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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION 7857 BLANDY ROAD, SUITE 100

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, 23551-2490

ACT/CAPDEV/REQITT-1020/SERNU-0300

TO: Director General, International Military Staff

SUBJECT: INTERIM REPORT - NATO'S JOINT AIR POWER STRATEGY INTEROPERABILITY STUDY

DATE: 30 August 2019

REFERENCES: A. PO(2018)00447, NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy, 6 February 2018.

B. IMSM-0068-2018, NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation, 14 Mar 2018.

C. IMSM-0513-2018, ACT's Request for Extension to Deliver the Bi-SC Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation Report on Interoperability Considerations, 3 Dec 2018.

D. 5000ITSC FCR 0010ITT-0924/Ser:NU0057, ACT Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation, 7 Feb 2019.

E. SH/SDP/J5/PLPNC/19-002091 (INV), NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report, 18 Apr 2019.

1. At Reference A, the Council approved NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS) and provided additional guidance for the implementation of the strategy. The guidance included tasking to the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) to identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges, including those from an operational perspective, and provide recommendations on a process to address these.

2. At Reference B, the Strategic Commands (SCs) were tasked to provide the required input for the implementation of JAPS. In particular, the SCs, with ACT in lead, were tasked to identify potential technological, process and human interoperability considerations and challenges between old and next generation platforms/systems and provide recommendations on a process how to address these.

3. At Reference C, the International Military Staff (IMS) acknowledged that the study will be delivered in increments, in order to cover the full spectrum of interoperability in joint air operations. The guidance included tasking to provide an interim report no later than 1 September 2019 to allow the main themes of the study to be incorporated into the Minimum Capability Requirement derivation process and is aligned with the information requirements from other stakeholders.

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4. At Reference D, ACT provided the first increment of the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study with the delivery of an Interim Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS) Interoperability Report, which identified a number of interoperability challenges associated with Joint Air Power capabilities and the command and control (C2) of air power.

5. At Reference E, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) provided the second increment of the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study, with the delivery of ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report, which was informed by survey responses from several Nations, expertise from a number of NATO headquarters and Centres of Excellence (COE), and an in depth interoperability study conducted by the European Air Group (EAG). This report provides a critical operational view to the overall BI-SC JAPS Interoperability Study and was supplemented by a Bi-SC in session update by SCs to the MCWG (P&C) in June 2019.

6. In June 2019, ACT initiated another increment of the study by commissioning a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) study. NIAG Study Group 240 (SG240) will provide the SCs with an important industrial view, leveraging experts from 19 companies from 10 nations. SG240 will deliver its final report in November 2019.

7. This interim report represents another increment to the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study. It highlights relevant JAPS interoperability considerations to inform the defence planning process and provides main themes of the study to be considered by defence planners for incorporation into the NDPP. It does not address recommendations on how to solve these challenges, which will be the focus of another increment that will be included in the BI-SC JAPS Interoperability Study final report. Many of the interoperability concerns noted in this interim report confirm issues previously raised by other studies and reports.

8. During the study, ACT received support from HQ ACO, SACT Staff Element Europe, Single Service Commands, Centres of Excellence, the NATO Standardsation Office, as well as NATO, non-NATO, and national subject matter experts.

9. There are several ongoing strands of work (e.g. standards, doctrine development, defence planning, defence investment, etc.) that have contributed to the identification and correction of JAPS-related interoperability challenges. However, progress does not keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment and developing technology. At times, high-level policies, such as information sharing restrictions and national caveats, limit interoperability solutions, placing the burden on our operators.

10. Moving forward, ACT intends to deliver a JAPS Interoperability Roadmap to provide a holistic and coordinated approach to address JAPS interoperability concerns with a sense of urgency. It will be constructed in a manner that capitalizes on existing and ongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and details lines of effort (LOE) with associated action items. The Roadmap will be delivered to the IMS with the Final Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study Report on 31 December 2019.

11. Should there be any questions or further detail required, the ACT point of contact is Mr. Chris Brunett, CIV, Federated Interoperability Branch, telephone NCN 555-3702, or email ch ris. [email protected].

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FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION:

Poul Primdahl Brigadier General, ONK (A) ACOS Capability Requirements

ENCLOSURE:

1. ACT Interim Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Interoperability Study, 30 Aug 2019

COPY TO:

External- COS SHAPE SHAPE J5 Director, JAPCC

Internal - COS ACT List III - NLRs List VII - NATO Agencies DCOS CAPDEV

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQITT -1 020/SER:NU-0300 DATED: 30 AUG 2019

Interim Report NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy

Interoperability Study

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS 1

PART 1- CONTEXT 2

Introduction 2

Interoperability 4

JAP Core Roles 4

PART II -INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE JAPS CORE ROLES 7

Background 7

Interoperability Considerations for All Core Roles 8

Interoperability Considerations for Counter Air 15

Interoperability Considerations for Attack 17

Interoperability Considerations for Air Mobility 22

Interoperability Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR. 26

PART III - JAPS INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEFENCE PLANNING 31

Background 31

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PREPARE 32

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PROJECT 35

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area ENGAGE 36

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area C3 36

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area SUSTAIN 36

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PROTECT 37

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area INFORM 37

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39

Conclusions 39

Recommendations 40

ANNEX A - ACRONYMS A-1

ANNEX B - JAP-RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS B-1

ANNEX C - JAP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NDPP C-1

ANNEX D - REFERENCES D-1

ANNEX E - ENDNOTES E-1

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PART I - CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

1. In February 2018, Defence Ministers endorsed the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS)1. It provides the Alliance with an enduring direction for the future development and employment of Joint Air Power (JAP) capabilities to fulfil NATO's core tasks".

2. JAPS is authoritative and guides and informs all existing and future NATO airpower activities and capability development. The JAPS underscores a number of areas, in particular the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) as central to the implementation of the JAPS Other areas include policy and doctrine, strategic communications and capability development.

3. The key to NATO JAP effectiveness is to force generate assets that are interoperable on Day-Zero. This requires an unremitting focus on interoperability. Allies continue to pursue modernisation, therefore interoperability between new and legacy platforms, systems and capabilities is increasingly important for Allies to exploit the full potential of JAP and maximize combat effectiveness.

4. In consideration of the implementation of JAPS, the Strategic Commands (SC), with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the lead, were tasked to identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between new and legacy platforms, systems and capabilities including from an operational perspective, and to propose a process how to address them. ACT recommended to the International Military Staff (IMS) to deliver the JAPS Interoperability Study in increments, in order to address the entire spectrum of interoperability in joint air operations through the prism of three lenses - Transformational, Operational and Industrial.

5. In February 2019, ACT provided the first increment of the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study with the delivery of an Interim JAPS Interoperability Report," which identified a number of interoperability challenges associated with JAP capabilities and the command and control (C2) of air power.

6. In April 2019, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) provided a second increment with the delivery of ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report," which was informed by survey responses from several Nations, expertise from a number of NATO headquarters and Centres of Excellence (COE), and an in depth interoperability study conducted by the European Air Group (EAG). The ACO report provides the overall Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study with an essential operational view by highlighting key issues that currently affect NATO operations.

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7. In June 2019, ACT initiated another increment of the study by commissioning a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) study. NIAG Study Group 240 (SG240) will provide an important industrial view to the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study, leveraging experts from 19 companies from 10 nations. It will deliver its final report to the SCs in November 2019.

Aim

8. This Interim Report represents another increment to the larger Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study.

9. It responds directly to the task, "Specifically concerning the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and in order to timely integrate the study findings and inputs, it would be fundamental to have an interim report no later than 1 September 2019. This allows the main themes to be incorporated into the Minimum Capability Requirement derivation process (step 2 of the NDPP) and is aligned with the information requirements from other stakeholders."

Scope

10. This interim report considers relevant interoperability challenges concerning JAP to inform the NDPP. It does not address specific recommendations on how to solve these challenges, which will be the focus of another increment in the form of a JAPS Interoperability Roadmap that will provide a process for addressing the interoperability concerns and challenges mentioned in parts II and III of this report. The Roadmap will provide a holistic and coordinated approach to correct interoperability concerns with a sense of urgency. It will be constructed in a manner that capitalizes on existing and ongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and details lines of effort (LOE) with associated action items. This roadmap will be included in or with the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study Final Report to be delivered to the IMS by 31 December 2019.

Method

11. There are two main components of this interim report.

a. First, the report provides an analysis of interoperability considerations and challenges within each of the four JAP Core Roles (Counter-Air, Attack, Air Mobility, Air Contribution to JISR) across the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability) capability Lines of Development (LoD).

b. Second, the report provides an in depth assessment of JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerations that have already been or should be incorporated into the NDPP Capability Codes and Statements (CC/CS).

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INTEROPERABILITY

12. For the purpose of this report, interoperability is defined as the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied obiectives". This NATO definition is one of the strongest in any dictionary and/or encyclopaedia as it clearly articulates the importance of interoperability and the force multiplying effect it can have in terms of operational effectiveness and cost efficiency."

13. Interoperability is achievable through common doctrine, procedures and technical means, and enhanced by cultural awareness, interoperability spans the full spectrum of the DOTMLPFI LaD, and is essential for the success of NATO JAP. Since Allies and partners will deliver capabilities to NATO at differing generational and technological levels, the integration of upgrades to legacy communications, identification and information systems, including technical validation and verification processes, will be critical to achieve seamless interoperability.

14. Interoperability is not limited to just technological interoperability. A well-balanced investment in people, procedural and technological interoperability is required to fulfil the ambition implied by NATO's deflrution.?

JAP CORE ROLES

15. The Core Roles of JAP are defined in the strategy itself and in NATO Joint Doctrine (Reference F) as follows:

16. Counter-Air. Control of the air helps shape the operational area wherein friendly operations can proceed at the optimum place and time without prohibitive air interference, while providing force protection."

a. Offensive counter-air. Offensive counter-air (OCA) consists of offensive operations to destroy, disrupt or degrade adversary air and missile capabilities as close to their source as possible, both before and after launch."

b. Defensive counter-air. Defensive counter-air (DCA) operations protect friendly forces and vital interests from adversary air and missile attacks; as such it is mainly, but not strictly synonymous with air and missile defence (AMD).1o

17. Attack. Attack lies at the heart of air power's capacity to create effects by changing behaviours or the course of events. Air attack is coercive in the broadest sense of the term as it creates tactical, operational and strategic effects through the threat, and use, of force."

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a. Strategic Attack. A strategic attack is an operational level-directed offensive action against a target, whether military, political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected to achieve military strategic objectives."

b. Air Power Contribution. These operations comprise air power contribution to land operations and air power contribution to maritime operations and are conducted to: defeat adversaries fielded forces; destroy their supporting infrastructure; or generate psychological effects to shatter their cohesion or will to fight.13

(1) Air Power Contribution to land Operations (APClO). Air operations flown in support of land operations are conducted as part of the overall joint campaign strategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict. Operations generally fall under two mission types: Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS).

(2) Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations (APCMO). Air operations flown in support of maritime operations extend the application of air power into the high seas or the littoral and its adjacent waters. Such operations usually contribute to two specific maritime warfare areas: Anti Surface Warfare (ASUW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).

c. Air-delivered Information Activities. Such activities primarily focus on non-lethal effects to influence an adversary's will, understanding and subsequent capability behaviour."

18. Air Mobility. Air mobility enables the deployment, sustainment and recovery of military and civilian personnel and material by air. It is critical to the success of joint operations. At the operational level air mobility operations fall into two fundamental categories: Air Transport (sometimes referred to as airlift) and Air-to-Air refuellinq."

a. Air Transport (AT). AT allows a Joint Task Force (JTF) to move and sustain forces anywhere in the world and across the entire range of operations. AT operations are typically classified as inter- or intra-theatre."

b. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR). AAR is an air support operation consisting of the in-flight transfer of fuel between an airborne tanker and suitable receiver aircraft."

19. Air Contribution to JISR. Air contribution to Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) is an integrated intelligence and operations set of capabilities, which synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with tactical collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) of the resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation, and execution of

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operations. Air and space based ISR-assets can be used strategically to build an early understanding of potential crisis points and enhance the quality of political and high-level military decision-making. At the operational and tactical levels it allows observation of an adversary's actions and dispositions (including battle damage assessment), thereby enabling commanders to identify dependencies, vulnerabilities and strenqths."

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PART II -INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE JAPS CORE ROLES

BACKGROUND

20. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together coherently, effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should be planned, prepared for and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths of the capabilities and forces made available for an operation." Since Allies and partners deliver capabilities at differing generational and technological levels, interoperability is an unending endeavour - a constant drive to improve our joint and multinational force common doctrine, procedures and technical means and enhanced by cultural awareness." The success of JAP, therefore, requires continuous adaptation across the spectrum of DOTMLPFI LoD.

Aim

21. This report aims to present the Bi-SC findings of potential JAP interoperability considerations and challenges between new and legacy platforms, systems and capabilities, including an operational perspective.

Scope

22. This analysis is limited to the four JAP Core Roles (Counter-Air, Attack, Air Mobility, Air Contribution to JISR) and does not include other JAPS Implementation lines of effort such as Space, Cyberspace, Air Command and Control (Air C2), etc.

Method

23. For each of the four JAP Core Roles, the SCs exposed interoperability concerns and challenges using an examination of lessons identified, extensive literary review, advice from NATO Centres of Excellence (CO E), national and multinational organisations, and the ACO Operational Assessment, which includes the results of a multinational workshop and national surveys.

24. Often interoperability findings span more than one JAP Core Role and impact more than one capability characteristic. In these cases, the finding is included in the most relevant section.

25. Interoperability findings that span all four JAP Core Roles are included separately and then repeated when appropriate within the applicable Core Roles.

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26. 5th generation platforms, such as F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), are multi-mission and therefore span more than one of the Core Roles (e.g. Counter-Air, Attack, JISR). For the purposes of this report, challenges related to 5th generation platforms and their integration with legacy but still capable platforms (e.g. 4th generation) can be found in the Attack subsection and are sometimes referred to as 'multi-generation' challenges.

27. The topic of Air C2 is beyond the scope of this tasking; however, Air C2 is integral to all JAP Core Roles and adjoins them. Therefore, it is impractical to discuss JAP interoperability without some mention of Air C2 and conversely.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALL CORE ROLES

Doctrine

28. Lagging Allied Publications. There are a significant number of ongoing JAP related work strands currently being worked in NATO that will have implications on existing strategies, policies, doctrines and plans. However, JAP-related doctrines in the Allied Joint Publications (AJP) have not yet explicitly implemented JAPS, as the current revision cycle commenced before the approval of the strategy. The next cycle is due to begin with the revision of the AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, starting at the end of 2019. Subsequent revision of JAP-related AJPs is planned for 2022.21 The speed with which NATO doctrine (and the overarching policy that guides it) evolves is inadequate to keep pace with rapidly changing operational environment and emerging technologies. The cross-domain characteristic of JAPS implies the need to ensure all domains incorporate changes into relevant AJPs.

29. Outdated Concepts. With the Joint C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) signed by the SCs in July 2019, the domain specific C2 CONOPS, are planned to be delivered in December 2019. The domain-specific C2 CONOPS must be aligned and reflect a truly joint approach to NATO operations. While NATO is well versed in vertical C2, it must consider and be able to achieve horizontal collaborations and synchronization across multiple domains, commands and joint operating areas (JOAs). The management of scarce resources is an enduring challenge for operational commanders during any . operation. The ability to seamlessly share information between domains, commands and JOAs help manage those resources and reduce duplication of effort. It requires NATO to provide commanders and NATO forces with effective, common and protected means of information sharing and information management. This is particularly important between Maritime and Air C2 CONOPS noting that both domains are key contributors to NATO Air Defence, NATO Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). The Air C2 CONOPS will be of pivotal importance to several JAP related work strands, as it will describe the conceptual approach to NATO Air C2 across the three NATO core tasks. Ideally, 5th generation warfare concepts should precede the introduction of 5th generation platforms into Alliance exercises and operations. Aircraft

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such as the JSF have been in development for over two decades and are now being introduced into several Alliance national air forces; however, NATO has yet to even define the characteristics, capabilities and limitations of 5th generation air platforms. Definitions are a prerequisite to the common language doctrine is intended to provide. NATO must find a way to decrease the cycle-time between identifying emerging requirements to adapting our policies, concepts and doctrines. NATO tends to employ new platforms and systems in the roles associated with legacy platforms and systems. Planners and operators, who do not fully understand a new platform or system, may not exploit the full range of its capabilities. Likewise, a failure to provide the right level of support for a new platform or system similarly prevents the full exploitation its capabilities.

30. Lagging Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). Updates to NATO tactics techniques and procedures do not keep pace with the arrival of new generation platforms or capabilities. Lacking overarching guidance, Nations develop their own TTP using a baseline provided by the aircraft/capability manufacturer. These TTPs are not always shared directly with NATO and may not be aligned with current NATO TTPs. This is especially relevant when employing new generation and legacy assets in a joint operational context. Moreover, the lack of NATO consistent doctrine and TTPs for multi generation platform usage negatively affects standardized training across platforrns.F Some specific examples are included in the following sections. Annex B presents the current JAP-related NATO Doctrines and TTPs in the form of AJPs and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) and their respective promulgations dates. A comprehensive review of JAP-related ATPs reveals several TTPs requiring update. Whilst the process to deliberately review and update these documents at a planned periodicity schedule slowly improves NATO's TTP library, it is neither flexible nor agile enough to complement the pace with which new technology and processes are introduced into Alliance air forces.

31. Restrictive information sharing policies. A principle interoperability challenge is lack of proper knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and operational requirements of new generation platforms, which links directly to information sharing constraints within new generation programme offices. This knowledge deficit impedes joint operational planning and execution." For example, the ability of new generation platforms to acquire a wide range of spectral information enables potentially more complete and accurate system displays. New generation platforms may even provide C2 for some small-scale and specific engagements. However, the capability to share this more accurate picture is reduced by information sharing restrictions between old and new generation plattorrns."

Organization

32. Need for more adaptive organisational constructs. NATO must improve JAP's modular organization to provide maximum agility and the ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment. The structure and qualifications of staff in NATO HQs have to evolve to take into account features of new

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capabillties" Suitably trained, qualified and experienced personnel to operational HQs should be a LoD consideration during the development and procurement stage of any new platform, system or capability.

33. Need to leverage closer relationships with partner countries. Cooperation with partner countries of NATO during recent operations achieved significant progress transforming some partners into more interoperable air forces capable to fight with NATO forces and eager to train with them. During recent NATO operations, such as Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), the presence of very different contributing partners provided not only legitimacy, but also some very useful capabilities. Additionally, the participating nations were pleased with the interoperability and experience they obtained as a NATO partner." Despite these benefits, there exists no NATO exercise that includes member and partner nations and exercises the full range of JAP capabilities. Force structures should be designed to maximise the contributions of member nations and partner countries. Future force generation should consider what national contributions are required to build and interoperable fighting force.

34. National limitations to collaborative relationships with other multinational organisations. European institutions like European Defence Agency (EDA) are natural strategic partners for NATO. They extend the membership of the respective organisations, improve standardization, enhance interoperability and partially mitigate gaps between national research and development programmes. In many cases, we are working on the same challenges. The European Air Group (EAG) Combined Air Interoperability Programme (CAIP) is a complementary multinational collaborative effort, focused directly on interoperability issues regarding 4th and 5th generation aircraft. Although participation in the EAG does not include all NATO nations and extends to some non-NATO nations, the interoperability challenges identified by the CAIP are analogous to those the Alliance faces. Therefore, the work of the EAG CAIP is extremely relevant to NATO. National constraints often impede full collaboration with organisations like the EDA and EAG. NATO would benefit from forming close collaboration with them to mitigate knowledge gaps and harmonize the defence capability planning and development activities of NATO and the European Union (EU).27

35. National limitations to collaborative relationships with industry. Some nations are supported by specialized industries for the maintenance of their platforms/systems. The introduction of new generation platforms, inter alia, increases the participation of industries in the maintenance and sustainment processes. The constraints and limitations imposed by industry on the operation of the platform may not be fully understood by NATO air planners operations." This lack of understanding may induce misunderstanding and interoperability issues.

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Training

36. lack of trained personnel. Interoperability is not only about standards, it is also about preserving the ability to work together. There is a lack of adequately qualified and experienced personnel in NATO headquarters who have the required subject matter expertise to effectively integrate multi-generational platforms into a Joint battlespace." The coexistence of multiple generations of platforms requires specific skill-sets to enable safe and effective integration of these capabilities. The required SME training for support infrastructure staff should be considered as part of the development and delivery of new and upgrading capabilities.

37. lack of multinational live exercises that train the full-spectrum of NATO JAP.

a. Military exercises help ensure the Alliance is ready and able to defend itself against any threat. Exercises test NATO's decision-making processes, systems, Doctrine, TTPs, and Alliance interoperability, as well as with partner countries. In 2018, NATO conducted 103 exercises with 51 NATO exercises open to partner countries. In addition, Allies separately held 183 national and multinational exercises." In 2019, 102 NATO exercises are planned, 39 of which are open to the participation of partner countries. Allies report that they will conduct 208 national and multinational exercises. The exercises led by NATO and Allies this year include around 25 exercises primarily focused on the land domain, 27 exercises focused on the air domain and 12 exercises focused mainly on maritime operations."

b. The success of an operation combining old and new generation platforms will abet an adaptation of the NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy to include new capabilities" specificities, constraints and requirements. Nations would be encouraged to incorporate NATO's ETEE Policy into their own training and education policies to conduct training in a more realistic environment. 32

c. NATO lacks adequate multinational exercises that test the full spectrum of JAP missions including Long-Range Bombing, Close Air Support (CAS), Air Policing (AP), Air-to-Air Combat, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), AAR, and cross-domain coordination with Maritime and Land air. Some air forces in the Alliance are unable to contribute to all areas of JAP and are reliant on Allies to conduct these operations. It is essential that all allied air forces continue to prepare for high-intensity air warfare and NATO should pay particular attention to providing Joint exercises and training designed to incorporate multinational capabilities into a single battles pace under an unfamiliar command structure. These training and exercises must, where practicable, provide operators and


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planners the opportunity to be tested in large scale Joint exercises offering situations close to combat. 33

38. Lack of multinational live exercises focused on the Future Security Environment (FSE), including Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). NATO frequently executes live training at the component level only and often overlooks the benefits of live Joint training. 34 Consequently, current live exercises do not adequately compel component interoperability. Component Commands are currently re-Iearning the basics of passing the Recognized Air Picture (RAP) due to technological advancements that have not been synchronized during development. NATO must develop training and exercises focused on: maximizing Joint and multinational participation; providing interoperability challenges to operators and planners; the use of latest technologies/ capabilities and reversionary modes of operation to ensure effective information exchange and management in realistic operating environments. Training and exercises should expose Command Groups and Senior Staff to the challenges that realistic operating environments impose on a Joint Task Force (JTF) and the means by which these challenges can be mitigated. NATO must improve synchronization across the Force, to include joint targeting and joint prioritization of effort. Integration of stealth and other 5th generation technology with legacy capabilities is critical. NATO needs to "train as it means to fight" and to do so, exercises should be Joint in nature wherever possible. Additionally, NATO should allocate sufficient time in exercises to allow end to end training rather than controlling activities through scripted activity

39. Under-classification of NATO exercises. NATO exercises are routinely conducted in an unclassified environment to allow the inclusion of han-NATO nations. However, new realistic scenarios must include collective defence operations facing a near peer opponent. Unfortunately, the unclassified environment does not allow the required exchange of sensitive operational information among the participants, limiting the quality of the training evenP5

40. Achieving agreed training standards. Many Allies have fallen below agreed standards in terms of training (specific and/or core) capabilities. Many member nations do not meet the NATO-required flying hours for pilots. This has a second-order effect in the training loss experienced by associated specialists. For example, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), who require a certain number of terminal controls, including control of a fast-moving jet, to obtain and maintain their qualifications.:" NATO must review the relevance of these and other training standards as Nations develop smarter training curricula using multiple benchmarks.

Material

41. Lack of information sharing regarding platform and systems capabilities and limitations. Material development is the foundation for the development of new



capabilities. Interoperability requires compliance with NATO standards. New generation platforms/systems programme offices and their corresponding nations should share information with NATO concerning new generation platforms capabilities.'? NATO should continue to exploit the Smart Defence (SO) and the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), which allow partners to share capability development opportunities with Allies to enable their national forces to operate alongside NATO forces.

42. Material standards need improvement. JAP specific standards and Measures of Performance/Measures of Effectiveness for NATO readiness must be improved for the Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the FSE.38 Current NATO standards are often: ambiguous; open to interpretation; a secondary consideration; an after-thought following adoption of new technologies. This is inadequate for achieving assured interoperability between international multi-generational technoloqies."

43. lack of compliance with standards. The NATO standardization process does not require nations to implement a NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) when ratified. Moreover, in many STANAGs there is no minimum requirement list of equipment to be standardized. This results in important differences and interoperability gaps between platforms since STANAGs are invariably developed after a new technology has been introduced and has entered service."?

44. C41SR capability incompatibility. The success of JAP requires strategic to tactical situational awareness through the flow of information across domains and functions while fully integrating Communication, Computers, Command and Control and ISR (C4ISR) capabilities and seamlessly connecting NATO, and Non-NATO, military and civilian, architectures. NATO C41SR architectures are often developed in a stove-piped fashion, internal to NATO projects or programmes with limited deliberate considerations of cross-domain coherence. To improve integration and interoperability of such systems, NATO must adopt an 'Interoperable by Design' approach that focuses on interoperability during development and acquisition processes." For example, the current NATO E-3 is not designed to optimize all new generation C2 and communication capabilities. NATO, however, seems to want to address this. The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) initiative was started to provide advice on the delivery of a follow-on to the NATO E-3 capability. It is required to be interoperable and capable of interacting with the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) and JISR capabilities and assets such as Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and MSA. It will consider the need for an Open Architecture and flexibility in design to allow maximum opportunity for scalable, modular, configurable and interoperable elements, which will seamlessly collaborate and integrate with national and NATO C41SR.42

45. C2 communications systems incompatibility with non-NATO bodies. NATO C2 communications systems do not link effectively to current European bodies and systems such as European Air Transport Command (EATC), European Tactical Airlift



Centre (ETAC), Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), European Planning and Coordination System (EPACS), the Management European Air Transport (MEAT) application and others."

46. lack of NATO programmes that enable and standardize the interoperable use of commercial off the shelf technology. NATO lacks a deliberate programme that maximizes the use of interoperable commercial off the shelf (COTS) capabilities and equipment. 44 This enables the introduction of national COTS systems that are incompatible with others systems and increase vulnerability and risk.

leadership

47. Need for more deliberate leadership development. The success of JAP relies upon the ability to make and implement more informed and more accurate decisions at a rate faster than the adversary. The introduction of new platforms, systems and capabilities can enhance or be detrimental to the process if not properly integrated and controlled. The level of knowledge of decision-makers on new generation systems and capabilities will be reflected in the quality of: planning, execution, and information exchange and management processes needed to ensure commanders receive timely information to enable tactical, operational and strategic decision rnaklnq." NATO needs robust, realistic and deliberate leadership building programme that leverages joint experimentation, training and exercises, to improve decision-making at every level.

Personnel

48. lack of qualified personnel. Personnel with the accurate level of knowledge on new generation platforms will be the key enablers to reach an efficient and effective JAP. Essential information regarding new generation platforms, systems and capabilities is not sufficiently disseminated by nations and programme offices through NATO Headquarters, leading to knowledge gaps.46 NATO fails to consider training subject matter experts (SME) as part of a capabilities development and procurement process. NATO should review JAP manning processes and develop policies that will support more efficient use of existing manpower, improve interoperability and standardization and identify future manpower shortaqes."

Facilities

49. Unknown support and security requirements. The successful execution of JAPS depends on adequate and secure basing. All air platforms have requirements concerning maintenance and support facilities. The introduction of new capabilities will inevitably require changes to NATO air basing facilities and have significant cost and time impact. Often these changes are not socialised prior to new capabilities entering into service and, therefore constrain/limit deployability and interoperability. This implies the need to enhance facilities planning within a new capabilities design, development and



procurement process and greater focus on developing adequate support infrastructure and subject matter expertise.

50. NATO air facilities are not yet modernized, equipped, or hardened to support the full spectrum of JAP capabilities. Depending on the end user, support requirement standards for older and newer capabilities are not implemented at the same time and therefore do not account for their interoperability with each other." For example, support requirements for new generation platforms are not known to NATO. New generation aircraft like the F-35 JSF don't comply with STANAG 343010 level C (minimum requirements) in terms of cross-servicinç" This can be exacerbated by the lack of adequate knowledge and agreements for dual use (civilian and military) facilities/installations.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER AIR

Doctrine

51. Improved IAMD policy. The revised IAMD policy'? represents a positive example of NATO policy responding to JAPS. The policy details and refines a number of topics, such as cyberspace defence and cruise missile defence. It also includes considerations on offensive options in support of IAMD as well as ETEE, which are now two distinct annexes of the policy. The revised policy includes language from and is responsive to the JAPS.51

52. Improved AEA and SEAD concepts. In September 2018, the CNAD approved the SEAD Concept of Employment (CONEMP), which defined the SEAD effects that will be required by 2030. Its recommendations are being examined by the International Staff and NATO's Military Authorities.F The Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) CONEMP is expected to be delivered in 2019. Once agreed, the second and third steps of the Short Term Capability Programme (Capability Audit and Gap Analysis) will begin with the aim to be complete by September 2021.53

Organization

53. Insufficient Missile Defence connectivity. Although a national responsibility, the horizontal connection between the CAOC, Control and Reporting Centres (CRC) and Surface-Based Air and Missile Defence (SBAMD) units must be established when needed. This is hampered by the use of legacy capabilities and a lack of access to suitable communications and tactical data links. Operational collaboration is further deprived by the limited availability of experienced Surface-ta-Air Missile (SAM)-allocators at the CRC.54



Training

54. Need for Joint multinationallAMD training at all levels. IAMD is one of the most complex and challenging missions for NATO because it encompasses all domains and requires flawless cooperation and collaboration between multiple nations and NATO entities. A successful execution of an IAMD mission depends heavily on interoperability, connectivity and a shared common understanding of doctrine, concepts of operation and TTPs. The complexity of IAMD necessitates extensive training at all levels to support Baseline and Current Operations (BACO) through to Maximum Level of Effort (MLE). Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW) was reintroduced in 2017, and is designed to provide unique opportunities to experiment, demonstrate, practice and validate the various NATO IAMD programmes and concepts. From threat identification to interceptor firing, IAMD involves all levels of decision making and incorporates both NATO and national systems. JPOW is effective at training multinational personnel to work together at the tactical and operational levels of IAMD and should be linked to exercise STEADFAST ARMOUR to develop the understanding of IAMD C2 at the strategic level of military-political leadership within the Alliance.55

Material

55. NATO IAMD System interoperability shortfalls. NATO BMD systems must be robust enough to fully utilize all available sensors and interceptors and operate fluidly as part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). However, there are shortfalls in interoperability regarding various NATINAMDS components, particularly regarding standards, interfaces, protocols, reliability and validating procecures." NATINAMDS and its key pillar, SBAMD, connectivity is impaired by missing horizontal connections between SBAMD units and critical national support elements, the up-link connections and land line dependency and the degraded interoperability with existing CRC.57

56. lack of standardization for multinational BMD procurement. Member states purchase platforms that do not technologically interoperate with other NATO IAMD platforms and should emphasize the multinational procurement of new BMD assets. To better provide for crisis management and collective defence, nations should ensure their BMD platforms have the technical ability to interoperate as part of NATINAMDS.58

57. lack of BMD self-protection. Not all BMD systems are able to assure their own force protection when engaging a threat, requiring external protection. NATO lacks TTPs to reflect this need.59

leadership

58. Need for senior leader participation in BMD Exercises. BMD operations require rapid decision making from the Strategic and Policy levels and throughout the entire kill



chain. Leaders at all levels must be involved during relevant multinational BMD exercises.P? NATO BMD exercises should require the participation of strategic-level decision makers.

Personnel

59. Insufficient BMD training and acculturation. NATO BMD personnel are not adequately trained and acculturated through BMD and IAMD courses, summits and conferences. Human interoperability is critical for ensuring those serving in BMD positions can work together while spread across the entire NATO European territory. Acculturation into the BMD mission allows personnel to better operate with one another. NATO needs to increase opportunities for BMD personnel to attend exercises, summits and courses, such as the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Course and the Surface Based Air Defence course at the NATO School in Oberammergau. Providing opportunities for NATO to come together can enable better communication and understanding of how different nations operate.F'

Facilities

60. No significant findings identified.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTACK

Doctrine

61. lack of multi-generational operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs. Lack of common operational concepts (e.g. CONOPS, CONEMP, etc.), doctrine and TTPs prevent optimizing the capabilities of multi-generational weapon platforms, systems and capabilities. As previously stated, operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs provide a common language for the Alliance and are the primary prerequisite for interoperability. The adoption of 5th generation technology and the enhanced capabilities they provide, requires a fundamental shift in thinking regarding the conduct of multinational combined JAP operations, particularly in the congested, contested and connected future operating environment. Incorporating these advanced capabilities requires conceptualization and articulation on how to best integrate these new systems with legacy platforms and conventional C2 structures. Concepts facilitate the development of doctrine and TTPs that enable operators to interoperate. Within NATO, however, there is an acknowledged lack of shared experience related to planning and executing Joint multi-domain, offensive and defensive operations utilizing multi-generational platforms, systems and capabilities.F

62. lack of multi-generational Air C2 operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs. Lack of NATO Air Command and Control CONOPS, doctrine and TTPs for the Command



and Control of 5th generation systems prevents the exploitation of the full operational capabilities provided by a combination of 4th and 5th generation weapon systems. NATO multi-domain C2 CONOPS, doctrine and TTPs will be the primary method we use to address interoperability risks and issues. The NATO multi-domain C2 CONOPS are currently in development and due to be delivered in December 2019. It is extremely important these CONOPS are delivered on time, are horizontally aligned and that there is a sense of urgency to the follow-on work.

63. Impact of 5th generation aircraft capabilities on National Caveats. National caveats regarding information sharing of essential knowledge about features, TTPs and capability of 5th generation platforms continue to prevent the building of a multinational force that is fully interoperable on Day-Zero. 63 Further, NATO lacks a common understanding of the impact of 5th generation capabilities on factors including rules of engagement, target engagement authorities and collateral damage estimates." The ability to seamlessly share information between domains, commands and JOAs help manage those resources and reduce duplication of effort. It requires NATO to provide commanders and NATO forces with effective, common and protected means of information sharing and information management.

64. Security protocols restrict exchange of information. Although there are various arrangements that enable user nations of 4th and 5th generation air platforms to operate together within national caveats and releasability constraints, National policies for information sharing have a significant impact on the ability to achieve adequate levels of interoperability. The possibility to share sensitive information when deemed necessary is a prerequisite for a successful planning and execution of multinational air operations." With the exponential increase in the confidence level of positive identification available through the combination of multiple sensors on new generation platforms ("fusion"), Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be re-evaluated in terms of positive identification (PlO) and electronic identification (EID). The changes to exercise/scenario ROE will need to consider who should be allowed to authorize the release of ordnance, in order to maximize the advantages given with these systems. These changes in ROE will only be possible if countries owning the new generation platforms are willing to share a common understanding of system capabilities and limitations, in order for countries without the new generation platforms to agree to the chanqes.ê"

65. No common procurement strategy. The expense of 5th generation platforms or systems is cost-prohibitive for some nations. Mass has a quality in warfare and that advent of 5th generation technology in many nations inventory will replace not add to the existing 4th generation systems, in many cases in smaller numbers than exist today. Perhaps some nations would be better served and provide better contribution to the Alliance by continuing to field 4th generation systems. NATO has provided little guidance how nations can contribute to the future air battle."



66. Need for concepts and procedures for JAP employment in the multi-domain environment. The increased complexity of modern warfare requires NATO to be prepared to fight as a Joint Force in a multi-domain and multi-threat environment in order to achieve desired effects space at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. JAP is arguably the key contributor to multi-domain operations. However, cross-domain operational concepts, doctrine and especially TTPs do not adequately address current and future multi-threat, multi-domain operations in a contested/denied environment. Specifically, more thought should be given to how JAP fixed wing and rotary wing aviation assets (traditional and non-traditional) support Broadband Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS); how manned and unmanned maritime air assets contribute to JISR; how traditional and non-traditional air assets support Mia and/or mine warfare operations (including mine laying and mine countermeasures).

Organization


Training

68. Need for 5th generation Education and Training. The success of JAP depends greatly on a common knowledge and understanding of 5th generation capabilities and their contribution to joint air operations. Lack of knowledge of 5th generation capabilities by leaders and decision makers increases interoperability risk and limits NATO's ability to exploit the full operational capabilities provided by a mix of multi-generational weapon systems. NATO lacks deliberate training and education programmes focused on 5th generation platforms, systems and capabilities and how they integrate into a multi generational force. In August 2019, HQ AIRCOM promulgated 5th generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirernents'" and directed such training to ensure a higher quality of operational preparation, inviting the EAG to participate. This is a promising first step and should be scaled to include other domains and operators at all levels, tactical to strategic.

69. Lack of high-end multi-generational integration training and exercises. Multinational training and exercises are among the most effective tools to learn/identify interoperability issues/risks and to improve awareness. They support the development of common concepts of operations, TTPs, build trust and promote a shared culture amongst planners, operators and support personnel from different nations. Additionally, multinational training and exercises help to identify technical interoperability gaps and support development of mitigation options and operating procedures. Lack of frequent and consistent Combined Air Operations training and exercises that include 5th generation operational concepts, limits the development and improvement of multi generation interoperability. Multinational training and exercises coherent with the development of 4th - 5th generation requirements need to be identified and plannedP?



70. lack of adequate training infrastructure. NATO lacks available opposition forces capable of replicating current and future threats to fully test TTPs during multi generational training and exercises." Furthermore, there is a lack of adequate training infrastructure: simulators; ranges; airspace; emitters; and, targets. NATO does not have a common approach to the provision of these through a NATO sponsored multi generational JAP training plan or requirement.

Material

71. Command and Control Systems non-compliance. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) endorsed Federated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative contributes significantly to C2 system interoperability by addressing the how through spiral specifications, the who through FMN affiliated Nations and organisations and the when through an interoperability road map based on a 10 year rolling vision implemented incrementally through 2 year spirals. However, the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) and the Bi-SC AIS Air Functional Service Air C2 Information Services (Air C2IS) are not in full compliance with the Federated Mission Network (FMN) specifications. Currently, national JFACs are not using ACCS as their standard equipment to advance operator interoperability nor are they utilizing Air C21S to its intended extent, due to known and routinely highlighted interoperability issues such as: national security compliance; flight plan integration; and, incomplete or delayed information exchange that are. This underlines the importance of interoperability as a force multiplier that may streamline national efforts to become a design feature in all NATO and national systems.

72. lack of datalink interoperability. Lack of Tactical Data Link (TDL) interoperability. Limited data interoperability between 4th and 5th generation systems has the potential to impede full information exchange by multi-generational air systems and degrade the common operational picture (COP)_?1 The success of JAP relies on TDL to communicate and share situational awareness and targeting data, a truism that is put at risk by the introduction of the latest communication data links methodology (e.g. MADL vice Link 16). It is unclear as to whether this technology will continue to share information via the existing and agreed NATO STANAGs for TDL. Failure to fully exploit 5th generation surveillance and information exploitation capabilities would impact on overall mission effectiveness, the completeness of the COP and increase risk of fratricide.

73. Potential targeting difficulties. As a result of new sensors and weapons, the targeting process for new generation platforms will be different from that used with older generation platforms and, consequently, is likely to create targeting management difficulties during multi-generation missions." NATO has not yet identified a preferred technical or procedural solution to address this issue.

74. Undefined bandwidth and connectivity requirements. The lack of a NATO Enterprise and Alliance wide HF spectrum utility strategy has led to the inability of a JFC



achieve the connectivity and bandwidth required to support JAP in contested operations against peer or near-peer adversaries.

75. Non-standard maintenance requirements. Non-standard maintenance requirements. There are many characteristics of 5th generation aircraft that separate them from older generation aircraft. These include, but are not limited to: multi-spectral low observable (LO) design features; integrated avionics that autonomously fuse and prioritize the aircraft's multi-spectral sensors and off board data; advanced on-board diagnostics; and, resilient communications, navigation and identification tools; robust networks. While 5th generation aircraft require the same maintenance considerations as legacy aircraft (such as maintaining flight systems and engines), there are additional unique maintenance requirements that are not fully understood or known within NATO. This is most likely due to the lack of bi or multi-lateral information sharing agreements between the nations that operate these aircraft. Lack of full knowledge leads to interoperability challenges at the operational and tactical levels.

76. Digitally Aided Close Air Support interoperability issues. Digital systems in aircraft and Digitally-Aided Close Air Support (DaCAS) ground kits provide significant benefits that improve CAS planning and execution. DaCAS allows the use of digital messages to expedite communications, rapidly build shared situational awareness, reduce human error and shorten the CAS kill-chain. The NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) reviewed the requirements for NATO on the use of DaCAS and identified several interoperability concerns including: the lack of interoperability amongst industrial solutions, lack of doctrine and TTPs; a lack of robust training and exercises; and the lack of conceptual thinking regarding the future of CAS in a contested envlronment."

77. lack of Air-launched weapon systems interoperability. The NAFAG identified several interoperability issues regarding weapon systems interoperability caused by the different interfaces used between aircraft and air-launched weapons. Each time a new air-launched weapon is introduced for NATO operations, an integration activity is performed that includes the modification and requalification of the aircraft operational flight programme (OFP) as well as the modification of the weapons themselves." This can be a lengthy process, delaying the use of modern air-launched weapons and weapon systems. An incremental approach to weapon systems development (akin to FMN spiral specification development) and testing could potentially reduce such delays and improve interoperabi I ity.

Personnel

78. JFAC Manning. Sustaining an operational JFAC-structure over a long period requires a considerable amount of trained Air C2 specialists. JAPS relies on JFACS that are trained to the same standard. Interoperability challenges emerge when national JFAC personnel are not trained to the same standards as the NCS personnel."



Facilities

79. Multinational Aircraft Cross Servicing (ACS) shortfalls. AIRCOM reactivated the ACS programme in 2017. ACS increases flexibility and acts as a force enabler for NATO air forces. ACS is defined in three different stages: stage A which enables an aircraft to be flown in another mission from a Host Base without change of weapons configuration, stage B which enables an aircraft to be flown on a subsequent mission from a Host Base and stage C which enables an aircraft to continue to its final destination. Though NATO is currently re-invigorating its logistics and cross-servicing arrangements, those procedures are not yet codified. Interoperability issues result from multinational agreements for training, maintenance and legal issues. ACS procedures differ depending on the arrangement between user nation and industry. Different users have different arrangements with industry suppliers and maintenance contracts differ from nation to nation, making cross-servicing a significant interoperability challenqe."

80. Unknown or undeveloped physical and information security requirements for 5th generation aircraft. The success of JAPS depends upon the seamless integration of JAP platforms, systems and capabilities into force protection planning and execution. Unknown security requirements for 5th generation aircraft impede effective force protection. Doctrine and standards should be updated to reflect these new security requirements."

81. Non-optimized Supply Chain Management (SCM). Maintenance and sustainability of the logistics supply chain is essential to optimize multinational operational efficiency and effectiveness in support of JAP. Unknown or non-standard supply chain requirements introduce interoperability challenges for NATO. For example, the JSF's supply chain has a unique design. Rather than individual air forces or units owning the spare parts for their aircraft, nine international partners and other foreign military sales customers share a common global pool of JSF parts that are managed by the prime contractor. This can lead to spare parts shortages and limited repair capabilities. Additionally, the global network to move JSF parts is immature resulting in long wait times for repair. Without a detailed logistics supply chain, Allies will not be able to optimally support the introduction of JSF_?8

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIR MOBILITY

Doctrine

82. AT and AAR Doctrine and TTPs do not reflect multi-role platforms. The recently promulgated ATP has section titles that suggest it can be used as a TTP manual; however, the information is general in nature and does not contain the level of detail found in many national or aircraft-specific TTP manuals." Air Transport Doctrine (ATP 3.3.4.1) was updated in April 2018 and Air-to-Air Refuelling Doctrine (ATP 3.3.4.2) was updated



in Apri12019. The ratified doctrine covers both AT and AAR, but as separate disciplines and not when simultaneously employed in a single mission in support of a multinational coalition.s? Capable of conducting tanker, receiver, and transport operations, the A400M Atlas is a significant capability gain for mobility fleets of the Alliance. Launched in 2003, the A400M conducted its first flight nearly a decade ago. Despite difficulties and delays, there are currently 81 A400Ms in service and that number will more than double over the next several years:", making the Atlas a significant contributor to current and future strategic airlift, tactical airlift and AAR operations. NATO doctrine and TTPs, however, still do not address this multi-role capability, which complicates planning, execution and contributes to interoperability challenges.

83. Lack of Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (A3R) policy. One of the latest developments in AAR includes Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (A3R), the ability of refuelling aircraft without human at the controls with any possible combination of manned or unmanned aircraft for the tanker/receiver pairing. The mechanical interface (boom mating to a receptacle of probe mating to a drogue) constitutes one essential requirement for interoperability, while a second essential requirement is standardized procedures. Recommended A3R procedures are already in development, led by the international Aerial Refuelling Systems Advisory Group (ARSAG). A draft CONOPS was submitted to the NATO Air-to-Air Refuelling Working Group for consideration and alignment. Information from the CONOPS should be eventually included in the NATO AAR Allied Tactical Publication 3.3.4.2 (ATP-3.3.4.2).82 A3R will require the use of precision navigation, sensors, and AAR systems combined with a networked data link. Therefore, a specific set of precision navigation, informational, and system status data will need to be shared between platforms to conduct A3R successfully. At a minimum, requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability of the underlying sensors and systems will need to be defined. At the core is the ability to accurately determine a system's precise location in a reference coordinate frame. All data link message format and content will need to be defined in a NATO standard. Additionally, clearing tanker and receiver pairings for A3R will require significantly more data compared to today's systems. Overall the path to operational A3R will be made easier by standardising the equipment and airworthiness requirements, as well as the procedures, now.83

84. Inaccurate Tanker Level of Ambition (LOA) accounting. Multi-role platforms also contribute to planning challenges such as tanker level of ambition (LOA) accounting. The required total, derived from the NDPP, is inaccurate for a number of reasons: double counting of Tanker Transport (TT) aircraft concurrently filling AT and AAR; differentiation between boom-capable tankers, probe and drogue-capable tankers and dual-system tankers. Current accounting assumes interoperability between all variants of tankers and all receivers; and the correlation between platform capability and mission profile.ê" LOA inaccuracies eventually lead to a lack of available resources and presents significant planning and execution challenges.



85. lack of future Rotorcraft concepts. Rotorcraft (helicopters and tilt rotors) bring indispensable capabilities to the battlefield. Their unique characteristics provide critical support to commanders for all types of tactical operations and their effects are often of operational and even strategic importance. Rotorcraft will remain instrumental to mission success in the FSE, especially within congested urban areas." Some nations have yet to commit to train, organize, and equip rotorcraft borne forces specifically to operate within urban areas. Similarly, rotorcraft support to littoral operations is a key factor in successful operations from the sea and those nations with a littoral capability are developing programmes that will replace legacy with next generation of rotorcraft. It is envisaged that many NATO member nations will refurbish or retire their current helicopter fleets in the 2025-2030 timeframe. Several groups, however, including the NATO Future Rotorcraft Capability Team and the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) have done and are doing significant thinking about the future battlefield rotorcraft and have contributed greatly to the dialogue regarding material specifications and technical requirements. A holistic effort is needed to conceptualize how to fully exploit the capabilities of the future rotorcraft in multi-domain operations in a denied environment.

86. lack of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and Autonomous Rotorcraft systems concepts and procedures. UAS and RPA or fully autonomous rotorcraft systems will increasingly be able to work in coordination with manned aircraft and ground stations. By adopting the use of safe and reliable robotics systems and/or artificial intelligence risk levels to aircrew life can be reduced and personnel resource employed where needed. However, these developments will raise legal and ethical questions and how these developments could be affected by the application of the law of armed conflict needs to be considered."

Organization

87. lack of governance regarding AAR Issues. There is no single office or focal point within the current NATO Command Structure to coordinate multinational AAR issues. The drafting of doctrine, equipment standardization agreements, tactical procedures, common qualification and currencies and the training of planning staffs is being undertaken by a number of national and multinational organisations, agencies and individuals. This lack of central coordination has led to AAR lessons being repeatedly re learned during the initial phases of air operations."

Training

88. Insufficient integrated AAR training. Pre- and post-strike or ingress/egress AAR should be planned and practised to more accurately represent the Joint operational demand, even if the training aircraft do not require any additional fuel to complete the training mission. The participation of Joint multinational force elements can only improve levels of standardization and interoperability. NATO joint collective training should



regularly and deliberately include training/exercise opportunities to integrate AAR planning and execution."

89. No common AAR qualification and currency standards. NATO has no common qualification and currency standards for AAR receiver pilots and boom operators. Individual nations determine their own respective standards. This induces risk and contributes to interoperability challenqes.ê?

Material

90. AAR systems standardization. NATO does not own any AAR tankers and is reliant upon the nations to provide this capability. With no common procurement strategy, nations have acquired AAR tankers in accordance with their own national policy. The requirement for both AAR fuel transfer systems on the same aircraft has been stimulated by the increasing pressure for greater levels of interoperability amongst NATO allies faced with purchasing fewer of the new generation of multi-role tanker transport aircraft." NATO has ratified the standardization of the two existing fuel transfer systems that are not compatible: the probe and drogue; and, boom systems. However the use of a Boom Drogue Adaptor (BOA) fitted on the ground pre-flight and the purchase of dual system tankers (fitted with both probe and drogue and boom equipment) addresses the needs of current receivers.91 Various receiver configurations as well as national caveats create significant challenges for Air-to-Air Refuelling mission planners. For example, during OUP over Libya, operators were challenged with nearly fifty different receiver configurations, most of which included caveats such as the inability to refuel at night, or with certain equipment. In all, the OUP AAR planners managed tanking and receiving assets available against a list of 240 caveats."

91. AAR Tankers that lack self-protection. Most legacy tanker aircraft lack self protection suites and are anything but stealthy, meaning that contested/denied operating environments will require the AAR station to be further away from the operating areas of their receivers. This induces performance and time challenges in operational planning and execution and will only be exacerbated in a FSE. Operator workarounds, such as orbiting a tanker farther from the receiver's orbit area, lead to coverage gaps, resulting in risk to mission accomplishment. 93

leadership


Personnel

93. lack of AAR experience on operational staffs. NATO not only has an over reliance on US tankers but also an over-reliance on the provision of US Joint Force Air Component Commanders, functional Air Operations Centres (AOC) and AOC personnel,



specifically AAR planners. The Lesson identified by HQ AIRCOM from OUP that the NATO JFAC lacked expertise in a number of key areas has not been adequately addressed. NATO's declaration for declaring Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Full Operating Capability (FOC) for the restructured NATO Command Structure ignored the Lesson Identified that the AOCs should be manned with qualified and trained personnel and not just any personnel."

Facilities

94. Need for Tanker facilities review. Although the new generation of NATO tankers are not significantly larger in physical dimensions than the current fleet, tanker bed-down spots should be reviewed to ensure they can fully support newer platforms.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIR CONTRIBUTION TO JISR

Doctrine

95. Incoherent Air C2 and JISR concepts and doctrine. Air C2 orchestrates air forces to achieve air decision superiority. A primary means to achieve decision superiority is attaining information superiority, which is the realm of JISR. Therefore, Air C2 and JISR are inextricably linked, interdependent and complementary. NATO has a vested interest in understanding how current and planned Air C2 and JISR systems and concepts support exploiting JAP to the maximum extent.

a. Contemporary NATO JISR practices focus almost exclusively on converting custom-collected data to create tailored intelligence products for specific, known audiences at the operational and strategic level. NATO lacks concepts, doctrine and TTPs that promote coherence and integration among Air C2, JISR, and Effects, especially at the tactical level.

b. The AJP 2.7 "NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance" doctrine'" captures the overarching concept to steer the traditional activities of ISR areas into a joint streamlined synchronization and integration of intelligence and operations. It details JISR fundamentals and process, but does not provide contextual understanding for the air power contribution to JISR. Perhaps more importantly, air-related doctrine and TTPs are strikingly deficient on details of how air power contributes to JISR. The AJP-3.3 "Air and Space Operations" doctrine'" dedicates only two pages to this core mission, focused mainly on definitions.

c. The key to JAP JISR integration is not only the networking of various ISR data sources, but also the operational integration, command and control (C2), and tactical employment of ISR capabilities. This is not possible without a sound and



mature body of doctrine and TTPs for those who will operate, employ, integrate, and control JISR.

96. lack of concepts and TTPs for 5th generation Air C2 and JISR. Traditional command and control approaches lack the agility required for increasingly complex and dynamic 21st century missions. As the changing character of war becomes immersed in the digital age, future conflicts will be decided by those who are fastest at collecting, correlating, fusing, analysing and securely transporting the right decision quality data across multiple domains to the right decision-maker. C2 approaches that are agile and take full advantage of all the available information and assets, are better suited. Lack of concepts and procedures for the C2 of 5th generation platforms, systems, and capabilities prevents the exploitation of the full operational capabilities provided by a combination of 4th and 5th generation weapon systems.

97. lack of tactical, dynamic information sharing supporting Processed IExploited IDisseminated (PED). NATO JISR lacks an operational warfighting focus. Current NATO JISR lacks dynamic, real-time warfighting ISR processes that are adaptive and interoperable across all domains. The adoption of new generation platforms, systems and capabilities, exacerbates this interoperability gap, especially when there is a lack of understanding regarding the level of quality and quantity of real-time information sharing between new and old generation platforms. New generation platforms may require an exponential growth in the volume of data to be PED. Legacy systems, if not upgraded, will be unable to PED this new volume of data." NATO lacks knowledge of the type, volume and accuracy of the data that can be collected by new generation platforms.

98. Need for a Future C41SR Vision. NATO C41SR architectures are often limited to address the technological aspects of capabilities and primarily for shore-based operational and strategic level connectivity rather than tactical data links and networks. Although intended for joint operations, they are often developed in a stove-piped fashion, internal to NATO projects or programmes service oriented and with limited deliberate consideration of cross-domain coherence between national systems and other NATO systems. Moreover, with 'the stove-piped view, architectures are developed at the system level, with no consideration of adjacent architectures. Furthermore, no architecture at the capability and enterprise level exists to support alignment of NATO C41SR capabilities across the business, information, applications, and technology domains. A coherent C41SR strategy vision would enable the integration of tactical C2 and surveillance functions to support decentralized decision-making and allocate decision rights dynamically, which will be required in a future operational environment where decision cycles are squeezed. Additionally, it is quite necessary to establish strategic to tactical situational awareness, understanding and anticipation, through the dynamic access and flow of information across domains and functions. This is possible when fully integrating all NATO and national C41SR capabilities and connecting their architectures in a seamless Federated Mission Networking environment. NATO needs a dedicated effort to



assess the problem of C41SR coherence/integration and address it by developing a way ahead ..

Organization


Training

100. Lack of realistic training opportunities for JISR tactical operators. Current NATO JISR practices and training focus almost exclusively on converting custom collected data into tailored intelligence products for specific, known audiences at the operational and strategic levels. However, the process of producing collection plans to gather that data is unrealistic in comparison to that which is required during operations and campaign planning. While the intelligence cycle must continue unabated during an operation, the Alliance must also have the agility to get real-time ISR data into the hands of analysts who can rapidly fuse that data with others, make quick assessments on the identification and intentions of opposing forces, and feed those assessments to decision makers for rapid action. A NATO JTF must be organized, trained, and equipped to plan and execute the JISR cycle, the JTF must also be set up for, connected to, and well versed in the process of real-time coordination inside the execution phase. NATO operators lack skills, qualifications and experience to manage dynamic ISR processes such as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), cross-cuing, etc. NATO lacks common training standards and protocol to teach, train and exercise these skills.

101. Lack of NATO and multinational exercises that train JAP contribution to JISR. While exercises like UNIFIED VISION have improved training for members of the JISR community, they tend to focus on technical capability development efforts, such as on the effective use of Alliance Ground Surveillance, and do not integrate air power operators.

Material

102. Lack of interoperable of JISR, C2 and Effects systems. NATO's ability to leverage JAP to its fullest extent will be limited by the interoperability of its JISR and C2 capabilities. While existing standards provide a mechanism for agreeing interoperability needs, these standards are not always implemented fully by the NATO Commands or the Nations.98

103. Need for Interoperable by Design approach to AFSC. The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) fleet that is scheduled to retire by approximately 2035. The AFSC initiative was started to provide advice on the delivery of a follow-on to the NATO E-3 capability. While it is still unclear if the AFSC capability will encompass all of NATO's C41SR capability, or is intended to complement existing and planned capability,



it is clear that an AFSC capability will be an integral part of NATO's C41SR capability. As such, it is required to be interoperable and capable of interacting with the IAMD and JISR assets and capabilities and with assets such as BMD, AGS and MSA..

104. Progress with JISR Technical Standards. There has been some progress regarding NATO technical standards related to JISR, for example:

a. STANREC 4777 "NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA)" (Reference BB) was promulgated in January 2018. This document describes the NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA), which defines how NATO and nationallSR assets can achieve an overall interoperable ISR capability."

b. STANAG 7085 "Interoperable Data Links for ISR Systems" (Reference CC) was promulgated in April 2018. This agreement removes the limits to interoperability that arise through the use of dedicated, proprietary data links to support ISR sensor systems."?

c. STANAG 4559 "NATO Standard ISR Library Interfaces and Services" (Reference DO) was promulgated in March 2018. It promotes interoperability of NATO ISR library interfaces and services for the exchange of shared ISR data, products and schemas."?'

leadership


Personnel

106. lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel. Recent Alliance operations and defence planning efforts have identified NATO JISR as having: scarce JISR assets; a lack of efficient intelligence sharing processes for dynamic targeting; insufficient JISR dedicated staff preparedness; and, over-dependence on a few nations for subject matter experts trained in dynamic targeting operations.t'" While NATO has made great strides in balancing the contributions of Allies to operations in other mission areas (particularly in precision-strike and electronic warfare), the enabling capabilities such as air mobility, command and control, and ISR in particular remain areas of over reliance on the United States. During Operation Allied Force, the bulk of mobility, C2, and ISR capacity came from the United States. The Alliance also relied on the United States to provide the communications networks, trained personnel, and the body of tactical expertise needed to integrate those capabilities into a coherent operation. To be truly interoperable at Day-Zero, NATO needs a pool of trained and qualified JISR specialists readily available and able to respond.



Facilities




PART III - JAPS INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEFENCE PLANNING

BACKGROUND

108. The Bi-SC Capability Hierarchy (CH) is the agreed means by which NATO groups and organizes capabilities. It describes a functional breakdown of capabilities and is used as a framework to support the expression of capability requirements at differing levels of detail. The CH a used primarily within the NDPP to provide a coherent structure to support the expression of the Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR) and for the aggregation of shortfalls.l'"

109. The top tier of the CH is comprised of seven main capability areas: Prepare; Project; Engage; Consult, Command and Control (C3); Sustain; Protect; and Inform. Each tier 1 capability is decomposed into either tier 2 or tier 3 capabilities, which provide the hierarchical framework for structuring capabilities.

110. One of the most effective ways to introd uce new concepts in the NATO Alliance is to instil the essential characteristics of the concept in the NDPP products that ultimately drive the level of ambition in the individual contributions of the Nations and the NATO Command Structure. In the case of the JAPS, related interoperability issues and recommendations need to be reflected in principal or enabling Capability Statements.

Aim

111. To present a stocktake of the JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerations that have already been or should be incorporated into the CC/CS of the NDPP.

Scope

112. Recommendations are limited to the four JAP Core Roles and do not include other JAPS Implementation considerations such as Space, Cyberspace, Air C2, etc.

Method

113. Prior to the official endorsement of JAPS in 2018, the SCs were tasked to provide recommendations for a long-term approach to inform the future development of JAP and identify the medium to long-term JAP capability requirements that should be included in the context of the NDPP. The resultant report, the Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities (Reference L), published 7 December 2015, provided the results of a comprehensive and inclusive gap analysis of the NDPP. It included specific recommendations for renewed focus on existing capability requirements and new capability requirements that would



require further development. The SCs used these recommendations as a baseline to evaluate the current NDPP Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC/CS) found within the Frozen 2020 Capability Requirements Review (CRR20).

114. As a first step in this analysis, the SCs compared the CC/CS findings within the CRR16 against the CRR20 to determine differences since the introduction of JAPS 2018. Next, the SCs compared those changes to the aforementioned recommendations drawn from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report. Noted below and within Annex C are the JAP recommendations for the NDPP CC/CS found within the CRR16 against the CRR20 to determine differences since the introduction of JAPS. Next, the SCs compared those changes to the aforementioned recommendations drawn from the 2015 Bi-SC report. Noted below and within Annex-C are the results of this analysis in the form of JAPS related improvements to the CC/CS, as well as recommended additions for future NDPP steps and cycles, arranged by Capability Hierarchy.

115. It should be noted that Defence Planners have made significant progress with the 2020 NDPP CRR, developing new CC/CS implied by newly identified tasks, especially taking into account the A2/AD environment, the JAPS, the Cyberspace Roadmap, NATO Command Structure (NCS) adaptation, and other relevant policy and/or doctrine, etc. The following recommendations are for consideration by defence planners.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PREPARE

116. Definition. Capability area PREPARE (R) covers the capabilities to establish, prepare and sustain sufficient and effective presence at the right time, including the ability to build up forces, through appropriate and graduated readiness, to meet any requirements, keeping sufficient flexibility to adapt to possible changes in the strategic environment. These also include the capabilities to contribute to Deterrence and Defence, Resilience and Projecting Stability.P'

117. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp105 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area PREPARE. In several cases, this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting. The paragraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities.

118. Recommendation. The following issues and recommendations in this section are outstanding from the 2015 B-SC Final Report (Ref L) have not yet been incorporated in the CC/CS in regards to interoperability for JAP:

a. Through effective and realistic education, training, exercises, and evaluation programmes, ensure an adequate number of personnel are trained and



proficient in JAP TTPs and on the systems used in conducting operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2 )

b. Conduct live exercises that provide training environments and experiences that more closely resemble potential operational situations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.1 )

c. Conduct realistic operational simulation, leveraging new modelling and simulation technologies, based on up to date operational scenarios, when live exercises cannot properly emulate the required environment. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.2)

d. Research, develop, and acquire innovative and leading-edge equipment (e.g. improved lift capability) in sufficient supply to enable the effective and timely conduct and sustainment of Joint air operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3)

e. Ensure sufficient equipment (e.g. weaponry and armour) and supplies (e.g. fuel and consumables) are immediately available to allow timely deployment of forces to various environments, ensuring efficient and effective JAP operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.1)

f. Ensure sufficient supplies (e.g. precision munitions) are available to sustain forces deployed to various environments while regular and recurring sustainment is established. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.2)

g. Review standardization with respect to sustainment and establish, improve or update requirements to enable better interoperability and integration of Alliance JAP. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.4)

h. Review, upgrade or develop new information sharing systems that take advantage of future technologies in order to improve assurance and better enable command and control while enhancing decision making processes in the future (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.5)

i. Improve JAP-specific standards and Measures of Performance/Measures of Effectiveness (MoP/MoE) for NATO readiness for the Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the future security environment. (paragraph 7.4.1.1.1)

j. Current Air C2 policy should undergo periodic review across the NCS and NFS to ensure that Air C2 keeps pace with changes to the FSE in order to better enable the effective employment of NATO JAP. (paragraph 7.4.1.1.2)

k. Improve JAP's modular organization and interoperability in order to cover a wide range of contingencies while offering maximum agility and providing the



ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the FSE. (paragraph 7.4.2.1.1)

I. Develop a robust NATO training plan that improves the realism of and incorporates all levels of leadership in joint experimentation and exercises. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.1)

m. Continue to develop training and simulations that leverage Alliance connectivity, maximizing the use of simulators, distance learning and existing or new training infrastructure. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.2)

n. Develop NATO training that enhances interoperability and maximizes joint participation, both national and multinational. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.3)

o. Conduct research in areas of material technology that will enhance survivability of NATO equipment, personnel, facilities, and infrastructure. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.1)

p. Conduct research in areas of material technology that enhance NATO sustainability. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.2)

q. NATO should invest in Alliance JAP leadership through deliberate leadership building programmes. Specific recommendations regarding leadership as well as C2 of JAP are addressed in the doctrine and training sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.3 respectively). (paragraph 7.4.5.1.1)

r. Review JAP manning processes and develop policies that will support more efficient use of existing manpower, improve interoperability and standardisation, and identify future manpower shortages. (paragraph 7.4.6.1.1)

s. Continue to support the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and Smart Defence (SO) projects with particular emphasis on JAP interoperability. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.1)

t. Conduct training that focuses on interoperability. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.2)

u. Improve integration and interoperability of all NATO CIS. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.3)

v. Increase focus on interoperability during acquisition processes. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.4)

w. Review, revise, and enforce relevant NATO STANAGS for JAP. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.5)



x. Establish and enforce language proficiency requirements. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.6)

y. Improve cultural awareness along with inter-service and cross-cultural training that will enhance the Alliance's abilities in multinational efforts. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.7)

z. Develop programmes that maximize the use of interoperable COTS capabilities and equipment. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.8)

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PROJECT

119. Definition. Capability area PROJECT (D) covers the capabilities to conduct strategic deployment of both NATO and national HQ's, forces and capabilities in support of any Alliance mission. These also include the capabilities to contribute to NATO deterrence.l'"

120. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp107 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area PROJECT. In several cases, this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting. The paragraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities.

121. Recommendation. The following issues and recommendations in this document have not yet been incorporated in the CC/CS in regards to interoperability for JAP.

a. Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures that facilitate interoperability and intra-Alliance movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.3)

b. Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures to optimize interoperability by the use of standardized, distributed, and pre-positioned personnel, equipment, and supplies. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.4)

c. Review, improve, or standardize existing NATO air facilities in order to handle the full spectrum of air power capabilities. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.1)

d. Modernize hardened facilities to enhance operational capability, survivability, sustainability, and resilience. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.2)

e. Review existing agreements for utilizing and/or develop new agreements for establishing dual use (civilian and military) facilities/installations and airspace. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.3)



INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA ENGAGE

122. Definition. Capability area ENGAGE (E) covers the capabilities to perform the tasks which contribute directly to the achievement of mission goals within the context of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. It includes all capabilities required to defeat, if necessary, adversaries as well as other capabilities such as, inter alia, those necessary to evacuate non-combatants, prevent the use of force by opponents, train local security forces and participate in stabilisation and reconstruction.P"

123. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp109 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area ENGAGE. In several cases this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting.

124. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on the air power interoperability in CC/CS.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA C3

125. Definition. Capability area CONSULT, COMMAND AND CONTROL (C) covers the capability of NATO commanders to exercise authority over and direct the full spectrum of assigned and attached (C3) forces in the accomplishment of the rnission.!"?

126. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp111 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area CONSULT, COMMAND AND CONTROL. In several cases, this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting.

127. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on air power interoperability in CC/CS.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA SUSTAIN

a. Definition. Capability area SUSTAIN (S) covers the capability to plan and execute the timely support and sustainment of forces, including essential military infrastructure, movement and transportation, military engineering support, contracting, supply/maintenance/services management, basing support and health and medical support.t'-

128. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp113 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area SUSTAIN. In several cases this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to



Annex-C for a complete accounting. The paragraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities.


a. Ensure sufficient personnel, equipment, supplies, and munitions are available to sustain long-term, high-intensity operations. (paragraph 6.5.4.2.1)

b. Rapidly implement, operate and maintain both an expeditiously dynamic and steady state supply and combat support capability. (paragraph 6.5.4.2.2)

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PROTECT

130. Definition. Capability area PROTECT (P) covers the capability to minimize through a common multinational and holistic approach of Force Protection the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, material and activities to any threat and in all situations, to include towards the effects of Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD), whilst ensuring the Allies freedom of action and contributing to mission success. During deployed operations, it includes lines of communication and lines of supply and cyber space."'"

131. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp115 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area PROTECT. In several cases, this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting.

132. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on air power interoperability in CC/CS.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA INFORM

133. Definition. Capability area INFORM (I) covers the capability to establish and maintain the situational awareness and level of knowledge required to allow commanders at all levels to make timely and informed decisions.!"

134. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAp117 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area INFORM. In several cases, this is already reflected in CC/CS. Refer to Annex-C for a complete accounting. The paragraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities.




a. Conduct robust and resilient processing, exploitation, and distribution of information gained through persistent ISR operations and integrate it into C3, decision making, and strategic awareness for the Alliance. (paragraph 6.5.7.2.2)



PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

136. There are several ongoing strands of work (e.g. standards, doctrine development, defence planning, defence investment, etc.) related to the identification and correction of JAPS interoperability challenges. However, progress is not keeping pace with the rapidly changing security environment and developing technology. At times, high-level policies, such as information sharing restrictions and national caveats, limit interoperability solutions and reduce operational effectiveness across the domains.

137. Many of the interoperability concerns noted in this interim report and the supporting increments of the JAPS Interoperability Study were previously noted in comprehensive studies, including the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities (Reference L) and the 2016 Urgent Priorities for JAP Following the Warsaw Summit (Reference H). Rather than more studies, NATO and Allies need to take action in the implementation of outstanding recommendations and to be proactive in providing relevant support infrastructure to fully exploit new capabilities. To fully implement the JAPS, NATO needs a holistic and coordinated approach with speed and agility to rapidly identify and correct interoperability concerns.

138. To fully implement the JAPS and gain full benefit from legacy and new capabilities commanders, planners and operators must be provided with a comprehensive understanding of platform/system capabilities and limitations. A continued policy of limiting knowledge sharing from the Nations owning new capabilities will prevent full exploitation of capabilities. Command staff subject matter expertise must be considered a key deliverable within any new capabilities design, development and procurement cycle to again ensure proper use of the available assets and to their fullest potential.

139. To be interoperable in the air domain, the first requirement is that the forces are able to communicate. Communication includes access to protected voice, data-link, and other means of information sharing among forces and between C41SR systems. NATO needs a coherent C41SR strategy to enable the integration of tactical C2 and surveillance functions in order to support decentralized decision-making and allocate decision rights dynamically. Such a strategy will help to develop strategic to tactical situational awareness through the seamless flow of information across multiple domains and functions, while fully integrating all C41SR capabilities and connecting seamlessly their arch itectu res.



RECOMMENDATIONS

140. Use the findings in this report to strengthen NDPP's CC/CS, ensuring they include interoperability statements to ensure effective use in a multinational environment and include interoperability as a Principal Capability Statement.

141. Strengthen the NATO ETEE Policy to include Joint and multinational exercises that test the full spectrum of JAP missions across all domains in a complex A2/AD environment. Strengthen Joint and multinational interoperability verification efforts through events to ensure practical rather than theoretical interoperability.

142. SCs, with ACT in the lead, develop a JAPS Interoperability Roadmap as final increment to the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study. The Roadmap will be delivered to the IMS with the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study Final Report, no later than 31 December 2019.


A2AD

A3R

AAR ACC ACCS ACO ACS ACT AD AEA AFSC AGS AI AIRC2 AIRCOM AJP AMD AMDC AOC APCLO APCMO ARSAG ASUW ASW AT ATP BDA Bi-SC BMD C2 C21S C3 C41SR CAIP


ANNEX A - ACRONYMS

Anti-Access/Area Denial Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling Air-to-Air Refuelling Air Command and Control Air Command and Control System Allied Command Operations / Airspace Control Order Aircraft Cross Servicing Allied Command Transformation Air Defence Airborne Electronic Attack Alliance Future surveillance and Control Alliance Ground Surveillance Air Interdiction / Artificial Intelligence Air Command and Control Air Command Allied Joint Publication Air and Missile Defence Air and Missile Defence Committee Air Operations Centre Air Power Contribution to Land Operations Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations Aerial Refuelling Systems Advisory Group Anti Surface Warfare Anti-Submarine Warfare Air Transport Allied Tactical Publication Boom Drogue Adaptor Bi-Strategie Commands Ballistic Missile Defence Command and Control Command and Control Information System Consultation, Command and Control Communication, Computers, Command and Control and ISR Combined Air Interoperability Programme

A-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

capsllims

CAS

CAOC

CCICS CCIR CIS CONOPS CONEMP COTS CRC DaCAS DCA DOTMLPFI

EAG EATC EDA EID EPACS ETAC ETEE EU EW FAC FAC(A) FMN FOC Ha lADS IAMD IOC ISAF ISR JAP JAPCC JAPS


Capabilities and limitations Close Air Support Combined Air Operations Centre Capability Codes and Statements (NDPP) Commanders Critical Information Requirement Communications and Information Systems Concept of Operations Concept of Employment Commercial of the shelf Control and Reporting Centre Digitally Aided Close Air Support Defensive Counter Air I Dual Capable Aircraft Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leadership, Material, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability European Air Group European Air Transport Command European Defence Agency Electronic identification European Planning and Coordination System European Tactical Airlift Centre Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation European Union Early Warning / Electronic Warfare Forward Air Controller Forward Air Controller - Airborne Federated Mission Networking Final Operating Capability Headquarters Integrated Air Defence System Integrated Air and Missile Defence Initial Operating Capability International Security Assistance Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Joint Air Power Joint Air Power Competence Centre Joint Air Power Strategy


JFAC

JISR

JOA

JPOW

JSF

JTAC

JTF

LO

LOA

MADL

MCCE

MEAT

NAC


Joint Force Air Component

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Joint Operational Area

Joint Project Optical Windmill

Joint Strike Fighter

Joint Terminal Attack Controller

Joint Task Force

Low Observable

Level of Ambition

Multifunction Advanced Data Link

Movement Coordination Centre Europe

Management European Air Transport

North Atlantic Council

NAFAG NATO Air Force Armaments Group

NATINAMDS NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System

NCS NATO Command Structure

NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process

NIAG

NSO

OCA

OUP

PED

PlO

ROE

RPA

RSOM

RSOMI

SAM

SBAMD

SC

SCM

SEAD

SHAPE

STANAG

STO

NATO Industrial Advisory Group

NATO Standardisation Office, NATO Standardisation Organisation

Offensive Counter Air

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

Positive Identification

Rules of Engagement

Remotely Piloted Aircraft

Reporting, Staging and Onward Movement

Reporting, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

Surface-to-Air Missile

Surface-Based Air and Missile Defence

Strategic Command

Supply Chain Management

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

NATO Standardisation Agreement

Science & Technology Organisation

STRATCOM Strategic Communications


TCPED

TDL

TST

TTP

UAS

WMD


Tactical Collection, Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination Tactical Data Link Time Sensitive Targeting Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Unmanned Air System Weapons of Mass Destruction



ANNEX B - JAP-RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS

Allied Joint Publications (Information drawn from the NATO Standardisation Office (NSO) Portal on 20 August 2019.

Short Title Long Title Promulgated STANAG 2437 Ed: 8 Allied Joint Doctrine - AJP-01 Edition E 28-Feb-2017 AJP-01 Ed. EVer. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine 28-Feb-2017 STANAG 7107 Ed: 3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance - AJP-2.7 11-Jul-2016

Edition A

AJP-2.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 11-Jul-2016

STANAG 2490 Ed: 4 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations - AJP-3 Edition C 11-Feb-2019

AJP-3 Ed. C Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 11-Feb-2019

STANAG 3700 Ed: 8 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations - AJP-3.3 Edition 8 8-Apr-2016

AJP-3.3 Ed. 8 Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations 8-Apr-2016

STANAG 3880 Ed: 6 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations - AJP-3.3.1 (8) 9-Jul-2010

AJP-3.3.1 Ed. (8) Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations 9-Jul-2010

STANAG 3736 Ed: 11 Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction- AJP-3.3.2(A) 11-Sep-2009

AJP-3.3.2 Ed. A Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 11-Sep-2009

STANAG 3703 Ed: 9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination - AJP-3.3.3 Edition A 2-Dec-2014

AJP-3.3.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination 2-Dec-2014

STANAG 3805 Ed: 9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control - AJP-3.3.5 Edition 8 8-May-2013

AJP-3.3.5 Ed. 8 Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control 8-May-2013

STANAG 6018 Ed: 3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare - AJP-3.6 Edition 8 5-Jul-2012

AJP-3.6 Ed. 8 Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare Doctrine 5-Jul-2012

B-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED


Short Title Long Title Promulgated STANAG 6511 Ed: 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel In A Hostile Environment - AJP-3.7 Edition 23-Feb-2016

A

AJP-3.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel In A Hostile Environment 23-Feb-2016

STANAG 2524 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting - AJP-3.9 Edition A 8-Apr-2016

AJP-3.9 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting 8-Apr-2016

STANAG 2526 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations - AJP-5 Edition A 11-Feb-2019

AJP-5 Ed. A Ver. 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations 24-May-2019

STANAG 2525 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems - AJP-6 Edition A 28-Feb-2017

AJP-6 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems 28-Feb-2017

Allied Tactical Publications (Information drawn from the NSO Portal on 20 August 2019)

Short Title Long Title Promulgated

STANAG 1242 Ed: 19 Naval Mine Warfare Principles - A TP-6 Vol I Edition D & Mtp-6 Vol I Edition D 5-Jun-2019

ATP-06 I Ed. D Ver. 3 Naval Mine Warfare Principles 1-0ct-2015

STANAG 1243 Ed: 20 Naval Mine Countermeasures Operations Planning and Evaluation - ATP-6 Vol II 5-Jun-2019 Edition D & Mtp-06 Vol II Edition D

ATP-06 II Ed. D Ver. 3 Naval Mine Countermeasures Operations, Planning and Evaluation 1-0ct-2015

STANAG 1132 Ed: 23 Naval Mine Countermeasures Tactics and Execution - ATP-24 Vol I Edition D & Mtp- 26-Sep-2016 24 Vol I Edition D

A TP-24 I Ed. D Ver. 1 Naval Mine Countermeasures Tactics and Execution 26-Sep-2017

ATP-3.2.2 Ed. B Ver. 1 Command and Control of Allied Forces 15-Dec-2016



Short Title Long Title Promulgated STANAG 7144 Ed: 5 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction - ATP- 10-Apr-2019

3.3.2.1 Edition D

ATP-3.3.2.1 Ed. D Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 10-Apr-2019 STANAG 3797 Ed: 7 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Programme - ATP-3.3.2.2 Edition B 8-Sep-2016 ATP-3.3.2.2 Ed. B Ver. 2 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Programme 10-Jan-2018

STANAG 7185 Ed: 1 Air Maritime Coordination Procedures (AMCP) - ATP-3.3.3.1 (ATP-34) 3-Aug-2005

ATP-3.3.3.1 Air-Maritime Coordination Procedures (AMCP) 1-Mar-2005

STANAG 7207 Ed: 1 Air Transport (AT) and Air-To-Air Refuelling (AAR) Doctrine - ATP-3.3.4 Edition A 22-Apr-2013

ATP-3.3.4 I Ed. A Ver. 2 Air Transport (AT) Doctrine 12-Apr-2018

ATP-3.3.4 II Ed. A Ver. 2 Air-To-Air Refuelling (AAR) Doctrine 3-Apr-2019

STANAG 7213 Ed: 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Movements - ATP-3.3.4.1 Edition 11-Jan-2018 A

ATP-3.3.4.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Movements 11-Jan-2018

STANAG 3971 Ed: 8 Air-To-Air Refuelling - ATP-3.3.4.2 Edition D 17 -Jan-20 19

ATP-3.3.4.2 Ed. D Ver. 1 Air-To-Air Refuelling 26-Apr-2019

ATP-3.3.4.2.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 A Guide To Obtaining Air-To-Air Refuelling Clearances and Compatibility 18-Jul-2019 Assessments

ATP-3.3.4.2.2 Ed. A Ver. 1 Recommended Air-To-Air Refuelling (AAR) Aircrew Certification and Currency 18-Jul-2019

ATP-3.3.4.2.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tanker Capabilities 18-Jul-2019

ATP-3.3.4.2.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tanker/Receiver Clearance - Technical Compatibility Matrix 18-Jul-2019

STANAG 3998 Ed: 5 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations - ATP- 26-0ct-2017 3.3.4.3 Edition B

ATP-3.3.4.3 Ed. B Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations 26-0ct-2017



Short Title Long Title Promulgated STANAG 7214 Ed: 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Airborne Operations - ATP-3.3.4.4 12-Feb-2018

Edition A

ATP-3.3.4.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Airborne Operations 12-Feb-2018

STANAG 7191 Ed: 1 Air-To-Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Boom-Receptacle System and Interface 3-Jun-2013 Requirements - ATP-3.3.4.5 Edition A

ATP-3.3.4.5 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air-To-Air Refuelling Equipment: Boom-Receptacle System and Interface 3-Jun-2013 Requirements

STANAG 3447 Ed: 5 Air-To-Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Probe-Drogue Interface Characteristics- 28-Jun-2016 ATP-3.3.4.6 Edition A

ATP-3.3.4.6 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air- To-Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Probe-Drogue Interface Characteristics 28-Jun-2016

STANAG 7215 Ed: 1 Air-To-Air Refuelling Signal Lights In Hose and Drogue Systems - ATP-3.3.4.7 Edition 27 -Mar-2013 A

ATP-3.3.4.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air-To-Air Refuelling Signal Lights In Hose and Drogue Systems 27 -Mar -2013

STANAG 7189 Ed: 2 Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - ATP-3.3.5.1 Edition A 27-Apr-2016

ATP-3.3.5.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 27 -Apr -2016

STANAG 1183 Ed: 6 NATO Qualifications for Fixed Wing Above Water Warfare/Aerospace Surveillance 9-May-2017 and Control System (AWW/ASACSs) Aircraft Controllers - ATP-3.3.5.2 Edition A

ATP-3.3.5.2 Ed. A Ver. 1 NATO Qualifications for Fixed Wing Above Water Warfare/Aerospace Surveillance 9-May-2017 and Control System (AWW/ASACS) Aircraft Controllers

STANAG 7217 Ed: 1 force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations - ATP-3.3.6 Edition A 8-Apr-2016

ATP-3.3.6 Ed. A Ver. 1 force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations 8-Apr-2016

STANAG 4670 Ed: 5 Minimum Training Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operators 8-May-2019 and Pilots - ATP-3.3.8.1 Edition B

ATP-3.3.8.1 Ed. B Ver. 1 Minimum Training Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operators 8-May-2019 and Pilots

8-4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED


Short Title Long Title Promulgated STANAG 3873 Ed: 6 Electronic Warfare In Air Operations - ATP-3.6.3 14-Aug-20 15 ATP-3.6.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Electronic Warfare In Air Operations 14-Aug-20 15 STANAG 6519 Ed: 1 NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Doctrine - ATP-3.6.4 Edition A 13-Jul-2017 ATP-3.6.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Doctrine 13-Jul-2017 STANAG 1167 Ed: 21 NA TO Above Water Warfare Manual - A TP-31 Edition E 12-0ct-2018 ATP-31 Ed. EVer. 1 NATO Above Water Warfare Manual 12-0ct-2018 STANAG 3920 Ed: 4 Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting - ATP- 47(A) 23-Jul-2004

ATP-47 Ed. (A) Ver. 1 Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting 1-Feb-2000 STANAG 2999 Ed: 10 Use of Helicopters In Land Operations Doctrine - ATP-49 Edition G 3-Mar-2016 A TP-49 Ed. G Ver. 1 Use of Helicopters In Land Operations Doctrine 3-Mar-2016

STANAG 7030 Ed: 3 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) - ATP-62 20-Nov-2000

ATP-62 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 1-Feb-2000

STANAG 1455 Ed: 6 Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations - ATP-71 Edition A 20-Sep-2013

ATP-71 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations 20-Sep-2013

STANAG 1154 Ed: 12 NA TO Qualifications for Helicopter Controllers at Sea - ATP-78 Edition A 21-Nov-20 13

ATP-78 Ed. A Ver. 2 NA TO Qualifications for Helicopter Controllers at Sea 20-May-2016

STANAG 2618 Ed: 1 Allied Doctrine for Ground-Based Air Defence - ATP-82 Edition A 31-Jan-2018

ATP-82 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Doctrine for Ground-Based Air Defence 31-Jan-2018



ANNEX C - JAP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NDPP

1. The following table summarizes the recommendations contained within the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L). The table arranged by Capability Hierarchy (CH) area and then Doctrine, Orqanisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) area. Each recommendation is followed by the paragraph within the 2015 report. Those associated with the CH are capabilities recommendations. Those recommendations associated with DOTMLPFI are recommendations that influence readiness and responsiveness. Each recommendation is then analysed against the 2020 Frozen Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC/CS).

2. The portion of the table on the left derives from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities. The portion of the table on the right presents the results of the analysis of the 2020 Frozen CC/CS.

CH 2015 Bi-SC Recommendation Paragraph

Prepare Review, develop and update doctrine and TTPs to 6.5.1.2.1 include:

Prepare Near-term development of a NATO JAP Strategy, 6.5.1.2.1.1 ensuring effective and efficient JAP operations.

Prepare Development or clarification of NA TO Space and Cyber 6.5.1.2.1.2 policy to support joint operations.

Through effective and realistic education, training, exercises, and evaluation programmes, ensure an

Prepare adequate number of personnel are trained and proficient 6.5.1.2.2 in JAP TTPs and on the systems used in conducting operations.

Conduct live exercises that provide training environments Prepare and experiences that more closely resemble potential 6.5.1.2.2.1

operational situations.

C-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Oen Cl) .... Cl) e ....

E ... o C) (.) NU ni Cl) ni ni M Cl) ... c.. '0' .... .... .e O- C) fi) U 0 NU Cl) ... ... c :::s ... e U a.. o, w en a.. - YES X

YES X

YES X

NO

NO



Conduct realistic operational simulation, leveraging new

Prepare modelling and simulation technologies, based on up to 6.5.1.2.2.2 date operational scenarios, when live exercises cannot properly emulate the required environment. Research, develop, and acquire innovative and leading-

Prepare edge equipment in sufficient supply to enable the effective 6.5.1.2.2.3 and timely conduct and sustainment of joint air operations. Ensure sufficient equipment (e.g. weaponry and armour) and supplies (e.g. fuel and consumables) are immediately

Prepare available to allow timely deployment of forces to various 6.5.1.2.2.3.1 environments, ensuring efficient and effective JAP operations. Ensure sufficient supplies (e.g. precision munitions) are

Prepare available to sustain forces deployed to various 6.5.1.2.2.3.2 environments while regular and recurring sustainment is established. Ensure sufficient capacity to operate in contested

Prepare electronic warfare (EW) environments is established or 6.5.1.2.2.3.3 developed. Review standardisation with respect to sustainment and

Prepare establish, improve or update requirements to enable 6.5.1.2.2.3.4 better interoperability and integration of Alliance JAP. Review, upgrade or develop new information sharing

Prepare systems that take advantage of future technologies to 6.5.1.2.2.3.5 improve assurance and better enable C2 while enhancing decision making processes in the future.


oC/) Cl) .... Cl) c .... E ... o C) (.)

NU ca Cl) ca ca M Cl) ... Co 'CS'

.... .... .E O- C) In U 0 NU Cl) ... ... c :::s ... e U a.. a.. w C/) a.. - NO

NO

NO

NO

YES X X X X X

NO

NO



Rapidly establish forward operating locations that may Project necessitate differing capabilities and differing levels of 6.5.2.2.1

support. Rapidly evaluate forward operating locations, that could be described as austere or not austere, nearby or far

Project away, in permissive or non-permissive environments, to 6.5.2.2.1.1 determine which combinations of capabilities will be best suited for achieving desired effects from those locations. Deploy or redeploy, within required timelines, JAP and

Project required support capabilities to a forward operating 6.5.2.2.1.2 location. Conduct missions at extended ranges, from main operating bases that mayor may not be close in proximity

Project to the area of operations, through the employment of air- 6.5.2.2.2 to-air refuelling or other capabilities that provide improved endurance. Operate across all threat environments, integrating with

Project land and maritime forces, to succeed in all operational 6.5.2.2.3 scenarios to include hostile A2AD. Bring persistent ISR capabilities into the area of

Project responsibility in support of air, land, or maritime forces in 6.5.2.2.4 advance of operations to prepare the battlespace and improve situational awareness. Support Alliance objectives through control of airspace

Project while delivering suitable command and control needed to 6.5.2.2.5 achieve the commander's desired effects.

Engage Conduct defensive and offensive joint air operations and 6.5.3.2.1 operations in support of other instruments of power.


oCl) Cl) ... Cl) r::: ...

E ... (,) C) o NO CU Cl) CU CU C") Cl) ...

Co 'CS' - - .E O- C) en 0 0 NO Cl) ... ... r::: ~ ... r::: 0 Cl.. o, W CI) o, - YES X X

YES X X X X X

YES X X

YES X

YES X

YES X X

YES X

YES X X



Engage Establish and maintain control of the air in order to set 6.5.3.2.1.1 conditions for joint military operations. Conduct timely, precision kinetic or non-kinetic attack

Engage operations into conditions up to and including non- 6.5.3.2.1.2 permissive.

Engage Exert the desired degree of control over the 6.5.3.2.1.3 electromagnetic spectrum. Provide persistent ISR, distributed command and control,

Engage and EW capacity that enables a fully networked, 6.5.3.2.1.4 integrated and interoperable force's ability to operate in a congested, contested and complex environment. Ensure sufficient personnel, equipment, supplies, and

Sustain munitions are available to sustain long-term, high-intensity 6.5.4.2.1 operations. Rapidly implement, operate and maintain both an

Sustain expeditiously dynamic and steady state supply and 6.5.4.2.2 combat support capability.

Sustain Rapidly establish, maintain, and/or repair infrastructure 6.5.4.2.3 necessary to conduct JAP operations. Rapidly establish C3 operations, to include properly

C3 integrated persistent ISR to provide strategic, operational 6.5.5.2.1 and tactical awareness and support Alliance decision making.

C3 Conduct robust, resilient and scalable C3 of JAP, while 6.5.5.2.2 enabling supported forces to achieve desired effects. Provide support to IAMO, which will require integrated C3

C3 capabilities supported by surveillance, fused data, and 6.5.5.2.3 information sharing (with military and/or civil authorities).


000 Q) - Q) s:: - E ... (.) 0) (.)

NO CU Q) CU CU C"') Q) ... c.. 'CS' - - .E 0- 0) II) 0 NO Q) 0 ... ... e :::s ... s:: 0 Il. Il. W 00 Il. - YES X X

YES X X

YES X X X

YES X

NO

NO

YES X X

YES X

YES X

YES X



Integrate air and missile defence to protect territory, Protect populations, and (deployed) forces, against the full 6.5.6.2.1

spectrum of future air threats. Ensure high survivability against the full spectrum of

Protect future threats through redundancy, resistance, and 6.5.6.2.2 resilience.

Protect Organically support force protection requirements. 6.5.6.2.3

Protect Conduct and provide support to joint personnel recovery 6.5.6.2.4 operations.

Inform Conduct persistent airborne ISR operations as required to 6.5.7.2.1 support Alliance decision making. Conduct robust and resilient processing, exploitation, and

Inform distribution of information gained through persistent ISR 6.5.7.2.2 operations and integrate it into C3, decision making, and strategic awareness for the Alliance.

DOTMLPFI 2015 Bi-SC Recommendation Paragraph

Improve JAP specific standards and measures of

Doctrine performance/effectiveness for NATO readiness for the 7.4.1.1.1 Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the future security environment.


Ot/) CI) - CI) I:: - E ... (.) C) o

NU CU CI) CU CU M CI) ... c.. ë5' - - .E O- C) fi) U 0 NU CI) ... ... I:: ::::J ... I:: U a.. e, w t/) a.. -

YES X X X

YES X

NO

YES X X

YES X

NO

Ot/) CI) - CI) I:: - E ... (.) C) o

NU CU CI) CU CU M CI) ... c.. '0' - - 0 O- C) fi) U 0 NU ~ ..... ... I:: ::::J ... I:: U a.. a, w t/) a.. - NO



Current Joint Air Command and Control (Air C2) policy should undergo periodic review across NCS and NFS to

Doctrine ensure that Air C2 keeps pace with changes to the future 7.4.1.1.2 security environment in order to better enable the effective employment of NATO JAP. Improve JAP's modular organization and interoperability in order to cover a wide range of contingencies while

Organization offering maximum agility providing the ability to rapidly 7.4.2.1.1 adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment. Develop a robust NATO training plan that improves the

Training realism of and incorporates all levels of leadership in joint 7.4.3.1.1 experimentation and exercises. Continue to develop training and simulations that leverage

Training Alliance connectivity, maximizing the use of simulators, 7.4.3.1.2 distance learning and existing or new training i nfrastructu re. Develop NA TO training that enhances interoperability and

Training maximizes joint participation, both national and 7.4.3.1.3 multinational. Conduct research in areas of material technology that will

Material enhance survivability of NATO equipment, personnel, 7.4.4.1.1 facilities, and infrastructure.

Material Conduct research in areas of material technology that 7.4.4.1.2 enhance NATO sustainability. Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures that

Material facilitate interoperability intra-Alliance movement of 7.4.4.1.3 personnel, equipment, and supplies.


oC/) CI,) .... CI,) t: .... E ... Co) C) Co)

NU CU CI,) CU CU M CI,) ... c. '0' .... - .E O- C) t/) U 0 NU CI,) ... ... t: :::s ... t: U a.. a.. w C/) e, -

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO



Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures to

Material optimize interoperability by the use of standardized, 7.4.4.1.4 distributed, and pre-positioned personnel, equipment, and supplies. NATO should invest in Alliance JAP leadership through deliberate leadership building programmes. Specific

Leadership recommendations regarding leadership as well as 7.4.5.1.1 command and control of JAP are addressed in the doctrine and training sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.3 respectively) . Review JAP manning processes and develop policies that

Personnel will support more efficient use of existing manpower, 7.4.6.1.1 improve interoperability and standardization, and identify future manpower shortages. Review, improve, or standardize existing NA TO air

Facilities facilities in order to handle the full spectrum of air power 7.4.7.1.1 capabilities.

Facilities Modernize hardened facilities to enhance operational 7.4.7.1.2 capability, survivability, sustainability, and resilience. Review existing agreements for utilizing and/or develop

Facilities new agreements for establishing dual use (civilian and 7.4.7.1.3 military) facilities/installations and airspace.

Interoperability Continue to support CFI and SO projects with particular 7.4.8.1.1 emphasis on JAP interoperability.

Interoperability Conduct training that focuses on interoperability. 7.4.8.1.2

Interoperability Improve integration and interoperability of all NATO CIS. 7.4.8.1.3


otn Q) .... Q) e ....

E ... o C) (.) NO CU Q) CU CU M G) ... c. ..... .... .... J2 0- G) 0 C) I/) 0 0 NO ... ... e ::::I ... e 0 c, Cl.. W tn Cl.. - NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO



Interoperability Increase focus on interoperability during acquisition 7.4.8.1.4 processes.

Interoperability Review, revise, and enforce relevant NATO STANAGS for 7.4.8.1.5 JAP.

I nteroperability Establish and enforce language proficiency requirements. 7.4.8.1.6 Improve cultural awareness along with inter-service and

I nteroperability cross-cultural training that will enhance the Alliance's 7.4.8.1.7 abilities in multinational efforts.

Interoperability Develop programmes that maximize the use of 7.4.8.1.8 interoperable COTS capabilities and equipment.


oC/) Q) ... Q) e .... E ... o en (.)

NO CU Q) CU CU M Q) ... c.. '__' .... .... 0 0- 0 en III 0 0 NO e ..... ... e :::J ... s:::: 0 c, e, w C/) c.. - NO

NO

NO

NO

NO


ANNEX D - REFERENCES

A. MCM-0257-2017, NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy, 18 December 2017 B. 5000ITSC-FCR-0010/ACT-0924/Ser:NU0057, Interoperability Report - NA TO's Joint Air

Power Strategy Implementation, 9 February 2019 C. SH/SDP/J5/PLPNC/19-002091, NA TO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO

Operational Assessment Interoperability Report, 18 April 2019 D. AAP-6, NA TO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Edition 2018 E. AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, Edition C F. AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition E, February 2017 G. C-M(2019)0014 (INV), Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report, 20 June 2019 H. Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit - Urgent Priorities, JAPCC, October

2017 I. Future Vector Project, Future vector - Part II, JAPCC, October 2014 J. The NA TO Secretary General's Annual Report 2018,

https:/Iwww.nato.intlcps/en/natohq/opinions_164187.htm. 14 March 2019 K. Component Integration Challenges presented by Advanced Layered Defence Systems

(A2IAD), Three Swords magazine, 33/2018 L. 5000ITSC FEF 0040ITT-151465/Ser:NU0069, Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power

Capabilities, 7 December 2015 M. AC/336(2019)0003, Policy for Integrated Air and Missile Defence, 2019 N. AC/336-WP(2019)0009-REV4(INV), Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report, Air

and Missile Defence Committee, 6 June 2019 O. AC/259-D(2018)0038, NATO Air Force Armaments Group Annual Report (October 2017-

September 2018), NATO Air Force Armaments Group, 24 October 2018 P. Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability, JAPCC Journal 28 (2019) Q. NSO(AIR)0432(2019)ASB, Final Record of Decisions (ROD) of the Military Committee Air

Standardization Board (MCASB) Meeting, New NATO Headquarters (BEL), 6 March 2019, 3 April 2019

R. Combined Air Interoperability Programme, European Air Group, version 3.0, 23 May 2018 S. JAPCC Perspective on the 5th generation Aircraft Discussion, Air Warfare Communication

in a Networked Environment, JAPCC Journal 24, pages 62 to 66, 17 July 2017 T. 5th Generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirements, Headquarters

AIRCOM, August 2019 U. GAO-19-321, F-35 Aircraft Sustainment - DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply

Chain Challenges, U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2019 V. Air-ta-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update, JAPCC W. Standardising Automated Air-ta-Air Refuelling, JAPCC Journal 26 (2018), pages 50 to 57

D-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED


x. Future Battlefield Rotorcraft Capability, JAPCC Y. A400M: Europe's Interoperability Poster Child, JAPCC Journal 23, pages 63 to 68,27

January 2017 Z. Aerial Tanking in 2035, JAPCC Journal 27, page 30 M. AJP 2.7, Allied Joint Publication for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,

Edition A, July 2016 BB. STANREC 4777, NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA), AEDP-02, Volume 1,

Edition B, January 2018 CC. STANAG 7085, Interoperable Data Links for ISR Systems, Edition 4, April2018 DO. STANAG 4559, NATO Standard ISR Library Interfaces and Services, Edition 4, March

2018 EE. 5010 TSC MDX-0090ITT-8443, 2017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy, 23 October 2017



ANNEX E - ENDNOTES

1 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference A) 2 Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security 3 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B) 4 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C) 5 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Reference D) 6 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 2.a 7 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 2.e 8 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference E), Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 1 9 Ibid, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 3 10 Ibid, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 4 11 Ibid, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 1 12 Ibid, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 2 13 Ibid, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 3 14 Ibid, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 4 15 Ibid, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 1 16 Ibid, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 3 17 Ibid, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 5 18 Ibid, Chapter 3.6 - JISR, paragraph 1 19 Allied Joint Doctrine (Reference F), pages 1 and 2 20 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference A), paragraph 41 21 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference F) 22 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 5 23 Ibid, paragraph 5 24 Ibid, paragraph 7 25 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 12 26 Future vector - Part II (Reference I), page 12 and page 105, chapter 5 27 Ibid, pages 9 and 10 28 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 8 29 Ibid, paragraph 5

E-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED


30 The NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2018 (Reference J), page 54 31 http://www.nato.int/factsheets, February 2019 32 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 12 33 Future vector - Part" (Reference I), pages 1 06 to 112, chapter 5 34 Component Integration Challenges presented by Advanced Layered Defence Systems (Reference K), page 62 35 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 5 36 Ibid, paragraph 5 37 Ibid, paragraph 12 38 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L), paragraph 7.4.1.1.1 39 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 11 40 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 5 41 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L), paragraph 7.4.8.1.4 42 Ibid, paragraph 9 43 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 6 44 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L), paragraph 7.4.8.1.8 45 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 12 46 Ibid, paragraph 12 47 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L), paragraph 7.4.6.1.1 48 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 8 49 Ibid, paragraph 6 50 Policy for Integrated Air and Missile Defence (Reference M) 51 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference N), paragraph 15 52 NATO Air Force Armaments Group Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 0), paragraph 10.a 53 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference N), paragraph 28 54 Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit (Reference H), page 156 55 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference P), page 52 56 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 9 57 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 5 58 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference P), page 53



59 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 10 60 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference P), page 53 61 Ibid, page 54 62 Final Record of Decisions of the MCASB Meeting (Reference Q), paragraph 30 63 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 8 64 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference R), Annex B, pages 87 and 88 65 Ibid, Annex B, pages 66 and 67 66 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 7 67 Air Warfare Communication in a Networked Environment (Reference S) 68 5th Generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirements (Reference T) 69 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 8 70 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference R), Annex B, page 48 71 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 7 72 Ibid, paragraph 7 73 NATO Air Force Armaments Group Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 0), paragraph 9.a 74 Ibid, paragraph 9.b 75 Future vector - Part II (Reference I), page 95, chapter 4 76 Air Warfare Communication in a Networked Environment (Reference S) 77 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference R), Annex B, pages 57 and 58 78 F-35 Aircraft Sustainment - DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply Chain Challenges (Reference U) 79 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 7.a 80 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference V), paragraph 5.2 81 https:l/www.airbus.com/defence/a400m.html 82 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 7.c 83 Standardising Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (Reference W) 84 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference V), paragraph 3.1.3 85 Future Battlefield Rotorcraft Capability (Reference X), paragraph 2.5.3 86 Ibid, paragraph 2.5.3 87 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference V), paragraph 1.1.2 88 Ibid, paragraph 3.7.3 89 Ibid, paragraph 3.7.2



90 Ibid, paragraph 2.3.3 91 Ibid, paragraph 2.3.2 92 A400M: Europe's Interoperability Poster Child (Reference Y) 93 Aerial Tanking in 2035 (Reference Z) 94 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference V), paragraph 3.6.1 95 Allied Joint Publication for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Reference M) 96 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference E) 97 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference C), paragraph 10 98 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference B), paragraph 5 99 NATO Air Force Armaments Group Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 0), paragraph 12.a 100 Ibid, paragraph 12.c 101 Ibid, paragraph 12.b 102 Letter from the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Integration Interoperability Coalition to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 16 Apri12012. 103 2017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE) 1042017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"R" 105 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 106 2017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"D" 107 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 108 2017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"E" 109 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 1102017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"C" 111 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 1122017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"S" 113 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 1142017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row"P" 115 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L) 1162017 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference EE), Annex A, row "I" 117 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference L)


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