jsse vol 1 no 2 december 2014

Editors:Michael T. Kezirian, Ph.D.Joseph Pelton, Ph.D.Tommaso Sgobba

VOL. 1 NO. 2 - DECEMBER 2014

Publication information: The Journal of Space Safety Engineering (ISSN Pending) is a quarterly publication of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS). You can read about IAASS mission, goals, organization, membership and activities at: http://iaass.space-safety.org/. The JSSE is published using an open access publication model, meaning that all interested readers are able to freely access the journal online without the need for a subscription, and authors are not charged.

Authors inquiries: For inquiries relating to the submission of articles please contact the Editor-in-Chief at: [email protected]. For all information about the journal, please visit the journal web page http://iaass.space-safety.org/publications/journal/. Authors instructions on preparation and submittal at: http://iaass.space-safety.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2013/07/JSSE-authors_instructions.pdf.

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Copyright and photocopying: Authors retain the copyright of their work. The IAASS maintains the copyright of the Journal as a whole. Single photocopies or electronic scans of single articles may be made for personal use as allowed by national copyright laws. Authors or IAASS permission and the payment of a fee is required for all other photocopying, including multiple or systematic copying, copying for advertising purposes, resale, and all forms of document delivery. For information on how to seek permission please contact the Editor-in-Chief at [email protected].

Notice: No responsibility is assumed by the Publisher IAASS and by Editors and Editorial Board for any injury and/or damage to persons or property from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the journal. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical professional conduct of IAASS, inclusion in this publication does not represent an endorsement of the quality or value of such product or service.

Credits: Kristhian Mason, IAASS graphic designer, for cover image, graphic work, layout and paginations.

Michael T. Kezirian, Ph.D.The Boeing CompanyUniversity of Southern CaliforniaEditor-in-Chief

Tommaso SgobbaEuropean Space Agency (ret.)Managing Editor

Joseph Pelton, Ph.D.George Washington University (ret.)Assistant Editor-in-Chief

EDITORS

George W. S. AbbeyNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (ret.)

Sayavur Bakhtiyarov, Ph.D.University of New Mexico

Kenneth CameronScience Applications International Corporation

Luigi De Luca, Ph.D.Politecnico di Milano

Joe H. EngleMaj Gen. USAF (ret.)National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Herve GilibertAirbus Space & Defense

Jeffrey A. Hoffman, Ph.D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Ernst Messerschmid, Ph.D.University of Stuttgart (ret.)

Isabelle RongierCentre National d’Etudes Spatiales

Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Ph.D.European Space Agency

EDITORIAL BOARD

William Ailor, Ph.D.The Aerospace Corporation

Jonathan B. Clark, M.D., M.P.HBaylor College of Medicine

Paul J. Coleman, Jr., Ph.D.University of California at Los Angeles (Emeritus)

Natalie CostedoatCentre National d’Etudes Spatiales

Gary JohnsonScience Application International Corporation

Barbara KankiNational Aeronautics and Space Administration

Bruno LazareCentre National d’Etudes Spatiales

Carine LeveauCentre National d’Etudes Spatiales

Tobias LipsHypersonic Technology Goettingen

Michael LutomskiSpace Exploration Technologies

Uwe WirtGerman Aerospace Center (DLR)

Erwin Mooij, Ph.D.Delft University of Technology

Nobuo TakeuchiJapan Aerospace Exploration Agency

Brian WeedenSecure World Foundation

Paul D. Wilde, Ph.D., P.E.Federal Aviation Administration

FIELD EDITORS

• Safety by design• Safety on long duration missions• Launch and re-entry safety• Space hazards (debris, NEO objects)• Space weather and radiation• Environmental impacts• Nuclear safety for space systems

• Human factors and performance• Safety critical software design• Safety risk assessment• Safety risk management• Organizational culture and safety• Regulations and standards for safety• Space-based safety critical systems

• Space Situational Awareness• Space traffic control• Space traffic and air traffic interfaces• Space materials safety• Safe & Rescue• Safety lessons learned

MAIN JSSE TOPICS

The Journal of Space Safety Engineering (JSSE) provides an authoritative source of information in the field of space safety design, research and develop-ment. It serves applied scientists, engineers, policy makers and safety advocates with a platform to develop, promote and coordinate the science, technol-ogy and practice of space safety. JSSE seeks to establish channels of communication between industry, academy and government in the field of space safety and sustainability.

AIMS and SCOPE

Volume 1 No. 2 – December 2014

JOURNAL ofSPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING

Journal of Space Safety Engineering – Vol. 1 No. 2 - December 2014

International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

BOOK REVIEW

SAFETY REGULATIONS WILL PROTECT CUSTOMER BUT ALSO INDUSTRY ......................42Tommaso Sgobba

NATIONAL LEGISLATION GOVERNING COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES ........................44Paul Stephen Dempsey

OPTO-PYRO TRAINS FOR SPACE SYSTEMS - GAINS PROVIDED BY OPTO-PYRO TECHNOLOGY IN TERMS OF SAFETY ON LAUNCHERS ...............................61Bernard Chamayou

SATELLITE INFLATABLE DEORBITING EQUIPMENT FOR LEO SPACECRAFTS ...................75Benjamin Rasse, Patrice Damilano, Christian Dupuy

MITIGATION RULES COMPLIANCE IN LOW EARTH ORBIT ............................................84Vincent Morand, Juan-Carlos Dolado-Perez, Thomas Philippe, David-Alexis Handschuh

WHAT CAN JAXA DO TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS FOR SAFETY & MISSION SUCCESS? ..93Shimpei Takahashi

SAFE MAY NOT BE AN OPTION, BUT RISK MITIGATION IS ............................................98Michael Fodroci


41


EDITORIAL

In 2004 the private spaceflight industry welcomed a law in the U.S. (CSLAA) postponing to after the accumula-tion of flight experience or an accident the ability by Fed-eral Aviation Administration to issue safety standards, except for aspects of public safety. The law requires that a prospective participant shall be debriefed about the risk of space flight and sign an informed consent. The law requires in fact that before receiving compensation from a space flight participant or making an agreement to fly a space flight participant, the operator shall inform the space flight participant in writing that the U.S. Gov-ernment has not certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants. (49 U.S.C. § 70105(b)(5)(B)). We can reasonably expect that the av-erage space flight participant will not have the techni-cal background and experience to truly grasp the risk of space flight. Therefore the written consent required by law could end up as a merely bureaucratic process, and possibly deter the participation of at least part of poten-tial customers.The CSLAA does not protect the flight participant and it does not protect industry. To illustrate the latter point there is a case of 2008 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the manufacturer of a medical device approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) cannot be sued under State Law if the device causes an injury. The Court ruled in favor of the manufacturer of a balloon catheter that burst and severely injured a patient during an angioplasty. The Court stated that the FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing each device application, and grants approval only if finds that there is “reasonable assurance” of its “safety and effectiveness”. The manufacturer had argued that the device design and manufacturing had been in accordance with FDA regula-tions and that FDA and not the courts was the right forum on imposing requirements on cutting edge medical de-vices, arguing that “nothing is perfectly safe”. (Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., No. 06-179).We commonly use the term “safety” to mean “acceptable risk”. To be perfectly safe a system, product, device or material should never cause or have the potential to cause an accident. Perfect safety therefore does not generally exist, but personal acceptance of risk is not the same of acceptable risk. Acceptable risk refers to the result of the implementation of commonly agreed or recognized best practices, those usually identified by relevant gov-

ernment regulations and/or industrial standards. Without such reference the term “safety” is simply meaningless.In any litigation following an accident the manufactur-er or operator would have a hard time defending a ve-hicle design and demonstrating the thoroughness of the information passed to the customer. The fleet would be grounded, and probably made obsolete by newly issued (strict) government standards in the emotional wake of the accident. We can therefore say that obtaining a certi-fication of compliance with safety regulations serves the interests of the customer, but at the same time is in the best interest of industry because it protects them from wide tort liability. Safety regulations are very important for industry, but can commercial human spaceflight industry do without government? The answer is yes, and it can be in the best interest of both, industry and government. Nowadays government bureaucracies are more and more miss-ing the means and flexibility to keep the pace with fast evolving high-tech industries. Therefore alternate models should be adopted that are industry driven but yet inde-pendent from a specific company or project. The Formula 1 car racing industry experience may provide an interest-ing example. Tremayne, a sport writer, wrote that “In the first three de-cades of the Formula 1 World Championship, inaugurated in 1950, a racing driver’s life expectancy could often be measured in fewer than two seasons. Drivers raced, driv-ers died. In a world too familiar with the carnage of war, it was accepted that total risk was something that went with the badge.” (The Science of Safety: The Battle Against Unacceptable Risks in Motor Racing, 2001). Nowadays Formula 1 car racing is a very safe multibillion dollars business of sponsorships and global television rights. Entertainment for families that can be enjoyed without risking shocking sights. It was the Imola Grand Prix of 1994 with the deaths of Roland Ratzenberger and Ayrton Senna (in direct TV) that forced the car racing industry to look seriously at safety or risk to be banned forever. In the days after the Imola crashes the FIA (Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile) established a safety Ad-visory Expert Group to identify innovative technologies to improve car and circuit safety, and strictly mandated their implementation and certification testing. In conclusion, due to the fact that the law does not re-lieve manufacturer and operator of any responsibility for

SAFETY REGULATIONS WILL PROTECT CUSTOMER BUT ALSO INDUSTRY

Tommaso SgobbaIAASS Executive Director


42


gross negligence, obtaining an independent (government or industrial) safety certification is very much in the in-terest of a commercial human spaceflight manufacturer or operator in case of future litigations. Furthermore, the insurance industry seems not much comfortable in sign-ing policies for completely unregulated and potentially risky businesses.By paraphrasing the wording of the U.S. Presidential Committee that investigated the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, “The com-mercial human spaceflight industry must move towards developing a notion of safety as a collective responsibil-ity. Industry should establish a “Safety Institute” …this would be an industry created, self-policing entity, aimed at developing, adopting, and enforcing standards of ex-cellence to ensure continuous improvement in space-flight safety”.

Tommaso Sgobba is Executive Director of IAASS. He has 38 years of experience in aerospace developments. Until 2013 he was head of independent safety office at the European Space Agency, where he also chaired the Payload Safety Review Panel of the International Space Station. T. Sgobba was co-editor of the book “ Safety De-sign for Space Systems” and editor-in-chief of the book “Safety Design for Space Operations”. He resides in The Netherlands.


43


NATIONAL LEGISLATION GOVERNING COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES

Paul Stephen Dempsey(*)

(*) Tomlinson Professor of Global Governance in Air & Space Law, and Director of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University. A.B.J., J.D., University of Georgia; LL.M., George Washington University; D.C.L., McGill University.

Admitted to the practice of law in Colorado, Georgia, and the District of Columbia. The author would like to thank Professor Caixia Yang of Beihang University for her assistance on interpretation and understanding of Chinese space laws.

1. INTRODUCTION

Through much of the 20th century, space exploration and development was dominated by governments. Increas-ingly, however, private for-profit firms began investing in commercial space development. In its early years, com-mercial activities in outer space were dominated by sat-ellite communications, particularly telephone and televi-sion communications. More recent commercial activities have focused on remote sensing and global positioning. The mining of asteroids and other near- Earth celestial bodies has not yet begun. Space tourism and the transpor-tation of passengers in space are but embryonic.

Global space activity of governments and private com-panies grew to $314 billion in 2013.1 Private-sector com-mercial space activity is growing at a brisk pace, while governmental activity is declining. Between 2012-2013, commercial space products and services revenue grew 7%; commercial infrastructure and support industries grew by nearly 5%; while government spending de-creased by almost 2%.2 Space investment is a major part of the infrastructure of communications – both telecom-munications and broadcast – of weather and geological monitoring, and of defense.3 Thus, commercial develop-ment of outer space is outpacing governmental activi-ties in space. As private firms launch commercial space activities, the legal obligations and liability exposure of space-faring States proliferate as well.

A growing number of States are becoming space-faring nations. Many are enacting national space legislation, establishing governmental space regulatory institutions and giving them jurisdiction to license private actors and ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.4 They promulgate laws regulating space activities in order to fulfill their international obligations, to protect their citi-zens from harm, to protect their treasuries from liability, and to encourage and foster the development of commer-cial space activities.5 Further, with the absence of an in-ternational regulatory regime addressing safety and navi-gation of aerospace vehicles, a growing number of space-faring States see the need to fill that regulatory void with domestic legislation.6 Though a number of commentators

have urged the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] to regulate the safety and navigation of aerospace vehicles, to date, it has declined.7 Moreover, the world community has failed to draft a single multilateral treaty addressing space issues since 1979. That abstinence too inspires the promulgation of domestic space legislation.

The U.N. General Assembly has encouraged States to “consider enacting and implementing national laws au-thorizing and providing for continuing supervision of the activities in outer space of non- governmental enti-ties under their jurisdiction.”8 The rapid emergence of national space legislation is the fastest growing area of Space Law.

2. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Space Law consists of a growing number of international multilateral and bilateral agreements and conventions, U.N. resolutions, decrees by international organizations, national legislation and regulations, and court decisions.9 Five multilateral conventions, drafted in a dozen years, place numerous obligations upon States.10 They require States to adhere to principles of international law, as-sume responsibility and liability for activities in space (whether governmental or non-governmental), authorize and supervise the activities of their nationals in space, and notify and register their space objects.

Among requirements imposed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are the following:

• States must carry on space activities in accordance with principles of international law;11

• States bear international responsibility for national activities in space and on the moon and celestial bod-ies, including activities of both governmental and non-governmental entities;

• States must authorize and supervise the activities of its nationals in space;12

• States that (a) launch, (b) procure the launch, or (c) from whose territory or facility an object is launched, are internationally liable for damage to another State

or its national or juridical persons by such object in the air or in space;13

• States on whose registry an object is launched must retain jurisdiction and control over the object and any personnel thereon;14

• States must avoid harmful contamination and adverse environmental consequences from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter; if it believes an activity or ex-periment by it or its nationals in space would poten-tially harm or interfere with activities of other States in space, it must consult with such States before pro-ceeding;15 and

• States must inform the UN Secretary General of the “nature, conduct, locations and results” of its activi-ties in space.16

Several of these provisions also are elaborated upon by the Liability Convention of 1972.17 Building on Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention imposes liability upon a launching State (i.e., the State that launches, procures the launch, or from whos territory or facility a space object is launched)18 to pay compensa-tion for personal injury and property damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth, or to aircraft.19 The Convention establishes a two-tier liability regime,20 providing that the “launching State” is absolutely liable for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight,21 and liable in negli-gence22 for damage23 caused to a space object of another State or to persons or property on board.24 Where there is more than one launching State, they shall be jointly and severally liable for the damage they cause.25

Hence, by ratifying or acceding to either the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, or the Liability Convention of 1972, the launching or launch-procuring State becomes potential-ly liable for damages caused by itself and its commer-cial launch sector.26 A ratifying State accepts absolute liability for damage on the ground or to aircraft in flight outside its territory when a launch takes place from its territory or facilities, or when it procures a launch from another State.27 A State incurs fault-based liability for damage caused in outer space.28 In addition to these multilateral conventions, additional legal obligations are imposed upon States through customary international law,29 an array of United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions,30 and a growing body of “soft law.”31

Further, the Chicago Convention of 1944 – which estab-lished the International Civil Aviation Administration to harmonize State regulation of aircraft safety and naviga-tion in – may apply to vehicles transporting space objects through air space.32 But to date, ICAO has promulgated

no Standards and Recommended Practices governing aerospace vehicles or rockets, though in time, it may.33

3. STATE REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES

As a consequence of the aforementioned international ob-ligations and the liability exposure created thereby, as well as a desire to protect the health and safety of their citizens, their property and the environment, a growing number of States have promulgated national legislation to regulate commercial space activities. As one source notes, “Since a government can only act on the basis of laws or respec-tive regulations, the establishment of national space laws is the most effective way of providing the State with the means to authorize and supervise non-governmental space activities.”34 At least twenty-six States – about 14% of the members of the United Nations - regulate space activities. Among the States that have enacted national space legisla-tion are Algeria,35 Argentina,36 Australia,37 Austria,38 Bel-gium,39 Brazil,40 Canada,41 Chile,42 the People’s Republic of China [PRC],43 Colombia,44 France,45 Germany,46 Italy,47 Japan,48 Kazakhstan,49 Netherlands,50 Nigeria,51 Norway,52 Russian Federation,53 South Africa,54 the Republic of Ko-rea [South Korea],55 Spain,56 Sweden,57 Ukraine,58 United Kingdom,59 United States,60 and Venezuela.61 Hong Kong also regulates space activities.62

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space [COPUOS] recommends that, “Space ac-tivities should require authorization by a competent na-tional authority; the authorities and procedures, as well as the conditions for granting, modifying, suspending and revoking the authorization should be set out clearly to establish a predictable and reliable regulatory framework ...The conditions for authorization should be consistent with the international obligations and commitments of States, in particular under the United Nations treaties on outer space...”63

Governmental oversight of space activities is essential to protect public safety, property, and the environment, and to fulfill State obligations under international law. Li-censing becomes the bedrock of governmental regulation of commercial space activities.

4. THE LICENSE AS A PREREQUISITE TO SPACE OPERATIONS

A growing number of States require a license as a prereq-uisite to space activity. Many require a permit for each individual launch of a space object, while some require separate licenses for an overseas launch or re-entry. Most


44


NATIONAL LEGISLATION GOVERNING COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES

Paul Stephen Dempsey(*)

(*) Tomlinson Professor of Global Governance in Air & Space Law, and Director of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University. A.B.J., J.D., University of Georgia; LL.M., George Washington University; D.C.L., McGill University.

Admitted to the practice of law in Colorado, Georgia, and the District of Columbia. The author would like to thank Professor Caixia Yang of Beihang University for her assistance on interpretation and understanding of Chinese space laws.

1. INTRODUCTION

Through much of the 20th century, space exploration and development was dominated by governments. Increas-ingly, however, private for-profit firms began investing in commercial space development. In its early years, com-mercial activities in outer space were dominated by sat-ellite communications, particularly telephone and televi-sion communications. More recent commercial activities have focused on remote sensing and global positioning. The mining of asteroids and other near- Earth celestial bodies has not yet begun. Space tourism and the transpor-tation of passengers in space are but embryonic.

Global space activity of governments and private com-panies grew to $314 billion in 2013.1 Private-sector com-mercial space activity is growing at a brisk pace, while governmental activity is declining. Between 2012-2013, commercial space products and services revenue grew 7%; commercial infrastructure and support industries grew by nearly 5%; while government spending de-creased by almost 2%.2 Space investment is a major part of the infrastructure of communications – both telecom-munications and broadcast – of weather and geological monitoring, and of defense.3 Thus, commercial develop-ment of outer space is outpacing governmental activi-ties in space. As private firms launch commercial space activities, the legal obligations and liability exposure of space-faring States proliferate as well.

A growing number of States are becoming space-faring nations. Many are enacting national space legislation, establishing governmental space regulatory institutions and giving them jurisdiction to license private actors and ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.4 They promulgate laws regulating space activities in order to fulfill their international obligations, to protect their citi-zens from harm, to protect their treasuries from liability, and to encourage and foster the development of commer-cial space activities.5 Further, with the absence of an in-ternational regulatory regime addressing safety and navi-gation of aerospace vehicles, a growing number of space-faring States see the need to fill that regulatory void with domestic legislation.6 Though a number of commentators

have urged the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] to regulate the safety and navigation of aerospace vehicles, to date, it has declined.7 Moreover, the world community has failed to draft a single multilateral treaty addressing space issues since 1979. That abstinence too inspires the promulgation of domestic space legislation.

The U.N. General Assembly has encouraged States to “consider enacting and implementing national laws au-thorizing and providing for continuing supervision of the activities in outer space of non- governmental enti-ties under their jurisdiction.”8 The rapid emergence of national space legislation is the fastest growing area of Space Law.

2. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Space Law consists of a growing number of international multilateral and bilateral agreements and conventions, U.N. resolutions, decrees by international organizations, national legislation and regulations, and court decisions.9 Five multilateral conventions, drafted in a dozen years, place numerous obligations upon States.10 They require States to adhere to principles of international law, as-sume responsibility and liability for activities in space (whether governmental or non-governmental), authorize and supervise the activities of their nationals in space, and notify and register their space objects.

Among requirements imposed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are the following:

• States must carry on space activities in accordance with principles of international law;11

• States bear international responsibility for national activities in space and on the moon and celestial bod-ies, including activities of both governmental and non-governmental entities;

• States must authorize and supervise the activities of its nationals in space;12

• States that (a) launch, (b) procure the launch, or (c) from whose territory or facility an object is launched, are internationally liable for damage to another State

or its national or juridical persons by such object in the air or in space;13

• States on whose registry an object is launched must retain jurisdiction and control over the object and any personnel thereon;14

• States must avoid harmful contamination and adverse environmental consequences from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter; if it believes an activity or ex-periment by it or its nationals in space would poten-tially harm or interfere with activities of other States in space, it must consult with such States before pro-ceeding;15 and

• States must inform the UN Secretary General of the “nature, conduct, locations and results” of its activi-ties in space.16

Several of these provisions also are elaborated upon by the Liability Convention of 1972.17 Building on Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention imposes liability upon a launching State (i.e., the State that launches, procures the launch, or from whos territory or facility a space object is launched)18 to pay compensa-tion for personal injury and property damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth, or to aircraft.19 The Convention establishes a two-tier liability regime,20 providing that the “launching State” is absolutely liable for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight,21 and liable in negli-gence22 for damage23 caused to a space object of another State or to persons or property on board.24 Where there is more than one launching State, they shall be jointly and severally liable for the damage they cause.25

Hence, by ratifying or acceding to either the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, or the Liability Convention of 1972, the launching or launch-procuring State becomes potential-ly liable for damages caused by itself and its commer-cial launch sector.26 A ratifying State accepts absolute liability for damage on the ground or to aircraft in flight outside its territory when a launch takes place from its territory or facilities, or when it procures a launch from another State.27 A State incurs fault-based liability for damage caused in outer space.28 In addition to these multilateral conventions, additional legal obligations are imposed upon States through customary international law,29 an array of United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions,30 and a growing body of “soft law.”31

Further, the Chicago Convention of 1944 – which estab-lished the International Civil Aviation Administration to harmonize State regulation of aircraft safety and naviga-tion in – may apply to vehicles transporting space objects through air space.32 But to date, ICAO has promulgated

no Standards and Recommended Practices governing aerospace vehicles or rockets, though in time, it may.33

3. STATE REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES

As a consequence of the aforementioned international ob-ligations and the liability exposure created thereby, as well as a desire to protect the health and safety of their citizens, their property and the environment, a growing number of States have promulgated national legislation to regulate commercial space activities. As one source notes, “Since a government can only act on the basis of laws or respec-tive regulations, the establishment of national space laws is the most effective way of providing the State with the means to authorize and supervise non-governmental space activities.”34 At least twenty-six States – about 14% of the members of the United Nations - regulate space activities. Among the States that have enacted national space legisla-tion are Algeria,35 Argentina,36 Australia,37 Austria,38 Bel-gium,39 Brazil,40 Canada,41 Chile,42 the People’s Republic of China [PRC],43 Colombia,44 France,45 Germany,46 Italy,47 Japan,48 Kazakhstan,49 Netherlands,50 Nigeria,51 Norway,52 Russian Federation,53 South Africa,54 the Republic of Ko-rea [South Korea],55 Spain,56 Sweden,57 Ukraine,58 United Kingdom,59 United States,60 and Venezuela.61 Hong Kong also regulates space activities.62

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space [COPUOS] recommends that, “Space ac-tivities should require authorization by a competent na-tional authority; the authorities and procedures, as well as the conditions for granting, modifying, suspending and revoking the authorization should be set out clearly to establish a predictable and reliable regulatory framework ...The conditions for authorization should be consistent with the international obligations and commitments of States, in particular under the United Nations treaties on outer space...”63

Governmental oversight of space activities is essential to protect public safety, property, and the environment, and to fulfill State obligations under international law. Li-censing becomes the bedrock of governmental regulation of commercial space activities.

4. THE LICENSE AS A PREREQUISITE TO SPACE OPERATIONS

A growing number of States require a license as a prereq-uisite to space activity. Many require a permit for each individual launch of a space object, while some require separate licenses for an overseas launch or re-entry. Most


45


States that have enacted national Space Law legislation require a license for a launch from their territory, or by their citizens from any location. Some States also regu-late launch facilities (a/k/a spaceports).64 Several exam-ples follow.

Brazil regulates launches from its territory.65 Kazakhstan also requires a license prior to carrying out space activi-ties.66 Australia imposes a requirement that an applicant procure a space license, launch permit or overseas launch certificate prior to operations.67 France requires a license of a French national or juridical persons headquartered in France who intend to launch or procure a launch of a space object from French territory.68

In Belgium a natural or legal person must obtain prior authorization to engage in space activities in zones under the jurisdiction or control of the State, or using installa-tions or property of the State, or from an area under the jurisdiction or control of Belgium.69 The Netherlands re-quires licensing for launching, flight operations or guid-ance of space objects performed in or from Dutch soil or a Dutch ship.70

In Korea, a person who seeks to launch a space vehicle must first obtain a license from the Ministry of Science and Technology.71 In issuing the license, the Minister must consider the purpose of the launch, the safety management of the vehicles, and the existence of liability insurance.72

Hong Kong requires a license for an entity seeking to launch, procure a launch, to operate a space object, or engage in any activity in space. The operations must not jeopardize public health or safety of persons or property. Activities must be conducted consistently with interna-tional obligations, and not impair national security.73

Norway promulgated a succinct piece of space legisla-tion.74 No Norwegian citizen or resident may launch a space object without permission, whether the launch takes place from Norway, from Norwegian territory, ves-sels or aircraft, or in areas not subject to sovereignty.75

South Africa requires a license for a launch from South African territory, or on behalf of South African incor-porated or registered company, or for the operation of a launch facility.76 The legislation imposes safety stan-dards, and requires compliance with international obliga-tions and responsibilities.77

In Sweden, no space activity is permitted on Swedish territory or by a Swedish person without a license.78 An application in writing must be submitted to the National Board for Space Activities (now the Swedish National Space Board). The license may be restricted in a manner

deemed appropriate.79 However, the legislation does not specify the formal procedures, nor does it explain how the public interest, security, public health or environment are to be protected.80

In the United Kingdom, a launch, operation of a space activity, or any activity in outer space (other than leasing a space segment satellite capacity, transponders) requires a license. Such activity may not jeopardize public health or safety of persons or property, and must be conducted in a manner consistent with international obligations. It may not impair national security. 81

In the United States, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 [CSLA]82 authorized the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration [FAA] to license the launch of launch vehi-cles, reentry of reentry vehicles, as well as the operation of a launch or reentry site.83 The U.S. licenses launches for commercial space flights, without safety certifications of vehicles.84 A U.S. citizen must obtain FAA authoriza-tion to launch, reenter or operate a launch or reentry site anywhere in the world.85 Any person seeking to conduct commercial space transportation in the U.S. must also obtain FAA authorization.86 Such licenses are issued by the FAA‟s Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation [AST], who prescribes the terms and conditions for conducting authorized activity by the vehicle or site operator.87 Regulatory review of a launch application focuses on public health and safety, safety of property, and U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns and obligations.88 Unless the launch and reentry is exempt from regulation,89 the applicant may apply for: (1) a launch- or reentry-specific license; or (2) a launch or reentry operator license.90 The FAA has 180 days to process a license application.91 The licensing process consists of several steps:

• Pre-application consultation;• Policy review and approval;• Safety review and approval;• Payload review and determination;• Financial responsibility determination;• Environmental review; and• Compliance monitoring.92

In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric Administration [NOAA] issues regulations for the licensing, monitoring and compliance of operators of pri-vate Earth remote sensing space systems.93 Similarly, Ger-many requires licensing of high-grade Earth remote sens-ing systems, and providers of such remote sensing data.94

Some States impose de minimus requirements. For ex-ample, Argentina requires that those engaging in space activities register with the government.95

5. TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANTS

Many States that license space activities evaluate the technical and financial fitness of the applicant and its fa-cilities to ensure that they do not endanger public health, safety and property or impose economic burdens on the national treasury. These requirements are similar to the managerial and financial fitness certification require-ments imposed upon airlines.96 Several examples follow.

Australia has promulgated an elaborate and detailed licensing statute.97 It requires that the launch facility, launch vehicle, and flight path be effective and safe. Ap-plicants must submit design and engineering plans of the launch vehicle. Applicants must identify their organiza-tional structure and financial fitness, their program man-agement plan, their technology security plan, and their emergency plan.

Brazil requires a license to engage in commercial Space Launching Activities from Brazilian territory.98 The li-cense may contain restrictive or conditioning clauses. Activities of the licensee are controlled, monitored and supervised by the Brazilian Space Agency [AEB]. Tech-nical, economic and financial qualifications are imposed upon licensees.99 In Brazil, “A license will only be grant-ed to legal persons, associated or affiliated with business or legal representation in the country, with express pow-ers to respond administratively or judicially and consid-ered technically and administratively qualified to perform launching activities. Granting, monitoring, and control of the permit for a commercial space launch from Brazilian territory is performed by the Brazilian Space Agency.100

In Korea, an applicant may be disqualified if he is deemed incompetent or quasi-incompetent, bankrupt, if he served a prison sentence in the prior two years, or been on probation for violating the Act.101 France assesses the applicant‟s technical, moral, financial and professional capabilities before issuing a license.102

In the Netherlands, eligibility for a license depends on the applicant‟s knowledge and experience, and his au-thorization for the use of radio frequency.103 An appli-cant must submit detailed information identifying the space activities planned, a financial risk analysis, li-ability insurance, authorization of radio frequency, and the applicant‟s knowledge and experience with regard to performance of space activities.104 An application for a license must be denied if necessary for protection of safety of persons or property, protection of the environ-ment, protection of public order, security of the State, or fulfillment of international obligations of the State.105 An application may be denied if a previously issued license

has been revoked, the applicant has not discharged his obligations under a license, if he fails to comply with the rules established governing space activities, or there is good reason to suspect that the applicant will not follow those rules.106

In The Russian Federation, the Russian Space Agency is-sues licenses for space operations.107 To obtain a license, the applicant must submit an application indicating the applicant‟s name, organizational and legal form, address, and banking information, the type of activity proposed, the duration of the license, a copy of constitutive docu-ments, the state registration of the legal entity, tax agency certification, payment of filing fees, a license for using radio frequencies, registration of the satellite, safety of space operations and reliability of space equipment, and a State Secrecy license.108 A decision to grant or deny a license must be made within 30 days of receipt of the application and supporting documentation.109 An applica-tion may be denied for false information or misrepresen-tation in documents filed by the applicant, or an adverse decision by the “expert commission.”110 This expert eval-uation is conducted by science organizations or indepen-dent experts on a contractual basis.111

6. LIABILITY, INSURANCE & INDEMNIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Professor Steven Freeland notes that the imposition of joint and several liability is among the reasons that many States have enacted national space laws to allow them to reduce their liability by imposing financial responsi-bility to private launching companies.112 Typically, stat-utes require that the licensee carry adequate insurance to cover death, injury or property damage, and indemnify the State should it have to pay damages. In order to pro-mote commercial development of space, some States cap liability, in effect backing such development with the fi-nancial resources of the national treasury.113

For example, in Korea, A person who launches is liable for any damages caused, and must carry sufficient insur-ance to cover that liability as prescribed by the Ministry of Science and Technology. 114 The launching party must pay compensation for damage caused by launch activi-ties, except in case of armed conflict, hostile activity, civil war or rebellion, in which case he shall only be li-able for damage caused by his willful misconduct or neg-ligence.115 One who procures a launch permit must insure against third party liability.116 However, the amount of liability is limited to 200 billion won.117 Austria is more generous still. In Austria, insurance requirements may be waived if the space activity is deemed to be in the public interest (i.e., if it advances the interests of science, educa-tion or research).118


46


States that have enacted national Space Law legislation require a license for a launch from their territory, or by their citizens from any location. Some States also regu-late launch facilities (a/k/a spaceports).64 Several exam-ples follow.

Brazil regulates launches from its territory.65 Kazakhstan also requires a license prior to carrying out space activi-ties.66 Australia imposes a requirement that an applicant procure a space license, launch permit or overseas launch certificate prior to operations.67 France requires a license of a French national or juridical persons headquartered in France who intend to launch or procure a launch of a space object from French territory.68

In Belgium a natural or legal person must obtain prior authorization to engage in space activities in zones under the jurisdiction or control of the State, or using installa-tions or property of the State, or from an area under the jurisdiction or control of Belgium.69 The Netherlands re-quires licensing for launching, flight operations or guid-ance of space objects performed in or from Dutch soil or a Dutch ship.70

In Korea, a person who seeks to launch a space vehicle must first obtain a license from the Ministry of Science and Technology.71 In issuing the license, the Minister must consider the purpose of the launch, the safety management of the vehicles, and the existence of liability insurance.72

Hong Kong requires a license for an entity seeking to launch, procure a launch, to operate a space object, or engage in any activity in space. The operations must not jeopardize public health or safety of persons or property. Activities must be conducted consistently with interna-tional obligations, and not impair national security.73

Norway promulgated a succinct piece of space legisla-tion.74 No Norwegian citizen or resident may launch a space object without permission, whether the launch takes place from Norway, from Norwegian territory, ves-sels or aircraft, or in areas not subject to sovereignty.75

South Africa requires a license for a launch from South African territory, or on behalf of South African incor-porated or registered company, or for the operation of a launch facility.76 The legislation imposes safety stan-dards, and requires compliance with international obliga-tions and responsibilities.77

In Sweden, no space activity is permitted on Swedish territory or by a Swedish person without a license.78 An application in writing must be submitted to the National Board for Space Activities (now the Swedish National Space Board). The license may be restricted in a manner

deemed appropriate.79 However, the legislation does not specify the formal procedures, nor does it explain how the public interest, security, public health or environment are to be protected.80

In the United Kingdom, a launch, operation of a space activity, or any activity in outer space (other than leasing a space segment satellite capacity, transponders) requires a license. Such activity may not jeopardize public health or safety of persons or property, and must be conducted in a manner consistent with international obligations. It may not impair national security. 81

In the United States, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 [CSLA]82 authorized the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration [FAA] to license the launch of launch vehi-cles, reentry of reentry vehicles, as well as the operation of a launch or reentry site.83 The U.S. licenses launches for commercial space flights, without safety certifications of vehicles.84 A U.S. citizen must obtain FAA authoriza-tion to launch, reenter or operate a launch or reentry site anywhere in the world.85 Any person seeking to conduct commercial space transportation in the U.S. must also obtain FAA authorization.86 Such licenses are issued by the FAA‟s Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation [AST], who prescribes the terms and conditions for conducting authorized activity by the vehicle or site operator.87 Regulatory review of a launch application focuses on public health and safety, safety of property, and U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns and obligations.88 Unless the launch and reentry is exempt from regulation,89 the applicant may apply for: (1) a launch- or reentry-specific license; or (2) a launch or reentry operator license.90 The FAA has 180 days to process a license application.91 The licensing process consists of several steps:

• Pre-application consultation;• Policy review and approval;• Safety review and approval;• Payload review and determination;• Financial responsibility determination;• Environmental review; and• Compliance monitoring.92

In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric Administration [NOAA] issues regulations for the licensing, monitoring and compliance of operators of pri-vate Earth remote sensing space systems.93 Similarly, Ger-many requires licensing of high-grade Earth remote sens-ing systems, and providers of such remote sensing data.94

Some States impose de minimus requirements. For ex-ample, Argentina requires that those engaging in space activities register with the government.95

5. TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANTS

Many States that license space activities evaluate the technical and financial fitness of the applicant and its fa-cilities to ensure that they do not endanger public health, safety and property or impose economic burdens on the national treasury. These requirements are similar to the managerial and financial fitness certification require-ments imposed upon airlines.96 Several examples follow.

Australia has promulgated an elaborate and detailed licensing statute.97 It requires that the launch facility, launch vehicle, and flight path be effective and safe. Ap-plicants must submit design and engineering plans of the launch vehicle. Applicants must identify their organiza-tional structure and financial fitness, their program man-agement plan, their technology security plan, and their emergency plan.

Brazil requires a license to engage in commercial Space Launching Activities from Brazilian territory.98 The li-cense may contain restrictive or conditioning clauses. Activities of the licensee are controlled, monitored and supervised by the Brazilian Space Agency [AEB]. Tech-nical, economic and financial qualifications are imposed upon licensees.99 In Brazil, “A license will only be grant-ed to legal persons, associated or affiliated with business or legal representation in the country, with express pow-ers to respond administratively or judicially and consid-ered technically and administratively qualified to perform launching activities. Granting, monitoring, and control of the permit for a commercial space launch from Brazilian territory is performed by the Brazilian Space Agency.100

In Korea, an applicant may be disqualified if he is deemed incompetent or quasi-incompetent, bankrupt, if he served a prison sentence in the prior two years, or been on probation for violating the Act.101 France assesses the applicant‟s technical, moral, financial and professional capabilities before issuing a license.102

In the Netherlands, eligibility for a license depends on the applicant‟s knowledge and experience, and his au-thorization for the use of radio frequency.103 An appli-cant must submit detailed information identifying the space activities planned, a financial risk analysis, li-ability insurance, authorization of radio frequency, and the applicant‟s knowledge and experience with regard to performance of space activities.104 An application for a license must be denied if necessary for protection of safety of persons or property, protection of the environ-ment, protection of public order, security of the State, or fulfillment of international obligations of the State.105 An application may be denied if a previously issued license

has been revoked, the applicant has not discharged his obligations under a license, if he fails to comply with the rules established governing space activities, or there is good reason to suspect that the applicant will not follow those rules.106

In The Russian Federation, the Russian Space Agency is-sues licenses for space operations.107 To obtain a license, the applicant must submit an application indicating the applicant‟s name, organizational and legal form, address, and banking information, the type of activity proposed, the duration of the license, a copy of constitutive docu-ments, the state registration of the legal entity, tax agency certification, payment of filing fees, a license for using radio frequencies, registration of the satellite, safety of space operations and reliability of space equipment, and a State Secrecy license.108 A decision to grant or deny a license must be made within 30 days of receipt of the application and supporting documentation.109 An applica-tion may be denied for false information or misrepresen-tation in documents filed by the applicant, or an adverse decision by the “expert commission.”110 This expert eval-uation is conducted by science organizations or indepen-dent experts on a contractual basis.111

6. LIABILITY, INSURANCE & INDEMNIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Professor Steven Freeland notes that the imposition of joint and several liability is among the reasons that many States have enacted national space laws to allow them to reduce their liability by imposing financial responsi-bility to private launching companies.112 Typically, stat-utes require that the licensee carry adequate insurance to cover death, injury or property damage, and indemnify the State should it have to pay damages. In order to pro-mote commercial development of space, some States cap liability, in effect backing such development with the fi-nancial resources of the national treasury.113

For example, in Korea, A person who launches is liable for any damages caused, and must carry sufficient insur-ance to cover that liability as prescribed by the Ministry of Science and Technology. 114 The launching party must pay compensation for damage caused by launch activi-ties, except in case of armed conflict, hostile activity, civil war or rebellion, in which case he shall only be li-able for damage caused by his willful misconduct or neg-ligence.115 One who procures a launch permit must insure against third party liability.116 However, the amount of liability is limited to 200 billion won.117 Austria is more generous still. In Austria, insurance requirements may be waived if the space activity is deemed to be in the public interest (i.e., if it advances the interests of science, educa-tion or research).118


47


Australia also imposes insurance and financial require-ments upon licensees.119 In China, a licensee must carry insurance against liability.120 Similarly, Hong Kong re-quires that the licensee insure himself against liability,121 and indemnify the Hong Kong and PRC governments against claims bought either.122

In the Netherlands, the licensee must maintain “the max-imum possible cover for the liability arising from the space activities for which a license is requested”, with account taken of what can reasonably covered by insur-ance.123 Some States, such as Kazakhstan, impose gen-eral indemnification requirements for damage caused by space activities.124

7. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Several States use the licensing process to address con-cerns about environmental contamination of outer space or the Earth. Austria places particular emphasis on space debris mitigation in its licensing process. It insists upon compliance with the “state of the art” and “internation-ally recognized guidelines for the mitigation of space debris”.125 Similarly, the Government of Hong Kong requires that licensees prevent contamination of outer space, and avoid interference with others in the peace-ful use of space.126 In Belgium, environmental studies are required as a prerequisite to licensing.127

8. OTHER CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON LICENSES

Several States authorize their regulatory agencies to im-pose restrictions upon licenses. For example, in the Neth-erlands, regulations and restrictions may be imposed for the following purposes:

a. the safety of persons and goods;b. protection of the environment in outer space;c. financial security;d. protection of public order;e. security of the State;f. fulfillment of the international obligations of the

State.128

In the Peoples Republic of China, an applicant for a li-cense for the launch of civil space objects is required to abide by its laws, to not endanger public health or safety,129 to not endanger national security, damage the national interests, or violate the national diplomatic poli-cies or the international conventions which China has ratified.130

In France, restrictions on the license may be imposed to protect the safety of people and property, as well as the protection of public health and the environment.131 In the United Kingdom, the license may include conditions permitting inspection by the regulator.132 In Australia, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are prohibited, and no fissionable material may be launched without prior approval.133

9. LICENSE DURATION

Most States that regulate commercial space activities re-quire a license for each individual launch.However, several issue licenses for longer periods of time.

For example, in Australia, one may receive a launch per-mit or exemption certificate for launch and return, and a space license for up to 20 years. 134 In Russia, licenses are valid for not less than three years.135 They are valid only for the type of space operations specified, and may not be transferred to another.136 In the Netherlands, a time limit may be imposed within which the licensee must begin the proposed space activities.137

10. PRE-LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS

Several States impose additional obligations upon licens-ees prior to launch. For example, in Australia, licensees must receive approval from local ambulance, fire, and police authorities prior to launching. Environmental ap-provals also are required. Launches must not be conduct-ed in a way likely to cause harm to public health or safety or damage to property. 138

In China, nine months prior to the scheduled launch, the applicant must submit relevant legal and technical docu-ments to the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense [COSTIND],139 including proof that the project complies with national environmen-tal laws and regulations, the safety design report relevant to the project and information related to public safety, supplementary information concerning the reliability of Safety Critical Systems, and the prevention from pollu-tion and space debris.140

11. OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to reduce the likelihood of personal, property or environmental damage, a number of States impose op-erational restrictions on the launch of space objects. For example:

In Australia, no launch is allowed that might create a haz-ard to aircraft, person or property; no launch is permitted into a prohibited area or restricted area; no launch is al-lowed higher than 400 feet in controlled airspace except in an approved area or in accordance with air traffic con-trol clearance; and no launch is permitted within three nautical miles of an aerodrome.141 The operator must demonstrate that the launch will impose the lowest prac-ticable risk within the bounds of reasonable cost.142

In Hong Kong, no contamination of space is permitted, nor is interference with others; and the disposal of pay-load on termination of activities is required.143

Ireland has promulgated legislation providing that a rocket may not be operated without a license.144 Seven days prior to launch, the Operating Standards Depart-ment of the Irish Aviation Authority must be informed of the identity of the persons responsible for the operation, the number, size and weight of each rocket, the altitude at which it will be operated, the location, date and time of the operation.145 In Ireland, rocket launches are pro-hibited if they create a potential collision hazard with an aircraft, operation in controlled space, within eight kilo-meters of an airport, at an altitude where horizontal vis-ibility is less than eight kilometers, into a cloud, within 300 meters of any person or property not involved in the operation of the rocket, or at night.146

12. REGISTRATION

So as to comply with their international obligations under the Registration Convention, several States require that all space objects launched by its corporate or individual citizens be registered.Argentina, Australia, Belgium, the Peoples Republic of China, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Spain, Swe-den, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States are among them.147

For example Belgium created a National Register in ac-cordance with the Registration Convention.148 Argentina enacted a novel provision requiring that the operator pro-vide information on environmental precautions taken, in-cluding mechanisms for placement of the space object in a transfer orbit at the end of its useful life, the anticipated date of its recovery, disintegration or loss of contact.149

13. ENFORCEMENT & SANCTIONS

To give their regulatory oversight teeth, many States impose enforcement mechanisms in their national space

legislation. License suspension or revocation, as well as fines and imprisonment, are important regulatory means to ensure compliance.

Suspension & Revocation

In Australia, a licensee may have its license suspended or revoked if it contravenes a license condition, endan-gers national security, or violates foreign policy or in-ternational obligations.150 In Belgium, a license may be suspended or revoked for failure to respect the conditions imposed upon the license, or an infringement of law, of public order, or the safety of people or property by the licensee.151

In China, The COSTIND may revoke the license in a se-rious situation if the licensee:

(a) violates the relevant national laws or regulations or the agreement between China and other states on maintaining confidentiality during execution of the project;

(b) conducts any actions endangering national secu-rity, damaging national interests or violating na-tional diplomatic policies during execution of the project;

(c) carries out the launch activities beyond the limit approved by the license; or

(d) conducts other actions in violation of the present measures.152

Also in China, the licensee may also be subject to admin-istrative penalties if he conceals the truth, practices fraud or injures the national interest in its application or during the execution of the project.153

In Korea, a license may be suspended on grounds that the licensee is incompetent, in bankruptcy or in violation of legislation, has delayed a launch for more than a year without cause, has obtained a license by false means, has caused threats to national security, or has jeopardized safety.154 A launch license may be revoked for delaying the launch more than a year, obtaining the license via false means, a threat to national security, safety deficien-cies (e.g., “fuel leakage or defects in the communication systems”), or failing to secure license amendment for changes in the launch.155

In the Netherlands, license revocation is required if re-quested by the license-holder, it is necessary to comply with an international obligation, or there is good reason to believe the licensee will jeopardize safety, environ-mental protection or the maintenance of public order and national security. The license may be revoked if the rules


48


Australia also imposes insurance and financial require-ments upon licensees.119 In China, a licensee must carry insurance against liability.120 Similarly, Hong Kong re-quires that the licensee insure himself against liability,121 and indemnify the Hong Kong and PRC governments against claims bought either.122

In the Netherlands, the licensee must maintain “the max-imum possible cover for the liability arising from the space activities for which a license is requested”, with account taken of what can reasonably covered by insur-ance.123 Some States, such as Kazakhstan, impose gen-eral indemnification requirements for damage caused by space activities.124

7. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Several States use the licensing process to address con-cerns about environmental contamination of outer space or the Earth. Austria places particular emphasis on space debris mitigation in its licensing process. It insists upon compliance with the “state of the art” and “internation-ally recognized guidelines for the mitigation of space debris”.125 Similarly, the Government of Hong Kong requires that licensees prevent contamination of outer space, and avoid interference with others in the peace-ful use of space.126 In Belgium, environmental studies are required as a prerequisite to licensing.127

8. OTHER CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON LICENSES

Several States authorize their regulatory agencies to im-pose restrictions upon licenses. For example, in the Neth-erlands, regulations and restrictions may be imposed for the following purposes:

a. the safety of persons and goods;b. protection of the environment in outer space;c. financial security;d. protection of public order;e. security of the State;f. fulfillment of the international obligations of the

State.128

In the Peoples Republic of China, an applicant for a li-cense for the launch of civil space objects is required to abide by its laws, to not endanger public health or safety,129 to not endanger national security, damage the national interests, or violate the national diplomatic poli-cies or the international conventions which China has ratified.130

In France, restrictions on the license may be imposed to protect the safety of people and property, as well as the protection of public health and the environment.131 In the United Kingdom, the license may include conditions permitting inspection by the regulator.132 In Australia, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are prohibited, and no fissionable material may be launched without prior approval.133

9. LICENSE DURATION

Most States that regulate commercial space activities re-quire a license for each individual launch.However, several issue licenses for longer periods of time.

For example, in Australia, one may receive a launch per-mit or exemption certificate for launch and return, and a space license for up to 20 years. 134 In Russia, licenses are valid for not less than three years.135 They are valid only for the type of space operations specified, and may not be transferred to another.136 In the Netherlands, a time limit may be imposed within which the licensee must begin the proposed space activities.137

10. PRE-LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS

Several States impose additional obligations upon licens-ees prior to launch. For example, in Australia, licensees must receive approval from local ambulance, fire, and police authorities prior to launching. Environmental ap-provals also are required. Launches must not be conduct-ed in a way likely to cause harm to public health or safety or damage to property. 138

In China, nine months prior to the scheduled launch, the applicant must submit relevant legal and technical docu-ments to the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense [COSTIND],139 including proof that the project complies with national environmen-tal laws and regulations, the safety design report relevant to the project and information related to public safety, supplementary information concerning the reliability of Safety Critical Systems, and the prevention from pollu-tion and space debris.140

11. OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to reduce the likelihood of personal, property or environmental damage, a number of States impose op-erational restrictions on the launch of space objects. For example:

In Australia, no launch is allowed that might create a haz-ard to aircraft, person or property; no launch is permitted into a prohibited area or restricted area; no launch is al-lowed higher than 400 feet in controlled airspace except in an approved area or in accordance with air traffic con-trol clearance; and no launch is permitted within three nautical miles of an aerodrome.141 The operator must demonstrate that the launch will impose the lowest prac-ticable risk within the bounds of reasonable cost.142

In Hong Kong, no contamination of space is permitted, nor is interference with others; and the disposal of pay-load on termination of activities is required.143

Ireland has promulgated legislation providing that a rocket may not be operated without a license.144 Seven days prior to launch, the Operating Standards Depart-ment of the Irish Aviation Authority must be informed of the identity of the persons responsible for the operation, the number, size and weight of each rocket, the altitude at which it will be operated, the location, date and time of the operation.145 In Ireland, rocket launches are pro-hibited if they create a potential collision hazard with an aircraft, operation in controlled space, within eight kilo-meters of an airport, at an altitude where horizontal vis-ibility is less than eight kilometers, into a cloud, within 300 meters of any person or property not involved in the operation of the rocket, or at night.146

12. REGISTRATION

So as to comply with their international obligations under the Registration Convention, several States require that all space objects launched by its corporate or individual citizens be registered.Argentina, Australia, Belgium, the Peoples Republic of China, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Spain, Swe-den, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States are among them.147

For example Belgium created a National Register in ac-cordance with the Registration Convention.148 Argentina enacted a novel provision requiring that the operator pro-vide information on environmental precautions taken, in-cluding mechanisms for placement of the space object in a transfer orbit at the end of its useful life, the anticipated date of its recovery, disintegration or loss of contact.149

13. ENFORCEMENT & SANCTIONS

To give their regulatory oversight teeth, many States impose enforcement mechanisms in their national space

legislation. License suspension or revocation, as well as fines and imprisonment, are important regulatory means to ensure compliance.

Suspension & Revocation

In Australia, a licensee may have its license suspended or revoked if it contravenes a license condition, endan-gers national security, or violates foreign policy or in-ternational obligations.150 In Belgium, a license may be suspended or revoked for failure to respect the conditions imposed upon the license, or an infringement of law, of public order, or the safety of people or property by the licensee.151

In China, The COSTIND may revoke the license in a se-rious situation if the licensee:

(a) violates the relevant national laws or regulations or the agreement between China and other states on maintaining confidentiality during execution of the project;

(b) conducts any actions endangering national secu-rity, damaging national interests or violating na-tional diplomatic policies during execution of the project;

(c) carries out the launch activities beyond the limit approved by the license; or

(d) conducts other actions in violation of the present measures.152

Also in China, the licensee may also be subject to admin-istrative penalties if he conceals the truth, practices fraud or injures the national interest in its application or during the execution of the project.153

In Korea, a license may be suspended on grounds that the licensee is incompetent, in bankruptcy or in violation of legislation, has delayed a launch for more than a year without cause, has obtained a license by false means, has caused threats to national security, or has jeopardized safety.154 A launch license may be revoked for delaying the launch more than a year, obtaining the license via false means, a threat to national security, safety deficien-cies (e.g., “fuel leakage or defects in the communication systems”), or failing to secure license amendment for changes in the launch.155

In the Netherlands, license revocation is required if re-quested by the license-holder, it is necessary to comply with an international obligation, or there is good reason to believe the licensee will jeopardize safety, environ-mental protection or the maintenance of public order and national security. The license may be revoked if the rules


49


of the Act or conditions imposed upon the license have been or are being violated, the space activities have not been commenced within the prescribed time period, the purpose of the space activities for which the license was issued have significantly changed, the technical or finan-cial capabilities of the licensee has changed, the informa-tion or documents provided with the application are so incorrect or incomplete that a different decision would have been made if the facts had been known at the time of license issuance, or it is necessary to protect safety, the environment, financial security, public order, State secu-rity or fulfillment of international obligations.156

In Russia, a failure to comply with instructions or orders, the discovery of the filing of false data, the dissolution of the legal entity of the licensee, or the violation of license conditions may result in license suspension or revoca-tion.157 Such suspension or annulment may be imposed on a three day notice.158 Decisions of the Russian Space Agency are subject to appeal.159

South Africa may amend, suspend or revoke a license if any condition was violated, or if the operations pose an unacceptable safety risk.160 In Sweden, the license may be withdrawn if license conditions are disregarded.161 In the United Kingdom, a license may be suspended or revoked if a condition imposed thereon is not complied with, or such action is required for public health, or na-tional security, or in order to comply with international obligations. 162

Fines and Imprisonment

In Korea, one who launches without a license may be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment, and face fines up to 50 million won. One who fails to comply with an interruption order may serve up to three years in prison and be fined up to 30 million won.163 Fines of up to 10 million won may be imposed for failure to reg-ister the space object, or failure to report changes in the launch different from the license. Fines of up to 5 million won may be imposed on the license for failure to report information different than that in the license application, one who “denies, interferes or evades investigation of an accident.164 One who objects to the imposition of a fine upon him may appeal within 30 days, and the penalty will be reviewed by a court.165

Japan may impose a fine not to exceed ¥200,000 for fail-ing to file a report or filing a false report,166 failure to ob-tain required authorization or approval from the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, failure to register, conducting unauthorized activities, or launching satellites without required insurance.167

In France, the administrative authority may at any time give instructions or require any measures deemed neces-sary to protect the safety of persons or property, or to protect the public health or the environment. Fines of up to €200,000 may be imposed for launching a space object without authorization.168

In the Netherlands, administrative penalties for failure to possess a license and launch a space object or endanger-ment of safety or the environment may be imposed of up to €450,000, or 10% of the relevant annual sales in the Netherlands. Failure to register a space object or fol-low rules related thereto may result in an administrative penalty of up to €100,000. In Sweden, violations of the national Space Laws may result in imprisonment of up to one year.169

14. CONCLUSION

Cognizant of their international legal obligations and li-ability exposure, and mindful of the need to protect life, property and the environment, at least 26 States have promulgated national space legislation and imposed reg-ulatory requirements upon commercial space activities. Professor Stephan Hobe observes, “By virtue of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, states are obligated to au-thorize and to continuously supervise their national space activities. This obligation can best be complied with by enacting national space legislation, preferably with a li-censing regime for private activities in outer space, in-cluding certification of space vehicles.”170 At the same time, many States are promulgating regulations to facili-tate and incentivize commercial use of space, including requiring State payloads to be placed in orbit by com-mercial rockets, and imposing limits on liability of non-governmental organizations.171

As we have seen, to enhance safety, many national space laws focus on common issues through the vehicle of li-censing – the technical and financial qualifications of ap-plicants, liability and indemnification, environmental is-sues, operational restrictions, sanctions and enforcement. Although a growing number of States are promulgating national Space Law legislation, and although, many such laws focus on common issues, there is little harmoniza-tion between the approaches taken to licensing and regu-lation. Some States (e.g., Australia and the United States) have enacted comprehensive and elaborate regulatory statutes, while others (e.g., Ireland and Norway) have promulgated rather terse laws. Many more (e.g., India and Switzerland) have yet to enact any legislation at all on the subject.

Three and a half decades have elapsed since the last inter-national multilateral Space Law convention was drafted. Given the dearth of international regulation of aerospace safety and navigation,172 States would be well advised to establish regulatory institutions to oversee space activi-ties in order to protect their environment, ensure safety, protect their citizens and persons and their territory and property from environmental damage or injury, and cov-er the costs of catastrophic loss when it occurs. National space laws are an important means of achieving those public policies. At minimum, States should promulgate domestic space laws establishing a regulatory agency with jurisdiction over licensing and enforcement, as well as addressing liability insurance and damage reimburse-ment. Further, so as to encourage commercial develop-ment of space, the regulatory burden and liability risk exposure should not be onerous. During the embryonic and developmental period of commercial space activity, liability should be capped.173 Moreover, States should at-tempt to harmonize their laws with other States, so that global uniformity might be enhanced, and flag-of-con-venience type forum shopping discouraged. It would be shameful if commercial space activities were attracted to the jurisdictions with the lowest taxes, and lowest cost regulatory structure, at the expense of safety and envi-ronmental harm.174

Eventually, one would hope, the growth in domestic reg-ulation might influence development of international law, and motivate the international community to come to-gether and establish harmonized regulatory standards,175 as it has done in the field of aviation safety and naviga-tion with the promulgation of the Chicago Convention of 1944.176

15. REFERENCES

[1] Space Foundation, The Space Report 2014: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity (2014).

[2] Id. http://www.spacefoundation.org/media/press-releases/space-foundations-2014-report-reveals-continued-growth-global-space-economy

[3] In its early years, commercial development of space was dominated by satellite communications, particularly telephone and television communi-cations. More recent commercial activities have focused on satellite imaging, global positioning, and radio communications. Mining of asteroids and other near-Earth celestial bodies has not yet begun. The transportation of passengers in space is but embryonic.

[4] See e.g., Michael Gerhard, National Space Legis-lation--Perspectives for Regulating Private Space

Activities, in ESSENTIAL AIR AND SPACE LAW 75-76 (Marietta Benko & Kai-Uwe Schro-gl eds., 2005); and Major Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63 A.F. L. REV. 75 (2009).

[5] “In view of the growing commercial activity, leg-islators have sought the need to establish govern-mental control over commercial operators in or-der to ensure compliance with their international obligations and their own security and safety concerns.” European Space Policy Institute, Eco-nomic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 5 (Sept. 2009).

[6] Paul Fitzgerald notes, “while it is true that do-mestic law is probably sufficient to cover “up and down” SATV [suborbital aerospace transpor-tation vehicle] flights, international carriage by SATV will require legal infrastructure, and such a requirement will likely be necessary within the next decade. Unless states begin to consider this issue, it is not inconceivable that such a lack of action could become an impediment to interconti-nental flights by SATVs.” P. Paul Fitzgerald, Inner Space: ICAO’s New Frontier, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 3 (2014).

[7] See e.g., See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRAT-ED REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011); Paul Stephen Dempsey & Michael C. Mineiro, ICAO’s Legal Authority to Regulate Aerospace Vehicles, In Space Safety Regulations and Standards 245, 251 (Joseph N. Pelton & Ram S. Jakhu eds., 2011); see Paul S. Dempsey and Michael C. Mineiro, The Intersection of Air and Space Law: ICAO’s Role in Regulating Safety and Navigation in Suborbital Aerospace Transportation (unpublished manu-script but scheduled to be presented and published to the IAASS in Rome October 21-23, 2008); Ru-wantissa Abeyratne, ICAO’s Involvement in Outer Space Affairs - A Need for Closer Scrutiny?, 30 J. SPACE L. 185, 185-86 (2004); Peter van Fen-ema, Suborbital Flights and ICAO, 30 AIR AND SPACE L. 396, 399-403 (2005); Dean N. Rein-hardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 65 (2007).

[8] Application of the Concept of the Launching State, G.A. Res. 59/115, UN GAOR, 59th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/59/11 (2004).

[9] For a dozen years commencing in 1967, the world community drafted five major multilateral conven-tions establishing the basic principles of Space Law:• The “Outer Space Treaty” of 1967; Treaty on

Principles Governing the Activities of States


50


of the Act or conditions imposed upon the license have been or are being violated, the space activities have not been commenced within the prescribed time period, the purpose of the space activities for which the license was issued have significantly changed, the technical or finan-cial capabilities of the licensee has changed, the informa-tion or documents provided with the application are so incorrect or incomplete that a different decision would have been made if the facts had been known at the time of license issuance, or it is necessary to protect safety, the environment, financial security, public order, State secu-rity or fulfillment of international obligations.156

In Russia, a failure to comply with instructions or orders, the discovery of the filing of false data, the dissolution of the legal entity of the licensee, or the violation of license conditions may result in license suspension or revoca-tion.157 Such suspension or annulment may be imposed on a three day notice.158 Decisions of the Russian Space Agency are subject to appeal.159

South Africa may amend, suspend or revoke a license if any condition was violated, or if the operations pose an unacceptable safety risk.160 In Sweden, the license may be withdrawn if license conditions are disregarded.161 In the United Kingdom, a license may be suspended or revoked if a condition imposed thereon is not complied with, or such action is required for public health, or na-tional security, or in order to comply with international obligations. 162

Fines and Imprisonment

In Korea, one who launches without a license may be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment, and face fines up to 50 million won. One who fails to comply with an interruption order may serve up to three years in prison and be fined up to 30 million won.163 Fines of up to 10 million won may be imposed for failure to reg-ister the space object, or failure to report changes in the launch different from the license. Fines of up to 5 million won may be imposed on the license for failure to report information different than that in the license application, one who “denies, interferes or evades investigation of an accident.164 One who objects to the imposition of a fine upon him may appeal within 30 days, and the penalty will be reviewed by a court.165

Japan may impose a fine not to exceed ¥200,000 for fail-ing to file a report or filing a false report,166 failure to ob-tain required authorization or approval from the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, failure to register, conducting unauthorized activities, or launching satellites without required insurance.167

In France, the administrative authority may at any time give instructions or require any measures deemed neces-sary to protect the safety of persons or property, or to protect the public health or the environment. Fines of up to €200,000 may be imposed for launching a space object without authorization.168

In the Netherlands, administrative penalties for failure to possess a license and launch a space object or endanger-ment of safety or the environment may be imposed of up to €450,000, or 10% of the relevant annual sales in the Netherlands. Failure to register a space object or fol-low rules related thereto may result in an administrative penalty of up to €100,000. In Sweden, violations of the national Space Laws may result in imprisonment of up to one year.169

14. CONCLUSION

Cognizant of their international legal obligations and li-ability exposure, and mindful of the need to protect life, property and the environment, at least 26 States have promulgated national space legislation and imposed reg-ulatory requirements upon commercial space activities. Professor Stephan Hobe observes, “By virtue of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, states are obligated to au-thorize and to continuously supervise their national space activities. This obligation can best be complied with by enacting national space legislation, preferably with a li-censing regime for private activities in outer space, in-cluding certification of space vehicles.”170 At the same time, many States are promulgating regulations to facili-tate and incentivize commercial use of space, including requiring State payloads to be placed in orbit by com-mercial rockets, and imposing limits on liability of non-governmental organizations.171

As we have seen, to enhance safety, many national space laws focus on common issues through the vehicle of li-censing – the technical and financial qualifications of ap-plicants, liability and indemnification, environmental is-sues, operational restrictions, sanctions and enforcement. Although a growing number of States are promulgating national Space Law legislation, and although, many such laws focus on common issues, there is little harmoniza-tion between the approaches taken to licensing and regu-lation. Some States (e.g., Australia and the United States) have enacted comprehensive and elaborate regulatory statutes, while others (e.g., Ireland and Norway) have promulgated rather terse laws. Many more (e.g., India and Switzerland) have yet to enact any legislation at all on the subject.

Three and a half decades have elapsed since the last inter-national multilateral Space Law convention was drafted. Given the dearth of international regulation of aerospace safety and navigation,172 States would be well advised to establish regulatory institutions to oversee space activi-ties in order to protect their environment, ensure safety, protect their citizens and persons and their territory and property from environmental damage or injury, and cov-er the costs of catastrophic loss when it occurs. National space laws are an important means of achieving those public policies. At minimum, States should promulgate domestic space laws establishing a regulatory agency with jurisdiction over licensing and enforcement, as well as addressing liability insurance and damage reimburse-ment. Further, so as to encourage commercial develop-ment of space, the regulatory burden and liability risk exposure should not be onerous. During the embryonic and developmental period of commercial space activity, liability should be capped.173 Moreover, States should at-tempt to harmonize their laws with other States, so that global uniformity might be enhanced, and flag-of-con-venience type forum shopping discouraged. It would be shameful if commercial space activities were attracted to the jurisdictions with the lowest taxes, and lowest cost regulatory structure, at the expense of safety and envi-ronmental harm.174

Eventually, one would hope, the growth in domestic reg-ulation might influence development of international law, and motivate the international community to come to-gether and establish harmonized regulatory standards,175 as it has done in the field of aviation safety and naviga-tion with the promulgation of the Chicago Convention of 1944.176

15. REFERENCES

[1] Space Foundation, The Space Report 2014: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity (2014).

[2] Id. http://www.spacefoundation.org/media/press-releases/space-foundations-2014-report-reveals-continued-growth-global-space-economy

[3] In its early years, commercial development of space was dominated by satellite communications, particularly telephone and television communi-cations. More recent commercial activities have focused on satellite imaging, global positioning, and radio communications. Mining of asteroids and other near-Earth celestial bodies has not yet begun. The transportation of passengers in space is but embryonic.

[4] See e.g., Michael Gerhard, National Space Legis-lation--Perspectives for Regulating Private Space

Activities, in ESSENTIAL AIR AND SPACE LAW 75-76 (Marietta Benko & Kai-Uwe Schro-gl eds., 2005); and Major Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63 A.F. L. REV. 75 (2009).

[5] “In view of the growing commercial activity, leg-islators have sought the need to establish govern-mental control over commercial operators in or-der to ensure compliance with their international obligations and their own security and safety concerns.” European Space Policy Institute, Eco-nomic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 5 (Sept. 2009).

[6] Paul Fitzgerald notes, “while it is true that do-mestic law is probably sufficient to cover “up and down” SATV [suborbital aerospace transpor-tation vehicle] flights, international carriage by SATV will require legal infrastructure, and such a requirement will likely be necessary within the next decade. Unless states begin to consider this issue, it is not inconceivable that such a lack of action could become an impediment to interconti-nental flights by SATVs.” P. Paul Fitzgerald, Inner Space: ICAO’s New Frontier, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 3 (2014).

[7] See e.g., See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRAT-ED REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011); Paul Stephen Dempsey & Michael C. Mineiro, ICAO’s Legal Authority to Regulate Aerospace Vehicles, In Space Safety Regulations and Standards 245, 251 (Joseph N. Pelton & Ram S. Jakhu eds., 2011); see Paul S. Dempsey and Michael C. Mineiro, The Intersection of Air and Space Law: ICAO’s Role in Regulating Safety and Navigation in Suborbital Aerospace Transportation (unpublished manu-script but scheduled to be presented and published to the IAASS in Rome October 21-23, 2008); Ru-wantissa Abeyratne, ICAO’s Involvement in Outer Space Affairs - A Need for Closer Scrutiny?, 30 J. SPACE L. 185, 185-86 (2004); Peter van Fen-ema, Suborbital Flights and ICAO, 30 AIR AND SPACE L. 396, 399-403 (2005); Dean N. Rein-hardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 65 (2007).

[8] Application of the Concept of the Launching State, G.A. Res. 59/115, UN GAOR, 59th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/59/11 (2004).

[9] For a dozen years commencing in 1967, the world community drafted five major multilateral conven-tions establishing the basic principles of Space Law:• The “Outer Space Treaty” of 1967; Treaty on

Principles Governing the Activities of States


51


in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, In-cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 6 I.L.M. 386, G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, entered into force on 10 Oc-tober 1967.

• The “Rescue Agreement” of 1968; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of As-tronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), entered into force on 3 De-cember 1968.

• The “Liability Convention” of 1972; Conven-tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 10 I.L.M. 965, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972.

• The “Registration Convention” of 1976; Con-vention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), entered into force on 15 September 1976, and

• The “Moon Agreement” of 1979. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1986 A.T.S. 14, 18 I.L.M. 1434; G.A. Res. 34/68, entered into force on 11 July 1984. Other conventions are also of significance, including the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Inter-national Telecommunications Convention of 1984/1992, and the Convention of the Interna-tional Maritime Satellite Organization of 1979, for example.

[10] See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC IN-TERNATIONAL AIR LAW 743-45 (McGill 2006).

[11] Outer Space Treaty Art. III.[12] Outer Space Treaty Art. VI. Article VI of the Outer

Space Treaty imposes upon States international responsibility to provide “authorization and con-tinuing supervision” of national activities in space, including the activities of both governmental and non-governmental entities.

[13] Outer Space Treaty Art. VII. Article VII provides that States that (a) launch, (b) procure the launch, or (c) from whose territory an object is launched, are internationally liable for damage caused to an-other State or its national or juridical persons by such object whether in the air or in space.

[14] Outer Space Treaty Art. VIII. See PAUL STE-

PHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LIABILITY LAW § 6.64 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013). Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty also requires that space ob-jects and component parts found in a State shall be returned to the State of registry. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that the State of regis-try shall retain jurisdiction and control over a space object and any personnel thereon, whether in space or on a celestial body. But it does not define the “State of registry.” The Registration Convention of 1976 provides elaboration. Convention on Reg-istration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), entered into force on 15 September 1976. The Registration Convention defines the “State of registry” as the launching State (recall the defini-tion above) on whose registry a space object is car-ried. Registration Convention Art. I. The Conven-tion requires that every space object launched be entered in appropriate registry that the launching State shall maintain. Registration Convention Art. II. It defines the information that shall be carried on the registry. The Convention also requires that the State of registry must notify the UN Secretary General of space objects which were, but no longer are, in Earth orbit. Registration Convention Art. IV(3).

[15] Outer Space Treaty Art. IX.[16] Outer Space Treaty Art. XI.[17] Convention on International Liability for Dam-

age Caused by Space Objects, opened for signa-ture Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 10 I.L.M. 965, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972.

[18] Liability Convention Art. I.[19] See generally, Marc S. Firestone, Problems in

the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Damage Caused in Outer Space, 59 TUL. L. REV. 747 (1985).

[20] The Liability Convention adopted “a two-tiered tort regime for injury or damage inflicted by a sat-ellite: absolute liability for harm caused on earth or to aircraft, and liability for „fault‟ for injuries to other countries’ space objects.” David A. Koplow, ASAT-Isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1200 (2009). One source notes:

“The [Liability Convention] estab-lished a basic framework of tort law applicable to space activities. The Li-ability Convention was a response to concerns about the danger that space

objects pose on Earth when they re-en-ter the atmosphere. Damage caused by space objects while they are in space, on the other hand, did not motivate the formation of the Liability Convention, which explains why terrestrial damage has a stricter liability scheme under the Liability Convention than damage that occurs in space. The Liability Conven-tion instituted an absolute liability pol-icy for damage on the Earth’s surface, or in airspace, caused by space objects. However, a state is only liable for dam-age to another state’s space objects if ‘the damage is due to [the state’s] fault or the fault of persons for whom [the state] is responsible.’ An injured party cannot recover compensation under this Convention if another entity of the same state harmed its space object. In that case, the injured party would most likely have a remedy under national tort law...”

Natalie Pusey, The Case for Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response to the Space De-bris Problem, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 425, 438-39 (2010) [citations omitted].

[21] Liability Convention Art II.[22] See generally, Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer

Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 77 (1999) (criticizing the failure of the treaty to define “fault”).

[23] It is unclear whether recoverable damages include lost wages, lost profits, or non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. Punitive damages are not envisaged. See Joseph J. MacAvoy, Nuclear Space and the Earth Environment: The Benefits, Dangers, and Legality of Nuclear Power and Pro-pulsion in Outer Space, 29 WM. & MARY EN-VTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 226 (2004).

[24] Liability Convention Art. III. The Convention out-lines a limited number of defenses. The launching State may be wholly exonerated from liability if it proves that the damage resulted from the “gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it repre-sents”, unless the launch was not in conformity with principles of international law, including in particular, the United Nations Charter or the Outer Space Treaty.

[25] See generally, HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICA-TIONS (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), and PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LI-

ABILITY LAW § 6.65 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013). The Liability Convention also establishes specific procedures for the settlement of damage claims, including a one year statute of limitations and, where necessary, establishment of a Claims Com-mission. Claims must be presented through diplo-matic channels by a State on its behalf, or on be-half of its nationals.

[26] Ronald Spencer Jr., International Space Law: A Basis for National Legislation, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 1, 9 (Ram Jakhu ed., Springer 2010).

[27] 66 Fed. Reg. 48311-01 (2001), 2001 WL 1089331 (F.R.) US Federal Aviation Administration.

[28] Henry Hertzfeld & Ben Baseley-Walker, A Legal Note on Space Accidents, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT [GERMAN J. OF AIR & SPACE L.] 230, 233 (2010).

[29] The 1978 crash of the Cosmos 954 satellite into Canada, creating damages totaling $14 million, led Canada to file a $6 million claim with the (then) Soviet Union, of which $3 million was eventually paid. Joseph J. MacAvoy, Nuclear Space and the Earth Environment: The Benefits, Dangers, and Legality of Nuclear Power and Propulsion in Out-er Space, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 227 (2004). The settlement agreement declared, “The standard of absolute liability for space activities, in particular activities involving the use of nuclear energy, is considered to have become a general principle of international law.” Canada‘s Claim Against the U.S.S.R. Arising Out of the Cosmos 954 Incident and the Claim‘s Settle-ment ¶ 22 in SPACE LAW § IV>B.Canada.1-4 (Paul Stephen Dempsey ed. 2004). See also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LIABILITY LAW § 6.69 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013).

Several sources contend that several core concepts from the international Space Law conventions have evolved into customary international law. For example, “[T]he consensus has developed that a few principles of customary international law apply to space activities. These include the ‘es-sential principles of the Outer Space Treaty...’”, Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of In-ternational Law, 1994 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 143, 159 (1995); Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 74 (2000). See also, ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2nd ed. 2010) (“The [Outer Space] Treaty’s basic principles... can now be regarded as representing customary international law.”). “De-spite the relative youth of space law, several core concepts have crystallized into customary interna-


52


in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, In-cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 6 I.L.M. 386, G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, entered into force on 10 Oc-tober 1967.

• The “Rescue Agreement” of 1968; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of As-tronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), entered into force on 3 De-cember 1968.

• The “Liability Convention” of 1972; Conven-tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 10 I.L.M. 965, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972.

• The “Registration Convention” of 1976; Con-vention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), entered into force on 15 September 1976, and

• The “Moon Agreement” of 1979. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1986 A.T.S. 14, 18 I.L.M. 1434; G.A. Res. 34/68, entered into force on 11 July 1984. Other conventions are also of significance, including the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Inter-national Telecommunications Convention of 1984/1992, and the Convention of the Interna-tional Maritime Satellite Organization of 1979, for example.

[10] See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC IN-TERNATIONAL AIR LAW 743-45 (McGill 2006).

[11] Outer Space Treaty Art. III.[12] Outer Space Treaty Art. VI. Article VI of the Outer

Space Treaty imposes upon States international responsibility to provide “authorization and con-tinuing supervision” of national activities in space, including the activities of both governmental and non-governmental entities.

[13] Outer Space Treaty Art. VII. Article VII provides that States that (a) launch, (b) procure the launch, or (c) from whose territory an object is launched, are internationally liable for damage caused to an-other State or its national or juridical persons by such object whether in the air or in space.

[14] Outer Space Treaty Art. VIII. See PAUL STE-

PHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LIABILITY LAW § 6.64 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013). Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty also requires that space ob-jects and component parts found in a State shall be returned to the State of registry. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that the State of regis-try shall retain jurisdiction and control over a space object and any personnel thereon, whether in space or on a celestial body. But it does not define the “State of registry.” The Registration Convention of 1976 provides elaboration. Convention on Reg-istration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), entered into force on 15 September 1976. The Registration Convention defines the “State of registry” as the launching State (recall the defini-tion above) on whose registry a space object is car-ried. Registration Convention Art. I. The Conven-tion requires that every space object launched be entered in appropriate registry that the launching State shall maintain. Registration Convention Art. II. It defines the information that shall be carried on the registry. The Convention also requires that the State of registry must notify the UN Secretary General of space objects which were, but no longer are, in Earth orbit. Registration Convention Art. IV(3).

[15] Outer Space Treaty Art. IX.[16] Outer Space Treaty Art. XI.[17] Convention on International Liability for Dam-

age Caused by Space Objects, opened for signa-ture Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 10 I.L.M. 965, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September 1972.

[18] Liability Convention Art. I.[19] See generally, Marc S. Firestone, Problems in

the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Damage Caused in Outer Space, 59 TUL. L. REV. 747 (1985).

[20] The Liability Convention adopted “a two-tiered tort regime for injury or damage inflicted by a sat-ellite: absolute liability for harm caused on earth or to aircraft, and liability for „fault‟ for injuries to other countries’ space objects.” David A. Koplow, ASAT-Isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1200 (2009). One source notes:

“The [Liability Convention] estab-lished a basic framework of tort law applicable to space activities. The Li-ability Convention was a response to concerns about the danger that space

objects pose on Earth when they re-en-ter the atmosphere. Damage caused by space objects while they are in space, on the other hand, did not motivate the formation of the Liability Convention, which explains why terrestrial damage has a stricter liability scheme under the Liability Convention than damage that occurs in space. The Liability Conven-tion instituted an absolute liability pol-icy for damage on the Earth’s surface, or in airspace, caused by space objects. However, a state is only liable for dam-age to another state’s space objects if ‘the damage is due to [the state’s] fault or the fault of persons for whom [the state] is responsible.’ An injured party cannot recover compensation under this Convention if another entity of the same state harmed its space object. In that case, the injured party would most likely have a remedy under national tort law...”

Natalie Pusey, The Case for Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response to the Space De-bris Problem, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 425, 438-39 (2010) [citations omitted].

[21] Liability Convention Art II.[22] See generally, Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer

Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 77 (1999) (criticizing the failure of the treaty to define “fault”).

[23] It is unclear whether recoverable damages include lost wages, lost profits, or non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. Punitive damages are not envisaged. See Joseph J. MacAvoy, Nuclear Space and the Earth Environment: The Benefits, Dangers, and Legality of Nuclear Power and Pro-pulsion in Outer Space, 29 WM. & MARY EN-VTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 226 (2004).

[24] Liability Convention Art. III. The Convention out-lines a limited number of defenses. The launching State may be wholly exonerated from liability if it proves that the damage resulted from the “gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it repre-sents”, unless the launch was not in conformity with principles of international law, including in particular, the United Nations Charter or the Outer Space Treaty.

[25] See generally, HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICA-TIONS (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), and PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LI-

ABILITY LAW § 6.65 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013). The Liability Convention also establishes specific procedures for the settlement of damage claims, including a one year statute of limitations and, where necessary, establishment of a Claims Com-mission. Claims must be presented through diplo-matic channels by a State on its behalf, or on be-half of its nationals.

[26] Ronald Spencer Jr., International Space Law: A Basis for National Legislation, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 1, 9 (Ram Jakhu ed., Springer 2010).

[27] 66 Fed. Reg. 48311-01 (2001), 2001 WL 1089331 (F.R.) US Federal Aviation Administration.

[28] Henry Hertzfeld & Ben Baseley-Walker, A Legal Note on Space Accidents, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT [GERMAN J. OF AIR & SPACE L.] 230, 233 (2010).

[29] The 1978 crash of the Cosmos 954 satellite into Canada, creating damages totaling $14 million, led Canada to file a $6 million claim with the (then) Soviet Union, of which $3 million was eventually paid. Joseph J. MacAvoy, Nuclear Space and the Earth Environment: The Benefits, Dangers, and Legality of Nuclear Power and Propulsion in Out-er Space, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 227 (2004). The settlement agreement declared, “The standard of absolute liability for space activities, in particular activities involving the use of nuclear energy, is considered to have become a general principle of international law.” Canada‘s Claim Against the U.S.S.R. Arising Out of the Cosmos 954 Incident and the Claim‘s Settle-ment ¶ 22 in SPACE LAW § IV>B.Canada.1-4 (Paul Stephen Dempsey ed. 2004). See also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LIABILITY LAW § 6.69 (Lexis Nexis 2nd ed. 2013).

Several sources contend that several core concepts from the international Space Law conventions have evolved into customary international law. For example, “[T]he consensus has developed that a few principles of customary international law apply to space activities. These include the ‘es-sential principles of the Outer Space Treaty...’”, Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of In-ternational Law, 1994 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 143, 159 (1995); Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 74 (2000). See also, ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2nd ed. 2010) (“The [Outer Space] Treaty’s basic principles... can now be regarded as representing customary international law.”). “De-spite the relative youth of space law, several core concepts have crystallized into customary interna-


53


tional law through state practice.” Dan St. John, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 686, 690-91 (2012). See also, I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 6 (3d ed. 2008); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 11-12, 71, 308-10 (2009).

But this view is not universally shared: “It is not clear, however, that customary international law even exists. At first glance, a lack of space cus-tom undermines the entire concept of a customary international law of space. According to one esti-mate in 2000, only six to ten countries had been sufficiently involved in space relations to consider their actions as contributing to international space law.” Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The Legality and Desirabili-ty of Bush’s National Space Policy Under the Pub-lic and Customary International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681 n. 42 (2008).

[30] In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly declared that international law applies to outer space and celestial bodies. It also declared outer space and celestial bodies free for exploration and use by all nations, and not subject to national appropriation. U.S. General Ass. Res. 1721 (Dec. 20, 1961). The following year, the General Assembly called upon nations “to co-operate in the further development of law for outer space”. U.S. General Ass. Res. 1802 (Dec. 14, 1962). The U.N. General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions addressing space, of which the most prominent include:• The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing

the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (the “Legal Principles Dec-laration”);

• The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Di-rect Television Broadcasting (the “Direct T.V. Broadcasting Principles”);

• The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “Remote Sens-ing Principles”);

• The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (the “Nuclear Power Principles”); and

• The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Tak-ing into Particular Account the Needs of Devel-oping Countries (the “International Cooperation Declaration”).

General Assembly Resolutions are not binding

upon U.N. member States, per se, even those that voted in favor of them, unless they reaffirm exist-ing – or eventually evolve into – general principles of customary international law. Nonetheless, they do offer some indication of consensus of where in-ternational law may be headed.

[31] See Steven Freeland, For Better or Worse? The Use of ‘Soft Law’ Within the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, XXXVI ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 409 (2011).

Gérardine Goh writes: “The complexity of space activities has quickly outrun traditional methods of lawmaking. This has led to the necessitation of action from international organizations, spe-cialized agencies, private bodies and professional associations that do not nicely fit into the State-centric paradigm of international lawmaking.” Gérardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Develop-ment of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009). Christine Chinkin writes that, “The complexity of international legal affairs has outpaced traditional methods of law-making, necessitating management through international organizations, specialized agencies, programmes, and private bodies that do not fit the paradigm of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the [International Court of Justice]. Consequently the concept of soft law facilitates international co-operation by acting as a bridge between the formalities of law-making and the needs of international life by legitimating behavior and creating stability.” COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton, ed., New York: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2000).

But the view that non-binding “soft law” agree-ments such as the Space Mitigation Guidelines have become customary international law is not universally shared. “The final potential source of international space law that must be considered is customary international law. Many commentators argue that the content of the nonbinding agree-ments ...from the Principles through the codes of conduct, could become, or even already have be-come, binding norms of customary international law... However, closer analysis of the requirements for customary international law demonstrates that nonbinding space agreements are unlikely to evolve into binding customary rules. The practices contained in nonbinding international space agree-ments do not meet the requirements of either the traditional or the modern approach to custom for-mation. State practice in outer space is not long-term enough to be the driving force behind the

formation of international custom, especially with regard to the more recent technical agreements, and statements of opinio juris have been far from the strong and nearly unanimous sentiment need-ed for opinio juris to be the leading factor. When considering the legal effects of nonbinding agree-ments for the purposes of rule of law, we must thus acknowledge that they are truly nonbinding and will not likely become otherwise through custom-ary international law.” Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289 297-98 (2012) [citations omitted]. Similarly, Professor Freeland notes, “These soft law instru-ments provide guidelines or standards of conduct that may often influence the actions of States..., but they do not in and of themselves have the legal ‘force’ of binding treaties... it is not appropriate to convert in our mind something that is not bind-ing ‘hard’ law, and not intended to be such, into a binding rule or obligation.” Steven Freeland, For Better or Worse? The Use of ‘Soft Law’ Within the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, XXXVI ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 409, 434, 444 (2011).

[32] See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC IN-TERNATIONAL AIR LAW (McGill 2008).

[33] See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REG-ULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgob-ba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011).

[34] European Space Policy Institute, Economic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 7 (Sept. 2009).

[35] Presidential Decree No. 02-49 “Creation, Orga-nization and Functioning of the Algerian Space Agency (ASAL)” of 16 January 2002; Presiden-tial Decree No. 06-225 “Ratifying the Conven-tion for Damage Caused by Space Objects” of 24 June 2006; Presidential Decree No. 06-468 “Ratifying the Convention on Registration of Ob-jects Launched into Outer Space” of 11 December 2006.

[36] National Decree No. 995/91 “Creation of the Na-tional Commission on Space Activities” (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95 “Establish-ment of the National Registry of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space” (25 July 1995).

[37] Space Activities Act 1998 (No. 123, 1998); Statu-tory Rules No. 186, containing the Space Activities Regulations 2011.

[38] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act),

entered into force on 28 December 2011.[39] Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Opera-

tions or Guidance of Space Objects Of 17 Septem-ber 2005; Royal Decree Implementing Certain Provisions of the Law Of 17 September 2005 on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations and Guidance of Space Objects from the Legal Basis for the Regulation Of Space Activities.

[40] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996; Administrative Edict n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Ad-ministrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Reso-lution No. 51 of 26 January 2001; Administrative Edict n. 96 of 30 November 2011.

[41] Canadian Space Agency Act (1990, c. 13).[42] Supreme Decree No. 338, Establishment of a Pres-

idential Advisory Committee known as Chilean Space Agency, amended by Supreme Decree No. 0144 of December 29, 2008, Being now the Chil-ean Space Agency presided by the Undersecretary of Economy.

[43] Measures for the Administration of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 8 Febru-ary 2001; Interim Measures on the Administration of Permits for Civil Space Launch Projects of 21 December 2002; Interim measures on Administra-tion of Mitigation of and Protection against Space Debris.

[44] Decree 2442, of July 2006 on the creation of the Colombian Commission of Space (CCE).

[45] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518 (2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief ―Parcours‖ of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).

[46] Act to give Protection against the Security Risk to the Federal Republic of Germany by the Dissemi-nation of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data (Satellite Data Security Act — SatDSiG), 2007.

[47] Law 23, 25 January 1983, Norms for the imple-mentation for the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Official Gazette No.35, 5 February, 1983); Law No. 153, 12 July 2005, Registration of objects launched into outer space. (Official Gazette No. 177, 1 August 2005).

[48] Basic Space Law (Law No.43, 2008 of 28 May 2008); The Law concerning Japan Aerospace Ex-ploration Agency (Law No. 161 of 13th December 2002).

[49] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Ac-tivities, 6 January, 2012, No. 528-IV; available at


54


tional law through state practice.” Dan St. John, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 686, 690-91 (2012). See also, I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 6 (3d ed. 2008); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 11-12, 71, 308-10 (2009).

But this view is not universally shared: “It is not clear, however, that customary international law even exists. At first glance, a lack of space cus-tom undermines the entire concept of a customary international law of space. According to one esti-mate in 2000, only six to ten countries had been sufficiently involved in space relations to consider their actions as contributing to international space law.” Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The Legality and Desirabili-ty of Bush’s National Space Policy Under the Pub-lic and Customary International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681 n. 42 (2008).

[30] In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly declared that international law applies to outer space and celestial bodies. It also declared outer space and celestial bodies free for exploration and use by all nations, and not subject to national appropriation. U.S. General Ass. Res. 1721 (Dec. 20, 1961). The following year, the General Assembly called upon nations “to co-operate in the further development of law for outer space”. U.S. General Ass. Res. 1802 (Dec. 14, 1962). The U.N. General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions addressing space, of which the most prominent include:• The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing

the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (the “Legal Principles Dec-laration”);

• The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Di-rect Television Broadcasting (the “Direct T.V. Broadcasting Principles”);

• The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “Remote Sens-ing Principles”);

• The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (the “Nuclear Power Principles”); and

• The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Tak-ing into Particular Account the Needs of Devel-oping Countries (the “International Cooperation Declaration”).

General Assembly Resolutions are not binding

upon U.N. member States, per se, even those that voted in favor of them, unless they reaffirm exist-ing – or eventually evolve into – general principles of customary international law. Nonetheless, they do offer some indication of consensus of where in-ternational law may be headed.

[31] See Steven Freeland, For Better or Worse? The Use of ‘Soft Law’ Within the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, XXXVI ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 409 (2011).

Gérardine Goh writes: “The complexity of space activities has quickly outrun traditional methods of lawmaking. This has led to the necessitation of action from international organizations, spe-cialized agencies, private bodies and professional associations that do not nicely fit into the State-centric paradigm of international lawmaking.” Gérardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Develop-ment of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009). Christine Chinkin writes that, “The complexity of international legal affairs has outpaced traditional methods of law-making, necessitating management through international organizations, specialized agencies, programmes, and private bodies that do not fit the paradigm of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the [International Court of Justice]. Consequently the concept of soft law facilitates international co-operation by acting as a bridge between the formalities of law-making and the needs of international life by legitimating behavior and creating stability.” COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton, ed., New York: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2000).

But the view that non-binding “soft law” agree-ments such as the Space Mitigation Guidelines have become customary international law is not universally shared. “The final potential source of international space law that must be considered is customary international law. Many commentators argue that the content of the nonbinding agree-ments ...from the Principles through the codes of conduct, could become, or even already have be-come, binding norms of customary international law... However, closer analysis of the requirements for customary international law demonstrates that nonbinding space agreements are unlikely to evolve into binding customary rules. The practices contained in nonbinding international space agree-ments do not meet the requirements of either the traditional or the modern approach to custom for-mation. State practice in outer space is not long-term enough to be the driving force behind the

formation of international custom, especially with regard to the more recent technical agreements, and statements of opinio juris have been far from the strong and nearly unanimous sentiment need-ed for opinio juris to be the leading factor. When considering the legal effects of nonbinding agree-ments for the purposes of rule of law, we must thus acknowledge that they are truly nonbinding and will not likely become otherwise through custom-ary international law.” Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289 297-98 (2012) [citations omitted]. Similarly, Professor Freeland notes, “These soft law instru-ments provide guidelines or standards of conduct that may often influence the actions of States..., but they do not in and of themselves have the legal ‘force’ of binding treaties... it is not appropriate to convert in our mind something that is not bind-ing ‘hard’ law, and not intended to be such, into a binding rule or obligation.” Steven Freeland, For Better or Worse? The Use of ‘Soft Law’ Within the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, XXXVI ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 409, 434, 444 (2011).


[33] See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REG-ULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgob-ba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011).


[35] Presidential Decree No. 02-49 “Creation, Orga-nization and Functioning of the Algerian Space Agency (ASAL)” of 16 January 2002; Presiden-tial Decree No. 06-225 “Ratifying the Conven-tion for Damage Caused by Space Objects” of 24 June 2006; Presidential Decree No. 06-468 “Ratifying the Convention on Registration of Ob-jects Launched into Outer Space” of 11 December 2006.

[36] National Decree No. 995/91 “Creation of the Na-tional Commission on Space Activities” (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95 “Establish-ment of the National Registry of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space” (25 July 1995).


[38] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act),

entered into force on 28 December 2011.[39] Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Opera-


[40] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996; Administrative Edict n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Ad-ministrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Reso-lution No. 51 of 26 January 2001; Administrative Edict n. 96 of 30 November 2011.

[41] Canadian Space Agency Act (1990, c. 13).[42] Supreme Decree No. 338, Establishment of a Pres-

idential Advisory Committee known as Chilean Space Agency, amended by Supreme Decree No. 0144 of December 29, 2008, Being now the Chil-ean Space Agency presided by the Undersecretary of Economy.

[43] Measures for the Administration of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 8 Febru-ary 2001; Interim Measures on the Administration of Permits for Civil Space Launch Projects of 21 December 2002; Interim measures on Administra-tion of Mitigation of and Protection against Space Debris.

[44] Decree 2442, of July 2006 on the creation of the Colombian Commission of Space (CCE).

[45] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518 (2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief ―Parcours‖ of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).

[46] Act to give Protection against the Security Risk to the Federal Republic of Germany by the Dissemi-nation of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data (Satellite Data Security Act — SatDSiG), 2007.

[47] Law 23, 25 January 1983, Norms for the imple-mentation for the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Official Gazette No.35, 5 February, 1983); Law No. 153, 12 July 2005, Registration of objects launched into outer space. (Official Gazette No. 177, 1 August 2005).

[48] Basic Space Law (Law No.43, 2008 of 28 May 2008); The Law concerning Japan Aerospace Ex-ploration Agency (Law No. 161 of 13th December 2002).



55


http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/spacelaw/na-tional/kazakhstan/528-IV_2012-01-06E.pdf.

[50] Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Estab-lishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Ac-tivities Act) of 24 January 2007; Decree Contain-ing Rules With Regard to a Registry of Information Concerning Space Objects (Space Objects Reg-istry Decree) of 13 November 2007; Order Con-cerning Licence Applications for the Performance of Space Activities and the Registration of Space Objects of 7 February 2008, as amended by Order of 16 April 2010.

[51] National Space Research and Development Agen-cy (NASDRA) Act 2010.

[52] Act on Launching Objects from Norwegian Terri-tory into Outer Space. (No. 38, 13 June. 1969).

[53] Law on Space Activity, Federal Law No. 5663-1 (1993, as amended); Statute on Licensing Space Operations, Federal Government Decree No. 104 (1996).

[54] Space Affairs Act, No. 84 (1993); Space Affairs Amendment Act, No. 64 (1995); South African Na-tional Space Act 36 of 2008.

[55] Space Development Promotion Act of 1 December 2005; Space Liability Act (Law 8714 of 21 Decem-ber 2007).

[56] Royal Decree 278/1995, dated 24th February 1995, establishing in the Kingdom of Spain the Registry foreseen in the Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 November 1974.

[57] Act on Space Activities (1982:963); Decree on Space Activities (1982:1069).

[58] Law of Ukraine on Space Activity, No. 503/96-VR, 1996.

[59] Outer Space Act (1986).[60] Title 51 of the U.S.C.; 14 C.F.R. 400-499; NPR

8715.6A; NASA-STD 8719.14; U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices; Title 47 of the U.S.C.; 47 C.F.R. Parts 5, 25, and 97; Order, FCC 04-130; 47 C.F.R. 25.160-162.

[61] Law on the Establishment of the Bolivarian Agen-cy for Space Activities (Official Gazette No. 38.796 of 25 October 2007); Decree number 3.389 of De-cember 2004; Decree No. 4.114 of 28 November 2005. These statutes are reproduced in PAUL STE-PHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW (Thomson Re-uters/West 2014).

[62] Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, 523 Laws of Hong Kong 1-15 (June 2, 2005), Art. 5(2), avail-able at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 20:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2012).

[63] COPUOS, Legal Subcomm. 52st Sess. A/AC.105/C.2/2012/LEG/L.1 (Mar. 2012).

[64] Michael C. Mineiro, Law and Regulation Govern-

ing U.S. Commercial Spaceports: Licensing, Lia-bility, and Legal Challenges, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 760-65 (2008).

[65] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996. Administrative Edit n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Admin-istrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Resolution No. 51 of 26 January 2001.

[66] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Activ-ities, Art. 13, 6 January, 2012, No. 528-IV; avail-able at


[67] Space Activities Act 1998 (No. 123, 1998); Statu-tory Rules No. 186 Space Activities Regulations 2001. See European Space Policy Institute, Eco-nomic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 16 (Sept. 2009).

[68] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518 (2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief “Parcours” of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).

[69] Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Opera-tions or Guidance of Space Objects Of 17 Septem-ber 2005; Royal Decree Implementing Certain Provisions of the Law Of 17 September 2005 on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations and Guidance of Space Objects from the Legal Basis for the Regulation Of Space Activities.


[71] Korea Space Exploitation Promotion Act, Law No. 7583, Art. 11, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 25:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).

[72] Id. Art. 11.[73] Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, 523 Laws of

Hong Kong 1-15 (June 2, 2005), Art. 5(2), avail-able at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 20:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2012).


[75] Id.


[77] Union of South Africa, Space Affairs Act (Act No. 84 of 1993), as amended by the Space Affairs Amendment Act (Act No. 64 of 1995).


[79] The statute specifies that receiving signals from space is not considered to be a space activity, nor is a sounding rocket launch. Id.


[81] Outer Space Act (1986). These statutes are repro-duced in PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW (Thomson Reuters/West 2014).

[82] 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, §§ 70101-70119 (2004); 14 CFR Parts 400-450 (2004). See Catherine E. Par-sons, Space Tourism: Regulating Passage to the Happiest Place Off Earth, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 493 (2006), and Major Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63 A.F. L. REV. 75 (2009).

[83] See Maria-Vittoria “Giugi” Carminati, Breaking Boundaries By Coming Home: The FAA’s Issu-ance of a “Reentry License” to SpaceX, 24 No. 2 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (2011), and Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y Rev. 405 (2011); and see Henry R. Hertz-feld, Legal and Policy Considerations for Com-mercial Reusable Launch Vehicles, AIR & SPACE LAW. 1 (Fall 2000).

[84] Claudia Pastorius, Law and Policy in the Global Space Industry’s Lift-Off, 19 BARRY L. REV. 201, 234 (2013).

[85] 49 U.S.C. § 70104(a)(2). Chapter 701 of Title 49 of the United States Code confers upon the U.S. Secretary of Transportation authority to issue launch vehicle and site certificates and permits and regulate their operations. This authority, in turn, has been delegated by the Secretary to the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA].

[86] 49 U.S.C. § 70104(a)(1). However, “amateur rock-et activities” are not licensed by the FAA, although an Experimental Airworthiness Certificate may be required. Such launch activities conducted at pri-vate sites must satisfy the following characteris-tics: -Powered by a motor(s) having a total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less; -Total burning or operating time of less than 15 seconds; and -A ballistic coefficient- i.e., gross weight in pounds divided by frontal area of rocket vehicle-less than

12 pounds per square inch.[87] However, U.S. government space activities (such

as those by NASA and the Defense Department) are not subject to FAA jurisdiction.

[88] 68 Fed. Reg. 59977 (Oct. 20, 2003). The CLSA gave the FAA jurisdiction to regulate commercial space activities, “only to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States and to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interest of the United States, ...encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches by the private sector, recommend appropriate changes in Federal statutes, treaties, regulations, policies, plans, and procedures, and facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation infrastructure.”

[89] An exemption applies if the vehicle is launched from a private site and the rocket: (1) has (a) motor(s) with a total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less; (2) and a total burning time of less than 15 seconds; and (3) has a ballistic content of less than 12 pounds per square inch. 14 CFR § 400.2.

[90] http://ast.faa.gov.lrra/about_1rra.htm.[91] 49 U.S.C. § 70105(a).[92] http://ast.faa.gov/lrra/ .[93] Title II of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of

1992.[94] Act to give Protection against the Security Risk to

the Federal Republic of Germany by the Dissemi-nation of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data (Satellite Data Security Act — SatDSiG), 2007, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 19:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2012).

[95] Oversight of space activities is provided by the National Commission on Space Activity (CONAE) (Art. 2 Decree No. 995/91); National Decree No. 995/91, Creation of the National Commission on Space Activities (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95, Establishment of the National Regis-try of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 July 1995).

[96] See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 254-57 (Coast-Aire 3rd ed. 2012).


[98] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996; Administrative Edict n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Ad-


56




[51] National Space Research and Development Agen-cy (NASDRA) Act 2010.


[53] Law on Space Activity, Federal Law No. 5663-1 (1993, as amended); Statute on Licensing Space Operations, Federal Government Decree No. 104 (1996).


[55] Space Development Promotion Act of 1 December 2005; Space Liability Act (Law 8714 of 21 Decem-ber 2007).

[56] Royal Decree 278/1995, dated 24th February 1995, establishing in the Kingdom of Spain the Registry foreseen in the Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 November 1974.


[58] Law of Ukraine on Space Activity, No. 503/96-VR, 1996.

[59] Outer Space Act (1986).[60] Title 51 of the U.S.C.; 14 C.F.R. 400-499; NPR

8715.6A; NASA-STD 8719.14; U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices; Title 47 of the U.S.C.; 47 C.F.R. Parts 5, 25, and 97; Order, FCC 04-130; 47 C.F.R. 25.160-162.

[61] Law on the Establishment of the Bolivarian Agen-cy for Space Activities (Official Gazette No. 38.796 of 25 October 2007); Decree number 3.389 of De-cember 2004; Decree No. 4.114 of 28 November 2005. These statutes are reproduced in PAUL STE-PHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW (Thomson Re-uters/West 2014).


[63] COPUOS, Legal Subcomm. 52st Sess. A/AC.105/C.2/2012/LEG/L.1 (Mar. 2012).

[64] Michael C. Mineiro, Law and Regulation Govern-

ing U.S. Commercial Spaceports: Licensing, Lia-bility, and Legal Challenges, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 760-65 (2008).

[65] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996. Administrative Edit n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Admin-istrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Resolution No. 51 of 26 January 2001.

[66] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Activ-ities, Art. 13, 6 January, 2012, No. 528-IV; avail-able at



[68] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518 (2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief “Parcours” of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).



[71] Korea Space Exploitation Promotion Act, Law No. 7583, Art. 11, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 25:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).

[72] Id. Art. 11.[73] Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, 523 Laws of



[75] Id.


[77] Union of South Africa, Space Affairs Act (Act No. 84 of 1993), as amended by the Space Affairs Amendment Act (Act No. 64 of 1995).


[79] The statute specifies that receiving signals from space is not considered to be a space activity, nor is a sounding rocket launch. Id.


[81] Outer Space Act (1986). These statutes are repro-duced in PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW (Thomson Reuters/West 2014).

[82] 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, §§ 70101-70119 (2004); 14 CFR Parts 400-450 (2004). See Catherine E. Par-sons, Space Tourism: Regulating Passage to the Happiest Place Off Earth, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 493 (2006), and Major Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63 A.F. L. REV. 75 (2009).

[83] See Maria-Vittoria “Giugi” Carminati, Breaking Boundaries By Coming Home: The FAA’s Issu-ance of a “Reentry License” to SpaceX, 24 No. 2 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (2011), and Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y Rev. 405 (2011); and see Henry R. Hertz-feld, Legal and Policy Considerations for Com-mercial Reusable Launch Vehicles, AIR & SPACE LAW. 1 (Fall 2000).

[84] Claudia Pastorius, Law and Policy in the Global Space Industry’s Lift-Off, 19 BARRY L. REV. 201, 234 (2013).

[85] 49 U.S.C. § 70104(a)(2). Chapter 701 of Title 49 of the United States Code confers upon the U.S. Secretary of Transportation authority to issue launch vehicle and site certificates and permits and regulate their operations. This authority, in turn, has been delegated by the Secretary to the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA].

[86] 49 U.S.C. § 70104(a)(1). However, “amateur rock-et activities” are not licensed by the FAA, although an Experimental Airworthiness Certificate may be required. Such launch activities conducted at pri-vate sites must satisfy the following characteris-tics: -Powered by a motor(s) having a total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less; -Total burning or operating time of less than 15 seconds; and -A ballistic coefficient- i.e., gross weight in pounds divided by frontal area of rocket vehicle-less than

12 pounds per square inch.[87] However, U.S. government space activities (such

as those by NASA and the Defense Department) are not subject to FAA jurisdiction.

[88] 68 Fed. Reg. 59977 (Oct. 20, 2003). The CLSA gave the FAA jurisdiction to regulate commercial space activities, “only to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States and to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interest of the United States, ...encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches by the private sector, recommend appropriate changes in Federal statutes, treaties, regulations, policies, plans, and procedures, and facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation infrastructure.”

[89] An exemption applies if the vehicle is launched from a private site and the rocket: (1) has (a) motor(s) with a total impulse of 200,000 pound-seconds or less; (2) and a total burning time of less than 15 seconds; and (3) has a ballistic content of less than 12 pounds per square inch. 14 CFR § 400.2.

[90] http://ast.faa.gov.lrra/about_1rra.htm.[91] 49 U.S.C. § 70105(a).[92] http://ast.faa.gov/lrra/ .[93] Title II of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of

1992.[94] Act to give Protection against the Security Risk to

the Federal Republic of Germany by the Dissemi-nation of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data (Satellite Data Security Act — SatDSiG), 2007, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 19:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2012).

[95] Oversight of space activities is provided by the National Commission on Space Activity (CONAE) (Art. 2 Decree No. 995/91); National Decree No. 995/91, Creation of the National Commission on Space Activities (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95, Establishment of the National Regis-try of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 July 1995).

[96] See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 254-57 (Coast-Aire 3rd ed. 2012).


[98] Law 8.854 of February 10, 1994; Law 9.112 of October 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996; Administrative Edict n. 27 of June 20, 2001; Ad-


57


ministrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Reso-lution No. 51 of 26 January 2001; Administrative Edict n. 96 of 30 November 2011.

[99] Law 8.854 of February 10, 199; Law 9.112 of Oc-tober 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996.

[100] COPUOS, Schematic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks for Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).

[101] Id. Art. 12.[102] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518

(2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief “Parcours” of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).

[103] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Rules Concern-ing Space Activities and The Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Activities Act) § 4 (2006), available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 26:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[104] Order of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Con-taining Rules Governing Licence Applications for the Performance of Space Activities and the Reg-istration of Space Objects, no. WJZ 7119929 (Feb. 7, 2008) § 2.

[105] Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Estab-lishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Ac-tivities Act) of 2006 § 6; Decree Containing Rules with Regard to a Registry of Information Concern-ing Space Objects (Space Objects Registry De-cree) of 13 November 2007; COPUOS, Schematic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).

[106] Id. § 6.[107] Russian Federation Federal Law on Commer-

cial Space Activity (April 1997), § 10, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 29:6 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[108] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Activities, Art. 27, 6 January, 2012, No. 528-IV; available at


[109] Id. § 12.[110] Id. § 16.[111] Id. § 19.[112] Steven Freeland, Up, Up and...Back: The Emer-

gence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the In-ternational Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2005).

[113] See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Liability Caused by

Space Objects in International and National Law, XXXVII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 333 (2011).

[114] Id. Art. 14, 15.[115] Korea Space Liability Act, Law No. 8852 (Dec,

21m 2007), Art. 4.1, available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 25:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[116] Id. Art. 6.[117] Id. Art. 5.[118] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of

Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act), entered into force on 28 December 2011.


[120] Law 8.854 of February 10, 199; Law 9.112 of Oc-tober 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996 Ar-ticle 19.

[121] Id. Art. 6(2)(f).[122] Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, 523 Laws of


[123] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Rules Concerning Space Activities and The Establishment of a Reg-istry of Space Objects (Space Activities Act) Ch. 2 § 1(3) (2006), available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 26:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).



[125] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act), entered into force on 28 December 2011.

[126] Id. Art. 6(2)(d).[127] Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Opera-



[129] Article 5 of the License Measures.[130] Article 5 of the License Measures.

[131] French Space Operations Act, No 2008-518 (2008); European Space Policy Institute, Eco-nomic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 20-21 (Sept. 2009).

[132] Outer Space Act (1986); see also Sa’id Mosteshar, Regulation of Space Activities in the United King-dom, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 357, 359-62 (Ram S. Jakhu ed., 2010).



[135] Russian Federation, No. 104 – Statute on Licens-ing Space Operations (Feb. 2, 1996) § 13, avail-able at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 29:3 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[136] Id. § 21.[137] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Rules Concerning

Space Activities and The Establishment of a Reg-istry of Space Objects (Space Activities Act) Ch. 2 § 1(3) (2006), available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 26:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).


[139] The Commission of Science, Technology, and In-dustry for National Defense [COSTIND] of the Peoples Republic of China enacted the Interim Measures on the Administration of License for Civil Space Launch Projects (hereinafter the Li-cense Measures) in 2002, available at PAUL STE-PHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 16.3 (Thom-son Reuters/West 2011). Any launch of a space-craft from the territory of China into outer space for civil purposes, and the overseas launch while the spacecraft is owned by, or the ownership of the spacecraft has been transferred to, the natural or juridical persons or the other organizations of China, are subject to these provisions.

[140] Article 6 of the License Measures.[141] Id.[142] European Space Policy Institute, Economic and

Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 23 (Sept. 2009).


[144] Irish Aviation Authority, Order 2000 available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 22:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[145] Id. Art. 4(1).[146] Irish Aviation Authority, Order 2000, Art. 4(2),

available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 22:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[147] See European Space Policy Institute, Economic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Eu-rope, Part I 5 (Sept. 2009). In 2001, China es-tablished a registry of space objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond. .See UN Doc. ST/SG/SER.E/INF.17. Pursuant to the Measures for the Administration of Registration of Space Objects, the registry is maintained by the CNSA. On June 8th, 2005, China informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry. Currently, the Chinese registration mech-anism consists of two stages of registration: the national registration and the international registra-tion.

[148] These statutes are set forth in COPUOS, Schemat-ic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).

[149] National Decree No.995/91, Creation of the Na-tional Commission on Space Activities (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95, Establishment of the National Registry of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 July 1995). COPUOS, Sche-matic Overview of National Regulatory Frame-works For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).



[152] Article 16 of the License Measures.[153] Article 24 of the License Measures.[154] Space Development Promotion Act of 1 December

2005; Space Liability Act (Law 8714 of 21 Decem-ber 2007). 155 Korea Space Exploitation Promo-tion Act, Law No. 7583, Art. 11, available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 25:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[156] Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Estab-lishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Ac-tivities Act) of 24 January 2007; Decree Contain-ing Rules With Regard to a Registry of Information Concerning Space Objects (Space Objects Reg-istry Decree) of 13 November 2007; Order Con-cerning Licence Applications for the Performance


58


ministrative Edit n.5 of February 21, 2002; Reso-lution No. 51 of 26 January 2001; Administrative Edict n. 96 of 30 November 2011.

[99] Law 8.854 of February 10, 199; Law 9.112 of Oc-tober 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996.


[101] Id. Art. 12.[102] French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518

(2008); Decree No. 2009-644 of 9 June 2009, modifying Decree No. 84-510 of 28 June 1984, re-lating to CNES; Decree No. 2009-643 of 9 June 2008; Decree No. 2009-640 of 9 June 2009. See Giugi Carminati, French National Space Legisla-tion: A Brief “Parcours” of a Long History, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).

[103] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Rules Concern-ing Space Activities and The Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Activities Act) § 4 (2006), available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 26:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[104] Order of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Con-taining Rules Governing Licence Applications for the Performance of Space Activities and the Reg-istration of Space Objects, no. WJZ 7119929 (Feb. 7, 2008) § 2.

[105] Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Estab-lishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Ac-tivities Act) of 2006 § 6; Decree Containing Rules with Regard to a Registry of Information Concern-ing Space Objects (Space Objects Registry De-cree) of 13 November 2007; COPUOS, Schematic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).

[106] Id. § 6.[107] Russian Federation Federal Law on Commer-

cial Space Activity (April 1997), § 10, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 29:6 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[108] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Activities, Art. 27, 6 January, 2012, No. 528-IV; available at


[109] Id. § 12.[110] Id. § 16.[111] Id. § 19.[112] Steven Freeland, Up, Up and...Back: The Emer-

gence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the In-ternational Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2005).

[113] See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Liability Caused by

Space Objects in International and National Law, XXXVII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 333 (2011).

[114] Id. Art. 14, 15.[115] Korea Space Liability Act, Law No. 8852 (Dec,

21m 2007), Art. 4.1, available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 25:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[116] Id. Art. 6.[117] Id. Art. 5.[118] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of

Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act), entered into force on 28 December 2011.


[120] Law 8.854 of February 10, 199; Law 9.112 of Oc-tober 10, 1995; Decree 1.953 of July 10, 1996 Ar-ticle 19.

[121] Id. Art. 6(2)(f).[122] Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, 523 Laws of





[125] Austrian Federal Law on the Authorization of Space Activities and the Establishment of a Na-tional Space Registry (Austrian Outer Space Act), entered into force on 28 December 2011.

[126] Id. Art. 6(2)(d).[127] Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Opera-



[129] Article 5 of the License Measures.[130] Article 5 of the License Measures.

[131] French Space Operations Act, No 2008-518 (2008); European Space Policy Institute, Eco-nomic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 20-21 (Sept. 2009).

[132] Outer Space Act (1986); see also Sa’id Mosteshar, Regulation of Space Activities in the United King-dom, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 357, 359-62 (Ram S. Jakhu ed., 2010).




[136] Id. § 21.[137] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Rules Concerning

Space Activities and The Establishment of a Reg-istry of Space Objects (Space Activities Act) Ch. 2 § 1(3) (2006), available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 26:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).


[139] The Commission of Science, Technology, and In-dustry for National Defense [COSTIND] of the Peoples Republic of China enacted the Interim Measures on the Administration of License for Civil Space Launch Projects (hereinafter the Li-cense Measures) in 2002, available at PAUL STE-PHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 16.3 (Thom-son Reuters/West 2011). Any launch of a space-craft from the territory of China into outer space for civil purposes, and the overseas launch while the spacecraft is owned by, or the ownership of the spacecraft has been transferred to, the natural or juridical persons or the other organizations of China, are subject to these provisions.

[140] Article 6 of the License Measures.[141] Id.[142] European Space Policy Institute, Economic and

Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Europe, Part I 23 (Sept. 2009).


[144] Irish Aviation Authority, Order 2000 available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 22:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[145] Id. Art. 4(1).[146] Irish Aviation Authority, Order 2000, Art. 4(2),

available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 22:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[147] See European Space Policy Institute, Economic and Policy Aspects of Space Regulations in Eu-rope, Part I 5 (Sept. 2009). In 2001, China es-tablished a registry of space objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond. .See UN Doc. ST/SG/SER.E/INF.17. Pursuant to the Measures for the Administration of Registration of Space Objects, the registry is maintained by the CNSA. On June 8th, 2005, China informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry. Currently, the Chinese registration mech-anism consists of two stages of registration: the national registration and the international registra-tion.

[148] These statutes are set forth in COPUOS, Schemat-ic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).

[149] National Decree No.995/91, Creation of the Na-tional Commission on Space Activities (28 May 1991); National Decree No. 125/95, Establishment of the National Registry of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 July 1995). COPUOS, Sche-matic Overview of National Regulatory Frame-works For Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).



[152] Article 16 of the License Measures.[153] Article 24 of the License Measures.[154] Space Development Promotion Act of 1 December

2005; Space Liability Act (Law 8714 of 21 Decem-ber 2007). 155 Korea Space Exploitation Promo-tion Act, Law No. 7583, Art. 11, available at Paul Stephen Dempsey, SPACE LAW § 25:1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2011).

[156] Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Estab-lishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Ac-tivities Act) of 24 January 2007; Decree Contain-ing Rules With Regard to a Registry of Information Concerning Space Objects (Space Objects Reg-istry Decree) of 13 November 2007; Order Con-cerning Licence Applications for the Performance


59


of Space Activities and the Registration of Space Objects of 7 February 2008, as amended by Order of 16 April 2010.


[158] Id. § 22.[159] Id. § 35.[160] Space Affairs Act, No. 84 (1993); Space Affairs

Amendment Act, No. 64 (1995); South African Na-tional Space Act 36 of 2008.


[162] Outer Space Act (1986).[163] Id. Art. 27.[164] Id. Art. 29.[165] Id. Art. 29.[166] Law Concerning the National Space Development

Agency of Japan, Law No. 50 of June 23, 1969, as amended, Art. 42, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 24:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).

[167] Id at Art. 43. See also Fundamental Act of Out-er Space (Law No.43, 2008 of 27 August 2008); Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (Law No. 161 of 13th December 2002). COPUOS, Schematic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks for Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).



[170] Stephan Hobe, Legal Aspects of Space Tourism, 86 NEB. L. REV. 439 (2007).

[171] See e.g., Meredith Blasingame, Nurturing the United States Commercial Space Industry in an International World: Conflicting State, Federal, And International Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 741 (2010).

[172] See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REG-ULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgob-ba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011); and An-toine Pitts, Space Tourism Policy: Why the World’s Space-Faring Nations Should Adopt A Code of Conduct to Control Outer Space Activities, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 687 (2012).

[173] See Justin Silver, Houston, We Have a (Liability) Problem, 112 MICH. L. REV. 833 (2014); Michael R. Laisné, Space Entrepreneurs: Business Strate-gy, Risk, Law, and Policy in the Final Frontier, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1039 (2013), and Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and

Risk Management in the Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 397-98 (2009).

[174] If States do not believe that the existing Space Law Conventions have “adequate mechanisms to en-force the signed treaties, they may elect to attract space business by maintaining minimal environ-mental and safety regulations.” Adrian Taghdiri, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The Inadequacy of Current Inter-national Law to Address the Opportune Registra-tion of Space Vehicles in Flag States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405 (2014).

[175] “The interplay between domestic legislation and international law will become an increasingly im-portant theme in the development of international space law. This is especially true if the number of commercial actors proliferates as predicted. It should also be noted that as domestic law develops and defines items such as best practices for space flight providers, these developments can have in-fluence at the international level and on the devel-opment of soft law mechanisms.” P.J. Blount, Ren-ovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515 (2012).


OPTO- PYRO TRAINS FOR SPACE SYSTEMS - GAINS PROVIDED BY OPTO-PYRO TECHNOLOGY IN TERMS OF SAFETY ON LAUNCHERS

Bernard Chamayou1

1AIRBUS Defence & Space, 66 route de Verneuil, Les Mureaux, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

The Redesign of pyro train seems to be mandatory for next generation of European launchers, in order to be compliant with new requirements coming from:

• European community: health regulations, REACH and RoHs requirements …

• Agencies and customers: Cost reduction, Mass improvement, obsolescence risks reduction, ro-bust design and versatility for any mission…

• Prime contractors: Safety improvements for pyro supply chain and AIT teams, explosive trains monitoring, dual components …

• Pyro Industries: «continuous» manufacturing to guarantee knowledge and competencies for the whole life of launcher manufacturing

Maturation and developments done since 1970 concern-ing Optic, optronique and explosive systems highlighted great opportunities to merge these so matured technolo-gies into opto-pyrotechnic system. But at this moment the energy ratio of such optic emitters was too low, to be applied into a launch vehicle.

Since a decade great effort had been done by industries to provide more and more powerful laser emitters such as laser diodes for main data transmissions applications and strong needs rising from Industries, Aeronautics, Medi-cine, nuclear research

The maturity of powerful and miniaturized optic com-ponents becoming COTS at the beginning of year 2000 accelerate their integration into new field such as air-craft data transmission applications. In addition the very good REX acquired through end users operations (civil and military fields), allow aircraft companies to spread this optic technology into more and more safety functions.

The heritages coming from telecom and aircraft indus-tries allow to set up and spread new type of portative monitoring tools to check any optical harness, detecting in a safe way any failure transmission and localize with a cm class accuracy any weak connection.

The maturity level of optronique and the robustness dem-onstrated within a large range of applications give con-fidence to space engineers for analyzing its implementa-tion into space systems, with a guarantee of long term technologies availability.

The ability of optical fibre to transfer high amount of en-ergy given by a very small laser diode, allow pyro de-signers to implement this technology into the first ele-ment of the pyro train: the initiator.

This main evolution highlights several improvements on launcher pyro trains, increasing mainly their safety levels.

The safety advantages given by Opto-pyro are addressing several fields such as:

• Ground aspect during preparations and operations• Functional aspects• Industrial and Prime concerns

AIRBUS Defence & Space through ASTRIUM-ST and Aerospatiale studies has been actively involved into Op-to-pyro activities for a long time. The amount of Opto-pyro demonstration and justification has been accelerated since 2010 thanks to a special AIRBUS-DS R&T effort, focusing on TRL, IRL and MRL.

Step by step, AIRBUS-DS manage to set up Opto-pyro train maturation from TRL4-IRL1, based on demon-strators and representative demonstrations of launcher configuration.These on going demonstrations will lead to a TRL6-IRL3 level in 2014.

The higher safety level demonstrated by Opto-pyro train compared to the electro-pyro safety trains used on current space systems, allow implementing this new Opto-pyro technology on any new safety systems to be developed.


60


of Space Activities and the Registration of Space Objects of 7 February 2008, as amended by Order of 16 April 2010.


[158] Id. § 22.[159] Id. § 35.[160] Space Affairs Act, No. 84 (1993); Space Affairs

Amendment Act, No. 64 (1995); South African Na-tional Space Act 36 of 2008.


[162] Outer Space Act (1986).[163] Id. Art. 27.[164] Id. Art. 29.[165] Id. Art. 29.[166] Law Concerning the National Space Development

Agency of Japan, Law No. 50 of June 23, 1969, as amended, Art. 42, available at PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, SPACE LAW § 24:1 (Thomson Re-uters/West 2011).

[167] Id at Art. 43. See also Fundamental Act of Out-er Space (Law No.43, 2008 of 27 August 2008); Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (Law No. 161 of 13th December 2002). COPUOS, Schematic Overview of National Regulatory Frameworks for Space Activities, A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.12 (24 March 2010).



[170] Stephan Hobe, Legal Aspects of Space Tourism, 86 NEB. L. REV. 439 (2007).

[171] See e.g., Meredith Blasingame, Nurturing the United States Commercial Space Industry in an International World: Conflicting State, Federal, And International Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 741 (2010).

[172] See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REG-ULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? (R. Jakhu, T. Sgob-ba & P. Dempsey ed., Springer 2011); and An-toine Pitts, Space Tourism Policy: Why the World’s Space-Faring Nations Should Adopt A Code of Conduct to Control Outer Space Activities, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 687 (2012).

[173] See Justin Silver, Houston, We Have a (Liability) Problem, 112 MICH. L. REV. 833 (2014); Michael R. Laisné, Space Entrepreneurs: Business Strate-gy, Risk, Law, and Policy in the Final Frontier, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1039 (2013), and Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and

Risk Management in the Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 397-98 (2009).

[174] If States do not believe that the existing Space Law Conventions have “adequate mechanisms to en-force the signed treaties, they may elect to attract space business by maintaining minimal environ-mental and safety regulations.” Adrian Taghdiri, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The Inadequacy of Current Inter-national Law to Address the Opportune Registra-tion of Space Vehicles in Flag States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405 (2014).

[175] “The interplay between domestic legislation and international law will become an increasingly im-portant theme in the development of international space law. This is especially true if the number of commercial actors proliferates as predicted. It should also be noted that as domestic law develops and defines items such as best practices for space flight providers, these developments can have in-fluence at the international level and on the devel-opment of soft law mechanisms.” P.J. Blount, Ren-ovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515 (2012).


OPTO- PYRO TRAINS FOR SPACE SYSTEMS - GAINS PROVIDED BY OPTO-PYRO TECHNOLOGY IN TERMS OF SAFETY ON LAUNCHERS

Bernard Chamayou1

1AIRBUS Defence & Space, 66 route de Verneuil, Les Mureaux, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

The Redesign of pyro train seems to be mandatory for next generation of European launchers, in order to be compliant with new requirements coming from:

• European community: health regulations, REACH and RoHs requirements …

• Agencies and customers: Cost reduction, Mass improvement, obsolescence risks reduction, ro-bust design and versatility for any mission…

• Prime contractors: Safety improvements for pyro supply chain and AIT teams, explosive trains monitoring, dual components …

• Pyro Industries: «continuous» manufacturing to guarantee knowledge and competencies for the whole life of launcher manufacturing

Maturation and developments done since 1970 concern-ing Optic, optronique and explosive systems highlighted great opportunities to merge these so matured technolo-gies into opto-pyrotechnic system. But at this moment the energy ratio of such optic emitters was too low, to be applied into a launch vehicle.

Since a decade great effort had been done by industries to provide more and more powerful laser emitters such as laser diodes for main data transmissions applications and strong needs rising from Industries, Aeronautics, Medi-cine, nuclear research

The maturity of powerful and miniaturized optic com-ponents becoming COTS at the beginning of year 2000 accelerate their integration into new field such as air-craft data transmission applications. In addition the very good REX acquired through end users operations (civil and military fields), allow aircraft companies to spread this optic technology into more and more safety functions.

The heritages coming from telecom and aircraft indus-tries allow to set up and spread new type of portative monitoring tools to check any optical harness, detecting in a safe way any failure transmission and localize with a cm class accuracy any weak connection.

The maturity level of optronique and the robustness dem-onstrated within a large range of applications give con-fidence to space engineers for analyzing its implementa-tion into space systems, with a guarantee of long term technologies availability.

The ability of optical fibre to transfer high amount of en-ergy given by a very small laser diode, allow pyro de-signers to implement this technology into the first ele-ment of the pyro train: the initiator.

This main evolution highlights several improvements on launcher pyro trains, increasing mainly their safety levels.

The safety advantages given by Opto-pyro are addressing several fields such as:

• Ground aspect during preparations and operations• Functional aspects• Industrial and Prime concerns

AIRBUS Defence & Space through ASTRIUM-ST and Aerospatiale studies has been actively involved into Op-to-pyro activities for a long time. The amount of Opto-pyro demonstration and justification has been accelerated since 2010 thanks to a special AIRBUS-DS R&T effort, focusing on TRL, IRL and MRL.

Step by step, AIRBUS-DS manage to set up Opto-pyro train maturation from TRL4-IRL1, based on demon-strators and representative demonstrations of launcher configuration.These on going demonstrations will lead to a TRL6-IRL3 level in 2014.

The higher safety level demonstrated by Opto-pyro train compared to the electro-pyro safety trains used on current space systems, allow implementing this new Opto-pyro technology on any new safety systems to be developed.


61


1. INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of space conquest, Pyrotechnic trains have been the key elements of space systems from launchers to satellites and spacecraft.By housing energetical materials into specifics pyrotechnical devices, engineers managed to faced the problem of launchers critical phases.For the whole mission, starting with on ground launcher ignition to the end of mission stage passivation, and for each criti-cal transient phase, current launchers commonly used pyrotechnics solutions to operate safely, in a very short time these difficult sequences: pyrotechnic remain the only technology able to perform launchers key functions

Figure 1

Specificity is also linked to their one shot mission with-out any major failure.

Their level of complexity is emphased with level of re-quirements concerning mission reliability, health regu-lations and safety regulation for their local launch port. That range of requirements makes the difference be-tween performances of pyro devices available for current launchers over the world.

Main disadvantages linked to space systems activities have to be targeted:

• No important manufacturing ratio regarding the quantity of space systems launched, and the amount of pyro devices for one space system

• Very low commonalities between products/func-tions/programs

• No re-use• Low duality• A geographical return activities oriented, that very

often lead to design One Function / One Equip-ment concept

The main advantages of these pyro trains is sum up in its small size equipments offering the high energy expected in the smallest volume and lowest mass, when activated over the safety level.The pyro equipments designed and developed for space since the sixties have been, within the fifty passed years, safety improved, performance increased and suited for each new space system architecture, on the basis of the same original product principle.AIRBUS Defence and Space by leading the prime con-tractor function, deliver to its customer an Ariane 5 launcher customized to each specific mission required, on quality and on time.This Prime role leads AIRBUS Defence & Space to pro-vide for each space systems under its responsibility the appropriate architecture with dedicated and selected pyro functions.By this way and since the last fifth decade, zero Pyro-technical accident occurred on its space systems. However, these systems are very complex with a design oriented on the main mission, and specifically compliant with regulations of their local launch port.

Other difficulties for space systems operations are direct-ly driven by pyrotechnic trains:

• Most of pyrotechnic trains are critical function in-ducing catastrophic events in case of premature firing

• Pyro train design, constrained by local safety reg-ulations

• The low electrical power available (low ratio Power/mass) lead Initiation train to generally use “Middle Energy” electric devices using Hot wire initiators loaded with sensitive primary explosives to be secured by heavy process to withstand possible and hazardous environmental levels

• One shot character• Device acceptance often need specific non de-

structive process analysis for device health moni-toring in order to achieve reliability demonstra-tion

• Poor maintainability performances• Small budget and not enough manufacturing vol-

ume lead to mono source suppliers • Non continuously manufacturing lead to organize

specific manufacturing batches• Small amounts of very specialized components• Need several pyro equipments to set up a train• Pyro train routed on very long distance regarding

launcher architecture• Without any monitoring possibility for pyro

trains, heavy pyro process are required to main-tain a successful AIT,

• Heavy training of pyro AIT team needed to main-tain safety and quality levels avoiding any “ac-custom” effects

• Several local health regulations leading more or less to friendly green energetical materials

These constraints don’t allow a unique and uni-versal pyro design for a same function.

Despites these elements, the current pyrotechnic systems got the advantages to:

• Be the unique solution for the time functioning required during flight mission

• Perfectly operate under space environments since the last fifty years!

For the next space system generation, perenity and obso-lescence risk reduction targeted, will lead to re-analyze available pyro solutions to comply with:

• New market expectations,• Customers and prime requirements,• Health and environmental regulations,

Any new space systems requirements will be focusing on ambitious requirements based on:

• Cost reduction (from hardware to AIT & Opera-tions) to stay on market price (Most available components are produced for the industrial and commercial markets),

• RAMS improvement and more particularly Safety level, Maintainability,…

• Performances• Mass and volume reduction,• Environmental regulations,• Design robustness to be manufactured during next

30 years of operations,• Upgradeability• …

Figure 2

Within a launcher budget, one can be aware that pyro-technic initiation systems are not the main drivers for improvements:

• Mass launcher contribution ≈ 0.2%• Cost launcher contribution ≈ 2%

However, any RAMS improvements concerning avail-ability, maintainability or safety of launcher pyro trains could relax current strong constraints such as safety con-cerns induced by the pyro network (pyro devices and electro-pyro initiators) spread allover the launcher stag-es, and needed for its whole life cycle. The pyro safety constraints have to be set up for each pyro technology, and customized for main operations such as: transporta-tion, storage, AIT, team training. This is one of the main drivers able to reduce process constraints such as AIT organization and duration …


62


1. INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of space conquest, Pyrotechnic trains have been the key elements of space systems from launchers to satellites and spacecraft.By housing energetical materials into specifics pyrotechnical devices, engineers managed to faced the problem of launchers critical phases.For the whole mission, starting with on ground launcher ignition to the end of mission stage passivation, and for each criti-cal transient phase, current launchers commonly used pyrotechnics solutions to operate safely, in a very short time these difficult sequences: pyrotechnic remain the only technology able to perform launchers key functions

Figure 1

Specificity is also linked to their one shot mission with-out any major failure.

Their level of complexity is emphased with level of re-quirements concerning mission reliability, health regu-lations and safety regulation for their local launch port. That range of requirements makes the difference be-tween performances of pyro devices available for current launchers over the world.

Main disadvantages linked to space systems activities have to be targeted:

• No important manufacturing ratio regarding the quantity of space systems launched, and the amount of pyro devices for one space system

• Very low commonalities between products/func-tions/programs

• No re-use• Low duality• A geographical return activities oriented, that very

often lead to design One Function / One Equip-ment concept

The main advantages of these pyro trains is sum up in its small size equipments offering the high energy expected in the smallest volume and lowest mass, when activated over the safety level.The pyro equipments designed and developed for space since the sixties have been, within the fifty passed years, safety improved, performance increased and suited for each new space system architecture, on the basis of the same original product principle.AIRBUS Defence and Space by leading the prime con-tractor function, deliver to its customer an Ariane 5 launcher customized to each specific mission required, on quality and on time.This Prime role leads AIRBUS Defence & Space to pro-vide for each space systems under its responsibility the appropriate architecture with dedicated and selected pyro functions.By this way and since the last fifth decade, zero Pyro-technical accident occurred on its space systems. However, these systems are very complex with a design oriented on the main mission, and specifically compliant with regulations of their local launch port.

Other difficulties for space systems operations are direct-ly driven by pyrotechnic trains:

• Most of pyrotechnic trains are critical function in-ducing catastrophic events in case of premature firing

• Pyro train design, constrained by local safety reg-ulations

• The low electrical power available (low ratio Power/mass) lead Initiation train to generally use “Middle Energy” electric devices using Hot wire initiators loaded with sensitive primary explosives to be secured by heavy process to withstand possible and hazardous environmental levels

• One shot character• Device acceptance often need specific non de-

structive process analysis for device health moni-toring in order to achieve reliability demonstra-tion

• Poor maintainability performances• Small budget and not enough manufacturing vol-

ume lead to mono source suppliers • Non continuously manufacturing lead to organize

specific manufacturing batches• Small amounts of very specialized components• Need several pyro equipments to set up a train• Pyro train routed on very long distance regarding

launcher architecture• Without any monitoring possibility for pyro

trains, heavy pyro process are required to main-tain a successful AIT,

• Heavy training of pyro AIT team needed to main-tain safety and quality levels avoiding any “ac-custom” effects

• Several local health regulations leading more or less to friendly green energetical materials

These constraints don’t allow a unique and uni-versal pyro design for a same function.

Despites these elements, the current pyrotechnic systems got the advantages to:

• Be the unique solution for the time functioning required during flight mission

• Perfectly operate under space environments since the last fifty years!

For the next space system generation, perenity and obso-lescence risk reduction targeted, will lead to re-analyze available pyro solutions to comply with:

• New market expectations,• Customers and prime requirements,• Health and environmental regulations,

Any new space systems requirements will be focusing on ambitious requirements based on:

• Cost reduction (from hardware to AIT & Opera-tions) to stay on market price (Most available components are produced for the industrial and commercial markets),

• RAMS improvement and more particularly Safety level, Maintainability,…

• Performances• Mass and volume reduction,• Environmental regulations,• Design robustness to be manufactured during next

30 years of operations,• Upgradeability• …

Figure 2

Within a launcher budget, one can be aware that pyro-technic initiation systems are not the main drivers for improvements:

• Mass launcher contribution ≈ 0.2%• Cost launcher contribution ≈ 2%

However, any RAMS improvements concerning avail-ability, maintainability or safety of launcher pyro trains could relax current strong constraints such as safety con-cerns induced by the pyro network (pyro devices and electro-pyro initiators) spread allover the launcher stag-es, and needed for its whole life cycle. The pyro safety constraints have to be set up for each pyro technology, and customized for main operations such as: transporta-tion, storage, AIT, team training. This is one of the main drivers able to reduce process constraints such as AIT organization and duration …


63


2. FOCUSING ON OPTO-PYRO TECHNOLOGY

For next generation of Space systems, innovative pyro technologies have been analyzed for initiation train, re-garding their ability to input the cut through needed to comply with ambitious requirements and bring improve-ments such as RAMS.

The Opto-pyro technology appears as the good candidate offering the best compromise for launcher pyro initiation functions, regarding improvement given at operation cost, safety and AIT level.The other solutions analyzed don’t demonstrate enough maturity and safety levels for short term applications.

At AIRBUS side, first Opto-pyro studies began in the 80’s with an Aerospatiale (AIRBUS DS) - GIAT (NEXTER) shared team for developing an optical initiator. These studies highlighted great advantages of opto-pyro as well at train level than system aspects. However at this moment this technology was not applicable on a space system be-cause of great impacts in terms of mass and volume: laser source not enough miniaturized, important power budget required for their functioning leading to oversized bat-tery. Within years 2000, the very fast improvements of electronic processes supported by a large deployment of electronic devices rise miniaturized laser source such as laser diode and small batteries, which allow boosting opti-cal technologies and industries related: data transmission, medicine, industries (welding, cutting …).

At this moment the technology maturity required for space systems, came from these new fields:

• Heritage of Optical data transmission / Telecom applications

• Important Market of Optical COTS supported by new Optical applications (industries, medicine, …)

• Miniaturization of Optical sources in High Power Laser Diodes

Figure 3

• Availability of High power Laser diode with Safe threshold current

• New batteries technologies improving ratio Energy/mass

• Optical power transmission by fibre networks• Progressive introduction of optics fibre into

airplanes replacing electric copper cables, to improve mass ratio

Optical Airbus heritage about optical harness inte-gration on Airplanes applications

Figure 4

• Successful Opto-pyro flight demonstration with CNES experience on Demeter Satellite

Figure 5

• Important heritage & acknowledgements from Partners and Sub-Co / Optical applications (Pro-cesses, High quality manufacturing, monitoring,

Figure 6

OPTO-PYRO raised again great interests but not as a new technology but as an innovation based on strong & matured technologies such as: Optronique, Optic and pyrotechnic. Implementation of their important heritages lead to opto-pyro technology

By analyzing results from several programs supporting Opto-pyro, it appeared that within activities and justifica-tions acquired during a decade, Opto-pyro technology is transferable on any safety architecture for space systems. The last system analysis phase concerning use of opto-pyrotechnic in avionics systems doesn’t raise any show stopper. In order to prepare decision making for next gen-eration of space systems, a maturation phase up to TRL6 – IRL2, was planed. After a first selection phase of partners, Airbus Defence & Space set up an opto-pyro roadmap for achieving maturation demonstration at end of 2014.

Figure 7

First principle was to design an opto-pyro train, totally interchangeable with existing pyro terminal functions, on an ex-isting space launcher. The study case was conducted on the A5 heavy launcher, due to the amount of pyro functions to be fulfilled. The second step was to adjust the opto-pyro train design in order to be implemented on the current avionic architecture with minimum impacts and with respect with safety requirements.

Figure 8


64


2. FOCUSING ON OPTO-PYRO TECHNOLOGY

For next generation of Space systems, innovative pyro technologies have been analyzed for initiation train, re-garding their ability to input the cut through needed to comply with ambitious requirements and bring improve-ments such as RAMS.

The Opto-pyro technology appears as the good candidate offering the best compromise for launcher pyro initiation functions, regarding improvement given at operation cost, safety and AIT level.The other solutions analyzed don’t demonstrate enough maturity and safety levels for short term applications.

At AIRBUS side, first Opto-pyro studies began in the 80’s with an Aerospatiale (AIRBUS DS) - GIAT (NEXTER) shared team for developing an optical initiator. These studies highlighted great advantages of opto-pyro as well at train level than system aspects. However at this moment this technology was not applicable on a space system be-cause of great impacts in terms of mass and volume: laser source not enough miniaturized, important power budget required for their functioning leading to oversized bat-tery. Within years 2000, the very fast improvements of electronic processes supported by a large deployment of electronic devices rise miniaturized laser source such as laser diode and small batteries, which allow boosting opti-cal technologies and industries related: data transmission, medicine, industries (welding, cutting …).

At this moment the technology maturity required for space systems, came from these new fields:

• Heritage of Optical data transmission / Telecom applications

• Important Market of Optical COTS supported by new Optical applications (industries, medicine, …)

• Miniaturization of Optical sources in High Power Laser Diodes

Figure 3

• Availability of High power Laser diode with Safe threshold current

• New batteries technologies improving ratio Energy/mass

• Optical power transmission by fibre networks• Progressive introduction of optics fibre into

airplanes replacing electric copper cables, to improve mass ratio

Optical Airbus heritage about optical harness inte-gration on Airplanes applications

Figure 4

• Successful Opto-pyro flight demonstration with CNES experience on Demeter Satellite

Figure 5

• Important heritage & acknowledgements from Partners and Sub-Co / Optical applications (Pro-cesses, High quality manufacturing, monitoring,

Figure 6

OPTO-PYRO raised again great interests but not as a new technology but as an innovation based on strong & matured technologies such as: Optronique, Optic and pyrotechnic. Implementation of their important heritages lead to opto-pyro technology

By analyzing results from several programs supporting Opto-pyro, it appeared that within activities and justifica-tions acquired during a decade, Opto-pyro technology is transferable on any safety architecture for space systems. The last system analysis phase concerning use of opto-pyrotechnic in avionics systems doesn’t raise any show stopper. In order to prepare decision making for next gen-eration of space systems, a maturation phase up to TRL6 – IRL2, was planed. After a first selection phase of partners, Airbus Defence & Space set up an opto-pyro roadmap for achieving maturation demonstration at end of 2014.

Figure 7

First principle was to design an opto-pyro train, totally interchangeable with existing pyro terminal functions, on an ex-isting space launcher. The study case was conducted on the A5 heavy launcher, due to the amount of pyro functions to be fulfilled. The second step was to adjust the opto-pyro train design in order to be implemented on the current avionic architecture with minimum impacts and with respect with safety requirements.

Figure 8


65


The scheme here under illustrate the fully interchange-ability of opto-pyro train between the unchanged electric train upstream, and the non modified pyro terminal func-tions downstream.Between the two vertical red lines, the opto pyro train is compared with the current electro-pyro one.

Fulfilling the FS/FS criterion, safety requirements de-mands three independent barriers on any Electro-pyro-technic train, whatever the life phases (storage, integra-tion, stand-by, tests…).

The Opto-pyro safety approach is also based on: • Different nature of safety barrier avoiding any

common failure mode,• 3 interceptions for the pyro fire signal for safety

allocation:For opto-pyro systems, the first two safety Barriers are electric (Electrical Safety Barriers: &) and, the ulti-mate one is Opto-mechanic (Optical Safety Barrier: ). In case of Electro-pyro systems the architecture of safety

barriers is the same, but with a Pyro-mechanic barrier for the ultimate one.The other safety principle requiring a technological and topological segregation between energies: functional one segregated from pyro activation, to have an intrinsically safe architecture and to avoid any risk of spreading a fail-ure, is also fully respected with the opto-pyro architec-ture.Due to the low sensibility of the optical harness and opto-pyro initiator (high energy initiator) vs accidental/hazardous environments, the last safety barrier: OSB is located as close as possible, and downstream to the electro-optical converter (Firing Unit), considering that the laser diode could be the weak component of the train, able to input a premature firing. On going studies will status about this hypothesis. As the safety barrier is located as close as the laser firing unit, this safety equipment can be centralized and shared for all the optic orders addressing terminal functions (ex-cept for neutralization trains which remain distributed in each stage).

The main philosophy for the ultimate safety barrier dedicated to an opto-pyro train can be described as:

Figure 9

Note that the case of a mechanical barrier required in A position is destructive regarding any pyro trainFor this reason the first activities was targeted on opto-initiator consolidation.

3. PRESENTATION OF THE SAFETY APPROACH FOR THE OPTO-PYRO TRAIN

Following the first positive result of AIRBUS DS sys-tem analysis concerning the implementation of Opto-pyro trains on launcher avionic system, the second step was dedicated to technical specifications consolidation with a special focus on Safety, Performances and Opera-tion improvements requirements. A validation process of technical specifications was set up with a dedicated task force including several experts (RAMS, Safeguard, mechanisms, mechanical, Electrical and Pyrotechnic design offices …). Then a consultation had been open through strong companies acknowledged in the fields of Electronics, Optronique, Optics and pyrotechnics. The dual applications targeted by AIRBUS DS, lead to select companies from France or Europe, able to deliver ITAR Free products compliant with technical specifications.In addition, without any R&T budget coming from agen-cies research program, it was decided at AIRBUS-DS R&T office to support this strategic Opto-pyro end of maturation activities, from existing TRL3/4 to TRL6, through common activities co-funded by AIRBUS DS & partner interested in, with short terms shared interests. Note that in parallel European space agency conduct also Opto-pyro maturation activities with one European partner KDA (Norway) through Future Launcher Prepa-ratory Program (FLPP), with a set of AIRBUS DS tech-nical specification for targeting an Opto-pyro train for an Ariane launcher.

The opto-pyro equipments development process was al-ways focusing on safety aspects, and started by the two safety key elements of the train: the Opto-initiator and the ultimate barrier.

The amount and barriers position are driven by:• Local safeguard regulation specifications,• Lessons learned by Prime from its Launcher ac-

tivities (at system and AIT levels)

4. OPTICAL INITIATORS: LID (LASER INITIATED DEVICE)

The initiation principle chosen for this opto-initiator is based on the conversion of optical power delivered through an optical fiber into thermal effect to react the first stage (safety pyro charge) of the initiator. Then the additional pyro charge (second stage of initiator) select-ed for the application needed: squib, igniter or detona-tor will convert the first pyro reaction into the output selected.

In order to manage an affordable optical power budget for the whole train, the optical requirement for LID ini-tiation is in the range of 0,8W- 1,5W. In addition it is required to design an optical module of initiator able to be selective between the dedicated fire wavelength and the one for monitoring. This optical module will be op-erating with low optical power at 20db below the firing power.

Figure 10

By selecting appropriate pyro charges, insensitive against launcher environments (normal, abnormal and hazard-ous), an opto-initiator had been set up.The design of this optical initiator is based on:

• An AIRBUS DS technical specification, allowing the implementation of that opto-initiator on exist-ing space systems

• A safety concept for detonators, develop and pat-ent by French-German institute: ISL

• A dedicated safety optical wavelength for moni-toring set up by SOURIAU into the optical module of initiator

• A dedicated fire wavelength for fire set up into the optical fibre (Harness and initiator optical mod-ule): an optical fibre manufactured and custom-ized by DRAKA compliant with Airbus technical specifications,

• Safety and low sensitivity pyro charges designed, customized and manufactured by NEXTER,

• Pyro charges sensitivity levels tested and certified by French DoD central laboratory

• A safety pig-tailed opto-initiator design by NEX-TER with integration of several stages (optic-safety-pyro), compliant with technical require-ments

• Performance tests to demonstrate the fully func-tions required, and safety tests for demonstration of non initiation conducted by NEXTER & ISL.


66


The scheme here under illustrate the fully interchange-ability of opto-pyro train between the unchanged electric train upstream, and the non modified pyro terminal func-tions downstream.Between the two vertical red lines, the opto pyro train is compared with the current electro-pyro one.

Fulfilling the FS/FS criterion, safety requirements de-mands three independent barriers on any Electro-pyro-technic train, whatever the life phases (storage, integra-tion, stand-by, tests…).

The Opto-pyro safety approach is also based on: • Different nature of safety barrier avoiding any

common failure mode,• 3 interceptions for the pyro fire signal for safety

allocation:For opto-pyro systems, the first two safety Barriers are electric (Electrical Safety Barriers: &) and, the ulti-mate one is Opto-mechanic (Optical Safety Barrier: ). In case of Electro-pyro systems the architecture of safety

barriers is the same, but with a Pyro-mechanic barrier for the ultimate one.The other safety principle requiring a technological and topological segregation between energies: functional one segregated from pyro activation, to have an intrinsically safe architecture and to avoid any risk of spreading a fail-ure, is also fully respected with the opto-pyro architec-ture.Due to the low sensibility of the optical harness and opto-pyro initiator (high energy initiator) vs accidental/hazardous environments, the last safety barrier: OSB is located as close as possible, and downstream to the electro-optical converter (Firing Unit), considering that the laser diode could be the weak component of the train, able to input a premature firing. On going studies will status about this hypothesis. As the safety barrier is located as close as the laser firing unit, this safety equipment can be centralized and shared for all the optic orders addressing terminal functions (ex-cept for neutralization trains which remain distributed in each stage).

The main philosophy for the ultimate safety barrier dedicated to an opto-pyro train can be described as:

Figure 9

Note that the case of a mechanical barrier required in A position is destructive regarding any pyro trainFor this reason the first activities was targeted on opto-initiator consolidation.

3. PRESENTATION OF THE SAFETY APPROACH FOR THE OPTO-PYRO TRAIN

Following the first positive result of AIRBUS DS sys-tem analysis concerning the implementation of Opto-pyro trains on launcher avionic system, the second step was dedicated to technical specifications consolidation with a special focus on Safety, Performances and Opera-tion improvements requirements. A validation process of technical specifications was set up with a dedicated task force including several experts (RAMS, Safeguard, mechanisms, mechanical, Electrical and Pyrotechnic design offices …). Then a consultation had been open through strong companies acknowledged in the fields of Electronics, Optronique, Optics and pyrotechnics. The dual applications targeted by AIRBUS DS, lead to select companies from France or Europe, able to deliver ITAR Free products compliant with technical specifications.In addition, without any R&T budget coming from agen-cies research program, it was decided at AIRBUS-DS R&T office to support this strategic Opto-pyro end of maturation activities, from existing TRL3/4 to TRL6, through common activities co-funded by AIRBUS DS & partner interested in, with short terms shared interests. Note that in parallel European space agency conduct also Opto-pyro maturation activities with one European partner KDA (Norway) through Future Launcher Prepa-ratory Program (FLPP), with a set of AIRBUS DS tech-nical specification for targeting an Opto-pyro train for an Ariane launcher.

The opto-pyro equipments development process was al-ways focusing on safety aspects, and started by the two safety key elements of the train: the Opto-initiator and the ultimate barrier.

The amount and barriers position are driven by:• Local safeguard regulation specifications,• Lessons learned by Prime from its Launcher ac-

tivities (at system and AIT levels)

4. OPTICAL INITIATORS: LID (LASER INITIATED DEVICE)

The initiation principle chosen for this opto-initiator is based on the conversion of optical power delivered through an optical fiber into thermal effect to react the first stage (safety pyro charge) of the initiator. Then the additional pyro charge (second stage of initiator) select-ed for the application needed: squib, igniter or detona-tor will convert the first pyro reaction into the output selected.

In order to manage an affordable optical power budget for the whole train, the optical requirement for LID ini-tiation is in the range of 0,8W- 1,5W. In addition it is required to design an optical module of initiator able to be selective between the dedicated fire wavelength and the one for monitoring. This optical module will be op-erating with low optical power at 20db below the firing power.

Figure 10

By selecting appropriate pyro charges, insensitive against launcher environments (normal, abnormal and hazard-ous), an opto-initiator had been set up.The design of this optical initiator is based on:

• An AIRBUS DS technical specification, allowing the implementation of that opto-initiator on exist-ing space systems

• A safety concept for detonators, develop and pat-ent by French-German institute: ISL

• A dedicated safety optical wavelength for moni-toring set up by SOURIAU into the optical module of initiator

• A dedicated fire wavelength for fire set up into the optical fibre (Harness and initiator optical mod-ule): an optical fibre manufactured and custom-ized by DRAKA compliant with Airbus technical specifications,

• Safety and low sensitivity pyro charges designed, customized and manufactured by NEXTER,

• Pyro charges sensitivity levels tested and certified by French DoD central laboratory

• A safety pig-tailed opto-initiator design by NEX-TER with integration of several stages (optic-safety-pyro), compliant with technical require-ments

• Performance tests to demonstrate the fully func-tions required, and safety tests for demonstration of non initiation conducted by NEXTER & ISL.


67


The safety pyro charge has been designed for insensitiv-ity towards environments and for an initiation capability limited to a high optical power: kW/cm² on a dedicated IR wavelength.

From mechanical aspects, the opto-pyro initiator is based on a robust and very simple design with a very few parts comparing to hot wire initiators. This contributes to in-crease its reliability, performances and low cost.

Note that for safety systems such as specific ones for space system, a low cost solution is not a cheap one, A low cost solution shall remain compliant with safety principle and reduce the amount of costly equipments by using COTS, heritage of other technology fields and ap-plications, …

Another safety principle introduced in the opto-deto-nators is a sterilization effects when submitted to hot temperatures: the pyro charges have been selected re-garding their sensitivity levels, performances and also thermal decomposition vs possible flight and accidental environments: in case of rising high temperature higher than 200°C the detonating stage (second stage) will de-compose without any detonating reaction before first stage reaction (≈ 400°C) that not allow any initiation of Pyro terminal functions and avoid any catastrophic effects

Figure 11

Figure 12

Figure 13

After setting up all fire and no fire levels for this opto-ini-tiator, safety test have been conducted in order to check its robustness against accidental and hazardous environ-ments:

• No degradation of No Fire level under hot tem-perature

• No degradation of No Fire level under long stay in hot temperature

• No Fire during and after fall down tests• No Fire during and after impact tests• No Fire during and after crushing tests

Tests conducted were successful.

By comparison with classical hot wire initiator currently used on space systems (electro-pyro technology), the opto-pyro initiators brings several safety advantages by avoiding any Initiator premature functioning from elec-trical disturbance:

• No more electrical continuity between energy source and energetic material (no pin, no wire), avoiding all type of electrical accident due to electri-cal discharges (ESD, electrical sparks, arcking …), Immunity to electromagnetic interferences (EMI on electric conductors induce current, cross-talk…), hazardous current (vagabond current, …), light-ning,

• Initiation only possible with a dedicated signal (to be created in wavelength, power, and shape) not available in normal environments

• Any gap on the optical path (disconnection, breaks, …) lead to a safety level, without any possibili-ties of firing the LID: 3dB of losses for any gap of 240 µm

Figure 14

As a conclusion for opto-initiator: Opto-pyro Devices are proven to be less sensitive

than Terminal Functions (and current items used on electro-pyro train such as Pyro transfer lines)

Not any safety blocking point for considering a translation of ultimate safety barrier from A posi-tion to another one upstream the Initiator.

5. OPTICAL HARNESS (OH)

At beginning of year 2000 main achievement through telecom application and optical networks maturity dem-onstration, lead aeronautic industries to implement op-tical harness on board (vs electrical ones), highlighting great advantages:

• Compactness & Mass saving with optical cable: Electrical copper quadrax = 40 g/m, Optical fibre

with 1.8 mm jacket = 4 g/m.

• Small dimensions of optical cable: Optical fibre is only 250 μm diameter and 1.8mm

with its outer jacket. Easier routing for Optical cable • ESD, EMI and lightning insensitivity: • Optical harness deployment on Aircraft: Increase of optical connectors amount on air-

crafts (Boeing, Airbus, …) ≈ 4 times more with-in 5 past years

Increase of optical cable length on aircrafts (Boeing, Airbus, …) ≈ 3 Km/plane with almost 300 links

The functioning principle of an optic fibre is to trans-mit a light wave signal through a physical pipe used as wave guide. This wave guide allow the transmission of reflected light thanks to two specific elements made with the same material, but with different refraction indexes in order to allow reflection and gives the best ratio for optical output:

• The core• The cladding

Figure 15

The optical cable is composed with several parts dedi-cated for optical transmission, and for fibre protection. Each of these technical parts contributes to the whole performance of the assembly, and shall be chosen regard-ing environmental conditions to be used.


68


The safety pyro charge has been designed for insensitiv-ity towards environments and for an initiation capability limited to a high optical power: kW/cm² on a dedicated IR wavelength.

From mechanical aspects, the opto-pyro initiator is based on a robust and very simple design with a very few parts comparing to hot wire initiators. This contributes to in-crease its reliability, performances and low cost.

Note that for safety systems such as specific ones for space system, a low cost solution is not a cheap one, A low cost solution shall remain compliant with safety principle and reduce the amount of costly equipments by using COTS, heritage of other technology fields and ap-plications, …

Another safety principle introduced in the opto-deto-nators is a sterilization effects when submitted to hot temperatures: the pyro charges have been selected re-garding their sensitivity levels, performances and also thermal decomposition vs possible flight and accidental environments: in case of rising high temperature higher than 200°C the detonating stage (second stage) will de-compose without any detonating reaction before first stage reaction (≈ 400°C) that not allow any initiation of Pyro terminal functions and avoid any catastrophic effects

Figure 11

Figure 12

Figure 13

After setting up all fire and no fire levels for this opto-ini-tiator, safety test have been conducted in order to check its robustness against accidental and hazardous environ-ments:

• No degradation of No Fire level under hot tem-perature

• No degradation of No Fire level under long stay in hot temperature

• No Fire during and after fall down tests• No Fire during and after impact tests• No Fire during and after crushing tests

Tests conducted were successful.

By comparison with classical hot wire initiator currently used on space systems (electro-pyro technology), the opto-pyro initiators brings several safety advantages by avoiding any Initiator premature functioning from elec-trical disturbance:

• No more electrical continuity between energy source and energetic material (no pin, no wire), avoiding all type of electrical accident due to electri-cal discharges (ESD, electrical sparks, arcking …), Immunity to electromagnetic interferences (EMI on electric conductors induce current, cross-talk…), hazardous current (vagabond current, …), light-ning,

• Initiation only possible with a dedicated signal (to be created in wavelength, power, and shape) not available in normal environments

• Any gap on the optical path (disconnection, breaks, …) lead to a safety level, without any possibili-ties of firing the LID: 3dB of losses for any gap of 240 µm

Figure 14

As a conclusion for opto-initiator: Opto-pyro Devices are proven to be less sensitive

than Terminal Functions (and current items used on electro-pyro train such as Pyro transfer lines)

Not any safety blocking point for considering a translation of ultimate safety barrier from A posi-tion to another one upstream the Initiator.

5. OPTICAL HARNESS (OH)

At beginning of year 2000 main achievement through telecom application and optical networks maturity dem-onstration, lead aeronautic industries to implement op-tical harness on board (vs electrical ones), highlighting great advantages:

• Compactness & Mass saving with optical cable: Electrical copper quadrax = 40 g/m, Optical fibre

with 1.8 mm jacket = 4 g/m.

• Small dimensions of optical cable: Optical fibre is only 250 μm diameter and 1.8mm

with its outer jacket. Easier routing for Optical cable • ESD, EMI and lightning insensitivity: • Optical harness deployment on Aircraft: Increase of optical connectors amount on air-

crafts (Boeing, Airbus, …) ≈ 4 times more with-in 5 past years

Increase of optical cable length on aircrafts (Boeing, Airbus, …) ≈ 3 Km/plane with almost 300 links

The functioning principle of an optic fibre is to trans-mit a light wave signal through a physical pipe used as wave guide. This wave guide allow the transmission of reflected light thanks to two specific elements made with the same material, but with different refraction indexes in order to allow reflection and gives the best ratio for optical output:

• The core• The cladding

Figure 15

The optical cable is composed with several parts dedi-cated for optical transmission, and for fibre protection. Each of these technical parts contributes to the whole performance of the assembly, and shall be chosen regard-ing environmental conditions to be used.


69


Figure 16 The optical harness gathered the several optical cables to allow their best protection for routing inside the host ve-hicle, and got optical connectors at each ends to be con-nected to optical equipments.

Figure 17

A selection of COTS already used in Aeronautics (AIR-BUS, BOEING…) or Telecom data transfers (from ground to submarine routing) has been tested in labs in order to select best compromise between existing heri-tages (optical standard parts already qualified through aeronautic applications …), performances, costs, peren-ity…and space systems requirements

A technical specification for optical harness was submit-ted to R&T partners selected: DRAKA-SOURIAU, in order to manufacture prototypes, tests them and analyses their compliances to requirements.Optical harness (OH) requirements have taken into ac-count the AIT lessons learned from electrical harness and pyro transfer lines of current space systems.OH has been design in a robust way from existing cots and process already qualified, coming from industry and Aeronautic.

Several optical cables have been designed in order to ful-fill all the harness needs for launcher stages. These cables have been manufactured with qualified existing process used for aeronautic cable. Optical cable designed are now available to set up architecture of opto-pyro trains:

• 24 path optical harness• Distribution fixture from 24 path to 3 x 8 paths• 8 path optical harness• Simplex harness for endings

At first, preliminary environmental lab tests (thermal, mechanical …) on cable parts allow selecting the best candidates.Additional mechanical test have been conducted on cable and harness assemblies with the selected items, follow-ing European norms EN 3745 applied for Aircraft cable to check:

• Cold-bend test• Cut-through test • Cable tensile strength• Impact resistance• Flexure endurance• Bending test• Torsion test• Crush resistance test• Resistance to fluids

Figure 18

6. OPTICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS ON OPTICAL HARNESS (OH) TRANSMISSION

Figure 19

Special conditions are required for transmitting an opti-cal signal without losses:

• Clean interface between contacts

• Polished contacts without any cracks or defects

• Optical ends in contact to avoid any major optical losses

• Contacts aligned between emitter and receiver, without angular of parallel defects

Figure 20

In case of not respect of these conditions the system re-main safe because of no optical transmission

For analyzing the possible influence of optical environments, a preliminary list of critical environments for pyro equip-ments on space systems is set up in order to focus optical environments to be characterized:

Figure 21


70


Figure 16 The optical harness gathered the several optical cables to allow their best protection for routing inside the host ve-hicle, and got optical connectors at each ends to be con-nected to optical equipments.

Figure 17

A selection of COTS already used in Aeronautics (AIR-BUS, BOEING…) or Telecom data transfers (from ground to submarine routing) has been tested in labs in order to select best compromise between existing heri-tages (optical standard parts already qualified through aeronautic applications …), performances, costs, peren-ity…and space systems requirements

A technical specification for optical harness was submit-ted to R&T partners selected: DRAKA-SOURIAU, in order to manufacture prototypes, tests them and analyses their compliances to requirements.Optical harness (OH) requirements have taken into ac-count the AIT lessons learned from electrical harness and pyro transfer lines of current space systems.OH has been design in a robust way from existing cots and process already qualified, coming from industry and Aeronautic.

Several optical cables have been designed in order to ful-fill all the harness needs for launcher stages. These cables have been manufactured with qualified existing process used for aeronautic cable. Optical cable designed are now available to set up architecture of opto-pyro trains:

• 24 path optical harness• Distribution fixture from 24 path to 3 x 8 paths• 8 path optical harness• Simplex harness for endings

At first, preliminary environmental lab tests (thermal, mechanical …) on cable parts allow selecting the best candidates.Additional mechanical test have been conducted on cable and harness assemblies with the selected items, follow-ing European norms EN 3745 applied for Aircraft cable to check:

• Cold-bend test• Cut-through test • Cable tensile strength• Impact resistance• Flexure endurance• Bending test• Torsion test• Crush resistance test• Resistance to fluids

Figure 18

6. OPTICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS ON OPTICAL HARNESS (OH) TRANSMISSION

Figure 19

Special conditions are required for transmitting an opti-cal signal without losses:

• Clean interface between contacts

• Polished contacts without any cracks or defects

• Optical ends in contact to avoid any major optical losses

• Contacts aligned between emitter and receiver, without angular of parallel defects

Figure 20

In case of not respect of these conditions the system re-main safe because of no optical transmission

For analyzing the possible influence of optical environments, a preliminary list of critical environments for pyro equip-ments on space systems is set up in order to focus optical environments to be characterized:

Figure 21


71


By inputting optical power transmitted by environment emitters on the optical train, for appropriate distance (and for optimistic configuration regarding numerical aperture of Optical fibre), the comparison of the No-Fire opto-initiator level to the optical power received will conclude about any risks of premature firing under environments.

This analyze conclude about safety margins remaining between maximal source effects and no fire level of:

• 20dB for all normal and accidental environments• A safety factor more than 6 for abnormal environ-

ment (Sun focalized with a magnification x 20 in the axis of optical fibre (very low probability for occurrence)

As a conclusion for optical Harness (HO): Optical Cables cannot capture and drive any

amount of Spurious Light liable to fire the Opto pyro Devices

Not any safety blocking point for moving the ulti-mate safety Barrier from B position to another one upstream the optical harness close to the Laser Di-ode which could becomes the source of danger

7. OPTICAL SAFETY BARRIER (OSB)

The Optical interception principle chosen for this Optical safety Barrier is based on the same principle than current Safe and Arm Device used on space system for the safety of electro-pyro trains: the principle is a physical intercep-tion of the signal.An optical Safety Barrier technical specification was sub-mitted by AIRBUS-DS to its R&T partner: SOURIAU in order to manufacture prototypes and analyses their com-pliances to requirements.

The Optical Safety Barrier requirements have taken into account the AIT lessons learned from electro-pyro trains of current space systems, such as:

• Status (Armed/disarmed) of Optical Safety Bar-rier is transmitted to ground system by electrical sensor,

• Direct visual information is given to the AIT oper-ator by a colored indicator on OSB (Red/Armed; Green/Disarmed).

• OSB got a safety system which forbids any con-nection in armed position, to avoid any cata-

Figure 22

A characterization phase of maximal optical power available with existing optical sources meet in a space system environ-ments (Ariane 5 launcher environment) determine maximal values and associated wavelength which could be collected by opto-pyro train and transmitted through the optical harness to the opto-initiator:

strophic accident during last connection of the harness bringing optical power from LFU (Laser Firing Unit),

• For emergency situation one can manually dis-armed the OSB.

Considering that the safety barrier can be located up-stream from optical harness (demonstration given here under), it will be located as close as the LFU. That al-low to get a centralize architecture, with few safety bar-rier able to cut simultaneously a great amount of orders (more than 70 orders). But for Neutralization train OSB will be decentralized in each stage with dedicated con-figuration. OSB have been design in a robust way from existing cots and process coming from space sys-tems (Electrical parts: sensor, actuator; design philoso-phy…) and Aeronautics (optical parts: connectors …). The same type of optical fibre than for OH has been se-lected for OSB.

Test already conducted highlighted compliances to re-quirements:

• No Cross talks• No optical transmission in disarmed position• very low optical losses when transmitting in

armed position • No thermal effects• Possible manual disarming• Robustness to optical power (twice maximal

power value tested) • Very short time for arming-disarming• …

The OSB design could be adjusted to the amount of opti-cal orders needed. The two specimens here after are designed for interrupt-ing 72 and 48 optical orders simultaneously:

Figure 23

In addition presentation meetings were organized by AIRBUS with safety and safeguard authorities from Space activities (Kourou safeguard authorities) and De-fence activities (French DoD) to describe:

• Methodology about Safety Barriers,• Justifications already acquired,

in order to gather advices and recommendations concern-

ing implementation and operations of opto-pyro on space systems. No show stopper was addressed by civilian and Defence safety regulations.

To conclude about the safety barrier (OSB) design se-lected:

Optical Safety Barrier allow the interception of high power optical orders (more than 25W)

OSB design can be adjusted to the amount of opti-cal path to be intercepted (from 1 to 96)

OSB cannot capture and drive any amount of Spu-rious Light liable to fire the Opto pyro Devices (same demonstration than for Optical Harness)

8. LASER FIRING UNIT (LFU)

The Laser Firing Unit principle is to remain in a safety position (no optical emission) without any command or-ders. When command orders are received LFU has to ad-dress the specific Pyro function(s) selected, and finally fired with the dedicated power Laser diode to input the right optical power into the selected optical train.

The LFU shall be suited to the launcher avionic system type:

• Centralized with LFU functions implemented on electronic card of Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA),

• Decentralized with a self standing equipment LFU to be integrated on launcher stage.

The LFU will integrate the Electro-Optic converters based on Laser diodes and drivers. For current LFU designs, optical switches allowing several optical ad-dressing from a same laser diode are not been taken into account due to their maturity levels and low robustness margin under critical environments. The current LFU design is based on one diode for one pyro initiation.The optical power of laser diode is increasing every year with important gaps, and offers now very good COTS suitable for LFU needs. This market supported by indus-tries and telecom needs is now delivering a range of laser diode up to 80W.First investigation on laser diode COTS lead to select a few ones regarding their results under environmental tests.A second selection phase with Destructive physical anal-ysis (DPA) leads to select final candidates.Investigations have now to be achieved concerning Laser diode failure modes and ability to spontaneously emit a spurious light.Expert people are quite agreeing to not consider this case


72


By inputting optical power transmitted by environment emitters on the optical train, for appropriate distance (and for optimistic configuration regarding numerical aperture of Optical fibre), the comparison of the No-Fire opto-initiator level to the optical power received will conclude about any risks of premature firing under environments.

This analyze conclude about safety margins remaining between maximal source effects and no fire level of:

• 20dB for all normal and accidental environments• A safety factor more than 6 for abnormal environ-

ment (Sun focalized with a magnification x 20 in the axis of optical fibre (very low probability for occurrence)

As a conclusion for optical Harness (HO): Optical Cables cannot capture and drive any

amount of Spurious Light liable to fire the Opto pyro Devices

Not any safety blocking point for moving the ulti-mate safety Barrier from B position to another one upstream the optical harness close to the Laser Di-ode which could becomes the source of danger

7. OPTICAL SAFETY BARRIER (OSB)

The Optical interception principle chosen for this Optical safety Barrier is based on the same principle than current Safe and Arm Device used on space system for the safety of electro-pyro trains: the principle is a physical intercep-tion of the signal.An optical Safety Barrier technical specification was sub-mitted by AIRBUS-DS to its R&T partner: SOURIAU in order to manufacture prototypes and analyses their com-pliances to requirements.

The Optical Safety Barrier requirements have taken into account the AIT lessons learned from electro-pyro trains of current space systems, such as:

• Status (Armed/disarmed) of Optical Safety Bar-rier is transmitted to ground system by electrical sensor,

• Direct visual information is given to the AIT oper-ator by a colored indicator on OSB (Red/Armed; Green/Disarmed).

• OSB got a safety system which forbids any con-nection in armed position, to avoid any cata-

Figure 22

A characterization phase of maximal optical power available with existing optical sources meet in a space system environ-ments (Ariane 5 launcher environment) determine maximal values and associated wavelength which could be collected by opto-pyro train and transmitted through the optical harness to the opto-initiator:

strophic accident during last connection of the harness bringing optical power from LFU (Laser Firing Unit),

• For emergency situation one can manually dis-armed the OSB.

Considering that the safety barrier can be located up-stream from optical harness (demonstration given here under), it will be located as close as the LFU. That al-low to get a centralize architecture, with few safety bar-rier able to cut simultaneously a great amount of orders (more than 70 orders). But for Neutralization train OSB will be decentralized in each stage with dedicated con-figuration. OSB have been design in a robust way from existing cots and process coming from space sys-tems (Electrical parts: sensor, actuator; design philoso-phy…) and Aeronautics (optical parts: connectors …). The same type of optical fibre than for OH has been se-lected for OSB.

Test already conducted highlighted compliances to re-quirements:

• No Cross talks• No optical transmission in disarmed position• very low optical losses when transmitting in

armed position • No thermal effects• Possible manual disarming• Robustness to optical power (twice maximal

power value tested) • Very short time for arming-disarming• …

The OSB design could be adjusted to the amount of opti-cal orders needed. The two specimens here after are designed for interrupt-ing 72 and 48 optical orders simultaneously:

Figure 23

In addition presentation meetings were organized by AIRBUS with safety and safeguard authorities from Space activities (Kourou safeguard authorities) and De-fence activities (French DoD) to describe:

• Methodology about Safety Barriers,• Justifications already acquired,

in order to gather advices and recommendations concern-

ing implementation and operations of opto-pyro on space systems. No show stopper was addressed by civilian and Defence safety regulations.

To conclude about the safety barrier (OSB) design se-lected:

Optical Safety Barrier allow the interception of high power optical orders (more than 25W)

OSB design can be adjusted to the amount of opti-cal path to be intercepted (from 1 to 96)

OSB cannot capture and drive any amount of Spu-rious Light liable to fire the Opto pyro Devices (same demonstration than for Optical Harness)

8. LASER FIRING UNIT (LFU)

The Laser Firing Unit principle is to remain in a safety position (no optical emission) without any command or-ders. When command orders are received LFU has to ad-dress the specific Pyro function(s) selected, and finally fired with the dedicated power Laser diode to input the right optical power into the selected optical train.

The LFU shall be suited to the launcher avionic system type:

• Centralized with LFU functions implemented on electronic card of Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA),

• Decentralized with a self standing equipment LFU to be integrated on launcher stage.

The LFU will integrate the Electro-Optic converters based on Laser diodes and drivers. For current LFU designs, optical switches allowing several optical ad-dressing from a same laser diode are not been taken into account due to their maturity levels and low robustness margin under critical environments. The current LFU design is based on one diode for one pyro initiation.The optical power of laser diode is increasing every year with important gaps, and offers now very good COTS suitable for LFU needs. This market supported by indus-tries and telecom needs is now delivering a range of laser diode up to 80W.First investigation on laser diode COTS lead to select a few ones regarding their results under environmental tests.A second selection phase with Destructive physical anal-ysis (DPA) leads to select final candidates.Investigations have now to be achieved concerning Laser diode failure modes and ability to spontaneously emit a spurious light.Expert people are quite agreeing to not consider this case


73


as a probable one, but for safety reasons this topic remain under studies to conclude.In case of safety behaviour of Laser diodes, it could be analyzed a possible translation of the ultimate safety Bar-rier from C positions to D one upstream the Laser Diode. In this case the replacement of current optical safety Bar-rier by an Electro-Mechanical Barrier could be analyzed on a safety point of view.

9. TESTS METHODS FOR MONITORING OPTO-PYRO TRAIN

Several methods are daily used for monitoring and check-ing process of optical train on Aeronautic industries. These matured methods are fully applicable and compliant with safety requirements for an Opto-pyro train such as:

Figure 24

10. CONCLUSION

Taking advantage of the high Safety level of Opto-pyro-technic Devices and new possibilities offered by Optic systems, it is possible to design new Opto-pyrotechnic architectures that fulfil the Safety « root » requirements (and especially FS/FS criterion), meeting the spirit of Safety RegulationsThanks to a special R&T effort: Opto-pyro is now com-pliant with ambitious requirements for next generation systems:

• Technology Maturity: TRL 5 (TRL6 in first quar-ter 2015)

• Safety improvements• Compliant with safety regulations• Operation Cost improvements • Mass saving • Fully interchangeable with existing systems

(Functional performances demonstrated)

Opto-pyro is suitable to any systems with high safety level (from air to space systems)

First implementation of Opto-pyro technologies on space systems have recently been presented to customers for next generation of systems.

SATELLITE INFLATABLE DEORBITING EQUIPMENT FOR LEO SPACECRAFTS

Benjamin Rasse1, Patrice Damilano2, Christian Dupuy3

1Airbus Defence and Space, rue du Général Niox 33165 St Médard en Jalles (France) Email: [email protected]

2Airbus Defence and Space, 31 rue des Cosmonautes 31402 Toulouse (France) Email: [email protected]

3CNES, 18 avenue Edouard Belin 31401 Toulouse Cedex 9 France Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Debris remediation and mitigation is one of the biggest challenges space engineering has to face today. Debris removal is taken into account as early as during the de-sign phase of a space system by selecting the right ma-terials, including the need for demise in the design and introducing de-orbiting strategies and corresponding subsystems. Today Airbus Defence and Space dedi-cates part of its activity to the development of a passive de-orbiting subsystem embedded in LEO satellites (al-titude ~ 750 km). Based on the IDEAS in-flight proto-type (currently in phase D with a qualification campaign completed mid 2014) developed in the framework of the CNES MICROSCOPE project, the subsystem consists in the deployment of aero-braking membranes by an inflat-able boom made of aluminium laminate at the end of the spacecraft’s operational life. On this basis, the system optimization - with different geometries of the deorbiting subsystem - is carried out to ensure re-entry in less than 25 years with a minimum impact on architectural design of the vehicle. Airbus Defence and Space’s final objec-tive is to address the market with “off-the-shelf” flight-ready deorbiting equipment meeting the requirements of the forthcoming Space Debris French legislation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Debris remediation and mitigation is one of the biggest challenges space engineering has to face today. Debris removal is taken into account as early as during the de-sign phase of a space system by selecting the right ma-terials, including the need for demise in the design and introducing de-orbiting strategies and corresponding subsystems. An increasing number of spacecraft are now

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on low earth orbit (LEO). As a consequence of space-craft fragmentation, a growing population of orbital de-bris has been induced. Therefore spacecraft shall be de-orbited at the end of their operational lives to lower the amount of orbital debris. A new legislation, the French Space Act relating to space operations (decree in June 2009, applicable in 2021), requires that the systems must be designed, produced and implemented so that, once the space object has completed its operational phase, it is de-orbited , preferably with a controlled atmospheric re-entry, but in case of impossibility of meeting this re-quirement, it must be designed and implemented so that it is no longer present in orbit twenty-five years after the end of the operational phase with a uncontrolled atmo-spheric re-entry. A certification office led by CNES will be in charge of checking the decree application. Today Airbus Defence and Space dedicates part of its activity to the development of a passive de-orbiting subsystem embedded in LEO satellites (altitude ~ 750 km) and compliant with the French legislation. This paper will first present the inflatable passive deor-biting equipment IDEAS which has been developed in the framework of the MICROSCOPE mission (300-kg, circular orbit 700-km). The programme is in phase D and the flight model is to be delivered by the end of 2014. The subsystem will be operational and flight-proven by the end of 2017. It consists of two inflatable 4.70 m booms, each deploying two aero-braking membranes. An exten-sive qualification campaign of the material and subsys-tem has been carried out following ESA-CNES regula-tions and TRL7/8 is now considered achieved. Based on IDEAS, mass reduction and new architectures have then been investigated in order to improve re-en-try performances. The modularity and scalability of the technology enables the system’s adaptation onto various panel geometries and satellite classes. In this framework,


74


as a probable one, but for safety reasons this topic remain under studies to conclude.In case of safety behaviour of Laser diodes, it could be analyzed a possible translation of the ultimate safety Bar-rier from C positions to D one upstream the Laser Diode. In this case the replacement of current optical safety Bar-rier by an Electro-Mechanical Barrier could be analyzed on a safety point of view.

9. TESTS METHODS FOR MONITORING OPTO-PYRO TRAIN

Several methods are daily used for monitoring and check-ing process of optical train on Aeronautic industries. These matured methods are fully applicable and compliant with safety requirements for an Opto-pyro train such as:

Figure 24

10. CONCLUSION

Taking advantage of the high Safety level of Opto-pyro-technic Devices and new possibilities offered by Optic systems, it is possible to design new Opto-pyrotechnic architectures that fulfil the Safety « root » requirements (and especially FS/FS criterion), meeting the spirit of Safety RegulationsThanks to a special R&T effort: Opto-pyro is now com-pliant with ambitious requirements for next generation systems:

• Technology Maturity: TRL 5 (TRL6 in first quar-ter 2015)

• Safety improvements• Compliant with safety regulations• Operation Cost improvements • Mass saving • Fully interchangeable with existing systems

(Functional performances demonstrated)

Opto-pyro is suitable to any systems with high safety level (from air to space systems)

First implementation of Opto-pyro technologies on space systems have recently been presented to customers for next generation of systems.

SATELLITE INFLATABLE DEORBITING EQUIPMENT FOR LEO SPACECRAFTS

Benjamin Rasse1, Patrice Damilano2, Christian Dupuy3

1Airbus Defence and Space, rue du Général Niox 33165 St Médard en Jalles (France) Email: [email protected]

2Airbus Defence and Space, 31 rue des Cosmonautes 31402 Toulouse (France) Email: [email protected]

3CNES, 18 avenue Edouard Belin 31401 Toulouse Cedex 9 France Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Debris remediation and mitigation is one of the biggest challenges space engineering has to face today. Debris removal is taken into account as early as during the de-sign phase of a space system by selecting the right ma-terials, including the need for demise in the design and introducing de-orbiting strategies and corresponding subsystems. Today Airbus Defence and Space dedi-cates part of its activity to the development of a passive de-orbiting subsystem embedded in LEO satellites (al-titude ~ 750 km). Based on the IDEAS in-flight proto-type (currently in phase D with a qualification campaign completed mid 2014) developed in the framework of the CNES MICROSCOPE project, the subsystem consists in the deployment of aero-braking membranes by an inflat-able boom made of aluminium laminate at the end of the spacecraft’s operational life. On this basis, the system optimization - with different geometries of the deorbiting subsystem - is carried out to ensure re-entry in less than 25 years with a minimum impact on architectural design of the vehicle. Airbus Defence and Space’s final objec-tive is to address the market with “off-the-shelf” flight-ready deorbiting equipment meeting the requirements of the forthcoming Space Debris French legislation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Debris remediation and mitigation is one of the biggest challenges space engineering has to face today. Debris removal is taken into account as early as during the de-sign phase of a space system by selecting the right ma-terials, including the need for demise in the design and introducing de-orbiting strategies and corresponding subsystems. An increasing number of spacecraft are now



on low earth orbit (LEO). As a consequence of space-craft fragmentation, a growing population of orbital de-bris has been induced. Therefore spacecraft shall be de-orbited at the end of their operational lives to lower the amount of orbital debris. A new legislation, the French Space Act relating to space operations (decree in June 2009, applicable in 2021), requires that the systems must be designed, produced and implemented so that, once the space object has completed its operational phase, it is de-orbited , preferably with a controlled atmospheric re-entry, but in case of impossibility of meeting this re-quirement, it must be designed and implemented so that it is no longer present in orbit twenty-five years after the end of the operational phase with a uncontrolled atmo-spheric re-entry. A certification office led by CNES will be in charge of checking the decree application. Today Airbus Defence and Space dedicates part of its activity to the development of a passive de-orbiting subsystem embedded in LEO satellites (altitude ~ 750 km) and compliant with the French legislation. This paper will first present the inflatable passive deor-biting equipment IDEAS which has been developed in the framework of the MICROSCOPE mission (300-kg, circular orbit 700-km). The programme is in phase D and the flight model is to be delivered by the end of 2014. The subsystem will be operational and flight-proven by the end of 2017. It consists of two inflatable 4.70 m booms, each deploying two aero-braking membranes. An exten-sive qualification campaign of the material and subsys-tem has been carried out following ESA-CNES regula-tions and TRL7/8 is now considered achieved. Based on IDEAS, mass reduction and new architectures have then been investigated in order to improve re-en-try performances. The modularity and scalability of the technology enables the system’s adaptation onto various panel geometries and satellite classes. In this framework,


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performance assessment has been done to cover Myri-ades and Myriades Evolution spacecraft classes (100-500 kg) at a typical SSO orbit between 700 and 800 km. Hereinafter, a review of the functional and design assets provided by passive de-orbiting equipment is done with the aim to provide the satellite system engineer with a clear overview during the early phase of design (phase A). In the following, the satellite inflatable de-orbiting equipment will be called SIDE (Satellite Inflatable Deor-biting Equipment).

2. IDEAS DEORBITING SYSTEM

The IDEAS aero-braking system is a GOSSAMER struc-ture designed to be deployed as post mission disposal in order to increase the ballistic coefficient (ratio mass/ surface) of the MICROSCOPE satellite (CNES) and to allow re-entry within 25 years. The IDEAS develop-ment has been carried out jointly with Air Liquide for the inflating subsystem, Airbus Defence and Space for the deployable assembly and with the CNES as system and project coordinator. The MICROSCOPE launch is scheduled for the first semester 2016 and the post mis-sion disposal should take place at the end of 2017.

2.1. IDEAS Architecture

The IDEAS system is made of three subsystems: the in-flating subsystem and two booms/sails subsystems (see Fig. 1).Each boom/sails subsystem weights 6.7 kg and the com-mon inflating subsystem 3.1 kg for a total mass of 16.5 kg.

The inflating subsystem’s main component is a titanium tank containing 133 g of N2 at 190 bars in order to in-flate the two booms (193 litres) up to 300 mbars pressure. Three pyro-valves complete the subsystem to first deploy at 50 mbars and then rigidify the booms at 300 mbars. A constant leakage in the subsystem allows a full flush-ing-out of the booms after 24 hours. The boom-sails subsystem is made of a 4.7 m boom (diameter: 0.16 m) , two 1.85-m² sails each and a Hold-Down Release Mechanism (HDRM). The boom material is polyimide-aluminium laminate (130 µm thick) with a thin SiOx coating to protect the polyimide against ATOX corrosion. Its mass is 248 g/m². By inflating the boom with a 300 mbars pressure, the strain in the boom mate-rial is beyond its yielding point. After release of the pres-sure, the deployed assembly keeps a residual stiffness exactly like a soda can.The sails are also made of a polyimide-aluminium lami-nate but only 50 µm thick. Each face is coated with SiOx and its mass is around 100 g/m². Once deployed, the membranes interact with the thin upper atmosphere and create a drag force which accelerates the re-entry. The thermo-optical properties of the polyimide shall limit the membrane temperature under solar exposureIn the stowed configuration, the boom is maintained by the HDRM (see Fig.2), which consists of a low-shock pyro-bolt called Pyrosoft. Before the inflating phase, the Pyrosoft is fired and the strap is opened, enabling boom deployment. The deployment dynamic is controlled and guided through a subsystem called TADECS (Tetrago-nal Accordion Deployment Control System), inserted in the folded boom, which releases the folds one-by-one (see Fig.2). TADECS is a patent-filed by Airbus De-fence and Space.

Fig. 1. Inflating subsystem (left) and stowed boom-sail subsystem (right)



As shown in Fig.3, the IDEAS system is set-up on +X MICROSCOPE’s panel. The booms are deployed with a 21° angle w.r.t vertical. This configuration ensures an average aerodynamic surface of 5 m² in tumbling dynam-ics for the MICROSCOPE satellite. The introduced angle minimizes the variation around this mean value.

Fig. 3. Microscope satellite after IDEAS deployment

2.2. Materials testing

Sustaining LEO space environment during 25 years is the main driver behind the new materials introduced by IDEAS. Therefore, an extensive Airbus-CNES joint characterization and qualification campaign has been performed on the sail membrane and the boom materials. The tests included:

• Outgassing tests done w.r.t E-ECSS-Q-70-02-A. The table below summarizes the results

Table 1 : Outgassing test resultsMaterial Test Results Test Status

Boom laminateTML = 1,3%, RML = 0,20%CVCM = 0,02 %

ECSS-Q-ST-70-02C OK

Sail membraneTML = 0,22%, ML = 0,09%CVCM = 0,00%

ECSS-Q-ST-70-02C OK

• Ageing tests including humidity and thermal cy-cling tests. No damage was noted on the membrane and the boom laminate. The ageing tests did not de-grade the material’s mechanical performances.

• Radiation tests with 41 Mrad-82 Mrad doses w.r.t ECSS-Q-ST-70-06C. No damages were observed on the material or the bonding joints.

• Micrometeoroid impact to assess rip risk. The mi-cro-meteoroid campaign demonstrated that impacts in the aluminium are ductile (see Fig. 4) and that there is no risk of rip propagation. Based on the MASTER-2005 tool, the space debris cumulative flux (particles > 1 µm) seen by the membranes is estimated at 1.36.104/m2/year leading to a surface loss smaller than 0.1% over a 25 year period.

• ATOX resistance tests. The protection provided by the SiOx coating appears to be efficient. No signifi-cant mass loss was noted after ATOX exposition.

• Folding tests. Superficial cracks and fragments of the SiOx coating were observed after the folding and compacting process (see Fig.4). The laminate polyimide-aluminium foil was also partially dis-rupted at bends. These defaults are not deemed critical to the membrane’s integrity.

• Thermal expansion coefficient evaluation. • Thermo-optical properties.

Fig. 2. HDRM (left), folded boom (right)

Pyrosoft

Strap

LockingMechanism


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performance assessment has been done to cover Myri-ades and Myriades Evolution spacecraft classes (100-500 kg) at a typical SSO orbit between 700 and 800 km. Hereinafter, a review of the functional and design assets provided by passive de-orbiting equipment is done with the aim to provide the satellite system engineer with a clear overview during the early phase of design (phase A). In the following, the satellite inflatable de-orbiting equipment will be called SIDE (Satellite Inflatable Deor-biting Equipment).

2. IDEAS DEORBITING SYSTEM

The IDEAS aero-braking system is a GOSSAMER struc-ture designed to be deployed as post mission disposal in order to increase the ballistic coefficient (ratio mass/ surface) of the MICROSCOPE satellite (CNES) and to allow re-entry within 25 years. The IDEAS develop-ment has been carried out jointly with Air Liquide for the inflating subsystem, Airbus Defence and Space for the deployable assembly and with the CNES as system and project coordinator. The MICROSCOPE launch is scheduled for the first semester 2016 and the post mis-sion disposal should take place at the end of 2017.

2.1. IDEAS Architecture

The IDEAS system is made of three subsystems: the in-flating subsystem and two booms/sails subsystems (see Fig. 1).Each boom/sails subsystem weights 6.7 kg and the com-mon inflating subsystem 3.1 kg for a total mass of 16.5 kg.

The inflating subsystem’s main component is a titanium tank containing 133 g of N2 at 190 bars in order to in-flate the two booms (193 litres) up to 300 mbars pressure. Three pyro-valves complete the subsystem to first deploy at 50 mbars and then rigidify the booms at 300 mbars. A constant leakage in the subsystem allows a full flush-ing-out of the booms after 24 hours. The boom-sails subsystem is made of a 4.7 m boom (diameter: 0.16 m) , two 1.85-m² sails each and a Hold-Down Release Mechanism (HDRM). The boom material is polyimide-aluminium laminate (130 µm thick) with a thin SiOx coating to protect the polyimide against ATOX corrosion. Its mass is 248 g/m². By inflating the boom with a 300 mbars pressure, the strain in the boom mate-rial is beyond its yielding point. After release of the pres-sure, the deployed assembly keeps a residual stiffness exactly like a soda can.The sails are also made of a polyimide-aluminium lami-nate but only 50 µm thick. Each face is coated with SiOx and its mass is around 100 g/m². Once deployed, the membranes interact with the thin upper atmosphere and create a drag force which accelerates the re-entry. The thermo-optical properties of the polyimide shall limit the membrane temperature under solar exposureIn the stowed configuration, the boom is maintained by the HDRM (see Fig.2), which consists of a low-shock pyro-bolt called Pyrosoft. Before the inflating phase, the Pyrosoft is fired and the strap is opened, enabling boom deployment. The deployment dynamic is controlled and guided through a subsystem called TADECS (Tetrago-nal Accordion Deployment Control System), inserted in the folded boom, which releases the folds one-by-one (see Fig.2). TADECS is a patent-filed by Airbus De-fence and Space.

Fig. 1. Inflating subsystem (left) and stowed boom-sail subsystem (right)



As shown in Fig.3, the IDEAS system is set-up on +X MICROSCOPE’s panel. The booms are deployed with a 21° angle w.r.t vertical. This configuration ensures an average aerodynamic surface of 5 m² in tumbling dynam-ics for the MICROSCOPE satellite. The introduced angle minimizes the variation around this mean value.

Fig. 3. Microscope satellite after IDEAS deployment

2.2. Materials testing

Sustaining LEO space environment during 25 years is the main driver behind the new materials introduced by IDEAS. Therefore, an extensive Airbus-CNES joint characterization and qualification campaign has been performed on the sail membrane and the boom materials. The tests included:

• Outgassing tests done w.r.t E-ECSS-Q-70-02-A. The table below summarizes the results

Table 1 : Outgassing test resultsMaterial Test Results Test Status

Boom laminateTML = 1,3%, RML = 0,20%CVCM = 0,02 %

ECSS-Q-ST-70-02C OK

Sail membraneTML = 0,22%, ML = 0,09%CVCM = 0,00%

ECSS-Q-ST-70-02C OK

• Ageing tests including humidity and thermal cy-cling tests. No damage was noted on the membrane and the boom laminate. The ageing tests did not de-grade the material’s mechanical performances.

• Radiation tests with 41 Mrad-82 Mrad doses w.r.t ECSS-Q-ST-70-06C. No damages were observed on the material or the bonding joints.

• Micrometeoroid impact to assess rip risk. The mi-cro-meteoroid campaign demonstrated that impacts in the aluminium are ductile (see Fig. 4) and that there is no risk of rip propagation. Based on the MASTER-2005 tool, the space debris cumulative flux (particles > 1 µm) seen by the membranes is estimated at 1.36.104/m2/year leading to a surface loss smaller than 0.1% over a 25 year period.

• ATOX resistance tests. The protection provided by the SiOx coating appears to be efficient. No signifi-cant mass loss was noted after ATOX exposition.

• Folding tests. Superficial cracks and fragments of the SiOx coating were observed after the folding and compacting process (see Fig.4). The laminate polyimide-aluminium foil was also partially dis-rupted at bends. These defaults are not deemed critical to the membrane’s integrity.

• Thermal expansion coefficient evaluation. • Thermo-optical properties.

Fig. 2. HDRM (left), folded boom (right)

Pyrosoft

Strap

LockingMechanism


77




Table 2 : Thermo-optical propertiesMaterial Absorptance

αEmissivity

εN

Test

Sail membrane 0.362 0.685 ECSS-Q-

ST-70-09C

All these tests have demonstrated the ability of the IDEAS materials to sustain space environment during 25 years without creating debris or fragments.

Fig. 4.Micrometeroid impact (top) and SiOx coating cracks after folding (bottom)

2.3. Subsystem testing

The IDEAS qualification was performed on a flight rep-resentative EQM model in compliance with the ECSS-E-10-03A rules. The test campaign consisted of:

• Sinus and random vibration (see Fig. 5)• Shock test

• Thermal vacuum cycling• Leak test• Functional deployment and rigidization test• Mechanical performances of the deployed boom

Fig. 5. Instrumented EQM model before vibration campaign and MLI integration

The environment testing demonstrated the robustness of the IDEAS mechanical design and results were in line with test predictions. The HDRM opening test (see Fig. 6) validated the strap motorization, the strap locking mechanism after open-ing and the Multi Layers Insulation (MLI) design. Sub-sequently the deployment was nominally performed in 323 seconds without any blocking point or deviation of the boom axis. Rigidization was correctly achieved with a 300 mbar pressure: external aspect of the boom was smooth with no folding. (see Fig. 6)

Fig. 6. EQM model after HDRM release (left) and after full deployment (right)



The last step of the test campaign consisted in evaluating the boom’s mechanical properties. The maximal com-pression load before buckling was 22.5 N. The bending test was performed by applying a transverse effort to the boom’s top extremity. The maximal bending moment be-fore buckling was 8 N.m.This mechanical stiffness and resistance are deemed suf-ficient to withstand in-orbit loads after the deployment due to aerodynamic pressure and spacecraft spin.

Fig. 7. Plastic deformation upon maximal bending stress

3. NEW ARCHITECTURES PROPOSALS

Thanks to the achievements done during the IDEAS proj-ect, several optimizations of the system have been identi-fied. Based on the IDEAS building blocks, a study was performed in order to reach a better ballistic ratio (Sdeployed / Msystem) for SIDE and to integrate panel accommodation constraints.One of the main aspects of the SIDE mechanical design is the modularity (see Fig. 8) and scalability of its main components so as to be easily accommodated on all types of spacecraft:

• The length of the boom can be extended up to 10 m in order to increase the deployed sail area if needed

• The number of sails attached to the boom can be increased (see Fig.8)

• The attachment angle of each sail to the boom can be adapted to the spacecraft panel’s specificities

• The width of the sail can be extended up to 1.20 m. Its length is not limited.

• The boom’s angle of deployment can vary from 0° up to 50° w.r.t panel normal by changing the base’s structural piece

Fig. 8. SIDE modularity examples

Typically implemented on the +X panel, the stowed equipment height is around 300 mm. An accommodation on Y or Z panel can be easily envisaged.

With the feedback from the IDEAS design, possibilities of mass savings have been investigated:

• Simplification of the inflating subsystem by merg-ing the inflating and the rigidization fluidic lines. The boom deployment and rigidization will be done in a single phase.

• HDRM re-design by introducing a second pyro-bolt and suppressing the strap and its locking mech-anism.

• Review of heavy mechanical parts which can be optimized


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Table 2 : Thermo-optical propertiesMaterial Absorptance

αEmissivity

εN

Test

Sail membrane 0.362 0.685 ECSS-Q-

ST-70-09C

All these tests have demonstrated the ability of the IDEAS materials to sustain space environment during 25 years without creating debris or fragments.

Fig. 4.Micrometeroid impact (top) and SiOx coating cracks after folding (bottom)

2.3. Subsystem testing

The IDEAS qualification was performed on a flight rep-resentative EQM model in compliance with the ECSS-E-10-03A rules. The test campaign consisted of:

• Sinus and random vibration (see Fig. 5)• Shock test

• Thermal vacuum cycling• Leak test• Functional deployment and rigidization test• Mechanical performances of the deployed boom

Fig. 5. Instrumented EQM model before vibration campaign and MLI integration

The environment testing demonstrated the robustness of the IDEAS mechanical design and results were in line with test predictions. The HDRM opening test (see Fig. 6) validated the strap motorization, the strap locking mechanism after open-ing and the Multi Layers Insulation (MLI) design. Sub-sequently the deployment was nominally performed in 323 seconds without any blocking point or deviation of the boom axis. Rigidization was correctly achieved with a 300 mbar pressure: external aspect of the boom was smooth with no folding. (see Fig. 6)

Fig. 6. EQM model after HDRM release (left) and after full deployment (right)



The last step of the test campaign consisted in evaluating the boom’s mechanical properties. The maximal com-pression load before buckling was 22.5 N. The bending test was performed by applying a transverse effort to the boom’s top extremity. The maximal bending moment be-fore buckling was 8 N.m.This mechanical stiffness and resistance are deemed suf-ficient to withstand in-orbit loads after the deployment due to aerodynamic pressure and spacecraft spin.

Fig. 7. Plastic deformation upon maximal bending stress

3. NEW ARCHITECTURES PROPOSALS

Thanks to the achievements done during the IDEAS proj-ect, several optimizations of the system have been identi-fied. Based on the IDEAS building blocks, a study was performed in order to reach a better ballistic ratio (Sdeployed / Msystem) for SIDE and to integrate panel accommodation constraints.One of the main aspects of the SIDE mechanical design is the modularity (see Fig. 8) and scalability of its main components so as to be easily accommodated on all types of spacecraft:

• The length of the boom can be extended up to 10 m in order to increase the deployed sail area if needed

• The number of sails attached to the boom can be increased (see Fig.8)

• The attachment angle of each sail to the boom can be adapted to the spacecraft panel’s specificities

• The width of the sail can be extended up to 1.20 m. Its length is not limited.

• The boom’s angle of deployment can vary from 0° up to 50° w.r.t panel normal by changing the base’s structural piece

Fig. 8. SIDE modularity examples

Typically implemented on the +X panel, the stowed equipment height is around 300 mm. An accommodation on Y or Z panel can be easily envisaged.

With the feedback from the IDEAS design, possibilities of mass savings have been investigated:

• Simplification of the inflating subsystem by merg-ing the inflating and the rigidization fluidic lines. The boom deployment and rigidization will be done in a single phase.

• HDRM re-design by introducing a second pyro-bolt and suppressing the strap and its locking mech-anism.

• Review of heavy mechanical parts which can be optimized


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From these mass optimizations two architectures have been defined which cover the mini-satellite category (100 kg -500 kg):

• A mono-boom architecture, called SIDE-1, with an 8-metre boom which provides an extra aerody-namic surface of 5.35 m² for a mass around 8 kg. This configuration is compatible with satellites up to 250 kg

• A bi-booms architecture, called SIDE-2, with two 6.5-metre booms which provide an extra aerody-namic surface of 7 m² for a mass around 12 kg.

4. RE-ENTRY PERFORMANCES

Passive re-entry performances were assessed by Airbus Defence and Space for satellites on circular SSO orbits (typical inclination of 98.8°) between 700 and 800 km. The study was also limited to mini-satellites (100-500 kg) which likely do not exceed the specified limit of hu-man casualties of 0.01% per uncontrolled re-entry. In this case, an uncontrolled de-orbit is permissible.The performance evaluation was performed with the STELA software which is the reference tool used by CNES for re-entry duration. (See [2]). The used atmo-sphere model was the NRLMSISE-00. The main as-

sumption used in the simulation was a constant mean so-lar activity (Flux F10.7 = 140). This assumption allowed to study cases of re-entry which were de-correlated from the solar activity and independent from the starting date. The spacecraft model was identical to the MICRO-SCOPE spacecraft (see Fig.1) with a minimal surface of 0.6 m², a maximal surface of 2.2 m² and a mean surface in tumbling configuration of 1.65 m². Relative attitude of the spacecraft re-entry was computed independently and re-injected in the STELA tool by hybridizing the drag coefficient file. The Fig.9 shows the typical re-entry of a 250-kg space-craft with SIDE-1. De-orbiting is done in 26 years in-stead of 126 years without SIDE system. Due to its over-all geometry, the satellite will topple as soon as the aero-dynamics drag will supersede the others forces involved in the spacecraft’s attitude stability. This flipping point shall be low enough (around 500-525 km) in order to fin-ish the re-entry with a minimal aerodynamic surface in less than 25 years.

Both architectures were benchmarked with IDEAS and de-orbiting strategy using a high-thrust impulsive Hohm-ann-type manoeuvre that sent the spacecraft onto an el-liptic orbit with a 25-year remaining lifetime. According to [1], this solution leads to a minimal ΔV requirement

Fig. 9. 250 kg-Satellite, Initial altitude 750 km, SIDE-1



for satellites where an uncontrolled re-entry is admis-sible. [1] has also demonstrated that monopropellant thrusters seem to be the best trade-off taking into account availability , maturity level and performances. Fig.10 shows the domains for SIDE-1 (resp. SIDE-2) respecting the 25 years re-entry criterion. Two abacuses representing the de-orbiting performances of 7 kg (resp. 12 kg) have been added so as to compare the performanc-es of SIDE to an equivalent mass of hydrazine.

Up to 750 km altitude, there is no real mass penalty to embark a SIDE-1 or SIDE-2 on a satellite with a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem. Beyond this altitude, SIDE loses its efficiency in comparison to thrusters.

5. INFLATABLE DE-ORBITING SYSTEM ASSETS

In order to be compliant with the coming legislations imposing a re-entry in less than 25 years, most of the spacecraft will likely propose to use the chemical propul-sion subsystem for the post mission disposal (see [1]). The SIDE equipment offers anyway specific advantages

which worth to be taken into consideration in the space-craft design and mission.

5.1. Fail-Safe Deorbiting Subsystem

One major asset of the proposed de-orbiting subsystem in comparison with propulsion subsystems is the ability to perform post mission disposal on loss of the satellite. The SIDE can be linked to Hardware Watchdog (WD) which triggers the boom release and its inflation in case of a major failure (battery failure, OBC failure). No en-ergy (except the pyro signals) is required to perform sail-boom deployment.The subsystem is also efficient in case of attitude control loss (propulsion subsystem major failure, AOC equip-ment failure) and is more reliable than a braking thrust which requires full operability and is hazardous at EOL.The boom can also act as de-tumbling device by modify-ing the spacecraft inertia and can enable attitude stabili-zation (Earth communication, Sun direction) even if this will cause the re-entry to start earlier than expected.Finally SIDE provides a functional redundancy to the de-orbiting function done typically by the propulsion sub-system and improves re-entry reliability.

Fig. 10. 25 years re-entry criterion domains


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From these mass optimizations two architectures have been defined which cover the mini-satellite category (100 kg -500 kg):

• A mono-boom architecture, called SIDE-1, with an 8-metre boom which provides an extra aerody-namic surface of 5.35 m² for a mass around 8 kg. This configuration is compatible with satellites up to 250 kg

• A bi-booms architecture, called SIDE-2, with two 6.5-metre booms which provide an extra aerody-namic surface of 7 m² for a mass around 12 kg.

4. RE-ENTRY PERFORMANCES

Passive re-entry performances were assessed by Airbus Defence and Space for satellites on circular SSO orbits (typical inclination of 98.8°) between 700 and 800 km. The study was also limited to mini-satellites (100-500 kg) which likely do not exceed the specified limit of hu-man casualties of 0.01% per uncontrolled re-entry. In this case, an uncontrolled de-orbit is permissible.The performance evaluation was performed with the STELA software which is the reference tool used by CNES for re-entry duration. (See [2]). The used atmo-sphere model was the NRLMSISE-00. The main as-

sumption used in the simulation was a constant mean so-lar activity (Flux F10.7 = 140). This assumption allowed to study cases of re-entry which were de-correlated from the solar activity and independent from the starting date. The spacecraft model was identical to the MICRO-SCOPE spacecraft (see Fig.1) with a minimal surface of 0.6 m², a maximal surface of 2.2 m² and a mean surface in tumbling configuration of 1.65 m². Relative attitude of the spacecraft re-entry was computed independently and re-injected in the STELA tool by hybridizing the drag coefficient file. The Fig.9 shows the typical re-entry of a 250-kg space-craft with SIDE-1. De-orbiting is done in 26 years in-stead of 126 years without SIDE system. Due to its over-all geometry, the satellite will topple as soon as the aero-dynamics drag will supersede the others forces involved in the spacecraft’s attitude stability. This flipping point shall be low enough (around 500-525 km) in order to fin-ish the re-entry with a minimal aerodynamic surface in less than 25 years.

Both architectures were benchmarked with IDEAS and de-orbiting strategy using a high-thrust impulsive Hohm-ann-type manoeuvre that sent the spacecraft onto an el-liptic orbit with a 25-year remaining lifetime. According to [1], this solution leads to a minimal ΔV requirement

Fig. 9. 250 kg-Satellite, Initial altitude 750 km, SIDE-1



for satellites where an uncontrolled re-entry is admis-sible. [1] has also demonstrated that monopropellant thrusters seem to be the best trade-off taking into account availability , maturity level and performances. Fig.10 shows the domains for SIDE-1 (resp. SIDE-2) respecting the 25 years re-entry criterion. Two abacuses representing the de-orbiting performances of 7 kg (resp. 12 kg) have been added so as to compare the performanc-es of SIDE to an equivalent mass of hydrazine.

Up to 750 km altitude, there is no real mass penalty to embark a SIDE-1 or SIDE-2 on a satellite with a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem. Beyond this altitude, SIDE loses its efficiency in comparison to thrusters.

5. INFLATABLE DE-ORBITING SYSTEM ASSETS

In order to be compliant with the coming legislations imposing a re-entry in less than 25 years, most of the spacecraft will likely propose to use the chemical propul-sion subsystem for the post mission disposal (see [1]). The SIDE equipment offers anyway specific advantages

which worth to be taken into consideration in the space-craft design and mission.

5.1. Fail-Safe Deorbiting Subsystem

One major asset of the proposed de-orbiting subsystem in comparison with propulsion subsystems is the ability to perform post mission disposal on loss of the satellite. The SIDE can be linked to Hardware Watchdog (WD) which triggers the boom release and its inflation in case of a major failure (battery failure, OBC failure). No en-ergy (except the pyro signals) is required to perform sail-boom deployment.The subsystem is also efficient in case of attitude control loss (propulsion subsystem major failure, AOC equip-ment failure) and is more reliable than a braking thrust which requires full operability and is hazardous at EOL.The boom can also act as de-tumbling device by modify-ing the spacecraft inertia and can enable attitude stabili-zation (Earth communication, Sun direction) even if this will cause the re-entry to start earlier than expected.Finally SIDE provides a functional redundancy to the de-orbiting function done typically by the propulsion sub-system and improves re-entry reliability.

Fig. 10. 25 years re-entry criterion domains


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5.2. Hydrazine tank threshold effect and Mission life extension

As mentioned in §4, there is no mass penalty to embark a specific inflatable de-orbiting equipment aside a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem. On one hand, by suppressing this hydrazine mass (around 30% of the volume), it could be possible to change the propellant tank to a smaller one (hence the so called “tank threshold effect”). The consequences are the following:

• Cost reduction • Mass gain beyond the hydrazine mass • Internal accommodation volume gain, opening new

scale factor gains. By taking into account the SIDE equipment at the very beginning of the design, a more compact satellite can be defined with unexpected mass gain.

On the other hand, SIDE is also a good solution to ex-tend the spacecraft’s lifetime without changing its de-sign (added hydrazine, tank size). The spared hydrazine is then dedicated to the operational life of the satellite instead of the re-entry. Typically 30% of the embedded hydrazine is used for reentry operation. This roughly cor-responds to a 30% increase of lifetime.

5.3. Mixed re-entry strategies

At iso-architecture (hydrazine mass, satellite mass), the SIDE equipment opens the flight domain of the satellite to higher altitudes. A mixed reentry strategy consists of a first lowering of the perigee to an altitude where the SIDE system is efficient and then to deploy SIDE. The reentry will proceed nominally with the passive re-entry. Mixed re-entry strategies are consistent with a global op-timization including hydrazine tank threshold effect.As an example, a 250-kg satellite at 715 km needs 7 kg hydrazine to perform an uncontrolled reentry within 25 years by lowering its perigee to 496 km. By combining a braking manoeuvre to lower the perigee and then the deployment of a mono-boom SIDE-1, the satellite can start at 870 km:

• First decrease the perigee to 660 km with 7 kg of hydrazine

• Then deploy the aero-braking sail to finish the un-controlled re-entry within less than 25 years

If the satellite performs reentry using thrusters only, it needs 14 kg of hydrazine to decrease the perigee down to 450 km.

5.4. Re-entry Operations Costs

A major advantage of SIDE in comparison with thrusters braking manoeuvre is the simplicity of the operations to be carried out.The deployment sequence of SIDE can be triggered on a single TC “Fire & Forget” without parameter and its completion lasts less than 10 minutes, meaning that the whole process will be completed during a single ground station visibility window. Only a reduced OPS team is necessary to perform the re-entry. On the contrary, transferring a spacecraft to an elliptical orbit with thrusters requires a lot of preparation, a com-plete OPS team and several ground stations visibilities. After the braking boost, the final orbit shall still be as-sessed with ground infrastructures. Finally the de-orbit-ing cost of the spacecraft with thrusters could exceed the cost of a SIDE system itself.

6. CONCLUSION

The technology of passive aero-braking re-entry devel-oped by Airbus Defence & Space in the frame of IDEAS project funded by CNES has reached today a high level of maturity (TRL7/8) and shall be “mission proven” in 2017. By developing new architectures based on these building blocks, Airbus Defence & Space proposes light-weight, low cost deorbiting equipment for mini-satellites (100kg-500 kg), filling the requirements of space legisla-tion which comes into effect in 2021. Satellite inflatable deorbiting equipment seems to be a competitive alternative to thrusters for all mini-satellites up to 750 km altitude. The addition of a de-orbit function on a spacecraft has in most cases a significant effect on satellite design; SIDE appears to be a low cost, reliable and lightweight solution. Embarking SIDE aside a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem can also be envisaged as it provides potential spacecraft design optimization such as tank size reduction and operation cost savings. This study was intended to highlight also the functional advantages of SIDE and to provide a global overview of its performances (mass, re-entry duration) to the satellite architect in the early phase of spacecraft design. Howev-er the selection of SIDE will have to be made in case by case taking into account the spacecraft mass, its altitude and the space availability on external panels.



7. REFERENCES

References

[1] R.Janovsky et al, “End-Of-Life De-orbiting Strat-egies for Satellites”,OHB System : ESA-contract 15316/01/NL/CK in press

[2] STELA User’s Guide version 2.5 October 2013 CNES

Acknowledgements

The work presented in this paper was performed by Air-bus Defence and Space and CNES in the frame of the IDEAS programme.


82




5.2. Hydrazine tank threshold effect and Mission life extension

As mentioned in §4, there is no mass penalty to embark a specific inflatable de-orbiting equipment aside a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem. On one hand, by suppressing this hydrazine mass (around 30% of the volume), it could be possible to change the propellant tank to a smaller one (hence the so called “tank threshold effect”). The consequences are the following:

• Cost reduction • Mass gain beyond the hydrazine mass • Internal accommodation volume gain, opening new

scale factor gains. By taking into account the SIDE equipment at the very beginning of the design, a more compact satellite can be defined with unexpected mass gain.

On the other hand, SIDE is also a good solution to ex-tend the spacecraft’s lifetime without changing its de-sign (added hydrazine, tank size). The spared hydrazine is then dedicated to the operational life of the satellite instead of the re-entry. Typically 30% of the embedded hydrazine is used for reentry operation. This roughly cor-responds to a 30% increase of lifetime.

5.3. Mixed re-entry strategies

At iso-architecture (hydrazine mass, satellite mass), the SIDE equipment opens the flight domain of the satellite to higher altitudes. A mixed reentry strategy consists of a first lowering of the perigee to an altitude where the SIDE system is efficient and then to deploy SIDE. The reentry will proceed nominally with the passive re-entry. Mixed re-entry strategies are consistent with a global op-timization including hydrazine tank threshold effect.As an example, a 250-kg satellite at 715 km needs 7 kg hydrazine to perform an uncontrolled reentry within 25 years by lowering its perigee to 496 km. By combining a braking manoeuvre to lower the perigee and then the deployment of a mono-boom SIDE-1, the satellite can start at 870 km:

• First decrease the perigee to 660 km with 7 kg of hydrazine

• Then deploy the aero-braking sail to finish the un-controlled re-entry within less than 25 years

If the satellite performs reentry using thrusters only, it needs 14 kg of hydrazine to decrease the perigee down to 450 km.

5.4. Re-entry Operations Costs

A major advantage of SIDE in comparison with thrusters braking manoeuvre is the simplicity of the operations to be carried out.The deployment sequence of SIDE can be triggered on a single TC “Fire & Forget” without parameter and its completion lasts less than 10 minutes, meaning that the whole process will be completed during a single ground station visibility window. Only a reduced OPS team is necessary to perform the re-entry. On the contrary, transferring a spacecraft to an elliptical orbit with thrusters requires a lot of preparation, a com-plete OPS team and several ground stations visibilities. After the braking boost, the final orbit shall still be as-sessed with ground infrastructures. Finally the de-orbit-ing cost of the spacecraft with thrusters could exceed the cost of a SIDE system itself.

6. CONCLUSION

The technology of passive aero-braking re-entry devel-oped by Airbus Defence & Space in the frame of IDEAS project funded by CNES has reached today a high level of maturity (TRL7/8) and shall be “mission proven” in 2017. By developing new architectures based on these building blocks, Airbus Defence & Space proposes light-weight, low cost deorbiting equipment for mini-satellites (100kg-500 kg), filling the requirements of space legisla-tion which comes into effect in 2021. Satellite inflatable deorbiting equipment seems to be a competitive alternative to thrusters for all mini-satellites up to 750 km altitude. The addition of a de-orbit function on a spacecraft has in most cases a significant effect on satellite design; SIDE appears to be a low cost, reliable and lightweight solution. Embarking SIDE aside a mono-propellant propulsion subsystem can also be envisaged as it provides potential spacecraft design optimization such as tank size reduction and operation cost savings. This study was intended to highlight also the functional advantages of SIDE and to provide a global overview of its performances (mass, re-entry duration) to the satellite architect in the early phase of spacecraft design. Howev-er the selection of SIDE will have to be made in case by case taking into account the spacecraft mass, its altitude and the space availability on external panels.



7. REFERENCES

References

[1] R.Janovsky et al, “End-Of-Life De-orbiting Strat-egies for Satellites”,OHB System : ESA-contract 15316/01/NL/CK in press

[2] STELA User’s Guide version 2.5 October 2013 CNES

Acknowledgements

The work presented in this paper was performed by Air-bus Defence and Space and CNES in the frame of the IDEAS programme.


83


MITIGATION RULES COMPLIANCE IN LOW EARTH ORBIT

Vincent Morand(1), Juan-Carlos Dolado-Perez(1), Thomas Philippe(1), David-Alexis Handschuh(2)

(1)CNES (French Space Center), 18 avenue Edouard Belin, 31401 Toulouse Cedex 9, France, +33561282905, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

(2)CNES (French Space Center), Launchers Directorate, 52 rue Jacques Hillairet, 75612 Paris Cedex, France, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Space debris mitigation is one of the French Space Oper-ations Act objectives, through the removal of non-opera-tional objects from populated regions. At the end of their mission, space objects are to be placed on orbits that will reduce collision hazards with other spacecraft or debris.This paper presents our investigations on mitigation guidelines compliance in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) by space operators from 2000 to 2013. We are particularly interested in studying the expected decrease of the mid- and long-term collision risk in LEO, through the applica-tion of the 25 years rule or the reaching of a graveyard orbit above this region.We have identified space objects ending their mission during the period of interest and estimated their orbital lifetime. We obtain a global compliance rate and analyze its evolution over a 14 years period.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the very beginning of the space era, human activi-ties have led to place into orbit more than forty thousand space items. These objects are of a great variety, going from several tons spacecraft to Cubesats. However, less than 7% of orbiting objects are still considered today as operational. This implies that the in-orbit population is mainly dominated by space debris of various sizes, rather than active spacecraft, and their growing number increas-es the probability of collision hazards, as illustrated by the loss in 2009 of the operational Iridium-33 satellite after the collision with the inactive Kosmos-2251. Such dramatic events create a large amount of new debris, corrupting durably the given space area, as already ex-pressed by Kessler et al. in 1978 [1].Therefore, space debris mitigation becomes a topic of primary importance for the preservation of the space en-vironment and for the space systems operations safety, especially in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). Objects removal from these regions once their missions are terminated is today a common practice to mitigate the growth of the debris population.In the last two decades, several actions have been under-

taken in order to restrict the expected growth of the debris population. In France, the French Space Operations Act (FSOA) [2] came into force in 2010 with Space debris mitigations being one of its objectives. At international level, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) [3] and the Inter-Agency Space De-bris Coordination Committee (IADC) [4] published their mitigation guidelines respectively in 2007 and 2002. In the FSOA, two protected regions have been defined, as shown in Fig.1:

A. The LEO protected region, which is the area with the highest space debris population density, is de-fined by an altitude lower than 2000 km;

B. The GEO protected region is defined by an altitude within 200 km of the geostationary altitude, and an absolute value of inclination inferior to 15°.

Figure 1. LEO and GEO protected regions

The French Space Operations Act states that a satellite or launcher element placed on an orbit crossing the LEO protected region shall reenter the Earth atmosphere by performing a controlled re-entry, or, if impossibility to do so is duly proven, to reenter the atmosphere no later than 25 years after its end of mission date [2].This paper focuses on the mitigation guidelines compli-ance analysis in the LEO protected region, for all space operators. The LEO region is the one with the highest objects spatial density, and consequently with the highest probability of collision between objects orbiting through this region, as presented in Fig. 2.

Figure 2. Spatial density as a function of altitude in protected region A

Once we have computed the mitigation guidelines com-pliance rate for LEO objects orbiting the Earth, we can use these statistics together with the long-term projec-tions of the Earth’s satellite population and the expected evolution of the Post-Mission Disposal (PMD) compli-ance rate, in order to evaluate if the efforts made to in-crease the global compliance with mitigation guidelines in LEO are already noticeable, and if such efforts are good enough to guarantee the long term sustainability of space activities.

1.1. Expected increase of the PMD compliance

Even if the number of objects orbiting the Earth has in-creased steadily since the launch of the first satellite in space, mainly due to new launches or explosions, the global dimension of the problem affecting the long term sustainability of space activities has not been understood until recent times.Starting in the 90s, such awareness has motivated new initiatives to limit the proliferation of space debris. How-ever, national mitigation guidelines were not published until 2002 [4]. This means that most satellites and rocket bodies orbiting presently the Earth have never been de-signed to be compliant with such guidelines.Hopefully, new treaties and laws such as the FSOA, as well as other initiatives to come, will start to have a sig-nificant impact on the compliance to mitigation guide-lines in the years to come.

1.2. Long term projection of the Earth’s satellite population

In the last decade, space debris modeling has been used intensively to analyze the way in which the Earth’s satel-lite population will evolve in the long term as a function of a given number of endogenous and exogenous vari-

ables, as for example the global compliance of the space-craft and rocket bodies with the mitigation guidelines.Such long-term simulations can be used to define the critical values of a group of variables (e.g. Post Mission Disposal compliance rate, frequency of explosions …) in order to guarantee the long term sustainability of space activities, or to analyze the sensitivity of the model to a modification in one of these variables.

Figure 3. MEDEE simulated LEO debris population (objects 10 cm and larger) as a function of PMD compliance rate. The thick curves are the arithmetic means from 40 MC projections. The dotted curves represent the 1-σ standard deviation

Fig. 3, excerpted from [5], depicts the long-term evolu-tion of the LEO population of objects larger than 10 cm, between 2009 and 2200, as a function of the PMD com-pliance rate and under the following assumptions:

- Initial Population: ESA’s MASTER reference pop-ulation ≥ 10cm residing in, or passing through, the LEO region on 1st May 2009.

- Launch Traffic: The observed 2001–2009 launch traffic cycle, is repeated throughout the simulation.

- Satellite Properties: Operational lifetime of satel-lites is set to 8 years. No station keeping or colli-sion avoidance maneuvers are considered.

- In-Orbit Explosion: No future explosions are as-sumed.

- Solar activity: 200 years variable solar activity pro-jection.

The PMD compliance rate presented in Fig. 3 refers to the percentage of objects in LEO, initially not compliant with the 25 years rule, performing a deorbit maneuver at the end of their operational lifetime. As we can see, the PMD compliance rate has a huge impact on the popula-tion evolution. It is therefore relevant to try to estimate its real value.


84


MITIGATION RULES COMPLIANCE IN LOW EARTH ORBIT

Vincent Morand(1), Juan-Carlos Dolado-Perez(1), Thomas Philippe(1), David-Alexis Handschuh(2)

(1)CNES (French Space Center), 18 avenue Edouard Belin, 31401 Toulouse Cedex 9, France, +33561282905, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

(2)CNES (French Space Center), Launchers Directorate, 52 rue Jacques Hillairet, 75612 Paris Cedex, France, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Space debris mitigation is one of the French Space Oper-ations Act objectives, through the removal of non-opera-tional objects from populated regions. At the end of their mission, space objects are to be placed on orbits that will reduce collision hazards with other spacecraft or debris.This paper presents our investigations on mitigation guidelines compliance in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) by space operators from 2000 to 2013. We are particularly interested in studying the expected decrease of the mid- and long-term collision risk in LEO, through the applica-tion of the 25 years rule or the reaching of a graveyard orbit above this region.We have identified space objects ending their mission during the period of interest and estimated their orbital lifetime. We obtain a global compliance rate and analyze its evolution over a 14 years period.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the very beginning of the space era, human activi-ties have led to place into orbit more than forty thousand space items. These objects are of a great variety, going from several tons spacecraft to Cubesats. However, less than 7% of orbiting objects are still considered today as operational. This implies that the in-orbit population is mainly dominated by space debris of various sizes, rather than active spacecraft, and their growing number increas-es the probability of collision hazards, as illustrated by the loss in 2009 of the operational Iridium-33 satellite after the collision with the inactive Kosmos-2251. Such dramatic events create a large amount of new debris, corrupting durably the given space area, as already ex-pressed by Kessler et al. in 1978 [1].Therefore, space debris mitigation becomes a topic of primary importance for the preservation of the space en-vironment and for the space systems operations safety, especially in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). Objects removal from these regions once their missions are terminated is today a common practice to mitigate the growth of the debris population.In the last two decades, several actions have been under-

taken in order to restrict the expected growth of the debris population. In France, the French Space Operations Act (FSOA) [2] came into force in 2010 with Space debris mitigations being one of its objectives. At international level, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) [3] and the Inter-Agency Space De-bris Coordination Committee (IADC) [4] published their mitigation guidelines respectively in 2007 and 2002. In the FSOA, two protected regions have been defined, as shown in Fig.1:

A. The LEO protected region, which is the area with the highest space debris population density, is de-fined by an altitude lower than 2000 km;

B. The GEO protected region is defined by an altitude within 200 km of the geostationary altitude, and an absolute value of inclination inferior to 15°.

Figure 1. LEO and GEO protected regions

The French Space Operations Act states that a satellite or launcher element placed on an orbit crossing the LEO protected region shall reenter the Earth atmosphere by performing a controlled re-entry, or, if impossibility to do so is duly proven, to reenter the atmosphere no later than 25 years after its end of mission date [2].This paper focuses on the mitigation guidelines compli-ance analysis in the LEO protected region, for all space operators. The LEO region is the one with the highest objects spatial density, and consequently with the highest probability of collision between objects orbiting through this region, as presented in Fig. 2.

Figure 2. Spatial density as a function of altitude in protected region A

Once we have computed the mitigation guidelines com-pliance rate for LEO objects orbiting the Earth, we can use these statistics together with the long-term projec-tions of the Earth’s satellite population and the expected evolution of the Post-Mission Disposal (PMD) compli-ance rate, in order to evaluate if the efforts made to in-crease the global compliance with mitigation guidelines in LEO are already noticeable, and if such efforts are good enough to guarantee the long term sustainability of space activities.

1.1. Expected increase of the PMD compliance

Even if the number of objects orbiting the Earth has in-creased steadily since the launch of the first satellite in space, mainly due to new launches or explosions, the global dimension of the problem affecting the long term sustainability of space activities has not been understood until recent times.Starting in the 90s, such awareness has motivated new initiatives to limit the proliferation of space debris. How-ever, national mitigation guidelines were not published until 2002 [4]. This means that most satellites and rocket bodies orbiting presently the Earth have never been de-signed to be compliant with such guidelines.Hopefully, new treaties and laws such as the FSOA, as well as other initiatives to come, will start to have a sig-nificant impact on the compliance to mitigation guide-lines in the years to come.

1.2. Long term projection of the Earth’s satellite population

In the last decade, space debris modeling has been used intensively to analyze the way in which the Earth’s satel-lite population will evolve in the long term as a function of a given number of endogenous and exogenous vari-

ables, as for example the global compliance of the space-craft and rocket bodies with the mitigation guidelines.Such long-term simulations can be used to define the critical values of a group of variables (e.g. Post Mission Disposal compliance rate, frequency of explosions …) in order to guarantee the long term sustainability of space activities, or to analyze the sensitivity of the model to a modification in one of these variables.

Figure 3. MEDEE simulated LEO debris population (objects 10 cm and larger) as a function of PMD compliance rate. The thick curves are the arithmetic means from 40 MC projections. The dotted curves represent the 1-σ standard deviation

Fig. 3, excerpted from [5], depicts the long-term evolu-tion of the LEO population of objects larger than 10 cm, between 2009 and 2200, as a function of the PMD com-pliance rate and under the following assumptions:

- Initial Population: ESA’s MASTER reference pop-ulation ≥ 10cm residing in, or passing through, the LEO region on 1st May 2009.

- Launch Traffic: The observed 2001–2009 launch traffic cycle, is repeated throughout the simulation.

- Satellite Properties: Operational lifetime of satel-lites is set to 8 years. No station keeping or colli-sion avoidance maneuvers are considered.

- In-Orbit Explosion: No future explosions are as-sumed.

- Solar activity: 200 years variable solar activity pro-jection.

The PMD compliance rate presented in Fig. 3 refers to the percentage of objects in LEO, initially not compliant with the 25 years rule, performing a deorbit maneuver at the end of their operational lifetime. As we can see, the PMD compliance rate has a huge impact on the popula-tion evolution. It is therefore relevant to try to estimate its real value.


85


2. METHODOLOGY

In order to compute the global compliance to mitigation guidelines of spacecraft and rocket bodies in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), we have proceeded in several steps:

- Identification of the space objects with perigees altitude lower than 6000 km, even if they have al-ready reentered the Earth’s atmosphere, from the USSTRATCOM’s SATCAT database [6];

- Detection of the End of Mission (EoM) date for the previous selected objects;

- Estimation of the physical parameters (i.e. Drag Area to Mass ratio and Reflecting Area to Mass ra-tio);

- Computation of the compliance rate with the miti-gation guidelines in accordance with the FSOA:• Orbital lifetime < 25 years;• Non-interference with the LEO region (perigees

altitude > 2000 km) during 100 years.

2.1. Identificationoftheobjects

In order to select the objects to include in our study, we have used the SATCAT database of the USSTRATCOM as well as the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) da-tabase of operational satellites [7]. The period of inter-est we considered goes from the 1st January 2000 to 31st

December 2013.The SATCAT database contains more than 39,000 en-tries on the 1st January 2014. From this database, we have removed all the objects matching one of the following criteria:

- Satellites and Rocket Bodies (R/B) launched before the 1st January 1980 (we consider a maximum mis-sion of 20 years for these objects);

- Objects that have reentered before the 1st January 2000;

- Objects flagged as DEB in the database, except for specific objects identified as SYLDA, SPELDA, SPELTRA, BREEZE-M DEB (TANK/ADAPTOR);

- Objects related to human space flight (MIR, ISS, Space Shuttle, Soyuz, Progress, ATV, HTV, Drag-on, Cygnus, Shenzhou);

- Objects with perigee higher than 6000 km.

From the UCS database, we have identified all the satel-lites flagged as operational, by the 1st January 2014 (1153 objects), and we have removed them from the study.Once all these filters have been applied, there are 2528 objects left. Amongst these objects 1504 are satellites and 1024 are rocket bodies.

Figure 4. Satellite repartition by orbit.

Figure 5. R/B elements repartition by orbit.

2.2. Identificationoftheendofmissiondate

The detection of the end of mission date is done as fol-lows:

- Spacecraft: Detection of maneuverability and end of maneuverability of a spacecraft via the devel-opment of a maneuvers detection algorithm. This algorithm is based on the time series analysis of or-bital data on a moving window approach [8].

- Rocket Body: In our study we suppose that the EoM of a launcher element (R/B) happens just after the launch. As a re- or de-orbit maneuver can be per-formed after injection, we consider that the orbit occupied by the launcher element 30 days after launch corresponds to its disposal orbit.

Figure 6. The thick line represents the semi-major axis evolution for SMOS satellite between 01-01-2010 and 01-01-2011 and the dashed lines represent the moving windows used for maneuver detection

For non-maneuverable satellites (i.e. satellites with orbit-al data presenting no maneuver in the studied timespan), we perform a bibliographic research in order to define their EoM date. For the objects with no available infor-mation, we assumed fixed mission duration:

- 1 year for Cubesats;- 4 years for COSMOS satellites;- 10 years for Molniya and ORBCOMM FM satel-

lites;- 3 years for UNISAT and MEGSAT satellites.

Non-maneuverable International Laser Ranging Service (ILRS) satellites have been excluded from the study, as their mission continues as far as they stay in orbit. This will not affect much the results of our analysis, as we count only 15 objects of this type.Fig. 7 & 8 show respectively the yearly evolution of sat-ellites and rocket bodies reaching EoM between 2000 and 2013.

Figure 7. Number of satellites reaching End of Mission between 2000 and 2013

Figure 8. Number of launched and decayed rocket bodies between 2000 and 2013

2.3. Estimation of physical parameters

The computation of the drag area to mass ratio (Sdrag/m) and reflecting area to mass ratio (Sref/m) is done via the analysis of a temporal series of orbital elements, we do not take into account any a priori information. The only orbital elements source used in our study comes from the public Two Lines Elements (TLE) sets of the USSTRAT-COM. The method used to estimate the physical param-eters of the selected objects, which is extensively de-scribed in [8], is based in a two-stage process:

- Computation of an initial Sdrag/m = Sref/m, by the ap-plication of the conservation of energy principle, under the following assumptions:• The only dissipative force acting on the object is

drag;• The object has a randomly tumbling attitude,

therefore its geometry is considered as spherical;• The rotation speed of the atmosphere can be ne-

glected.- Computation of a more accurate estimate of Sref/m

and Sdrag/m ratios, by the decomposition of the tem-poral evolution of semi-major axis and eccentricity as a function of conservative and dissipative forces.

To validate the estimation of the surface to mass ratios, we used French launcher elements, for which we know very well the physical properties. Fig. 9 depicts the rela-tive error of estimation for all French launcher elements, as well as launcher elements with perigees lower than 500 km.


86


2. METHODOLOGY

In order to compute the global compliance to mitigation guidelines of spacecraft and rocket bodies in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), we have proceeded in several steps:

- Identification of the space objects with perigees altitude lower than 6000 km, even if they have al-ready reentered the Earth’s atmosphere, from the USSTRATCOM’s SATCAT database [6];

- Detection of the End of Mission (EoM) date for the previous selected objects;

- Estimation of the physical parameters (i.e. Drag Area to Mass ratio and Reflecting Area to Mass ra-tio);

- Computation of the compliance rate with the miti-gation guidelines in accordance with the FSOA:• Orbital lifetime < 25 years;• Non-interference with the LEO region (perigees

altitude > 2000 km) during 100 years.

2.1. Identificationoftheobjects

In order to select the objects to include in our study, we have used the SATCAT database of the USSTRATCOM as well as the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) da-tabase of operational satellites [7]. The period of inter-est we considered goes from the 1st January 2000 to 31st

December 2013.The SATCAT database contains more than 39,000 en-tries on the 1st January 2014. From this database, we have removed all the objects matching one of the following criteria:

- Satellites and Rocket Bodies (R/B) launched before the 1st January 1980 (we consider a maximum mis-sion of 20 years for these objects);

- Objects that have reentered before the 1st January 2000;

- Objects flagged as DEB in the database, except for specific objects identified as SYLDA, SPELDA, SPELTRA, BREEZE-M DEB (TANK/ADAPTOR);

- Objects related to human space flight (MIR, ISS, Space Shuttle, Soyuz, Progress, ATV, HTV, Drag-on, Cygnus, Shenzhou);

- Objects with perigee higher than 6000 km.

From the UCS database, we have identified all the satel-lites flagged as operational, by the 1st January 2014 (1153 objects), and we have removed them from the study.Once all these filters have been applied, there are 2528 objects left. Amongst these objects 1504 are satellites and 1024 are rocket bodies.

Figure 4. Satellite repartition by orbit.

Figure 5. R/B elements repartition by orbit.

2.2. Identificationoftheendofmissiondate

The detection of the end of mission date is done as fol-lows:

- Spacecraft: Detection of maneuverability and end of maneuverability of a spacecraft via the devel-opment of a maneuvers detection algorithm. This algorithm is based on the time series analysis of or-bital data on a moving window approach [8].

- Rocket Body: In our study we suppose that the EoM of a launcher element (R/B) happens just after the launch. As a re- or de-orbit maneuver can be per-formed after injection, we consider that the orbit occupied by the launcher element 30 days after launch corresponds to its disposal orbit.

Figure 6. The thick line represents the semi-major axis evolution for SMOS satellite between 01-01-2010 and 01-01-2011 and the dashed lines represent the moving windows used for maneuver detection

For non-maneuverable satellites (i.e. satellites with orbit-al data presenting no maneuver in the studied timespan), we perform a bibliographic research in order to define their EoM date. For the objects with no available infor-mation, we assumed fixed mission duration:

- 1 year for Cubesats;- 4 years for COSMOS satellites;- 10 years for Molniya and ORBCOMM FM satel-

lites;- 3 years for UNISAT and MEGSAT satellites.

Non-maneuverable International Laser Ranging Service (ILRS) satellites have been excluded from the study, as their mission continues as far as they stay in orbit. This will not affect much the results of our analysis, as we count only 15 objects of this type.Fig. 7 & 8 show respectively the yearly evolution of sat-ellites and rocket bodies reaching EoM between 2000 and 2013.

Figure 7. Number of satellites reaching End of Mission between 2000 and 2013

Figure 8. Number of launched and decayed rocket bodies between 2000 and 2013

2.3. Estimation of physical parameters

The computation of the drag area to mass ratio (Sdrag/m) and reflecting area to mass ratio (Sref/m) is done via the analysis of a temporal series of orbital elements, we do not take into account any a priori information. The only orbital elements source used in our study comes from the public Two Lines Elements (TLE) sets of the USSTRAT-COM. The method used to estimate the physical param-eters of the selected objects, which is extensively de-scribed in [8], is based in a two-stage process:

- Computation of an initial Sdrag/m = Sref/m, by the ap-plication of the conservation of energy principle, under the following assumptions:• The only dissipative force acting on the object is

drag;• The object has a randomly tumbling attitude,

therefore its geometry is considered as spherical;• The rotation speed of the atmosphere can be ne-

glected.- Computation of a more accurate estimate of Sref/m

and Sdrag/m ratios, by the decomposition of the tem-poral evolution of semi-major axis and eccentricity as a function of conservative and dissipative forces.

To validate the estimation of the surface to mass ratios, we used French launcher elements, for which we know very well the physical properties. Fig. 9 depicts the rela-tive error of estimation for all French launcher elements, as well as launcher elements with perigees lower than 500 km.


87


Figure 9. Relative error of S/m ratio estimation for French launcher elements

Two major conclusions were drawn from the data de-picted in Fig 9:

1. The higher the perigee is, the harder it is to estimate the drag force, and therefore the higher is the rela-tive error. The red bar at minus 100% relative error is the consequence of this lack of observability.a. The estimation error, also containing the atmo-

spheric model error, is in most cases in the ±30% interval for perigee altitudes lower than 500 km;

b. Objects with perigee altitudes higher than 500 km are most of the time not compliant with the 25 years rule, so the high estimation error for this subset of objects has no impact on our con-clusions.

2. For objects with perigee altitude lower than 500 km, the estimation error is centered in 0%, so the conclusions are not biased due to a systematic over- or underestimation of the physical parameters.

Once our estimation method is validated, we can com-pute the physical parameters for spacecraft and launcher elements considered in the study.

Figure 10. Drag area over mass ratio cumulated distribution function. The median value of the Sdrag/m ratio is 0.012 m2/kg

2.4. Mitigation guidelines compliance

The compliance to the mitigation guidelines, both the re-spect of the 25 years rule and the non-interference with the LEO region (perigee altitude > 2000 km) during 100 years, is done using STELA [9], which is the reference software used to check the compliance of disposal orbits with the good practices attached to the FSOA. This com-pliance is verified following two different approaches:

- FSOA approach:• LEO objects: propagation from the end of mis-

sion date with a constant equivalent solar activ-ity [9];

• HEO objects: propagation, from the end of mis-sion date, using a statistical approach [10], and a solar activity built by the random combination of the five past solar cycles and a random date in the first cycle for the phasing.

- Variable solar activity (VAR) approach:• LEO objects: propagation from the last available

TLE with the NOAA-DAS solar activity predic-tion;

• HEO objects: propagation, from the last avail-able TLE, using a statistical approach [10], the NOAA-DAS solar activity until 2019, and a ran-dom combination of the five past solar cycles for the rest.

For the VAR approach, the time lapse between the end of mission date and the last available TLE is carefully tak-en into account in the total orbital lifetime. Concerning the statistical approach, as it is clearly explained in [10], we do not perform only one lifetime computation, but a Monte-Carlo draw composed of N orbital propagations since one lifetime computation is very sensitive to initial conditions for HEO. Once the Monte-Carlo simulation is done, we conclude that the object is compliant only if its orbital lifetime is shorter than 25 years with a 90% probability. In our Monte-Carlo simulation, we vary the following parameters:

- Ballistic Coefficient (±20% variability);- Solar Activity Projection.

3. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

In the previous section, we have described the method and the different algorithms that we have developed and used within this study. Those algorithms have mainly two objectives:

- Identifying the End of Mission date of the satellites, by detecting their end of maneuverability;

- Computing their compliance to mitigation guide-lines, once the physical properties of the objects have been estimated.

The first objective will help us analyze the number of objects arriving to EoM yearly during all the period of study (Fig. 11), as well as to subdivide the population in two subsets:

- Spacecraft with Orbit Control Capabilities (OCC);- Spacecraft without OCC.

This subdivision is of key importance to the discussion of compliance with mitigation guidelines that involve a de- or re-orbit maneuver.

The second objective will help us draw a figure of the global compliance to mitigation guidelines, either thanks to a de- or re-orbit maneuver, or by the natural decay of the space object from its operational orbit.

As it can be observed from Fig. 11, 37% of the satel-lites reaching EoM between 2000 and 2013 and 33% of rocket bodies launched during the same period of time are already compliant with the 25 years rule mitigation guideline.

Figure 11. Number of satellites and Rocket Bodies reach-ing End of Mission (EoM) between 2000 and 2013, and already decayed

3.1. Satellites compliance

As presented in paragraph 2.2, the detection of the EoM of satellites is linked with the detection of the end of maneuverability. The analysis done in order to detect the end of maneuverability gives us all the information needed to distinguish satellites with OCC from satellites without OCC.

Figure 12. Detail of the Orbit Control Capabilities of the satellite population considered for the study and detail on the EoM maneuvers performed

From Fig. 12 it can be observed than more or less half of the spacecraft population have orbit control capabili-ties. From the sub-population with OCC, only 27% of the objects (corresponding to 12% of the whole spacecraft population) performed an EoM maneuver.In addition to the total number of EoM maneuvers, the temporal evolution of the number of EoM manoeuvers between 2000 and 2013 constitutes important informa-tion, as it reflects the efforts made by operators to be compliant with mitigation guidelines.

Figure 13. Yearly evolution of the number of satellites with and without OCC. The green (resp. red) curve repre-sents satellites with OCC performing a (resp. no) deorbit maneuver. The green dashed line is a linear fit.

As it can be observed from Fig. 12, the yearly number of spacecraft with OCC arriving to EoM, and perform-ing a re- or deorbit maneuver, is relatively low compared to the yearly number of satellites arriving to EoM with OCC. However the trend of the data (linear fit on Fig. 12) shows that efforts are being made to increase the number of satellites performing EoM maneuvers.As shown in Fig. 11 & 12, the compliancy with the miti-


88


Figure 9. Relative error of S/m ratio estimation for French launcher elements

Two major conclusions were drawn from the data de-picted in Fig 9:

1. The higher the perigee is, the harder it is to estimate the drag force, and therefore the higher is the rela-tive error. The red bar at minus 100% relative error is the consequence of this lack of observability.a. The estimation error, also containing the atmo-

spheric model error, is in most cases in the ±30% interval for perigee altitudes lower than 500 km;

b. Objects with perigee altitudes higher than 500 km are most of the time not compliant with the 25 years rule, so the high estimation error for this subset of objects has no impact on our con-clusions.

2. For objects with perigee altitude lower than 500 km, the estimation error is centered in 0%, so the conclusions are not biased due to a systematic over- or underestimation of the physical parameters.

Once our estimation method is validated, we can com-pute the physical parameters for spacecraft and launcher elements considered in the study.

Figure 10. Drag area over mass ratio cumulated distribution function. The median value of the Sdrag/m ratio is 0.012 m2/kg

2.4. Mitigation guidelines compliance

The compliance to the mitigation guidelines, both the re-spect of the 25 years rule and the non-interference with the LEO region (perigee altitude > 2000 km) during 100 years, is done using STELA [9], which is the reference software used to check the compliance of disposal orbits with the good practices attached to the FSOA. This com-pliance is verified following two different approaches:

- FSOA approach:• LEO objects: propagation from the end of mis-

sion date with a constant equivalent solar activ-ity [9];

• HEO objects: propagation, from the end of mis-sion date, using a statistical approach [10], and a solar activity built by the random combination of the five past solar cycles and a random date in the first cycle for the phasing.

- Variable solar activity (VAR) approach:• LEO objects: propagation from the last available

TLE with the NOAA-DAS solar activity predic-tion;

• HEO objects: propagation, from the last avail-able TLE, using a statistical approach [10], the NOAA-DAS solar activity until 2019, and a ran-dom combination of the five past solar cycles for the rest.

For the VAR approach, the time lapse between the end of mission date and the last available TLE is carefully tak-en into account in the total orbital lifetime. Concerning the statistical approach, as it is clearly explained in [10], we do not perform only one lifetime computation, but a Monte-Carlo draw composed of N orbital propagations since one lifetime computation is very sensitive to initial conditions for HEO. Once the Monte-Carlo simulation is done, we conclude that the object is compliant only if its orbital lifetime is shorter than 25 years with a 90% probability. In our Monte-Carlo simulation, we vary the following parameters:

- Ballistic Coefficient (±20% variability);- Solar Activity Projection.

3. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

In the previous section, we have described the method and the different algorithms that we have developed and used within this study. Those algorithms have mainly two objectives:

- Identifying the End of Mission date of the satellites, by detecting their end of maneuverability;

- Computing their compliance to mitigation guide-lines, once the physical properties of the objects have been estimated.

The first objective will help us analyze the number of objects arriving to EoM yearly during all the period of study (Fig. 11), as well as to subdivide the population in two subsets:

- Spacecraft with Orbit Control Capabilities (OCC);- Spacecraft without OCC.

This subdivision is of key importance to the discussion of compliance with mitigation guidelines that involve a de- or re-orbit maneuver.

The second objective will help us draw a figure of the global compliance to mitigation guidelines, either thanks to a de- or re-orbit maneuver, or by the natural decay of the space object from its operational orbit.

As it can be observed from Fig. 11, 37% of the satel-lites reaching EoM between 2000 and 2013 and 33% of rocket bodies launched during the same period of time are already compliant with the 25 years rule mitigation guideline.

Figure 11. Number of satellites and Rocket Bodies reach-ing End of Mission (EoM) between 2000 and 2013, and already decayed

3.1. Satellites compliance

As presented in paragraph 2.2, the detection of the EoM of satellites is linked with the detection of the end of maneuverability. The analysis done in order to detect the end of maneuverability gives us all the information needed to distinguish satellites with OCC from satellites without OCC.

Figure 12. Detail of the Orbit Control Capabilities of the satellite population considered for the study and detail on the EoM maneuvers performed

From Fig. 12 it can be observed than more or less half of the spacecraft population have orbit control capabili-ties. From the sub-population with OCC, only 27% of the objects (corresponding to 12% of the whole spacecraft population) performed an EoM maneuver.In addition to the total number of EoM maneuvers, the temporal evolution of the number of EoM manoeuvers between 2000 and 2013 constitutes important informa-tion, as it reflects the efforts made by operators to be compliant with mitigation guidelines.

Figure 13. Yearly evolution of the number of satellites with and without OCC. The green (resp. red) curve repre-sents satellites with OCC performing a (resp. no) deorbit maneuver. The green dashed line is a linear fit.

As it can be observed from Fig. 12, the yearly number of spacecraft with OCC arriving to EoM, and perform-ing a re- or deorbit maneuver, is relatively low compared to the yearly number of satellites arriving to EoM with OCC. However the trend of the data (linear fit on Fig. 12) shows that efforts are being made to increase the number of satellites performing EoM maneuvers.As shown in Fig. 11 & 12, the compliancy with the miti-


89


gation guidelines, and in particular with the 25 years rule, can be done either with EoM maneuvers or with the se-lection of the operational orbit. Therefore, all the satel-lites with and without OCC must be taken into account for the computation of the mitigation guidelines compli-ance rate.

Figure 14. Global statistics on the spacecraft population between 2000 and 2013

On Fig. 14, the out of study percentage makes reference mainly to spacecraft with very sparse data. As can be observed from this figure, a total of 59% compliance to FSOA mitigation guidelines is estimated for the 2000–2013 period. A detail of the mitigation guidelines compli-ance as a function of the year is given in Fig. 15.

Figure 15. Number of satellites compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

If we focus on the spacecraft population with Orbit Con-trol Capabilities, we observe from Fig. 16 that 46% of this subset is compliant with mitigation guidelines, either via an EoM maneuver or by natural decay.As a consequence, 54% of this subset is not compliant, even if some of them (6%) made an effort to try being compliant via an EoM maneuver.

Figure 16. Global statistics on the spacecraft population with OCC between 2000 and 2013

A detailed representation of the mitigation guidelines compliance as a function of the year for satellites dispos-ing of OCC is given in Fig. 17.

Figure 17. Number of satellites with OCC compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

3.2. Launcher elements compliance

As presented in paragraph 2.2, we consider for launcher elements that its EoM happens just after the launch. In order not to be perturbed by aberrant data due to maneu-vers or to errors linked with initial orbit determination, we compute the physical parameters of the launcher el-ements using orbital data released one month after the launch. This thirty days period is then taken into ac-count for the computation of the residual lifetime of the launcher element.As a consequence, we do not have any information con-cerning the percentage of launch elements with Orbit Control Capabilities (OCC). Therefore, only global sta-tistics on the mitigation guidelines compliance of launch-er elements are given hereafter.

Figure 18. Global statistics on the launcher elements population between 2000 and 2013

On Fig. 18, the out of study percentage makes reference mainly to objects with very sparse data. As it can be ob-served from this figure, a total of 60% compliance of mitigation guidelines is estimated for launcher elements for the 2000–2013 period. A detailed representation of the mitigation guidelines compliance as a function of the year is given in Fig. 19.

Figure 19. Number of launcher elements compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

3.3. Influenceofthedisposalorbit

The compliance with the 25 years rule is a direct function of the disposal orbit and drag area to mass ratio for both satellites and launcher elements. The disposal orbit is ei-ther the operational orbit if no maneuver is performed at the end of the mission, or the new orbit reached after a deorbit maneuver.

Figure 20. Orbital lifetime as a function of the disposal orbit (perigee & apogee) for satellites and launcher ele-ments residing in the LEO region

Figure 21. Orbital lifetime as a function of the disposal orbit (perigee & apogee) for all considered satellites and launcher elements

Fig. 20 & 21 show the orbital lifetimes of the considered space objects (satellites and launcher elements) as a func-tion of their disposal orbit following the FSOA approach.In addition to the difference on lifetime as a function of perigee and apogee of the disposal orbit, it is important to point out that a great percentage of the satellites and launcher elements not compliant with the 25 years rule have a very high residual lifetime.

4. CONCLUSION

We have presented in this paper an analysis of the com-pliance rate of satellites and launcher elements with the mitigation guidelines from 2000 to 2013. The main re-sults that we obtained are:

- The global compliancy rate is 59% for satellites and 60% for launcher elements;

- The percentage of spacecraft performing a re- or deorbit maneuver at the end of their mission is equal to 12%;


90


gation guidelines, and in particular with the 25 years rule, can be done either with EoM maneuvers or with the se-lection of the operational orbit. Therefore, all the satel-lites with and without OCC must be taken into account for the computation of the mitigation guidelines compli-ance rate.

Figure 14. Global statistics on the spacecraft population between 2000 and 2013

On Fig. 14, the out of study percentage makes reference mainly to spacecraft with very sparse data. As can be observed from this figure, a total of 59% compliance to FSOA mitigation guidelines is estimated for the 2000–2013 period. A detail of the mitigation guidelines compli-ance as a function of the year is given in Fig. 15.

Figure 15. Number of satellites compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

If we focus on the spacecraft population with Orbit Con-trol Capabilities, we observe from Fig. 16 that 46% of this subset is compliant with mitigation guidelines, either via an EoM maneuver or by natural decay.As a consequence, 54% of this subset is not compliant, even if some of them (6%) made an effort to try being compliant via an EoM maneuver.

Figure 16. Global statistics on the spacecraft population with OCC between 2000 and 2013

A detailed representation of the mitigation guidelines compliance as a function of the year for satellites dispos-ing of OCC is given in Fig. 17.

Figure 17. Number of satellites with OCC compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

3.2. Launcher elements compliance

As presented in paragraph 2.2, we consider for launcher elements that its EoM happens just after the launch. In order not to be perturbed by aberrant data due to maneu-vers or to errors linked with initial orbit determination, we compute the physical parameters of the launcher el-ements using orbital data released one month after the launch. This thirty days period is then taken into ac-count for the computation of the residual lifetime of the launcher element.As a consequence, we do not have any information con-cerning the percentage of launch elements with Orbit Control Capabilities (OCC). Therefore, only global sta-tistics on the mitigation guidelines compliance of launch-er elements are given hereafter.

Figure 18. Global statistics on the launcher elements population between 2000 and 2013

On Fig. 18, the out of study percentage makes reference mainly to objects with very sparse data. As it can be ob-served from this figure, a total of 60% compliance of mitigation guidelines is estimated for launcher elements for the 2000–2013 period. A detailed representation of the mitigation guidelines compliance as a function of the year is given in Fig. 19.

Figure 19. Number of launcher elements compliant with the FSOA between 2000 and 2013

3.3. Influenceofthedisposalorbit

The compliance with the 25 years rule is a direct function of the disposal orbit and drag area to mass ratio for both satellites and launcher elements. The disposal orbit is ei-ther the operational orbit if no maneuver is performed at the end of the mission, or the new orbit reached after a deorbit maneuver.

Figure 20. Orbital lifetime as a function of the disposal orbit (perigee & apogee) for satellites and launcher ele-ments residing in the LEO region

Figure 21. Orbital lifetime as a function of the disposal orbit (perigee & apogee) for all considered satellites and launcher elements

Fig. 20 & 21 show the orbital lifetimes of the considered space objects (satellites and launcher elements) as a func-tion of their disposal orbit following the FSOA approach.In addition to the difference on lifetime as a function of perigee and apogee of the disposal orbit, it is important to point out that a great percentage of the satellites and launcher elements not compliant with the 25 years rule have a very high residual lifetime.

4. CONCLUSION

We have presented in this paper an analysis of the com-pliance rate of satellites and launcher elements with the mitigation guidelines from 2000 to 2013. The main re-sults that we obtained are:

- The global compliancy rate is 59% for satellites and 60% for launcher elements;

- The percentage of spacecraft performing a re- or deorbit maneuver at the end of their mission is equal to 12%;


91


- Only 10% of spacecraft with proven Orbit Control Capacities did a successful deorbit maneuver with respect to the 25 years rule between 2000 and 2013.

The most noticeable observations made during our study are therefore the following:

1. There is no clear trend of improvement over the years in terms of global compliancy with the miti-gation guidelines;

2. Most space objects rely on natural decay to meet mitigation rules;

3. The compliancy rate of spacecraft performing an active deorbit maneuver is slightly increasing over time;

4. Most objects performing a deorbit maneuver are doing so on a best effort basis, as they were de-signed and launched before mitigation guidelines were adopted.

According to these observations, a great effort is still needed in order to guarantee the sustainability of space activities by the application of mitigation guidelines. We hope that an initiative such as the French Space Opera-tions Act will help to improve the security of space op-erations activities in the future.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors would like to acknowledge the members of the French Space Operations Act team in CNES for their contribution in the establishment of these Good Practices and all CNES and THALES SERVICES people that have contributed to the definition and implementation of the methods presented in this paper and to the STELA soft-ware development.

6. REFERENCES

[1] Kessler, D.J., Cour-Palais, B.G. (1978). Collision frequency of artificial satellites: the creation of a de-bris belt. JGR 83, 2637-2646.

[2] Lazare B., The French Space Operations Act: Tech-nical Regulations, Acta Astronautica, 92, Issue 2, 209-212, December 2013.

[3] Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Com-mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scien-tific and Technical Subcommittee of the Commit-tee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space, A/AC.105/890, 2008.

[4] Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Com-mittee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01, 2007.

[5] Dolado-Perez J.C., Revelin B., Di-Costanzo R., Sensitivity Analysis of the Long Term Evolution of Space Debris Population in LEO, Proceedings of the 65th International Astronautical Congress, Sep-tember 29 to October 3 2014, Toronto, Canada

[6] USSTRATCOM, www.space-track.org.

[7] UCS Satellite Database, www.ucsusa.org.

[8] Dolado-Perez J.C., Aivar Garcia L., Agueda Maté A., Llamas I., OPERA: A tool for lifetime predic-tion based on orbit determination from TLE data, Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Space Flight Dynamics, 5 – 9 May 2014, Laurel, Maryland.

[9] Fraysse, H., Morand, V., Le Fevre, C., Cauhert, A., Lamy, A., Mercier, P., Dental, C., and Deleflie F., STELA a Tool for Long Term Orbit Propagation, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Astrodynamics Tools and Techniques, 29 May – 1 June 2012, ESA/ESTEC, Netherlands.

[10] Le Fèvre C., Fraysse H., Morand V., Lamy A., Ca-zaux C., Mercier P., Dental C., Deleflie F., Hand-schuh D.A., Compliance of Disposal Orbits with the French Space Operations Act: The Good Practices and the STELA Tool, Acta Astronautica, 94, Issue 1, 234 – 245, February 2014.

WHAT CAN JAXA DO TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS FOR SAFETY & MISSION SUCCESS?

Shimpei Takahashi 1

1 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), 2-1-1 Sengen, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8505, Japan, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

In 2008, JEM (Japanese Experiment Module) started on orbit operations.Since then, JAXA has conducted numbers of experiments and achieved numerous scientific goals. Meanwhile, numbers of hardware or software failures and human er-rors caused by astronauts or ground operators occurred which resulted in scientific loss.JAXA Human Space Safety and Mission Assurance Of-fice (JAXA S&MA) has been working with hardware providers and experiment teams to solve and prevent failures caused by human errors.However, unfortunately, as long as humans take part in hardware/software design, manufacture, tests, operations and project management, human error cannot be com-pletely eliminated.What is most essential is to continue organizational ac-tivity in preventing errors and recover quickly from the error, especially errors causing safety hazard.Root Cause Investigations of errors causing safety hazard and mission failure reveal that most errors were caused by time pressure, lack of budget etc.However, these causes cannot be reduced or solved eas-ily in most cases because any organization is required to maximize outcomes with limited resources.Under such severe circumstances, what can JAXA S&MA do to reduce errors for safety and mission success?This paper discusses Human Error Investigation and Root Cause Analysis conducted by JAXA S&MA.A specific example is described analyzing the simple and common astronaut’s error; “Improper Mating of Power Cable”.

1. INTRODUCTION

On August 19, 2011, the installation task of the MSPR (Multipurpose Small Payload Rack) was conducted in JEM. During the installation task of the MSPR, the MSPR power was not supplied due to improper power cable mating.Later, the cable was re-mated and the MSPR was suc-cessfully powered on.The Human Error Investigation Team conducted a thor-ough investigation and made recommendations to all par-

ties involved in order to prevent the same type of error occurring again.

2. MSPR IMPROPER POWER CABLE CONNECTION

Figure 1 shows the location of the MSPR in JEM and overview of the MSPR.

Figure 1 Location and Overview of the MSPR in JEM

MSPR was designed to install following COTS (Com-mercial Off the Shelf) components in the rack on orbit.

(1) MSPR DCU (DC Convertor Unit)(2) MSPR Hub(3) MSPR VRU (Video Recording Unit)(4) MPC (Multi-Protocol Converter)(5) MSPR Laptop Computer

Figure 2 is the launch configuration of MSPR.

Figure 2 MSPR Launch Configuration


92


- Only 10% of spacecraft with proven Orbit Control Capacities did a successful deorbit maneuver with respect to the 25 years rule between 2000 and 2013.

The most noticeable observations made during our study are therefore the following:

1. There is no clear trend of improvement over the years in terms of global compliancy with the miti-gation guidelines;

2. Most space objects rely on natural decay to meet mitigation rules;

3. The compliancy rate of spacecraft performing an active deorbit maneuver is slightly increasing over time;

4. Most objects performing a deorbit maneuver are doing so on a best effort basis, as they were de-signed and launched before mitigation guidelines were adopted.

According to these observations, a great effort is still needed in order to guarantee the sustainability of space activities by the application of mitigation guidelines. We hope that an initiative such as the French Space Opera-tions Act will help to improve the security of space op-erations activities in the future.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors would like to acknowledge the members of the French Space Operations Act team in CNES for their contribution in the establishment of these Good Practices and all CNES and THALES SERVICES people that have contributed to the definition and implementation of the methods presented in this paper and to the STELA soft-ware development.

6. REFERENCES

[1] Kessler, D.J., Cour-Palais, B.G. (1978). Collision frequency of artificial satellites: the creation of a de-bris belt. JGR 83, 2637-2646.

[2] Lazare B., The French Space Operations Act: Tech-nical Regulations, Acta Astronautica, 92, Issue 2, 209-212, December 2013.

[3] Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Com-mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scien-tific and Technical Subcommittee of the Commit-tee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space, A/AC.105/890, 2008.

[4] Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Com-mittee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01, 2007.

[5] Dolado-Perez J.C., Revelin B., Di-Costanzo R., Sensitivity Analysis of the Long Term Evolution of Space Debris Population in LEO, Proceedings of the 65th International Astronautical Congress, Sep-tember 29 to October 3 2014, Toronto, Canada

[6] USSTRATCOM, www.space-track.org.

[7] UCS Satellite Database, www.ucsusa.org.

[8] Dolado-Perez J.C., Aivar Garcia L., Agueda Maté A., Llamas I., OPERA: A tool for lifetime predic-tion based on orbit determination from TLE data, Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Space Flight Dynamics, 5 – 9 May 2014, Laurel, Maryland.

[9] Fraysse, H., Morand, V., Le Fevre, C., Cauhert, A., Lamy, A., Mercier, P., Dental, C., and Deleflie F., STELA a Tool for Long Term Orbit Propagation, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Astrodynamics Tools and Techniques, 29 May – 1 June 2012, ESA/ESTEC, Netherlands.

[10] Le Fèvre C., Fraysse H., Morand V., Lamy A., Ca-zaux C., Mercier P., Dental C., Deleflie F., Hand-schuh D.A., Compliance of Disposal Orbits with the French Space Operations Act: The Good Practices and the STELA Tool, Acta Astronautica, 94, Issue 1, 234 – 245, February 2014.

WHAT CAN JAXA DO TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS FOR SAFETY & MISSION SUCCESS?

Shimpei Takahashi 1

1 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), 2-1-1 Sengen, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8505, Japan, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

In 2008, JEM (Japanese Experiment Module) started on orbit operations.Since then, JAXA has conducted numbers of experiments and achieved numerous scientific goals. Meanwhile, numbers of hardware or software failures and human er-rors caused by astronauts or ground operators occurred which resulted in scientific loss.JAXA Human Space Safety and Mission Assurance Of-fice (JAXA S&MA) has been working with hardware providers and experiment teams to solve and prevent failures caused by human errors.However, unfortunately, as long as humans take part in hardware/software design, manufacture, tests, operations and project management, human error cannot be com-pletely eliminated.What is most essential is to continue organizational ac-tivity in preventing errors and recover quickly from the error, especially errors causing safety hazard.Root Cause Investigations of errors causing safety hazard and mission failure reveal that most errors were caused by time pressure, lack of budget etc.However, these causes cannot be reduced or solved eas-ily in most cases because any organization is required to maximize outcomes with limited resources.Under such severe circumstances, what can JAXA S&MA do to reduce errors for safety and mission success?This paper discusses Human Error Investigation and Root Cause Analysis conducted by JAXA S&MA.A specific example is described analyzing the simple and common astronaut’s error; “Improper Mating of Power Cable”.

1. INTRODUCTION

On August 19, 2011, the installation task of the MSPR (Multipurpose Small Payload Rack) was conducted in JEM. During the installation task of the MSPR, the MSPR power was not supplied due to improper power cable mating.Later, the cable was re-mated and the MSPR was suc-cessfully powered on.The Human Error Investigation Team conducted a thor-ough investigation and made recommendations to all par-

ties involved in order to prevent the same type of error occurring again.

2. MSPR IMPROPER POWER CABLE CONNECTION

Figure 1 shows the location of the MSPR in JEM and overview of the MSPR.

Figure 1 Location and Overview of the MSPR in JEM

MSPR was designed to install following COTS (Com-mercial Off the Shelf) components in the rack on orbit.

(1) MSPR DCU (DC Convertor Unit)(2) MSPR Hub(3) MSPR VRU (Video Recording Unit)(4) MPC (Multi-Protocol Converter)(5) MSPR Laptop Computer

Figure 2 is the launch configuration of MSPR.

Figure 2 MSPR Launch Configuration


93


MSPR DCU was unstowed from MSPR Work Volume and installed on the drawer. Figure 3 shows the installa-tion steps.

Figure 3 MSPR DCU Installation Steps

After DCU installation, the MSPR was tilted down to ac-cess its rear side for power cable mating.132 Captive Fasteners were loosened with a ratchet to remove 3 Rear Panels. (See Figure 4)

Figure 4 MSPR Rear Panels Removal

Power Cable P102 was de-mated from the connector bracket and mated to J102.Figure 5 and 6 show the Connector Bracket, before and after mating Power Cable P102.

Figure 5 Power Connector Bracket (Before Mating)

Figure 6 Power Connector Bracket (After Mating)

Power cable mating/de-mating is a simple task and it has been done by astronauts many times on orbit. However, in this case, the cable was not properly mated and power supply to the MSPR failed. When the cable is properly mated, the red line on J102 is not supposed to show. But in this case, the red line can be seen on J102 due to improper cable mating. (See Figure 7)

Figure 7 Improper Power Cable Mate

3. HUMAN ERROR INVESTIGATIONS

3. 1. Investigations

In response to this error, The Human Error Prevention Meeting Chair requested to start investigations and the following investigations were conducted.

(1) Thorough interviews with hardware developer, procedure writers, astronaut trainer, JEM Flight Control Team members and the astronaut who made the error.

(2) Verified all the real time voice conversations re-corded during this task on voice loops among the astronaut and all Flight Control Team members.

(3) Verified the crew training records.(4) Based on the information gathered, Verification

Tree Analysis and Why-Why Analysis were con-ducted.

Figure 8 shows the Improper Cable Mating ‘Why-Why Analysis

Figure 8 Improper Cable Mating ‘Why-Why Analysis’

3. 2. Findings

The analysis was discussed at the Human Error Preven-tion Meeting. The findings are listed below.

(1) The hardware provider had recognized that the power connector was especially hard to mate com-pletely compared to other connectors.

The power connector was located in the part of the connector bracket with the poorest access and the diameter of the connecter was larger, which re-quired more force for proper mating.

(2) The astronaut procedure stated ‘Check the red line using an inspection mirror and an LED headlamp’. However, this instruction was stated in parentheses so, the astronaut skipped this instruction, thinking it was only a recommendation, not a mandatory step to confirm proper power cable mating.

(3) The same power connectors are used commonly throughout the International Space Station (ISS). Because of this, “Hands on Training” was not per-formed. The training team showed the astronaut the MSPR Engineering Model and explained the cable connection procedures orally.

3.3. Recommendations

Based on the findings, the meeting made the recommen-dations listed below.

(1) Any difficulties or concerns found at the develop-ment phase which may affect astronaut operations should be reported to JAXA in order to incorporate them in procedure development, training and op-erations.

(2) Any questions to astronauts should be encouraged especially when the questions are valuable for mis-sion success. Asking questions should not be hesi-tated.

These recommendations are shared among all parties in-volved in this particular error and all astronauts.

4. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS (RCA)

In addition to the Human Error Prevention Meeting in-vestigations, RCA was conducted.Description and purpose of the RCA are as below.‘When Performing root cause analysis, it is necessary to look at more than just the immediately visible cause, which is often the PROXIMATE CAUSE.There are underlying ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES that are more difficult to see, however, they may con-tribute significantly to the undesired outcome and, if not corrected, they will continue to create similar types of problems. These are ROOT CAUSES.’ [1]

4.1. Proximate Cause

(1) Improper Cable Mating Due to the improper power cable mating, the

MSPR power was not supplied.

4.2. Intermediate Causes

(1) Use of COTS DCU If the MSPR DCU had been designed, manufac-

tured and installed in the MSPR, power cable con-nection would not have been required.

(2) Limited Development Cost Purchasing COTS DCU was beneficial to the hard-

ware development team to minimize the develop-ment cost.

To minimize structural analysis and test costs, COTS

DCU was designed to be launched in the experi-ment storage locations in the MSPR and to be in-stalled in orbit. Therefore, it was also beneficial to the hardware development team.

(3) Launch Schedule Pressure To meet the HTV-2 launch schedule, COTS DCU

was beneficial to the hardware development team in the aspect of shortening the MSPR development schedule.

4.3. Root Causes

4.3.1. Political Root Causes

(1) ‘Lack of a National Vision for Space’ [2] Absence of clear visions and roadmaps for the Jap-

anese human space flight program is influencing inappropriate allocation of resources in the JAXA ISS Program.

(2) ‘Merging Conflicting Interests’ [3] As the budget for the JAXA ISS Program shrinks,

expectations are escalating and schedule pressure


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MSPR DCU was unstowed from MSPR Work Volume and installed on the drawer. Figure 3 shows the installa-tion steps.

Figure 3 MSPR DCU Installation Steps

After DCU installation, the MSPR was tilted down to ac-cess its rear side for power cable mating.132 Captive Fasteners were loosened with a ratchet to remove 3 Rear Panels. (See Figure 4)

Figure 4 MSPR Rear Panels Removal

Power Cable P102 was de-mated from the connector bracket and mated to J102.Figure 5 and 6 show the Connector Bracket, before and after mating Power Cable P102.

Figure 5 Power Connector Bracket (Before Mating)

Figure 6 Power Connector Bracket (After Mating)

Power cable mating/de-mating is a simple task and it has been done by astronauts many times on orbit. However, in this case, the cable was not properly mated and power supply to the MSPR failed. When the cable is properly mated, the red line on J102 is not supposed to show. But in this case, the red line can be seen on J102 due to improper cable mating. (See Figure 7)

Figure 7 Improper Power Cable Mate

3. HUMAN ERROR INVESTIGATIONS

3. 1. Investigations

In response to this error, The Human Error Prevention Meeting Chair requested to start investigations and the following investigations were conducted.

(1) Thorough interviews with hardware developer, procedure writers, astronaut trainer, JEM Flight Control Team members and the astronaut who made the error.

(2) Verified all the real time voice conversations re-corded during this task on voice loops among the astronaut and all Flight Control Team members.

(3) Verified the crew training records.(4) Based on the information gathered, Verification

Tree Analysis and Why-Why Analysis were con-ducted.

Figure 8 shows the Improper Cable Mating ‘Why-Why Analysis

Figure 8 Improper Cable Mating ‘Why-Why Analysis’

3. 2. Findings

The analysis was discussed at the Human Error Preven-tion Meeting. The findings are listed below.

(1) The hardware provider had recognized that the power connector was especially hard to mate com-pletely compared to other connectors.

The power connector was located in the part of the connector bracket with the poorest access and the diameter of the connecter was larger, which re-quired more force for proper mating.

(2) The astronaut procedure stated ‘Check the red line using an inspection mirror and an LED headlamp’. However, this instruction was stated in parentheses so, the astronaut skipped this instruction, thinking it was only a recommendation, not a mandatory step to confirm proper power cable mating.

(3) The same power connectors are used commonly throughout the International Space Station (ISS). Because of this, “Hands on Training” was not per-formed. The training team showed the astronaut the MSPR Engineering Model and explained the cable connection procedures orally.

3.3. Recommendations

Based on the findings, the meeting made the recommen-dations listed below.

(1) Any difficulties or concerns found at the develop-ment phase which may affect astronaut operations should be reported to JAXA in order to incorporate them in procedure development, training and op-erations.

(2) Any questions to astronauts should be encouraged especially when the questions are valuable for mis-sion success. Asking questions should not be hesi-tated.

These recommendations are shared among all parties in-volved in this particular error and all astronauts.

4. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS (RCA)

In addition to the Human Error Prevention Meeting in-vestigations, RCA was conducted.Description and purpose of the RCA are as below.‘When Performing root cause analysis, it is necessary to look at more than just the immediately visible cause, which is often the PROXIMATE CAUSE.There are underlying ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES that are more difficult to see, however, they may con-tribute significantly to the undesired outcome and, if not corrected, they will continue to create similar types of problems. These are ROOT CAUSES.’ [1]

4.1. Proximate Cause

(1) Improper Cable Mating Due to the improper power cable mating, the

MSPR power was not supplied.

4.2. Intermediate Causes

(1) Use of COTS DCU If the MSPR DCU had been designed, manufac-

tured and installed in the MSPR, power cable con-nection would not have been required.

(2) Limited Development Cost Purchasing COTS DCU was beneficial to the hard-

ware development team to minimize the develop-ment cost.

To minimize structural analysis and test costs, COTS

DCU was designed to be launched in the experi-ment storage locations in the MSPR and to be in-stalled in orbit. Therefore, it was also beneficial to the hardware development team.

(3) Launch Schedule Pressure To meet the HTV-2 launch schedule, COTS DCU

was beneficial to the hardware development team in the aspect of shortening the MSPR development schedule.

4.3. Root Causes

4.3.1. Political Root Causes

(1) ‘Lack of a National Vision for Space’ [2] Absence of clear visions and roadmaps for the Jap-

anese human space flight program is influencing inappropriate allocation of resources in the JAXA ISS Program.

(2) ‘Merging Conflicting Interests’ [3] As the budget for the JAXA ISS Program shrinks,

expectations are escalating and schedule pressure


95


is heightening. This is the conflict of the JAXA ISS Program.

4.3.2. Organizational Root Causes

“An Agency Trying to Do Too Much with Too Little” [4] The political root causes above are affecting the JAXA ISS Program in the following areas.

(1) Proper H/W development, management and orga-nizational decision making.

(2) Maintaining adequate technical knowledge and skills of JAXA engineers and contractors.

(3) Maintaining adequate level of S&MA knowledge, skills and risk management.

(4) Close internal and mutual communication within the organization.

Figure 9 shows Improper Cable Mating ‘Root Cause Analysis.

Figure 9 Improper Cable Mating ‘Root Cause Analysis’

5. WHAT CAN JAXA S&MA DO TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS FOR SAFETY AND MISSION SUCCESS?

5.1. Common Root Causes

MSPR Improper Power Cable Connection Investigation and Root Cause Analysis revealed that the same political and organizational causes which caused the error ana-lyzed in this paper also caused the tragedies of human space flight in the past.Fortunately, JAXA has not experienced any safety acci-dents in JEM yet, because the JAXA ISS Program team members and managers maintain a high ‘Safety First Mind’.However, there is already an undesirable environment where safety accidents could happen in JEM once the “Safety First Mind” degrades in the Program.

5.2. What JAXA S&MA can do?

Then, what can JAXA S&MA do to reduce human errors for safety and mission success?Here are the effective ways to reduce human errors and maintain Safety & Mission Assurance in JEM.

(1) Educating the members and the managements that the root causes of simple human errors in JEM and the root causes of tragedies in human space flight in the past are common.

(2) Educating the members and the managements that there is already an undesirable environment where safety accidents could happen in JEM once the ‘Safety First Mind’ degrades in the Program.

(3) Monitoring a ‘Safety First Mind’ in the organiza-tion by participating in program meetings, design reviews, safety reviews and on orbit operation meetings.

(4) In the case that any indications of ‘Safety First Mind’ degradation are found, JAXA S&MA should let the team members and managements know and work together with them for correction at an orga-nizational level.

6. CONCLUSIONS

As discussed, the role of JAXA S&MA is to monitor and correct the JAXA ISS Program in order to maximize the outcome, keep on schedule and assure safety, within lim-ited resources.As the JEM operation is extended, there will be increas-ing safety concern created by degradation of the key components.However, the limitation of resources and increasing out-come requirement will not be changed.Therefore, JAXA S&MA must be responsible for guiding the program in the right direction.This is similar to operating the ISS to maintain its correct orbit and attitude with limited resources. Figure 10 shows the ISS orbit and Figure 11 shows the ISS attitude.Without orbit and attitude control burns, the ISS would not be able to maintain a healthy condition due to dis-turbances such as earth atmosphere drag and fluctuating gravity force between the earth and the ISS, etc.

Figure 10 ISS Orbit

Figure 11 ISS Attitude

Assuming that these disturbances are the root causes de-scribed in Chapter 4.3, and that the ISS is the JAXA ISS Program, JAXA S&MA monitors deviations of the ISS orbit and attitude caused by disturbances. When any deviations are observed, JAXA S&MA should instruct the ISS to make burns to correct the orbit and attitude of the ISS.In order to make a good burn, a sufficient amount and good quality of propellant should be filled in the propel-lant tanks and without ‘S&MA’ mind, high quality pro-pellant cannot be produced.Figure 11 shows the HTV (H- Transfer Vehicle) main thruster burn using ‘S&MA mind-full’ propellant.

Figure 12 HTV Main Thrusters Burn with S&MApropellant tanks.

7. REFERENCES

[1] Office of Safety & Mission Assurance Chief En-gineering Office “Root Cause Analysis Overview” (July 2003)

[2] Columbia Accident Investigation Report Volume 1 Page 209 (August 2003)

[3] Columbia Accident Investigation Report Volume 1 Chapter 1.2 (August 2003)


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is heightening. This is the conflict of the JAXA ISS Program.

4.3.2. Organizational Root Causes

“An Agency Trying to Do Too Much with Too Little” [4] The political root causes above are affecting the JAXA ISS Program in the following areas.

(1) Proper H/W development, management and orga-nizational decision making.

(2) Maintaining adequate technical knowledge and skills of JAXA engineers and contractors.

(3) Maintaining adequate level of S&MA knowledge, skills and risk management.

(4) Close internal and mutual communication within the organization.

Figure 9 shows Improper Cable Mating ‘Root Cause Analysis.

Figure 9 Improper Cable Mating ‘Root Cause Analysis’

5. WHAT CAN JAXA S&MA DO TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS FOR SAFETY AND MISSION SUCCESS?

5.1. Common Root Causes

MSPR Improper Power Cable Connection Investigation and Root Cause Analysis revealed that the same political and organizational causes which caused the error ana-lyzed in this paper also caused the tragedies of human space flight in the past.Fortunately, JAXA has not experienced any safety acci-dents in JEM yet, because the JAXA ISS Program team members and managers maintain a high ‘Safety First Mind’.However, there is already an undesirable environment where safety accidents could happen in JEM once the “Safety First Mind” degrades in the Program.

5.2. What JAXA S&MA can do?

Then, what can JAXA S&MA do to reduce human errors for safety and mission success?Here are the effective ways to reduce human errors and maintain Safety & Mission Assurance in JEM.

(1) Educating the members and the managements that the root causes of simple human errors in JEM and the root causes of tragedies in human space flight in the past are common.

(2) Educating the members and the managements that there is already an undesirable environment where safety accidents could happen in JEM once the ‘Safety First Mind’ degrades in the Program.

(3) Monitoring a ‘Safety First Mind’ in the organiza-tion by participating in program meetings, design reviews, safety reviews and on orbit operation meetings.

(4) In the case that any indications of ‘Safety First Mind’ degradation are found, JAXA S&MA should let the team members and managements know and work together with them for correction at an orga-nizational level.

6. CONCLUSIONS

As discussed, the role of JAXA S&MA is to monitor and correct the JAXA ISS Program in order to maximize the outcome, keep on schedule and assure safety, within lim-ited resources.As the JEM operation is extended, there will be increas-ing safety concern created by degradation of the key components.However, the limitation of resources and increasing out-come requirement will not be changed.Therefore, JAXA S&MA must be responsible for guiding the program in the right direction.This is similar to operating the ISS to maintain its correct orbit and attitude with limited resources. Figure 10 shows the ISS orbit and Figure 11 shows the ISS attitude.Without orbit and attitude control burns, the ISS would not be able to maintain a healthy condition due to dis-turbances such as earth atmosphere drag and fluctuating gravity force between the earth and the ISS, etc.

Figure 10 ISS Orbit

Figure 11 ISS Attitude

Assuming that these disturbances are the root causes de-scribed in Chapter 4.3, and that the ISS is the JAXA ISS Program, JAXA S&MA monitors deviations of the ISS orbit and attitude caused by disturbances. When any deviations are observed, JAXA S&MA should instruct the ISS to make burns to correct the orbit and attitude of the ISS.In order to make a good burn, a sufficient amount and good quality of propellant should be filled in the propel-lant tanks and without ‘S&MA’ mind, high quality pro-pellant cannot be produced.Figure 11 shows the HTV (H- Transfer Vehicle) main thruster burn using ‘S&MA mind-full’ propellant.

Figure 12 HTV Main Thrusters Burn with S&MApropellant tanks.

7. REFERENCES

[1] Office of Safety & Mission Assurance Chief En-gineering Office “Root Cause Analysis Overview” (July 2003)

[2] Columbia Accident Investigation Report Volume 1 Page 209 (August 2003)



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Simberg correctly notes that American culture is far less risk-tolerant than it once was. (Think of settlers heading west by the thousands from St. Louis with virtually no idea of what lay before them, but willing to risk their lives and the lives of their families.) He also gives a nod to purpose as a reason for accepting more risk. In war, for example, we are willing to accept far more risk than we are in peacetime. (Again though, far less than previously. This year marks the 100th anniversary of the beginning of WW I. During the battle of the Somme alone, more than a million men were wounded or killed. Would any belligerent in a modern war be prepared to absorb such horrific casualties?) The US was willing to press on with the Apollo program after the loss of three crewmembers in the Apollo I fire, because the purpose of the program, the reason they were flying, was considered sufficient to justify the risk. However, after the loss of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia there was much discussion regarding the risks that had been taken during that mission simply to perform micro-gravity experiments. This purpose was considered insufficient to support fur-ther missions of this sort, and as a result, all subsequent Shuttle missions, with the exception of the final Hubble Space Telescope repair mission, were directed toward the assembly of the ISS, after which the Shuttle program was terminated.

Simberg also notes both the high cost and high visibility of NASA programs as reasons why special care is taken with crew safety. Fatalities during military training exercises, while tragic, seldom see wide reporting, even when multi-ple lives and expensive hardware are lost. But for programs like the Shuttle, where the cost of an Orbiter replacement ran into the billions, or the ISS, where the international partnership has invested over a hundred billion dollars, it’s another thing entirely. Due to the open nature of our pro-grams we receive wide reporting as a matter of course. The loss of an Orbiter was a major news event for months. The loss of the ISS could be the story of the century.

Some of Simberg’s observations are sound, but oth-ers strike one as far-fetched. For instance, he questions why we need a launch abort system (LAS) for our future manned space vehicles, and asserts that this mitigates only a fraction of the total risk associated with only one mis-sion phase. While true, the actual situation here is complex, and involves societal expectations for risk mitigation, the

Rand Simberg thinks we’re wimps. Or at least the people in charge of space exploration, who, he implies, should be willing to accept a higher body count in the name of ex-panding the space frontier. In “Safe is Not an Option” he lays out the case that our experience in manned space ex-ploration to date has led us to a point where we are unwill-ing to accept the risks we will encounter in advancing the human exploration of the solar system. His premise is that we have become “obsessed” with safety, and are unwilling to accept that, for instance, a mission to Mars might carry risks that we are unwilling to face.

He begins by walking us through the hazards of explora-tion, starting with Magellan, and then discusses the early days of the space age. He recites a veritable litany of NASA disasters, (which hardly bolsters his argument that we are obsessed with safety.) He devotes a chapter to the “irratio-nal” approach to International Space Station (ISS) safety, and concludes by providing recommendations for space vehicle design and certification for operations beyond low Earth orbit.

SAFE Is Not An OptionOvercoming the Futile Obsession With Getting Everyone Back Alive That Is Killing Our Expansion Into SpaceBy Rand SimbergInterglobal Media LLCISBN 978-0-9891355-1-1Pages: 215Price: $19.95, paperback

SAFE MAY NOT BE AN OPTION, BUT RISK MITIGATION IS

BOOK REVIEW

Michael Fodroci1

1 S&MA (Safety and Mission Assurance) manager for NASA in support of the International Space Station (ISS) Program


98


human perception of risk, as well as aspects of liability in our litigious culture. But the short answer is that hav-ing killed seven crewmembers during the Shuttle Program through lack of an escape system, NASA is not about to design a manned space vehicle without an LAS. While Mr. Simberg argues that the cost and weight of an LAS out-weigh the risk reduction achieved, humans are not robots, nor are we Vulcans, operating purely on logic. Emotional and political considerations make it a certainty that such a ship will never be built by a Government agency. Individu-als flying on private carriers are, of course, free to accept whatever risks they mutually deem acceptable, something which Mr. Simberg spends considerable time on, but which I believe to be a red herring: The exploration of the solar system will almost certainly be carried out by international partnerships, not by daredevils, and they will insist on a methodical approach to risk identification and mitigation. Mr. Simberg also questions the need for a lifeboat for each crewmember on the ISS, (here it’s impossible not to imag-ine the fun headline writers would have comparing the ISS to the Titanic) and suggests as an alternative that we could use a co-orbiting platform of some sort as a tempo-rary safe haven. How this would benefit someone suffering from a heart attack, a ruptured appendix, or the bends, he doesn’t say. Nor does he address the cost of such a venture. He spends an entire chapter on how NASA was ready to “abandon” the ISS after the loss of the 44P Progress cargo mission (August 23, 2011). It’s true that NASA did proceed with planning on how they would de-crew the station if the Russian Soyuz booster was unable to return to service after a certain point in time. But this was only prudent, and had they not done so I would assert that they would have been negligent. What he omits to say is that in all of their plan-ning their foremost concern was with protecting the ability to reoccupy the station. Abandoning the ISS was simply never discussed. Mr. Simberg proposes that we could have flown an empty Soyuz vehicle up to replace the one on or-bit that was about to exceed its certification limit, but he omits one slight obstacle to this plan: NASA doesn’t own the Soyuz vehicle, nor the Soyuz launcher, nor are we re-sponsible for determining when these vehicles are ready to fly. While the Russians engaged with NASA to an almost unprecedented degree in the evaluation of the root cause of the loss of 44P, the decision as to when they would fly again was theirs and theirs alone. But again, NASA never envisioned anything more than a temporary decrewing of the ISS. They are, after all, sensible of the fact that they are protecting a $100 billion investment, thirty years in the making. As Frank Culbertson remarked to me once (and he was in a unique position to do so, having been both a Shuttle Commander and an ISS Commander, as well as a naval aviator), “When you have a fire in an airplane, you head for the ground. When you have a fire on a ship at sea, you head for the fire.” NASA recognize that on the ISS they are a ship at sea, and act accordingly. They operate

in degraded modes. They perform contingency EVA’s with suits that are not pristine. They are constantly engaged in a complex process of trading risks against benefits, and risks against risks. But they will not sacrifice crew safety just to maintain a record string of “days in space.”

Ultimately, I think Simberg fails to make his case, and there are a couple places where I think he gets it dead wrong. In the first place, although they may struggle with what ex-actly it signifies in terms of the likelihood of loss of crew or loss of mission, safety is not given “an almost infinite value” in NASA spaceflight programs, as Mr. Simberg re-peatedly alleges. No such program could exist, and none do. Safety, cost, schedule, and functionality are routinely traded against one another. As for an “obsession” with safety, one could argue that in large, complex, integrated programs, an obsession with safety is both necessary and healthy. Here Simberg indulges in setting numerous straw men alight, alleging that an excessive focus on safety is counterproductive, because, “spaceflight isn’t safe.” He states, “…the culture of the S&MA community in the space industry believes…that safe and unsafe are absolute states, rather than degrees along a continuum.” This is utter nonsense. It is well known that spaceflight is not safe. No one at NASA says otherwise. In fact, they know it’s down-right dangerous. Their focus is on identifying, character-izing, communicating, and mitigating risk to the greatest extent practical, so that risks are accepted with eyes wide open. Their goal is to make it “safe enough” after hearing all arguments, understanding the trade space involved, and placing the particular subject of discussion in the context of other spaceflight risks. Mr. Simberg seems to think that “Safety First” is a bad notion somehow. I’d be interested in an example of a successful program where this was not held to be the ideal.

In short, while there may be a perception that we have be-come more “risk averse”, I would assert that what we have become is more risk aware, particularly of those risks that spring from hubris, poor communication, and a lack of cu-riosity. Mr. Simberg may have a point, but he loses his way in trying to make it.

Michael Fodroci has 35 years of experience in human spaceflight safety and risk management working with aca-demic, commercial, government, and international part-ners. Mr. Fodroci presented a keynote address incorporat-ing the thoughts of this book review at the Seventh IAASS Conference in Friedrichshafen, Germany from October 20-22, 2014. He resides in Houston, Texas.

REFERENCES

[1] http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2435/1


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http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2435

Call for Papers: 3rd Manfred Lachs International Conference on NewSpace Commercialization and the LawOrganized by the Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization - 16 and 17 March 2015

Call for papersThe term ‘NewSpace’ is commonly used within the industry, regulatory and policy circles pertaining to new commercial space endeavors, yet its pre-cise definition is vague and does not appear to have been fully articulated. NewSpace Global, which provides market indices and strategic analyses of NewSpace industries, defines ‘NewSpace’ as “an emerging global industry of private companies and entrepreneurs who primarily target commercial customers, are backed by risk capital seeking a return, and profit from innovative products or services developed in or for space.”

Although difficult to define, several themes appear to apply unequivocally to the NewSpace movement: disruptive technologies, entrepreneurship, privately held companies, individual access to and settlement of space and exploitation of space resources. Through innovative technologies and prac-tices, new production techniques and new products, NewSpace resurrects unresolved legal issues and brings forth new legal challenges. By canvassing NewSpace endeavors, their technological developments and business initiatives, it will be possible to better understand the various legal challenges facing this nascent industry so as to initiate positive changes in law and policy and to appropriately address industry needs arising therefrom as well as protecting global public interest, public safety, environment and national and international security interests.

In order to comprehensively address these challenges, the McGill Institute of, and Centre for Research in, Air and Space Law in close collaboration with other premier institutions, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) and Global Space Institute (GSI), are organizing an international interdisciplinary Conference on NewSpace and the Law. We expect to attract participation from representatives of all major stakeholders in the space sector, (i.e., governmental and non-governmental institutions, academic institutions, private entities, etc.) acting in their personal or professional (as opposed to their official) capacities.

By this Call for Papers, the organizers of the Conference hereby solicit papers that, among other things, will discuss and critically analyze the current technical, economic, political, strategic, and legal challenges to the achievement of responsible commercialization of the NewSpace industry. Papers should be between 3,000 and 4,500 words in length and must specifically address at least one of the following topics:

1. New Extensions of Commercial Space Applications--Broadband Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Geomatics2. New Space Transportation Systems and Capabilities for Traffic Management of Objects in Air Space and Outer Space3. Small Satellites (including Nano, Micro, Cube, Femto and Chip satellites) 4. Commercial Space Stations and Launches for Trips to the Moon and Mars, etc.5. On-Orbit Servicing and Active Space Debris Removal6. Commercial Satellites for Military Purposes7. Commercial Space Mining (i.e. exploitation of Space Natural Resources)8. Funding Sources

Interested author may submit an abstract of the paper not exceeding 250 words via e-mail to Dr. Jinyuan Su at [email protected] by 5 January 2015.

The abstract must indicate the precise topic or title of the paper, the author’s (or authors’) full name(s), full contact details including valid email address, and current institutional affiliation. Please submit your abstract under cover of the following email header “3rd MLC 2015 Abstract – [Author(s) LAST NAME]”. The language of the Conference will be English.

Each submitted abstract will be evaluated on the basis of its technical quality, innovative ideas and relevance to the theme of the Conference. The Con-ference registration fee will be waived for authors who participate in the Conference as speakers. Suitable and well-written papers will be published in the Proceedings of the Conference. Papers of the highest quality may be published as part of an edited collection.

Deadlines5 January 2015 - Deadline for abstract submission15 January 2015 - Notification to authors5 March 2015 - Deadline for paper submission (No paper – no podium)16-17 March 2015- Conference

For further information on the Conference, please contact Dr. Jinyuan Su, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University ([email protected]).

NB: The McGill Institute of Air and Space is pleased to host the 3rd Manfred Lachs Conference at the ICAO Headquarters back-to-back with the ICAO/UNOOSA AeroSpace Symposium, which will take place right after, from 18 to 20 March 2015. Participants in the Manfred Lachs Conference will benefit from the significantly reduced special “academia” rate of US$145.00 in the registration fee for the ICAO/UNOOSA AeroSpace Symposium. Information about the Symposium is available at www.icao.int/meetings/space2015.

Ram S. JakhuConference Chair

mailto:jinyuan.su%40mail.mcgill.ca?subject=

mailto:jinyuan.su%40mail.mcgill.ca?subject=

http://www.icao.int/meetings/space2015

Safety Design for Space SystemsElsevier 2009

Progress in space safety lies in the acceptance of safety design and engineering as an integral part of the design and implementation process for new space systems. Safety must be seen as the principle design driver of utmost importance from the outset of the design process, which is only achieved through a culture change that moves all stakeholders toward front-end loaded safety concepts. Superb quality information for engineers, programme managers, suppliers and aerospace technologists.

Safety Design for Space Systems, Chinese Edition2011

Progress in space safety lies in the acceptance of safety design and engineering as an integral part of the design and implementation process for new space systems. Safety must be seen as the principle design driver of utmost importance from the outset of the design process, which is only achieved through a culture change that moves all stakeholders toward front-end loaded safety concepts. Superb quality information for engineers, programme managers, suppliers and aerospace technologists.

Space Safety Regulations and StandardsElsevier 2011

Space Safety Regulations and Standards is the definitive book on regulatory initiatives involving space safety, new space safety standards, and safety related to new space technologies under development. More than 30 world experts come together in this book to share their detailed knowledge of regulatory and standard making processes in the area, combining otherwise disparate information into one essential reference and providing case studies to illustrate applications throughout space programs internationally.

Safety Design for Space OperationsElsevier 2013

Safety Design for Space Operations provides the practical how-to guidance and knowledge base needed to facilitate effective launch-site and operations safety in line with current regulations. With information on space operations safety design currently disparate and difficult to find in one place, this unique reference brings together essential material on: Best design practices, Advanced analysis methods, Implementation of safe operation procedures, Safety considerations relating to the general public and the environment in addition to personnel and asset protection, in launch operations.

ALSO AVAILABLE IN BOOKSTORES

jsse vol 1 no 2 december 2014

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