jpr.2015.policy debate - contemporary antisemitism

8/9/2019 JPR.2015.Policy Debate - Contemporary Antisemitism

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jpr /policy debate Could it happen here? What existing data tell us about contemporary antisemitism in the UK May 2015

Introduction

“After the murderous attack on a kosher supermarketin Paris on January 9th, British Jews are scared. Should they be?” (The Economist , 24 January 2015)

The quote from the January 24 edition of TheEconomist captures a central part of Jewish communaldiscourse in the United Kingdom in the aftermathof the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the koshersupermarket in Paris. In the rst few days followingthe attacks, the Institute for Jewish Policy Researchwas inundated with requests for data on antisemitism

and analysis of contemporary reality. The CommunitySecurity Trust was similarly ooded with requestsfor comment and interviews, alongside demands foradvice and support from community organisationsconcerned about their levels of security. The JewishChronicle issued a special edition on January 16,devoting thirty out of eighty of its pages exclusivelyto “After Paris” commentary from journalists,political leaders and prominent personalities in the Jewish community of the UK. And the conversationcontinued for several weeks and months afterwards,fuelled further by a new report published by theCommunity Security Trust in February showing a

Institute for Jewish Policy Research

jpr / policy debate May 2015

In the immediate aftermath of the murderous attackson Jews in Paris and Copenhagen, and following ayear in which a signicant jump in antisemiticincidents was recorded by monitoring agencies,widespread anxiety among Jews in the UK and acrossEurope is being reported by the media. Concernappears to have risen to levels not seen for some time,and it is clear that some Jews, at least, are askingquestions about whether they have a long-term futurein the United Kingdom. At the same time, Jewishleaders working at all levels are trying to ascer tainwhat measures are required to ensure that their sitesand events are safe, and communal and nationalagencies with responsibility for security are makingregular assessments about current security needs.

In order to answer such ques tions and to makesuch assessments, it is necessary to have access toreliable empirical data designed to meet these needs.Yet the data that exist only partially achieve this, and

different sources suggest different trends. Somesupport the more alarmist claims that antisemitismis reaching intolerable levels; others suppor t theconicting claims that the UK, at least, remains oneof the safest places in the world for Jews to live. Theresult is a distinc t lack of clarity – a lot of ‘noise,’ agreat deal of anguish and debate, but little certaintyabout the nature of the problem, its scale, or itsdirection of travel.

This policy paper examines existing data onantisemitism in the UK and elsewhere in order to

demonstrate that a substantial leap in research

and analytical quality has become an imperative if leadersoperating at a European, national and communal level areexpected to be able to dispense sound practical adviceboth to Jews in general, and to those responsible fortheir safety.

Dr Jonathan Boyd is Executive Director of JPR. A specialistin the study of contemporary Jewry, he is a former JerusalemFellow at the Mandel Institute in Israel, and has heldprofessional positions in research and policy at the JDCInternational Centre for Community Development, the JewishAgency, the UJIA and the Holocaust Educational Trust. Heholds a doctorate in educational philosophy from the Universityof Nottingham, and a BA and MA in modern Jewish historyfrom University College London, where he specialised inthe history of antisemitism. He has published widely on arange of issues concerning contemporary Jewish life, andrecently headed up the academic team for the study of Jewishperceptions and experiences of antisemitism across Europe,which was commissioned by the European Union Agency for

Fundamental Rights.

Dr Daniel Staetsky is a Senior Research Fellow at JPR.His expertise spans the disciplines of demography, appliedstatistics and economics, and he is a former researcher andanalyst at the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel and at RANDEurope. He holds a PhD in social statistics from the Universityof Southampton, and an MA in demography from the HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem, where he specialised in Jewish andIsraeli demography and migration. His work has been widelypublished in a variety of journals, and he is currently workingon a series of reports looking at antisemitism in several EU

Member States.

Could it happen here?What existing data tell us about contemporary antisemitism in the UK

Jonathan Boyd and L. Daniel Staetsky


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huge increase in antisemitic incidents in 2014,1 and thesubsequent publication of the Report of the All-PartyParliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism later in thesame month .2 The communal debate about the extentand intensity of antisemitism in the UK goes on andon, and is likely to continue for some time.

Providing commentary on the issue of antisemitismis not a simple task, particularly if it is meant toserve any practical purpose: i.e. to inform thepersonal choices of British or European Jews, or todevelop policy around combating antisemitism. Inthe aftermath of the Paris attacks, if the rhetoric isto be believed, at least some British Jews are askingthemselves whether they should stay in Britain inthe long-term, or move instead to a safer place. And,certainly, Jewish organisations, as well as the police,the security services and government agencies allasked themselves in the weeks following the attacksin Paris whether new measures should be put in place

to combat antisemitism or to provide greater securityto Jews living in the UK. So the Jewish communityis beset by a series of very practical questions andconcerns that are crying out to be answered, andpeople want, and indeed, deserve, the types of answersthat go beyond mere conjecture and opinion, andthat are based on robust empirical evidence. Indeed,any errors of judgment on the part of leaders oranalysts could have very serious consequences, asthe potential costs of erroneous advice – in terms ofnances, reputations or even lives – are high. Facedwith this situation, it is incumbent upon those bearing

responsibility for the security of Jews in this countryto ask themselves whether or not they feel theypossess enough condence in the research tools anddesigns currently at their disposal in the monitoring ofantisemitism to enable them to dispense sound adviceand to participate effectively in the political debatesthat need to be held.

Confronted with these types of questions duringinterviews with the national media, JPR’s conclusionwas that we remain at some distance from thatposition, in spite of the fact that the British Jewish

1 Antisemitic Incidents Report 2014 (2015). London:Community Security Trust.

2 Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry in Antisemitism (2015). London: All-Party ParliamentaryGroup Against Antisemitism.

community appears to have started to pay greaterattention than ever before to the empirical basis ofany statements about antisemitism. The recent urryof surveys commissioned by various Jewish and non- Jewish organisations in an attempt to establish theprevalence of antisemitic attitudes testies to thistendency. However, as a community, we are still farfrom understanding what constitutes high-qualityevidence, where it is to be found and what can andshould be done with it. We can examine the data thatexist – as we do at length in this paper – in search ofclues to understand contemporary reality. But as willbecome clear, in spite of the huge amounts of researchthat has been conducted on antisemitism and the issuesaround it, we remain some way from being able toempirically and unequivocally determine the natureof the problem, its scale, or its direction of travel inways that cut through all of the hyperbole, bias andconjecture that litter public discourse. Whilst theproblem of contemporary antisemitism is far fromalone in this regard – many other social ills also sufferfrom a lack of empirical evidence – this issue needs tobe addressed as a matter of urgency. We need to knowwhat is going on with a far greater degree of certaintythan exists at present in order to dene the problem,gain political and nancial support to tackle it, providesecurity where it is most needed, and ensure that Jewsin Britain have the evidence they need to make sound

decisions about their families’ future.The rst step in this process is to explore the sources ofdata that currently exist, to investigate their meaningand their shortcomings, and to assess the extent towhich they enable us to achieve these goals. This paperconstitutes an initial attempt to do this and it arguesthat, under the current circumstances, a substantialleap in research and analytical quality has become animperative. In the next chapters, we present researchndings on levels and trends in antisemitism, andexplore both the multitude of meanings that can be

attributed to them, and the somewhat paradoxical

increase in uncertainty that occurs with each additionalpiece of data that is revealed. Whilst that may beconducive to public debate (indeed, commentatorsfrom across the political spectrum use much of thedata investigated below to make their points andpromote their agendas), this rhetorical sophisticationis rarely translated into greater clarity concerning thepolicies that should be adopted to combat antisemitism.Furthermore, in spite of the wealth of quantitativedata that exists on antisemitism, insufcient workis currently being done to allow us to measure the

Providing commentary on the issue ofantisemitism is not a simple task, particularlyif it is meant to serve any practical purpose:i.e. to inform the personal choices of British orEuropean Jews, or to develop policy aroundcombating antisemitism.

Under the current circumstances, a substantialleap in research and analytical quality hasbecome an imperative.


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phenomena under examination or to give unambiguousmeaning to the results of that measurement. We willnot progress in dealing with antisemitism withoutresolving this fundamental predicament.

1. Exploring the attitudes ofnon-Jews towards Jews

General attitudes towards JewsThe rst port of call for anyone interested in thelevels and trends of antisemitism should be theexisting data of major polling organisations. This isfor a number or reasons. First, these organisationsemploy professional teams and implement scienticdesigns in the development of survey samples;

typically, these are random samples representative ofthe population whose attitudes are being assessed.Second, these organisations possess signicantresources which allow them to reach large samples,and, importantly, run surveys at regular intervals,employing the same methods and asking exactly thesame questions on each occasion, thereby allowingthem to reliably track change over time. Third, theirsurveys often integrate various topics, rather thansingle-mindedly focusing on Jews or attitudes tominorities, thereby reducing the risk of attractingrespondents with a special interest in a particulartopic. This combination of professionalism, resourcesand context makes the ndings reliable, valid andcomparable – both across time and across differentcountries, making them a good starting point for anydiscussion about antisemitism.

One of the global leaders in this eld is the PewResearch Center, an American non-prot researchorganisation that runs its highly insightful ‘GlobalAttitudes Project,’ a long-term data collection enterprise

that, through the deployment of public opinion surveysthroughout the world, seeks to document people’sviews on contemporary issues and affairs.3

Among other issues, Pew’s surveys regularly includea question using the following formulation: “I’d like you to rate some different groups of people in [surveycountry] according to how you feel about them. Pleasetell me whether your opinion is very favourable, mostly favourable, mostly unfavourable or very unfavourable.a. Jews; b. Roma; c. Muslims.”This question has beenasked in various countries over several years, thereby

allowing us to see changes in attitudes over time.4 The question about attitudes towards Jews has beenincluded on all occasions, and the earliest data on thistopic for the United Kingdom comes from 2004. Theresults for seven countries, including the UK, are setout in Figure 1.

In examining these data, two particular observationsare worthy of mention. First, the levels of antipathytowards Jews that are observed in Britain and the USA

3 The practical element of work is coordinated by Princeton

Survey Research Associates International, and the actualeldwork (either telephone or face-to-face interviewing) iscarried out by national research organisations.

4 It is worth noting that earlier surveys also includedattitudes towards other groups too - such as Blacks,Christians (in general) and Catholics.

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Figure 1. Proportion of people holding ‘very unfavourable’ or ‘somewhat/mostly unfavourable’ opinion aboutJews-selected European countries (Pew Research Center data)

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are consistently the lowest in the comparison. In bothcountries, less than 10% of people hold unfavourable(combining the counts for ‘mostly unfavourable’ and‘very unfavourable’) attitudes towards Jews. Similarlevels were recorded by Pew in Canada and Australia,although these countries are not presented here to

avoid cluttering the diagram. Thus, 10% appears tomark the approximate level of antipathy towards Jewsin English-speaking countries.

Second, viewed over time, the countries shown onthe diagram can be largely divided into three groups,based on their levels of antipathy towards Jews: (i)high level: in Spain, Poland and Russia, where levelsare in the region of 25% to 45%; (ii) low level: inEnglish-speaking countries where under 10% of theadult population holds unfavourable attitudes; and (iii)intermediate level: in Germany and France, where thelevels have mostly been between about 10% and 25%.However, whilst this hierarchy has held over much ofthe period shown, the most recent data for Germany

and France suggest that levels have declined to suchan extent that they are beginning to converge with theUK and the USA.

Given recent events, the data on France are perhapsparticularly puzzling. Levels of antipathy towards Jews remain only marginally higher there than inthe UK, and in the last two points in time are at thelowest levels shown. Yet, this decline coincides witha period that has seen a series of particularly violentand murderous attacks on Jews in France. So are

the ndings correct? If so, what are we to make ofthem? And can they serve in any way as a guide to theseriousness of the threat facing the Jewish community?Technically, there is no reason to doubt the veracity ofthese ndings – they do, indeed, reect some sort ofreality. At the same time, they clearly fail to capturesomething very important, and something that weneed to understand to help explain what has changed

in recent years to cause the upsurge in brutal violenceagainst Jews in France.

One might also hypothesise that because the Pew dataonly go up to spring 2014, they fail to capture anychange that occurred as a result of the war in Gazain the summer of that year. As we will see later onin this paper, there is clear evidence to indicate thata signicant spike in antisemitic incidents took placeacross Europe as a direct result of that conict, soperhaps Pew’s data are simply insufciently up-to-date to capture the changed reality? However, thisdoes not appear to be the case. A YouGov surveycommissioned by The Sunday Times in January2015 – six months after the war – replicated a versionof the Pew question, and found that 7% of Britishadults said they had either a ‘very negative’ or a ‘fairlynegative’ opinion about Jews.5 This suggests that,when measured six months after the war in Gaza insummer 2014, we observeno discernible change overallin British people’s attitudes towards Jews in the UK asa medium to long-term result of that conict. If thisis correct – and again, there is no reason to doubt theveracity of the ndings – we are still left feeling ratherpuzzled. Many Jews feel as if antisemitism is on therise in the UK, yet on this measure, the data indicateno change. How should we make sense of this?

Examining more detailed attitudestowards JewsIn understanding these ndings, it is important tobear in mind that they are based on a particularapproach to measuring antisemitism. They take a verygeneral question (e.g. what is your overall opinionof Jews?), and ask it to a broad sample of people (e.g.adults in the UK). Other surveys have attempted togo beyond this basic attitudinal question above, and,whilst addressing their research to similarly broadpopulations, have looked to explore the actual contentof antisemitic views in greater depth. Undoubtedly

the largest of these surveys was run by the Anti-Defamation League in 2013 and 2014. It examinedthe attitudes of adults in over one hundred countriesworldwide and was published in 2014 as the ADL Global 100.6 ADL has also conducted similar surveys

5 The published data showed that 2% held a ‘verynegative’ opinion, and 5% a ‘fairly negative opinion.’17% of respondents didn’t know how they felt; if theseare proportionately redistributed across the scale, theproportion holding ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ negative opinions risesto 8%.

6 See: http://global100.adl.org. The surveys were carried out

by various research rms (First International Resources;Anzalone Liszt Grove Research; Ipsos-Reid Public Affairs)on large randomly selected samples via telephone and inface-to-face interviews. As far as the ADL methodologicalliterature allows us to understand, the ADL samples areweighted to reect the national population composition

Given recent events, the data on Franceare perhaps particularly puzzling. Levels ofantipathy towards Jews remain only marginallyhigher there than in the UK, and in the last twopoints in time are at the lowest levels shown.Yet, this decline coincides with a period thathas seen a series of particularly violent andmurderous attacks on Jews in France.

Levels of antipathy towards Jews thatare observed in Britain and the USA areconsistently the lowest in the comparison. Inboth countries, less than 10% of people holdunfavourable attitudes towards Jews.


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in the past, and in Figures 2 and 3 we integrate thendings of the ADL Global 100 with two other ADLsurveys from previous years. Figure 2 focuses onthe proportions of adults in ve selected Europeancountries (plus Russia and USA gures for 2014; 2009

and 2012 are not available) for those who maintainthat the statement ‘Jews have too much power in thebusiness world’ is ‘probably true.’ Figure 3 does thesame for the statement ‘Jews still talk too much aboutwhat happened to them in the Holocaust.’

Before investigating the proportions themselves(which one instantly notices are markedly higher thanthose found in the Pew data shown in Figure 1), the

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Figure 2. Proportion of people saying that the statement ‘Jews have too much power in the business world’ is‘probably true’ – selected countries (Anti-Defamation League data)

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Figure 3. Proportion of people saying that the statement ‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to themin the Holocaust’ is ‘probably true’ – selected countries (Anti-Defamation League data)

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for each country in terms of age and gender, and at timesalso by religion, locality (urban or rural), ethnicityand language.


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results support the impression from the Pew data thatthe UK and USA have the lowest levels of the sevencountries investigated. However, among the other vecountries, the picture is slightly more complex. ThePew hierarchy seems to hold when looking at Figure2: there is a distinction between Spain, Poland andRussia on the one hand (the high group), and Franceand Germany on the other (the intermediate group).Yet Figure 3 presents a slightly muddier picture wherePoland stands out as the highest, followed by Spainand Germany, followed by France and Russia.

Because ADL has developed a methodologicalapproach that allows comparisons to be drawn acrosstime, its data can also help to provide an indicationof the direction of travel in attitudes: an increase ordecline seen on multiple measures over time is likelyto indicate an equivalent shift in antisemitic sentiment.Thus it is worth noting the difference in patternsbetween France and Germany on the one hand, andthe UK on the other, where the former two countriesprovide evidence of a recent jump in antipatheticattitudes, whereas the UK shows a drop. The jump –or the growth – in counts for France over time maybe particularly signicant, as certainly one’s intuitivesense, based on recent outbreaks of antisemiticviolence there, is that the situation for Jews has becomemore precarious over time. On the other hand, this

conclusion contradicts the Pew data showing a recentdecline in unfavourable attitudes. Moreover, somewhatconfusingly, other countries in the graphs show similarpatterns to France with even higher counts, yet todate at least, they have not experienced the same levelsof violent antisemitism. One can only hypothesiseabout why this might be the case, but these differentresults create a degree of complexity which needsto be explored and understood. The UK data areinteresting too, insofar as they somewhat challenge thePew nding of stability over time, indicating insteadthat antisemitic attitudes have actually declined in

the most recent past. Without corroborating evidencefrom other sources, one should not read too much intoeither organisation’s result, but the dissonant ndingsdemand to be explained.

It is also possible to investigate other pieces of datathat approach antisemitism from a similar perspective.Indeed, the Sunday Times/YouGov poll mentionedabove was actually one of three surveys relating toantisemitism that were commissioned, paid for, andundertaken in the UK in the course of just ve weeksbetween 21 December 2014 and 25 January 2015.7

7 Two of these three polls were undertaken by YouGov, areputable research rm specialising in internet pollingwhich used a self-selecting panel of respondents weightedaccording to the basic country’s demographics. The thirdwas conducted by Populus, a respected research and

One of the other two was also conducted byYouGov, on behalf of a new British Jewishorganisation, the Campaign Against Antisemitism(CAA). It is not clear whether or not the CAA wasaware of the ADL ndings when it commissionedits own study in early 2015, or whether it thoughtthat the 2014 ADL survey was outdated, but itsndings are not too dissimilar from those producedby the ADL. The CAA question wording wassomewhat different from the ADL’s, but in responseto the statement “In business, Jews are not as honestas other people” it found 11% agreement, and inresponse to the statement “Jews have too muchpower in the media” it found 17% agreement. Thesetypes of results align well with the ADL’s ndingsfrom recent years, but add little of substance to ourshared understanding or to policy development.

Similarly, a poll conducted by Populus in January2015 as part of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiryinto Antisemitism, also investigated these issues.In response to the statement “Jews have too muchpower in the UK media and politics” it found 11%agreement, and in response to the statement “Jewstalk too much about what happened to them in theHolocaust” it found 14% agreement. Both of thesendings are a few percentage points higher thanthe ADL 2014 survey, which possibly points to a

slight increase in antisemitic attitudes in the UK inrecent months, but differences in question wordingmake comparisons imperfect. That said, the ndingsbroadly conrm the approximate level found byothers, but need supporting evidence from elsewhereto verify, and multivariate analysis of the data wouldbe required to understand with any depth or nuanceprecisely what is going on.

By contrast, Fondapol ( Fondation pour L’innovationPolitique) data from France allow us to see howFrench adults responded to similar statements in a

survey the foundation commissioned and publishedin November 2014.8 Again, the statements are notidentical to those in the ADL surveys, but the

8 Fondapol worked with l’Ifop (Institut français d’opinionpublique) to survey a representative sample of 1005 Frenchcitizens aged 16 and above, online, between 26 and 30September 2014.

strategy consultancy, which used a similar approach. It isparticularly striking that these three new surveys designedto test the levels of antisemitic attitudes took place in sucha short space of time. Whilst this sudden burst of activityreects the levels of concern and interest about the topic,and, in some instances, a desire to do something to addressexisting anxieties, it was not coordinated, its purposesvaried from survey to survey, and ultimately, consideredfrom the perspective of developing policy to combat

antisemitism, the work seems to have generated far moreheat than light.


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contrast between the ndings of the two surveys isquite arresting. Fondapol found that 25% said ‘Jewshave too much power in the realm of the economyand nance,’ 22% said ‘Jews have too much powerin the realm of the media,’ and 19% said ‘Jews havetoo much power in the realm of politics,’ all of whichare proportions which differ substantially from theADL nding of 51% for the similar statement ‘Jewshave too much power in the business world. 9 Quitewhy this should be the case is unclear.

However, perhaps the real puzzle in all of these datais that the levels of antisemitism revealed by specicstatements about Jewish power and the Holocaustseem to be signicantly higher than the non-specicdislike of Jews presented earlier (Pew data, Figure1). What does this nding mean, if indeed, it hasany meaning at all? Might one assessment be more

accurate than the other? Might it mean, for example,that antisemitic attitudes are latent in some way, andare not easily revealed without specic prompting, i.e.presenting specic statements? Or, alternatively, mightthe data on specic statements conceal an underlyingdegree of afnity with, or empathy for Jews?Moreover, what does any of this really tell us aboutpeople’s politics, or the likelihood of them becomingviolently antisemitic? Fundamentally, do the ‘specics’paint a more reliable picture of antisemitism thanthe ‘generics’, or vice versa, and are either in any wayindicative of future political behaviour or the potential

for violence?

Often, organisations employing this methodologicalapproach have used the ndings to try to quantify thenumber of antisemites that exist in a given countryor region at a particular moment in time – the ADLGlobal 100, for example, argued that 26% of the adultglobal population harboured antisemitic attitudesin 2014, equating to 1,090,000,000 people. But itis important to understand that these gures arebased on a very particular approach to measuringantisemitism that differs from other approaches (suchas those employed by Pew). Moreover, again, it does

9 See:L’Antisémitisme Dans L’Opinion Publique Française. Nouveaux Éclairages. Fondation pour L’InnovationPolitique, 2014.

not allow us to understand the extent to which anyof these people might act on the basis of the attitudesthey hold – i.e. the proportions within that 26% thatare likely to perpetrate the types of acts of terrorseen recently in France, or ground their politicalactions in these attitudes. Indeed, whilst these typesof gures often generate headlines, few researchers,when pressed, would be able to provide this level ofinterpretation, or offer any meaningful policy uses oftheir ndings, and this is rarely, if ever, acknowledged.Thus how one uses this information to develop policydesigned to combat antisemitism or to provide helpfuladvice to Jews is wholly unclear.

Antisemitic incidentsPerhaps one way of adding to our understandingwould be to examine Community Security Trust(CST) antisemitic incident data, which, at rst viewingat least, appear to challenge the ideas that levels ofantisemitism in the UK have remained stable (assuggested by Pew) or declined (as suggested by ADL)in the recent past. Its Antisemitic Incidents Report for 2014 begins: “The CST recorded 1,168 antisemiticincidents in the UK in 2014, an increase of 118% fromthe 535 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST for 2013and the highest annual total ever recorded by CST.The previous highest number of antisemitic incidentsrecorded by CST in a single year was 931 incidents,

recorded in 2009.”10

Its rst chart, replicated in Figure4 below, provides clear evidence of the recent story,and particularly if one focuses exclusively on the pastve years (2010-14) shown in light blue, the dramatic jump in 2014 is very striking.

The CST report goes on to provide an explanation forthe 2014 spike. “The sharp increase, and record hightotal, in antisemitic incidents recorded in 2014 followsa pattern whereby UK-based reactions to ‘triggerevents’, often from overseas, cause temporary butsignicant ‘spikes’ in antisemitic incidents in the UK.

In this case, antisemitic reactions in the UK to theconict in Israel and Gaza that occurred in July andAugust 2014 were the biggest contributing factor to therecord total of incidents reported to CST. A similar

pattern contributed to the two previous record yearlytotals in 2009 and 2006, due to antisemitic reactionsto conicts in Israel and Gaza (2009) and Israel andLebanon (2006).”

10 CST Antisemitic Incidents Report 2014, op. cit.

Fondapol found that 25% said ‘Jews have toomuch power in the realm of the economy andnance,’ 22% said ‘Jews have too much powerin the realm of the media,’ and 19% said ‘Jewshave too much power in the realm of politics,’all of which are proportions which differsubstantially from the ADL nding of 51% forthe similar statement ‘Jews have too muchpower in the business world.

Antisemitic reactions in the UK to the conictin Israel and Gaza that occurred in July andAugust 2014 were the biggest contributingfactor to the record total of incidents repor tedto CST.


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This conclusion can be conrmed by looking at annualtotals for antisemitic incidents over the entire periodshown in Figure 4. The spike for 2014 is clearly themost pronounced so far, but a slightly smaller, albeithighly signicant one can be seen in 2009, as well as afar less pronounced one in 2006.

Annual statistics reveal something of the change thatis going on, but arguably, the monthly gures, alsoincluded at the back of the CST’s annual reports,provide us with a clearer picture. Indeed, the 2014report notes that in July 2014 “CST recorded 314antisemitic incidents, a 432% increase from the 59incidents recorded in July 2013 and more than thenumber of antisemitic incidents recorded in therst six months of 2014 combined. In August, CSTrecorded 228 antisemitic incidents (a 375% increasefrom the 48 incidents recorded in August 2013). Of

the 542 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in Julyand August 2014, 258 (48%) involved direct or indirectreference to the conict in Israel and Gaza alongsideantisemitic content, motivation or targeting.” Thusalmost half of the year’s incidents occurred over amaximum of two months.

Figure 5 investigates the picture when the data areexamined on a month-by-month basis over the sameperiod of time. What it conrms is that the spikes arevery time-specic, rather than being indicative of anoverall and prolonged increase in antisemitic incidents.Once the trigger event and its immediate fallout areover, incident levels appear to return approximatelyto their previous levels. Looking at the chart overall,whilst there is no question about the extraordinaryspikes that occur periodically, there appears to be

little evidence for a dramatic increase in levels ofantisemitism over time. Whilst monthly incidenttotals clearly uctuate under ‘normal’ circumstances,the range is quite small. On average, 55 incidents permonth were recorded by the CST between 2004 and2014 (solid red line); when the few months with majorspikes caused by signicant outbreaks of violence inor around Israel are removed, the monthly average iscalculated at 48 (dotted red line).

The CST has also noted a second trigger for reportedincidents. It is common to see an increase at the time ofthe High Holydays ( Rosh Hashana– the Jewish NewYear, and Yom Kippur– the Day of Atonement) whichtypically take place in September and October. Indeed,in eight of the past eleven years, September (shownin purple in Figure 5) has seen above average countsof incidents (and in two of the other three years, all,or most of the holidays fell in October), a ndingCST attributes partly to the increased visibility of Jews on the streets at this time of year, and partly tothe increased presence of CST and police ofcers onthe streets, which makes it easier for people to reportincidents when they occur.

When both of these trigger factors are taken intoaccount, is it possible to ascertain empirically whether

The spikes are very time-specic, rather thanbeing indicative of an overall and prolongedincrease in antisemitic incidents. Once thetrigger event and its immediate fallout are over,incident levels appear to return approximatelyto their previous levels.

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Figure 4. Antisemitic incidents in the UK recorded by the CST, by year, 2004-14 (CST data)

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or not there has been an increase in antisemitism inthe UK over the 2004-14 period? Using advancedstatistical methods this can be done, and the resultscan be seen in Figure 6.11

The columns shown in the darkest shade ofblue provide the monthly average for ve yearsbetween 2004 and 2014 if the two trigger factorsare removed from the assessment. If all years wereshown, the picture would uctuate more readily,but the selection of these ve points in time revealsthe overarching trend. It shows that the monthlyaverage has indeed increased somewhat over time,from 35 incidents per month in 2004 to 51 in 2014.The columns in the lightest shade of blue similarlyreveal a gradual increase over time when the Jewishholiday factor is taken into consideration. By

comparing the two gures, we can also calculatethe ratio of the ‘normal’ average to the averagewhen Jewish holidays are taking place, which hasremained consistently around the 1:1.3 mark (i.e.on average, the number of antisemitic incidentsoccurring around the time of the High Holydays is

11 In order to generate this chart, we modelled the monthlynumber of incidents (the dependent variable) as a functionof security conicts in Israel, Jewish holidays, and avariable capturing the general time trend (the independentvariables). This was in order (i) to establish the effect that

security conicts in Israel and Jewish holidays have on thenumber of antisemitic incidents in the UK, independentlyof each other; and (ii) to understand whether there is ageneral trend of increase in antisemitic incidents in the UK,after the effects of security conicts and Jewish holidaysare controlled for.

30% higher than ‘normal’). The middle column foreach year shown calculates the expected monthlylevel if a trigger security conict around Israelwas taking place (e.g. the summer 2014 conict inGaza), and this too reveals an increase over time –

from an average expected total of 101 incidents in amonth in 2004 to 147 in 2014. The ratio can also becalculated, and it too has barely changed over theperiod of investigation – it stands consistently at justbelow 1:3 (i.e.on average, a trigger security conictalmost trebles the number of antisemitic incidentstaking place).

How should these ndings be interpreted? They maywell indicate that levels of antisemitism in the UKhave climbed over the course of the past decade –certainly, at rst viewing, that would appear to be

the case. However, one cannot rule out an alternativeexplanation – that the increase shown is due to an

increased prevalence among Jews to report incidentsin the rst place. Certainly, whilst CST incidentreporting data are a vital source of information andmake a critical contribution to understanding (they areone of the very few available sources on antisemitismin Britain that have been monitored in a consistentfashion over many years) there is no way, at this stage,of empirically ascertaining whether the increase shownis real, or whether it is due to a change in reporting

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Figure 5. Antisemitic incidents in the UK recorded by the CST, by month, 2004-14

There is no way, at this stage, of empiricallyascertaining whether the increase shownis real, or whether it is due to a change inreporting habits of Jews in Britain.


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habits of Jews in Britain.12 So whilst we may haveevidence here that challenges the Pew thesis of stabilityor the ADL thesis of decline, we cannot be certain.

The problem about whether an increase in the numberof recorded antisemitic incidents is real, or whether itis caused by changes in reporting habits, needs to besolved. However, unfortunately, little is known aboutchanging patterns of reporting behaviour over time.Perhaps the best available source on the topic is the2012 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights(FRA) survey of Jews’ perceptions and experiences ofantisemitism, which was conducted by a joint JPR/Ipsos MORI team on behalf of the FRA. It examinedthe extent to which Jews report antisemitic incidentsto the police or any other authority, and revealed

12 It is worth noting that signicant efforts have been made inrecent years to improve reporting practices across Europe.Indeed, frustrated by the lack of ofcial, high qualityand standardised data , the European Union Agency forFundamental Rights (FRA) and the CST began to worktogether in 2008 to establish the Facing Facts project. Theproject, paid for by the European Commission, fundspartner bodies to train volunteers and professionals tostandardise criteria for comparable hate crime and hateincident data collection, as well as to learn how to holdtheir governments accountable to international agreementsand to work to improve cooperation between civil society

and public authorities. These efforts are to be welcomed,but the data gathered need to be cross-referenced with othersources by professional statisticians to maximise their valuein order to answer the practical questions posed earlier: is itsafe to remain in Europe, and what policies are required tosafeguard Jewish life?

that, across Europe, Jews behave rather similarly toother minorities, and tend not to report incidents,particularly in cases of harassment, an issue that hasalso been noted by the CST. 13 The ndings from

the FRA survey for Jews in the UK are shown in

Figure 7.14 Overall, they demonstrate that just 17% ofall incidents are estimated to be reported to the police,and 22% are estimated to be reported to anotherorganisation (these gures include cases of harassment,which would typically be recorded by the police as

‘hate incidents’ rather than ‘hate crimes’). They alsoshow that cases of physical violence and vandalismare most likely to be reported to the police, whereascases of harassment are marginally more likely to bereported to another organisation.

These results give us some indication of the extentto which Jews typically report antisemitic incidents,but because they represent a mere snapshot intime, they cannot be used to make an assessmentof whether the increase shown in Figure 6 is dueto changes in reporting habits. However, they can

13 See: CST, Antisemitic Incidents2014, op. cit.14 See: Staetsky, L. D. and Boyd, J. (2014).The Exceptional

Case? Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom. London: Institute for JewishPolicy Research.

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Figure 6. Assessment of whether levels of antisemitism have increased be tween 2004 and 2014 (JPR analysis ofCST data)

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Just 17% of all incidents in the UK areestimated to be reported to the police, and22% are estimated to be repor ted to anotherorganisation.


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be used for other purposes, including making anapproximate assessment of the likely scale and extentof antisemitism today. There may be particular valuein doing this in order to explore similarities anddifferences between the situations in the UK andFrance, not least because much of the anxiety that hasbeen generated in recent months was prompted by theattack on the kosher supermarket in Paris in January2015 and concern around whether a similar type ofincident might occur in the UK.

Drawing comparisons with FranceAs in the UK, the French Jewish community alsogathers statistics about antisemitic incidents. The

SPCJ, Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, is the equivalent body to the CST in the UK,and recently published its statistics for 2014. It isvaluable to compare these gures, not least because theanxieties felt about antisemitism in the UK today haveclearly been inuenced by recent events in France.

Figure 8 compares the counts for France and the UK,based on these two sources.

Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, the counts forthe UK have been consistently higher than those forFrance every year since 2006. That might lead one toassume that levels of antisemitism are higher in the UKthan in France, an assumption that would appear tobe problematic based on recent observed events. That

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Figure 8. Comparison of number of antisemitic incidents in UK and France, 2004-14, using CST and SPCF data

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Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, thecounts for the UK have been consistentlyhigher than those for France every year s ince2006. That might lead one to assume thatlevels of antisemitism are higher in the UK thanin France, but before drawing that conclusion,one would need to look very closely at themethods of data gathering and the propensityto report in each country to determine whatelse might be contributing to the results.


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said, the distinction may be real – one cannot rule outthat possibility – but before drawing that conclusion,one would need to look very closely at the methodsof data gathering and the propensity to report in each

country to determine what else might be contributingto the results. Inconsistencies in approaches, ordifferences in understanding among Jews in the twocountries about what to do in the event of experiencingan antisemitic incident, may well affect the results.

However, if we take the FRA data for reportingincidents for the UK (shown in Figure 7) alongside theequivalent data for France,15 we can reconstruct thepicture presented in Figure 8 in order both to estimatethe actual number of antisemitic incidents that occurin each country each year, and to investigate whether

the distinctions in the comparative counts for the twocountries remain when reporting behaviour is takeninto account. The results can be seen in Figure 9.

Based on this analysis, we can see that the picturepresented in Figure 8 changes to some degree.Whereas, in the UK, the CST recorded 12% moreincidents than the SPCF did in France over the elevenyears shown (actual counts), when the adjustment ismade, the estimated number of incidents that tookplace in France is marginally higher (by 3%) thanthe estimated number in the UK (estimated counts).Furthermore, the pattern of consistently higher counts

15 The equivalent ndings for France are: 72% of incidents areunreported, 19% of all incidents are reported to the police,and 16% are reported to another organisation.

in the UK since 2006 is broken somewhat: in 2006,2009 and 2012, the estimated annual counts for Franceare higher than for the UK.

However, it is also worth noting that the French Jewish population is signicantly larger than the UK Jewish population, and this factor should also betaken into consideration when seeking to understandthese gures. When we do so, we see that, whereas inFrance there are, on average, six incidents per annumper 1,000 Jews in the French population, in the UKthere are ten. Thus, once again, we are left with a resultshowing that levels of antisemitism appear to be higherin the UK than in France, a nding which may feelintuitively strange given recent events. Clearly, morework needs to be done to be able to make sense of

whether the observed distinctions are real, or simplya result of other external factors concerned with datagathering procedures.

However, what can be said with a high degree ofcertainty is that the spike in incidents seen in bothcountries in 2009 and 2014 is related to the conicts

in Gaza that took place in those years, and thus thephenomenon of an increase in antisemitic incidentsat such times is clearly not limited to any single

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Figure 9. Actual and estimated counts for the number of antisemitic incidents per annum in the UK and France,2004-14 (JPR analysis of CST, SPCF and FRA data)

What can be said with a high degree ofcertainty is that the spike in incidents seen inboth countries in 2009 and 2014 is related tothe conicts in Gaza that took plac e in those

years


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country. 16 Furthermore, one can also say that thisphenomenon has been noted not only by Jewishsecurity organisations, but also by the police – theFrench data are based on French police data, and boththe Metropolitan Police (London) and the Greater

Manchester Police recorded spikes in antisemiticincidents in 2009 and 2014.17

All of this stated, one might hypothesise that thecritical issue is less the number of incidents that occuras a whole, but rather the number of violent incidents.Perhaps a clear distinction between the two countriescan be drawn on this basis? Figure 10 provides thecounts for the most serious types of incidents –physical assaults, and the far rarer cases of homicides,attempted homicides or terrorism – for the years 2008to 2014.

16 To further prove this, the count for antisemitic incidentsin France for July 2014 was 208; the next highest for anysingle month during the year was 87. See:2014 Rapport surl’antisémitisme en France. Paris: Service de Protection de laCommunauté Juive. What is less clear is why there wouldhave been a spike in France in 2004 but not in the UK.

17 See:Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry in Antisemitism, February 2015, section 3.2, pp.40-42. It isworth noting that this issue has been going on, and hasbeen known about, for a long time now – it was observedin France during the explosion of antisemitic violence thattook place in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of

the second intifada in September 2000. Of the 119 recordedacts of violent antisemitism that took place in France in2000, 114 of them occurred af ter the second intifada brokeout on 28 September. See: Robert Badinter, Address atOSCE Meeting on Antisemitism, Vienna ( June 19, 2003),PC.DEL/642/03, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/42105.

The overall impression one receives from the chart isthat there is no overarching pattern. Neither country isshown to have consistently more violent incidents overtime, although, if anything, violent antisemitism isshown to be more common in the UK than in France.

Indeed, over the seven years shown, the number ofincidents recorded in the UK is 18% higher than inFrance, and in ve of the seven years, counts for theUK outnumber counts for France. However, in twoof the past three years, there have been signicantlymore violent antisemitic incidents in France than theUK. When known patterns of reporting are applied tothese gures, the lack of distinction remains. In fourof the seven years, the UK scores higher than France;in the other three France scores higher than the UK,and overall, the total number of violent antisemiticincidents that have taken place in the two countries

over the seven years is more or less identical: 352 inFrance compared to 339 in the UK. Thus, there islittle one is able to ascertain from these calculationsthat serves to meaningfully differentiate between thetwo countries.

In summary, looking across the various sources ofdata explored so far, we learned from Pew that Frenchpeople’s attitudes towards Jews in France have beenless favourable than British people’s attitudes towards Jews in the UK, but that the levels of antipathytowards Jews in France show signs of improvementto the point where they are starting to converge withthose found in the UK. We saw in the ADL datathat, when attitudes towards Jews are investigatedwith more specicity, antisemitic sentiments areconsistently higher in the French population than the

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Figure 10. Violent antisemitic acts in France and UK, 2008-2014 (CST and SPCF data)

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British population and that the trends are moving inopposite directions – becoming better in the UK andworse in France. And when we look at antisemiticincident data, we see that, if anything, the situationin the UK appears to be worse than in France, thatantisemitic incidents spike in both places when conict

erupts between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, but that,beyond that, the differences seen do not appear to

follow patterns that in any way allow us to ascertainthe level of risk currently facing Jews in Britain, orto determine whether it is rising or falling. In short,whilst many Jews in the UK appear to sense intuitivelythat the events they have witnessed in France couldsoon be replicated in Britain, the various sources ofdata fail to paint a coherent picture of reality thateither conrms or challenge people’s anxieties, oroffers them an intelligible plan to inform them aboutwhat they should actually do.

The Israel factor

Nevertheless, the spike in antisemitic incidents thatwas seen in both the UK and France in 2014, as wellas in other years, clearly points to at least part ofthe current problem. Plainly and undeniably, thesespikes occur when conict arises in Israel, and theIsrael-Gaza conict in summer 2014, known in Israelas ‘Operation Protective Edge,’ was simply the latestexample of this. Indeed, much of the apprehensionthat exists within the Jewish community todayabout antisemitism is related to Israel; the summer2014 conict prompted a series of anti-Israeldemonstrations across Europe, several of whichdescended into clear examples of antisemitic violence.This fact alone raises questions about how the public’sattitudes towards Israel affect levels of antisemitismin society, and, more generally, about the relationshipbetween antisemitism and anti-Israelism. So to what

extent do British people harbour anti-Israel views, anddo we know anything about those who do?

Polling data gathered by Populus for BICOM inOctober 2014 provide us with a snapshot of reality.That survey investigated British adults’ generalopinions of Israel, and invited them to locatethemselves on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = very coldand unfavourable towards Israel and 10 = very warmand favourable. Figure 11 shows the results: the twocoloured vertical lines mark out the 19% of peoplewho position themselves in the middle of the scale,expressing neither a favourable nor an unfavourableview. All those to the right of the blue vertical line(62%) hold unfavourable views; all those to the left ofthe red vertical line (20%) hold favourable views.

Intuitively, this is a troubling nding in and of itself,although, examined alone, it offers no contextual

information, neither in terms of British attitudesto other countries, nor whether the levels indicatedare higher or lower than those recorded in the past.Fortunately, the BICOM survey included the formerin its study, and this information is shown in Figure12. Not surprisingly, attitudes toward the UK andthe US stand out as most positive – at some distancefrom Israel. But British attitudes towards Israel appearto more or less mirror British attitudes towardsthe Palestinians – indeed, the results are largelyidentical. In contrast, attitudes towards some of theother countries in the Middle East – Syria and Iran,

as well as to entities like Hamas and to ISIS – areconsiderably colder.

This context is important, but again, does little toprovide any direction in terms of policy. As interestingas these ndings are, they tell us little about thenature or character of the people who hold the mosthostile views towards Israel, or for that matter, thosewho hold the most favourable views towards ISIS orHamas. So, whilst they show us the lay of the land,they are of limited value when it comes to determiningthe nature or scale of anti-Israel and/or antisemitic

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Figure 11. Attitudes of British adults towards Israel, October 2014 (BICOM/Populus data)

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Whilst many Jews in the UK appear to senseintuitively that the events they have witnessedin France could soon be replica ted in Britain,the various sources of data fail to paint a

coherent picture of reality that either conrmsor challenge people’s anxieties, or offers theman intelligible plan to inform them about whatthey should actually do.

British attitudes towards Israel appear to moreor less mirror British at titudes towards thePalestinians – indeed, the results are largelyidentical.


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And interestingly, the results are unambiguous:89% said ‘yes,’ the State of Israel does have a rightto exist. Of the remaining 11%, 7% did not know,1% refused to answer, and just 4% said ‘no.’ Whilstthese data again represent a single snapshot in time,and tell us little in detail about the characteristics ofthe respondents beyond their sex, age band, generalsocio-economic status and the region in which theylive, they do provide an interesting insight into ourshared understanding of general British attitudestowards Israel.

There is also some data available on whether Britishadults feel that British Jews have divided loyalties.The same Populus poll explored this issue, and foundthat only a small proportion, 6% to 7%, of Britishadults feel that British Jews are more loyal to Israelthan to Britain. 19 Proportionately, this aligns verywell with the Pew data which demonstrate that asimilar proportion of British adults hold unfavourable

views of Jews, but we have no way of knowing theextent to which the groups identied by Populus andPew overlap with one another. This highlights oneof the problems of dealing with data from multiplesources, gathered at different times in different wayswith different underlying purposes. Attemptingto pull together all of the data discussed above isextraordinarily difcult; in the event that it all revealedsimilar levels and trends, one might be able to drawsome reasonably robust conclusions, but that wouldbe extremely unlikely, not least because each type of

survey has its own independent rationale, purposeand methodology, and many fail to draw adequatelyon existing research traditions on antisemitism tomake comparisons meaningful or reliable. Again, itbecomes clear that a planned, systematic approachto data gathering and analysis, informed by a clearrationale, is an imperative if we wish to understandcontemporary antisemitism and develop effectivepolicies to combat it.

19 Populus found that 60% to 62% of British adults thought

that “British Jews are as loyal to Britain as any other Britishcitizen,” 23% to 27% thought that British Jews “havedivided loyalties and are as loyal to Israel as to Britain,” 6%to 7% thought that “British Jews are more loyal to Israelthan to Britain,” and 6% to 8% didn’t know or refused toanswer.

SummaryIn summary, the data presented in this section reveal arather confusing and incoherent picture of reality. Wehave sources showing that levels of antipathy towards Jews are comparatively low and stable in the UK, eventhough other sources demonstrate that 2014 broke allknown records for the number of antisemitic incidentsin the country. We have sources suggesting thatantisemitic attitudes are held by a considerably smallerproportion of British adults than French adults, butother sources showing that more antisemitic incidentsper member of the Jewish population occur in the UKthan in France. And we have sources demonstratingnotably cold and unfavourable attitudes towardsIsrael among British adults, but others indicatingoverwhelming support for Israel’s existence. Thesecontrasting images provide commentators withplenty of scope for discussion and debate, and one canreadily nd analysts offering doomsday predictions,or dismissing such forecasts as vast exaggerations,calculated mainly to score political points. But in themidst of all this are European Jews, trying to makesome sense of reality among the conicting claims, andEuropean Jewish leaders trying to set policy. The data,while fascinating, are, more often than not, failing toenlighten in ways that can be of genuine use.

2. Exploring Jewish attitudesabout antisemitism

Jewish perceptions and experiencesof antisemitismUp to this point, most of the data we have investigatedhave been based on the attitudes of non-Jews towards Jews. Whilst the picture produced from these datais complex, the lack of clarity generated is only partof the overall complexity that exists, because it isbased on just one overriding approach to examiningantisemitism, namely what non-Jews, in general,

think of Jews. However, there is a second approach toresearching this topic which should also inform ourunderstanding of reality: how Jews experience andperceive the reality in which they nd themselves.

There is far less data on this, not least becausesurveying small, difcult-to-reach populations isnotoriously complex. However, in this section, weexplore some of the data that do exist. We do soto illustrate an important point of this paper: thattrends and levels of antisemitism, as shown by thevarious surveys of non-Jews, have a rather loose, or,

Attempting to pull together all of thedata discussed above is extraordinarilydifcult because each type of survey hasits own independent rationale, purposeand methodology, and many fail to drawadequately on existing research traditions tomake comparisons meaningful or reliable.

Trends and levels of antisemitism, as shownby the various surveys of non-Jews, have arather loose, or, more accurately, ambiguousrelationship with what Jews actually feel.


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it more frequently, they are more likely to think it ison the rise, they are more anxious about it, and theyare more likely to be contemplating emigration as aresult of it.

Yet, in considering these results, it is important tobear in mind that these are the results for Jews asa whole; they do not take into consideration thatdifferent types of Jews may perceive and experience

antisemitism differently. JPR research on the 2012FRA data investigated this, and, most notably,identied important distinctions between Orthodoxor haredi (strictly Orthodox) Jews, on the one hand,and non-Orthodox Jews on the other, or, expressedslightly differently, Jews who are identiably Jewishas a result of the clothing they wear or some otherdistinctive external sign, and Jews who are not. Forexample, Orthodox Jews in the UK are twice as likely

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to have experienced antisemitic harassment and/or discrimination in recent years as non-Orthodox Jews in the UK. Orthodox Jews are also more thantwice as likely to be worried about becoming a victimof antisemitism and to have considered emigrationas non-Orthodox Jews. More generally, it is theOrthodox group that is most likely to think thatantisemitism in a problem in the UK and that it is onthe increase (Figure 16).

Whilst further data are required to deepen our

understanding of how Jews differ from one anotherin terms of their perceptions and experiences ofantisemitism, the fundamental nding in Figure 16is sound. However, the shortcoming of these datalies predominantly, once again, inasmuch as theyoffer a mere snapshot in time, so at this stage atleast, we have no way of ascertaining the extent towhich the gaps between these two groups of Jewsare growing, declining or stable. This is important,not least because demographic data indicate thatthe numerical balance between these two groupsis likely to shift over time, in favour of the moreOrthodox. So, even if we were to see the gapbetween them changing over time, we would needto take into consideration how these demographicchanges were exacerbating or dampening theobserved results.

However, there is a much more importantcomplication. Overall, we can see that a signicantminority of Jews in the UK, for example, is worriedabout the level of antisemitism and concerned thatit is increasing. Yet this stands in stark contrast tothe relatively low and stable trends in antisemiticsentiment as expressed by non-Jews when they arepolled. Why is this? And, which side is more ‘right’?At this stage, based on existing data, we have no wayof answering these questions.

Our position is no better when we try to forma view of how signicant the volume of concernexpressed by Jews is in policy terms. On the onehand, UK Jews seem to be the least worried Jewishpopulation in Europe; indeed, almost half say thatthey consider antisemitism to be ‘not a very bigproblem’ and a small minority (one in twenty) says itis ‘not a problem at all.’ Yet, at the same time, nearlyone in three fears an antisemitic attack of some sort

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A signicant minority of Jews in the UK isworried about the level of antisemitism andconcerned that it is increasing. Yet this standsin stark contrast to the relatively low and stabletrends in antisemitic sentiment as expressedby non-Jews when they are polled. Why is this?And, which side is more ‘right’?


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in the next twelve months. How do we explain thisdiscrepancy? And, for those who express concern,what do the levels of concern expressed actually

mean? Do they imply a high level of deep personalanxiety, or mild apprehension, or something inbetween? Indeed, what is the ‘normal’ level ofdiscomfort for an ethnic minority with a longhistory of persecution and religious/political conictwith a surrounding majority population? Thesequestions remain unanswered.

However, we do have a benchmark to help us toexplore the relationship between Jews’ perceptionsof antisemitism and its realities. JPR’s 2013National Jewish Community Survey investigatedvarious dimensions of the Jewish identities ofBritish Jews, and the previously unpublisheddata shown in Figure 17 present the ndingsfor where ‘combating antisemitism’ sits in theirconception of their Jewishness. The chart dividesthe whole sample into six denominational groups,

and within each of these, three sub-groups byage. One of the clearest observations is that, in alldenominational categories, younger people considercombating antisemitism to be a less important partof their Jewish identity than older people. Thiscould suggest declining levels of concern aboutantisemitism over time – those born more recentlyclearly see antisemitism as a less important featureof their Jewishness than their elders. But it couldequally suggest adaptation to reality – a senseamong the young that the antisemitism they observeand experience is simply a ‘normal’ feature of

contemporary Jewish life.

It is also interesting to note that haredi Jews –i.e. those most religiously observant and clearlyidentiably Jewish – are among the least likely tosee antisemitism as an important part of their Jewishidentity, whereas ‘Traditional’ Jews (most likely to bemembers of British modern Orthodox synagogues,but not necessarily identiably Jewish), are mostlikely to do so. However, overall, it is clear thatcombating antisemitism features as a highly prominentcomponent of contemporary British Jewish identity.Indeed, presented with a list of twenty differentitems that might comprise important elements oftheir Jewish identities, ‘combating antisemitism’came in fourth, with 55% maintaining that it is ‘veryimportant’, and a further 32% saying it is ‘fairly

important.’ 21 Given that ‘Remembering the Holocaust’featured as the second most important part of British Jews’ identities, it is clear that antisemitism, bothcontemporary and historical, looms large in theirminds. Yet, the extent to which this is primarily areaction to current reality, or a perception informed byrecent Jewish history, is unclear.

In public discourse, some commentators maintain thatthe threat facing British Jews today is not dissimilar tothe threat facing German Jews in the 1920s or 1930s.Others calmly believe that Britain remains one of thebest places in the world for Jews to live, and that, inmany respects, Jews have never had it so good. British Jews sometimes adopt one of these positions, but mostprobably sit somewhere in the middle, trying to makesense of all the noise, concerned by an uncomfortablesense that they should be more concerned than theyactually are, or worried by a lingering sense that theymight be more worried than is actually necessary.And, in the sea of data that exists, few seem to noticethat the ndings often speak with multiple voicesand at cross-purposes, that Jewish concerns aboutcontemporary antisemitism may be intertwined withthe Jewish historical experience (rightly or wrongly),and that our resultant capacity to develop practicalinsights or sound policy is severely limited. Indeed,looking at the various different sources presented

thus far, can anyone say with any degree of certaintywhether or not it is safe for Jews to remain in the UK,whether or not the threat is growing or decliningover time, or precisely what it is that we should evenbe monitoring that might help us to answer thesequestions? This situation begs the question: do we

need to change something in our research philosophyand practice to get better and more useful results? Canwe undertake research in new ways that would makeus more condent about our ndings, and more able todevise sensible policy?

SummaryIn most countries across Europe, there is evidence tosuggest that a majority of Jews believes antisemitism

21 See: Graham, D., Staetsky, L. D. and Boyd, J. (2014). Jews inthe United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary ndings from the National Jewish Community Survey. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, p.13.

On the one hand, UK Jews seem to be theleast worried Jewish population in Europe;at the same time, nearly one in three fear san antisemitic attack of some sor t in the nexttwelve months.

This situation begs the question: do we need tochange something in our research philosophyand practice to get bet ter and more usefulresults? Can we undertake research in newways that would make us more condent

about our ndings, and more able to devisesensible policy?


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to be a problem in their country and that levels of ithave increased in recent years. Large proportions areworried about becoming a victim of it in the comingyear, particularly in France and Belgium, and

signicant minorities avoid Jewish sites or eventsout of fear for their safety, and have consideredemigrating as a result. Nevertheless, it is clear thatdifferent types of Jews perceive and experienceantisemitism differently – most notably theOrthodox and non-Orthodox – due, in part, to thediffering ability of potential perpetrators to be ableto identify them as Jews, and in part, to their owninternal understanding of the place of antisemitismwithin their own sense of Jewish identity. However,there are substantial differences between thelevels of antipathy towards Jews found in the data

investigating the attitudes of non-Jews, and the levelsof anxiety and apprehension about antisemitismfound in the data examining the perceptions andexperiences of Jews. Much more in-depth researchamong Jewish populations is required to make senseof these data, conducted with a clear eye on devisingpolicy about how best to respond to existing Jewishcommunity concerns.

3. Considering the perpetrators

Who are the antisemites?Thus far, we have seen data from Pew which suggestlevels of antipathy towards Jews in Britain haveremained largely steady and comparatively lowover recent years; data from ADL which suggest

that antisemitic attitudes among British adultsare comparatively low and have declined recently(in contrast to the attitudes of people in France,Germany, Spain and Poland, which are higher and

have increased recently); and data from CST whichshow a sharp increase in antisemitic incidents fora particular period during 2014, but generally arather steady rise over time caused either by agenuine increase in the number of incidents, and/or by a change in reporting behaviour. We haveexplored attitudes of people in different countriestowards Israel, and, from the fairly scant andsporadic data that exist, have seen that, whilstmost British adults view Israel unfavourably, fewappear to question its right to exist. We have alsoseen how Jews in different countries experience

and perceive antisemitism differently, noting thatmore Orthodox (and thus more easily identiable) Jews experience antisemitism more frequently andperceive it to be worse than non-Orthodox (andthus less easily identiable) Jews, and noted howantisemitism appears to play a rather importantrole in contemporary Jewish identity in Britain.However, perhaps most importantly, in collectingand investigating these data, we are arguably noclearer about the real nature of the problem. Wehave some conicting indications of its scale, andits direction of travel, but we have not yet shone aspotlight on, arguably, the most important issueof all – who holds these hostile views and/orperpetrates these violent or aggressive acts? If wewant to tackle antisemitism, we must develop anunderstanding of this.

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Figure 17. Proportions of different denominational groups and age bands saying ‘combating antisemitism’ is‘very important’ to their own sense of Jewish identity (%)

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given the known history of antisemitism (e.g. thepolitical right and left, and Christian and Muslimextremists). Indeed, one of the most intriguing andchallenging features about antisemitism is that,at different stages in its development, it has comefrom all parts of the political spectrum and fromdifferent religious groups living in close proximityto Jews, most notably Christians and Muslims.

Any serious research initiative should acknowledgethis reality, and include within its programmeattempts to understand and monitor antisemitismfrom all of these sources, not only to determineits contemporary character, but also to ensure anon-going assessment of whether more latent formsof antisemitism are showing any signs of revival.This requires complex and costly data gatheringand analysis, not least because each of these sub-populations needs to be researched in sufcientdetail to be able to draw meaningful conclusions notonly about each group as a whole, but, much more

importantly, about the sub-groups within the sub-groups that may pose the most serious threats.

However, at present, it is clear which group iscausing the highest level of concern. It can be seenin the FRA ndings that situates ‘Someone with aMuslim extremist view’ at the top of the list of mostlikely perpetrators of antisemitic harassment andviolence in Europe, and in the somewhat euphemistic‘South Asians’ and ‘Arabs or North Africans’ in the

CST data. Furthermore, all of the most murderousattacks on Jews in Europe in recent years – on IlanHalimi in Paris in 2006, at the Ozar HaTorah Jewishschool in Toulouse in 2012, at the Brussels JewishMuseum in 2014, in the kosher supermarket in Parisin 2015 and outside the synagogue in Copenhagen in2015 – were all perpetrated by Islamist extremists. Sowhat do we know about Muslims and antisemitism?

British Muslims represent just 5% of the UKpopulation, so the number of Muslim respondentsin general polls of the UK population is typically fartoo low to undertake any detailed analysis of them.Furthermore, any signicant differences between theattitudes of British Muslims and the attitudes of theBritish population as a whole will typically fail to bepicked up in general polls of British adults, because

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Figure 18. Perpetrators of specic cases of antisemitic harassment or physical attack in the previous ve years inthe UK, as perceived by respondents (%)

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N=425 (harassment) and N=70 (physical violence).

One of the most intriguing and challenging

features about antisemitism is that, at differentstages in its development, it has come fromall parts of the political spectrum and fromdifferent religious groups


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Muslims do not comprise a large enough proportionof the whole to affect the counts. 24 That said,from time to time, survey takers allow ‘boosters’for specic, usually small, ethnic and religiousminorities, and these can be valuable. However,

sources which, in the context of surveying nationalpopulations around the world, regularly surveypeople in countries with large Muslim majorities, areparticularly revealing.

When we examine such data, there is clear evidenceto indicate that the level of antipathy amongMuslims towards Jews is a major issue. The Pew datainvestigated earlier in this paper, for example, havealso explored attitudes towards Jews in countries withpredominantly Muslim populations – notably Turkey(which is 98.6% Muslim), Egypt (94.7%), Jordan

(98.8%), Indonesia (88.1%) and Pakistan (96.4%) 25 –and it is clear that, based on this measure, levels of

24 For example, whilst Pew nds that only about 2–3% ofBritish adults holds ‘very unfavourable’ views of Jews, thatcount conceals much higher levels of antipathy among theMuslim population of the UK (see Figure 20). Moreover,even if those levels were to remain stable over time, thesignicant projected increase in the size of the Muslim

population over the coming decades will still barely registerany change in the overall gures because they will continueto be a small minority among the UK population asa whole.

25 Pew Research Center (2011).The Future of the GlobalMuslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030.

antipathy towards Jews are signicantly higher inthese countries than in any of the countries in Europeexplored previously (Figure 19).

In countries bordering Israel with a history of

armed conict with it but which currently havepeace agreements in place (Jordan and Egypt),unfavourable views of Jews are held by almost 100%of their populations. In the predominantly Muslimcountries of South Asia (Pakistan and Indonesia)that do not share borders with Israel and have nohistory of military conict with it, Jews are also seenunfavourably, across most years, by over 70% ofpopulation. In all countries shown, with the exceptionof Turkey, the trend is essentially at from 2004-2009.In Turkey, Jews are seen unfavourably by 50% of thepopulation in 2004 and by over 70% of the population

in 2009; indeed, the trend there converges over theyears shown to the levels exhibited by Pakistan andIndonesia. The lowest levels of unfavourable attitudestowards Jews in the given set of predominantlyMuslim countries (Turkey in 2004) is marginallyhigher than the countries with the most unfavourableattitudes in Europe (see Figure 1). In short, in thewords of the Pew analysts who rst investigatedthese data, “anti-Jewish sentiment is endemic in theMuslim world.”26

26 See:Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim andWestern Publics. 17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey.Pew Research Center, 2005, p.5.

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Figure 19. Proportion of people holding ‘very unfavourable’ or ‘mostly unfavourable’ opinion aboutJews, in selec ted predominantly Muslim countries

Source: Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project.

There is clear evidence to indicate that the levelof antipathy among Muslims towards Jews is amajor issue.

In short, in the words of the Pew analysts who

rst investigated these data, “anti-Jewishsentiment is endemic in the Muslim world.”


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subscribing to an especially extreme, radical andviolent interpretation of Islamic ideas, does thissuggest, for example, that levels of general Muslimantipathy towards Jews are not, in and of themselves,a predictor of antisemitic violence? Might it suggestthat other factors – perhaps the levels of antipathyamong the non-Muslim population, or the relationshipbetween this and the levels found within the Muslimpopulation – are inuential? Or might it be entirelydifferent factors, such as the presence or absence ofspecic Islamic doctrines or ethnic groups that arecritical, or socio-economic factors, or the availabilityof weaponry, or the visibility of Jews and Jewishinfrastructure? Alternatively, there are other datasources which generate different results. For example,Fondapol data on French Muslims indicate thathostility towards Jews is actually much higherthan this: in its 2014 survey, for example, it foundthat 67% of French Muslims believe that Jews havetoo much power in the realm of the economy andnance, and 56% believe that Jews use their status asvictims of the Holocaust for their own interests. 28 Itis conceivable that something signicant changed inthe period betw

jpr.2015.policy debate - contemporary antisemitism

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