joint doctrine for operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical

11 July 2000

Joint Doctrine for Operationsin Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical (NBC) Environments

Joint Publication 3-11

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication sets forth principles toassist commanders and staffs to plan for andconduct operations in which their forces mayencounter the employment or threat of nuclear,biological, and chemical weapons and othertoxic materials. These principles apply tojoint, multinational, and interagencyoperations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.Lieutenant General, US Marine CorpsDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ii

Preface

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1• International Environment ......................................................................................... I-2• NBC Weapons .......................................................................................................... I-3• Threat ....................................................................................................................... I-4• Strategic Guidance .................................................................................................... I-7

CHAPTER IIPEACETIME PREPAREDNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• Preparedness in the United States ............................................................................. II-1• Preparedness in Theater Operational Areas .............................................................. II-3• Considerations for Supported and Supporting Combatant Command Strategic

Planning ................................................................................................................ II-5• Considerations at the Outset of Operations ............................................................... II-6

CHAPTER IIISUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1• Principles of Operations in NBC Environments ...................................................... III-1• Principles of NBC Defense .................................................................................... III-6• Relationship of NBC Defense to Other Offensive and Defensive Capabilities ....... III-13• Special Considerations for Sustained Combat ........................................................ III-15• Logistics and Rear Area Operations ...................................................................... III-23• Responsibilities for Operations in NBC Environments .......................................... III-34

CHAPTER IVHEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Campaign Planning ................................................................................................ IV-1• Health Service Support .......................................................................................... IV-2• Preventive Medicine Principles .............................................................................. IV-6• Countermeasures and Response to NBC Medical Effects ....................................... IV-7• Patient Movement .................................................................................................. IV-8• Casualty Decontamination and Triage .................................................................... IV-8• Medical Treatment Facilities .................................................................................. IV-9

iv

Table of Contents

JP 3-11

CHAPTER VSUPPORTING CONFLICT TERMINATION

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1• Transition to Conflict Termination........................................................................... V-1• Post-Conflict Operations ......................................................................................... V-7

CHAPTER VIMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-1• Overview ............................................................................................................... VI-1• Peacetime Preparations and Transition to Operations .............................................. VI-3• MOOTW Within the United States ........................................................................ VI-7

APPENDIX

A Threat Considerations ....................................................................................... A-1B Nuclear Hazard Considerations .......................................................................... B-1C Biological Hazard Considerations ...................................................................... C-1D Chemical Hazard Considerations ...................................................................... D-1E Treaty, Legal, and Policy Obligations ................................................................. E-1F References ......................................................................................................... F-1G Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... G-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons .................................................. I-3I-2 Potential Adversaries Who Might Possess Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Capabilities ................................................................................... I-5II-1 Considerations for Combatant Command Strategic Planning ......................... II-6II-2 Military Goals at the Outset of Operations ..................................................... II-7III-1 Protecting the Force from Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons ....... III-4III-2 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Principles ................................. III-7III-3 Notional Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels for Forces Ashore ..... III-8III-4 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Command and Control

Considerations .......................................................................................... III-12III-5 Joint Force Planning Considerations for Operations in Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Environments ................................................... III-19III-6 Joint Mission Essential Task List Development Process Example ............... III-21III-7 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Logistics Readiness Considerations ...... III-25

v

Table of Contents

IV-1 Preventive Measures in Health Service Support Planning ............................ IV-4IV-2 Department of Defense Immunization Policy, Biological Threat Excerpt ..... IV-7V-1 Search/Recovery Task Force Sample Organization ....................................... V-5V-2 Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Goals ..................................................... V-8V-3 Deliberate Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Concept ............................... V-11VI-1 Types of Military Operations Other Than War ............................................. VI-1A-1 NBC Threat Assessment Framework ............................................................ A-1A-2 Broad Objectives of Potential Adversaries for Acquisition and Employment

of NBC Weapons ........................................................................................ A-2A-3 Emerging Global Adversary NBC Employment Profile ................................ A-3A-4 Regional Adversary NBC Employment Profile ............................................ A-4A-5 Non-state Adversary NBC Employment Profile ........................................... A-5B-1 Primary Products of a Nuclear Explosion ...................................................... B-1B-2 The Primary and Secondary Products of a Nuclear Air Burst ......................... B-2B-3 Nuclear Weapons Effects ............................................................................... B-3B-4 Radiation Exposure Status Categories ........................................................... B-4B-5 Radiation Exposure States and Risk Criteria .................................................. B-4B-6 Low Level Radiation Guidance for Military Operations ................................ B-6C-1 Potential Biological Agents and Effects ......................................................... C-2C-2 Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination ...................................... C-3D-1 Chemical Weapons Effects ........................................................................... D-1D-2 Threat Chemical Agents ............................................................................... D-2D-3 Weather Effects on Aerosol Chemical Agents ............................................... D-2D-4 Industrial Chemical Site Minimum Downwind Hazard Distances ................. D-3D-5 High Hazard Toxic Industrial Chemicals ...................................................... D-4

vi

Table of Contents

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

vii

Describes the International Security Environment and theThreat Posed by Adversaries Armed with Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

Provides Principles for Planning and Conducting Operationsin NBC Environments Across the Range of MilitaryOperations

Describes the Role of NBC Defense and Other Offensive andDefensive Capabilities in Sustained Operations

Provides Considerations for Sustaining Logistic and HealthService Support

Addresses Requirements for Conflict Termination andMilitary Operations Other Than War

The Armed Forces of the United States, in the United Statesor abroad, may be required to conduct operations in nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) environments. The principlesset forth in this publication are designed to enable combatantcommanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs)to plan for, train their forces for, and execute their assignedmissions in a tumultuous international security environmentagainst a varied set of NBC-capable adversaries.

The Armed Forces of the United States plan for and conductoperations to overcome complex simultaneous challengesacross the range of military operations against adversaries whomay be armed with NBC weapons. While any given threatand operation may be focused principally in a particularoverseas region, the adversary may have the motivationand means to extend the conflict to other regions includingUS territory.

The International Security Environment

The crises and conflictsthat characterize theinternational securityenvironment pose complexsimultaneous challenges tothe interests and securityof the United States.

viii

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

The worldwide availability of advanced military andcommercial technologies (including dual-use) permitadversaries to develop and employ NBC weapons in theirgeographic regions and beyond. Potential adversaries includeemerging global powers, regional powers, and non-stategroups. Adversary concepts for NBC threats and actual useinclude selective use before, during, or after a crisis or conflict.NBC targets include not only military units and capabilities,but also US and other country government entities, civilianinfrastructures, and populations.

Maintaining military preparedness in peacetime for potentialoperations in NBC environments demands clearunderstanding of the threats and unity of effort in theUnited States and abroad. Threat assessments includeoverseas areas of potential conflict as well as US territory,with particular attention to the civilian infrastructure, militaryforces, and facilities needed to support the range of militaryoperations. Peacetime preparedness includes visibly andsuccessfully exercised joint, multinational, and interagencyplans that demonstrate the capability to operate and succeedin NBC environments. Combatant commanders and Servicesare also responsible for including NBC considerations in forcedevelopment, training, and leader development activities.

The commander’s focus is mission accomplishment. Planningand execution also include those nonmilitary elements in thetheater and in the United States that are essential for sustainingcombat operations and achieving US objectives. Moreover,the military instrument of national power is applied in NBCenvironments as in other situations in conjunction with thediplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power.JFCs are responsible for assuring the integration ofmilitary operations with the other instruments of nationalpower.

In applying the principles of war and fundamentals of jointoperations in NBC environments, commanders include theunique NBC aspects of intelligence preparation of thebattlespace; take action to reduce force vulnerability to

Threat

Peacetime Preparedness and the Transition to Operations

Assuring Sustained Combat Operations

Adversaries may beparticularly inclined tothreaten or use nuclear,biological, and chemical(NBC) weapons inasymmetric operations toovercome the militarystrengths and assail thevulnerabilities of theUnited States and itsmultinational partners.

Commanders areresponsible for continuousassessments of threats tothe United States and itsinterests by adversariesand opportunists who maypossess NBC weapons.

Successful combatoperations in NBCenvironments requireintegrated planning andsynchronized execution ofall elements of militarycapability in conjunctionwith the specific NBCdefense capabilitiesavailable to the command.

ix

Executive Summary

NBC attack; and provide for protection of the forcecommensurate with mission accomplishment. Thesecommand responsibilities encompass assuring the effectivenessof the civilian workforce and infrastructures supporting militaryoperations. This includes not only US personnel and assets,but also those of other multinational partners and the host nationthat are essential for successful operations and achieving thedesired end state in the theater. In the event of an NBC attack,commanders apply the principles of avoidance of NBC hazards— particularly contamination, protection of individuals andunits from unavoidable NBC hazards, and decontamination— in order to restore operational capability. The purpose ofapplying these principles is to minimize vulnerabilities, protectfriendly forces, and maintain the force’s operational tempo inorder to achieve campaign or operation objectives, whilecomplicating adversary targeting. JFCs need to provide specificguidance to ensure the adequacy of NBC reconnaissancedetection, and warning systems; and for enforcing mission-oriented protective postures that facilitate missionaccomplishment while affording force protection to themaximum extent feasible.

Across the range of military operations, commanders train andplan for inclusion of the military elements of other countriesand nonmilitary elements of the United States and othercountries. While multinational and interagency operations areanticipated in most cases, the Armed Forces of the United Statesmaintain the capability for unilateral joint military action,including operations in NBC environments.

From the outset of concept of operations development, JFCsinclude logistics. JFCs include NBC aspects of logistics inplanning deployment; reception, staging, onwardmovement and integration; and support for sustainedoperations. JFCs are responsible for ensuring that logisticunits of component commands can survive and operateeffectively in NBC environments.

Operations in contaminated environments demand closeattention by commanders to the joint logistic principles ofsustainability, survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness. Thegeographic combatant commander is responsible for ensuringthe ability to maintain logistic support throughout the operation.Logistic planning and training include considerations forreducing vulnerabilities to NBC attacks and assuring logistic

Logistics

Operations in NBCenvironments can placesignificant burdens on thelogistic system.

x

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

support operations. These measures include protection andalternatives for ports of embarkation and debarkation, en routefacilities, and facilities within and outside the theater.

Planning for military operations at all levels inherently includesprovisions for adequate health service support. Commandersare responsible for maintenance of the health of theircommands to assure mission accomplishment in the eventof NBC attacks. Planning and training include maintenanceof the health of essential civilian workforce memberssupporting military operations, as well as integration of militarycapabilities with those of the local public health services,including those of the host nation for operations abroad.

Preparations for operations in potential NBC environmentsinclude pre-exposure immunizations, pretreatments,prophylaxis, and medical barrier materials applicable to theentire force, including multinational, interagency, and civilianparticipants. Post-exposure measures require advancedplanning and include continuation of preventive measures forpersonnel not yet exposed, as well as decontamination,antidotes, and other medical treatments. In contaminatedenvironments, commanders take action to ensure the integrityof their health service support capabilities, including provisionof support for decontamination and security from nonmedicalresources in order to preserve essential medical capabilities.

In operations in NBC environments, the JFC considersthe residual NBC capabilities of the adversary, the potentialneed for a post-conflict inspection and arms control regime,and the decontamination and removal of materiel fromthe theater. Planning and training for conflict terminationinclude the interaction with host nation and other groups thatremain in the theater following military operations, and includeinternational organizations and nongovernmentalorganizations. The JFC is responsible for planning for andexecuting liaison operations that ensure success of the militaryoperations, provide support as appropriate for nonmilitaryoperations, and assure achievement of US post-conflictobjectives and end states.

Health Service Support

Conflict Termination

Operations in NBCenvironments place uniquedemands on military andcivilian health servicesystems.

Combatant commandersinclude conflicttermination considerationsin plans for action acrossthe range of militaryoperations.

xi

Executive Summary

While the general principles of sustained operations apply,additional principles apply to operations other than war in NBCenvironments. Domestic operations routinely are theresponsibility of nonmilitary agencies of government in whichthe commander provides military support to civil authoritiesunder rules and terms of reference established by the NationalCommand Authorities and Federal law. Operations abroadmay also involve military support to US and other countries’civil authorities either controlled by the US ambassador andcountry team or provided directly by the JFC according tobilateral or multinational arrangements. In all circumstances,commanders participating in joint operations must reduce theirforces’ vulnerability to NBC attack and be prepared to mitigateand recover from the consequences of an NBC attack. Inmilitary operations other than war, the commander must becognizant of the possibility that opportunists not party to theevents precipitating the conflict may be motivated and able toemploy NBC weapons for their own purposes.

JFCs at all levels are faced with the possibility that anyoperation may have to be conducted in an NBC environment.Therefore, NBC considerations are inherent in planning,developing concepts of operations, training, and maintainingpeacetime readiness. Responsibility for operations in anytheater involves peacetime preparations and transition tooperations with forces from areas outside the theater, includingother theaters and the United States, and inherently involvesjoint, multinational, and interagency dimensions. A forcetrained and ready to fight and win in NBC environments is anessential element in deterring potential adversaries and inassuring successful accomplishment of US objectives shoulddeterrence fail.

Military Operations Other Than War

CONCLUSION

All types of militaryoperations other than war,those that involve use orthreat of force as well asthose that do not involveuse or threat of force, maybe conducted in NBCenvironments.

xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER ITHE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

I-1

1. General

a. The employment or threat of nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) weaponsand other toxic materials pose uniquechallenges to US military operationsworldwide. The disruptive and destructiveeffects of these weapons and materials meritcontinuous consideration by the joint forcecommander ( JFC) and suppor t ingcommanders.

b. This chapter outlines the strategiccontext for conducting operations in NBCenvironments. It explains the setting in whichthe United States may be required to employmilitary forces, describes the NBC and other

“But even as Third Wave armies hurry to develop damage-limiting precisionweapons and casualty-limiting nonlethal weapons, poorer countries . . . areracing to build, buy, borrow, or burgle the most indiscriminate agents of masslethality ever created, chemical and biological as well as atomic. Once morewe are reminded that the rise of a new war-form in no way precludes the useof earlier war-forms — including their most virulent weapons.”

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War:Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 1993

toxic material threats, and summarizesapplicable US national strategic guidance.Principles for US employment of nuclearweapons provided in the joint publication(JP) 3-12 series are not further elaborated inthis publication. The term “NBCenvironments” includes the deliberate oraccidental employment or threat of NBCweapons and attacks with other chemical,biological, or radiological materials or toxicindustrial materials (TIMs).

See Appendix B, "Nuclear HazardConsiderations," Appendix C, "BiologicalHazard Considerations," and Appendix D,"Chemical Hazard Considerations," forfurther information.

The gas attacks of World War I, for which forces on both sides were woefullyunprepared, ushered in a new era in modern warfare.

I-2

Chapter I

JP 3-11

2. International Environment

a. A variety of crisis and conflict situationsmay emerge in the international securityenvironment to challenge US interests. Thesesituations encompass disputes and hostilitiesbetween and among states, coalitions of states,and non-state groups (including regional,ethnic, religious, and criminal entities). Thesecrises and conflicts may threaten regionalstability, the territory and populations of theUnited States, its allies, multinational partners,and other friendly states, democraticprocesses, economic progress, and a range ofother US interests. These challenges can occursimultaneously in a number of regions. Theirimplications can transcend state and regionalboundaries. Military involvement toadvance and protect US interests in thesesituations may include war and militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW) suchas peace operations, foreign humanitarianassistance (FHA), and other militarysupport to civil authorities (MSCA). Thisenvironment presents numerous opportunitiesfor US military operations to encounterantagonists possessing NBC weapons or othertoxic materials.

b. The worldwide availability of advancedmilitary and commercial technologies(including dual-use), and commonly availabletransportation and delivery means, may permitadversaries to develop and employ NBCweapons and other toxic materials within theirgeographic regions and beyond. Moreover,adversaries not party to an ongoing conflictmay seize that opportunity to hold US interestsat risk for their own purposes, perhaps atlocations beyond their geographic regions,including the United States.

c. States may have incentives to acquireNBC weapons in spite of their adherence tointernational agreements and treatiesforbidding such actions. Non-state groupsmay not consider themselves bound by suchagreements and treaties. States and non-stategroups alike may have incentives to operateoutside the norms of acceptableinternational behavior, especially whenimportant interests are involved. They mayseek to overcome US and alliance or coalitionstrengths by focusing on vulnerabilities to theuse of NBC weapons and other toxicmaterials.

The current proliferation of NBC weapons require US forces to be prepared todeal with any possible threats to military and civilian health and safety.

I-3

The Strategic Context

Appendix A, "Threat Considerations,"provides information on categories ofpotential NBC-capable adversaries, theirobjectives, capabilities, and employmentconcepts.

d. These characteristics of the internationalsecurity environment affect the manner inwhich the Armed Forces of the United Statesprepare for and conduct operations.Commanders have the responsibility toconsider the implications of a potentialadversary’s NBC capabilities not only inthe adversary’s geographic region, but alsoin other regions, including the UnitedStates. This responsibility extends to theassessment of adversaries who are belligerentsin a conflict as well as opportunists not directlyengaged who may take advantage of a conflictto threaten US interests. Military planning toassure sustained operations in potential NBCenvironments includes joint, multinational,and interagency dimensions.

3. NBC Weapons

a. General. The descriptions that followidentify significant characteristics and effectsof NBC weapons (see Figure I-1) and otherselected toxic material. Adversaries mayemploy NBC weapons and other toxicmaterials in a widespread manner to achieveextensive effects, or in a limited focusedmanner to achieve specific effects. Inaddition to the physical effects andcommon to any adversary use or threat ofthese weapons is the psychological effect,both in the immediate target area and in othervulnerable areas that may be potential futuretargets.

b. Nuclear Weapons. The effects ofnuclear weapons are qualitatively differentfrom biological or chemical weapons. Anuclear detonation produces its damagingeffects through blast, thermal energy, andradiation. Radiation includes initial radiationthat directly injures humans and other life

forms, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) thatdirectly damages a variety of electrical andelectronic equipment (EMP may also beproduced without a nuclear detonation), andresidual radiation directly induced or spreadby fallout that may remain at lethal levels forextended periods of time. A number ofpotential state and non-state adversarieshave or may acquire nuclear weapons.

Appendix B, "Nuclear HazardConsiderations," provides additionalinformation on nuclear weapons effects andoperational considerations for other hazardssuch as dispersed toxic radioactive materials.

c. Biological Weapons. Biological agentsinclude pathogens and toxins that produceillness and death in humans and other lifeforms. Biological agents pose a threat dueto four factors: small quantities ofbiological agents can produce lethal orincapacitating effects over an extensivearea; they are relatively easily produced;

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

NUCLEAR:

BIOLOGICAL:

CHEMICAL:

Produces damaging effectsthrough blast, thermalenergy, and radiation

Includes pathogens andtoxins that produce illnessand death in humans andother life forms

Have effects that can beimmediate or delayed, can bepersistent or nonpersistent,and have significantphysiological effects

NUCLEAR:

BIOLOGICAL:

CHEMICAL:

Produces damaging effectsthrough blast, thermalenergy, and radiation

Includes pathogens andtoxins that produce illnessand death in humans andother life forms

Have effects that can beimmediate or delayed, can bepersistent or nonpersistent,and have significantphysiological effects

Figure I-1. Nuclear, Biological, andChemical Weapons

I-4

Chapter I

JP 3-11

they are easily concealed; and the varietyof potential biological agents significantlycomplicates effective prophylaxis anddefense. These factors, combined with smallemployment signatures, delayed onset ofsymptoms, and detection, identification, andverification difficulties can confer importantadvantages to adversaries who decide to usebiological agents.

Appendix C, "Biological HazardConsiderations," provides additionalinformation on the variety of potential agentsand their effects.

d. Chemical Weapons. Chemical agentshave been the most prevalent NBC agentspossessed by potential adversaries, and havebeen used in regional and internal conflictsby a number of states. Chemical agents haveeffects that can be immediate or delayed, canbe persistent or nonpersistent, and havesignificant physiological effects. As in thecase of biological agents, a number of toxicchemical agents (including industrialchemicals) are easily produced. Whilerelatively large quantities of an agent arerequired to maintain an area contaminatedover time, small-scale selective use thatexploits surprise can cause significantdisruption and may have lethal effects.

Appendix D, "Chemical HazardConsiderations," describes general chemicalagent characteristics and their effects andidentifies other potential toxic chemicalhazards.

e. Delivery Means. The means availableto adversaries for delivery of NBC weaponsrange from specially designed, sophisticatedweapon systems developed by state actors torelatively inefficient improvised devicesemployed by terrorists and other disaffectedindividuals and groups in the theater. Stateand non-state groups may have or be able toacquire military, civilian, and dual-usetechnologies and methods that provide

adequate reliability for selective attacksagainst civilian and military targets.

• For nuclear and radiological attacks,employment means include aircraft,cruise and ballistic missiles, conventionalartillery systems, and clandestinedelivery by special operations forces(SOF) and terrorists. Adversaries maydisperse toxic radioactive materials usingconventional explosives or other devices.They also may be able to generate high-energy transmissions that produce EMPagainst specific targets.

• For biological agents, delivery isfeasible with aircraft and missiles, andby aerosol generators employed by SOFand terrorists. SOF and terrorists can alsouse liquid cultures to contaminate foodand water supplies.

• For chemical agents, employmentoptions include delivery by mortars,artillery, rockets, mines, aircraft, aerosolgenerators, and missiles as well as bySOF or terrorists.

4. Threat

a. General. A number of potentialadversaries have, or could rapidly acquire,biological and chemical weapons and othertoxic materials and, in some cases, nuclearcapabilities. They may also have or seek toacquire clandestine and long-range deliverysystems that can reach beyond theirgeographic regions. Potential adversarieswho might possess NBC capabilitiesinclude emerging global adversaries,regional adversaries, and non-stateadversaries (see Figure I-2). States haveterritorial and population bases of power.While some non-state adversaries also haveterritorial and population bases of power,others rely on the shared interests andcapabilities of members. Non-stateadversaries include terrorist and criminal

I-5


organizations and individuals with themotivation and resources to hold US interestsat risk.

b. Global Adversaries. A globaladversary could be a dominant regional powerwith an advanced economy and technologybase. Such a state would have programsunderway to field a full range of militarycapabilities, potentially including NBCweapons and delivery vehicles with thecapability to project power beyond itsgeographic region.

c. Regional Adversaries. A regionaladversary could be a state willing to threatenor employ military force to settle disputescontrary to international law. Regionaladversaries may develop or possess NBCweapons to gain international prestige, to use

against or threaten neighbors to achievedomination, or to deter other regional orglobal adversaries. Such a state could havea robust economy and a range of forcecapabilities, including the means to projectpower beyond its state boundaries.

d. Non-state Adversaries. Non-stateadversaries are likely to act without regardfor the boundaries of established stateauthority. Such adversaries could possess orhave access to a range of conventional andNBC weapons and other toxic materials, aswell as the means to employ them worldwideby overt or clandestine means.

e. Adversary Objectives for NBC Use

• A global adversary could elect toemploy NBC weapons in order to assure

POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES WHO MIGHTPOSSESS NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND

CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES

GLOBALADVERSARY. . . could be adominant regionalpower with anadvanced economyand technologybase.

NON-STATE ADVERSARY. . . likely to act without regardfor the boundaries ofestablished state authority.

REGIONALADVERSARY. . . could be a state willing tothreaten or employ militaryforce to settle disputescontrary to international law.

Figure I-2. Potential Adversaries Who Might Possess Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical Capabilities

I-6

Chapter I

JP 3-11

its success or delay its defeat in a regionalconflict. A regional adversary maythreaten with or use NBC weapons forcoercion or aggression against US alliesor other friendly states. Transnationaland non-state groups with NBCcapabilities may pose similar threatsabroad and to US territory.

• States with NBC capabilities maysuccumb to internal turmoil that createsthe possibility for deliberate or accidentaldetonation of NBC weapons orcontamination by NBC materials withintheir territory, or smuggling of these itemsto other states or non-state groups.

• Broad adversary objectives foracquisition and employment of NBCweapons may include the capabilities to:

•• Defeat, influence, intimidate, anddeter a regional rival;

•• Deter US military intervention;

•• Disrupt US and multinational forcesand operations;

•• Delay defeat by US and multinationalforces;

•• Defeat US and multinational forces ina region;

•• Punish and inflict revenge on theUnited States and multinational partnersfor their policies and actions;

•• Assure regime survival; and

•• Inflict political, economic, or militarydefeat on the United States.

f. Vulnerabilities. Adversaries mayemploy NBC weapons to exploit US andmultinational vulnerabilities. Civilianpopulations and physical infrastructures, and

unwarned and unprotected military forces,are especially vulnerable to attack by NBCweapons. Joint and multinational operationsin areas where indigenous friendly forces andpopulations have less protection than USforces present similar vulnerabilities.Adversaries may employ NBC weapons toexploit these vulnerabilities and to seek toovercome US and multinational advantages.In doing so, adversaries may believe they candictate the terms of the conflict to thedisadvantage of the United States.

g. Adversary Motivation. In preparationfor or early in a crisis, an adversary may haveincentives to employ or threaten to employNBC weapons. Its objective could be to deterUS military intervention by raising theperceived costs of action, weakeningmultinational cohesion, and demonstrating awillingness to escalate the conflict. Anadversary could seek to degrade US andmultinational forces in order to gain anadvantage. Clandestine attacks could seek tocause terror among the populace, inflictunacceptable damage, alter the politicalobjectives of the United States and itsmultinational partners, and take revenge forUS and coalition actions. Adversaries withlong-range delivery means could seek to denythe United States a geographic sanctuary, holdhostage civilian populations andinfrastructures, and retaliate directly againstthe United States and multinational partnersdistant from the operational area. In anongoing conflict, an adversary could employNBC weapons to prevent, limit, or reverse USinvolvement as well as fracture multinationalpublic support and unity. Late in a conflict,perhaps as a last resort, an adversary couldemploy NBC weapons in an attempt to delaydefeat, avenge itself, or influence the termsof conflict termination.

h. Adversary NBC EmploymentConcepts. Adversary concepts foremployment of NBC weapons may includeselective use against US and multinational

I-7


vulnerabilities. An NBC attack in a crisisor during a conflict could seek to secureadvantages that avoid or overcome thestrengths of US and multinational forces. Anadversary could employ NBC weapons toimpose terms of combat that are not easilyovercome by US and multinational forces,such as holding vulnerable high-value targetsat risk.

• An emerging global adversary mayacquire a sufficient NBC stockpile toestablish credible deterrence against USintervention when no vital US interestsare involved in a conflict. However,when faced with the certainty of USintervention, this adversary may actlargely in the manner of a regionaladversary and seek to avoid defeat andsurvive to engage in the future.

• Regional adversaries, including thoseaspiring to regional ascendancy, mayselect employment concepts that delaydefeat and seek reduction or eliminationof US influence and presence in theregion. These concepts may includeNBC weapons employment directlyagainst US and multinational capabilitiesearly in a crisis with the hope to influencea US decision to forego intervention, thuspermitting the adversary to achieve earlyvictory. Once US intervention is a reality,the regional adversary may seek to secureits continued existence through astalemate rather than risk defeat.

• A number of regional adversariesoperate routinely to violate theinternational norms of state conduct,often taking unpredictable, high-riskactions. Their employment concepts mayinclude conventional and clandestinedelivery of NBC weapons at theinception, during, or late in a conflict.These adversaries are likely to considerNBC use and escalation (includingtargets in the US territory) as a last resort

to ensure regime survival when faced withoverwhelming force or apparent defeat.

• Non-state and terrorist adversariestypically operate outside the boundariesof state authority and without concern forthe international norms of state conduct.They may use NBC weapons for thepurposes of disruption, destabilization,coercion, or revenge against the UnitedStates and its coalition partners. Non-state and terrorist adversaries’ NBCemployment concepts may becharacterized by covert delivery so that theattack may not be attributed to them, andmay emphasize surprise and shock effect.

5. Strategic Guidance

a. The US approach to military operationsis shaped by a set of principles that are derivedfrom national security and military strategies.These same principles guide militaryoperations in NBC environments. Theyinfluence peacetime preparedness foroperations, mobilization, deployment,employment, sustainment, conflicttermination, redeployment, and post-conflictoperations. These principles apply in war andMOOTW, including peace operations andFHA.

b. In shaping a peaceful internationalenvironment favorable to US interests, USpolicies and strategies seek to prevent andlimit the proliferation of NBC capabilitiesthrough international agreements andtreaties, multilateral initiatives, andunilateral actions. The Armed Forces of theUnited States support these policies andstrategies within their respective roles andfunctions. The JFC conducts military supportactivities in accordance with the provisionsof this publication whenever and whereverappropriate.

c. Wherever proliferation has occurred,deterrence of an adversary’s NBC

I-8

Chapter I

JP 3-11

weapons employment is a principal USnational objective . To supportdeterrence, commanders must ensure thattheir forces and supporting facilities arevisibly able to operate effectively in NBCenvironments. Should deterrence fail, USforces will need to survive, avoid or mitigatethe effects of NBC employment, fight, andwin in a contaminated battlespace. Key tooperational success may be the joint taskforce’s (JTF’s) ability to eliminate or reducethe adversary’s NBC capabilities withavailable and appropriate means, if necessaryemploying means against the adversary fromlocations outside the theater.

d. Commanders must be prepared toadvance and defend US interests in the faceof unpredictable and simultaneous events,crises, and conflicts that characterize theinternational security environment. Thesepreparations include assessments of thefeasibility and probability of US militaryinvolvement in crises and conflicts abroad,demands of peace operations and FHA, andother US military participation in MOOTWworldwide. Consideration of NBC risks isintegral to these assessments, including NBCuse in the adversary’s geographic region andin the United States against both civiliantargets, military forces, and facilities neededto support the contemplated militaryoperations.

e. When developing theater strategies andplans to execute the national security andmilitary strategies as well as the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP), JFCs shouldinclude specific guidance to ensure thattheir forces are able to sustain militaryoperations in NBC environments. Thisincludes actions required to assure successfultransition from any existing state ofpreparedness and engagement to anyoperation directed by the National CommandAuthorities (NCA). Peacetime preparationsinclude the joint, multinational, and

interagency aspects of deliberate and crisisplanning. All organizations of the ArmedForces of the United States subject to jointdoctrine are responsible for ensuring that theirforces and facilities are prepared to operate inNBC environments, and to provide neededsupport to JFCs in execution of nationalmilitary strategy.

f. Supporting and ensuring the attainmentof US strategic goals at the end of conflictsconducted in NBC environments call forspecific measures that may involveinternational, multinational, joint, andinteragency arrangements. The JFC willensure that these measures are planned,rehearsed, and put into operation in advanceof redeployment of US forces from the region.Planning for these measures is an inherentaspect of regional campaign planning.Abroad, the country team has leadresponsibility for coordinating arrangementswith host country organizations, supported bythe JFC in view of the command’s missionrequirements.

g. Preparations in peacetime,mobilization, and subsequent phases ofoperations in NBC environments includethe joint, multinational, and interagencyaspects of professional military education,training, and leader development. Thesepreparations are the purview of combatantcommands, subunified commands, and JTFs(e.g., JTF-Civil Support (JTF-CS), which isresponsible for consequence management(CM) operations in response to nuclear,radiological, chemical, or biological weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) incidentsoccurring in the United States), andsubordinate components of these commands.The Services and the US Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) also must complywith this strategic guidance in performingtheir duties to organize, train, equip, andsustain forces for joint operations in NBCenvironments.

CHAPTER IIPEACETIME PREPAREDNESS AND THE TRANSITION

TO OPERATIONS

II-1

1. General

a. Varied and unpredictable challenges toUS interests in the international securityenvironment place special requirements on theArmed Forces of the United States.Maintaining adequate preparedness inpeacetime to facilitate rapid transition tooperations, is a responsibility shared byServices, combatant commands, andsubunified commands. This chapteraddresses requirements for forcecapabilities and unity of effort before andduring the initial phases of operations thatmay be executed in NBC environments.

b. Peacetime preparedness and planningfor the transition to operations are based onnational security, military strategies, andsupporting plans. The Services andUSSOCOM have the primary responsibilityfor organizing, training, and equipping forcesfor the full range of potential operations, aswell as for professional military educationand leader development programs, withemphasis on current threats and combatantcommand plans. Combatant commands haveresponsibilities for organization, joint training,and integration of force elements provided bythe Services and USSOCOM, to meetpeacetime, war, and MOOTW requirements.All elements in the Armed Forces of theUnited States are responsible for ensuring thattheir training for individuals and organizations

“War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued byman. An army’s military qualities are based on the individual who is steepedin the spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands,rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies intelligence to everydetail; who gains ease and confidence through practice, and who completelyimmerses his personality in the appointed task.”

Major General Carl von Clausewitz, On War

meets the requirements of the combatantcommands for operations in NBCenvironments.

c. The fundamental elements needed formaintaining adequate preparedness are aclear understanding of the threats andoperational requirements, both overseasand in the United States, as well as unity ofeffort. The Services and USSOCOM trainand prepare forces to meet these requirementsfor operations in NBC environments in thecombatant commands’ areas of responsibility(AORs). To support these requirements,commanders’ mission analyses identifyspecific, mission-essential tasks forindividuals and organizations that facilitateoperations in NBC environments. The ArmedForces of the United States also areresponsible for appropriate military supportwithin the United States to counter adversarythreats and employment of NBC weaponsdirectly against the United States. Suchdomestic military activity is subject toconstitutional, statutory, and policyrestrictions.

2. Preparedness in the UnitedStates

a. The nature of the international securityenvironment, and the worldwide NBC threat,have implications for peacetime preparednessin the United States. The peacetime programs

II-2

Chapter II

JP 3-11

of the Services and USSOCOM areresponsible for enabling an adequate and rapidtransition of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates, including the Reserve Components, tooperations to meet the urgent needs ofemerging crisis or conflict situations.

For unique MOOTW considerations, seeChapter VI, "Military Operations Other ThanWar."

b. Commanders of forces and facilities inthe United States are responsible forassessments of vulnerabilities that maycompromise peacetime preparedness giventhe NBC threat and the potential utility to stateand non-state actors of NBC attacks againstUS civilian and military targets. A numberof state and non-state adversaries maychoose early NBC employment against theUS civilian population and infrastructuresas well as military forces and facilities inthe expectation of achieving an early,decisive advantage in pursuit of theirobjectives. Therefore, peacetime preparednessand planning for transition to operations musttake into account the vulnerabilities that, ifexploited by adversaries, could impedeexecution of mission-essential tasks.Commanders’ actions to reducevulnerabilities take into account their assignedmissions and supporting plans, as well as theUniversal Joint Task List (UJTL).

c. Commanders must maintain currentassessments of the NBC threat against theUnited States, integrating their efforts withother US Government (USG) agencies,including appropriate law enforcement andintelligence organizations. Of particularimportance are facilities essential to training,staging, deploying, and sustaining forces foroperations. These facilities include aerial andseaports of embarkation as well as essentialUSG and civilian transportation and relatedinfrastructures.

d. Peacetime planning and supportingactions must include plans to minimizevulnerability to and mitigate the effects ofNBC attacks in order to maintain requiredforce preparedness. Combatant command andsupporting planning routinely produce JointMission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) thatmust include appropriate elements to facilitateoperations in NBC environments. Plans mustbe visibly and successfully exercised inorder to provide maximum deterrent effecton potential adversaries. Commanders areresponsible for coordination with civilianauthorities and agencies to prevent and, ifnecessary, mitigate and manage theconsequences of deliberate or accidental NBCemployment or similar toxic material eventsin the United States. Detailed interagencyprocesses guide the Armed Forces of theUnited States in providing MSCA to copewith such events.

e. This JP addresses key requirements inCJCSI 3500.01A, Joint Training Policy forthe Armed Forces of the United States. ThisJP supports the following key CJCSI3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL),tasks: SN 3.4 Protect Strategic Forces andMeans, 8.1.12 Coordinate CounterproliferationPrograms and Activities, and 8.3.4 PerformConsequence Management in the InteragencyArena; ST 6.2.8 Establish NBC Defense inTheater, 8.4.4 Counter Weapons andTechnology Proliferation, and 8.5.4Coordinate Theater ConsequenceManagement; OP 5.7.8 CoordinateConsequence Management in the JOA, and6.2.8 Establish NBC Protection in the JOA;Joint Tactical 6.6 Coordinate Chemical andBiological Defense.

f. The key tasks to be undertaken in theUnited States in order to reduce thevulnerability of US forces to NBC attacks areenforcing operations security (OPSEC),maintaining emergency NBC response plans,

II-3


ensuring redundant force capabilities,maintaining effective NBC defenseequipment, and visible joint and interagencyplanning, training, and related preparations.OPSEC should emphasize uncertainty to anadversary about the precise units and timesassociated with any particular US militaryresponse.

g. Attacks at locations essential todeployment may delay operations.Emergency response immediately after anNBC incident will determine the suitabilityof that location to continue deploymentactivities. Redundant capabilities shouldprovide flexible options for shiftingresponsibilities for deployment to circumventthe effects of any particular NBC attack.Installations supporting deployment musthave timely access to specialized equipment,personnel, and units needed to identify andprovide early warning of an NBC attack. Jointand interagency plans, training, and exercisesshould visibly demonstrate the ability of theUnited States to maintain its essentialdeployment, sustainment, and employmentcapabilities while minimizing the effects ofplausible NBC attacks. Key audiences forthese exercises are potential adversaries as

well as domestic and international citizenryand media.

3. Preparedness in TheaterOperational Areas

a. Peacetime preparedness for operationsin NBC environments includes measurestaken by commanders in theater operationalareas abroad. Force requirements (includingreadiness and force protection) in anyparticular combatant command area mayrequire support not only from the UnitedStates but also from other overseas geographiccombatant commands. As a result, allcommands must undertake vulnerabilityassessments and supporting actions similarto those described for US territory, withappropriate emphasis on aerial and sea portsof embarkation and debarkation, vulnerableforeign civilian populations andinfrastructures, nonmilitary and foreignmilitary support personnel, and deployed USforces and facilities. All commands areresponsible for cooperative actions inpeacetime with governments, armed forces ofallies, and potential multinational partners tofacilitate sustainment of operations in NBCenvironments. Commands develop JMETLs

US forces must implement effective defenses and counters to adversaryNBC attacks and other toxic material releases.

II-4

Chapter II

JP 3-11

in order to support the military strategy forevery theater. Essential in these JMETLs isthe inclusion of key tasks for establishmentof effective defenses and counters to adversaryNBC attacks and other toxic material releases.

b. US ambassadors and their countryteams have primary responsibility forcoordination with the host countrygovernment(s). Commanders in theateroperational areas must coordinate their actions

with the country team to maintain peacetimepreparedness and assure effective transitionto operations. Geographic combatantcommanders also have special responsibilitiesfor US citizens and civilian assets in theirAORs. These responsibilities may includenoncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)and other support to US citizens and interestsas defined by current US policies. To assureadequate and timely intertheater transportationsupport, affected combatant commands and

A MISTY, DEADLY EMBRACE

Late in the afternoon on 22 April 1915, a setting sun cast long shadows overthe battle-scarred terrain around the medieval Belgium city of Ypres. In thedistance the faint sound of large-caliber guns could be heard. Birds flutteredand swooped, seeking places to roost on the practically treeless landscape.Suddenly, at 1724, three flares rose from an observation balloon over theGerman lines and burst against the darkening eastern sky. German artillerycommenced a fierce bombardment that landed to the rear of the French andBritish lines in the Ypres sector. Then, at 1800, an eerie silence fell over thearea.

Peering across the battlefield, men of two French divisions, the 87th Territorialand the 45th Algerian, saw blue-white wisps of haze rising from the Germantrenches. The haze swirled about, gathered in a cloud that slowly turned yellow-green, and began to drift across the terrain at a height of up to six feet. As thecloud drifted, it settled into every depression in the landscape. Finally, thegentle north-northeasterly wind brought it spilling into the French trenches,silently enveloping the occupants in a misty, deadly embrace.

To the north and southwest of the now mist-enshrouded French positions,British and Canadian troops looked into the haze and, to their amazement,saw soldiers, many without weapons, emerge from the cloud, “running wildlyand in confusion” toward positions to the rear. Terror-stricken Algerians ranby the startled Dominion troops, coughing and clutching their throats. Momentslater French soldiers staggered by, “blinded, coughing, chests heaving, facesan ugly purple color, lips speechless with agony.” One by one, the guns of theFrench artillery batteries in the sector stopped firing, and the two Frenchdivisions collapsed. The Ypres front now had a gap over four miles widecontaining hundreds of men in a “comatose or dying condition.” After half anhour, German troops, equipped with cotton wadding tied over their faces – aprimitive form of protective mask – cautiously advanced into the breech createdby the discharge of chlorine gas.

SOURCE: Leavenworth Papers, No. 10, Chemical Warfare in World War I:The American Experience, 1917-1918, by MAJ (P) Charles E. Heller, USAR

Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900, September 1984

II-5


US country teams must continuouslycoordinate their planning with the USTransportation Command.

c. The effectiveness of deterrence abroadmay depend on an adversary’s appreciationof the ability of US combatant commands andcountry teams, in conjunction with indigenousmilitary forces, to maintain force readinesswhile mitigating and managing the effects ofNBC attacks.

4. Considerations forSupported and SupportingCombatant CommandStrategic Planning

a. Supported and supporting combatantcommand strategic planning must take intoaccount potential adversary NBC weaponsemployment concepts in developing theatercampaign plans as well as in planning forplausible but unforeseeable crises (see FigureII-1). In particular, campaign and supportingplans must include options for generatingadequate and timely force capabilities(including force protection) in the event ofearly adversary NBC employment in thesupported combatant command AOR orother supporting areas, including theUnited States. Combatant commands mustestablish priority intelligence requirements,take pre-crisis actions to prevent adversaryNBC weapons employmen t , p l ancounterforce and active defense operations toprevent or minimize NBC attacks, and planactions to counter, mitigate and manage theeffects of an NBC attack. In conjunction withhost countries, particular emphasis should beplaced on early warning and detection; actionsto prepare US and indigenous military forces;and protection of threatened civilianpopulations, essential infrastructures, andfacilities. Combatant commands should alsodevelop and exercise plans to support host

country actions to minimize and manage theeffects of an NBC attack, especially wherethe effects may constrain US military freedomof action.

b. Plans and implementing actions tocounter potential adversary NBCdevelopments during peacetime and earlyin crises are crucial. These plans and actionsrequire aggressive and integrated joint,multinational, and interagency intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)activities to identify adversary NBCemployment concepts and doctrine, weaponsdevelopments, activities at suspected orknown NBC storage and production sites, anddeployments of operational NBC weaponsystems.

Potential adversaries may be deterred from NBCweaponry use by the visible peacetimedemonstration of US preparedness.

II-6

Chapter II

JP 3-11

5. Considerations at the Outsetof Operations

In the United States and abroad, all elementsand commands of the Armed Forces of theUnited States have basic goals at the outset ofoperations (see Figure II-2). A key task isthe establishment of protection againstNBC attacks in the operational area andin other areas providing forces andsustaining capabilities. The goals establishedto carry out military responsibilities in this

Figure II-1. Considerations for Combatant Command Strategic Planning

phase of operations include prevention ofadversarial use of NBC weapons either in theUnited States or abroad, rapid anduninterrupted force preparation anddeployment, and comprehensive forceprotection. These goals should be reflectedin joint operation planning, development ofbranches in campaign plans, redundantassignments of mission essential tasks toforces, and visible exercises that ensurepeacetime preparedness and may therebydeter potential adversaries.

CONSIDERATIONS FORCOMBATANT COMMAND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Establish priority intelligence requirements

Take pre-crisis actions to prevent adversarynuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weaponsemployment

Plan counterforce and active defense operationsto prevent or minimize NBC attacks

Plan actions to counter, mitigate, and manage theeffects of an NBC attack

Emphasize early warning and detection

Take actions to prepare US and indigenousmilitary forces

Protect threatened civilians, infrastructures, andfacilities

II-7


Figure II-2. Military Goals at the Outset of Operations

MILITARY GOALS AT THE OUTSET OF OPERATIONS

These goals should be reflected in joint operation planning,development of branches in campaign plans, redundant assignmentsof mission-essential tasks to forces, and visible exercises that assurepeacetime preparedness and may thereby deter potential adversaries:

These goals should be reflected in joint operation planning,development of branches in campaign plans, redundant assignmentsof mission-essential tasks to forces, and visible exercises that assurepeacetime preparedness and may thereby deter potential adversaries:

Rapid and uninterrupted force preparationand deployment

Comprehensive force protection

Prevention of adversarial use of nuclear, biological,and chemical weapons either in the United Statesor abroad

II-8

Chapter II

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIISUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS

III-1

1. General

This chapter provides guidance for theconduct of sustained joint and multinationalcombat operations when an adversary iscapable of employing NBC weapons. Itaddresses the overall principles of operationsin NBC environments, the specific principlesof NBC defense, the relationship of NBCdefense to other offensive and defensivecapabilities and sustained combat,considerations for assuring logistic support,and the distribution of key responsibilities ina theater of war.

2. Principles of Operations inNBC Environments

a. Applicability. The Armed Forces of theUnited States must be prepared to conductprompt, sustained, and decisive combatoperations in NBC environments. Anadversary’s NBC capabilities can have aprofound impact on US and multinationalobjectives, campaign plans, and supportingactions, and therefore must be taken intoaccount in JTF planning. The principlesthat follow assist the JFC in planningcampaigns and major operations, assuringeffective execution, and providing essentialsupport to civilian authorities charged withmitigating and managing the consequences ofan adversary’s use of NBC weapons.

“Immediately there ensued a terrific hissing noise as a huge release of gascommenced. The dense, grey cloud made an awe-inspiring sight as it rolledsteadily forward, widening as it went. We watched it pour over our ownFront Lines and continued across No-Man’s Land. Such a threatening cloudas this we had never before witnessed. Over the enemy lines the gas beltspread wider and wider engulfing them from sight.”

Corporal Martin Fox, as quoted by Martin Gilbert,The First World War — A Complete History

b. Deterrence. A fundamental premiseof US military preparedness is thatadversaries are most likely to be deterred fromprovocative action when US forces aresufficiently and visibly organized, trained,and equipped to defeat that provocation.Deterring adversary use of NBC weaponsdepends to a significant degree on effectivepreparations by the defender to deny theadversary any meaningful advantagefrom the employment of such weapons.The JFC should be prepared to communicateand reinforce US deterrence policiesestablished by the NCA. The JFC shouldalso be prepared to recommend andimplement flexible deterrent options (FDOs)in NBC environments consistent with theJSCP and other applicable plans. FDOs maybe diplomatic, informational, military, oreconomic in nature. They may includeexercises and demonstrations of NBC defensecapabilities in order to convey USpreparedness to counter adversary threats andmitigate the consequences of NBC attackswithout significant degradation of operations.Credible plans, visibly effective capabilities,and a clearly communicated commitment tohold an adversary and its leadership at risk inresponse to NBC use are also importantelements of deterrence. The adversary shouldperceive US capabilities and determination withcertainty while remaining uncertain about theprecise nature and timing of US actions.

III-2

Chapter III

JP 3-11

c. Assuring Sustained CombatOperations. The classic principles of warand fundamentals of joint operations apply tosituations in which adversaries possess NBCcapabilities. In considering the challenges tosustained combat operations in suchsituations, six areas merit special emphasis:intelligence preparation of the battlespace(IPB), reducing vulnerability to adversaryNBC use, preventing adversary employmentof NBC capabilities, protecting the force,multinational operations, and synchronizationof operations.

• Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace. The continuous IPBprocess must account for confirmed aswell as plausible but unconfirmedadversary capabilities, plans, and actions.An adversary’s NBC capabilities mayresult from deliberate research anddevelopment that includes operationaltesting, theoretical research anddevelopment without operational testing,or acquisition of readily usable NBCcapabilities from other countries or non-state adversaries. The JFC must take intoaccount these potential adversary NBCcapabilities in assessments, estimates,and plans. The IPB process mustaddress the capabilities and limitationsof adversary NBC weapons anddelivery systems; their command,control, and release procedures; andthe indicators of intent to employ NBCweapons.

• Reducing Vulnerability to AdversaryNBC Capabilities. Vulnerabilitiesshould be examined through continuouscomprehensive risk assessments thatencompass the full range of potentialtargets that may be subject to adversaryNBC attack. Commanders have multiplemeans to contain, mitigate, and managethe consequences of identified risks andcontrol hazards in order to preservecombat power and minimize casualties.

Such means include planning forbranches and sequels in campaignplans, eliminating unique nodes,assuring that multiple units areprepared to assume vital missions, andtraining and exercising in order tofacilitate shifting missions andresponsibilities to counter unanticipatedNBC attacks.

•• When US, host nation (HN), or othercivilian populations and infrastructuresare at risk to NBC attack, the JFC assiststhe appropriate military and civilauthorities to protect against, mitigate,and manage the consequences of theserisks. Of particular concern to the JFCin this regard are NBC risks to civilianareas that may affect execution of themilitary campaign.

•• Risk assessment and vulnerabilityreduction must also address the dangersposed by toxic materials, includingradiological contamination and otherenvironmental contamination fromindustrial operations within the JFC’soperational area. Particular care must betaken in identifying the nature of suchhazards, because in many cases standardmilitary NBC individual protectiveequipment (IPE) will not provide thenecessary protection. In some instances,avoiding the hazard may be the mosteffective or only course of action(COA). In all circumstances, the JFCshould act to minimize immediate andlong-term effects of toxic hazards tohealth.

See Chapter IV, "Health ServiceSupport," for additional health servicesupport information.

• Preventing Adversary NBC WeaponsEmployment. The JFC should not relysolely on efforts to reduce the force’svulnerability to NBC attacks. JTF plans

III-3

Sustained Combat Operations

should include every effort to preventthe adversary from successfullydelivering NBC weapons, using the fullextent of actions allowed by the rulesof engagement (ROE). These actionsinclude interdiction, collateral damageplanning and assessments, early andsustained operations to disrupt or destroyNBC capabilities, and establishment ofmulti-layered defenses against NBCweapons delivery.

• Protecting the Force. Fundamentally,protecting the force consists of thoseactions taken to prevent or mitigatehostile actions against personnel,resources, facilities, and criticalinformation. These actions conserve theforce’s fighting potential so that it can bedecisively applied. Offensive anddefensive measures are coordinated andsynchronized to enable the effectiveemployment of the joint force whiledegrading opportunities for the adversary.In NBC environments, the JFC must takeinto account a number of uniqueconsiderations that have a significanteffect on force protection. As depictedin Figure III-1, these include but are notlimited to training and leader

development, psychological operations(PSYOP), force health protection,protective equipment, and OPSEC.

•• Training and Leader Development.Rigorous and realistic individual andjoint unit training across the force ensuresreadiness to fight and win should anadversary employ NBC weapons.Training and leader development areresponsibilities shared by combatantcommands, Services, and a number ofDepartment of Defense (DOD) agencies.Training, exercises, and professionalmilitary education and leaderdevelopment programs shouldincorporate the principles foroperations in NBC environments andinclude realistic consideration of NBCweapons effects on sustained combatoperations.

•• PSYOP. As a means to minimize thepotential for and mitigate the effects ofadversary NBC use, PSYOP candecrease an adversary’s perception ofthe utility of NBC weapons, contributeto deterring their employment, andenhance efforts to reduce an adversary’sdomestic and international support.

The JFC should not rely solely on efforts to reduce the force’s vulnerability toNBC attacks, but should plan to prevent the adversary from delivering NBCweapons.

III-4

Chapter III

JP 3-11

•• Force Health Protection. Medicalprotection of the force against NBCthreats involves integrated preventive,surveillance, and clinical programs. TheJFC’s plans should include preventivemedicine, joint medical surveillance,NBC casualty control, medicalevacuation, and provision for readilyavailable treatments and supplies tocounter the physical effects of NBCexposure. These plans should take intoaccount the capabilities and requirementsof host countries, multinational partners,and essential civilian workers supportingUS and multinational forces.

•• Protective Equipment. Sufficientequipment must be available to protectnot only the uniformed force but also theessential supporting US and civilian workforces. Individual and unit training forproper sizing, use of, and care for thisindividual and crew-served equipmentis required to take full advantage ofits capabilities.

•• OPSEC. In affecting an adversary’sintelligence and situational awareness,information operations including OPSECprovide forces with a significant measureof protection by preventing an adversary

PROTECTINGTHE FORCE FROM NUCLEAR,BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PsychologicalOperations

ForceHealth

Protection

ProtectiveEquipment

OperationsSecurity

Training andLeader

DevelopmentCommander's

IntentCommander's

Intent

Figure III-1. Protecting the Force from Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

III-5


from acquiring information necessary tosuccessfully target forces and facilities.Deception, dispersion of forces, andeffective use of terrain are examplesof measures that complement OPSEC.

• Multinational Operations

•• US military operations are routinelyconducted with forces of other countrieswithin the structure of an alliance orcoalition. An adversary may employNBC weapons against non-US forces,especially those with little or no defenseagainst these weapons, in an effort toweaken, divide, or destroy themultinational effort. In planning andconducting combat operations, the JFCmust consider the capabilities andlimitations of all available forces tomaximize their contributions andminimize their vulnerabilities. Peacetimeactivities with multinational partners,particularly multinational and interagencytraining and planning exercises, providemeans of preparing for multinationalcombat operations in NBCenvironments.

•• Multinational operations in manycases will involve the use of HN bases,facilities, and personnel (including othercountries’ civilian workers supportingUS and multinational forces). For somecontingencies, HN considerations are thesubject of significant peacetime planningin which operational, legal, contractual,and personnel issues are addressed. Forother contingency situations, these issuesmust be addressed in an ad hoc fashion.Due to the complex and vital nature ofcoordinated action with HN authoritiesto defend against and mitigate the effectsof NBC attacks, advance planning is ahigh JFC priority. JFC coordination ofHN support activities will involve anumber of DOD components as wellas the US country team.

Other issues relating to HN support areaddressed in Chapter IV, "Health ServiceSupport," Chapter V, "SupportingConflict Termination," and Chapter VI,"Military Operations Other Than War."

• Synchronization of Operations. Theobjective in synchronizing operations is

COALITION COORDINATION

The next USCENTCOM [US Central Command] responsibility was to coordinateNBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] defense operations for all coalitionforces. Within the first week after the NBCC [NBC center]’s establishment,Lieutenant Colonel Silvernail was tasked to assist the Saudi Arabian Ministryof Defense and Aviation to form a Saudi joint-level NBC staff. He and CaptainPaul Schiele conducted a three-day refresher training class (the first of several)for the Saudi NBC School located at King Khalid Military City; it was attendedby fifty Saudi, Syrian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti officers. Saudi Army NBC defensestocks proved to be woefully low — not that there was any shortage ofcontractors offering to supply the desert nations. The US government was inno shape to assist the Saudi military logistically, barely having enoughprotective equipment for its own soldiers. The Saudi government did askUSCENTCOM’s NBCC for support in evaluating the capabilities of the manycommercial offers, relying on it to get the best value for the money.

SOURCE: Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies and Decisionsin the Gulf War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 23.

III-6

Chapter III

JP 3-11

to maximize the combined effects of allfriendly forces while degrading adversarycapabilities. Synchronization entailsthe interrelated and time-phasedexecution of all aspects of combatoperations, and is enhanced by superiorsituational awareness and agility inadjusting ongoing operations to reduceforce vulnerability and maximize combatpower. In NBC environments, successfulsynchronization requires properintegration of and sequencing among ISRcapabilities; passive defense measures;active defense operations; counterforceoperations; and sustainment. The JFC’scampaign plan, command and control(C2) arrangements, and tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) shouldfacilitate synchronization across all forcefunctions and components.

d. Public Diplomacy and Information.JFC planning should consider publicdiplomacy and information requirementswhen confronting the threat or use of NBCweapons. Public interest in NBC-relateddevelopments may be intense and may havean effect on NCA and multinationalauthorities’ decision making. Therefore, theJFC must be a source of timely, accurateinformation, with particular emphasis on theexplanation of actions taken in response toNBC threats or use. Establishing productiverelationships with media organizations is aninherent element of JFC planning.

3. Principles of NBC Defense

a. General

• The capability to defend against NBCattacks and sustain combat operations inNBC environments requires forewarningand properly trained and equipped forcesthroughout the theater. US forces mustbe prepared to conduct and sustainoperations in NBC environments withminimal degradation. NBC defense is

based on the general principles notedabove for operations in NBCenvironments and three additionalprinciples that specifically address thehazards created by NBC weapons:avoidance of NBC hazards, particularlycontamination; protection of individualsand units from unavoidable NBChazards; and decontamination in orderto restore operational capability.Application of these principles (seeFigure III-2), help to minimizevulnerabilities, protect friendly forces,and maintain the force’s operationaltempo in order to achieve campaignobjectives while complicating adversarytargeting.

• Sustaining combat operations in NBCenvironments presents major challengesto air, land, maritime, space, and specialoperations forces. Logistic operationsand facilities are at particular risk to NBCattack to the degree that they rely on fixedsites (e.g., ports and airfields) or mustremain in particular locations forextended periods of time. The need tooperate in NBC environments is likelyto add to the physical andpsychological demands of militaryoperations, with potentially significanteffects on the performance of individualsand units. Force-specific and logisticconsiderations are described later in thischapter.

Chapter IV, "Health Service Support,"describes the requirements for healthservice support.

b. Contamination Avoidance. Successfulcontamination avoidance prevents disruptionto operations and organizations by eliminatingunnecessary time in cumbersome protectivepostures and minimizing decontaminationrequirements. Avoiding contaminationrequires the ability to recognize thepresence or absence of NBC hazards in the

III-7


air, on water, land, personnel, equipment,and facilities, at both short and long range.Surveillance and detection capabilities enableforces to recognize the invisible NBC hazards.The fusion of these capabilities withinformation from other sources yields anoverall surveillance picture supportingdecisions for specific avoidance, protection,and decontamination actions. Thesesurveillance and detection results alsoestablish requirements for other avoidancemeasures such as sounding alarms, markinghazards, and warning forces. To support JFCdecisions on contamination avoidance,specific TTP guide essential implementationmeasures designed to avoid or limit exposure,such as increased use of shelters during NBCemployment windows, and providing keyinformation for movement before, during, andafter NBC attacks. In planning for

contamination avoidance, the JFC mustinclude an assessment of the capabilities ofavailable detection systems. Particularchallenges include unanticipated use ofbiological agents and the capabilities andlimitations of current remote and standoffdetection systems.

c. NBC Protection. NBC protectionrequires the planning, preparation, training,and execution of physical defenses to negatethe effects of NBC weapons and hazards onpersonnel and materiel. As staffs analyze theirmission requirements and conditions, theplanning process will yield specific actionsrequired before, during, and after NBCattacks. As commanders anticipate andidentify NBC risks, these actions should beclearly communicated and rehearsed fromcommand to individual levels. NBC

Figure III-2. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Principles

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICALDEFENSE PRIORITIES

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

Anticipate; use intelligence preparation for the battlespace,sensors; avoid hazards BEFORE contamination affects

operations

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICALPROTECTION

Apply individual and collective protection toconserve combat power

DECONTAMINATION

Decontaminate when needed torestore combat power

III-8

Chapter III

JP 3-11

protection conserves the force by providingindividual and collective protectionpostures and capabilities.

• Individual Protection

•• Commanders adopt a mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) toestablish flexible force readiness levelsfor individual NBC protection. MOPPanalysis (the process of determining arecommended MOPP) integrates NBCprotection requirements — derived fromNBC threat assessments — with missionrequirements in light of the performancedegradation caused by wearing protectiveequipment. MOPP analysis relies onaccurate IPB and NBC hazard predictionas well as a clear understanding of theforce’s ability to quickly increase its NBCprotection. To facilitate adapting tovarying mission demands across a

combatant command’s AOR, MOPPdecisions should be delegated to thelowest level possible and retained athigher levels only in exceptional cases.The JFC has overall responsibility forproviding guidance for levels ofprotection and ensuring timelywarning of NBC risks. Figure III-3depicts notional MOPP levels. Forcecomponents may require variationalconfigurations, such as “mask only” foridentified situations, but shouldstandardize configurations wherepossible. Service TTP address specifictechniques and procedures for MOPPanalysis and donning protectiveequipment (e.g., masking, unmasking).

•• Ordinary clothing can provide someprotection against the thermal effects ofa nuclear detonation. More sophisticatedprotection is required against biological

NOTIONAL MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVEPOSTURE LEVELS FOR FORCES ASHORE

Over-garment

ITEM LEVEL 0 LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3 LEVEL 4

Mask &Hood

Overboots

Gloves

Worn

Carried

Carried

Carried

Worn

Worn

Worn

Carried

ReadilyAvailable

Carried

Readily

ReadilyAvailable

Worn

Carried

Worn

Carried

These notional mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels apply to personnel onland. Personnel operating in the air and at sea adopt MOPP levels tailored to theirenvironments as determined by their component or subordinate commanders.

Worn

Worn

Worn

Worn

Figure III-3. Notional Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels for Forces Ashore

III-9


and chemical agents. These measuresinclude medical prophylaxis, pretreatments,protective masks and clothing, antidotes,immunizations, and other medicaltreatments. Wearing a correctly sized andmaintained protective mask provides thebest protection to the respiratory tractagainst a biological aerosol attack.Protective mask filters are designed toremove aerosol particles and vapors ofchemical and biological agents. NBCovergarments provide protection from awide range of chemical and biologicalagents. Likewise, individual equipmentand supplies gain some protection fromcovers. These covers may be as simpleas plastic sheathing, which provideslimited protection against large-scale useof liquid agents, or NBC protectivecovers which provide improvedprotection.

• Collective Protection. Sustainingoperations in NBC environments mayrequire collective protectionequipment, which provides a toxic freearea (TFA) for conducting operationsand performing life support functionssuch as rest, relief, and medical treatment.Contamination transfer into the TFA

compromises the health and safety of alloccupants and jeopardizes their ability tosupport the mission. Therefore, trainingmust include procedures for TFA entryand exit. When collective protection isnot available, plans must be developed,exercised, and evaluated to movepersonnel to alternative TFAs that arewell away from the contaminated areas.If evacuation is not possible, buildingoccupants may be able to gain limitedprotection by closing all windows anddoors, turning off ventilation systems, andmoving to closed, inner rooms. If there issome advance warning, occupants may beable to increase protection by sealingwindows, doors, and openings, whilerecognizing that the building or space mayquickly become uninhabitable withoutcooling or ventilation.

d. Decontamination. Decontaminationsupports the post-attack restoration of forcesand operations to a near-normal capability.Decontamination is intended to minimizethe time required to return personnel andmission-essential equipment to a mission-capable state. Because decontamination maybe labor intensive and assets are limited,commanders must prioritize requirements

The goal of immediate decontamination is to minimize casualties, save lives,and help to limit contamination exposure and spread.

III-10

Chapter III

JP 3-11

and decontaminate only what is necessary.Commanders may choose to deferdecontamination of some items and,depending on agent type and weatherconditions, opt to either defer use ofequipment or allow natural weathering effects(temperature, wind, and sunlight) to reducehazards. Decontamination is organized intothree categories that reflect operationalurgency: immediate, operational, andthorough. Decontamination also entailsspecial considerations for patients, sensitiveequipment, aircraft, fixed sites, and theretrograde of equipment. The extent and timerequired for decontamination depends on thesituation, mission, degree of contamination,and decontamination assets available. Servicepublications provide detailed TTP for thetechnical aspects of decontamination.

• Immediate Decontamination. The goalof immediate decontamination is tominimize casualties, save lives, and helpto limit contamination exposure andspread. Upon becoming contaminated,an individual carries out immediatedecontamination, which includes threetasks: skin decontamination, personalwipedown (hood, mask, gloves, and

individual equipment), and operatorspraydown of frequently touchedequipment surfaces using on-sitedecontamination equipment.

• Operational Decontamination.Operational decontamination limitscontamination exposure and spread,and helps to sustain operations byproviding temporary and, in some cases,long-term relief from wearingprotective equipment. Operationaldecontamination includes twotechniques: MOPP gear exchange forpersonnel, and operator washdown formission-essential equipment.

• Thorough Decontamination.Thorough decontamination reduces oreliminates the need for wearing ofprotective equipment. Thoroughdecontamination is supported byspecialized decontamination units andpersonnel. There are three thoroughdecontamination techniques: detailedpersonnel decontamination, detailedequipment decontamination, and detailedaircraft decontamination. Thoroughdecontamination is required for total

Thorough decontamination is supported by specializeddecontamination units and personnel.

III-11


reconstitution and return to unrestricteduse of personnel and materiel.

• Additional DecontaminationConsiderations. There are situationsthat require unique application ofdecontamination principles, procedures,and methods.

•• Patient decontamination reduces thethreat of contamination-related injury tohealth service support (HSS) personnel andpatients. Patient decontamination will haveto be accomplished as the operation and

patient load allows. The JFC or subordinatecommanders may provide supportpersonnel to assist in patientdecontamination at medical facilities.

•• Sensitive equipment decontaminationconsiders the delicate nature of certaintypes of equipment (e.g., avionics and/or electrical, electronic, and environmentalsystems); vehicle interiors; associatedcargo; and some weapon systems.

•• Aircraft p o s e u n i q u edecontamination challenges. JFC plans

COMMANDER CONCERNS

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Silvernail and Major Patrick Fogelson arrived inDhahran as the USCENTCOM [US Central Command] NBC [nuclear, biologicaland chemical] Defense Division of J-3 (Operations) on August 9, with theUSCENTCOM advance party. Silvernail, designated as the Theater ChemicalStaff Officer, would receive seven more Army chemical officers by mid-September to form the USCENTCOM NBC Center (NBCC). On 23 August,Captain Paul Schiele and three chemical officers from CRDEC joined theforward-deployed Chemical Division. Between late August and mid-September,three [continental United States]-based chemical officers arrived to composethe USCENTCOM Chemical Division (Rear). His initial priorities were to developthe chemical unit infrastructure and coordinate the entire coalition’s [chemical-biological] defense logistics. USCENTCOM would recommend that all soldiersdeploy with three unopened sets of protective clothing, a protective mask,three Nerve Agent Antidote Kits and M258A1 skin decon kits, and a set ofreplacement mask filters. Army units would discover this goal could not berealistically met, nearly all units lacking adequate quantities of protectiveclothing and masks. The Marines, upon inspecting their pre-positioned stocks,found their protective suits damaged by heat and petroleum, their protectivemasks dry-rotted, and mask filters aged past their shelf life. All the MarineCorps’s M8A1 alarms were in an Albany depot supposedly because they hadnot instituted a radioactive control program (required for the americium isotopeinside the detector). The Air Force and Navy were having similar difficulties,finding severe shortages in both protective suits and decontamination supplies.Lieutenant Colonel Silvernail began immediate discussions with the JointChiefs of Staff and the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operationsand Plans over options to increase or accelerate the delivery of any recentlyfielded or about to be fielded chemical defense equipment to include the M1CAM, the XM21 RSCAAL, and the XM93 NBCRS. The top priority was increasingthe quantities of protective masks, protective clothing, and medical antidotes.


III-12

Chapter III

JP 3-11

must take into account these challengesin considering employment of aircraftinto, within, and from contaminatedareas.

•• Fixed site decontaminationtechniques focus on fixed facilities andmission support areas, such as command,control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I) facilities, supplydepots, aerial and sea ports, medicalfacilities, and maintenance sites.Paragraph 6c of this chapter addresses ingreater detail decontaminationconsiderations for critical fixed sitessupporting logistic operations.

•• Retrograde cargo may requireextensive decontamination measures;

specialized, highly sensitive monitoringequipment; extended weathering; ordestruction. Retrograde of previouslycontaminated equipment may be delayeduntil after conflict termination.

e. NBC Defense Command and ControlConsiderations. Effective C2 is essential tofully utilizing available NBC defense assets(see Figure III-4). In particular, the uniqueaspects of communications, intelligenceoperations, and decision making in NBCenvironments present challenges tocommanders and staffs. Developing soundNBC defense COAs will require timelyexploitation of all ISR data sources. SuchCOAs often must be developed and executedrapidly. Sensors, detection systems, andwarning and reporting networks that provide

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSECOMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

To ensure unity of effort focused on the joint forcecommander's intent, staffs must:

Translate all-source information into anunderstanding of the nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) threat and the operationalenvironment for NBC defense actions

Conduct timely vulnerability assessments

Recommend specific courses of action for reducingvulnerabilities and countering specific threats

Integrate warning and reporting on potential andactual NBC attacks into joint force commandercommand, control, communications, computers, andintelligence systems to facilitate risk assessmentsand actions to minimize the short-and long-termhealth effects of toxic exposures to the deployedforce

To ensure unity of effort focused on the joint forcecommander's intent, staffs must:

Translate all-source information into anunderstanding of the nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) threat and the operationalenvironment for NBC defense actions

Conduct timely vulnerability assessments

Recommend specific courses of action for reducingvulnerabilities and countering specific threats

Integrate warning and reporting on potential andactual NBC attacks into joint force commandercommand, control, communications, computers, andintelligence systems to facilitate risk assessmentsand actions to minimize the short-and long-termhealth effects of toxic exposures to the deployedforce

Figure III-4. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Commandand Control Considerations

III-13


accurate, real time information for JFCdecision making must be fully integrated intothe overall C2 systems to make the best useof available decision time.

f. Other NBC Defense Considerations.NBC defense principles should be coupledwith aggressive programs of intelligence,PSYOP, OPSEC, deception, andobscuration. All-source intelligence assetsgather information on the battlespace andenemy capabilities and intentions. PSYOPsupport deterrence measures and, in the eventdeterrence fails, enhance response capabilitiesas a force multiplier. Deception at the theaterlevel supports the campaign plan and its large-scale operations. Obscuration increases thesurvivability of operations, including those atports and airfields.

4. Relationship of NBC Defenseto Other Offensive andDefensive Capabilities

While a necessary part of the solution tothe NBC threat, passive NBC defense isinsufficient in and of itself. In addition topassive defense measures, neutralizing thethreat will require the effective applicationof other military capabilities, in particularactive defense measures and counterforceoperations. While each of these capabilitieshas unique aspects and associated commandand control requirements, they are mosteffective when applied in a synchronizedcombination, in response to specific adversaryNBC concepts of operations. The followingconsiderations are intended to guide the JFC’sassessment of how best to synchronize thecombined capabilities represented byavailable passive defense, active defense, andcounterforce assets in an integrated conceptof operations.

a. General Considerations

• An adversary capable of sustaining aprolonged period of attack with NBC

weapons poses an especially seriousthreat to operations. Extended periodsin a protective posture and exposure totoxic hazards will degrade the operationaltempo of US and multinational forces andcomplicate the performance of keymissions and tasks. The cumulativeeffect of prolonged enemy NBC attackmay be an increasingly contaminatedenvironment in which passive defensesare likely to experience reducedcapabilities.

• Adversary ballistic missile capabilitiespose a particularly dangerous threatin this regard, and have the potential tobe highly effective against US andmultinational fixed sites, especially in adeveloping theater or early in a conflict.Both active defense and counterforceoperations will be required to containmissile threats and thereby enhance theeffectiveness of in-place passivedefenses.

• Active defenses play an important rolein a coordinated operational concept tocounter NBC threats by reducing thenumber of missiles and aircraft arrivingat key defended sites, thereby limiting theextent and intensity of the resultingcontamination and compelling theadversary to consider expenditure ofadditional high value systems in re-attackoperations. If active defense systemssufficiently reduce the scope of initialstrikes, it may be possible to rely oncontamination avoidance at key sites.Further, mitigation and recoveryoperations will be easier to accomplish.

• In countering missile and air threats,counterforce operations — particularlyin combination with active defenses —have the potential to complicate anadversary’s planning. Counterforceoperations should seek to divert, deny,degrade, or destroy the adversary’s

III-14

Chapter III

JP 3-11

ability to execute the types of attacks(including NBC attacks) that mostseriously threaten theater defenses;particularly large, tightly coordinatedaircraft and missile raids that cansaturate and overwhelm active defensesystems. Counterforce operations alsohelp to constrain the adversary’s re-attack capability by targeting adversaryNBC systems as well as production,transport, and storage facilities.Measures of effectiveness forcounterforce planning should emphasizeminimizing any collateral damage whilecausing meaningful degradation of theadversary’s missile and air attackcapabilities to the point where in-placeactive and passive defenses caneffectively neutralize those attacks thatare launched. This will not requirecomplete elimination of enemy missilecapabilities.

• In the design of campaign and operationplans for operations in NBCenvironments, the JFC should includeintegrated operational concepts thatachieve the maximum synergy from thecomplementary contributions of all forceelements. These operational conceptsshould reflect AOR-specific NBC threatsand the general principles of operationsin NBC environments.

b. Planning Considerations

• Threat and Capability Assessments

•• Understanding the complementaryroles of passive defense, active defense,and counterforce operations requires arigorous assessment of how the NBCthreat is likely to present itself. Jointforce intelligence staffs, in addition toassessing the full range of adversaryNBC capabilities, should also assessconcepts of operations for delivery ofNBC weapons. In light of the

considerations discussed above, attentionshould be given to identifying missile,clandestine, and covert deliveryoperational concepts that would stress in-place US defenses — especially prior toa major US force build-up.

•• Development of integrated operationalconcepts to counter the NBC threat mustbe based on realistic assessments ofavailable passive defense, active defense,and counterforce capabilities. Even witheffective counterforce and active defensecapabilities, some attacks will succeed,forcing reliance on passive defenses inorder to survive and operate. If thereare more serious shortfalls incounterforce and active defense assets,the burden on passive defenses will becorrespondingly greater.

• Considerations for ImmatureTheaters

•• In the transition to war or earlystages of hostilities, the NCA may placea high priority on neutralizing enemyNBC capabilities in order to counter theoperational threat to US andmultinational forces and civilians, limitthe coercive potential of NBC attacks,and generally reassure multinationalpartners, particularly in the theater. Inan immature theater characterized byonly a limited US force presence prior toa major force build up, achieving thisobjective may present challenges. In-place active defenses may be limited, andthe conditions to support counterforceoperations from within the theater maynot have been achieved.

•• In these circumstances, the JFC willneed to consider how best to allocatescarce resources to counter the NBCthreat, and how best to rapidly augmentforces in theater. Reliance on forcescapable of operations from outside the

III-15


theater may be required until the propermix of forces is available where needed.For instance, counterforce operationsmay be conducted using cruise missiles,long-range strike aircraft, low-visibilityaircraft, and SOF.

•• Allocation of forces is not static. Asthe theater matures, continuousreassessment of the allocation of forcesand the priorities attached to passivedefense, active defense, and counterforceoperations will be required. Reallocationof forces and priorities will be affectedby changes in the nature and scope ofthe NBC threat, build-up of forces in thetheater, transition from build-up activitiesto sustained operations, and US andmultinational operational tempo.

• Coordination. Maximizing availablepassive defense, active defense, andcounterforce capabilities through anintegrated operational concept willrequire careful coordination among jointforce intelligence, planning, andoperational elements. Organizations witha responsibility for active defense andcounterforce planning must have anunderstanding of theater passive defensecapabilities, current threat assessments,and the results of relevant analytic work.Pre-conflict wargames and training(including joint and multinational fieldexercises) should endeavor to advancethe development of integrated operationalconcepts that exploit offensive anddefensive force linkages. Critical to thiseffort are C2 concepts that link activedefense warning and detection elementsto counterforce and NBC defense missionplanning elements.

5. Special Considerations forSustained Combat

As the theater campaign transitions frominitial combat to sustained operations, the

JFC focuses on operations in depth toensure successful accomplishment ofcampaign objectives. Adversary use of NBCweapons can have a significant impact onthe outcome of the theater campaign andattainment of US and multinational objectives.Given this potential impact, joint force plansshould consider the following factors in orderto assure sustained combat operations in NBCenvironments.

“[joint force commanders] seek toextend operations throughout thebreadth and depth of the operationalarea. JFCs conduct sustainedoperations when a ‘coup de main’ is notpossible.”

JP 3-0, Doctrine forJoint Operations

a. NBC Weapons Effects on JointForces

• Operational tempo, logistic operations,the HSS system, and reconstitutionefforts may be profoundly affected by theintroduction of NBC weapons by anadversary. However, components of USand multinational forces may experiencethe effects of NBC use differently. NBCweapons present separate and distinctthreats to personnel, units, equipment,and operations. Planning shouldaddress the unique characteristics ofeach threat. The ability to assess thevarying impact of NBC attacks on theforce will be important to decidingpriorities for NBC protection andefficiently allocating resources.

Chapter I, "The Strategic Context,"Appendix B, "Nuclear HazardConsiderations," Appendix C,"Biological Hazard Considerations,"Appendix D, "Chemical HazardConsiderations," and Servicepublications provide information onNBC threats and agents.

III-16

Chapter III

JP 3-11

• Generally, operations will slow as tasks,both simple and complex, areperformed by personnel encumberedby protective equipment or exposed toNBC effects. Contamination hazardsmay require abandonment or limited useof facilities, transfer of forces touncontaminated facilities, and avoidanceof planned terrain and routes. In all cases,time penalties will be incurred.Additionally, adversary NBC use couldseverely hamper the componentcommanders’ capabilities for forcegeneration and sustainment if there ismajor disruption of normal personneland materiel replacement processes inthe theater. Force reconstitutionrequirements may also dramaticallyincrease. Even when sufficient protectionhas been afforded to individuals andunits, the increased number of casualtiesmay severely tax reorganization andreconstitution systems as well as thedeployed medical treatment capabilities.

Some of the sustainment considerationsthat should be reviewed by the JFC areoutlined in paragraph 6 of this chapter,"Logistics and Rear Area Operations."

• The use of protective equipmentdegrades individuals’ and units’ability to perform assigned tasks andmissions. The use of IPE can adverselyimpact unit capabilities, and commandersmust conduct assessments and ensure theconduct of actions that mitigate theimpact of any performance degradation.Degradation could take the form ofincreased movement times for tacticaloperations and logistics, degradedcommunications requiring increasednumbers of electronic transmissions,longer response times on requests for firesupport, and degraded C2. The impactof the use of protective equipment, suchas reduced sensory awareness and workrates as well as increased fatigue andwater requirements, requires thatindividuals and units conduct realisticmission-oriented training while usingtheir IPE.

• All units can expect deficits inperformance because of the impact ofprotective clothing and equipment.Commanders at every level can preparetheir units by engaging in realistictraining at a variety of MOPP levels to

All units can expect deficits in performance because of the impact ofprotective clothing and equipment and must train accordingly.

III-17


build confidence and cohesion. Trainingwith protective clothing and equipmentshould take special account of those tasksparticularly affected (e.g., those thatrequire clear vision; precise hearing; finemotor skills; social and emotionalsupport; or communication by facialexpression, gestures, and inflections invoice). Individuals and organizationsthat train often and realistically underrestrictive MOPP levels will be betterprepared for the constraints imposed byprotective clothing and equipment oncommunication, vision, and movement.

• The Armed Forces of the United Statesroutinely tailor force packages foremployment by the combatantcommanders. This tailoring includesmaintaining force elements outside theoperational area in order to reduce in-theater logistic requirements andminimize vulnerabilities. Joint forcecomponents may establish supportingand supported relationships that provideadequate and timely support in theaterfrom locations outside the theater. Theability of in-theater components to callfor, and receive, timely support, assistsin reducing vulnerabilities in theater toadversary employment of NBC weapons.

b. Impact on Air and Space Forces

• NBC attacks have the potential tosignificantly degrade the aerospaceoperating environment and thecontribution of air and space forces tooperational objectives. Nucleardetonations and EMP can directly affectthe aerospace environment, whilecontamination from a variety of NBCweapons can degrade air operations anddisrupt the entire joint operation. Asfixed or semi-fixed installations, air basesare lucrative targets for NBC attacks. Thelethality of NBC weapons and theoperational tempo of air operations create

requirements for timely and effectiveNBC detection and warning. Near realtime warning from US and coalitioninformation systems will reduce thepossibility of operational degradation byNBC contamination and ensure thesustainment of sortie generation. The useof shelters, particularly hardened shelters,offers aircraft protection from the effectsof NBC weapons. Similarly, maintainingthe ability to sustain air operations fromalternate bases limits the potentialdamage of any particular NBC attack.Aircraft contaminated with NBC agentspresent unique challenges fordecontamination that make prioritizationof NBC defense asset allocation andapplication of contamination avoidancepolicies paramount for effectivesustained operations.

• The JFC integrates air forces into plansfor operations against adversary NBCcapabilities. Air and space forces shouldbe prepared to execute such operations,according to the priority assigned by theJFC.

c. Impact on Land Forces. The abilityof land forces to maneuver must not beconstrained by unforeseen areas ofcontamination. Contaminated areas mustquickly be identified, delineated, andavoided. Alternate routes, assembly, andsupport areas must be identified duringpreplanning. To the extent possible, unitsshould be dispersed and thereby reducevulnerability to NBC attacks, physicallymassing only when required. Avoidingcontamination will preclude the twin burdensof assuming a higher MOPP and undertakingdecontamination operations. Higher levels ofMOPP may affect joint fire support as wellas C2. Radio transmissions may becomelonger in duration or may frequently need tobe repeated. Incidents of fratricide couldincrease. Fixed facilities and relativelyimmobile organizations that support

III-18

Chapter III

JP 3-11

maneuver forces (e.g., maintenance andsupply) are lucrative targets for NBC attack.

d. Impact on Maritime Forces

• Maritime forces are most vulnerableto NBC attacks when in proximity toland, such as when in port, duringamphibious operations, and whenconstrained by restrictive watertransits (e.g., canals, locks, straits, andshallow water). Both the ship’s crew andembarked personnel are vulnerable toclandestinely disseminated chemical andbiological agents. Biological agentsdesigned to defeat shipboard filtration orpurification systems could beclandestinely introduced into the foodand water supply.

• With sufficient warning time, ships maybe able to put to sea to avoid NBC attackas they routinely put to sea to avoidhurricanes or typhoons. At sea, all shipsare inherently able to maneuver to avoididentified NBC threats. Ships withcollective protection systems may be ableto operate for a period of time incontaminated areas. However, not allships have collective protection systemsand may encounter difficulties inprotecting crewmembers. Forces afloatare mobile and thus more difficult totarget than a fixed site. They can exploitthis mobility to remain clear of areas ofcontamination, provided these areas havebeen identified and characterized.Amphibious forces may have moredifficulty avoiding areas threatened withchemical and biological hazards.

• The operational advantages provided bycoastal operations can be negated byadversary employment of NBC weapons,especially during the early phases ofoperations ashore. Naval forces in portand their fixed host installations mayhave less flexibility to avoid

contamination. Port facilities, ships indry dock, aircraft under repair, and navalconstruction units located at these fixedfacilities may not have the opportunityto relocate from NBC threat areas.

e. Impact on Special Operations Forces

• The threatened use or actual effects ofNBC weapons employment posesignificant challenges to SOF. Due totheir unique nature (small, self-sufficient, operating independently inhostile, denied, or politically sensitiveareas), SOF operations can be affectedby the limited NBC defense assetsfound within SOF elements, inparticular with respect to equipmentand personnel decontamination. Anumber of SOF mission profiles requirerapid deployment into contaminatedareas. The requirement for rapidworldwide mobility limits SOF to anaustere NBC defense structure.Accordingly, SOF rely heavily uponpreventive health measures, earlydetection and, when possible,contamination avoidance in NBCenvironments. Timely and accurateintelligence and maximum use ofweather and terrain are also keyconsiderations.

• Deployed SOF units often operate“dismounted” and carry with them allessential equipment. If threatassessments do not identify NBC threats,commanders may reduce requirementsfor protective clothing and equipment tominimum deployment packages. Whenunits must operate with deliberate riskof exposure to contamination, extendedperiods at high MOPP levels may benecessary for mission accomplishment.

• Army SOF include small NBCreconnaissance teams and chemicaldetachments. The reconnaissance teams

III-19


are capable of infiltrating into areasnot accessible to conventionalreconnaissance elements and conductinglimited sampling and field identificationof NBC agents. These teams are alsocapable of assessing an adversary’s NBCcapability. The chemical detachmentsassist Army SOF units in NBC planning,warning, reporting, training, and small-unit decontamination operations.

f. Joint Force Planning Considerations

See Figure III-5.

• Joint force intelligence collection,analysis, and production must giveappropriate attention to regional NBCthreats. Peacetime assessmentsemphasizing order of battle andoperational concepts should support

Figure III-5. Joint Force Planning Considerations for Operations in Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical Environments

JOINT FORCE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOROPERATIONS IN NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND

CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENTS

Intelligence collection, analysis, and production

Situational awareness

Common planning, training, andequipment standards

Medical nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)defense

Protection of the joint rear area and theatersustainment capabilities

Logistic burden of NBC attacks

In-theater active defense systems

Preplanning for counterforce operations

Effects of NBC attacks on command, control,communications, and computers

Capabilities and limitations of multinational forces

In-theater consequence management

III-20

Chapter III

JP 3-11

focused assessments of indications andwarning in crisis and transition to war.Of particular importance is ensuring thedissemination of threat data andassessments to units down to the lowestlevel, including sub-components of USand multinational commands.Assessments should include identificationof industrial sites containing toxicmaterials that would present a hazard todeployed forces if sabotaged ordestroyed.

• Ensuring adequate situationalawareness is a central concern forplanning. An integrated warning andreporting system provides a significantmeasure of protection by allowingfriendly forces to minimize exposure tothe hazard. Accurate and timelyunderstanding of the hazard and itseffects minimizes the possibility of eitherexcessive or inadequate protection of theforce, maintaining a protective posturelonger than necessary, or misusing NBCdefense assets. These assets are combatmultipliers and must be managedeffectively to support the campaign planand protect capabilities with highvulnerabilities to the effects of NBCweapons.

• Common standards for NBC defense,especially in training, exercises, andequipment maintenance, must beestablished in order to maximizeeffectiveness and prevent inadvertentvulnerabilities in joint force capabilities.Gaps in the NBC defense capabilities ofmultinational forces must be addressedin order to ensure multinational cohesionand effectiveness in both planning andoperations. Joint and multinationalexercises must include realistic standardsfor conducting operations in NBCenvironments. The joint force missionanalysis may produce joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs). For each task,

t he cond i t i ons unde r wh ichimplementation must be conducted willfacilitate establishing realistic standardswhich, in turn, form the basis for trainingand for assessing readiness. This processis facilitated by the UJTL, which providesa standard description of key joint tasksfor action across the range of militaryoperations. An example of thedevelopment of JMET is shown in FigureIII-6.

• Medical NBC defense should be fullyintegrated into the deliberate planningprocess in order to maximize readiness.Key elements include casualtyestimation, prophylaxis (includingimmunizations), active medicalsurveillance, diagnostics, mass casualtymanagement, evacuation, and patientdecontamination requirements for HSS

Medical NBC defense should be fullyintegrated into the deliberate planningprocess in order to maximize readiness.

III-21


Figure III-6. Joint Mission Essential Task List Development Process Example

JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTDEVELOPMENT PROCESS EXAMPLE

JOINT MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK (JMET) ST 6.2.8Establish Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Defense in Theater

AssignedMissions

CINCGuidance

MissionTask

JMETLCriteria

CommandTask

IdentifyJMET

SupportingTask

CINCGuidance(No Notice+ 18 hours)

Priority 1:protect keyfixed sites

Priority 2:protect keyRSOI nodes

DescribeConditions

Threat capable of delivery bymissile, rocket, aerial spray,and special operations forces

Descriptor: blood, blister,persistent nerve, and rear areatoxic industrial materials

Cause immediate and delayedcasualties, disrupt operationaltempo

M1

M3

M4

M6

: 18 hours to establish NBCwarning and reporting processafter closure of JTF HQs ontheater

:

: 90% of JTF HQ personneltrained and equipped to operate inNBC environments

: 100% of JTF HQ JMET can beaccomplished in NBCenvironments

: 100% of operationallyrelevant NBC attacks detected

: 100% timely warning to forces

M2

M5

EstablishStandards JMETL

JMET ANALYSIS

CINCHQJMETLJTFRSOI

combatant commanderheadquartersJoint Mission Essential Task Listjoint task forcereception, staging, onward movement, and integration

Plans &Orders

JointDoctrine

UniversalJoint Task

List

MISSION ANALYSIS

III-22

Chapter III

JP 3-11

operations. Joint force plans shouldrecognize that NBC attacks have thepotential to create mass casualties. Thetreatment and evacuation of NBCcasualties will be difficult and hazardousboth to the patients and to medicalpersonnel and facilities. The potentialfor high casualties may make HN medicalfacilities unavailable to the joint force.

Chapter IV, "Health Service Support,"addresses HSS in NBC environments.

• The joint rear area (JRA) and theatersustainment capabilities must beprotected. A successful adversary NBCattack on an essential port of debarkationor other critical logistic facility candramatically alter the campaign.Measures to prevent and, if necessary,mitigate the effects of NBC attacks mustfocus on maintaining support to combatoperations and rapidly restoring thedegraded capabilities. Under somecircumstances it may be necessary to usealternate facilities.

• Protecting forces from the effects ofNBC attack is logistically taxing. Theresupply of protective clothing andequipment and repair parts, medicalsupplies (antidotes and antibiotics), andother resources needed for recovery fromNBC attacks can strain the theater logisticsystem and have unanticipated effects oncombat operations.

Paragraph 6 of this chapter, "Logisticsand Rear Area Operations," addresseslogistic operations in NBC environments.

• In-theater active defense systems willbe allocated according to the JFC’sdefended asset list. Planning shouldconsider deployment configurations andconcepts of operations that maximize thedefended areas of available systems.

Doctrine for active defense operationscan be found in JP 3-01, Joint Doctrinefor Countering Air and Missile Threats,and JP 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint TheaterMissile Defense.

• Preplanning for counterforceoperations should be integrated into thedeliberate planning processes atmultinational, joint, and componentlevels. Counterforce operations may bea high NCA priority at any point in acrisis, during the transition to war, andduring hostilities as a means to deny anadversary the capability to produce, store,transport, or employ NBC weapons.Because counterforce operations relylargely on general-purpose forces thatsupport multiple missions, conductingsuch operations in a developing theatermay conflict with the requirement toperform other high priority missions.

• NBC attacks can degrade command,control, communications andcomputers (C4) operations andsystems. Limitations will result from therequirement to operate in NBC protectiveequipment, from contamination ofequipment, and from the effects of EMPon electrical and electronic equipment.In order to assure information superiority,joint force plans must take into accountthe vulnerability of C4 architectures(equipment, personnel, and networks) toNBC attacks. US and multinationalforces must plan ways to compensate forpotential shortfalls.

• Where multinational operations areenvisioned, joint force planning mustinclude a rigorous and realisticassessment of multinational membercapabilities for NBC defense andinteroperability with US forces in NBCenvironments. The planning processshould consider the implications and

III-23


feasibility of diverting US assets andcapabilities to support HNs and othermultinational members in meetingcommon operational objectives.

• The JFC must plan for in-theaterconsequence management; that is,mitigation and management of the effectsof NBC attacks. For purposes ofmultinational cohesion, maintainingaccess to basing and logistic facilities,and minimizing casualties and damage,every effort should be made withinavailable resources to reduce HNvulnerability to NBC attacks andimprove HN ability to mitigate the effectsof such attacks. This will require closejoint force coordination and cooperationwith USG civilian agencies, HN militaryand civil authorities, and possiblyinternational organizations (IOs), andnongovernmental organizations(NGOs). Here, too, it may benecessary to provide US military assets(equipment, personnel, and supplies)to support HNs.

6. Logistics and Rear AreaOperations

The ability to sustain combat operationswith an appropriate level of logistic supportis vital to operational success. Operations inNBC environments can place significantburdens on the logistic system. Planssupporting deployment; reception, staging,onward movement, and integration (RSOI);and sustainment must continually bereviewed. The JFC must ensure that logisticunits of component commands can surviveand operate effectively in NBC environments.

a. Overview and Assumptions

• Theater Maturity. US forces may bedeployed to theaters that provide a wide

range of infrastructure and supportactivities. Mature theaters haveforward-deployed forces with asignificant amount of logisticinfrastructure already in place. Quantitiesof pre-positioned supplies and equipmentmay be stored in environmentallycontrolled warehouses or coveredshelters to reduce their vulnerability tocontamination. Host-nation support(HNS) agreements may be in place androutinely exercised. Immature theatershave few, if any, deployed forces andminimal logistic infrastructure; pre-positioned supplies and equipment maybe stored in the elements with nooverhead cover. Other supplies andequipment may be stored at anintermediate staging base outside thetheater until the theater logisticinfrastructure matures to accept them.HNS agreements may not have beennegotiated prior to the onset ofhostilities.

• Logistic Operational Areas. Logisticelements may operate throughout thetheater. Logistic elements directlysupporting engaged forces may be small,mobile units. Logistic elementsproviding area support may involvelarger, more complex transportation andsupply activities conducted at fixed orsemi-fixed sites. Mobile units seek toavoid NBC contamination to themaximum extent possible. Ifcontaminated, units identify clean areas,and on order move along pre-designatedroutes from contaminated areas. Unitsdecontaminate equipment and exchangeprotective garments during the move toclean sites. Logistic units in the JRA,in contrast, may be required inemergency situations to conductoperations from contaminated fixed sitesuntil they can relocate to clean areas.

III-24

Chapter III

JP 3-11

• Workforce Composition. In mostcircumstances, the logistic infrastructurein a theater operates with a substantialcomplement of nonmilitary personnel.In a typical theater, sustained logisticoperations will rely heavily on militarypersonnel, DOD civilians, HNSpersonnel, other nation supportpersonnel, and contractor-providedlogistic support personnel. During theearly phases of deployment, the logisticinfrastructure may rely on HNSpersonnel for port operations andtransportation requirements.

• Key Threat Considerations. Logisticunits accompanying engaged forces mayfall within range of adversary air andsurface weapon delivery systems armedwith chemical, biological, or possiblynuclear warheads. Logistic supportareas may be threatened by ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles, aircraft orSOF. Adversaries may elect to usenonpersistent agents on targets inproximity to their own forces, andpersistent agents on deep, fixed sites,main supply routes (MSRs), or flankareas. Industrial facilities subject toattack may release toxic materials whichcould produce hazards to personnel.

b. Logistic Operations in ContaminatedEnvironments. Logistic operations areparticularly vulnerable to NBC attack. Duringa major conflict, NBC weapons may beemployed early in order to disrupt and delaythe build-up of forces in the theater. Theremay be certain advantages to the adversary inusing chemical or biological weapons in suchoperations. When assessing the likely natureand frequency of possible attacks on logisticfacilities, the JFC will consider the numberof available delivery means and chemical andbiological warheads, and the ability of theadversary to deliver an agent in quantitiessufficient to significantly disrupt JRAoperations. For example, while the effects of

chemical and biological weapons can bedevastating on unprotected equipment anduntrained personnel and can disrupt the best-prepared organizations, the impact can bemitigated by well-conceived plans andprocedures that are routinely practiced.Commanders must consider several factors.

• Areas of Vulnerability. The areas ofgreatest vulnerability are large fixed sites(e.g., ports of debarkation), staging andmarshalling areas, hubs and bases,assembly areas, and MSRs adjacent tosites involved in early force build-upactivities.

• NBC Logistic Readiness. Adequatelogistic support, which must bemaintained under all conditions, is vitalto operations in NBC environments. Thekey considerations, as depicted in FigureIII-7, are application of the jointlogistic principles of sustainability,survivability, responsiveness, andflexibility to ensure adequate NBCequipment stocks, interoperability,and training.

•• Applying Joint Logistic Principles.Operations in contaminated environmentsdemand close attention by commandersto the joint logistic principles ofsustainability, survivability, responsiveness,and flexibility. The geographiccombatant commander will ensure theability to maintain logistic supportthroughout the operation. (1)Sustainability. Sustainability is themeasure of the ability to maintain logisticsupport to all users throughout the theaterfor the duration of the operation. In NBCenvironments, constant, long-termconsumption of NBC defense suppliesrequires careful planning and anticipationof future requirements. (2)Survivability. Theater logistic sites andunits present an adversary with lucrativeand often static high value targets for

III-25


attack with NBC weapons. Logisticplanners must plan for both active andpassive measures to minimize the risksof NBC weapons attacks while satisfyingthe needs of the joint force foruninterrupted logistic support. (3)Responsiveness. The hazards andpotential damage caused by NBC attackmay require relocation of bases and HSSfacilities, major redirection of supplyflow, reallocation of transportation andengineering services, and short-noticetransfer of replacement personnel or unitsfrom one part of the theater to another.joint force plans should allow for surgesin logistic requirements for NBC defenseconsumables and equipment items toappropriate units. (4) Flexibility.Maintaining logistic flexibility in NBCenvironments requires that logistic unitsbe capable of rapid alteration of workschedules. NBC attacks can cause

degradation of logistic operations due tooperating in protective clothing and therequirement to handle and decontaminatesupplies and equipment. Logisticplanners will plan for deliberate andexpedient covers and shelters to protectessential items from contamination.Commanders will prioritize and focusefforts on accomplishment of mission-essential tasks.

For a complete discussion of all jointlogistic principles see JP 4-0, Doctrinefor Logistic Support of Joint Operations,especially Chapter II, "LogisticPrinciples and Considerations."

•• NBC Equipment Stocks. Logisticsupport for NBC readiness requiresadequate supplies and transportation ofchemical and biological defenseequipment, as well as sustainment of

Figure III-7. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Logistics Readiness Considerations

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICALLOGISTICS READINESS CONSIDERATIONS

Sustainability

Responsiveness

Survivability

Flexibility

Interoperability

Training

Nuclear,Biological, and

ChemicalEquipment

Stocks

III-26

Chapter III

JP 3-11

supporting NBC defense organizationsresponsible for carrying outreconnaissance, decontamination, andsupporting tasks.

•• Interoperability. In operationsabroad, the JTF will be working withHN and other forces. While eachmember of the multinational effort isresponsible for its own NBC defense, theability to exploit logistic interoperability(e.g., in equipment and supplies) cancontribute to the effectiveness of thecollective force.

•• Training. Individual and unitsurvival skills and the ability to performmission-oriented tasks while inprotective clothing are vital to theaterlogistic activities. Mission-essentialtasks will be identified in theater plansand unit standing operating procedures,and regular training will be conductedto establish individual and unitproficiency. Examples of essential tasksthat may be required include driving; railloading and equipment movementoperations; aerial port of debarkation(APOD) and seaport of debarkation

THEATER LOGISTICS PRIOR TO THE GROUND OFFENSIVE

Resolving the 1st Infantry Division issue [dedicated recon assets] still left thelast nine Fox vehicles of the sixty-Fuchs to go. The 490th Chemical Battalionsent a team to Germany on February 16 to escort the nine vehicles to Dhahran.By February 21, they were ready to return to Saudi Arabia, delivering threevehicles each on the 21st, 24th, and 25th, but the Air Force was not ready todeliver. Last-minute theater airlift priorities had prevented their immediatereturn, although they had been third priority for in-bound logistics (first beingPatriot missiles, second being 120-mm tank ammunition).

On the eve of the ground offensive, there were a total of fifty-one operationalFox vehicles in the US forces, not including the one “Nunn” float. VII Corpshad twenty-four of the vehicles on-line, while XVIII [Airborne] Corps retainedseventeen. The ARCENT Support Command would not have its planned Foxreconnaissance vehicles, but it could still rely on chemical troops in APC reconvehicles. MARCENT had the other ten vehicles, split between their twodivisions. The XM21 and bio-detection sampling teams increased their vigilanceto cover the division marshaling areas. While the greatest concern was focusedon the threat of Iraqi chemical strikes against [US Central Command] forces inthe breach operation, there was equal interest in the possibility of chemicalScud attacks and Iraqi air attacks against the rear area supporting the offensiveoperations. ARCENT [nuclear, biological, and chemical center] counted onthe inbound nine Fox vehicles to supply the needed capability. Also, the oilwells burning constantly in Kuwait presented new problems to the Marinesand VII Corps. In addition to posing health problems because of the hydrogensulfide fumes, the heavy, oil-laden smoke clogged the M8A1 filter paddlesresponsible for filtering particulates from the air sampling mechanism. Thelimited airflow caused increasing numbers of false alarms, until many unitssimply turned off the detectors rather than constantly checking for chemicalagents.


III-27


(SPOD) operations; HSS activities; andC4I functions.

• Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence Systems.C4I systems are integral to maintaininglogistic support in NBC environments.The JFC will ensure that C4I systemssupporting logistic operations aresufficiently self-reliant and robust tooperate through NBC attacks. C4I-related vulnerability assessments willinclude: a review of plausible NBCattacks; the NBC warning and reportingsystem; equipment redundancy;availability and proficiency in the use ofprotective clothing and equipment;proficiency of military and nonmilitarypersonnel in the performance ofindividual and unit tasks at various levelsof MOPP; and the degree of reliance onand compatibility of HN equipment andsupport (e.g., utilities and transmissionfacilities).

• NBC Defense Planning Responsibilities

•• Theater-level logistic support isgenerally furnished from Service-operated and other functional fixed sitesthroughout the JRA. Logistic NBCdefense operations in the JRA are basedon Service and site requirements, but willbe coordinated with the joint rear areacoordinator (JRAC) and base clustercommanders (when designated). One ofthe JRAC’s responsibilities is NBCdefense integration. Componentcommanders will incorporate NBC plans,exercises, equipment considerations,individual decontamination measures,and preventive measures into their areaand base cluster defense plans. They willalso position NBC defense personnel andassets to support current missionrequirements and facilitate futureoperations, in accordance with JFC andarea commander directives and priorities.

JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear AreaOperations, provides additional guidanceon JRAC and component commanderroles and responsibilities.

•• The JFC must consider the adequacyof equipment and training of nonmilitaryand non-US logistic personnel to surviveand operate in NBC environments.While it is a Service responsibility to trainand equip the forces they provide to thejoint force, the JFC is responsible forestablishing the requirements based onthe command’s assessment of the NBCthreats. If there are deficiencies in NBCequipment and training, resources mustbe requested through Service and jointchannels.

c. Logistic Planning Considerations forFixed Sites. Ports, airfields, and relatedfixed sites are choke points vulnerable toNBC attack. Combat forces are vulnerableto NBC attack during entry operations andduring movement to areas of militaryoperations. Fixed sites can be centers ofgravity because they are vital for sustaining,enhancing, and controlling combat power. Asa consequence, they may be high-value targetsfor adversary NBC attack. Common fixed-site defense measures can reduce theirvulnerability.

• Attack Warning and Dissemination

•• In order for individuals and units totake necessary self-protection measures,timely warning of NBC attacks andsubsequent spread of contamination isessential in order to ensure thatindividuals and units can take necessaryself-protection measures. The JFC hasthe responsibility, in coordination withthe HN, to establish an effective andtimely warning system and to exercisethis system on a recurring basis. In ahigh threat environment, fixed sitecommanders should monitor NBC

III-28

Chapter III

JP 3-11

warning systems continuously andshould be capable of passing warningsto workers and units throughout theirsites.

•• Because of the variety of deliverymethods for NBC weapons and thelimitations of detection capabilities,personnel and units may not receivewarning before exposure occurs.Warning architectures should bedesigned to alert workers promptlyupon initial detection of an attack.Because workers may be widelydispersed throughout the area, a site-widealarm system, capable of being activatedimmediately upon receipt of warning,must be available, maintained, andexercised regularly.

• Protective Postures

•• At many sites, military throughputwill rely on civilian labor. Logisticplanners must consider thevulnerability of HN and other civilianworkers to attack, and planaccordingly. The JFC is responsible forensuring that mission-essential civilian

workers receive appropriate equipmentand training and are integrated into areaNBC defense plans. This may involvecoordinating with HN representativesand the US country team.

•• Upon hearing an alarm, workers mustbe trained to protect themselves byrapidly donning protective clothing andmoving to the nearest overhead cover.Planners must ensure that overhead coveris available at appropriate locationsthroughout the area.

•• Typically, even during high capacityoperations, much of the materialshandling equipment (MHE) at a facilityis not in use. Commanders should protectidle MHE from exposure to chemical orbiological agents in the event of attack.Housing and covering MHE with plastic,or otherwise protecting it from exposure,can ensure that it will be readily availableto resume operations after the attack.

• Post-Attack Reconnaissance.Understanding the nature of possiblecontamination by NBC agents is centralto adopting an effective concept of

Timely warning of NBC attacks and subsequent spread of contamination isessential in order to ensure that individuals and units can take necessary self-protection measures.

III-29


operations that reduces the risk ofcasualties and cross-contamination,while ensuring rapid resumption ofoperations after an attack. This requirescoordinated reconnaissance, detection,and marking. Workers should be trainedto conduct self-assessment activities todetect possible contamination in theirwork areas; however, a military unittrained and equipped to deal with NBCcontamination normally will benecessary to support these surveys.

• Decontamination

•• A chemical or biological attack maycontaminate essential operating areas.Local commanders, accordingly, musthave available the capability todecontaminate operating surfaces,MHE, aircraft, and exposed militarycargo to the extent required to sustainoperations. Large area facilities (e.g.,ports) with throughput capacity higherthan required allow flexibility to shiftoperations to uncontaminated locationswithin the facility. At smaller facilities,however, an attack could reducethroughput capacity to a level below therequirement.

•• Decontamination of equipment andoperating surfaces at fixed sites isrequired to restore full operationalcapacity. The mission and requiredoperational tempo at a contaminated sitewill determine the MOPP level anddegree of decontamination. Fullreconstitution will require thoroughdecontamination. When possible,decontamination will concentrate firston removal of persistent agent.Contaminated areas and equipmentshould be clearly marked. Until the areais fully cleaned and verified, the pick-upand transfer hazard from the residualagent on operating surfaces requires thatworkers be in the appropriate MOPP.

•• Operational decontaminationoperations should commence in parallelwith resuming operations in protectiveposture, starting with high-traffic areasand high-use equipment. This mayrequire support of a decontaminationunit. Given proper procedures, it maybe possible to conduct operations atpiers that were contaminated bypersistent agents prior to thoroughdecontamination. Before selecting thisoption, however, commanders mustcarefully weigh the operational necessityof disembarking unit equipment againstthe risk of operating in a contaminatedenvironment.

• Considerations for Ports ofEmbarkation (POEs) and En RouteFacilities

•• POEs and en route fixed sites may betargeted in order to disrupt or inhibit USmilitary deployments. Because these sitesmay be located in the continental UnitedStates (CONUS) and other regionsoutside the threatened theater, they aresubject to clandestine (includingterrorist) attack. Commanders of POEsmust take action to protect their facilities(including supporting staging areas aswell as rail and road networks) againstand mitigate the effects of NBC attacks.

•• Intermediate logistic bases andinfrastructure are also vulnerable to NBCattack. For some large-scaleoperations, the en route structure islimited and may be a particularlylucrative target. Commanders mustprotect and be prepared to deal withattacks at these facilities.

• Considerations for Aerial Ports ofDebarkation

•• While each APOD is unique, a fewgeneral considerations are important.

III-30

Chapter III

JP 3-11

The size and operational flexibility ofthe site will affect the commander’soptions for contamination avoidance.Because it is unlikely that all of theoperational areas of an APOD will becontaminated at any one time, it isparticularly important that thecommander know the location of hazardareas, requirements for working andparking areas, and the availability ofrunways and taxiways. APOD plansshould include expedited offloadprocedures (e.g., engines running, nocrew changes or refueling) within theNBC threat area to minimize the numberof aircraft exposed at any one time duringground operations.

•• Contaminated aircraft must bethoroughly decontaminated (bothexterior and interior) to meet JFC and HNrequirements before returning to the airmobility flow. The JFC is responsiblefor establishing aircraft decontaminationoperations at appropriate sites.

•• Regardless of an aerial port’s NBCpreparedness, some aircraft will not beable to land at or depart fromcontaminated areas. Of particularimportance are limitations in NBCenvironments on the employment of theCivil Reserve Air Fleet, civilian, andother aircraft under contract to supportmilitary operations. Combatantcommand plans must provide forreplacing these aircraft with other airliftassets or conducting transload operationsfrom bases outside the immediate threatarea. These replacement aircraft wouldhave to operate from transload airbasesto shuttle the affected cargo andpassengers to the theater. If that is notfeasible, alternate means (e.g., sea, rail,or wheeled transport) must be madeavailable.

•• The availability of alternative aerialports to accomplish the transload ofpersonnel and materiel from intertheaterto intratheater airlift can minimizepotential deployment interruptions byadversary NBC use. The supportedcombatant commander is responsible fordesignating transload aerial ports.

• Considerations for Seaports ofDebarkation

•• In large-scale operations, the USequipment and materiel normally enterthe theater on strategic sealift ships andoffload at SPODs. The vital importanceof these seaports to US powerprojection capability makes them anattractive target for NBC attack.However, conducting successful attacksagainst SPODs presents significantchallenges to the adversary. If portmanagers and operators are properlyprepared to survive the attack and sustainoperations, NBC attacks may not causesignificant long-term degradation ofmilitary logistic throughput capacity.This is especially true at large ports wheremany piers, storage areas, and much ofthe MHE may escape contamination.Operations in these cases may be limitedmore by the effects of the attacks on thelocal workforce and nearby civilianpopulation.

•• Analysis of SPOD vulnerability,impact of WMD attack on throughput,and timelines for restoration of operationsis not as complete as for the APOD.Though similarities concerning theimpact of WMD attack on SPOD andAPOD operations exist, there aresubstantial differences. For example,assignment of overall responsibility fordecontamination efforts is morecomplex.

III-31


•• Each port provides unique capabilitiesand has different vulnerabilities in NBCenvironments, but contaminationavoidance is an essential element ofsustaining throughput operations. Innormal circumstances, a port is but onenode of a complex, theater-wide logisticnetwork. Plans should include optionsfor redirecting incoming ships whenpossible from contaminated ports to thosethat are uncontaminated. However, whenalternate ports with adequate capacity andberths to handle large cargo ships are notavailable, it may be necessary to continueoperations at contaminated ports. Inconsidering alternate ports, planners musttake into account the requirements forunit equipment to arrive in proximity tothe marshalling areas for unit personnel,ammunition, and sustainment supplies inorder to ensure a coherent RSOI foraffected units.

•• In some cases, it will be possible tocontinue operations at a contaminatedport. While NBC attacks may result incontamination of some operatingsurfaces, the size of the contaminated areamay be small compared to the size of theport. The capability to shift operationsto those areas and facilities within the portthat escaped contamination is key tosustaining throughput operations. Properpreparation can significantly reduce theimpact of NBC attacks on a SPOD.

d. Logistic Planning Considerations forReception, Staging, Onward Movement,and Integration. The permanency of sitesfor RSOI of arriving forces can vary widelybetween theaters. Theaters with largeforward-deployed forces rely on fixed sitesfor a wide variety of activities, such as pre-positioned stock maintenance and control,supply and maintenance, materiel andtransportation management, and logistic C4I.Theaters with limited forward presence

normally rely more heavily on temporarilyfixed sites (e.g., facilities that aretransportable or mobile but, due to ongoingoperational constraints, may not be rapidlymoved). Area commanders will ensure thatadequate detection, personnel protection, anddecontamination assets are available to meetthe threat and that alternative sites, along withrehearsed activation plans, are identified andprepared. Consideration of RSOI in NBCenvironments encompasses a number ofspecific functional areas.

• Staging Areas. Staging areas forpersonnel or equipment near APODs andSPODs may be attractive targets for NBCattack. Logistic planners must assess therelative value of the convenienceprovided by establishing large centralizedfacilities, which are more easily targeted,and the enhanced security that resultsfrom a larger number of smaller,dispersed facilities that are more difficultto command and control but lessvulnerable to NBC attack. While theanticipated threat will influence thestaging area selection process, adequatefacility and area space availability maybe the determining considerations.Planning must consider equipmentmarshalling areas and rail yards(which may not be in close proximity ofAPOD and SPOD facility complexes);theater logistic hubs and bases (whichmay be fixed facilities in theaters withlarge forward-deployed forces); andforce integration assembly areas(where deploying units completedeployment recovery, equipment receipt,and processing and prepare formovement to tactical assembly areas).

• Main Supply Routes. The vulnerabilityof MSRs to NBC attack may vary widelyamong theaters. In theaters that rely ona few major MSRs and have limitedalternative routes and off-road capability,

III-32

Chapter III

JP 3-11

NBC attacks may have a greater impacton operations than in theaters with moreextensive supply routes and whereobstacles can more easily be traversed.

e. External Support for US MilitaryOperations

• In many operations, US military forceswill receive significant logistic supportfrom US and foreign nonmilitarypersonnel. In some theaters, foreignmilitary sources will also augmentnonmilitary support. These supportpersonnel fall into the followingcategories: USG civilians (to includenon-DOD personnel), HN governmentcivilians, HN military personnel (in directsupport of US forces), other multinationalpartner military personnel, andcontractors. Support and services thatdepend heavily on nonmilitary andforeign military personnel include, butare not limited to: transportation;stevedore and port operations; generalengineering; personnel marshalling areaoperations (including supply of basicnecessities); rail workers; emergencyutility operations; selected maintenanceactivities; administrative activities (e.g.,contracting specialists and localcommunications experts); and MSRsecurity and control. Theater logisticsupport is provided through a wide arrayof Service, multinational, contract, andcross-Service agreements and will varyfrom theater to theater.

• The three basic categories of externalsupport for US military operations arewartime HNS, contingency contracts,and current contract agreements.These usually exist in conjunction withone another and collectively provide tothe theater its full logistic capability.Contracts or agreements will clearlyspecify services to be provided duringperiods of crisis or war.

• Logistic and area commanders shouldnot expect unprotected or untrainedindividuals to continue to provideessential logistic services under the threatof NBC attack or during operations inNBC environments. Massive workerabsenteeism is possible, and a lack ofadequate protective clothing andequipment could result in significantcasualties should an attack occur. Thearea commander is responsible forensuring that mission-essential personnelreceive appropriate equipment andtraining, working in coordination withHN authorities and the US country team.NBC protection includes individual andcollective survival skills as well asoperational training. Survival skills referto the capability to take required,immediate action upon NBC attack, toinclude masking, proper wear and careof protective clothing and equipment,personal decontamination, and buddyaid. Operational training refers to theability to continue to perform essentialfunctions under MOPP conditions andresume normal operations after an attack.Essential functions and tasks includeconvoy driving, supply and equipmentloading, refueling operations, andmateriel decontamination.

f. Handling of Contaminated Materieland Equipment and Human Remains

• Materiel and Equipment

•• The geographic combatantcommander is responsible for ensuringthat all materiel and equipment that isreturned to stock or retrograded from thetheater is decontaminated and safe fortransport. Joint and Service TTP arerequired to protect individuals againstlow-level NBC hazard exposure,conserve valuable assets, identifyrequirements for the return of equipmentand personnel to the United States, and

III-33


maintain DOD life cycle control ofpreviously contaminated equipment.In view of the limitations ofdecontamination technology in meetingall safety and health standards, someequipment may require extensiveweathering to meet safety objectives. Insome cases, equipment may be sogrossly contaminated that reuse orrepair is not practical and in-theaterdestruction will be required.

•• For nuclear and biologicalcontaminants, residual hazards aredefined by nuclear and biologicaldecay rates. For residual radiation, ifthe particles cannot be removed, the timerequired for natural decay is a functionof the half-life of the isotope and cannotbe accelerated. Distance and shieldingbetween personnel and the equipment isthe only means of reducing exposurerisks. Biological agents generally decayto acceptable levels within hours afterdissemination or exposure to ultravioletlight (sunlight). For more robustbiological agents, thoroughdecontamination and preparation ofequipment to US Department ofAgriculture import standards willeliminate most health threats.

•• As a rule, contaminated materiel andequipment will be marked, segregated,and disposed of or decontaminated afterthe cessation of hostilities. Theatercampaign plans and orders will provideguidance and procedures for retrogradeof contaminated materiel and prioritizeselected items that, due to their essentialnature and short supply, requireimmediate retrograde, repair, andsubsequent return to the theater.

More detailed treatment of retrogradeof equipment and personnel is inChapter V, "Supporting ConflictTermination," paragraph 3h,

"Retrograde of Contaminated Materielfrom the Theater."

• Human Remains

•• The g e o g r a p h i c c o m b a t a n tcommander has the responsibility tosearch, recover, tentatively identify, andevacuate US remains from the AOR. Tocomplete this task, the combatantcommand’s affected area commanderestablishes a Mortuary AffairsDecontamination Collection Point(MADCP). The MADCP is anoperational element under the oversightof the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office(JMAO), and is manned by specializedmortuary affairs and NBC defensepersonnel. Unique MADCP equipmentis maintained as kits in operationalproject stocks and supplemented asrequired by theater assets.

•• The area commander’s principalresponsibility, with respect tocontaminated remains, is to ensure thatall remains are rendered safe for transportinto the United States and for releaseto mortuaries. Remains contaminatedwith chemical agents can generallybe rendered safe by externaldecontamination. Biologicallycontaminated remains must beembalmed and transported in appropriatecontainers — or other equivalentlyeffective contamination control methodsauthorized by qualified medical authority— prior to movement from the theater.When conditions permit, personnelremains will be evacuated to primarymilitary port mortuaries in CONUS.

•• In some circumstances (such as large-scale NBC casualties), the areacommander may need to authorizealternative procedures for the dispositionof human remains. If decontaminationcapabilities are not available,

III-34

Chapter III

JP 3-11

contaminated remains may have to beburied in place following emergencyburial procedures. In instances of massfatalities, the area commander, on adviceof the JMAO, may authorize massburials. The JMAO will direct andcontrol subsequent disinterments.

For joint policy and detailed instructionsfor handling contaminated remains, seeJP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Mortuary Affairs in JointOperations, and Service manuals FieldManual (FM) 10-63, Handling ofDeceased Personnel in Theater ofOperations, AFI 34-501, and FM 4-8.

7. Responsibilities forOperations in NBCEnvironments

This paragraph summarizes joint,component, and HN responsibilitiesthroughout the theater, including the JRA,ports, airfields, and other key fixed sites.

a. Joint and Component Responsibilities

• The JFC must plan for and integrate USand multinational force capabilities tosustain the multinational operationaltempo in all mediums (air, sea, land, andspace), regardless of the nature andtargets of an adversary’s NBC attack.The JFC will establish and implement adeliberate process for assessing thevulnerability of manpower and materielto NBC attack. This process will integrateall offensive and defensive capabilities toreduce the threat of NBC use and sustainoperations if attacks occur. The processwill also include executing mitigation andrestoration plans to reduce the operationalimpact of NBC contamination and othertoxic hazards.

• Combatant commanders must be ableto execute the campaign under NBC

conditions through unified action atthe theater level. Unified action forsubordinate JFCs is equally important forcombat, combat support, and combatservice support units of all Services andmultinational partners. Unified actionencompasses not only NBC-related actionsbut also all other actions that permitcontinuation of theater operations and focuson attaining the single theater militaryobjective in line with the JFC’s intent.

• The JFC has the responsibility, consistentwith available capabilities and theoperational mission, to provideprotection to US civilians in the jointoperations area (JOA) who accompanythe force to provide mission-essentialservices or who are sponsored by theforce. The Service or other componentsponsoring the civilians in the theaternormally discharges responsibilities inthis area. These responsibilities mayinclude, but are not limited to, theissuance of protective clothing andequipment, training on this equipment,instructions regarding movement intoand within high NBC threat areas, andprocedures to implement in the event ofattack. Protective clothing andequipment will be made available to UScivilians consistent with supplyavailability and their risk of exposure. Inthe event of shortages of masks orovergarments, limitations on movementby unequipped civilians into high-threatareas may be necessary. Sufficientquantities of the necessary clothing andequipment may be obtained as the theatermatures. In response to a request fromthe US country team, the combatantcommander or subordinate JFC mayassume responsibility for US civilianswho are neither mission essential norsponsored.

• Enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) andcivilian internees (CIs) must be

III-35


safeguarded from all attacks, toinclude NBC attacks. EPWs and CIsmay not have protective clothing that isadequate or compatible with that of USand multinational partners, and mayrequire the issue and training on the useof US equipment. Appropriate medicaltreatment must be provided to EPWs andCIs in the event of injury, to includeinjury from NBC exposure. Where theNBC threat to EPWs and CIs is high, thismay place additional requirements on USand multinational forces for training,liaison, decontamination, HSS, and otherlogistic support. If conditions permit,consideration may be given to movingEPWs and CIs out of NBC threat areas.

• NBC defense force structure and forcedevelopment activities are theresponsibility of individual Servicesand USSOCOM. Combatant commandersremain aware of the salient factors thatpertain to NBC defense requirements andUSSOCOM or Service components’responses to their requirements throughthe Joint Operation Planning andExecution System. The combatantcommander is responsible for ensuringproper placement of NBC defenseassets in theater in advance of a crisisor conflict, and in the time-phasedforce and deployment data preparedto support movement to the theater.In particular, the combatant commandershould be cognizant of any significantshortfalls in the capability or availabilityof NBC defense assets.

• In multinational operations, the JFC hasresponsibility to establish appropriatecommand, planning, and operationalrelationships. The JFC has responsibilityfor ensuring that coalition and HNweaknesses do not compromise USforces or missions. It may be necessaryin this regard to apply US resources tosupport multinational partners and HNs

before, during, and after NBC attacks.The JFC must identify requirements forsupport from US resources and developplans and procedures that integrate andobtain maximum value frommultinational forces and HN capabilitiesto support the continuation of operations.The JFC is responsible to establish thenecessary support agreements that wouldmake available US assets (e.g., units,equipment, personnel, and supplies) tosupport NBC defense and mitigate andmanage the consequences of adversaryNBC use in the theater.

b. Multinational Force Responsibilities

• Subject to the provisions of mutualsupport agreements and available means,multinational partners may assume theresponsibility for providing support andassistance to US and other multinationalforces operating in their areas. Thissupport and assistance may involve thefull spectrum of NBC defense activities,offensive actions to reduce or eliminatethe NBC threat, and actions to mitigateand manage the consequences ofadversary NBC use in the theater. Withinavailable means and mutual supportagreements, support and assistance mayinvolve the full spectrum of NBC defenseactivities, offensive actions taken toreduce or eliminate the NBC threat anddefend against, mitigate, and manage theconsequences of adversary NBC use inthe theater.

• The protection of forces and supportingcivilians of other countries participatingwith the United States in multinationaloperations is the responsibility of themultinational force chain-of-commandwithin the theater of operations. In orderto provide maximum protection to allforces, the JFC should, to the greatest extentpossible, involve other participating forcesin NBC defense and related activities.

III-36

Chapter III

JP 3-11

c. Host Nation Responsibilities

• Based in applicable agreements andproper coordination, the HN has theresponsibility to provide support andassistance to US and other forcesoperating in its territory. This supportand assistance may entail HSS personnel,supplies, facilities, decontamination, andtransportation.

• In the event of adversary NBC attack,the HN is responsible for protecting itsforces, citizens, and infrastructure. TheJFC will respond to requests for NBCdefense or mitigation and managementof the consequences of adversary NBCuse in coordination with the US countryteam, consistent with support agreementsand available resources.

CHAPTER IVHEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

IV-1

1. General

Maintaining the physiological andpsychological health of military forces is abasic requirement for combat effectiveness.This chapter provides principles andconsiderations for the HSS of combatantcommand and subordinate joint forcesoperating in NBC environments. An NBCattack in an operational area will affect bothmilitary and civilian populations. HSSconsiderations in NBC environments,therefore, include civilian public healthservice (PHS) matters. The command surgeonis responsible for ensuring the integration ofPHS matters into the command HSS plans andactivities in order to support missionaccomplishment.

2. Campaign Planning

a. HSS is integral to theater strategic,deliberate, and crisis planning and execution.To provide adequate HSS, definitiveplanning and coordination are required.HSS activities must maintain peacetimepreparedness to ensure adequate preparationsbefore and during the transition to operations.The JFC must consider and plan for HSSrequirements when preparing for war orMOOTW. Planning for HSS must includeall aspects of HSS requirements. Failure toplan for preventive medicine (PVNTMED)support as part of the early entry force cancause mission failures due to disease and non-battle injuries. Planning for and maintaininga sound medical surveillance program for alloperations can maximize force effectivenessby eliminating or reducing the effects ofmedical threats. Planning and training

“Even in theory the gas mask is a dreadful thing. It stands for one’s firstflash of insight into man’s measureless malignity against man.”

Reginald Farrer, The Void of War

before conflicts or crises occur is essential.Commanders should participate visibly inHSS activities to reinforce and demonstrateArmed Forces of the United States resolve tooperate effectively in NBC environments.

b. HSS supports all phases of operations,taking into account the unique characteristicsand effects of the range of NBC weapons.While US policy and doctrine acknowledgethat HSS is primarily a Service responsibility,the command surgeon is responsible forguiding and integrating all HSS capabilitiesavailable to the command to support themission. HSS planning for post-NBC attackmust include efforts to conserve available HSSpersonnel for medical treatment. Althoughmost definitive care is rendered outside thearea of immediate combat in a non-tacticalenvironment, triage, patient decontamination,and initial resuscitative care may be necessaryin the combat area. HSS planners must ensurethat units can locate clean areas in which tooperate a medical treatment facility (MTF) or,if available, employ collective protectiveshelter systems to provide life and limb carein combat areas. Commanders and medicalleaders must also plan to prevent or reducethe numbers of stress-related cases in thisenvironment.

c. The geographic combatant commanderestablishes the command’s HSS requirementsand uses directive authority to ensure theproper coordination of all HSS capabilities inthe force (to include general HSS services,shelter, food, water, environmental andoccupational health, medical prophylaxis,medical pre-treatments, immunizations,antidotes, and fluids).

IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 3-11

Basic doctrine for HSS operations is in JP4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support inJoint Operations.

3. Health Service Support

a. Effects of NBC Weapons Employment.Adversary use of NBC weapons can causelarge numbers of military and civiliancasualties. Commanders and HSS plannersmust ensure that a process is in place tocope with and treat NBC casualties.Additionally, the potential for accompanyingwidespread disruption and destruction willrequire special patient handling andchallenge HSS capabilities and resources.Consequently, pre-deployment andemployment intelligence collection, reporting,analyses, and risk assessments must be timelyand accurate for PVNTMED protocols to beeffective. Timely and complete intelligenceand risk assessments assist commanders toprevent casualties and prepare forces forimmediate or long-term treatments, ifrequired, prior to deployment andemployment.

b. Intelligence

• Operations in NBC environments placeparticular HSS demands on intelligence.Especially important are a clear andcommonly shared assessment ofadversary NBC capabilities, NBC useeffects, and US, multinational, and HNHSS capabilities and limitations incountering adversary NBC use. TheArmed Forces Medical IntelligenceCenter (AFMIC) is responsible forintelligence products to support HSSaspects of JFC intelligence requirements.AFMIC can assist by producingepidemiological and environmentalthreat assessments associated withspecific geographical locations. Threatassessments should include theidentification of industrial sites in thetheater that can produce toxic

industrial hazards. TIM could becomea health hazard to deployed forces if thesesites are accidentally or intentionallydestroyed or damaged. Further, TIM couldpose a hazard to deployed forces even whenthe sites are in normal operation.

• In the theater, HSS activities supportingthe continuous IPB process includeinvestigations of disease and injuryresulting from known or suspectedbiological and chemical agents, andintegration of HSS information frommedical and non-medical units. Effectivepreventive and curative HSS for the forcesrequires production of complete, timely, andaccurate HSS intelligence products andtheir integration into overall theaterintelligence assessments and estimates.

c. Other Information Resources. Inaddition to AFMIC, other specializedorganizations provide expert information onmedical aspects of NBC threats, casualtyprevention, NBC agent sample and specimencollection, and medical care and managementof casualties. These include the DefenseThreat Reduction Agency, the Armed ForcesRadiobiology Research Institute, the NavalMedical Research Center, the US ArmyMedical Research Institute of InfectiousDisease, the US Army Medical ResearchInstitute of Chemical Defense, and the USArmy Nuclear and Chemical Agency.

d. Preventive Measures. Effective HSSincludes a combination of preventive andcurative measures. Commanders must ensurethat all the command’s personnel train tosurvive and accomplish their missions in NBCenvironments. The command’s HSSactivities must be able to effectively carefor NBC casualties while providing allother required health services.Commanders must ensure that personnel keepimmunizations current (including full use ofthe Military Immunizations Tracking System),use available prophylaxis and pre-treatments

IV-3


against suspect agents, and applycontamination avoidance procedures.Preventive measures in HSS planning forNBC environments (see Figure IV-1) include,but are not limited to the following.

• Development of the body’s naturaldefenses through individual and unithealth and fitness programs.

• Integration of military PVNTMED andcivilian PHS preventive capabilities tothe extent feasible and permissible bymission requirements.

• Integration of HSS considerations intoISR activities to detect NBC and othertoxic agents and materials; provide earlywarning to maximize the effectivenessof PVNTMED and curative HSS.

• Protection of medical supplies andequipment by using chemical agent-resistant coatings or protective coverings.

• Frequent testing of all food and watersources and supplies for NBCcontamination.

• Establishment and maintenance of amedical surveillance system to identify

populations at risk, to anticipate,recognize, and assess hazardousexposures, to monitor health outcomes,and to employ new countermeasures.

• Force protection measures extended toHSS organizations and facilities based onJFC priorities to ensure HSS availabilityin the event of adversary NBC attacks.

• Integration of HSS units and facilitiesinto joint force plans and activities tolimit NBC exposure and contaminationfollowing an NBC attack, throughapplication of NBC defense principles.

e. Care and Management of NBCCasualties

• Effective care and management by HSSorganizations of casualties caused byNBC weapons, and in particularbiological agents, requires planning totreat large numbers of individualsexposed to infectious disease or toxins,chemical agents, and the effects ofnuclear and radiological weapons. Eachelement of the medical evacuation andtreatment process requires carefulevaluation to assure it best conserves andrestores the command’s combat

Commanders must ensure that personnel keep immunizations current.

IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 3-11

capability. Consideration of multinationalcoalition partner and HN requirementsand capabilities that affect the JFCmission and the ability of US HSS unitsto function effectively is especiallyimportant. Demand for PVNTMEDservices increases commensurate withthe NBC threat. PVNTMED personneland the command surgeon assist the JFCin determining the health risks associatedwith NBC hazards; the safety of drinkingwater; the appropriate time for usingpre-treatments, prophylaxis, andimmunizations; and other PVNTMEDmeasures. PVNTMED personnel mustremain aware of the potential medicalthreats in the local environment. Theymust establish and maintain a medicalsurveillance program that provides a

database on actual medical threats intheir command’s area; names and unitsof personnel exposed to the medicalthreats; and treatments provided toexposed personnel. The medicalsurveillance program must beestablished before the first personnelenter the theater, whenever possible, andbe maintained and continued after thepersonnel depart. To conserve, restore,or maintain combat effectiveness,commanders and HSS personnel withinthe evacuation and treatment processesmust continually evaluate capabilitiesand make adjustments to conform to JFCpriorities. All patients must be checkedfor NBC contamination anddecontaminated, if required, prior tobeing admitted to MTFs to reduce the

Figure IV-1. Preventive Measures in Health Service Support Planning

Development of the body’s natural defeses through individualand unit health and fitness programs

Integration of military preventive medicine (PVNTMED) andcivilian public health service preventive capabilities

Integration of health service support (HSS) considerations intointelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities; provideearly warning to maximize the effectiveness of PVNTMED andcurative HSS

Protection of medical supplies and equipment

Frequent testing of all food and water sources and supplies fornuclear, biological, and chemical contamination

Establishment and maintenance of a medical surveillance system

Force protection measures extended to HSS organizations andfacilities based on joint force commander priorities

Integration of HSS units and facilities into joint task force plans andactivities

PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN HEALTHSERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING

IV-5


hazard to medical personnel and otherpatients and to prevent contaminationof the MTF. Treatment of life- or limb-threatening conditions must beaccomplished in the patientdecontamination area prior to and duringdecontamination. Medical personnelmust support this mission, either byprov id ing the ac tua l pa t ien tdecontamination function, or assistingwith the patient decontamination process.

• Units have primary responsibility fordecontaminating their casualties as soonas possible and prior to moving themto MTFs. However, operationalcircumstances may prevent them fromdoing so; this has a serious impact on thecommand’s ability to maintainuncontaminated medical facilities.Decontamination and collectiveprotection following NBC attacks areessential if MTFs are in apresumptively contaminated area.The JFC, with advice from the commandsurgeon, must consider MTF needs whenestablishing priorities for allocatingdecontamination assets. Componentsmay make available to the JFC dedicateddecontamination assets such as theUS Air Force Wartime MedicalDecontamination Teams.

• Demands for military medical support toneighboring civilian populations followingan NBC attack may be substantial,especially in areas with a concentration ofvery young, very old, and other individualsalready suffering from underlying diseaseor other forms of weakening stress. Inconsultation with the command surgeon,the combatant commander must establish,at the beginning of the operation, the scopeof care to be rendered to civilianpopulations.

• In accordance with their missions,medical organizations assist with

providing adequate shelter, establishingsafe food and water sources, and ensuringthat preventive measures and curativetreatments are available. Enemy actionand the potential need to deal with panicamong the civilian population requirephysical security measures at facility thatpermit uninterrupted medical treatment.The JFC may decide to assign thephysical security mission to non-medicalunits, if operational requirements andpriorities permit.

• Although the source and means ofexposure to NBC hazards affectincidence and the severity of injuries,basic principles of prevention andtreatment do not change. For instance,in the event of a biological attack, rapiddetection and accurate identification ofthe agent are important factors inproviding operationally relevantinformation to the JFC and HSS units.This allows the command to mitigateeffects on the force, facilitate adequatecasualty management, and provideeffective medical treatment. The firstindication of biological attack may bethe appearance of numerous casualtiesin which medical specialists arechallenged to differentiate endemicdisease occurrence from enemy attack.

• In the case of a biological attack,casualties may not occur during the attackas they would during large-scaleconventional bombardment or attackwith nerve agents against unprotectedpersonnel. Moreover, the degree of agentexposure and personal resistance (naturalor acquired) may delay illness. HSS unitsmust anticipate increasing casualty loadsbeginning with relatively few initialcasualties and escalating to a peak oversuccessive hours or days. An exceptionto this aspect would be an attack withbiological agents that might create animmediate and dramatic mass casualty

IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 3-11

situation. Since some biological agentsare transmissible among humans, theimplementation of methods thatminimize spread after the initial attackwill be essential for military PVNTMEDand civilian PHS organizations.

4. Preventive MedicinePrinciples

a. The damage caused by biological andchemical attacks will vary according togeographic and climatic conditions.Nevertheless, adherence to both theprinciples of PVNTMED and public healthstandards can mitigate the effects of NBCattacks, particularly if these are implementedbefore an outbreak. PVNTMED specialistsassist the JFC by identifying health hazardsand providing assessments of thesusceptibility of the force to these hazards.They also identify hazards associated withcontamination; identify safe food and watersources and their vulnerabilities; conductcontinuous medical surveillance; andrecommend when to use prophylaxis, pre-treatments, immunizations, quarantines, insectand rodent control, destruction of livestock,and other preventive measures associatedwith NBC defense.

b. In the aftermath of an NBC attack, HSSand PHS facilities may be strained beyondtheir capacities. Demands for medical supportto both military and civilian populations couldbe intense. PVNTMED specialists must assistthe JFC in establishing priorities andeffectively using available HSS and PHSresources. To assure adequate support to thejoint force, JFC directives concerningtreatment of civilian populations must be clearand adhered to by the joint force HSSpersonnel and facilities.

c. Carelessness in emergency situationsregarding food and water sanitation, generalhygiene, and other common disease controlmeasures can significantly contribute tosecondary spread of disease. Enforcingsatisfactory personal hygiene and fieldsanitation is a leadership responsibility.Washing with soap and water is the mosteffective, and often simplest, personal hygienemeasure for controlling communicablediseases. All personnel must apply standard,individual hygiene and sanitation measures.Strict procedures are required for wastetreatment and sewage, including watersurveillance and sanitation control measures.Generally, the best method of sanitizing wateris purification or boiling. However, these are

The primary responsibility for decontamination of casualties prior totransportation to medical treatment facilities rests with the unit.

IV-7


not effective against certain biological agentssuch as viruses, spores, or toxins if the waterwill be used for human consumption andhygiene purposes. The reverse osmosis waterpurification unit can remove most NBCagents, and provide a safe water supply forthese uses. In all cases, the designated medicalauthorities must approve all water suppliesbefore distribution and consumption.

d. Maintaining safe food and watersupplies is vital in NBC environments.Following an attack, all food except cannedor similarly protected items should bethoroughly inspected for contamination. Ifthe situation demands that suspect items beconsumed, they should be decontaminated.Foods determined to be safe must be protectedagainst secondary contamination. Protectivemeasures must be practiced by those whotransport, store, prepare, and serve food aswell as by those who consume the food. Inaddition, commanders must consider applyingcontrol measures to prevent contaminationof foodstuffs by insects, rodents, and othervectors.

5. Countermeasures andResponse to NBC MedicalEffects

Countermeasures and responses to themedical effects of NBC agents includeimmunizations, medical prophylaxis,medical treatments, antidotes, and medicalfluids. These actions occur before exposureto high-risk, NBC conditions (e.g., pre-treatments and immunizations) as well as afterexposure to NBC agents (e.g., treatments andfluids). The timeliness and accuracy ofintelligence including any warning candirectly enhance the success of medicalcountermeasures and response. Figure IV-2highlights DOD biological threatimmunization policy.

a. Pre-Exposure. Commanders mustensure that all their personnel have up-to-dateimmunizations, begin required pre-treatmentsand prophylaxis, and/or use designatedmedical barrier materials as ordered beforeexposure to NBC agents.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMMUNIZATIONPOLICY, BIOLOGICALTHREAT EXCERPT

... the following personnel ... should be immunized againstvalidated biological warfare threat agents for which suitablevaccines are available ...

Personnel assigned to high-threat areas.

Personnel predesignated for immediate contingencydeployment.

Department of Defense Directive 6205.3November 26, 1993

Figure IV-2. Department of Defense Immunization Policy, Biological Threat Excerpt

IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 3-11

b. Post-Exposure. HSS personnel willassist commanders by ensuring that allexposed personnel continue prophylaxis, pre-treatments, and the use of medical barriermaterials, and to administer antidotes asrequired. Exposed personnel should seekmedical assistance as soon as possible.

c. Psychological Impact. NBC incidentswill generate confusion, panic, and hysteria.Therefore, the use of combat stress controlteams is essential in preparing for andresponding to NBC incidents.

6. Patient Movement

a. Patient movement in combat areas isnormally a Service responsibility usingorganic assets (personnel, surface vehicles,and aircraft). US Air Force aircraft withspecialized aeromedical evacuation (AE)crews can assist with movement ofdecontaminated patients. The combatantcommander, with advice from thecommand surgeon, is responsible formoving patients within the theater anddeciding the extent to which evacuationassets will be committed to contaminatedareas. The Commander in Chief, USTransportation Command establishes,operates, trains, and maintains a common-userAE system for intratheater and intertheaterpatient movement.

b. Commanders operating in NBC threatenvironments must consider the commitmentof evacuation assets to contaminated areas.In planning for evacuation, the JFC considersthe nature of the actual contamination hazard.Radiological contamination andradioactive fallout impose differentoperating conditions than persistent ornonpersistent chemical agents or lethal ornonlethal biological agents. Whenevacuation personnel are sent into aradiologically contaminated area, anoperational exposure guide (OEG) must beestablished. Prolonged wearing of individual

protective equipment under MOPPconditions, climate, workload, and fatiguecombine to limit personnel effectiveness andconsequently hamper casualty evacuation.Based on factors such as missions, priorities,and OEG, commanders decide whichevacuation assets will be sent into thecontaminated area. As a general principle,to limit contamination of evacuation assets,patients should be decontaminated beforeevacuation.

7. Casualty Decontaminationand Triage

a. Decontamination of casualtiesprotects them from the detrimental effectsof additional contaminants and protectsthose who evacuate and treat them. Thecontrol and treatment of contaminatedcasualties will vary with the tactical situationand the specific contaminants. Although theprimary responsibility for decontamination ofcasualties prior to transportation to MTFs restswith the unit, a medical unit must be preparedto receive contaminated casualties. Withinthe theater, decentralization of casualtydecontamination is necessary. Casualtiesmust not be forced to wait at central pointsfor decontamination. All medical units shouldhave readily available, and be proficient inthe use of, the necessary decontaminationequipment for self and patientdecontamination. MTFs supportingoperations in potential NBC environmentsmust establish appropriate procedures forcasualty decontamination and triage.

b. Triage of contaminated casualtiestakes place with due regard to the typeNBC agent that is known or likely to havecaused the contamination. The triageofficer takes account of the significantdifferences between and among nuclear,radiological, biological, and chemicalhazards. When casualties arrive at theMTF, the triage officer will determinedecontamination priorities based on the

IV-9


urgency of patient treatment needs. Patientswith life- or limb-threatening conditions willreceive emergency medical treatment beforedecontamination.

8. Medical Treatment Facilities

The success of MTFs in treating arrivingcasualties in NBC environments dependson prior planning and adaptability. Thegeographic combatant commander isresponsible for directing and guidingplanning and exercises to ensure adequateHSS, including the operations of MTFs.

a. NBC weapons are capable of producingmass casualties. In the hours immediatelyfollowing an NBC attack, MTFs can beoverwhelmed with casualties that exceed theircapacity. The JFC, supported by thecommand surgeon, establishes HSS prioritiesfor treatment of mass casualties. MTFcommanders are responsible for planning andtraining to cope with this situation in line withjoint force plans and priorities.

b. Whenever possible, an MTF should belocated such that it is maximally protectedfrom an NBC attack.

c. To facilitate operations in NBCenvironments, MTFs should have collectiveprotective shelters (CPSs) which enable themto operate in contaminated environments andensure contamination-free areas are availableto treat casualties after their decontamination.CPSs supplement, but cannot replace, MTFcapabilities for continuing care. They provideemergency capabilities until relocation fromthe contaminated area or decontaminationeliminates the threat of further contamination.

d. HSS operations at MTFs should avoiddiversion of medical specialists to non-medical tasks. Whenever possible, in linewith joint force priorities and assets,augmentation will be made available toperform tasks such as decontamination,physical security, and maintenance ofcontamination-free areas and CPSs.

e. The JTF is responsible for providingMTFs with adequate logistic support intheater, including damage control, relocation,and resupply, in line with joint force prioritiesand assets.

Exposed personnel should seek medicalassistance as soon as possible.

IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VSUPPORTING CONFLICT TERMINATION

V-1

1. General

a. Successful conflict termination is theculmination of actions taken and conditionsestablished that end hostilities and otherconflicts not involving the use or threat offorce. The conflict termination processmust create an environment that supportslong-term US security objectives, regionalstability, and reconciliation. NBC weaponsin the possession of belligerents oropportunists in the operational area can havea significant impact on conflict termination,making it more complex, challenging, andpolitically charged. Conflict terminationconsiderations should be included incombatant commander peacetime strategicguidance and campaign planning processes,and adjusted in conflicts to reflect the currentsituation as well as NCA and multinationalobjectives.

b. Conflict termination operations in NBCenvironments should be directed toward twoNBC-specific basic objectives: ensuring thesafety of all personnel in the theater andestablishing the foundation for long-termcontrol or elimination of adversary NBCcapabilities. There are two stages to conflicttermination: transition to conflict terminationand post-conflict operations. This chapteraddresses major considerations affecting jointforce planning for, and execution of, conflicttermination under conditions where NBCweapons, or other toxic materials, are in orthreaten the theater of operations. This chapterfocuses on conflicts involving the use of force.

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect,you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certainthat the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war. Thisis a lesson supported by abundant experience.”

CPT Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

For MOOTW not involving the use or threatof force, see the additional considerations inChapter VI, "Military Operations Other ThanWar." For the broad principles relatingconflict termination to US and multinationalstrategic goals see JP 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, especially Chapter I, "TheStrategic Context."

2. Transition to ConflictTermination

a. Overview. Conflict termination is adeliberate process of concluding hostilitiesand preparing for peace. It should not beconfused with culmination, although anadversary’s culmination may lead directly totermination. Conflict termination should sealthe accomplishment of tactical, operational,and strategic objectives. These objectives mayencompass specific goals related to theadversary’s NBC weapons and supportingcapabilities.

b. End States. Reaching specificobjectives and conditions related to theadversary’s NBC weapons may be central tothe achievement of overall campaign endstates, and joint force plans should accountfor this likelihood. At the same time, it ispossible that the NCA may decide to terminatethe conflict before attaining all previouslyestablished objectives and conditions. If thebasic termination preconditions have been metbefore attainment of NBC-related objectivesand conditions, there will be a requirement tocontinually assess adversary NBC capabilities

V-2

Chapter V

JP 3-11

and identify possible post-hostility actions toneutralize any remaining NBC threats. Evenwhen objectives and conditions related toNBC weapons are achieved, verificationand monitoring may be necessary andimportant to establishing normal post-conflict relations.

c. Transition from Combat Operations.Normal actions and missions undertakenduring the campaign will have utility for thetransition to conflict termination. Forexample, intelligence collection and analysiswill already be focused on adversary NBCcapabilities. Likewise, NBC defenseoperations will have been underway, and mayneed to continue if residual toxic hazards andadversary threats remain. As conflicttermination approaches, the JFC must alsoconsider actions to attain specific NBC-related objectives and conditions,particularly those associated with disablingor destroying NBC capabilities. At aminimum, the JFC must ensure continuoussurveillance of adversary NBC assets (e.g.,known or suspected NBC capabilities thathave yet to be captured or destroyed) as thebasis for post-hostilities planning.

d. Cease-Fire and Negotiating an Endto Hostilities

• During the transition to conflicttermination, a major milestone will bethe establishment of a cease-fire, whichmay be arranged through diplomaticchannels. The cease-fire may be aprecursor to formal cessation ofhostilities as part of peace accords. Thetime period between cease-fire andconflict termination may be a matter ofhours, months, or years. Among theprimary aims of the JFC during thenegotiations or imposition of cease-fireconditions is to ensure that enemyNBC capabilities are identified andsecured under joint force controlrapidly during the initial phases ofpost-conflict operations. Ideally theprovisions should:

•• Require adversary military andcivilian authorities to specify the locationof all NBC weapons, production andstorage facilities, and delivery systems,as well as chemical minefields andcontaminated areas;

POST-HOSTILITIES CONSIDERATIONS

A staffer in USCENTCOM [US Central Command] headquarters brought up thequestion of what would happen if the units captured biological munitions. Upto this time, no one had considered what exactly combat units should do withmunitions filled with biological agents. Normally, one would call the explosiveordnance disposal (EOD) teams to disarm munitions, but weren’t specialcircumstances present here? While the United States had established waysto demilitarize biological munitions at US production sites in the 1970s, therewas no mobile capability to do this in Southwest Asia. The Joint Staff beganworking on procedures to permit a field destruction capability for biologicalweapons, in the event that USCENTCOM might capture armed biologicalmunitions. Guidance finally came through on February 27. Authorization todestroy small quantities of biological munitions using field methods wasgranted. Bulk quantities of biological agent munitions were to be securedand not destroyed, due to the possibility of international implications of findingand disposing of the munitions.


V-3

Supporting Conflict Termination

•• Establish rules against access to andtransport of the weapons and deliverysystems;

•• Provide for measures to mitigateresidual hazards, to include theimmediate securing of all disclosedfacilities and searches to examinesuspected sites;

•• Establish procedures preventing theremoval or introduction of weapons ortoxic materials from or to other countriesor parties; and

•• Establish rules for transition to long-term disarmament, monitoring, andinspection regimes.

• Prevailing conditions during negotiationsfor cessation of hostilities will affectspecific US objectives and plans.Required US activities related toadversary NBC weapons should not beconstrained by a demarcation line.Rather, a range of permissible verificationand enforcement activities should beidentified including movement offriendly forces into adversary areas asnecessary.

e. Intelligence Considerations. Intelligenceon adversary NBC capabilities will be criticalto conflict termination and the negotiation ofcease-fire terms, and may require increasedcollection, analysis, and production activities.Intelligence objectives in this phase shouldemphasize developing a complete pictureof the adversary’s residual NBC assets andcapabilities, including: location anddisposition of weapons, delivery means,production and research facilities,documentation, key military and civilianpersonnel, and operational units. Intelligenceobjectives should also include assessment ofpotential adversary COAs as the end ofhostilities approaches. As the preconditionsfor conflict termination are attained, the JFC

must consider how the adversary, presumablystill in possession of NBC weapons, may react.The adversary may act cooperatively;undertake passive resistance; act to hide ordisassemble NBC weapons, delivery systems,and production means; seek to transfer certaincapabilities to other countries or confederateterrorist groups; or even decide to use NBCweapons in desperation or for revenge.

f. Mitigation of Residual Hazards

• Identifying, assessing, and mitigatingresidual hazards in the theater ofoperations will be an important aspect oftransition to conflict termination. US andother multinational forces must beable to detect and evaluate hazardousareas in order to contain and mitigatecontamination hazards. They must becapable of providing immediate life-saving support and emergency disposal(or containment) of leaking, unstable, orotherwise dangerous toxic materials.Joint force plans must also provide forthe transfer of custody of contaminatedmaterials and sites and associatedmonitoring tasks to the HN or follow-onforces or organizations.

• Operations may require the applicationof specialized ISR assets; continued NBCdefense actions in selected zones evenas hostilities are terminated; NEOs; andthe execution of in-theater plans tomanage the consequences of deliberateor accidental contamination. Theseactivities may require intensivecoordination and cooperation withmultinational forces and HN civilauthorities, as well as IOs and NGOs thatoffer specialized capabilities and skills.

• The JFC will determine whenemergency or routine equipmentretrograde procedures will beundertaken. This JFC decision entailsaccepting higher contamination risk

V-4

Chapter V

JP 3-11

when warranted by immediate(emergency) mission requirements. Asconflict termination appears morecertain, commanders must weigh therisks to personnel safety againstoperational requirements prior tocessation of hostilities.

• The geographic zone in whichmitigation activities will be conductedmay be quite extensive as adversary andfriendly occupied territory come underUS and multinational control, and maybe further complicated by the need tointeract with local populations, bothfriendly and unfriendly. The potentialcomplexity of this mission calls fordetailed planning before transition toconflict termination. Plans shouldinclude provisions for maintainingdetailed written and visual (e.g.,photographic, video) records ofcontamination caused by NBC weaponsand other toxic materials. These recordsmay be essential for determiningaccountability and reparationsrequirements.

g. Search, Identification, Control, andRecovery of Adversary NBC Capabilities

• The transition to conflict terminationmust include a comprehensive effortto locate and secure residual NBCcapabilities. This effort may have begunduring hostilities. However, if adversaryNBC weapons and facilities have notbeen captured by friendly forces duringthe campaign, gaining control of thembefore cessation of hostilities is likelyonly if the adversary has collapsed to thepoint where cease-fire terms can bedictated. Completion of search,identification, control, and recovery tasksprovides a critical foundation for post-conflict planning to eliminate adversarycapabilities and establish effectivemonitoring and other controls.

• A recovery, search, identification, andcontrol plan should be established andexecuted with sufficient forces to gaintimely control of NBC capabilities.Specifically designated search andrecovery task forces (S/RTFs) shouldbe responsible to the JFC and includepersonnel with the technicalproficiency necessary to identify andevaluate NBC weapons, equipment,and associated materiel. Figure V-1depicts a notional S/RTF organization.

A recovery, search, identification, and control plan should be established andexecuted with sufficient forces to gain timely control of NBC capabilities.

V-5


S/RTFs should also be capable ofemergency response to NBC accidentsor incidents. S/RTFs should be preparedto initiate operations as soon as a cease-fire is in effect or, at the latest, upon theformal cessation of hostilities. Assumingongoing efforts by the adversary todisperse, conceal, or remove NBCcapabilities, early expansion of the areaunder positive US and multinationalcontrol is a central concern.

• S/RTFs will require clear ROE forexecution of their missions, which couldencompass a diverse set of tasks, toinclude the following:

•• Securing NBC-related sites;

•• Disabling or confiscating NBCweapons and materiel, includingemergency operations to dispose of toxicmateriel that cannot wait for normal

Figure V-1. Search/Recovery Task Force Sample Organization

SEARCH AND RECOVERY TASK FORCESAMPLE ORGANIZATION

ManeuverBattalion

MPCompany

WMD TechTeam

Transportation(for retrograde)

MediaTF HQ

AviationDetach

CivilAffairs

HQIOMPNBC

NGOPSYOPTFWMD

HeadquartersInternational OrganizationMilitary PoliceNuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Nongovernmental OrganizationPsychological OperationsTask ForceWeapons of Mass Destruction

NOTE: The above organization illustrates the functional requirements needed touse a battalion task force as the base. The size, type, and composition of theindividual elements as well as additional subunits should be determined based onmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time availableanalysis of the search and recovery operation with particular attention given to thesecurity requirement and the quantity and type of munitions and components to besecured, evacuated, or destroyed.

AirDefense

ArtilleryDetach

PSYOP SOF NGO

IO

NBC ReconSection

DeconUnit

BA

SE

AU

GM

EN

TATI

ON

V-6

Chapter V

JP 3-11

processing during all phases ofoperations in peace, war, and MOOTW;

•• Detaining adversary or third countrynationals who may be associated withNBC weapons, accountable as possiblewar criminals, or useful for intelligencepurposes;

•• Countering efforts to remove NBCassets from the adversary country;

•• Interacting with nonmilitary entities,especially to provide accurate and timelyinformation to IOs and news media.

• S/RTFs must also begin inventoryingadversary NBC capabilities, as well asclassifying, evaluating, and mappingassociated sites. Where possible,international monitoring organizationsshould be involved to demonstrate thelegitimacy and credibility of S/RTFactions and assist in the transition tointernational control. S/RTF effortsshould assist planners in determining thescope and requirements for disposing ofenemy NBC capabilities in the post-conflict phase.

h. Interaction With Nonmilitary Entities

• Nonmilitary IOs and NGOs could playsignificant roles during conflicttermination. The JFC may already havecoordinated with US and HN agenciesto help manage activities such as medicaltreatment of NBC casualties, evacuationof remains, decontamination andmanagement of contamination hazards,and retrograde and destruction of NBCand other toxic material. As conflicttermination approaches, additionalcoordination may be required.

• The HN, IOs, and NGOs may bringvaluable knowledge and capabilities tospecific NBC-related challenges in this

phase, and some may assume animportant role in post-conflictarrangements. The JFC must be ableto quickly determine the ability ofthese organizations to contribute to themilitary, political, and humanitarianobjectives associated with the NBCaspects of conflict termination. Wherethere has been extensive use of NBCweapons, the contribution of HN, IO, andNGO personnel may be vital tomitigating and coping with theconsequences of contamination. Theremay also be requirements to helpprotect these personnel from exposureto NBC hazards. Successful integrationof HN, IO, and NGO activities willrequire effective communications andrelationships at all command levels, fromthe theater command to field units.

• Finally, interaction with the media onissues related to NBC weapons willrequire continuous JFC oversight. USobjectives can be advanced through apositive relationship with the media thatensures expeditious dissemination ofaccurate information.

i. Types and Quantities of ForcesRequired. The JFC must determine theappropriate mix of forces to accomplish NBC-related conflict termination objectives.Security and compliance forces, such ascombat, military police, and engineers willalso be needed in addition to specializedintelligence, technical, and medical personnel.SOF may also be required to perform civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairsactivities, and PSYOP tasks specificallyrelated to NBC aspects of conflict termination.

j. Transition to Post-ConflictOperations. Conflict termination operationsshould establish the basis for post-conflictoperations that assure accomplishment of USlong-term objectives in the region. To thedegree that US forces and personnel are

V-7


integral to post-conflict operations, planningfor the transition should emphasize continuityacross all relevant tasks, consistent withredeployment requirements.

3. Post-Conflict Operations

a. Overview. Post-conflict operationsprovide the basis for a systematic eliminationof the adversary NBC threat capabilities.Scattered, violent activity, to includeterrorism, criminal acts, or continuedresistance by armed groups refusing torecognize the peace accords, may continue forsome time. Positive control of adversaryNBC capabilities, appropriate handling ofNBC contamination challenges, andeffective transition to a disarmament,inspection, and monitoring regime arecentral to mission success in this phase. Theplanning considerations important to thetransition to conflict termination remainrelevant.

b. General Considerations

• The JFC will maintain sufficient combatforces to enforce implementation of thepeace accords. Once there is highconfidence that a return to hostilities isunlikely, withdrawal of excess combatand support forces may begin. Certaincombat and specialized units may berequired as reaction forces and to dealwith NBC-specific tasks. These mayinclude detection, explosive ordnancedisposal, decontamination, medical,military police, and other units. The JFCwill also need sufficient forces to preventor monitor clandestine reintroduction orremoval of NBC weapons and material.

• The rapid re-establishment of stability inthe region will reduce the likelihood ofNBC incidents, facilitate the transitionto civil sector activities, and enhance theeffectiveness of HN, IO, and NGOefforts. Where the HN, IOs, and NGOs

are expected to play significant roles inpost-conflict operations, the JFC mustdetermine how to transition from US-ledactivities and to define and provide forsubsequent HN, IO, and NGO supportrequirements.

c. Intelligence Considerations. With areturn to peace, the reduction of combatforces, and establishment of disarmament ormonitoring regimes, intelligence is likely tobe critical to achieving post-conflict objectivesrelated to NBC weapons.

d. S/RTF Operations. Recoveryoperations to secure and remove adversaryNBC assets begun during the transition toconflict termination may require expansionas more detailed knowledge of adversarycapabilities is developed and as the full rangeof NBC-related facilities is identified.

e. Force Protection. In this period,disaffected groups or terrorist organizationsmay seek to strike at US and othermultinational forces as well as indigenouselements cooperating with the United States.With the reduction in US force levels, forceprotection measures must remain adequate todeter and mitigate the possible effects of NBCattacks and threats.

f. Disarmament, Inspection, andMonitoring Regimes. The JFC may haveresponsibility to help establish and enforce theinitial stages of NBC disarmament, inspection,or monitoring regimes mandated by the cease-fire or peace accord. This responsibility maytransition in full to an international entity (e.g.,the United Nations) within a relatively shortperiod of time. Military support tointernational disarmament and inspectionefforts may be required. The NCA may alsochoose to undertake offensive military actionto enforce compliance or in response to non-compliance. These requirements must beintegrated into joint force intelligence andoperation plans.

V-8

Chapter V

JP 3-11

g. Decontamination Actions. It ispossible that decontamination actions will berequired in the post-conflict phase.Established TTP for decontamination ofmilitary equipment and personnel will befollowed. If decontamination of civilianpersonnel, equipment, or facilities is required,procedures will be established in coordinationwith HN authorities and IO and NGO expertsas appropriate. These procedures will includeprovisions for securing, safeguarding, ordestroying NBC weapons, materiel, andagents as necessary.

h. Retrograde of ContaminatedMateriel from the Theater

• In the early stages of post-conflictoperations, returning US equipment toCONUS or other locations will be amajor activity as forces are withdrawnfrom the theater of operations. Asshown in Figure V-2, goals forcontaminated materiel retrograde from

the theater are mission support,protection of forces and resources fromNBC hazards, and the control ofcontamination. The JFC will establishthe relative priority among these goalsin view of the circumstances at hand, inparticular operational timing and theextent of contamination. For example,under emergency conditions, theattainment of US and multinationalobjectives may warrant increased risksand require a more robust protectiveposture to limit contamination hazardsand mitigate their effects. In a non-emergency situation, those same risksmay be unacceptable and more stringentcontamination control measures may berequired to support lower individualprotection levels.

• Essential actions begin at the operatorlevel and continue to the organizationultimately receiving the shippedequipment. Two key roles are

Figure V-2. Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Goals

CONTAMINATED MATERIELRETROGRADE GOALS

MISSION

CONTROL

PROTECTION

Support strategic and operational objectives

Control contamination and previously contaminated equipmentfor the remainder of its life cycle, including its final destruction

Protect the force and mission resources fromnuclear, biological, and chemical hazards

V-9


performed by the JRAC and the NBCretrograde support element (RSE).Consistent with JFC and componentcommander guidance, the JRACdetermines if mission requirementswarrant the risk of emergency retrogradeor if other COAs are acceptable. To assistwith requirements for deliberatecontaminated materiel retrograde, theJRAC may organize an NBC RSE toaccomplish tasks from markingequipment to contamination monitoring.FM 3-4-1, Fixed Site Protection,p rov ides u se fu l a s s i s t ance .Redeployment planning should addressrequirements for consolidation points forequipment with residual NBCcontamination.

• The safety of personnel is of foremostconcern during the retrograde of

equipment with potential, residual, orlow-level NBC contamination. Based onprinciples outlined in this paragraph,Services and other responsible militaryagencies must develop and implementspecific, precautionary procedures forhandling and transporting theirequipment. Any equipment present inthe attack or downwind hazard areas maypossess residual contamination. Servicemanuals define NBC contaminationhazard areas. Specialized detectors maybe required at specified sites in the JRAto monitor contamination. Givendecontamination technology limitations,some equipment may require extensiveweathering or, in some cases, destructionto meet safety objectives. Followingthorough decontamination, residualcontamination risks include potentialvapor and contact hazards. These risksincrease as contaminated equipment isconsolidated and personnel work aroundthis equipment for prolonged periods.Risks may also increase as equipment isdisassembled for maintenance functionsor containerized for shipment.

• Methods to mitigate nuclear andbiological hazards are primarilyfunctions of removal or decay of thenuclear matter and biological agents. Forresidual radiation, if the radioactiveparticles cannot be removed, the timerequired for natural decay is a function ofthe isotope’s half-life and cannot beaccelerated. Under these conditions,distance and shielding between personneland the equipment are the only means ofreducing exposure risks. Biological agentsgenerally decay within hours afterdissemination or exposure to ultravioletlight (sunlight). For more robustbiological agents, thoroughdecontamination and preparation ofequipment to US Department ofAgriculture import standards will eliminatemost health threats; even so, continuing

Post-conflict operation removal of USequipment may be affected by NBCcontamination threats.

V-10

Chapter V

JP 3-11

precautions, such as individual protection,are warranted. Because of the small particlesize of many biological agents, some agentmay adhere to internal equipment surfaces,creating a risk, primarily respiratory, tounwarned maintenance personnel touchingfacial areas after contact with these internalsurfaces.

• The non-emergency equipmentretrograde concept shown in Figure V-3assumes that post-conflict conditionsallow time for thorough decontaminationand weathering in the JOA beforeretrograde from the theater. Personnelassisting the JRAC with detection,monitoring, and preparation of theequipment will require stringentpersonal protection and specializeddetectors. These preparations may

require continuous operations for weeksor months. As suspect equipment isconsolidated for monitoring,decontamination, and weathering,security and buffer zones around theconsolidation site provide additionalcontamination control measures toprotect US and multinational forces aswell as HN personnel.

• Air quality control and related legalrequirements are additional considerationsrequiring legal advice and review priorto equipment retrograde. Once inCONUS, precautionary measurescontinue throughout the remainingequipment life cycle, including DODcontrol requirements, pre-maintenancemonitoring, and other periodicmonitoring.

V-11


DELIBERATE CONTAMINATED MATERIELRETROGRADE CONCEPT

Contamination ControlMeasuresIn-Transit MonitoringIndividual Protection

Periodic MonitoringContamination ControlMeasuresDisassembly Precautions

Postconflict Return to ContinentalUnited States (CONUS)Specialized MonitoringThorough DecontaminationExtraordinary DecontaminationMeasuresWeatheringStringent Individual ProtectionMeasuresStringent Contamination ControlMeasures

IntermediateCONUS Location

Figure V-3. Deliberate Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Concept

V-12

Chapter V

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIMILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

VI-1

1. General

This chapter describes principles for jointforce MOOTW in NBC environments. Itencompasses MOOTW involving the use orthreat of force as well as those not involvingthe use or threat of force. The unique aspectsof conducting MOOTW within the UnitedStates receive special consideration; seeparagraph 4, below.

2. Overview

a. Figure VI-1 illustrates the range ofoperational activities that are conducted asMOOTW. The Armed Forces of the UnitedStates participate in MOOTW in efforts todeter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, andsupport civil authorities in domestic andoverseas emergency or attack situations aspermitted by law. MOOTW may beconducted as singular operations, as theprecursor to combat operations, in parallelwith ongoing combat operations, or followingthe cessation of combat activity.

b. State-supported and non-state terroristgroups may employ NBC weapons, or naturaland manmade disasters may contaminate areaswith toxic materials whose mitigation willrequire the efforts of specialized militaryforces. Further, the conduct of MOOTWin NBC environments may require

“MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support avariety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war,returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensionsbetween nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining USinfluence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent withapplicable law. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing militaryforces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other thanwarfighting.”

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

Figure VI-1. Types of Military OperationsOther Than War

TYPES OF MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER

THAN WAR

Arms Control

Combatting Terrorism

DOD Support to CounterdrugOperations

Enforcement ofSanctions/Maritime InterceptOperations

Enforcing Exclusion Zones

Ensuring Freedom of Navigationand Overflight

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Domestic Support Operations

Nation Assistance/Support toCounterinsurgency

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

Peace Operations

Protection of Shipping

Recovery Operations

Show of Force Operations

Strikes and Raids

VI-2

Chapter VI

JP 3-11

coordination and cooperation withagencies, organizations, and individualsoutside the military chain of command ordirect control. In many MOOTW situations,the JFC may be in a supporting role to civilauthorities, to US ambassadors and theircountry teams, or to HN authorities.

c. The basic principles of operations inNBC environments apply to MOOTW. The

JFC and joint force elements must be preparedfor NBC use and contamination with toxicmaterials at any point, including the transitionfrom non-combat to combat environments. JP3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military OperationsOther Than War, and other JPs in the 3-07series promulgate detailed guidance for therange of MOOTW. The JFC must apply thisguidance while adapting to the current NBCthreat in the operational area. Additionally,

DEATH IN THE SUBWAY

Until last week, Kasumasa Takahashi was just another faceless Japanesebureaucrat, the deputy stationmaster at Kasumigaseki subway station in centralTokyo. The blue-suited mandarins of the nation’s key ministries who pouredfrom the commuter trains every morning were his customers: Takahashi tooktheir tickets, pointed them up the proper escalators and kept the sprawlingstation — where three major subway lines converge — so clean that the whitegloves he wore on the job were seldom soiled.

Then last Monday, suddenly and quietly, the 50-year-old career subway manbecame a hero. The 8:14 a.m. Chiyoda Line train bound for Yoyogi-Ueharapulled in on track 5 with an obvious problem. Passengers were spilling out ofits first car with tears streaming, choking, some foaming at the mouth.Takashashi walked into the car, picked up a foul-smelling, 6-inch-high packagewrapped in newspaper and carried it onto the platform. Drops began leakingfrom it onto the platform tiles, and Takahashi started to mop them up with hishandkerchief. Then, he collapsed and lost consciousness. The man whoseson and brother were also subway workers never came out of the coma, andhe died later that day in a nearby hospital.

The poisonous nerve gas that killed Takahashi and nine other Japanese andinjured more than 5,500 was Sarin, invented by the Nazis and applied withdeadly efficiency, suggested Japanese authorities, by members of AumShinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect. In the following days, gas-maskedpolice, accompanied by a few Japanese military personnel and several cagedcanaries used to detect deadly fumes, raided two dozen sites throughout Japanwhere sect members lived. They made several arrests and seized bags andbarrels of chemicals - tons of toxic material in all – which authorities saidcould be used to make Sarin.

For the rest of the world, the deadly Tokyo attack was yet another shockingreminder of how vulnerable most societies are to terrorism. The weapon wasn’tan exotic nuclear device but a relatively unsophisticated mixture of chemicalagents, most of them readily available. And the alleged perpetrator was not adistant hostile government closely watched by intelligence agencies but ashadowy, global and unpredictable religious band.

SOURCE: Mike Tharp, U.S. News & World Report, April 3, 1995

VI-3


CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to ForeignConsequence Management Operations,defines responsibilities for planning andconducting military CM operations inresponse to incidents on foreign soil involvingWMD.

3. Peacetime Preparations andTransition to Operations

a. General. Planning for MOOTW issimilar to that of war. The mission analysisand command estimate processes require thedevelopment of a clear, well-definedunderstanding of potential threats, includingNBC weapons and other toxic materials, andtheir associated vulnerabilities. JFCs shouldplan for suitable forces to meet the NBCthreats and to mitigate NBC effects inconjunction with civil authorities, HN andfriendly forces, and their capabilities.MOOTW planning and operations mayinclude strikes or raids to eliminate adeveloping NBC threat, as well as activitiesto prepare friendly forces and civilianelements for NBC attacks.

b. Force Composition

• Deploying and undertaking the assignedMOOTW with the appropriate mix offorces and military capabilities is centralto mission success. In addition to thoseforces and capabilities necessary toachieve primary MOOTW objectives,the JFC must identify those specializedNBC defense units and resourcesrequired from both government andnongovernment sources to deal withNBC threats.

• Plans should provide for maintaining unitintegrity in selecting forces for MOOTW,since units are best able to accomplish amission when deployed intact. However,deploying with ad hoc force elementsoften becomes necessary. In theseinstances, personnel and units may be

drawn from various commands oragencies, may have varying levels ofNBC training and equipment availability,and may require special logistic support.Thus, the JFC must ascertain the NBCdefense readiness of units andindividuals and take action to correctshortfalls, preferably prior todeployment.

• Joint Technical Augmentation Cell(JTAC). A specialized organization, theJTAC is composed of technical expertsfrom throughout the DOD and isavailable to advise and assist thegeographic combatant commandertasked with mitigating and managing theconsequences of an NBC attack or othertoxic material contamination on foreignsoil. Upon activation, the JTAC operatesunder the operational control (OPCON)of US Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM) for deployment, employment,and force protection. USJFCOM willtransfer OPCON, as needed, to theappropriate geographic combatantcommander to support operations in thatcommander’s AOR. JTAC has technicalexpertise in the areas of agent analysisand mitigation, contamination,reconnaissance, decontamination, andspecialized medical care.

c. Information Gathering andIntelligence Production. NBC threatconsiderations require the use of data gatheredfrom a wide variety of sources, includingremote sensing devices, standoff NBCdetectors, weather and terrain mappingsatellites and aircraft, imagery reconnaissanceand surveillance assets, human intelligence(HUMINT), and signals intelligence. To keepabreast of the NBC threat, all-source datagathering and intelligence production arerequired for the JFC. In addition to theinformation gathering requirements noted inJP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War, specific priority

VI-4

Chapter VI

JP 3-11

intelligence requirements should be developedfor the contemporary NBC threat posed, andshould receive appropriate priority in thecollection effort. The use of HUMINT andclose coordination with civilian organizations,including NGOs, may be important in thiseffort. For instance, the first indication ofbiological attack may emerge from civilianmedical authorities attempting to deal with asudden outbreak of a disease or illness.

d. Multinational Operations. US forcesoften conduct MOOTW overseas as part of aUnited Nations or multinational (e.g., NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization) force. Theseoperations require the multinational forcecommander and the supporting US JFC toconsider not only military factors, such astraining, interoperability, and logistic support,but also political, linguistic, and culturalfactors. Multinational force commandersshould be expected to assign missions basedon each multinational partner’scapabilities, including NBC defensetraining, equipment, and readiness. Insome cases, US NBC defense capabilities maybe required to augment those of otherparticipating nations. In other cases, HNcapabilities (including medical personnel andfacilities) may be required to meet US jointforce needs. US MOOTW liaison andadvisory teams must assist in developingcommon procedures for operations in NBCenvironments and plan for coordinated actionsin the event of NBC attack or contaminationby other toxic materials.

e. Command and Control

• The JFC should ensure that ROE for theparticular MOOTW being undertakenare appropriate for operations in NBCenvironments. Special ROE withregard to NBC threats should bepromulgated and thoroughlyunderstood by all participants. SuchROE may pertain to limitation of

collateral damage in targeting suspectedNBC weapons sites. Other considerationsinclude refugee control and medicaltreatment for civilians.

• Communications interoperability inan NBC environment is essential.Communications may be severelyhampered by wearing protective clothingand equipment. The JFC should devisealternate methods of communication inadvance of primary systems becomingaffected by NBC conditions.Interoperability with HN civilian andmultinational force communications isalso essential for mission accomplishment.In some cases, joint force communicationscapabilities may need to augment thoseof civil authorities or multinational forceelements in the conduct of NBC defensemissions.

f. Public Affairs. In their public affairsplanning, JFCs should include provisions fortimely NBC threat warning and actions tokeep the civilian populace informedconcerning NBC threats and actions beingtaken to mitigate NBC effects. Public affairsplans should be constructed to take the leadin providing accurate information, verifyingreports and facts, countering erroneousinformation disseminated from a range ofsources, and minimizing panic.

g. Psychological Operations. PSYOPactivities constitute a planned, careful processof conveying messages to and influencingselected target groups, often using radio andtelevision mass communications within thetheater. PSYOP plans in support of MOOTWshould account for possible use of NBCweapons, and should be coordinated with thepublic affairs plan. PSYOP messages mustbe compatible with and reinforce public affairsmessages to ensure that no conflictinginformation is being disseminated to thepublic.

VI-5


h. Coordination with IOs and NGOs. Inconducting MOOTW, JFCs should beprepared to coordinate both civilian andmilitary actions. For some operations, acivil-military operations center (CMOC)may be established and staffed as thesituation warrants with JTF personnel andliaison personnel from HN civil authorities,IOs, NGOs, and other organizations. TheCMOC provides a specifically designedinstrument for establishing coordination andcooperation with nonmilitary groups. If civilaffairs units or personnel are available, theycan perform many of the required liaisonduties. The JFC may need to interact withcivil authorities, IOs, NGOs and otherorganizations on NBC-related issues, toinclude civil defense warning and alarmprocedures, response capabilities, refugee andcrowd control, medical assistance, and otheractions to mitigate the effects of NBC use orother toxic material contamination. Civil andmilitary HN authorities, IOs, NGOs, andothers may be important sources of NBC-related information.

i. Interagency Operations Abroad. TheDepartment of State and the US ambassadorto the particular country coordinate USactivities abroad through the country team,

with US agency representation (including theDepartment of Defense) as required in thespecific situation. The military chain ofcommand from the NCA to the JFCremains in effect, even though a non-DODagency may have overall lead responsibilityfor NBC-related and other MOOTWactivities.

j. Logistics

• Unit Mix. In MOOTW, combat supportand combat service support elements mayprovide the bulk of forces that comprisethe US MOOTW command. The JFCmust ensure that support units are capableof meeting force protection requirements,including NBC defense, and havesufficient combat or security forcesassigned or in support to meet theseneeds. Support units should be properlyequipped and trained to meet individualand unit NBC defense standards.

• Special Logistic Needs. The JFCshould ensure that all equipmentneeded for NBC defense is on handand can be distributed for rapid usein MOOTW. Planning for these logisticrequirements (including rapid

The JFC may need to interact with civil authorities, IOs, NGOs, and otherorganizations on NBC-related issues to mitigate the effects of NBC use.

VI-6

Chapter VI

JP 3-11

augmentation or surge) should be partof the initial NBC threat assessment, bewritten into MOOTW plans, and adjustedas necessary. For example, NEO are acategory of MOOTW whose NBCdefense requirements should beanticipated by the JFC.

• Civilian and HN Logistic Capabilities.JFCs must be familiar with civilian andHN capabilities for NBC defense in thetheater. This should include civil defenseand emergency preparedness capabilities,transportation systems, civilian andmilitary medical systems, commercialand military decontaminationcapabilities, and communications. In theaftermath of an NBC attack or toxiccontamination event, the joint forcemay be compelled to rely on access tocivilian or military capabilities in thetheater to meet joint force needs.Conversely, the restoration of criticallogistic support structures in the theatermay depend on available US,multinational, or other non-indigenouscapabilities. Close liaison with civilianand military HN authorities, othermultinational partners, IOs, and NGOswill be required.

• Critical Infrastructure Concerns. TheJFC must ensure that critical logisticthroughput and transportation facilitiesreceive adequate protection fromconventional or NBC attack, and thatplans, training and equipment are in placefor rapid restoration of operations afterattack. This should be addressed earlyin the joint force planning andpreparation effort and will involvecoordination with HN and coalitionpartners. Areas that should be addressedinclude facility usage planning, warningand alarm systems, coordinated activeand perimeter defense measures, sheltersystems, decontamination capabilitiesand procedures, and the training andequipping of essential civilian work forcemembers. In some cases, the sharing ofUS military equipment stocks may beauthorized to meet HN or multinationalpartner NBC defense needs.

k. Health Service Support

• HSS planning activities generallyinclude hospitalization, PVNTMED,veterinary services, medical logistics,blood supply and distribution, medicalregulating, and patient movement and

The ability of domestic and HN medical facilities to deal with NBC effectsshould be assessed and factored into US joint and multinational HSS planning.

VI-7


evacuation. The permanent party healthcare system (for mature theaters) anddeployable HSS units are usuallyassigned to a joint force for the care andtreatment of US military personnel, theirdependents, and other specificallydesignated personnel. However,requirements to treat the HN populaceor multinational partner militarymembers should be anticipated. In thecase of operations in the United States, theremay be a requirement to augment civilianmedical capabilities in the handling ofcasualties resulting from NBC attacks orother toxic material contamination.

• HSS planning for overseas or CONUSoperations should include provisionfor surge medical requirements usingon-hand and rapidly deployablecapabilities. Special consideration isrequired for HSS for NEO evacuees whomay have been exposed to NBC or othertoxic agents. The ability of domestic andHN medical facilities to handle masscasualties from NBC effects should beassessed and factored into US joint andmultinational HSS planning. Closecoordination with HSS and other publichealth providers in the theater is a vitalmeans of detecting chemical andbiological attacks, since casualties fromsuch an attack may appear initially in thecivilian medical system.

l. Active and Reserve Mix. MOOTWoften employ a larger proportion of reserveand National Guard units and personnel thanother military operations. All units, active orreserve, must meet readiness standards forNBC defense if they are to sustain operationsin NBC environments.

4. MOOTW Within the UnitedStates

a. General. While most MOOTW areconducted overseas, domestic operations may

be conducted in support of civil authoritiesconsistent with established law. In mostsituations, the Department of Defense willnot be the lead federal agency (LFA), but willsupport other agencies. DOD assistance isrequested through the Secretary of Defense(SecDef), who has appointed an executiveagent for screening requests, providinginteragency coordination, and executing supportto civil authorities (See Department of DefenseDirectives 3025.1, Military Support to CivilAuthorities, and 3025.15, Military Assistanceto Civil Authorities). JTF-CS is the standingtask force that provides military support tomitigate the effects and manage theconsequences of an WMD attack or other toxicmaterial contamination within the United States,its territories, and possessions.

b. JTF-CS Operational Concept. Whendirected by the Secretary of Defense, JTF-CS— a standing, permanent headquarterselement subordinate to USJFCOM — willdeploy to provide tailored and flexible supportto LFA efforts to prevent loss of life, mitigatehuman suffering, restore essential services,and prevent or contain further damage. JTF-CS focuses first on incident assessment andrapid deployment of DOD capabilities toensure sufficient and synchronized supportto LFA activities. Once forces have arrivedat the incident site, the focus will shift tofulfilling approved requests for assistancefrom the LFA.

c. JTF-CS Guiding Principles

• JTF-CS is a command and controlheadquarters operating in support of theLFA and participating in mitigating andmanaging the consequences of a WMDincident. It is a follow-on force behindthose elements that arrive first at theincident site, primarily state and localassets. JTF-CS will respond when thePresident issues a Federal emergencydeclaration and the NCA approves theuse of JTF-CS.

VI-8

Chapter VI

JP 3-11

• JTF-CS will be organized, equipped, andtrained for flexible response, capable ofrapidly tailoring the scale and characterof its response to the requirements of theLFA. JTF-CS will not duplicate thetechnical response capabilities thatcurrently exist throughout theDepartment of Defense and the federalgovernment. It will complement thosecapabilities, employing DOD assets intheir most appropriate and useful roles.As a subordinate organization ofUSJFCOM, JTF-CS has available allresources of USJFCOM and its Servicecomponents, as well as specialized DODagencies. When deployed, JTF-CS willoperate under the OPCON of thesupported combatant commander.

d. Support to the Lead Federal Agency.JTF-CS support encompasses both crisismanagement before an NBC attack or othertoxic material contamination occurs, and CMactivities following such an event.Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 39, USGovernment Policy on Counterterrorism,defines a number of Federal roles in domesticcrisis management and CM. The LFA forcrisis management is the Department ofJustice-Federal Bureau of Investigation. TheLFA for CM is the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA).

• Crisis Management

•• During crisis management operations,the JTF-CS will support the LFA inthe conduct of CM planning throughFEMA to prepare for any projected CMmission. JTF-CS planning includes twotypes of events: ”national special securityevents” and ”no notice events.”

•• No Notice Events. Should apreviously unforeseen significant threatbe identified JTF-CS will, when directedby the Secretary of Defense, deploy insupport of the LFA to plan for CM.Tasks to be accomplished focus ondetailed planning, predictiveanalysis, and adjusting alertpostures for appropriate US forcesshould this be needed. JTF-CS willexercise OPCON of DOD forcesdeployed in support of CM planningin these types of events, less theelements of joint special operationstask force (JSOTF) and US ArmyCorps of Engineers (USACE).

•• For both types of crisis managementevents, the occurrence of an incident willresult in a mission change for USJFCOMthat initiates execution of JTF-CS supportto FEMA as the LFA for CM.

JTF-CS focuses first on incident assessmentand rapid deployment of DOD capabilities toensure sufficient support to LFA activities.

VI-9


• Consequence Management

•• In a CM operation, therelationship of JTF-CS will parallelthe lines of coordination andcooperation that exist for anydisaster response mission in whichthe Department of Defense supportsFEMA. JTF-CS will exercise OPCONover all DOD forces (less elements ofJSOTF and USACE).

•• JTF-CS develops procedures andplans for CM activities that provideMSCA in coordination with combatantcommands with responsibilities foroperations in US territories andpossessions. Upon approval ofimplementation plans in theserespective combatant command areas,the proper relationships will beestablished between JTF-CS and theaffected combatant commander’sforces, including any available CMJTFs.

•• National Special Security Events.Preplanned national events may beperceived by adversaries asopportunities for the employment ofNBC weapons or other toxicmaterials. When such threats appearsignificant, the Attorney General and theSecretary of the Treasury may designatethe event a national special securityevent. The LFA may request supportfrom the Department of Defense. UponSecDef approval, the JTF-CS will deployin support of the LFA to plan for CM.As the threat develops, plans and unitalert postures will be adjusted asnecessary. Since this type of operationis typically planned for in advance, thecommand and control relationshipswithin the Department of Defense willbe established prior to the event. JTF-CS will be prepared to exercise OPCONof all or any portion of DOD forcesdeployed in support of the event, withthe exception of elements of the JSOTFand the USACE.

VI-10

Chapter VI

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ATHREAT CONSIDERATIONS

A-1

1. General

a. This appendix outlines considerationsfor assessing the threat posed by adversaryuse of NBC weapons and other toxic materialsto joint, multinational, and interagencyoperations in which the Armed Forces of theUnited States may participate. Because theireffects on the electromagnetic spectrum aresimilar to those of nuclear detonations, non-nuclear weapons that generate EMP areincluded. This appendix also contains general,notional threat profiles based on genericcharacteristics of the types of adversaries thatmay challenge US interests. These profilesprovide the basis for preliminary planning andmust be supplemented or replaced, wheneverpossible, by current validated intelligenceproducts.

b. In planning, the considerationscontained in this appendix supportdevelopment of a combatant and subordinatecommander’s priority intelligence

requirements and campaign plans in general.In developing capabilities to meet combatantand subordinate commander’s missions inareas in which adversaries may possess NBCweapons, the considerations in this appendixalso support training, professional militaryeducation, and leader development activitiesof individual Services and, collectively, of theArmed Forces of the United States.

2. Assessment Framework

a. The framework for assessing the threatposed by an adversary possessing, orsuspected of possessing, NBC weaponscontains six elements: who, why, when,where, what, and how. These elements aresummarized in Figure A-1.

b. This framework supports the NBC threatassessment process and forms the basis for atabular description of the threat profiles thatfollow. The framework provides an analytictool for assessing the vulnerability of targets

Figure A-1. NBC Threat Assessment Framework

NBC THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Who Type of adversary possessing NBC weapons

Why Broad objectives for use of NBC weapons

When Timing for use in crises and conflicts

Where Types and locations of targets

What Type of NBC use

How Concept for NBC employment

NBC = nuclear, biological, and chemical

A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-11

in general and in areas of interest to specificcommands.

3. Broad Objectives forAdversary Employment ofNBC Weapons

a. Figure A-2 summarizes the broadobjectives that the three types of adversariesmay entertain for employment of NBCweapons against US forces operatingunilaterally or in multinational coalitions. Italso identifies the types of NBC weapons thatmay be most appropriate for those broadobjectives. While an adversary may use anyweapons available in a conflict involving theUnited States, Figures A-2 through A-5 focuson the weapons that an adversary couldconsider most effective for achieving thestated objective.

b. Adversaries may also develop andemploy radiological weapons whose effectsare achieved by dispersing toxic radioactivematerials against desired targets. Moreover,other toxic industrial materials may be used

deliberately or spread accidentally in ways thatthreaten US forces and interests. Adversaryemployment of radiological and other toxicmaterials may be most appropriate in seekingto disrupt US and coalition forces, deterringUS intervention, or achieving regionalleverage or intimidation. The variety of thesetoxic materials makes their detailed treatmentin this appendix impractical.

c. Global and regional adversaries mayhave the means and motivation to develop andemploy nuclear and non-nuclear weapons forthe purpose of generating an EMP. In somecases, EMP weapons could be detonated athigh altitudes. Figures A-3 and A-4 take thesepotential adversary actions into account.

4. Emerging GlobalAdversaries

An emerging global adversary could havean NBC employment profile that seeks broadobjectives as indicated in Figure A-3, andseeks to exploit US and coalitionvulnerabilities.

Figure A-2. Broad Objectives of Potential Adversaries for Acquisitionand Employment of NBC Weapons

BROAD OBJECTIVES OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES FORACQUISITION AND EMPLOYMENT OF NBC WEAPONS

WHY US Defeat,Revenge,Survival

PreventDefeat bythe United

States

Disrupt USMultinational

Force

Deter USIntervention

RegionalLeverage,

Intimidation

WHO

EmergingGlobalAdversary

!Nuclear!Biological

!Nuclear!Biological!Chemical

!Biological!Chemical



RegionalAdversary






Non-stateAdversary





A-3

Threat Considerations

5. Regional Adversaries

A regional adversary could have an NBCemployment profile that seeks broadobjectives as indicated in Figure A-4, andseeks to exploit US and coalitionvulnerabilities.

Figure A-3. Emerging Global Adversary NBC Employment Profile

6. Non-state Adversaries

A non-state adversary could have an NBCemployment profile that seeks broadobjectives as indicated in Figure A-5, andseeks to exploit US and coalitionvulnerabilities.

EMERGING GLOBAL ADVERSARY NBC EMPLOYMENT PROFILE

Why: When: Where: What: How:

BroadObjective Timing Targets

Type NBCUse

EmploymentMeans

US Defeat,Revenge,Survival

!

!

Mid-war;fearing defeatLate; defeatimminent

! US andregionalCivilianinfrastructureandpopulation

!!

NuclearBiological

!

!

BallisticmissilesSOF

PreventDefeat byUnitedStates

! Mid-war !

!

!

US andregionalcombat unitsC2Logistics

!

!

!

!

Nuclear EMPNonnuclearEMPBiologicalChemical

!

!

Ballistic andcruisemissilesSOF

Disrupt USMultinationalForce

! Early !

!

!

Regionalcombat unitsC2Logistics

!

!!

Nuclear EMPBiologicalChemical

!

!

!

AircraftBallistic andcruisemissilesSOF


! Early !

!

RegionalcivilianinfrastructureLogistics

!

!

!

NonnuclearEMPNonlethalbiologicalNonpersistentchemical

!

!

!


RegionalLeverage,Intimidation

! Early !

!

RegionalcivilianinfrastructurePopulation

!

!

NonlethalbiologicalNonpersistentchemical

!

!

!


C2 = command and control NBC = nuclear, biological, and chemicalEMP = electromagnetic pulse SOF = special operations forces

A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-11

Figure A-4. Regional Adversary NBC Employment Profile

REGIONAL ADVERSARY NBC EMPLOYMENT PROFILE



Type NBCUse

EmploymentConcept

Defeat US,Revenge,Survival

!

!

Late; fearingdefeatPost-conflict;for revenge

! US andregionalMilitary andcivilianinfrastructure

!

!!

NuclearBiologicalChemical

!

!!

!

ArtilleryAircraftBallistic andcruisemissilesSOF

PreventDefeat byUS

! Mid-war !

!!


!

!!


!

!!

!

ArtilleryAircraftBallistic andcruisemissilesSOF


! Early !

!!


!

!!

!

NonnuclearEMPBiologicalChemical

!

!

!



! Early !

!

!!

Civilian andmilitaryinfrastructureCombat unitsC2Logistics

!

!!

!

NonnuclearEMPBiologicalChemical

!

!

!



! Early !

!

CivilianinfrastructureLivestock

!

!

!

NonnuclearEMPNonlethalbiologicalNonpersistentchemical

!

!

!

AircraftCruisemissilesSOF

C2 = command and control NBC = nuclear, biological, and chemicalEMP = electromagnetic pulse SOF = special operations forces

A-5

Threat Considerations

Figure A-5. Non-state Adversary NBC Employment Profile

NON-STATE ADVERSARY NBC EMPLOYMENT PROFILE



Type NBCUse

EmploymentConcept

Defeat US,Revenge,Survival

!

!LatePost-conflict

!

!

CivilianinfrastructurePopulation

!

!!


!

!

!



!

!EarlyMid-war

!

!!

Civilian andmilitaryinfrastructureC2Logistics

!

!BiologicalChemical

!

!

!



! Early !

!

Civilian andmilitaryinfrastructurePopulation

!

!BiologicalChemical

!

!

!



! Early !

!

CivilianinfrastructurePopulation

!

!

NonlethalbiologicalNonpersistentchemical

!

!

!


C2 = command and control SOF = special operations forcesNBC = nuclear, biological, and chemical

A-6

Appendix A

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BNUCLEAR HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS

B-1

1. General

The international security environmentencompasses threats from potentialadversaries armed with nuclear weapons andother radiation sources. Additional hazardsmay result from radiological materialsreleased from industrial activities or expendedmunitions. This appendix summarizescommon effects produced by nuclearweapons, high-energy radiation, andradiological materials to assist combatant andsubordinate commanders to plan for andconduct operations in NBC environments.

2. Nuclear Weapons Effects

a. Nuclear Detonations and TheirProducts

• The nature and intensity of the effects ofa nuclear detonation are functions of thetype of weapon, its yield, the physicalmedium in which the detonation occurs,and the characteristics of the target. Atthe point of detonation, a typical nuclearweapon will release most of its energyas thermally generated x-rays. FigureB-1 depicts the relative proportions of theprimary products of a nuclear explosion.

• A nuclear weapon may be detonated inspace, in the atmosphere above the earth’ssurface, on the surface, and below thesurface. Data in this appendix focus onair bursts. When the detonation occursin the atmosphere, the primary radiationproducts (e.g., x-rays, gamma rays, andneutrons) interact with the surrounding

PRIMARY PRODUCTS OF ANUCLEAR EXPLOSION

18% Kinetic and Internal Energyand Radioactive Debris

18% Kinetic and Internal Energyand Radioactive Debris

0.5% Gamma Rays0.5% Gamma Rays

1.5% Neutrons1.5% Neutrons

80%Thermally Generated X-rays80%Thermally Generated X-rays

Figure B-1. Primary Products of a Nuclear Explosion

B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-11

air molecules and are absorbed andscattered as they radiate from the pointof detonation. The secondary radiationproducts — which produce thepreponderance of the damage andcasualties beyond the immediate point ofdetonation — are as depicted in FigureB-2.

For additional technical data see JP3-12.2, Nuclear Weapons EmploymentEffects Data (SECRET); JP 3-12.3,Nuclear Weapons Employment EffectsData (Notional) (UNCLASSIFIED); andFM 3-7, NBC Handbook.

b. Blast and Shock. A nuclear explosionproduces shock waves, high overpressures,and severe winds. These blast and shockeffects produce casualties and damage throughcrushing, bending, and breaking as the directeffects of shock waves and winds areamplified by falling and flying debris.

Personnel suffering critical injuries from blastand shock effects would likely suffer lethalradiation exposure as well.

c. Thermal Radiation. Heat and lightreleased by a nuclear detonation can causeburns over substantial distances. Dependingon proximity and shielding, clothing and otherflammable items may ignite. Secondary firesfrom blast and heat are an additional hazard.Thermal effects can also disrupt operationplans as fire and melting snow and ice mayimpede movement.

d. Ionizing Radiation. Initial radiation inthe form of x-rays, gamma rays, and neutronsproduced by a nuclear detonation ionizesmaterial and is therefore a significant threatto personnel and materiel, including optical,mechanical, and electronic components.Gamma rays and neutrons have a long rangein the air, are highly penetrating, and are likelyto be a main cause of casualties.

THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARYPRODUCTS OF A NUCLEAR AIR BURST

Secondary Products

Thermal RadiationX-rays

Shock Wave

Neutrons Neutrons

Gamma Rays Gamma Rays

Radioactive Debris

Electromagnetic Pulse

Fallout

Primary Products

AIRAIR

AIRAIR

Figure B-2. The Primary and Secondary Products of a Nuclear Air Burst

B-3

Nuclear Hazard Considerations

e. Electromagnetic Pulse. The interactionof gamma radiation with the atmosphere cancause a short pulse of electric and magneticfields that may damage and interfere with theoperation of electrical and electronicequipment and can cause widespreaddisruption. The effects of EMP can extend tohundreds of kilometers depending on theheight and strength of the nuclear burst. High-altitude EMP (HEMP) can generatesignificant disruptive field strengths over acontinental-size area. The portion of thefrequency spectrum most affected by EMPand HEMP is the communications band.

f. Fallout. In addition to the initial thermaland ionizing radiation and EMP, a nucleardetonation produces residual radiationresulting from the dispersal of radioactivematerials in the target area and downwind.Fallout may be a lingering and widespreadhazard that severely limits military operationsin the contaminated area. Figure B-3 providesa synopsis of militarily significant nucleareffects.

3. Protective Actions

a. Protective actions taken before an attackare most effective for individual survivabilityand unit effectiveness and may includeclothing (one or two layers of loose, light-

colored clothing can reduce burns), terrainselection (use of reverse slopes), dispersion,and sheltering (use of depressions, culverts,caves, bunkers, and obstructions). Educationand training of leaders, staffs, and individualson nuclear weapons effects and the principlesof operations in NBC environments cansignificantly enhance operationaleffectiveness in the event of nuclear attack.

b. Commanders operating in NBCenvironments must minimize and control theexposure of their personnel to radiation.Figures B-4 and B-5 provide information onradiation exposure status categories andmilitary radiation exposure states and riskcriteria. Control of exposure to radiation mustbe considered together with other risks, inlight of the JFC priorities, in theaccomplishment of the unit’s mission.

See FM 3-3-1/Fleet Marine Force Manual(FMFM) 11-18, Nuclear ContaminationAvoidance.

4. Additional RadiationHazards

a. In the operational environment, manyhighly technical items of equipment havehigh-energy or radiological sources that mayaccidentally or deliberately become radiation

Figure B-3. Nuclear Weapons Effects

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

Source Target Effect

Blast Crushes, deforms, tumbles, shocks,creates missiles and obstacles

Thermal Radiation Fires, burns, eye damageNuclear Radiation Causes immediate or delayed

radiation sickness, increased diseaseand non-battle injury, material andterrain contamination

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) andHigh Altitude EMP

Causes permanent or temporaryimpairment of electrical, electro-optical, and electronic equipment

B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-11

hazards. For example, communications andsurveillance sites may have known hazardareas around their equipment that result fromhigh-energy transmissions. Thesetransmissions can injure personnel, damageequipment, and cause avionics malfunctions.Additionally, medical radiation sourcesrequire precautions to avoid accidental ordeliberate exposure. The potential for terroristuse of radiological materials threatens

Figure B-4. Radiation Exposure Status Categories

Figure B-5. Radiation Exposure States and Risk Criteria

RADIATION EXPOSURE STATUS CATEGORIES

RES-0 The unit has not had radiation exposureRES-1 The unit has been exposed to greater than 0 cGy but less

than or equal to 75 cGy1

RES-2 The unit has been exposed to greater than 75 cGy but lessthan or equal to 125 cGy

RES-3 The unit has been exposed to greater than 125 cGyNotes:1Nuclear radiation exposure status (RES) guidelines specify units in centigray(cGy); however, the US Navy is required by the Code of Federal Regulationsto conduct radiation monitoring in classic radiation units such as R, rad, orrem. 1 CGy = 1 rad.

RADIATION EXPOSURE STATES AND RISK CRITERIA

RadiationExposure State

Total Past CumulativeDose In Centigray

(cGy)

Exposure Criteria for aSingle Operation Which

Will Not Result inExceeding the DoseCriteria for the Stated

RES-0 Units No Exposure Negligible Risk < 75 cGyModerate Risk < 100 cGy

Emergency Risk < 125 cGyRES-1 Units Greater than 0, less than

or Equal to 75 cGyNegligible Risk < 35 cGyModerate Risk < 60 cGy

Emergency Risk < 85 cGyRES-2 Units Greater than 75, less

than or Equal to 125 cGyAny further exposureexceeds negligible or

moderate risk.RES-3 Units Greater than 125 cGY All further exposure will

exceed the emergency risk

personnel safety as well as terrain or facilitydenial.

b. The Services are responsible forenforcing precautions and establishing TTPfor handling their conventional munitions thatemploy radioactive materials such as depleteduranium, including enforcing standards thatprotect their personnel against alpha particleinhalation and ingestion. In addition,

B-5

Nuclear Hazard Considerations

dangerous levels of radiation can result fromdamaged industrial radiation hazard areas.Due to the downwind hazards such damagecan produce, avoidance is the most effectiveindividual and unit protective measure againstindustrial radiation hazards (see Figure B-6).

c. Further, adversaries could use low-levelradiation sources in a number of ways todisperse radioactive material. Such dispersal

could range from arming the warhead of amissile with active material from a nuclearreactor, releasing low-level radioactivematerial intended for use in industry ormedicine, or disseminating material from aresearch or power-generating nuclear reactor.Dispersal of radioactive materials representsan inexpensive capability that requires limitedresources and technical knowledge.

B-6

Appendix B

JP 3-11

Figure B-6. Low Level Radiation Guidance for Military Operations

LOW LEVEL RADIATION GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Total Cumulative Dose(see Notes 1, 2, and 3)

Radiation ExposureStatus (RES) Category

Recommended Actions

0 to 0.05 cGy 0 None

0.06 to 0.5 cGy 1A Record individual dose readings.Initiate periodic monitoring.

0.5 to 5 cGy 1B Record individual dose readings.Continue monitoring.Initiate rad survey.Prioritize tasks.Establish dose control measuresas part of operations.

5 to 10 cGy 1C Record individual dose readings.Continue monitoring.Update survey.Continue dose control measures.Execute priority tasks only (seenote 4).

10 to 25 cGy 1D Record individual dose readings.Continue monitoring.Update survey.Continue dose control measures.Execute critical tasks only (seenote 5).

25 to 75 cGy 1E Record individual dose readings.Continue monitoring.Update survey.Continue dose control measures.Execute critical tasks only (seenote 5).

Notes:

1. The use of the measurement millisieverts (mSv) is preferred in all cases. However, militaryorganizations normally only have the capability to measure centigray (cGy). If the ability toobtain measurements in mSv is not possible, US forces will use cGy. For whole body gammairradiation, 1 cGy = 10 mSv

2. The US Navy is required by the Code of Federal Regulations to conduct radiation monitoringin classic radiation units such as R, Rad, or REM. 1Cgy = 1 rad.

3. All doses should be kept as low as reasonably achievable. This will reduce individual risk aswell as retain maximum operational flexibility for future employment of exposed persons.

4. US Service doctrine extablishes 75 cGy as the maximum for RES Category 1.

5. Examples of priority tasks are those that avert danger to persons, prevent damage fromspreading, and support the organization s Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).

6. Examples of critical tasks are those that save lives and support the organization s JMETL.

APPENDIX CBIOLOGICAL HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS

C-1

1. General

Militarily significant characteristics forbiological aspects of operations in NBCenvironments include: a normally vulnerabletarget population, infectious or toxic agentswith highly lethal or incapacitating properties,agent availability or adaptability for scaled-up production, agent stability, and agentsuitability for aerosol dispersion. Limitingfactors include biological properties(particularly rapid decay), environmentalfactors, and dissemination methods.

2. Technical Aspects

Biological agents can be classified aspathogens or toxins. Human pathogens aredefined as organisms that cause disease inman. Pathogens include bacteria, rickettsia,fungi, and viruses. Naturally occurring toxinsare non-living byproducts of cellularprocesses that can be lethal or highlyincapacitating. Figure C-1 provides asynopsis of several potential biological agentsand their ranges of effects.

See Appendix F, "References," for additionaltechnical sources of information.

3. Operational Considerations

a. Dissemination. Biological agents maybe dispersed or deposited as aerosols, liquiddroplets, or dry powders. Live microorganismsusually grow in a moist environment;therefore, these agents may be disseminatedin a liquid medium as wet aerosols. However,microbiological materials may also be storedand released in more stable powder mediums.In general, agents dispersed as dry powderwill survive longer than those dispersed as wetaerosols.

b. Persistency. Persistency of biologicalagents varies greatly and depends on specificagent characteristics and environmentalconditions. These conditions include: solar(ultraviolet) radiation, relative humidity, windspeed, and temperature gradient. Ultravioletlight accelerates decay of most biologicalagents. However, encapsulation or geneticengineering may protect agents from naturaldecay and increase their persistency. FigureC-2 provides an overview of weather effectson biological agent clouds.

C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-11

Figure C-1. Potential Biological Agents and Effects

POTENTIAL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND EFFECTS

Disease OrAgent

Routes ofInfection1

UntreatedMortality (%)

IncubationPeriod

Vaccine Treatment

Anthrax (Bacillusanthracis)

S, D, R S: 5-20%R: 80-90%

1-4 days Yes Antibiotics(limitedeffectivenessafter severesymptomsdevelop)

BotulinumNeurotoxins

D, R 60% 1-4 days IND; Availableonly underFDA-approvedprotocol

Antitoxin early

Plague (YersiniaPestis)

V, R Bubonic: 50%Pneumonic100%

2-3 days No Antibiotics

Q Fever (Coxiellaburnetii)

V, R < 1% 2-10 days IND Antibiotics

Ricin Toxin D, R High 30% 1-3 days No Symptomatic

StaphylococcalEnterotoxin B

D, R < 1% 4-6 days No Symptomatic

Smallpox R High 30% 10-12 days Available onlyfrom controlledUS stock

Supportive

Tularemia D, R, V 30-60% 2-10 days IND Antibiotics

VenezuelanEquineEncephalitis

R, V Low < 1% 2-6 days IND Supportive

Viral HemorrhagicFevers (Ebola,Marburg, Lassa,Rift Valley,Dengue, etc.)

DC, R, V Up to 90%(depends onvirus)

3-21 days No Symptomatic(Some mayrespond toRibavirin)

D = digestive systemIND = investigational new drugV = vector

DC = direct contactR = respiratory

FDA = Food & Drug AdministrationS = skin

Note:1Respiratory would be the primary route of entry in a biological attack; and the most probablemode of dissemination would be release of a biological agent through aerosol delivery.

C-3

Biological Hazard Considerations

Figure C-2. Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination

WEATHER EFFECTS ON BIOLOGICAL AGENT DISSEMINATION

Weather Conditions Cloud PerformanceOperational

Considerations

Favorable

Stable or InversionConditions

Agent clouds traveldownwind for longdistances before theyspread laterally. Highhumidity and light rainsgenerally favor wet agentdissemination.

Agent clouds tend todissipate uniformly andremain cohesive as theytravel downwind. Cloudslie low to the ground andmay not rise high enoughto cover the tops of tallbuildings and/or other tallobjects.

Marginal

Neutral Conditions Agent clouds tend todissipate quickly.

More agent required forsame results as understable conditions. Desiredresults may not beachieved.

Unfavorable

Unstable or LapseConditions

Agent clouds rise rapidlyand do not traveldownwind any appreciabledistance. Coldtemperatures affect wetagent dissemination.

Agent clouds tend to breakup and become diffused.Little operational benefitfrom off-targetdissemination.

C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DCHEMICAL HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS

D-1

1. General

The employment of chemical agents caninfluence operational tempo and sustainmentof forces. To better understand their effects,this appendix presents a brief overview ofchemical weapons and TIM.

2. Chemical Agents

a. Chemical agents are classified accordingto physical state, physiological action, and use.According to their physiological effects, thereare nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents.The terms “persistent” and “nonpersistent”describe the time an agent stays in an area.Persistent chemical agents affect thecontaminated area for an extended period oftime. Conversely, nonpersistent agents affectthe contaminated area for relatively shortperiods of time.

b. The hazards from a chemical strike maylast for less than an hour or for several weeks.The effects on personnel may be immediate.For units forced into high levels of protection,missions will take longer to perform. Asummary of chemical weapons effects for

persistent and nonpersistent agents is shownin Figure D-1.

c. Figure D-2 indicates individualsymptoms and effects, rate of action, and howchemical agents are normally disseminated.

d. Adversaries will seek to employchemical agents under favorable weatherconditions, if possible, to increase theireffectiveness. Weather factors considered arewind, air stability, temperature, humidity, andprecipitation. Favorable, moderatelyfavorable, and unfavorable weather conditionsfor tactical employment of a chemical aerosolor vapor cloud are summarized in Figure D-3.The best weather for direct placement on anoccupied area is calm winds with a strong,stable temperature gradient. Low winds andstable or neutral conditions are most favorablefor spreading an agent cloud evenly over alarger target area.

e. Adversaries may choose to deliveragents upwind of targets; in which case, stableor neutral conditions with low to mediumwinds of 5-13 kilometers per hour (kph) arethe most favorable conditions. Marked

Figure D-1. Chemical Weapons Effects

CHEMICAL WEAPONS EFFECTS

Chemical Agent Target of Choice Target Effect

Nonpersistent Nerve Personnel Immediate and lethalPersistent Nerve Terrain, material,

logistics, and commandand control facilities

Reduced operationstempo or missiondegradation; lethal orcasualty-producing

Persistent Blister Same as persistent nerve Same as persistentnerve but not always

Nonpersistent Blood andNonpersistent Choking

Personnel Immediate, lethal, orcasualty-producing

D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-11

turbulence, winds above 13 kph, moderateto heavy rain, and an air stability category of“unstable” result in unfavorable conditions forchemical clouds.

f. Most weather conditions do not affectthe quantity of munitions needed for effective,initial liquid contamination.

See Appendix F, "References," for additionaltechnical sources of information.

Figure D-2. Threat Chemical Agents

THREAT CHEMICAL AGENTS

Types Symptoms Effects Rate of Action Release Form

Nerve Difficulty breathing.Sweating, drooling,nausea, vomiting,convulsions, anddimming of vision.Symptoms usuallydevelop quickly.

Incapacitates atlow concentration;kills if inhaled orabsorbed throughthe skin or eyes.

Very rapid byinhalation orthrough theeyes; slowerthrough skin.

Aerosol, vapor,or liquid

Blood andChoking

Difficultybreathing; coma.

Kills if highconcentrationsare inhaled.

Rapid. Aerosol orvapor

Blister Symptoms rangefrom immediate todelayed, dependingon agent. Searingof eyes andstinging of skin.Powerful irritationof eyes, nose, andskin.

Blisters skin andrespiratory tract;can causetemporaryblindness.Some sting andform welts on theskin.

Blisters frommustard mayappear severalhours afterexposure,whereas lewisitecauses blisterswithin minutes ofexposure.

Liquid ordroplets

Figure D-3. Weather Effects on Aerosol Chemical Agents

WEATHER EFFECTS ON AEROSOL CHEMICAL AGENTSFactors Favorable Moderately

FavorableUnfavorable

Wind (kilometersper hour)

Steady < 5 kph Steady 5-13 kph > 13 kph

Air Stability Stable Neutral UnstableTemperature > 21o C 4-21o C < 4o CHumidity > 60% 40-60% < 40%Precipitation None Light Any

3. Toxic Industrial Materials

a. US forces frequently operate inenvironments in which there are toxicmaterials, particularly toxic industrialchemicals (TIC). A number of thesechemicals could interfere in a significantmanner across the range of militaryoperations. Most TIC are released as vapors.These vapors exhibit the same disseminationcharacteristics as chemical agents noted

D-3

Chemical Hazard Considerations

above. The vapors tend to remainconcentrated downwind from the release pointand in natural low-lying areas such as valleys,ravines, or manmade underground structures.High concentrations may remain in buildings,woods, or any area with low air circulation.Explosions may create and spread liquidhazards, and vapors may condense to liquidsin cold air.

b. To assist in combatant and subordinatecommand planning, Figure D-4 identifiesminimum downwind hazard distances (dayor night) from chemical production or storagesites for selected TIC (See FM 3-14, NBCVulnerability Analysis). These are thedistances a lethal exposure level could reachif a massive release to the amounts noted inthe table occurred. Release of TIC is mostdangerous at night. The downwind hazardfrom a nighttime release is much longer thanthat for a daytime release.

c. The most important action in case ofmassive industrial chemical release isimmediate evacuation outside the hazard’spath. The greatest risk from a large-scale toxicchemical release occurs when personnel areunable to escape the immediate area and areovercome by vapors or blast effects. Militaryrespirators and protective clothing mayprovide only limited protection against TIC.

For detailed information on these TIChazards, see: National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health, PocketGuide to Chemical Hazards, and USDepartment of Transportation, NorthAmerican Emergency Response Guidebook.

d. In planning for operations in areas inwhich there may be toxic materials includingindustrial chemicals, the combatant andsubordinate commanders includeconsideration of these potential hazards as part

Figure D-4. Industrial Chemical Site Minimum Downwind Hazard Distances

INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL SITE MINIMUM DOWNWINDHAZARD DISTANCES

Chemical Quantity (tons) Day Night

Distance (kilometers)ChlorinePhosgeneAmmoniaHydrogen Cyanide inhot climateHydrogen SulfideMethyl Isocyanate

Up to 100Up to 50Up to 500Up to 50

Up to 50Up to 50

2 5

Hydrogen Cyanide incold climateHydrogen FluorideSulfur trioxideNitrogen TextroxideHydrogen ChlorideAmmoniaBromineSulfur DioxideAcrylonitrile

Up to 50

Up to 100Up to 50Up to 50Up to 50Up to 100Up to 50Up to 50Up to 50

1 2.5

D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-11

of the IPB process. These hazards could occurfrom massive deliberate or accidental releasefrom industrial sites as well as storage andtransport containers. Particular emphasisshould be placed on those TIC that produce

Figure D-5. High Hazard Toxic Industrial Chemicals

acute effects when inhaled. Figure D-5identifies TIC that are widely produced andtraded, available worldwide, highly toxic, andeasily vaporized.

HIGH HAZARD TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALSName of Material ID Number Guide

NumberAmmonia, anhydrous 125 1005Arsine 119 2118Boron trichloride 125 1741Boron trifluoride 125 1008Carbon disulfide 131 1131Chlorine 124 1017Diborane 119 1911Ethylene oxide 119 1040Fluorine 124 1047Formaldehyde solution (flammable) 132 1198Formaldehyde solutions (formalin) 132 1198Formaldehyde solutions (formalin, corrosive) 132 2209Hydrogen bromide (anhydrous) 125 1048Hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) 125 1048Hydrogen cyanide (anhydrous, stabilized) 117 1051Hydrogen fluoride (anhydrous) 125 1052Hydrogen sulfide 117 1053Hydrogen sulfide, liquefied 117 1053Nitric acid, fuming 157 2031Phosgene 125 1076Phosphorus trichloride 137 1809Sulfur dioxide 125 1079Sulfuric acid (fuming) 137 1831Tungsten hexafluoride 125 2196Note: Reference material obtained from US Department of Transportation,1996 North American Emergency Response Guidebook - A Guidebook forFirst Responders During the Initial Phase of a HazardousMaterials/Dangerous Goods Incident.

APPENDIX ETREATY, LEGAL, AND POLICY OBLIGATIONS

E-1

1. General

This appendix contains brief descriptionsof treaty, legal, and policy strictures onproliferation, testing, possession, andemployment of NBC weapons. While theUnited States adheres to these strictures, anumber of potential adversaries may not.Combatant and subordinate commanders willplan appropriate NBC priority intelligencerequirements and include NBC considerationsin their IPB process. Additionally, they willmake periodic assessments of potentialadversary NBC capabilities includingpotential violations of internationalagreements to which the adversary may beparty.

2. Nuclear Weapons

a. The employment of nuclear weapons bythe United States is governed by the currentNuclear Weapons Employment Policy.Guidance to combatant and subordinatecommanders is contained in the JP 3-12 seriesand other NCA directives.

b. The United States is party to treaties andinternational agreements that limitproliferation, testing, and possession ofnuclear weapons. The affected commandermust consult current NCA directives toconfirm the signature, ratification, and entryinto force of these instruments.

c. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons entered into force for statesparties on 5 March 1970. It binds states partiesto prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Theparties to the treaty agree not to transfer, assist,or encourage the manufacture of nuclearweapons or nuclear weapons technology. TheUnited States ratified this treaty on 24November 1969. On 4 June 1990, the United

States and the Soviet Union issued the JointStatement on Non-Proliferation, in which bothreaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and, specifically, to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

d. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treatybetween the United States and Russiaestablishes limits on the number and type ofstrategic offensive forces.

e. The Limited Test Ban Treaty limits statesparties’ testing of nuclear devices.

3. Biological and ChemicalWeapons

a. General

• The “Protocol for the Prohibition of theUse in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous,or other Gases and BacteriologicalMethods of Warfare,” also known as the“Geneva Protocol of 1925,” prohibitschemical and bacteriological methods ofwarfare. Most parties interpret theprotocol as a prohibition only of the firstuse of these agents in war. It did not banthe development, production, andstockpiling of these weapons. In 1974,the US Senate gave advice and consentto ratification of this protocol subject tothe reservation that the United Stateswould not be bound by the provisionswith respect to an enemy state or its allieswho fail to respect the prohibitions of theprotocol. On 22 January 1975, the UnitedStates ratified the protocol subject to thisreservation. The protocol entered intoforce for the United States on 10 April1975. The relevance of the GenevaProtocol is largely superceded by themore restrictive Convention on theProhibition of the Development,

E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-11

Production, Stockpiling, and Use ofChemical Weapons and their Destruction(also known as the Chemical WeaponsConvention [CWC]) and by theConvention on the Prohibition ofBacteriological and Toxic Weapons (alsoknown as the Biological WeaponsConvention [BWC]) summarized below.

• The Presidential Statement on Chemicaland Biological Weapons, 25 November1969, renounced the use by the UnitedStates of lethal biological agents andweapons and confined biologicalresearch to defensive measures such asimmunization and safety. It alsoreaffirmed the renunciation of first useof chemical weapons and extended therenunciation to first use of incapacitatingchemicals.

b. Biological Weapons. Under the termsof the BWC, parties undertake not to develop,produce, stockpile, or acquire biologicalagents or toxins “of types and in quantitiesthat have no justification for prophylactic,protective and other peaceful purposes,” aswell as weapons and means of delivery. The

BWC does not establish a specific verificationregime. The United States ratified the BWCon 29 March 1975.

c. Chemical Weapons

• The CWC, which entered into force forstates parties on 26 April 1997, bans theacquisition, development, production,transfer, and use of chemical weapons.It prohibits the use of riot control agents(RCA) as a method of warfare. Itprovides for the destruction of allchemical weapons stocks and productionfacilities within 10 years after entry intoforce. It contains a vigorous challengeregime to ensure compliance. The UnitedStates ratified the CWC on 25 April 1997.

• Executive Order No. 11850, 8 April1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses inWar of Chemical Herbicides and RiotControl Agents, renounced first use ofherbicides in war (except for specifieddefensive uses) and first use of RCA inwar except for defensive military modesto save lives. The order provides fourexamples of potential RCA uses.

APPENDIX FREFERENCES

F-1

The development of JP 3-11 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General

a. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 39, US Government Policy on Counterterrorism.

b. US Congress, Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

c. US Congress, National Defense Authorization Act FY 94 (Public Law 103-160).

2. DOD

a. Department of Defense, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense, FY95 Annual Reportto Congress, April 1995.

b. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on Nonproliferation andCounterproliferation Activities and Programs, May 1994.

c. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, Appendices A-S, April1992. (See Appendix Q – “Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense”)

d. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

e. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

3. Joint

a. Joint Service Concept for NBC Defense, Joint Services Integration Group StaffingDraft, 20 February 1996.

b. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, Washington, DC:Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

d. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

e. JP 1-01, Joint Publication System: Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures Development Program, Change 1.

f. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

g. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

F-2

Appendix F

JP 3-11

h. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

i. JP 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.

j. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

k. JP 3-12.2, Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data, (SECRET).

l. JP 3-12.3, Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (Notional), (UNCLASSIFIED).

m. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

n. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

o. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

p. JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in JointOperations.

q. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

r. JP 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policiesand Procedures).

s. JP 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning andExecution Formats and Guidance).

t. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.

u. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

v. JSM 3500.04, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

w. National Defense University, Center for Counterproliferation Research. The WeaponsProliferation Threat, March 1995.

x. CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations,June 1998.

4. Multi-Service

a. ATP 45(A), Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, andPredicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas.

b. FM 3-3/FMFM 11-17, Chemical/Biological Contamination Avoidance, September 1994.

c. FM 3-3-1/FMFM 11-18, Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, September 1994.

F-3

References

d. FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992.

e. FM 3-5/FMFM 11-10, NBC Decontamination, November 1993.

f. FM 3-6/AFM 105-7/FMFM 7-11H, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smokeand Incendiaries), November 1986.

g. FM 3-9/AFR 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds,December 1990.

h. FM 3-14, NBC Vulnerability Analysis.

i. FM 3-19/FMFM 11-20, NBC Reconnaissance. November 1993.

j. FM 8-285/NAVMED P-5041/AFM 160-11, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualtiesand Conventional Military Injuries.

k. FM 8-9/NAVMED P-54059/AFJMAN 44-151, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspectsof NBC Defensive Operations AMEDP-6, August 1973.

l. FM 10-63/AFM 143-3/FMFM 4-8, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theater ofOperations. February 1986.

m. FM 3-100/MCWP 3-3-7.1, Chemical Operations, 8 May 1996.

5. US Army

a. AR 350-41, Training in Units. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. March1993.

b. AR 350-42, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.

c. FM 3-4-1, Fixed Site Protection. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. August1989.

d. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. September1994.

e. FM 3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team). Washington, DC: Department ofthe Army. May 1993.

f. FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.November 1993.

g. FM 8-10, Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations. Washington, DC:Department of the Army. March 1992.

F-4

Appendix F

JP 3-11

h. FM 8-10-7, Health Services Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment.April 1993.

i. FM 8-10-8, Medical Intelligence, July 1989.

j. FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military ChemicalInjuries, February 1990.

k. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. June 1993.

l. FM 100-9, Reconstitution. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. January 1992.

m. FM 100-10, Combat Service Support. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.February 1988.

n. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, DC: Department of theArmy. May 1997.

o. TM 3-250, Storage, Shipment, Handling, and Disposal of Chemical Agents andHazardous Chemicals. March 1969.

p. US Army Training and Doctrine Command Publication 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield.FT Monroe, VA: Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

q. US Army Training and Doctrine Command Publication 525-5, Force XXI Operations:A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of theTwenty-First Century. FT Monroe, VA: Headquarters, US Army Training and DoctrineCommand. August 1994.

r. US Army Chemical School Publication, Training Force XXI for the NBC Environment.FT McClellan, AL: US Army Chemical School. 28 July 1995.

s. US Army Chemical School Publication, Chemical Corps Architecture For Tomorrow.FT McClellan, AL: US Army Chemical School. 17 May 1995.

t. US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Publication, MedicalManagement of Biological Casualties Handbook. August 1993.

u. US Army Modernization Plan, Annex P, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical.

6. US Navy

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. Washington, DC: Department of theNavy. 28 March 1994.

b. Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence. Washington, DC: Department of theNavy. 30 September 1994.

F-5

References

c. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics. Washington, DC: Department of theNavy. 10 January 1995.

d. Naval Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control. Washington, DC:Department of the Navy. 19 May 1995.

e. NWP 3-20.31 (Rev A), Surface Ship Availability.

f. OPNAV P-86-1-95, US Navy CBR Defense/US Marine Corps NBC Defense Handbook.Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. April 1995.

7. US Marine Corps

a. MCWP 3-37, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Nuclear, Biological, andChemical Defense Operations. Washington, DC: September 1998.

b. MCO 3400-3E Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Training.

c. MCO 1510.71, Individual Training Standards (ITS) System for NBC Defense (NBCD)Occupational Field (OCCFLD57).

d. OPNAV P-86-1-95, US Navy CBR Defense/US Marine Corps NBC Defense Handbook.Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. April 1995.

e. Marine Corps Skills Training Handbook, Individual Combat Basic Tasks. Washington,DC: US Marine Corps. January 1993.

8. US Air Force

a. Lessons Learned by Civil Engineering, Services, Air Base Operability, DisasterPreparedness, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, ProvenForce/Provide Comfort. Alberquerque, New Mexico: New Mexico Engineering ResearchInstitute. 1992.

b. AFDD-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine.

c. AFDD 2-1.8, Counter NBC Operations.

d. AFH 32-4014, Volume 1, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological Warfare(CB) Environment, Planning and Analysis.

e. AFH 32-4014, Volume 2, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological Warfare(CB) Environment, CB Hazards.

f. AFH 32-4014, Volume 3, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological Warfare(CB) Environment, Defense Equipment.

F-6

Appendix F

JP 3-11

g. AFH 32-4014, Volume 4, USAF Ability to Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environment.

h. AFI 32-4001, Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations. May 1998.

i. AFI 32-4002, Hazardous Material Emergency Planning and Response Program.December 1997.

j. AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness Planning and Training.

k. AFJMAN 24-204, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments.

l. AFJMAN 32-4003, Technical Aspects of Biological Defense.

m. AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations.

n. AFMAN 32-4005, Personnel Protection and Attack Actions.

o. AFMAN 32-4006, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Mask Fit and LiquidHazard Simulant Training.

p. AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technicians Manual for Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical Defense.

q. Air Force Police Directive 10-13, Air Force Doctrine. Washington, DC: Department ofthe Air Force. October 1998.

r. AFPD 32-40, Disaster Preparedness. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force.May 1997.

s. AFPD 41-3, Worldwide Aeromedical Evacuation.

t. AFPAM 32-4019, Chemical-Biological Warfare Commander’s Guide.

u. AFVA 32-4012, Mission-Oriented protective Postures.

v. United States Air Force Counterproliferation Master Plan (U).

APPENDIX GADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

G-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-11, 10 July 1995, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

G-2

Appendix G

JP 3-11

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AE aeromedical evacuationAFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence CenterAOR area of responsibilityAPOD aerial port of debarkation

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCI civilian interneeCM consequence managementCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations centerCOA course of actionCONUS continental United StatesCPS collective protective shelterCWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DOD Department of Defense

EMP electromagnetic pulseEPW enemy prisoners of war

FDO flexible deterrent optionFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFM field manualFMFM Fleet Marine Force Manual

HEMP high-altitude electromagnetic pulseHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHSS health service supportHUMINT human intelligence

IO international organizationIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIPE individual protective clothingISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JFC joint force commanderJMAO Joint Mortuary Affairs Office

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-11

JMET joint mission-essential taskJMETL Joint Mission Essential Task ListJOA joint operations areaJP joint publicationJRA joint rear areaJRAC joint rear area coordinatorJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOTF joint special operations task forceJTAC joint technical augmentation cellJTF joint task forceJTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support

kph kilometers per hour

LFA lead federal agency

MADCP Mortuary Affairs Decontamination Collection PointMHE materials handling equipmentMOOTW military operations other than warMOPP mission-oriented protective postureMSCA military support to civilian authoritiesMSR main supply routeMTF medical treatment facility

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNGO nongovernmental organization

OEG operational exposure guideOPCON operational controlOPSEC operations security

PHS public health servicePOE port of embarkationPSYOP psychological operationsPVNTMED preventive medicine

RCA riot control agentsROE rules of engagementRSE retrograde support elementRSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

SecDef Secretary of DefenseSOF special operations forcesSPOD seaport of debarkationS/RTF search and recovery task force

GL-3

Glossary

TFA toxic free areaTIC toxic industrial chemicalsTIM toxic industrial materialTTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UJTL Universal Joint Task ListUSACE United States Army Corps of EngineersUSG United States GovernmentUSJFCOM United States Joint Forces CommandUSSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

aerosol. A liquid or solid composed of finelydivided particles suspended in a gaseousmedium. Examples of common aerosolsare mist, fog, and smoke. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

agent. See biological or chemical agent.(This term and its definition are applicableonly in the context of this publication andcannot be referenced outside thispublication.)

avoidance. Individual and/or unit measurestaken to avoid or minimize nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks andreduce the effects of NBC hazards. (JP1-02)

binary chemical munition. A munition inwhich chemical substances, held in separatecontainers, react when mixed or combinedas a result of being fired, launched orotherwise initiated to produce a chemicalagent. See also munition; chemicalmunition; multi-agent munition. (JP 1-02)

biological agent. A microorganism thatcauses disease in personnel, plants, oranimals or causes the deterioration ofmateriel. (JP 1-02)

biological ammunition. A type ofammunition, the filler of which is primarilya biological agent. (JP 1-02)

biological defense. The methods, plans, andprocedures involved in establishing andexecuting defensive measures againstattacks using biological agents. (JP 1-02)

biological environment. Conditions foundin an area resulting from direct or persistingeffects of biological weapons. (JP 1-02)

GL-4 JP 3-11

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

biological operation. Employment ofbiological agents to produce casualties inpersonnel or animals or damage to plants.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

biological threat. A threat that consists ofbiological material planned to be deployedin order to produce casualties in personnelor animals or damage plants. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

biological weapon. An item of materielwhich projects, disperses, or disseminatesa biological agent including arthropodvectors. (JP 1-02)

blister agent. A chemical agent which injuresthe eyes and lungs, and burns or blistersthe skin. Also called vesicant agent. (JP1-02)

blood agent. A chemical compound,including the cyanide group, that affectsbodily functions by preventing the normalutilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP1-02)

campaign. A series of related militaryoperations aimed at accomplishing astrategic or operational objective within agiven time and space. (JP 1-02)

chemical agent. Any toxic chemicalintended for use in military operations.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

GL-5

Glossary

chemical ammunition. A type ofammunition, the filler of which is primarilya chemical agent. (JP 1-02)

chemical ammunition cargo. Cargo suchas white phosphorous munitions (shell andgrenades). (JP 1-02)

chemical, biological, and radiologicaloperation. A collective term used onlywhen referring to a combined chemical,biological, and radiological operation. (JP1-02)

chemical contamination. Seecontamination. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

chemical defense. The methods, plans andprocedures involved in establishing andexecuting defensive measures against attackutilizing chemical agents. See also NBCdefense. (JP 1-02)

chemical environment. Conditions found inan area resulting from direct or persistingeffects of chemical weapons. (JP 1-02)

chemical operations. Employment ofchemical agents to kill, injure, orincapacitate for a significant period of time,personnel or animals, and deny or hinderthe use of areas, facilities, or material; ordefense against such employment. (JP1-02)

chemical warfare. All aspects of militaryoperations involving the employment oflethal and incapacitating munitions/agentsand the warning and protective measuresassociated with such offensive operations.Since riot control agents and herbicides arenot considered to be chemical warfareagents, those two items will be referred toseparately or under the broader term“chemical,” which will be used to include

all types of chemical munitions/agentscollectively. Also called CW. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

chemical weapon. Together or separately,(a) a toxic chemical and its precursors,except when intended for a purpose notprohibited under the Chemical WeaponsConvention; (b) a munition or device,specifically designed to cause death or otherharm through toxic properties of thosechemicals specified in (a), above, whichwould be released as a result of theemployment of such munition or device;(c) any equipment specifically designed foruse directly in connection with theemployment of munitions or devicesspecified in (b), above. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations center. An ad hocorganization, normally established by thegeographic combatant commander orsubordinate joint force commander, to assistin the coordination of activities of engagedmilitary forces, and other United StatesGovernment agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations, private voluntaryorganizations, and regional andinternational organizations. There is noestablished structure, and its size andcomposition are situation dependent. Alsocalled CMOC. (JP 1-02)

collective nuclear, biological and chemicalprotection. Protection provided to a groupof individuals in a nuclear, biological andchemical environment which permitsrelaxation of individual nuclear, biologicaland chemical protection. (JP 1-02)

collective protection. See collective nuclear,biological, and chemical protection. (Thisterm and its definition are applicable only

GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-11

in the context of this publication andcannot be referenced outside thispublication.)

combatant command. A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander established andso designated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. (JP 1-02)

contaminate. See contamination. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

contaminated remains. Remains ofpersonnel which have absorbed or uponwhich have been deposited radioactivematerial, or biological or chemical agents.(JP 1-02)

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption,or adsorption of radioactive material, or ofbiological or chemical agents on or bystructures, areas, personnel, or objects. Seealso fallout; induced radiation; residualradiation. (DOD) 2. Food and/or watermade unfit for consumption by humans oranimals because of the presence ofenvironmental chemicals, radioactiveelements, bacteria or organisms, thebyproduct of the growth of bacteria ororganisms, the decomposing material (toinclude the food substance itself), or wastein the food or water. (JP 1-02)

contamination control. Procedures to avoid,reduce, remove, or render harmless,temporarily or permanently, nuclear,biological, and chemical contamination forthe purpose of maintaining or enhancingthe efficient conduct of military operations.(JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of makingany person, object, or area safe byabsorbing, destroying, neutralizing, makingharmless, or removing chemical orbiological agents, or by removingradioactive material clinging to or aroundit. (JP 1-02)

detection. In nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) environments, the act of

GL-7

Glossary

locating NBC hazards by use of NBCdetectors or monitoring and/or surveyteams. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hitsaround the mean point of impact of bombsand projectiles dropped or fired underidentical conditions. 2. In antiaircraftgunnery, the scattering of shots in range anddeflection about the mean point ofexplosion. 3. The spreading or separatingof troops, materiel, establishments, oractivities which are usually concentrated inlimited areas to reduce vulnerability. 4. Inchemical and biological operations, thedissemination of agents in liquid or aerosolform. 5. In airdrop operations, the scatterof personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone.6. In naval control of shipping, thereberthing of a ship in the periphery of theport area or in the vicinity of the port for itsown protection in order to minimize the riskof damage from attack. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by whichthe military forces or elements thereof guidetheir actions in support of nationalobjectives. It is authoritative, but requiresjudgement in applications. (JP 1-02)

herbicide. A chemical compound that willkill or damage plants. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crisis or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

immediate decontamination. Decontaminationcarried out by individuals immediatelyupon becoming contaminated. It isperformed in an effort to minimize

casualties, save lives, and limit the spreadof contamination. Also called emergencydecontamination. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

individual protection. Actions taken byindividuals to survive and continue themission under nuclear, biological, andchemical conditions. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

individual protective equipment. In nuclear,biological and chemical warfare, the personalclothing and equipment required to protectan individual from biological and chemicalhazards and some nuclear effects. (JP 1-02)

industrial chemicals. Chemicals developedor manufactured for use in industrialoperations or research by industry,government, or academia. These chemicalsare not primarily manufactured for thespecific purpose of producing humancasualties or rendering equipment,facilities, or areas dangerous for human use.Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride,phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrialchemicals that also can be militarychemical agents. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

joint. Connotes activities, operations,organizations, etc., in which elements oftwo or more Military Departmentsparticipate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-11

mission-oriented protective posture. Aflexible system of protection againstnuclear, biological, and chemicalcontamination. This posture requirespersonnel to wear only that protectiveclothing and equipment (mission-orientedprotective posture gear) appropriate to thethreat level, work rate imposed by themission, temperature, and humidity. Alsocalled MOPP. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

mission-oriented protective posture gear.Military term for individual protectiveequipment including suit, boots, gloves,mask with hood, first aid treatments, anddecontamination kits issued to soldiers.Also called MOPP gear. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

munitions. Materiels used in war, especiallyweapons and ammunition. (JP 1-02)

nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemicalagent which interferes with thetransmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02)

nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent thatwhen released dissipates and/or loses itsability to cause casualties after 10 to 15minutes. (JP 1-02)

nuclear, biological, and chemical capablenation. A nation that has the capabilityto produce and employ one or more typesof nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons across the full range of militaryoperations and at any level of war inorder to achieve political and militaryobjectives. (JP 1-02)

nuclear, biological, and chemicalconditions. See nuclear, biological, andchemical environment.

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense.Defensive measures that enable friendlyforces to survive, fight, and win againstenemy use of nuclear, biological, orchemical (NBC) weapons and agents. USforces apply NBC defensive measuresbefore and during integrated warfare. Inintegrated warfare, opposing forces employnonconventional weapons along withconventional weapons (NBC weapons arenonconventional). (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nuclear, biological, and chemicalenvironment. Environments in whichthere is deliberate or accidentalemployment, or threat of employment, ofnuclear, biological, or chemical weapons;deliberate or accidental attacks orcontamination with toxic industrialmaterials, including toxic industrialchemicals; or deliberate or accidentalattacks or contamination with radiological(radioactive) materials. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

nuclear defense. The methods, plans, andprocedures involved in establishing andexercising defensive measures against theeffects of an attack by nuclear weapons orradiological warfare agents. It encompassesboth the training for, and the implementationof, these methods, plans, and procedures. Seealso NBC defense. (JP 1-02)

pathogen. A disease-producingmicroorganism. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

persistency. In biological or chemicalwarfare, the characteristic of an agentwhich pertains to the duration of its

GL-9

Glossary

effectiveness under determined conditionsafter its dispersal. (JP 1-02)

persistent agent. A chemical agent thatwhen released remains able to causecasualties for more than 24 hours to severaldays or weeks. (JP 1-02)

precursor. Any chemical reactant whichtakes place at any stage in the productionby whatever method of a toxic chemical.This includes any key component of abinary or multicomponent chemicalsystem. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

protection. Measures that are taken to keepnuclear, biological, and chemical hazardsfrom having an adverse effect on personnel,equipment, or critical assets and facilities.Protection consists of five groups ofactivities: hardening of positions;protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physicaldefense measures; and reacting to attack.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

protective mask. A protective ensembledesigned to protect the wearer’s face andeyes and prevent the breathing of aircontaminated with chemical and/orbiological agents. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

riot control agent. Any chemical, that isnot listed in the Chemical WeaponsConvention, which can produce rapidly inhumans sensory irritate or disablingphysical effects which disappear within ashort time following termination ofexposure. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definition

and are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

subordinate command. A commandconsisting of the commander and all thoseindividuals, units, detachments,organizations, or installations that havebeen placed under the command by theauthority establishing the subordinatecommand. (JP 1-02)

survey. The directed effort to determine thelocation and the nature of a chemical,biological, and radiological hazard in anarea. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

tactics. 1. The employment of units incombat. 2. The ordered arrangement andmaneuver of units in relation to each otherand/or the enemy in order to use theirpotentialities. (JP 1-02)

toxic chemical. Any chemical which,through its chemical action on lifeprocesses, can cause death, temporaryincapacitation, or permanent harm tohumans or animals. This includes all suchchemicals, regardless of their origin or oftheir method of production, and regardlessof whether they are produced in facilities,in munitions or elsewhere. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

toxin. See toxin agent. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

toxin agent. A poison formed as a specificsecretion product in the metabolism of avegetable or animal organism asdistinguished from inorganic poisons.Such poisons can also be manufactured bysynthetic processes. (JP 1-02)

GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-11

weapons of mass destruction. In arms controlusage, weapons that are capable of a highorder of destruction and/or of being used insuch a manner as to destroy large numbers ofpeople. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological,

and radiological weapons, but excludes themeans of transporting or propelling theweapon where such means is a separable anddivisible part of the weapon. Also calledWMD. (JP 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

�

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

�

STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-11 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

�

joint doctrine for operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical

Documents