Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection

1996-04

Joint Intelligence Is JIC/JAC/NMJIC Intelligence

Channell, Ralph Norman

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/52645

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0 JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC INTELLIGENCE

Ralph Norman Channell

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Most of the material contained in this report is from personal interviews with the Commanders and their staffs in the new Joint Intelligence Centers {IlC's). The graphics appended to the IlC descriptions are courtesy of each organiz.ation's POC officers who

most ably assisted me in compiling material. U.S. warfare has become joint warfare. The intelligence officers of the new IlC's have embraced this concept, and are participating daily in the 0 new structure. Military intelligence has made great strides in adapting to the new order of warfare. This author is grateful to those who have taken the time to assist in making this summary possible. It is being used to acquaint students at the Naval Postgraduate School with the new IlC structure. The compilation, comments and conclusions are> of course, the responsibility of the author.

The author is particularly grateful to Rear Admiral Cramer, the DNI, who sponsored this research on the nc structure when he was the J2 for the Joint Chiefs, and to his then assistants in J2, Captains Lautenschlager, Porterfield, and Henington. Also to Rear Admiral Tom Wilson when he was J2 at the Atlantic Comniand and Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby, J2 at the Pacific Command, and to Captain John Liles when he was Commander Atlantic Intelligence Command, Captain Rich Smith, Commander Strategic Command IlC, Captain Vince Fragomene when he was Deputy J2 at European Command, Captain Dave Peszko and Colonel Bob Kielhofer at Central Command, and to Captains Frank Kelly and Bob Simeral when they were the Third Fleet Intelligence Officers. Again, this author is most grateful to all the officers who assisted me in compiling this material. • •

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0 JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC JNTELLIGENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. rn'I'R.ODUCTION ........................................................ 1

II. NATIONAL MILITARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER .... . .... .... .... .... . 3

ill. U.S. All.ANTIC CO~ .... ... ...... . ..... ... ............ ... .... .. .. 11

IV. U.S. PACIF'IC co~ ....... . . ; ... ... ..... . ...... . ............. .. ... 17

0 v. U.S. CEN'l'R.AL co~ ..... ........ .. .. . ...... ........ .. . . . ..... . ... 23

VI. U.S. S'I'RATEGIC co~ ... .. ..... .... .... .. .... . ........ .. ...... . . 29

VII. U.S. EUROPEAN' co~ ... . . .... ... ... . .. .. .... .... .. . ... . .... .... 33

VIIl. THE JOINT TASK FORCE ..... .. .... ... ..... ... ...... .. ... .... .... .. . . 37

IX. CONCLUSIONS . . ..... ... .... .... .... ... ..... .. ... .. ...... . . . .. ...... . 41

X ENDNO'I'ES ...... .. ...... ... ..... . ....... ....... ... .... ..... .. ... ..... . 43

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC INTELLIGENCE

Ralph Norman Channell

L INTRODUCTION

I ntelligence support to the operating forces has been restructured to provide intelligence required along the joint command organization. Although there have been joint intelligence organWttions previously, most intelligence support was provided along service lines. The

new structure is a major departure from the previous organization. The new structure is primarily a reflection of the new joint command structure with its emphasis on the CJCS, the Joint Smff: the CINC's, and the Joint Task Force. The new intelligence structure was strongly insisted upon by the DoD and key congressional committees. Major cuts in the intelligence community (funding and personnel) were also important filctors in the restructuring. The services were generally opposed to the new concept, although Naval Intelligence was quick to recognize the advantages of early participation.

Another key factor enabling the establishment of centralized IlC's was the advent of decentralized computer based systems and improved data communications connectivity, permitting centralized data storage and rapid dissemination. The appearance of the Joint Defense Intelligence Support System 9J)ISS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) are prime examples of the availability of the new systems and connectivity.

Another major development is the production of the new joint intelligence publications, and the intelligence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP's). These publications are establishing common doctrine and terms for the military intelligence community. However, some confusion still exists regarding intelligence terminology. F cir example, the Navy still uses the tenn OPINTEL to mean what is now defined more closely as tactical intelligence. This paper uses tenns as defined in Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", in which strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are described as supporting those three levels of warfare, and intelligence production is divided among I&W, current, general military intelligence (GMI), targeting, and technical categories of intelligence.

• -T.h.e remainder of this paper will describe the structure and functions oftlie major JIC's,

starting with the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in Washingto~ DC.

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ll. NATIONAL MILITARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

(NMJIC)

The NMJIC is the part of the JCS 12 organiution which provides crisis support to the Secretmy of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Smfl: and the Joint Staff Other elements of the J2 produce joint intelligence publications, support the Joint Staff as action

officers, and provide the DIA representatives to the CINC's.

Within the NMJIC are divisions that form and dispatch "National Intelligence Support Teams" (NIST's) for JTF augmentation, provide targeting and BDA support, operate the Defense Intelligence Network (DIN), and man and operate the NMJIC. A J2 organiution chart is attached.

The NMJIC handles crisis intelligence and current intelligence as needed, while other current intelligence production is accomplished at the DIA National Mllitmy Intelligence Production Center (Nl\fiPC) at Bolling AFB, Anacostia. When a specific crisis occurs, a "Crisis Cell" is set up in the NMJIC as the initial effort, then as the threat increases, a "Crisis Working Group" is established, then lastly, an "Intelligence Task Force•. Efforts are coordinated with other intelligence agencies and with the DIA Operatiohal Intelligence Coordination Center at the NMIPC. The NMJIC handles crisis RFl's when the crisis reaches the "Working Group" stage. The NMJIC then has tasking authority with the intelligence community for the crisis. In general, CIA concentrates on political and economic intelligence, while DIA concentrates on military intelligence. This flexible response to crises is sometimes referred to as the "Burger King" approach to intelligence management.

The NMJIC normally has 60 to 70 analysts assigned, maintaining a 24 hour watch. At any given time, there may be as many as three crisis w:orking groups in operation, e.g., Balkans, Haiti, and Africa. During the Haiti operation, there were about· 100 personnel in the Haiti Intelligence Task Force. Flexibility is key to the team effort in the NM.Ile.

Connectivity to others in Washington is via JWICS/JDISS and person to person (secure phone, etc.). Connectivity to other IlCflAC's is via JWICS/JDISS, to include secure video teleconferencing. A connectivity chart is attached. The NMJIC is shifting to a JCSIJ3 UNIX based operating system which will eventually run at multi-level security. Intel Link is becoming an important connectivity asset also .

... Collection management is accomplished by the DIA Defense Collection Coordination

Center (DCCC), located adjacent to the NMJIC. The DCCC is part of the DIA National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC), but is responsive to the J2, and operates, in effect, as

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part of the NMJIC when a crisis occurs.

The JDISS is key to the NMJIC connectivity. JDISS bas the capability to conduct "chatter", email, and database queries with other IlC's, as well as imagery retrieval and manipulation. The JDISS is relatively easy to operate; however, accessing the various databases is another matter, requiring passwords and fiuniliarity with other systems. The JDISS uses a UNIX based workstation with peripherals, and can use various means of connectivity including the JWICS and the STIJ Ill. The IDISS is mamged under the JCS J2, but the Program Office is resident in Suitlan~ MD, at the National Maritime Intelligence Center.

Targeting and BDA are now crucial functions for the NMJIC, with some 20 personnel involved in this process. Due to NCA and JCS requirements for immediate BDA, the NMJIC now has first phase imagery and IDEX capabilities. BDA information ftom other sources must be received and analyud rapidly if it is to be useful BDA is coordinated with the appropriate CINC's and other members of the Intelligence Community using the JDISS and the interactive video capabilities of the JWICS.

An I&W system still exists, accomplished as part of crisis intelligence in the NMJIC, in coordination with NSA and the appropriate CINC, especially with regard to watch conditions. There is a tie with allied systems as well.

The NMJIC "floor" is divided into nuinerous cubicles both geographic and functional. It is full of computer terminals and telephones. There are representatives from CIA, NSA, Technical Operational Intelligence (TOPINT), the services, DIA regional desks, and DMA. A Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) from NSA, consisting of 20 to 25 personnei maintains a watch team of about five for COMINT and BLINT support. The NMJIC relies heavily on augmentation, especially during crises; however, the current trend is towards a more permanent organiz.ation. Minimum tours are supposed to be three months long, there is a training course, and augment cadre from other organizations are pre-trained and identified. The geographic desks are usually manned by the DIA NMIPC, but could be manned by the services and/or other agencies as well. Each service bas a desk on the floor, and although service current intelligence was to have moved to the NMJIC, the services have retained a capability for tlµs function in their respective service centers. ·

UN support is accomplished at two levels by a UN support desk on the NMJIC "floor". Level I intelligence is only "show and tell" not for keeping, while Level Il is basically unclassified. Level II is passed to the UN situation room in New York providing essentially unclassified intelligence. Level I intelligence is passed to the U.S. UN Mission SCIF. Connectivity is via JDISS. There are also desks that link the NMJIC with the U.K., Canada, and ~a. Connectiyity with these nations is now via JWICS. There is a Linked Operations1Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) terminal in the NMJIC which provides connectivity to EUCOM and NATO, although eventually the LOCE is planned to migrate to the JDISS.

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c There are usually about 15 personnel minimum at the NMJIC standard desks, plus another 20-25 in the various working groups on the "floor" at any given time.

The Defense Intelligence Network is a classified broadcast that has its studios as part of the NMJIC. The DIN broadcasts items of current intelligence interest 17 hoµrs per day, increasing to 24 hours during crises. Programming is from sources around the Intelligence Community and connectivity is via the JWICS.

As noted above, the JCS 12 also produces joint intelligence doctrine publications. The keystone publication for intelligence, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" Qoint Pub 2-0) is out and in use. "Four other supporting publications, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations" (Joint Pub 2-01), "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations" Qoint Pub 2-02), "JTTP for MC&G Support" Qoint Pub 2-03), and "JTTP .for Intelligence Support toTargeting" (Joint Pub 2-01.1), are in various stages of draft. "Doctrine/JTTP for Counterintelligence" (Joint Pub 2-01.2) has been published and is in use. Attached is a copy of the joint intelligence publication structure.

The JCS J2's have tried to:

• Make the NMJIC the pre-eminent intelligence watch center in Washington;

• o . Transition the briefing team to video format using JWICS;

Produce professional products including "world class" briefing material.

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It appears that all these objectives have been accomplished in highly professional manner.

It is very impressive to see the intelligence personnel ftom the various parts of the community working together bringing their expertise to bear regarding geographic ar~ collection systems, data systems, and connectivity, while keeping everything together from an assessment and management aspect. The NMJIC is a crucial node in crisis management in Washington .

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Ill. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Atlantic Command was a &st mover in the effort to establish the IlC's. Planning for the new Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) started in early 1990, and the AIC was established in May 1991. The concept was to consolidate intelligence operations and

organi7.8tions into one intelligence organi7.ation to provide better support to Atlantic Command forces. The new organintion consolidated such intelligence commands as FICEURLANT, FOSICLANT, LANTilC, and others, to include parts of the now ACOM and LANTFLT staffs .

. The number of personnel on the ACOM and LANTFLT staffs bas been reduced to only those needed for policy and management functions. Intelligence production and systems support is now vested in the AIC, with the Commander of AIC also a member of the ACOM/LANTFLT/ SACLANT staffs for intelligence operations.

Emphasis at AIC is on support to the ACOM mission of joint force training/adaptive joint force packaging. The IlC part of AIC is the watch team that handles J&W, Current Intelligence, RFI's, etc. - the daily support to the operating forces. The IlC is the "front door" to the AIC for commands needing support. The nc watch team consists of some eight members during the normal course of events, augmenting from~ AIC to about 17 as needed, and to around 25 for a major crisis.

The number of personnel in the AIC bas been reduced from a previous 1,000 or so to a current level of around 700 personnel. Over half of these arc Navy, with the remainder divided among Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and civilian personnel. The AIC structure lias been altered to include directorates for Operations (production), Field Support, Resources (systems), and a group for Customer Support. As noted above, emphasis is on joint force training and augmentation, especially the use of JDISS and intelligence teams for joint force packaging. Intelligence Operations includes the production of databases, GMI, current intelligence, targeting materials, etc .. The Field Support Directorate includes three teams of 15 personnel each for augmentation during exercises and ~· Resources provi~es the systems and connectivity assets in support of the AIC.

AIC has participated in several joint force exercises, notably the Ocean Venture series in which the ITF flagship, USS Mount Whitney, was augmented and an afloat IlC was established. Connectivity between the afloat nc and AICmc was via JDISS and a partial JWICS.

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The attached graphics illustrate the ACOM AIC IlC mission and responsibilities, the IlC watch "accordion" structure, and the large crisis manning plan. Attached also is a graphic that illustrates bandwidth capabilities for various systems, and bandwidth requirements for JWICS and JDISS.

The AIC and its IlC performed exceedingly well during the recent Haiti crisis. As described by Rear Admiral Tom Wtlson in an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, the combination of the IlC structure, the connectivity using JWICS and JDISS, a common TI'P, and experience gained from joint force training, all proved their value in providing intelligence support to the joint forces.

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IV. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Pacific Command emphasis is on regional issues and crises, and has resulted in the establishment of a two tier command and control structure for the Pacific AOR. Specific operational commanders are to be activated as JTF commanders to meet crises as required,

and will be augmented from CINCP AC by the Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell (DITF AC).

To support these operations, a new joint intelligence structure has been established, centered around the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (IlCPAC). IlCP AC was formed in July 1991, consolidating the former FICPACJFOSIC, IPAC, and the USAF 548th RTG. By 1993, the new IlCP AC consisted of some 900 personnel, but is in the process of being reduced to about 800 personnel. About 300/o of the personnel are Navy, 30% Air Force, with the remainder divided among Army, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel. The former FIC at Makalapa is the location of the Commander, most intelligence production, systems managemen~ and the current intelligence "watch floor". Target materials, expeditionary wartare support, and the photo lab are at Hickam AFB. The current intelligence watch provides daily support to the operating forces, and, ofNavy interest, has assumed the functions of the former FOSIC Hawaii and some of the functions of the former FOSIF Kamiseya.

The P ACOM J2 and staff retain policy Q>ntrol over intelligence functions in the Pacific Command, especially with regard to architecture, validation of requirements, joint TTP, collection policy, etc .. The PACOM 12 hosts a PACOM Intelligence Board that discusses major intelligence matters, and consists of the component commander 10.'s, JTF J2's, and others as invited.

FOSIF Kamiseya has recently been reassigned as IlCPAC Detachment (JDET), and will provide joint intelligence expertise and augmentation for the northwest Pacific area. JDET has moved from its former location at Kamiseya to Yokota AFB, Japan.

The P ACOM architecture concept calls for a series of intelligence system servers called P ASS's (P ACOM ADP Server Sites) located at IlCPAC iii Hawaii, Yokota AFB in Japan (site of IDET), Korea, and at ffiCPAC/JITAP in San Diego. The PACOM PASS nodes are being connected with JWICS and contain the various databases and imagery needed by the operating forces. An imagery bulletin board has been established by IlCPAC. Primary access for the operating forces will be via "pulls" using JDISS. There also is a plan for forces to be able to build their own databases using CD ROM technology, pulling from the IlCP AC/PASS databases .

• · Jl(;PAC emphasis is on watch teams for current/I&W intelligence, and on augmentation

and production for other customer support. The watch teams have some 15 personnel on watch at any time, augmented by Crisis Action Support Cells as needed. Support is to the prime potential JTF's: COM7THFLT, I CORPS, ill MEF, and to the standing J1F's: Joint Interagency Task

17

Force West (IlATFW) and ITF Full Accounting. The IlCP AC, by MOU, provides special support for CINCP ACFL T intelligence briefings and submarine warfare analysis.

IlCPAC support to the operating forces is provided by an area scheme, with JDET covering the Pacific north of Korea, IlCP AC covering south of Korea to the CENTCOM AOR., and J2 US Forces Korea using the SOlst MI Brigade as a "mini IlC" to cover Korea. ITF support will be via a "Named Area Of Interest" (NAI) concept, currently in operation for the standing JTFs, to be provided to the crisis JTFs when activated.

The IlC is connected interactive with Australian Naval Intelligence at MIC Sydney for the interchange of maritime intelligence.

MOUs are being established with COMUSFORCES Korea to avoid duplication of intelligence support in the Korean area, and an MOU has been established with ONI to provide for coverage of naval and shipping matters, and to avoid duplication.

Attached are graphics depicting the CINCP AC J2 organization, the IlCPAC structure, and the systems that currently support the IlCPAC effort.

~

18

• •

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. '

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

r

J2STAFF 81 SPINTCOMM 75 NATIONAL SUPPORT . ELEMENTS ~O JICPAC , U1

. • 1057

J2S INTEL

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l J21 J22

J2 DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE ·

J20 DEPUTY '

DIRECTOR

J2R 1----i RESOURCE

MGMT

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JICPAC

I J24

ARCHITECTURE &SYSTEMS

POLICY, TARGETS,&

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J23 COUNTERDRUG & COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

SECURITY &SSO

J2C ANALYTIC SUPPORT

J2D · DIA

LIAISON

POLICY <#

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CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific · ·

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Commanding Senior Enlisted Advisor Officer E·9, Nominative

0-6, Nominative Plans and Programs I GS·15 I Reserve Management

Deputy Office Commander 0·6, Navy

0·6,Army

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Resources l or,eratlons DI rectorale l D rectorate 0·6, Air Force 0·6, Navy .

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I 0·4, Air Force 0·4, Navy Admlnlslrallve Oala Systems/

Production Servlcea Communications Oeperlmenl Oepartmenl Officer 0·5, Armt • • O•S, Navy

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8

V. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Central Command has a unique problem regarding intelligence support because the intelligence structure is filr removed from the AOR, and is not as well developed as those of the more established areas such as ACOM and PACOM The nc is located in the

CENTCOM headquarters building at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida, and is increasing in size from about 200 personnel to around 300, with plans for further increases to a posSiole 500. Additional space is being made available at MacDill AFB, and at least the GMI and other production efforts should move out of their currently crowded spaces for the new facilities.

The CENTCOM JIC provides support to JTF SWA (Southwest Asia) and, to a certain extent. to NAVCENT forces. During operations in Somalia, the IlC provided support to the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) there. Due to the relatively small number of personnel at the CENTCOM IlC, the main effort is in support of the various crises and current/ I&W intelligence. Basic intelligence production is at a minimum until adequate resources are on board. Also, the concept for JTF manning is to have the services provide augmentation since the CENTCOM IlC manning is relatively low. In addition, the IlC has agreements with other IlC's and with component intelligence organi7.Btions for certain OB, target materials, and other basic intelligence production to be accomplished at these other locations until the nc is adequately manned and able to take over. The CENTCOM-JIC is assuming these functions as its assets mcrease.

CENTCOM nc is heavily into RFI management and response. Most RFI's are handled via JDISS, and the JIC has estab~shed a system to assign priorities, track progress, and issue weekly status summaries.

It is interesting to note that each service component commander still seems to retain its own intelligence production capability: the Army {Third Army) has the 513th MI Brigade at Atlanta, GA, the Air Force (N"mth Air Force) has the 480th,Intelligence Group at Shaw AFB, and the Navy is building a support element of some 30 persomiel in Bahrain. Naval Intelligence support is provided via three different groups: on board the NAVCENI' flagship for I&W /Current Intelligence, all source fusion, and policy guidance. The more extensive analysis and imagery support is produced by the support detachment in Bahrain, while the plans, programs, architecture, and budget functions are accomplished by a small group at NAVCENT (REAR) at Tampa. Latest changes to NAVCENI' include the shift of the afloat staff ashore, and the establishment of the new Fifth Fleet staff.

. . ,

23

Attached are graphics showing the basic CENTCOM IlC structure and the planned connectivity. JWICS and JDISS are key elements in the connectivity between the IlC and the operating forces.

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0 VL U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Strategic Command was established in June 1992 at Offutt AFB near Omaha, Nebraska, and essentially combined much of the former SAC stafl: and JSTPS, the producer of the SIOP. STRATCOM is a functional combatant commander, acquiring all nuclear forces when on

patrol in the case of SSBNs, and when generated in the case of ICBMs and bombers. Component commanders and supporting commanders provide support when needed. STRATCOM has COCOM over nuclear forces (but not necessarily OPCON); however, the Commander Task Forces form when a nuclear alert is generated, taking OPCON of the nuclear forces. Day to day OPCON is normally exercised by the component commanders: CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, ACC, and AFSPACECOM

Intelligence support is provided by the STRATCOM nc, which consisted initially of some 1400 personne~ but is in the process of decrementing to around 550 personnel, with an additional 100 working in the IlC but assigned to SPACECOM The IlC is an integral part of the STRATCOM 12 sUlfl: fonning three of the seven divisions of the 12 directorate. Imagery is clearly the strong point of the STRATCOM IlC, with extensive machinery to perform imagery functions. The main areas of interest for the IlC include the four nuclear republics of the Former Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and'the field of proliferation of weapons of mass c destruction.

0

The attached charts depict the basic STRATCOM IlC and 12 organi7.ation as well as current production efforts. •

29

• •

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGEN.ce· I .: •

A~ENCYREP. OMA ctA DIA ONA , NSA NAIC .

J2A DEPUTY DIRECTOR

. FOR INTELLIGENCE

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VIL U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

European Command is more complex in many respects than the other CINC's, especially for intelligence, because of its close integration with the NATO nations.

The Joint Intelligence Center is not located close to the EUCOM headquarters in Stutt~ Germany, but is at Molesworth, UK, north of London, and is called the Joint Analysis Center (JAC). The JAC is relatively new, reaching only an initial operational capability in September 1991, formed from components of the EUCOM staff and several analysis centers. The JAC is in the process of building to 600 or 700 personne~ when fully manned. Full operational capability was expected in 1995. The Navy has contributed billets to the JAC from FOSIF Rota and FOSIC London, and has shifted from reliance on intelligence support from service assets to reliance on the JAC. FOSIF Rota has greatly decreased in size, and will phase out in 1996.

Naples has become an important intelligence support area, with a IlC to support Balkan operations, a NATO Southern Region JOIC, and support to the Sixth Fleet.

EUCOM has created the new Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth in England to be its primary center for intelligence support. In addition, EUCOM anticipates that at least some current intelligence support will continue to be provided by component service intelligence organizations, although this appears to be in a changing state. USAREUR still has MI/CEWI capability in Europe, USAFE has intelligence squadrons, and for NATO, there remains the Swvey Section at SHAPE and the JOIC's for the NATO Northwest, Central, and Southern Regions. The JOIC's are the main conduit fqr providing US intelligence support to the NATO regions.

The EUCOM concept for contingency warfare is the Joint Task Force/Coalition Task Force (JTF/CTF) operation, with basic support provided by the JAC, and tacticaVoperational support provided by on-scene assets and the automated systems. These systems have been developed or are currently in development to support the rapid analysis and dissemination of intelligence. The basic system is EISS (EUCOM Intelligenec Support System), a UNIX based workstation, currently deployed, containing EUCOM message traffic, and providing ready access to various intelligence databases. The LOCE (Linked Operations/Intelligence Center Europe) is another UNIX based workstation designed to provide intelligence support to NATO, and is currently operational throughout many US and NATO commands in Europe. LOCE is the primary gateway to the NATO nations, runs at the "Secret Releasable to NATO" leve~ has both a dynamic current intelligence function, and a more static central database including POB and other referenc~ intelligence. The database is controlled by the JAC, and provides acces~ to theater databases~ ELINT databases, and some sanitized US source data. The system is deployed to all services, NATO headquarters, and operating forces down to Corps level. EUCOM is in the process of incorporating the JDISS into its intelligence architecture.

33

Attached are graphics that show the EUCOM structure for intelligence support for "peacemaking,,, and for punitive strike. Although dated, these charts provide an idea of the complexity of the intelligence arrangements when NATO is involved.

..

,

34

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0

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UNCLA~IFIED I INTEL SPT FOR PEACEMAKING (U) I

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UNCLASSIFIED I INTm: SPT FOR PUNITIVE STRIKE (CJ) ~ -

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FIST ICON JDISS/EIS TREl'l'RAP NMIST

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UHFSATCOM ,_~--~SHFSATCOM Mok•worth DIAL·UP PTT

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UNCLASSIFIED

•

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Vll. THE JOINT TASK FORCE

JTF, s to be formed up will have a JIC/JISE in support. The JIC/JISE will vary in size depending upon the J1F Commander's requirements and the nature of the JTF mission. Most of the CINC's plan to augment the J1F JIC/JISE with personnel from the CINC JIC, and

also with NIST teams from the 12 JCS. Each J1F JIC/JISE will have at least one JDISS, and JWICS connectivity if at all possible. Note that recent changes to joint intelligence doctrine indicate that the JTF JIC may be called a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) to avoid confusion with the larger theater JIC.

ACOM plans to have JTF 120 (NORTH} and J1F 140 (SOUTH) with a JIC and JDISS.

EUCOM plans to organize a JTF-2 or CTF-2 with a Director of Intelligence (DI) and the following divisions:

• Intelligence Operations (Air, Ground, Maritime, Collection, National Systems)

• Plans {Threat, MC&G, Terrain/IPB, SWO)

• Analysis (Crisis Action Team, Targets, BDA)

• Support (Systems, Admin, SSO, CI, Security)

Support to be via EISS (EUCOM Intel Support System), LOCE (Linked Ops/Intel Center Europe), and JDISS.

COMTIDRDFLT during operation TANDEM THRUST used the following JTF organization:

The DI (J2) was a Navy 06 who was part of the battle staff which included Ops, Intel, Plans, and Support. The Intelligence Division consisted of: ·

• Intel Plans/Support (Navy 04) (Plans and Admin)

• Current Intel (Army 05) (Watch, Briefs, Strike, BDA)

37

• Mission Support (Navy 04) (Collection, Targets, National Assets)

• Cryptology (Navy 05) (SIGINT Support, SI Comms)

Attached is a diagram from Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", depicting a representative ]2 and Joint Intelligence Center, to include a National , Intelligence Support Team (NIST), a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), a Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JC:MEC), and a Joint Document Exploitation Center (IDEC) .

•

38 :)

0

SSO/ SECURITY J-2 .,__ _ _.. AOMIN

PLANS INTEL SYSTEMS

LNOs 11 I JIF

0

CURRENT INTEL/l&W

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

JIC I I NIST

TARGETS

JDEC

DISSEMINATION

Representative Joint Intelligence Center

( ,4Nt> ~~)

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IX. CONCLUSIONS

U S militaiy intelligence has built a new joint intelligence structure in a remarkably short time, to include modem workStations (the JDISS) and

• • high capacity connectivity (the JWICS). This new intelligence structure follows closely the new joint command organizatio~ as it should, because the intelligence structure must provide support to command. Although the services were not pleased with the new joint intelligence structure initially, they now seem to support it, at least on the JCS/CINC/JTF levels that function on the strategic and operational levels of warfare.

The services still retain intelligence organizations from the component level down, or what might be described as the tactical level of warfare. This has the advantage of providing direct intelligence support, but also presents problems regarding connectivity and the division of intelligence effort for interoperability and the unity of the intelligence effort. The architecture for the NMJIC, IlC/JAC, and the JTF IlC/IlSE structure seems well organized, and each service is engaged in building or improving its own intelligence architecture. Still at issue, however, is the connectivity, interoperability, and the division of infolligence effort among the services, as well as between the service components and the JTF.

Targeting and BDA are still problems and, despite the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War, there does not seem to be an obvious solution to this important aspect of warfare.

Another area of concern is the differing requirements for CINC IlC's. Do the functional CINC's need the same type of IlC as the geographic CINC's ? Clearly, the area CINC's need a fairly extensive IlC, but do the functional CINC's need an elaborate IlC, or should they rely primarily on the area CINC's to provide their intelligence production support.

The most serious problem facing the IlC/IAC structure is support to the actual operating forces. The tendency of intelligence organizations, especially when located with or near a CINC sta£t: is to support the CINC and the staff at the expense of the operating forces. This is an intelligence management problem, one that the J2 and even the CINC should monitor.

On balance, however, the military intelligence organizations have accomplished a remarkable restructuring in a relatively short period of time. The concepts, workstations, and connectivity are in place and operating. Continuing good management is required to ensure that ~ structure provides.the required support to the CINC and to the operating forces. The service intelligence organizatfons need to ensure that the structure of the intelligence equipment acquired, and the personnel trained, will interface properly with the new joint structure.

41

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X. ENDNOTES

A utlwr is indebted to the following soun:es in compiling this study:

• ''Restructuring to Meet the Challenge" - A series of articles that appeared in the Naval Intelligence Bulletin, Summer 1992.

• "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy", Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wtlson, USN, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1995.

• The many JIC personnel who gave so much of their time to show me their organizations, and the graphics they provided that are included in this report.

Note: Info on EUCOM is very dat~ having been collected during a briefinfonnal visit to EUCOM 12 in Oct 1992.

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