof professionaljournalism.54They caution against aliberalfree-for-allin politicalcommunication,recommendingboth statereg-ulation of speech (as in Malaysia since 1969) and NGO interventiontorestrict hate speech and promote professional journalism in integrativemedia.The problemof what ChambersandKopstein(2001) call badcivil soci-ety is not confined to postauthoritarianocieties. 55ocusingon racisthategroupsinthe United States,ChambersandKopsteinadvocategreater ncomesecurityand social justice, which would meanfewer insecure individualstobe temptedby sectarian extremism.ChambersandKopsteinalso guardedlyendorseinterventionto shape grouplife through(for example) subsidies torelativelybenign organizationsthatprovideservices.56They approveof theroleplayedby Ford,the EurasiaFoundation,and Sorosin promotingbenigngrouplife in the postcommunistworld, while recognizingthatsuch effortsmay hinderhomegrown groups.Callingthe state to the rescueof badcivil society is problematic f thestateitself is the instrumentof one groupin a dividedsociety,or if it is engagedin a


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homogenizationprojectto bolster its own support.A consociational stateisnot muchbetterif it seeks to suppressengagement in the public sphere.Butonly a power-sharingstate(or a majoritarian overnmentwith incentives toappealto minorities) s in a positionto contributeto deliberationacross divi-sion in thepublic sphere.The state need not be the exclusive source of solu-tions here;NGOs and foundationscan play similar parts.And theremighteven be a role for political theorists when it comes to exposing the falsenecessities pushedby sectariangroups.

IX. LOCATINGTHEPUBLIC SPHERE TRANSNATIONALLYEngagement across division can be furtherpromoted by transnationalaspects of deliberation n the public sphere. Channels of political influencecan be extendedto and fromintergovernmentalbodies such as the EuropeanUnion, internationalNGOs, transnationalcorporations, and other states.Some groups in divided societies have already succeeded in making suchlinks. Forexample,inresponseto governmentalrepressionandenvironmen-

tal destructionassociated with oil production,the Ogoni people in Nigeriasought help from NGOs basedmainly in developed countries.These NGOsin turn pressuredtheir own governments and corporations such as Shellwhich operatein Nigeria. In Mexico, the Zapatistasin Chiapashave devel-opedanInternet-based etworkof sympathizers.This sortof outreachcomeswith an obligationto behaveaccordingto emerging transnationalnorms ofcivility.SnyderandBallentinerecommendtransnationalntervention ocurbthe contributionof partisanjournalism to hostility in divided societies.5Appropriatemeasures might include professional journalism education,presscodes, sponsorshipof nonpartisanmedia,and subsidies conditional onaccurateand balancedcoverage.They point to the success in Cambodiaof aUN mediaprogram.Of course,morenegativeformsof transnational inkage arepossible too,especially by nationalistsreachingout to a diaspora. The IrishRepublicanArmy long dependedon financialsupportfrom Irish Americans,and muchof the Serbdiasporawas in the 1990s vocal in supportingnationalism andexcusing ethniccleansing.Theopeningof channels to a neighboringstate ofsharedethnicityby a minority s also dangerousand hashistorically providedajustificationfor invasion of the Sudetenlandby Nazi Germany,of Cyprusby Turkey,of Croatiaby Serbia.So only outreach beyond shared nationalidentity has a civilizing force. This caveat aside, strengtheningof trans-nationalsources of political authoritywould be conducive to the weakening


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Dryzek/ DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY 233

of the connection between engagementin the public sphereandthe deadlycontest for sovereign authority.Any associated weakening of the sovereignstate mightbe especially at-tractiveto those on the receiving end of oppressionin countrieslike Sudanand Rwanda, for whom a centralizedstate has always broughtmisery be-cause it has only ever been experiencedas the instrumentof one segment.Suchweakening is also consistent with the increasingconditionalityof sov-ereigntyin the internationalsystem. NATO intervention n Kosovo in 1999helpedreinforcethe idea thatsovereignty s notabarrierbehindwhich a statecanterrorize ections of itspeople.Theconditionality f sovereigntyandtrans-nationalization f authoritywill not please consociationalists,whose plansrequireconflict to becentralizedandthen resolvedin afully sovereignstate.

X. PUBLIC SPHEREINFLUENCEONTHE STATE:LOOSECONNECTIONSEmphasizingthe public sphere(andits transnational onnections) as the

focus for discursive engagement does not have to mean banning publicsphereinfluence over state actions. This influence is centralto Habermas'smodel of deliberativedemocracy. Habermasendorsesdiffuse subjectlesscommunication n thepublicsphere,producingpublicopinionwhose influ-ence can then be turned into communicativepower throughelections, theninto administrativepower throughlegislation.This sequence is insufficientfor divided societies for two reasons. The first reason is that subjectlesscommunication s too amorphouswhen the identityof subjectsthemselvesis thekey issue andpublic opinionis deeply plural.It is betterundersuchcir-cumstances to think of engagement across discourses ( discourse itselfbeingdefined in non-Habermasianerms,becauseforHabermasdiscourseiscompletely unconstrainedcommunication).The second reason is thatelec-tions arehighly problematictransmissionmechanisms.In any society,com-petitive elections are largely strategicand symbolically manipulatedexer-cises. In divided societies, the results they register when it comes to theweight of competing groups and of theirextremistsandmoderatesdependcrucially on the design of the electoral system. And as discussed earlier,adeadlynumbersgame at themetalevel can resultonce all sides recognizetheimportanceof electoral engineering.Elections are not theonly sourceof democratic egitimacy,whichcanalsobe securedthrough responsivenessof publicpolicy to the relativeweight ofdiscourses in the public sphere, which does not have to involve the direct


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countingof heads.59However,some electoral systems are betterthan otherswhenit comes topromotingdiscursiveengagementin a dividedsociety.Pref-erentialvoting has the meritsof promotingcommunication across dividesinvolving voters andleaders.Electoralor otherwise, the link from public sphere to state ought not betoo tight, because then the deadly contest for sovereign authorityresumes.But if influence is absententirely,there is a danger the public spheremaydecay into inconsequentiality.Such decay would underminethe legitimacyof the state itself.60Between these two extremes one can think of state andpublic sphere as being loosely connected, or semidetached. Discursiveengagementin thepublic spherecan influence stateaction in manyinformalways. Theseways includechangingthetermsof discoursein ways thateven-tually come to pervade the understandingsof governmental actors. AsHabermasputs it in a momentof expansiveness beyond his stress on elec-tions, Communicativepower is exercised in the mannerof a siege. It influ-ences the premisesof judgmentanddecision making in the political systemwithout intendingto conquerthe system itself. '61Much of the success ofenvironmentalismand feminism in the late twentieth centurycan be inter-pretedin these terms.These two movements provided a new vocabulary-including,forexample,the termenvironment,which did notexist prior o the1960s. Individualsversed in these discourseseventually occupiedinfluentialpositions in government.Social movements have at times achieved more formal integration ntopolicy making, though sometimes this has provedto be a badbargain f themovement has received mostly symbolic rewards. Genuine inclusion asopposedtosymbolic inclusionis facilitatedto thedegree amovementcanes-tablisha linkbetween its defininginterestand a core function in the state'ssystem of priorities.Forexample, the alignment of environmentalismwiththe core economic priorityhas recentlybeen facilitatedin NorthernEuropebythe ideaof ecological modernization.62nthese terms,agroupthatdefinesone side in a dividedsociety has thecapacityonce included to connectto thecore interestof the state in securinginternalorder,or at least its leadershipdoes, as is clear from the historicalsuccess of consociational settlementsinEurope.But as this examplemakesclear,inclusion of groupleadershipbegssome largerquestionsaboutadversarypolitics versus consensualpolitics intheinstitutionsof government,and how this affects social learningacrossdif-ferencein thepublic sphere.Otherunresolvedquestions includethecharac-terof theleaders ncluded(radicalsormoderates)and incentivesfor differentsortsof behavior once included.Movement impact from the public sphere by means of changes in thetermsof discourse can occurbefore,during,and afterany such inclusion.In


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divided societies, it is easy to identify rapidchange in thetermsof discoursethatcreatedivisions rather hanheal them.Forexample,Hutuand Tutsi den-titieshardlyexisted inRwandabeforeBelgiancolonialrule.But morebenignshifts arepossible, as indicatedby the rethinkingof identityon all sides butespecially on the partof formerly dominantwhites in South Africa in the1990s.Changes in the terms of discoursecan be broughtaboutby the power ofrhetoric,which can also reachfromthepublicsphereinto the state. Such wasthe achievement of Dr. MartinLutherKing Jr.in the 1960s. Because King

appealedto the emotional commitmentof white Americansto symbols suchas the Declarationof IndependenceandtheConstitution,he could noteasilybe dismissed, and eventually the rhetoricforced redefinitionof the ways inwhich dominant liberal discourse was understood.When Nelson Mandelaemergedfrom prison he could have espoused a rhetoricof victimhood andrevenge;instead, he developed a rhetoricof reconciliation that looked for-ward rather han backward,with telling effect on the state structure.Argu-mentshoned in the public sphere maybe noticed and heededby stateactors,andrhetoricianssuch as KingandMandeladidof courseaccompanyrhetoricwith argument.This sortof influence is whatHabermas following Arendt)meansby communicativepower (thoughHabermasacceptsonly argumentandrejectsrhetoric).

XI. POSITIVEEXAMPLESNo polity that I know of exemplifies the sort of discursivedemocratic

engagement in a semidetached public spherethatI am endorsinghere. Butelementscan be discerned in some systems. ConsiderCanada classifiedbyLijphartas semiconsociational, even though not one of his four definingfeaturestruly applies).63Canadafeatures occasional attemptsto rewritetheconstitution o accommodatethecompetingaspirationsof FrancophonesandAnglophones, as well as episodes where Quebec looks as though it mightsecede and then draws back. Attemptsto rewritethe constitutionnormallyend in deadlock, frustration,and failure--even if elites manageto bargainaresolution,as in the Meech Lakeaccordsof 1987, whichfailedto attainratifi-cation because of opposition from Anglophones and indigenous peoples.Failureis generally followed by a period of inaction at the constitutionallevel. In these periods of inaction,Canada s at its best, because individualson the various sides can thenget backto engaging one another n the publicspherewhere struggle over sovereigntyis not at stake.Political leadershipcan get back to the modus vivendi that makesCanadasuch a generallysuc-


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cessful society. The peace is disturbedonly by political philosopherswhobelieve a constitutional solution is required. This is exactly what is notrequired-as should be clear from the lessons of what happenswhen it istried.A secondpositiveexamplecan be found in South Africa'stransition nthemid-1990s. Thoughclaimedby Lijphart orconsociationalism,thatdesigna-tion applies mainly in terms of the grandcoalition that oversaw transition.There was no suppressionof engagement across racial andethnic lines asrequiredby consociationalism's segmental autonomy. Engagement andreflection were promotedby Archbishop Desmond Tutu's 1995-98 Truthand ReconciliationCommission-which operatedat arm's length from thecoercive authorityof the sovereign state (and withstood legal challengesfrom bothformerapartheidPresidentF W.de Clerk and the AfricanNationalCongress). The commission was a deliberative institution whose terms ofreferencewere themselves the productof broad public debate (thoughthecommission was established under the new constitution). It could offeramnestyand recommendreparations, hough the implementationof its rec-ommendations n public policy were haphazard,so its influence on the statemayhave fallen shortof theoptimum nthe termsI havedeveloped.Perpetra-torsand victimsof apartheid-era olitical crimes told theirstories,and therewere some very public episodes of reconciliation between perpetrators ndsurvivors. South Africa also featured mixed-race discussion groups, andefforts to rethinkidentity in the media, educational institutions,and else-where in the public sphere.

Deep divisionin SouthAfrica did not end with the departure f apartheid.In 1996, a liberalconstitutionwas adoptedthatspecified equalrightsformenand women, clashing with the institution of customary marriagein someAfricancommunities. Deveaux discusses a series of consultationsinitiatedby the SouthAfricaLaw Commissionto resolve this conflict, which threat-ened the authorityof traditional eaders. These consultations producedacompromise,which was reflected in legislation, thatwas acceptableto bothwomen's groups and traditional eaders. This compromise entailed somereform to traditionalpractices,while retaining the nonliberal bridewealthpayment practice, and avoided confronting the authority of traditionalleaders. Deveauxdoes not addressthe issue, but this avoidanceof challengeto the sovereignty of traditional eaders may have facilitated deliberativeresolution.So althoughtherewas a (rare)tightconnection between delibera-tive forum and legislative outcome, this was possible because thesovereignty ssue was not confronted.


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XII. THREEKINDS OF FAILURETo furtherstrengthenthe case for emphasizing the engagementof dis-courses in a semidetachedpublic spherein divided societies, considerthreekinds of failure in these terms.The first consists of too tighta connection betweenpublicsphereand sov-ereign authority.The tighterthisconnection,thegreater s the likelihood of adeadlycontest over the content of sovereign authority.Northern relandsincethe 1990s illustrates this difficulty.NorthernIreland is a highly politicizedsociety, so there is plenty of publicdebatein themedia, clubs, bars,commu-

nity groups, and so forth. However, the organizationsactive in this debatehaveclose links to the political leadershipnegotiatingwithBritish and Irishgovernmentsover how governmentin NorthernIrelandshall be organized.Community groups, paramilitaries,and politicians are tightly connected.There is great difficulty in maintaininga public sphereatany distance fromthe sovereignty contest. Heroic attemptshave been made by activists todevelop networks concerned with issues such as healthcare, employment,andwelfare across the communaldivide,but such networksremainprecari-ous in the face of sectarianpublic spheres oined to each othermainlyin thesovereigntycontest. Perhapsthe most successful antisectariannstitutions nNorthern reland odayareCommunityPolice Boardswithrepresentatives fbothcommunities. These boardsdeal with some of the most divisive and con-tentiousissues in day-to-day life in NorthernIrelandbutstay awayfrom thesovereignty question. As such they are elements of a semidetachedpublicsphere.A second, very different,kind of failing exists whena publicspherecon-fronts a completely unresponsive state. Indeed, this kind of polity comesclose to failing to be a deliberativedemocracyby definition(unlesscollectiveoutcomes sensitive to public opinion can be producedin nonstate or trans-state locations). NorthernIreland at the commencementof the Troublesinthe late 1960s may illustratethis condition. At the time, the province hadbeen governed for decades by the Ulster Unionist Party,whose leadershipwas upper-middleclass. The Troublesbegan as a civil rights movement onthe Catholicside. Butunresponsivenessandrepressiononthepartof the stateplayedinto the hands of theIrishRepublicanArmy,andthe social movementgave way to paramilitaryaction and terror.The strugglestopped being aboutcivil rightsand startedbeing aboutsovereignty.On the Unionist side, work-ing-class activists denied access by thetraditionalunionistelite organized nparamilitary ashion.


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Individedsocieties, a statethat is completely obtuse in the face of move-ment activismmay playintothe hands of warlords who preferviolence to thetraditional ocial movementrepertoire,exacerbatinga sectarianpolitics thatis both irresponsibleand violent. Of course, NorthernIrelandwas alreadyasectarianstate-though beginningin the early 1970s, direct rule from Lon-don began to amelioratethis aspect. But even a consociational statethat iscompletely unresponsiveto events in the public sphere may be vulnerable.Manyfactorsconspiredto drive Lebanon'sconsociational system into civilwarin the 1970s, but one factorwas thecomplete lack of responsivenessof asystem dominatedby traditional lites to emerging social forces, particularlyon the Muslim side. Warlords ould then harness these forces.A thirdkind of failure exists when there is no autonomouspublicsphereworthspeakingof. Againthis failure s one of deliberativedemocracyalmostby definition,if (as I haveargued)deliberativedemocracydepends cruciallyon theengagementof discoursesinthepublicsphere.But theremayalso be athreat opolitical stability.Inthecase of Austria,decadesof a noncontentiousparty politics andconsensusgovernmenteventually providedfertilegroundfor the rise of right-wing populism in the form of Jorg Haider's FreedomParty n thelate 1990s. Ina verydifferentsetting, YugoslaviaunderTitosup-pressedanykind of contestatorypolitics, be it within the stateor the publicsphere,partlyfor fear of ethnic nationalist mobilization. While the storyofthe breakdownof Yugoslavia s complex, therewere no substantialpoliticalforces to stand n thewayof powerfulfiguresfrom the old regime reinventingthemselves as murderousethnic nationalists.

XIII. CONCLUSIONAgonism may featureplentyin the way of authentic democraticcommu-nication,but is hard to applyto any divided society in the real world. Stateswith consociational aspects for their partcan sometimes preserve politicalstability in real-world divided societies, but they underminethe ability ofgroupsto live together throughdeliberativeand democratic social learning.Many positionsmayexist in thelarge territorybetween these twomodels,but

my aim has not been merely to stake out a moderateposition, for there isvalidity in aspects of both these extremes, and I have tried to show thatthese aspectscan be redeemed and developed in a discursive democracyindivided societies that emphasizes engagement in the public sphere onlyloosely connectedto the state.Contributions o its developmentcould comefromthe following:


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* deliberative nstitutionsat a distance fromsovereignauthority,* deliberativeforums in the public spherethat focus on particularneeds rather hangeneralvalues,* issue-specific networks,* centripetalelectoral systems,* a power-sharingstate that does not reach too farinto the public sphere,* the conditionality of sovereignty,and* the transnationalizationof political influence.

NOTES1. BenjaminR. Barber,Jihad vs. McWorld:How Globalismand TribalismAre Reshapingthe World New York:Ballantine, 1995).2. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voiceof Reason:Deliberative Democracy and AmericanNational Government(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).3. Seyla Benhabib,The Claimsof Culture:EqualityandDiversityin theGlobalEra(Prince-ton, NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press, 2002), 108-12.4. Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson,Democracyand Disagreement (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 1996).5. StanleyFish, MutualRespect as a Device of Exclusion, nDeliberativePolitics: Essayson Democracy and Disagreement, ed. StephenMacedo (New York:Oxford University Press,

1999), 88-102, at 92-93.6. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,2000), 16-51. Youngidentifies herself with agonism(pp.49-51 ), but the reasonablenessmotiva-tionalnormwould set herapart rommany agonists.She does pushdeliberativedemocracy n anagonistic direction.7. WilliamH. Simon, ThreeLimitationsof DeliberativeDemocracy:IdentityPolitics, BadFaith,andIndeterminacy, n Deliberative Politics, 49-57, at 50-52.

8. WilliamE. Connolly, Identity/Difference:DemocraticNegotiationsof Political Paradox(Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 1991);and Bonnie Honig, Political Theoryand the Dis-placement of Politics (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1993).9. ChantalMouffe, DeliberativeDemocracyor Agonistic Pluralism? Social Research 66(1999): 745-58; ChantalMouffe, The DemocraticParadox(London:Verso,2000); and ChantalMouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, Political Science Series 72 (Vienna:Institute or Advanced Studies, 2000).10. Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, 16.11. Mouffe, DeliberativeDemocracy or Agonistic Pluralism? 755-56.12. Ibid., 755.

13. Ilan Kapoor, DeliberativeDemocracy or Agonistic Pluralism?The Relevance of theHabermas-MouffeDebate for ThirdWorldPolitics, Alternatives27 (2002):459-87, at 472-73.14. JohnForester, Dealingwith Deep ValueDifferences, n TheConsensusBuildingHand-book,ed. Lawrence Susskind (ThousandOaks,CA: Sage, 1999), 463-93, at 470-72.15. Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, 16.16. ArendLijphart, Varietiesof NonmajoritarianDemocracy, n Democracy and Institu-tions: TheLife Work fArend Lijphart,ed. MarkusM. L.Crepaz,ThomasA. Koelble,andDavid


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Wilsford (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2000), 225-46, at 228. See also ArendLijphart,Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1977).17. ArendLijphart, Prospects or PowerSharing n the New SouthAfrica, n Election '94SouthAfrica:AnAnalysisof theResults,Campaignand FutureProspects, ed. AndrewReynolds(New York:St. Martin's, 1994), 222.18.StuartKaufman,ModernHatreds: TheSymbolicPolitics of EthnicWar(Ithaca,NY: Cor-nell UniversityPress, 2001).19. See also Jorge M. Valadez,Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy,and Self-Determination n MulticulturalSocieties (Boulder,CO: Westview, 2001), 36-38.20. AndrewReynolds, Majoritarian r Power-SharingGovernment, n Democracy andInstitutions:TheLife Work fArendLijphart,ed. MarkusM. L. Crepaz,Thomas A. Koelble,andDavid Wilsford(Ann Arbor:Universityof Michigan Press, 2000), 155-96, at 169-70.21. Cass R. Sunstein, TheLaw of GroupPolarization, Journal of Political Philosophy 10(2002): 175-95.22. John S. Dryzek, DeliberativeDemocracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations(Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress,2000); and JohnS. Dryzek, LegitimacyandEconomyinDeliberativeDemocracy, Political Theory29 (2001): 651-69.23. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, chap. 3; Young, Inclusion andDemocracy.24. Dryzek,DeliberativeDemocracyand Beyond,68. Young,Inclusion and Democracy,77-79, proposesa complementary et of standards: o ask if an intervention s respectful,publiclyassertable,and does it standup to public challenge?25. MargaretMoore, BeyondtheCulturalArgumentfor LiberalNationalism, CriticalRe-view of InternationalSocial and Political Philosophy 2 (1999): 26-47.26. Benhabib,The Claimsof Culture.27. Ibid., 1.28. Ibid.,25.29. See alsoMoniqueDeveaux, ADeliberativeApproachto Conflicts of Culture, PoliticalTheory31 (2003): 780-807, at 781.30. Benedict Anderson,ImaginedCommunities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism (London:Verso, 1983).31. As lamentedby Connolly, Identity/Difference.32. See theguidelines proposedby MeindertFennemaand Marcel Maussen, DealingwithExtremists nPoliticalDiscussion: FrontNationaland 'FrontRepublican'in France, ournalofPolitical Philosophy8 (2000): 379-400.33. Deveaux, ADeliberativeApproach, 788.34. James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity,and Democracy (Cam-bridge, MA: MITPress, 1996), 83-85.35. JohnForester,TheDeliberative Practitioner (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1999), 115-53.

36. JohnM.Orbell,AlphonsJ. C. van de Kragt,andRobyn M. Dawes, ExplainingDiscus-sion-InducedCooperation n Social Dilemmas, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology54 (1988): 811-19.37. HeatherRae,StateIdentitiesand theHomogenisationofPeoples (Cambridge,UK:Cam-bridge UniversityPress, 2002).38. Forexample,Will Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford, UK:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).39. Moore, Beyondthe CulturalArgument.


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40. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groupsin Conflict (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1985);andBenjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: ElectoralEngineering or Con-

flict Management(Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001).41. STV combines preferentialvotingwithproportional epresentationn multimembercon-stituencies. The ballot requiresvoters to rankall candidates.Candidatesachieving a quota aredeclaredelected; theirsurplusvotes are thenredistributed, long with the second preferencesofcandidateseliminated on the basis of theirlow numberof firstpreferences.If thereare(say) sixseats perconstituency,a quotacould be 16.67percentof votes. AV uses single-memberconstitu-encies, again requiringvoters to rankall candidates.Candidatesare eliminatedbeginning withthose with the fewest first preferences, the votes for eliminated candidatesbeing reallocatedaccordingto the next preferenceon the ballot. UnderSV,votersidentify only theirfirst andsec-ond preferences for candidates in a single-member constituency. If no candidate receives amajorityof firstpreferences,all butthetop two candidates basedon firstpreferences)are elimi-nated,and second choices of votes for all the other candidatesarereallocatedto determine thewinner.

42. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 136-37.43. DonaldHorowitz,A Democratic SouthAfrica? ConstitutionalEngineeringin a DividedSociety (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1991), 189.44. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms inEuropeand Latin America (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1991), 24.45. Donald Horowitz, ConstitutionalDesign: An Oxymoron? n Designing DemocraticInstitutions Nomos XLII),ed. Ian ShapiroandStephenMacedo (New York:New YorkUniver-sity Press, 2000), 253-84, at 262.46. GerryMackie, Does DemocraticDeliberationChangeMinds? paperpresentedat theannualmeeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2002).47. ArchonFung, Recipes for Public Spheres, Journalof Political Philosophy 11(2003):338-67.

48. GrahamSmith andCorinneWales, Citizens'Juriesand DeliberativeDemocracy, Polit-ical Studies48 (2000): 51-65; and JamesFishkin,The Voiceof the People:Public OpinionandDemocracy (New Haven, CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1995).49. Deveaux, A Deliberative Approach, 792.50. David Schlosberg, Environmental ustice and theNew Pluralism:TheChallenge ofDif-ferencefor Environmentalism Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversityPress, 1999).51. Fung, Recipes for Public Spheres.52. Claire Jean Kim, Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-KoreanConflict in New YorkCity(New Haven,CT:Yale University Press, 2000).53. Sunstein, The Law of GroupPolarization.54. Jack Snyder and KarenBallentine, Nationalismand the Marketplaceof Ideas, Inter-national Security21 (1996): 5-40.55. SimoneChambersandJeffreyKopstein, BadCivil Society, Political Theory29 (2001):837-65.

56. Ibid., 855.57. Snyderand Ballentine, Nationalism andthe Marketplaceof Ideas, 38-39.58. JtirgenHabermas,Between Facts and Norms: Contributions o a Discourse Theory ofLaw and Democracy (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1996).59. Dryzek, Legitimacyand Economy.60. Ibid.61. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms,486.


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62. JohnS. Dryzek, David Downes, ChristianHunold, and David Schlosberg, with Hans-KristianHernes,GreenStates and Social Movements:Environmentalism n the UnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,Germany,and Norway(Oxford, UK: Oxford UniversityPress, 2003).63. Lijphart,Democracy in PluralSocieties.64. Deveaux, ADeliberativeApproach, 795-800.

John S.Dryzek sprofessorin the Social and Political TheoryProgram,ResearchSchoolof Social Sciences, AustralianNational University.Recent books include DeliberativeDemocracyand Beyond (OxfordUniversityPress, 2000), Post-CommunistDemocrati-zation (coauthored, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002), and Green States and SocialMovements(coauthored,OxfordUniversityPress, 2003).

john s. dryzek - deliberative democracy in divided societies-alternatives to agonism and analgesia

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