jones - history in foreign affairs 1965-2000

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BSIS Journal of International Studies Vol. 1, 2004

32

HISTORY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1965-2000

Milo Jones*

Foreign policy decision makers are influenced by prevailing policy ideas, many of which

are generated with recourse to History and references to the past, and then disseminated

through policy publications. One of the most influential of these publications is the US

Council for Foreign Relations' journal, Foreign Affairs. This article first makes the case

that this journal is a key informal input to US foreign policy-makers' decisions and

therefore to US foreign policy it then discusses the author's detailed examination of the

historical references (in terms of their scope, depth and temporal origin) in this journal

between 1965 and 2000. Based on this analysis and the criteria for the "good" use of

History established in debates between historians and political scientists, the author finds

that historical references in Foreign Affairs can be criticized as largely decorative,repetitious, epistemologically naive, and possibly even Orientalist (pace Edward Said).

Given the standing of Foreign Affairs, a corresponding negative impact on US foreign

policy can be inferred. Furthermore, the way in which historical references are used in

this journal supports wider-reaching insight into the way in which History and the past

are poorly used to justify, support and even predict events in current policy debates.

Finally, the data generated in this research leads the author to propose that a "Gravity

model" should supplant the Generational model when trying to predict the impact,

durability and perceived relevance of historical events and individuals on the policy

debate.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank the staff of BSIS as a whole, especiallyDr. Jarrod Wiener for his help in constructing this and other arguments Dr. ChristopherDaase, for stressing the need to make sure research is important as well asinteresting Dr. Mike Palo, for introducing me to the epistemological debate betweenhistorians and political scientists (and for pointing me towards some great sources)Ignacio Corrochano for his timely reminder of the Gravity Model in Economics andRachael Atkinson, for her assistance with logistics and proofreading.

INTRODUCTION: THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has long been recognised as one of the

most influential modern American institutions.1

Like the discipline of International

* Milo Jones holds a BA in Art History from Northwestern University, an MBA from the University ofKent. He is currently pursuing a PhD in International Relations at the University of Kents Brussels School

of International Studies.1

Inderjeet Parmar, "The Issue of State Power: The Council on Foreign Relations as a Case Study," The

Journal of American Studies 29, no. 1 (1995). p. 71.


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Relations (IR),2

the CFR traces its roots back to the First World War, in the CFRs casespecifically back to The Inquiry. The Inquiry was a working fellowship of

distinguished scholars assembled in New York City in the winter of 1917-18, tasked to

brief Woodrow Wilson about options for the postwar world once the Kaiser and imperialGermany [were defeated].

3

Historians differ about how seriously President Wilson took The Inquirys

efforts4 but what is certain is that in 1921, Americans who had participated in the Paris

Peace Conference of 1919,5 disappointed at being ignored and under-utilised6 during

the Conference, established the CFR in New York, on July 29, 1921.7

The Councilsintent was simple: to be a continuous conference on international questions affecting the

United States.8

Though non-partisan, the CFR has long been recognised as the voice ofAmericas Establishment.9 As Parmar wryly notes, the CFRs founders tried to avoidthe taint of political partisanship by deliberately appointing one well-known millionaire

Wall Street lawyer from each of the Democratic and Republican parties.10 Today,Council members are expected to be responsible and informed individuals withreasonably predictable views, temperaments and associates.11

The heyday of the CFRs clout was during and soon after the Second World War,when it enjoyed a semi-official status, close to government but distinct from it12. In1947, as part of the CFRs Committee for the Marshall Plan, member Arthur W. Pagewrote our ideas will control the world.13 With the benefit of hindsight, Parmar couldwrite in 1995: If isolationism was largely overcome in the 1940s, it was not purelythrough the educative force of events: organisations that were ostensibly private, like theCFR, were a vital part of the process of both elaborating the new consensus anddisseminating its central principles.14

And ever since its foundation, the primary way the CFR has reached a wider public with its views has been through its journal Foreign Affairs (FA), which has beenpublished continuously since 1922.

THE CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

2Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (London: Palgrave, 1997). pp. 21-63

Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). p. 1.4

Ibid., p. 1.5

According to Parmar, specifically, the key members were Whitney Hart Shepardson, Thomas Lamont and

Isaiah Bowman.6

Parmar, "The Issue of State Power." p. 78.7David C. Hendrickson, "Review Essay Inquiring Minds: The Story of the Council on Foreign Relations,"

Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (1997). p. 159.8

Grose, Continuing the Inquiry. p. 9.9

Hendrickson, "Review Essay Inquiring Minds." p. 160.10

Parmar, "The Issue of State Power." p. 79.11

Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign

Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). p. 248.12

Hendrickson, "Review Essay Inquiring Minds." p. 161.13

Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War

(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994). p. 171.14

Parmar, "The Issue of State Power." p. 75.


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It is clear that in any discussion of the CFR and its importance today, influence is

problematic both as a concept and as a phenomenon for measurement15

and that no

adequate social scientific tools exist that objectively measure influence. 16 Someobservers maintain, for example, that Council officials and friends have oftenexaggerated the bodys importance...,17 while others feel that ...failure to be asked to be

a member of the Council has been regarded for a generation as a presumption ofunsuitability for high office in the national security bureaucracy.18

Whatever the role of the CFR, most media observers agree with ColumbiaJournalism Reviews opinion that FA is an immensely influential journal in American

foreign policy circles.19

Since 1922, FA has frequently set the limits of respectabledebate20 and helped form the climate of opinion21 in which US foreign policy isdebated and made.

Anecdotal evidence confirming FAs importance is abundant. Consider the words

of Japanese Governor Shintaro Ishihara: How to influence American policy towardJapan: Make a speech at Stanford and write an article for Foreign Affairs.

2222 Time

magazine called FA The most influential periodical in print and Newsweekreferred to itas The pre-eminent journal of its kind.

But to characterise FAs influence anecdotally is not to identify the socialmechanism by which influence is exercised or to confirm its actual impact.Understanding the social mechanism, or transmission belt,23 by which FA influencesUS foreign policy requires two steps. The first is to establish that according to severalschools of thought within IR theory, ideas, and decision-makers behaviour arising out ofthese ideas, matter to foreign policy formation and to state conduct. The second step is to

prove that FA readers are such decision-makers. To take these steps seriatim:

One approach to explaining foreign policy conduct is the state-centric view. 24 Inthis view, domestic or foreign organisations like the CFR, not to mention a journal like

15Ibid., p. 86.

16Ibid., p. 86.

17Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs. p. xi.

18Ibid., p. 248.

19Camille Finefrock, "Players Only: Where Media and Foreign Policy Elites Talk Geopolitics," Columbia

Journalism Review (2001). p. 42.20

Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and

United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). p. 6.21

Ibid., p. 6.22

Anonymous, " Foreign Affairs Media Kit," (New York, NY: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

Available http://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/.23

For a discussion of the importance of mechanisms and an exploration of the transmission belt

metaphor, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, "Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay," in Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg eds.

(Cambridge: CUP, 1998.24

See for example Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/


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FA, are not important in foreign affairs. Against this highly debatable25

view, however,the following argument can be advanced:

Foreign policy has to be understood as being made in certain domestic andinternational contexts by...state institutions that mobilize domestic groups andindividuals for the achievement of state-determined policy objectives. The

democratic features of the political system and the diversity of attitudes and

interests in a continental-sized nation, however, ensure that the state cannot

lead without national mobilisation and cannot mobilise without taking due

regard for the major social, economic and political interests within the United

States.26

(Emphasis added).

Alexander Wendt makes a broader, but equally compelling case for theimportance of ideas (and therefore the transmitters of ideas, like FA) in international life:

the key is to reclaim power and interest from materialism by showing how their contentand meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. In other words, it makes sense to

begin our theorizing about international politics with the distribution of ideas...in thesystem, and then bring in material forces, rather than the other way around.

27Moreover,

as Levy says, Most research in social psychology concludes that interpretation of realitytends to be more theory-driven than data-driven,

28and Deborah Larsons classic study

the Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation29 demonstrates the validity of

such conclusions. Hermann, Hermann and Hagans work has been even more specific,and has exhaustively documented how human decision-making processes and ideasinfluence the foreign policy behaviour of individuals, single groups, and multiplegroups.30

But what about the argument that FA is an essentially scholarly journal, and thatscholarly IR theory can be divorced from foreign policy? Despite FAs self-appointedmandate described above, a critic could maintain that FA is perceived to be a scholarly,

not policy, publication. (EBSCO, the academic data retrieval system, specificallycategorises it as a "Scholarly [Peer Reviewed]31 Journal). Kenneth Waltz, for example,

insists on a sharp distinction between foreign policy and IR theory,32

saying that askingneorealist theory to explain specific policies of states is like asking the law of gravity to

25For the classic exploration of the tangle of goals that can explain or motivate foreign policy behavior, see

Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , Seconded. (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). passim.26

Parmar, "The Issue of State Power." p. 76.27

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, ed. Steve Smith, Cambridge Studies in

International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). p. 371.28

J. S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International

Organization 48 (1994a). Footnote 12.29

Deborah W. Larson, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1985). passim.30

Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann, and Joe Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy

Behaviour," in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy , ed. Charles Hermann, Jr. Charles Kegley,and James Rosenau (London: HarperCollins, 1987). pp. 313-18.31

Though this is a mistake: FA is not peer-reviewed.32

Kenneth. N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6 (1996). passim.


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A lot of policy influence might be inferred from the evidence above, but do FAreaders documented education, wealth and internationalism, and its international

distribution, really translate into policy influence? According to data derived from Erdos

& Morgan Opinion Leaders 1998- 1999 and 2000-2001, they do, and quite powerfully:

Foreign Affairs is read by more individuals who directly affect

legislative/governmental policy issues than the National Journal, CongressionalQuarterly, Aviation Week, or Janes Defense Weekly...A reader of Foreign

Affairs is almost three times more likely to influence a legislative/governmentalissue than a reader of Business Week... Foreign Affairs is read by more

individuals who directly influence military and defense spending than AviationWeek, Janes Defense Weekly, The National Journal, Roll CallorCongressionalQuarterly...A reader of Foreign Affairs is five times more likely to influencedefense spending than a reader ofBusiness Week, Forbes, or Fortune...A reader

of Foreign Affairs is more likely to influence business issues than a reader ofThe EconomistorHarvard Business Review...A reader ofForeign Affairs is fourtimes more likely to influence trade issues than a reader of Business Week or

Fortune. [FA readers] academic achievement has also made them extraordinarilyactive in public life. Compared to the national average, they are almost eighttimes as likely to have written something for publication, almost nine times aslikely to have addressed a public gathering, and over seven times as likely tohave worked actively for a political party or candidate.

4040

In short, ideas matter, and through its circulation among the major social,economic and political interests of America and abroad, FA reaches educated, wealthy

and international individuals directly involved in government policy and legislation,defence spending, business, and trade. It also reaches thousands of educators and studentsin Political Science and History. If there were ever a publicly circulated journal that

influences US foreign policy, FA is it.

FOREIGN POLICY AND HISTORY

So far I have asserted that the expression of ideas often through journals like FA- matters in foreign policy, and also proved that the FA readership matters in the

formation and the conduct of US foreign policy. But what about historical information? Isit possible to isolate historical information as a subset of these ideas that matter in

policy formation? I believe that it is, and before exploring the demonstrable historicalcontent ofFA, I will explain why.

In 1973, May41 argued that Men in power often make decisions on the basis of

their impressions of the past, that these impressions are often mistaken, and that a more

40All data derived from Erdos & Morgan Opinion Leaders 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, and cited in the

2002 Foreign Affairs Readers Profile.41

Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New

York,: Oxford University Press, 1973). passim.


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critical and systematic use of history would improve their decisions.42

While historicalknowledges influence relative to other factors is difficult to gauge accurately43 (and

some argue, Occasionally a lack of historical memory may be a positive benefit in

making policy decisions),44 it is difficult to dispute the assertion that historicalknowledge is a central part of every policy problem.

45This assertion can be sustained on

many levels, as we shall now explore.

Jervis maintains in his classic Perception and Misperception in InternationalPolitics that at the very least, the lessons [of history] are perceptual predispositions.46

Fry is more specific, saying that for the policy-maker historical knowledge provides the basis for their casual opinions, general attitudes, predispositions, perceptions, images,

beliefs, convictions and axioms and for their values, preferences and expectations...[it]provides their governing concepts, propositions and seemingly powerful theories of howthe world works, it helps statesmen construct their mental maps.47 Vertzberger is moreexplicit still, saying that in policy information processing and decision-making,

historical knowledge plays four roles: 1) defining the situation, 2) circumscribing the roleof the actors 3) determining strategy, and 4) justifying the strategy.

48

Jeffrey Record has clearly illustrated the importance of the use of history in theseroles in a recent study of American Presidential decisions to use (or not to use) force inforeign affairs. In this study, he details the use of historical knowledge in the policyformation of Truman in Korea, Eisenhower in Indochina, Kennedy and Johnson inVietnam and the Caribbean, Nixon and Kissinger in Vietnam, Reagan in Lebanon,Grenada, Central America and Afghanistan, Bush in Panama, the Persian Gulf andSomalia, and Clinton in Haiti and the Balkans.49

This impressive list raises the question ofwhy historical knowledge is employed

(when it is consciously recognized as such), in policy. Fry argues that policy-makers findin history certainty where uncertainty reigns,50 and statesmen often find in the

42Arthur M. Jr. Schlesinger, "Review of " 'Lessons' of the Past", by Ernest May," The Journal of American

History 61 (1974). p. 443. Along with Neustadt, in 1986 May delivered a series of specific frameworks for

decision-makers to back up his suggestion and to help them make better use of the past. See: Richard E.

Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: FreePress Collier Macmillan, 1986). passim.43

Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from

Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002). p. 60, and reinforced on p. 165.44

A. N. Gilbert, "International Relations and the Relevance of History," International Studies Quarterly 12

(1968). p. 351.45

Michael G. Fry, "Introduction," in History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians

(London: Pinter Publishers, 1991). p. 3.46

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1976). pp. 222-25.47

Fry, "Introduction." p. 2.48

Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied

History and Its Shortcomings," International Studies Quarterly 30 (1986). p. 225.49

Record, Making War, Thinking History. passim. For other examples see also Maciej Bartkowski, "The

Impact of Analogies on the Foreign Policies of the United States and Great Britain: The Case ofIntervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Rubikon: E-Journal(2002).50

Fry, "Introduction." p. 13.


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historical record a particular form of evidence that they regard as authoritative.51

In particular, current events dominated by a single leader tend to lead policy-makers to

retrieve historical figures against which to compare him.52

Another common area where

historical information is used is during surprising events53 and military crises. FA readers,for example, might draw upon what they know of history under these circumstances

because of the high level of drama, stakes and time pressures,54 or to fill in the blanks

when information is scarce.55

Certainly decision-makers also use historical knowledge in policy formation

purely rhetorically. Historical references are trigger words that help decision-makersachieve what scholars in the field of political communication call interpretive

dominancethat is, the widespread acceptance of ones own characterization of a particular issue.56 As Lakoff observes, the people who get to impose their metaphors on[a] culture get to define what we consider to be trueabsolutely and objectively true. 57

As a result, some argue that historical references and analogies are often made merely to

justify previously made policy choices.58

Before leaving this discussion of the use of history in policy-making, a specialcategory of the use of historical references has to be explained: historical analogies. Thisis because the use of historical analogy, or precedent based reasoning, has beenadvanced as a key cognitive mechanism in the analysis of international politics.59 Itmay be hyperbole to maintain that the United States went to war [in the Persian Gulf in1991] over an [historical] analogy,60 but it is also difficult to dismiss the notion thatWithout historical analogies, every foreign policy crisis would be unique.

61Moreover,

research confirms that both individuals and groups use historical analogies in policyformation.

62In Analogies at War, Khong explores historical analogies and decision-

51Ibid. p. 1152

Scot Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice: Historical Analogies and the Decisions to Use Military Force in

Regional Contingencies (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000). p. 199.53

Scot Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," Diplomacy &

Statecraft13, no. 4 (2002). p. 44.54

Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 18. For other examples of this phenomenon, see David Patrick

Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations," British Journal of

Political Science 26 (1996).55

Philip E. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World

Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?," American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2

(1999). p. 338.56

Roland Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War," Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 3 (2002). p. 425.57

Mark Johnson George Lakoff, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). p.160.58

Andrew J Taylor and John T. Rourke, "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy

Process," The Journal of Politics 7, no. 2 (1995).59Philip A. Schrodt, "Pattern Recognition of International Crises Using Hidden Markov Models," in

Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann Arbor, MI: University of

Michigan Press, 2000). p. 296.60

Barbara A. Spellman and Keith J. Holyoak, "If Saddam Is Hitler Then Who Is George Bush? Analogical

Mapping between Systems of Social Roles," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62, no. 6(1992). p. 913.61

Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. ix.62

Ibid., p. 5.


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making in depth. He argues that historical analogies assist policy-makers by performingthree diagnostic tasks 1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policy-

maker, 2) help assess the stakes, and 3) provide prescriptions. In addition, they help

policy-makers evaluate alternative options by 1) predicting their chances of success, 2)evaluating their moral rightness, 3) warning about the dangers associated with theoptions.63

As a refinement of Khong, MacDonald introduces the idea of master analogies,i.e. clusters of analogies based on events which are used because they are presumed to

be widely understood by policy-makers and the public64

An example of an analogycluster or master analogy might be Hitler /Munich /Appeasement/ Chamberlain/

outbreak of WWII. Many master analogies apparently overlap with or mirror themyths of IR described in the section above.

But when asked How well are [historical] analogies used? Khong with othersconcludes Not very well.65 Among other reasons, this is because Availability is a key

factor in determining which historical analogy will be chosen a person estimates theprobability of an event by the ease with which similar instances can be recalled

66 just as

important, the impact of readily available information is often not conscious. 67 Like thedrunk who looked for his keys not where he dropped them, but under the lamppost wherethe light was better, people often seek inadequate information that is readilyavailable...

68Humans are cognitive misers who seek simple, easy heuristics (such as

historical analogies) to solve problems69 this leads to common errors and bias.70 Some ofthese errors will form the basis for my argument below that FA falls short in its service to

policy-makers.The final refinement in this short review of how and why decision-makers use

historical information is to note the existence of the Generational Model. MacDonald

and others argue (following Mannheim)71 that there is a Generational model at work inthe use of history, in which the common experiences of a cohort or generation whenthey are between the ages of 17 and 25 in elite groups have an impact on policy

formation about two decades later.72 Jervis appears to be in qualified agreement with thistheory,73 and at least one scholar goes so far as to argue that these generationally

63Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of

1965 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992). P. 10.64

Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow." p. 4365

Khong, Analogies at War. p. 9.66

Ibid., p. 212, quoting Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging

Frequency and Probability," in Judgement under Uncertainty, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, andAmos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).67

Robert Jervis, "The Drunkard's Search," in Explorations in Political Psychology, ed. Shanto Iyengar and

William James McGuire (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1993). p. 345.68

Ibid., p. 339.69

Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 207.70

Many of which are catalogued in Jervis, Perception and Misperception, and Richard Heuer, The

Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Center for Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1999).71

Howard Schuman and Cheryl Rieger, "Historical Analogies, Generational Effects, and Attitudes toward

War," American Sociological Review 57, no. June (1992). p. 315.72

Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 9 and Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow." p. 42.73

Jervis, Perception and Misperception. p. 253-71.


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significant events from decision-makers youth form the primary paradigm for theforeign policy decisions taken when they are adults.74 As I will argue below, however,

based on the evidence of historical references in FA, I think that a different model

provides a better explanation for the patterns at work.

CATALOGUING THE HISTORICAL REFERENCES IN FA

Having established the influence of FA, and the importance of historicalinformation in the foreign policy process, we can now turn to the analysis of the journalshistorical content. Using a combination of physical and electronic searches of thecontents of the journal, I devised a method to establish the identity and frequency ofhistorical figures, events and epochs referenced in FA from 1965 to 2000. Mymethodology is predicated on the idea that one can draw conclusions about how well FAuses history through a large-scale analysis of what historical references are used in the

journal and how frequently (the number of hits per reference).I will begin by briefly describing the process of textual analysis that I devised.

There were eleven steps:1. I selected the online search service EBSCOhost BSP and its text search capability

to review issues in my chosen time period.75

2. I selected issues of FA from 1965 (the first full year available) to 200076 as the population for analysis (172 Issues).

3. I selected a random sample77 of twenty percent78 (thirty-four issues)79 of the totalissue population for closer examination. (NB: though some years were skipped in

the random sample, I relied on the law of large numbers80

to pick up most commonhistorical references over the entire period, because thirty-four is a statistically

significant sample of a population of 172, and the text search described belowwould search all issues in the population.)

74Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy,"

Political Science Quarterly 89, no. Fall (1974). At least one large scale survey contradicts this finding. It

argues that in terms of predicting foreign-policy predilections, generation proved to be a much less potentexplanation than occupation. See Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend

on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," Public

Opinion Quarterly 10, no. Spring (1980). (1997), 76:6 (1997), 77:1 (1998), 77:4 (1998), 77:6 (1998), and79:6 (2000).75

Accessed via http://library.kent.ac.uk/library/online/journals/76

An admittedly arbitrary cut-off point, but one which. generated enough issues for meaningful analysis of

FA content.77

Generated by http://www.random.org/sform.html.78

Emil G. Milewski, The Essentials of Statistics (Piscataway, NJ: Research and Education Association,

1989). p. 106.79

These thirty-fourForeign Affairs issues were: 44:1 (1965), 45:3 (1966), 46:1 (1967), 47:2 (1968), 49:2

(1970), 49:3 (1970), 51:2 (1972), 52:2 (1973), 52:3 (1973), 52:4 (1973), 53:2 (1974),55:1 (1976), 56:3

(1977), 57:2 (1978), 57:4 (1978), 58:1 (1979), 59:1 (1980), 60:5 (1981), 62:1 (1983), 63:2 (1984), 67:1

(1988), 68:4 (1989), 71:2 (1992), 73:1 (1994), 75:4 (1996), 75:5 (1996), 76:1 (1997), 76:2 (1997),76:3(1997), 76:6 (1997), 77:1 (1998), 77:4 (1998), 77:6 (1998), and 79:6 (2000).80i.e.: the sample mean approaches the population mean as the sample size increases See Anonymous,

"Laws of Large Numbers," in A Dictionary of Statistics, ed. Graham Upton and Ian Cook (OxfordUniversity Press, 2002).


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4. The entire contents, minus advertising, of each issue in the sample81

(using the physical copy of the journal in the ULB Library) were reviewed for all references

to: historical events, historical epochs, historical figures or significant

contemporary figures.82

5. I recorded these references, and screened them for repeats, alternativenomenclatures etc.83, which gave me a list of 564 historical references.

6. Using EBSCO, I performed a text search for all of the references I collected in stepfive, above. The number of times that each reference occurred was also recorded in

the same spreadsheet. For example: a search for Allende generated sixty-threehits.

7. I determined the nature of the section where the reference was found, that is,whether it occurred in a book review, letter to the editor, etc., rather than in anactual policy article, and recorded the numbers of hits according to their sourcesection. For example, of the sixty-three references to Allende, above, twenty- two

occurred in Recent Books on International Relations, letters to the Editor, orsomething similar.

8. To test the effect of time passing on contemporary (i.e., 1965 to 2000) references, afive-year exclusion period was assigned to these references. This was done bynoting the end date of the active political life of a figure, or the occurrence of anevent,

84and then adding five years. For example: Salvador Allende, above, died in

1973. Therefore, he was assigned a contemporary reference exclusion year of1978.

9. The full-text reference search was then rerun on these references to see how manymentions were made of each figure or event from the exclusion year onwards. Tocontinue the Allende example, an EBSCO search of FA was run for the period

1978- 2000, which generated thirty-two hits, of which ten were found to be inbook reviews, etc, rather than articles.

10. When this process was complete, and two particular patterns (described below),

were noticed, an additional eighty-two reference terms were added and searches runto help confirm some biases apparently detected in the first cut of the data (in

particular, the additions included any US Presidents or Secretaries of State missingfrom the original list, plus additional prominent Western pre-20th century people,

epochs and events85

), for a final total of 646 terms searched.11. Finally, it became clear during the course of the analysis that there were problem

areas with a small number of references which could impact the results. These

81This required about 40 minutes per issue, or about 23 reviewing hours in toto.

82Contemporary at the time of the issue what/who was significant was an admittedly subjective

judgement.83

Unfortunately, they also had to be screened for nouns used to refer to historical epochs when capitalized

(e.g. The Reformation, The Renaissance, The Plague etc.) because the full text search capability of

EBSCO cannot be setup to be sensitive to capitalization. For the possible problems this fact creates, see

Appendix I.84

This one was done by consulting Peter Teed, ed ., A Dictionary of Twentieth Century History: 1914-1992

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)., http://www.infoplease.com/, andhttp://politicalgraveyard.com/index.html.85

Selected for their general familiarity at World History section ofhttp://www.infoplease.com.
http://www.infoplease.com/http://politicalgraveyard.com/index.htmlhttp://www.infoplease.com/


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areas, and the decisions taken as to how to deal with them, have been set out inAppendix I.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

As described above, I searched thirty-five years ofFA (172 issues) for the presence

of 646 historical reference terms in policy articles. What were the results? In terms ofsize, the results of this search can be summarized as follows:

There were 16,461 raw references (hits) overall

When contemporary (as defined above) hits are excluded from these, there were12,151 hits

Of these, however, twenty-four percent (2,947) were in book reviews and letters tothe editor, not policy articles

When both these factors are accounted for, the total number of historical referencehits in FA policy articles from 1965 to 2000 is 9,204, or an average of fifty-four perissue.

At first glance this seems an impressive amount of history in the policy discussions in FA. A closer look at the data, however, reveals that this is not the case: Of the 9,204 hits on 646 references, a staggering fifty-six percent (4,007) are

accounted for by only twenty-five people or events, with the top five accounting fortwenty percent (1,831) of the total. In other words, the scope of historical referencesin FA is extremely restricted

Even extending the list of reference terms (e.g. by adding to the reference list, andtesting, the complete list of all US Presidents and Secretaries of State, as opposed to

only those found in the issues sampled see point 10, above) did not broaden thescope. Rather, I determined that in thirty-five years of policy articles, nine US

presidents and eighteen Secretaries of State are never mentioned in FA at all an

additional eight and fourteen of them, respectively, are mentioned only once or twice.In other words, FA policy articles have a severe case of historical amnesia with

respect to American foreign policy leadership.

The temporal scale of the historical references reflects the same historical amnesia:

Only thirteen percent (1,226) of the total hits referred to events or people thatoccurred prior to the 20 th century. Again, these pre-20th Century references were

narrow, with only twenty-five people and events accounting for forty-nine percent(618) of the total, and with five references accounting for sixteen percent (194) of the

total number of hits.

In 20th

Century references, FAs narrowness continued: Fifty-eight percent (5,329) of the total hits were to people and events circa 1900 to

1965 of these, sixty-five percent (3,442) are accounted for by only twenty-fivereferences, and just five accounted for thirty-two percent (1,718) of the total of hits.

The remaining twenty-nine percent (2,649) of hits are on people or events from 1965to 2000 (excluding contemporary mentions) of these sixty- five percent (1,741) are


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accounted for by the top twenty-five references, and five account for thirty percent(786) of the total.

In terms of the effect of time passing on contemporary references, it was found to

cut hits by an average of forty-six percent. In other words, though very few (only four)significant contemporary events and people disappeared completely from reference afterfive years, their historical presence, especially in policy articles, decays quite rapidly.

The Mayaguez Incident, for example, is referred to four times within five years of itsoccurrence in 1975. After 1980, however, it drops out of policy articles entirely, despite

the fact that the US attempted another hostage rescue in that very year (in Iran). Thispattern has interesting implications for the Gravity model I describe below.

And finally, when one examines the FA data closely, another trend becomesevident: a disproportionate reliance on pre-20th century people and events when referringto Asia. While only four percent (373) of the total hits on historical people and eventsmentioned are exclusively Asian,86 when the field of study is restricted to pre-20th

Century references this percentage rises to twelve percent - and furthermore, exclusivelyAsian references make up sixteen percent (four) of the twenty-five most common pre-20

th

century references in policy articles.Given the apparent trend in the nature of the Asian references, a further test was in

order. Therefore, additional Western references deemed to be of a similar type wereadded to the reference search list (as with US Presidents and Secretaries of State, thesewere not obtained from the physical examination of the FA copies, but were added in tothe search). Because, for example, policy articles in FA mention the Chin, Han, Manchu,Ming, Qing, Sung, and Tang Dynasties in China, the Meiji period in Japan, and theMogul Empire in India, searches were run on Western proxy terms and people such asFeudalism, Middle ages, Celts, Roman Empire, Jacobite and Louis XIV.

Nevertheless, the lack of equivalence (300 percent) between Asian hits overall and pre-20th Century Asian hits persisted, as the numbers above reflect.

FAS UNCONSCIOUS DISDAIN FOR HISTORY

Based on the evidence above, I would argue that FA uses historical references in alargely unexamined and uncritical manner. Such usage may even reflect, in Schroeders

words, an unconscious disdain87

for history. This conclusion can be justified in severalways.

First, this conclusion is supported by the fact that that almost a quarter (twenty-four percent) of the total historical references in the journal are made outside of policy

articles, coming instead largely from the section of the journal entitled "Recent Books on International Relations" (emphasis added). The fact of this large percentage is easy to

explain that section ofFA, despite its name, actually reviews large numbers of booksabout history by historians. But this fact is part of the problem, not ammunition in FAs

defence, because failure to distinguish a work of history from a work of political scienceis to invite the sort of un-scientific cherry-picking of history that historians abhor and

86By exclusively Asian, I mean having no Western hand in their existence. i.e., Mao Zedong or the Han

Dynasty are exclusively Asian, while the Korean and Vietnam Wars are not because America participatedin them.87

P. W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality Vs. Neo- Realist Theory," International Security 19 (1994). p. 148.


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responsible social scientists condemn. As one critic argues, the work of historians is notunderstood by historians to be, and cannot legitimately be treated by others as, an

unproblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited

for framing problems and testing theories,88 but FAs lumping of history in with otherworks invites decision-makers to do exactly that. The American journals shortcomingsin this regard are especially egregious when one considers the example ofInternational

Affairs, the journal published by the sister organisation of the CFR in the UK, The RoyalInstitute of International Affairs this journal very carefully distinguishes between books

under review that are about IR and books under review that are about history. Such adistinction would not solve every problem with FAs use of history, but it is an important

first step.Second, the pitiful breadth of the historical references in FA policy articles revealed

allows one to infer a lack of reflection at the CFR about historical references as a whole.When it was founded, FA noted that technical articles will be left to more special

magazines,89 but FA appears to have drifted too far from a thoughtful approach for apolicy magazine (at least insofar as historiography and modern issues of epistemology areconcerned). In 1984, for example, one critic ofFA noted that in a single issue two of thearticles lead with quotes from Winston Churchill, the savior of the unimaginative after-dinner speaker.90 When only twenty-five references out of 646 account for fifty-six

percent of all hits over thirty-five years (Churchill among them, at number fifteen!), onecan repeat the charge for the entire period of analysis. This lack of breadth also makes itlikely that no account is taken in policy articles of the subtlety required when makingreference to historical figures and events, even though responsible techniques for usinghistorical sources are available, but they require understanding the extent to which

patterns within historiography rather than History, must be the direct focus of

investigation and explanation.91 In short, it seems likely that historical references are being used in FA more as dignified background92 than to put ideas, theories andrecommendations through any sort of rigorous screen for evidence. Illustrating one of the

historians charges of the worst abuse of history by IR, in FA references to Napoleon,Munich, Stalin, or Pearl Harbor (all in the top twenty-five) may merely salt articles

with the appearance of depth and profundity.The same can be said of the the tyranny of recent history 93 that is clearly at work

in FA (as evidenced by the fact that eighty- seven percent of all historical references hitswere to events and people in the twentieth century). One IR scholar notes that the

academic comparative advantage, which applies to International Relations no less than to

88I. S. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the

Problem of Selection Bias," American Political Science Review 90 (1996). p. 605.89

Archibald Cary Coolidge, "Editorial Statement," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 1 (1922). p. 1.90

Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs. p. 251.91

Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science." p. 605.92

The expression is used in Nevil Johnson, The Limits of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1989). Chapter 2, passim.93

The expression is used in Nevil Johnson, The Limits of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1989). Chapter 2, passim.


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any other subject, is a long time perspective,94

but FA has obviously disposed of thisadvantage in favour of what Smith referred to in his catalogue of the abuse of history in

IR as presentism.95

In fact, the lack of historical breadth and depth in FA makes it highly likely thatmany historical references are not really references to history at all, but instead arereferences to the Clichs of memory,96 or myth.97 By myth I mean, a synonym for

a representation or a story, simplified or illusory, which deals with a past event but whichhas an explanatory power in the present day. It is illusory or simplified, because a myth,

although always having an objective foundation, differs from [history] qualitatively byexaggerating or otherwise transforming the facts.98 Munich, for example, is the most

powerful and influential political myth of the second half of the twentieth century99

(though there have been numerous attempts to explode it, 100 including in FA itself.101)Among other common historical myths employed in policy are Prussia, 102 Yalta,103

the Special Relationship,104 The Spanish Civil War, and Din Bin Phu.105 This

matters for a policy journal not least because what these myths are said to have incommon is their reliance on a stark monocausality.

106Instead of illuminating the real

conduct or consequence of foreign policy, historical myths have the same function as

94Christopher Hill, "Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance," in Two

Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas , ed. Pamela Beshoffand Christopher Hill (New York: Routledge, 1994). p. 20.95

The term is used in Smith, History and International Relations. passim.96

The expression seems to have been first used in Marcellin Hodeir, "Clichs of Our Memory," in Hauntedby History: Myths in International Relations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI:

Berghahn Books, 1998).97

Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, "Introduction: Of Myths and Men," in Haunted by History: Myths in

International Relations,ed. Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books,, 1998). p. viii.98

Aline Angoustures, "The Spanish Civil War: "Betrayal" by the Bourgeois Democracies," in Haunted by

History: Myths in International Relations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn

Books,, 1998). p. 54.99

David Chuter, "Munich, or the Blood of Others," in Haunted by History: Myths in International

Relations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books,, 1998). p. 65.100

See among others: Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," International Security 14 (1989).

Chuter, "The Blood of Others." Spellman and Holyoak, "If Saddam Is Hitler." Macdonald, "Hitler's

Shadow." May, " Lessons" of the Past. and Arno J. Mayer, "Greece Is Not Munich," The Nation, March

25, 1968.101

Gerhard Weinberg, "Munich after Fifty Years," Foreign Affairs 67 (1988).102

Robert Cooper, "The Myth of Prussia," in Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations, ed.

Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books,, 1998).103

Reiner Marcowitz, "Yalta, the Myth of the Division of the World," in Haunted by History: Myths in

International Relations, ed. Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1998).104

John Baylis, "The 'Special Relationship': A Diverting British Myth?," in Haunted by History: Myths in

International Relations,ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1998).105

Hodeir, "Cliches of Our Memory." p. 104.106

Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, "Conclusions: Historical Myths and the Denial of Change," in

Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence,RI: Berghahn Books,, 1998). p. 263.


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classical myths, with a moral dimension that assigns a value system of guilt and punishment, or of redemption through sacrifice...107on the past and on policy.

In FAs defence one may say that historical analogies, at least, have to be familiar

to fulfil their simplifying role.108 Historical references as a whole, however, should beconsiderably more rich, and more detailed forFAs use of history to stand up to scrutiny(NB: though my research did not check the detail offered by each reference in each

article, the lack of diversity in the reference distribution as a whole make me comfortablewith this conclusion). Thucydides backed up his conclusions with proper historical

analysis, current examples, and observations of political actors both inside and outside ofthe state in question.109 The heavy reliance on a few references, and the speed with

which most references to the past decay in FA, make it unlikely that its articles aredoing the same.

And finally, FAs incredible bias in favour of pre-20 th century references to Asian people and events in policy articles supports the charge of an unreflective and

unselfconscious use of history. My analysis revealed that the Wars of the Roses, theMerovingian and Capetian Kings, the Conquistadors of South and Central America, andthe Mason-Dixon Line have not once in thirty-five years been summoned to make a pointin FAs policy articles in contrast, the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Mongols, the MeijiRestoration and Chinese dynasties stretching back literally thousands of years arerelatively commonly employed in their policy articles.

While it is outside the scope of this article to explore why this bias might be presentin FA beyond the unreflective use of history and historical references generally, it is atleast possible that what my analysis reveals is a classic case of Orientalism, in whichcertain parts of the globe are to Western eyes a fact, which if it develops, changes orotherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is

fundamentally, even ontologically, stable.110 In other words, while FA is unlikely toexplain Spains foreign policy in terms of the Moors, or the UKs in terms of the NormanConquest, historically distant events are more likely to be summoned to frame policy

arguments about China and Japan. Even if none of the other arguments above could bemade in terms of the unexamined and uncritical use of history by FA, this Asian bias

alone would sustain the charges.

MASTER ANALOGIES A GENERATIONAL OR A GRAVITY MODEL?

107Ibid. p. 269.

108Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 196.

109L. M. Bagby, "The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations," International

Organization 48 (1994). p. 148.110

Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 1995). p.

32.


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My analysis also cast into doubt a theory about the use of historical references in policy formation. As described above, MacDonald, Jervis,111 et al, argue that there may

be a generational model at work in the use of history in policy-making, in which the

common experiences of a cohort or generation when they are between the ages of 17and 25 in elite groups become master analogies and have an impact on policyformation about two decades later.112

My research does not support this thesis as a single explanation for the choice ofreferences. If this were the case, one would not expect to find the First World War and

the Second World War (and variations thereof, like Nazis) overwhelmingly in the topfive historical references in FA for 1965 to 2000, and nor would one expect to find so

many related references (or components of master analogies) to these two conflicts inthe top twenty-five references (see the Top Twenty-Five lists in Appendix I). One wouldexpect rather to see some equality of numbers of hits between the Second World War,Korea and Vietnam in fact, we see close parity between the latter two, but a massively

larger number of Second World War hits. Similarly, we find Napoleon in the top twenty-five references, where the Generational model cannot be responsible for hisappearance.113

Though the manner in which master analogies from history form and aresustained remains a mystery (indeed remains virgin territory for research 114), I wouldargue that a model originally borrowed from Newtonian Physics and since applied widelyin Economics115 fits the data better: a Gravity Model. A gravity model predicts that theinfluence of an object or the pull of gravity from it is positively related to the size ofthe object, and inversely related to the distance between objects thus, in most models, [it]increases with size and decreases with distance.

116Identification of gravitationally

significant people or events, and assessment of their relative sizes/effects, could be

achieved by high volume textual analysis of the type demonstrated in this article withregard to FA. The Gravity model could then be applied to predict their longevity andon-going influence. One might thereby uncover, for example, a tendancy for policy

articles to remember (i.e. cite) events more on the basis of their seeming gravity orshock value (e.g. the assassination of a president, a major terrorist attack, etc.) rather

than on the basis of their aptness with contemporary policy questions, or the generationalexperiences of contemporary policy-makers. This model seems to explain better than the

generational model the refusal of events such as Versaille, Munich, and PealHarbor to leave the stage of historical references two and even three generations of

policy-makers after their occurance. It would further predict that a shocking event such asthe terrorist attacks in America of September 11, 2001 will be refered to not only in the

111Jervis, Perception and Misperception. p. 253-71.

112Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. P. 9 and Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow." p. 42.

113If the argument is made that there has been more time for the Second World War to be absorbed and

referenced than for the other two examples, then the generational model is immediately being brought intoquestion.114

Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 215.115

Anonymous, "Gravity Model," in A Dictionary of Economics, ed. John Black (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002).116

Anonymous, "Gravity Model," in Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. Craig Calhoun (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002).


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policy debates of 2021, but also those of 2051 a prediction which seems safe, evenbanal, but which the Generational model of MacDonald, Jervis et al does not support.

In short, while my research sheds no light on how the larger planets of master

analogies form, it opens a path to reconsidering and expanding the Generational modeland its prediction of dominant opinion-forming events or people. The Gravity modelcan be used to identify the presence and persistence of reference points in the policy

debate.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

FA

FAs website boasts Inevitably, articles published in Foreign Affairs shape thepolitical dialogue for months and years to come.117 This is true, but FAs use of historyalso makes this fact problematic. As I argue above, Men in power often make decisionson the basis of their impressions of the past, that these impressions are often mistaken,

and that a more critical and systematic use of history would improve their decisions.118

Therefore, I argue that at least three changes in FA are required to ensure a more criticaland systematic use of history in the journal.

First, the editors ofFA (who commission many of its articles rather than receivingsubmissions119) should insist that instead of relying on a few historical references fromthe recent past, its authors expand and enrich the historical content of their articles.Should these authors be unable or unwilling to do so, FA should consider whether theydeserve a voice in a journal of its influence and ambitions. To borrow Schroeders words,The sign I am trying to post on historical terrain...is not Keep OffPrivate Property(which would be absurd) but rather Thin Ice .

120A particular point for the editors to

address in this context is the ensuring of a consistent and reasonable balance of historical

references with respect to Asia versus the rest of the world.Second, as well as expanding the breadth and depth of historical references in its

articles, FA should also be more rigorous in its use of history to avoid thin ice: it should

ensure that each article makes clear that the historical facts behind a policy article fromwhich its authors organize and stylize for their own purposes are historians selections

and constructs. This is because misfit leading to misuse or abuse occurs when [people]fail to understand or keep sufficiently in mind that the historical facts...are pieces of

sculpture, and do not work well as building blocks.121

This might be most effectivelydone by a brief review of the historiography of the topic in a footnote or appendix to each

article.Third, it would be a simple matter for FA to differentiate in its book reviews

between IR books and History books as International Affairs does, and to increase thenumber of historians on its Book Review Panel. Currently, FAs unconscious disdain is

117See http://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/.

118Schlesinger, "Review of " 'Lessons' of the Past"." p. 443. Along with Neustadt, in 1986 May delivered a

series of specific frameworks for decision-makers to back up his suggestion and to help them make better

use of the past. See: Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time. passim.119

Finefrock, "Players Only."120

P. W. Schroeder, "History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit,"

International Security 22 (1997). pp. 71-3.121

Ibid., pages 71-3.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/


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all too evident from the fact that their Book Review Panel has five political scientists, oneWar Studies specialist, a Law professor, two economists, and a single historian (a

specialist on the Middle East) reviewing works of History under the rubric Recent

Books on International Relations.I recommend these changes in FA for the following four reasons.First, I demonstrated above that FA readers are decision-makers in US foreign

policy. As Jervis says, A decision-maker whose conceptual framework is dominated bya few categories will fit events into them quickly and on the basis of little information.

On the other hand, those who are familiar with multiple possibilities will be lessinfluenced by any single historical case.122 Therefore, richer and better use of history in

FA will make its readers less likely to be taken in by a single dominant (and perhapsmythic) version of history. To say this is simply to acknowledge that FA readers asdecision-makers are only human, who will use as much (or as little) history as FA offersthem: People look for information where the light is brightest...the data that analysts and

decision-makers use are more often distinguished by their ready availability than by theirrelation to the questions being asked.

123

Second, as noted above, historical analogies are drawn upon most frequently andmost poorly in crisis situations. Currently, FAs narrowness restricts The range andscope of a policy-makers knowledge of history, and this knowledge therefore maywell be limited to inappropriate analogies which will nevertheless constitute the solereservoir of intellectual capital he has to draw upon.124

Third, when making policy, both to interpret others behaviour and to design onesown so that others will respond as one would wish, one must examine the world througha variety of different perspectives.

125Jervis also warns that it is particularly dangerous to

take important questions for granted and to have a limited understanding of the

workings of others arguments.126 And fourth, according to historians, history properlyconceived and used expands the ranges of experience for decision-makers, both directlyand vicariously.127 It also hones the ironic sensibilities, so that one becomes aware that

[history] is filled with the unexpected, and that an infinite variety of obscure relationshipsare woven into the past... [it also shows] how men interact with events over which they

have limited control.128

Without this sensibility, FA readers natural inclination will beto draw upon what they think they know about that past, and pay more attention to

what happened than to why it has happened...[making their learning from history]superficial, overgeneralized, and based on post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.129

122Jervis, Perception and Misperception. p. 270.

123Jervis, "The Drunkard's Search." p. 358.

124Vertzberger, "Applied History and Its Shortcomings." p. 241.

125Jervis, Perception and Misperception. p. 409.

126Ibid., p. 410.

127John Lewis Gaddis, "In Defense of Particular Generalization: Rewriting Cold War History, Rethinking

International Relations Theory," in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study

of International Relations (Bcsia Studies in International Security), ed. Colin Elman and Miriam FendiusElman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). p. 326.128

Gilbert, "International Relations and the Relevance of History." p. 353.129

Jervis, Perception and Misperception. p. 294.


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As Jervis says, helping decision-makers be more thoughtful will not solve all our problems, but neither is it a trivial goal.130 IfFA takes its mission to not only inform

but also to guide US public opinion131

and policy-makers,132

it should address the

shortcomings in its use of history in policy articles which my research has revealed. Foran organisation as conscious of its heritage as the CFR, its journal should be moreconscious of History. Based on my analysis ofFAs historical references from 1965 to

2000, it has a long way to go.

APPENDIX I: NOTES ON METHODOLOGY AND SEARCH RESULTS

Introduction:

This Appendix provides both background and detail concerning the research carriedout as described in this article. Section one of the Appendix covers the problems

identified with certain search terms and the choices made in order to achieve meaningfulresults: Section two of the Appendix holds the results of the research. The Top Twenty-five results overall, the Top Twenty-five results for pre-20th century references, the TopTwenty-five results for Asian references, and the Master historical reference list, areattached.

Section one:

In undertaking research across the selected population of FA issues (that is, 172issues) a number of problems were identified with the references which were culled fromthe initial review of thirty-four issues. Decisions had to be made in order to achieve

results that would be re-creatable, justifiable and meaningful. This section sets out the problems encountered and the decisions taken to address the problems. I was guided ingeneral terms in this process by the advice in Theory and Methods in Political Science.133

1. Proper names - individuals: clearly, in research of this type proper names of

individuals form a great part of the body of terms searched for. There are two classesof problem associated with proper names of individuals: firstly, the names themselves

can refer to more than one individual. References to Ford can refer to Henry or toGerald. In such cases, searches were carried out on the form of an individuals name

that was deemed to be most specific to him/her, e.g. Gerald Ford. Secondly, someindividuals are routinely referred to by any of a number of common alternatives, e.g.

President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy or JFK. Where these alternatives were alldeemed to be specific enough that only the intended individual would be so

designated, all terms were searched on.

130Holsti, "Cognitive Process Approaches." p. 184.

131Hendrickson, "Review Essay Inquiring Minds." p. 159.

132Parmar, "The Issue of State Power." p. 79.

133Melvyn Read and David Marsh, "Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods," in Theory and

Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002) .


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2. Proper names individuals in their own right, versus places, prizes, etc named

after the individual: To continue with the Kennedy example, JFK can refer both to

the president and to the airport. In such cases a view was taken as to whether, in the

opinion of a reasonable individual, the term in question was more likely to be used, inthis journal, to refer to the reference which was sought or to the accidentalhomonym, and the term was either used in or dropped from the search according to

that likelihood.

3. Proper names places: Place names that exist now as well as in the historical pastwere not included in the search unless their significance was deemed to be primarily

historical. For example, determining whether London, Athens or Germanywere being used to refer to their historical past or to their present was impossible, andsuch place names were not included in the search. Munich, however, was deemedin this journal to be more likely to be used in reference to the events of 1938 than to

the present-day city, and the term was searched for.

4. Continuous activity of an individual: in a few cases, figures of historicalimportance during the period investigated have continued to operate up until the

present day, either in the same role throughout (e.g. Fidel Castro) or in differentguises (e.g. Henry Kissinger Secretary of State author). References to suchindividuals were not sought, due to the difficulty of ascribing the reference tohistorical or contemporary activity. The only exception to this was President Carter,who was searched for only under this title. Poets, writers, philosophers, andeconomists were also removed from the list, because of the difficulty of knowingwhether a reference was actually historical or to their work and ideas.

5. Long-term activity of an individual: as was explained above, a contemporaryexclusion zone of five years was set from the date that an individual disappeared

from the active political scene. This exclusion may have meant that some bona fidehistorical references to individuals who had been active in different roles for some

years were not included. For example, a reference to Eisenhowers generalship, madewithin five years of the end of his presidency, would automatically be excluded by

the terms of this research. It was deemed that such exclusions would be minimal inoverall impact.

6. Historical epochs: terms such as Reformation, Confederacy, or Terror could

not be searched for. Capital letters as a distinguishing mark indicating that the wordin question referred to the historical epoch rather than an abstract noun were not

recognised by the search engine. NB: This may account for some of the apparent biasin the pre-20th century references, wherein a disproportionate percentage of Oriental

references were found (e.g. Han, Ming, Meiji) it is possible that, if such commonlyused Western epoch names such as those above could have been searched on, the

percentage of Asian pre-20th

century references would be found to be as(extraordinarily) low as in the 20th Century references.


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7. Commonly used words as names for particular historical people/events: It provedimpossible to search for some historical references with any certainty that the results

would refer to that reference only. For example: Enigma, Assassins.

8. Figures of speech/stylistic phrasing: authors will sometimes use Russian Empirein a Soviet context, or Sung Dynasty to refer to the current Korean regime. Where

confusion of this type was identified a decision was taken on a case by case basis todrop or include the results, based on the likelihood of one or the other meaning being

ascribed to the words.

9. Classification within FA: in ninety-six percent of cases, the search will clearly showwhether a reference occurs within an article, a book review, or correspondence. In aminority of cases the issue in question did not make the distinction in its electronicsummary of contents, and all such unclassified references were therefore deemed to

be from articles rather than other sources.

Section Two

Below is a selection of some of the data about the use of historical references in FA1965-2000 that my research generated, from which I draw my conclusions.


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jones - history in foreign affairs 1965-2000

Documents