judgment aggregation and moral responsibility frank hindriks university of groningen lse-groningen...
TRANSCRIPT
Judgment Aggregationand
Moral Responsibility
Frank Hindriks
University of Groningen
LSE-Groningen Workshop 2009Models of Value and OpinionFebruary 12-14, 2009
2
The Doctrinal Paradox & the Discursive Dilemma
Employee Safety
p q r p q rSerious danger?
Effective Measure?
Bearable Loss?
Pay Sacrifice?
A No Yes Yes No
B Yes No Yes No
C Yes Yes No No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
3
Theorem (List and Pettit 2002)
Let the agenda contain at least two distinct atomic propositions and their conjunction, or their disjunction, or their material implication. Then there exists no aggregation rule satisfying the conditions of ‘universal domain’, ‘collective rationality’, ‘systematicity’ and ‘anonymity’.
4
Pettit
• Groups have minds of their own
• Corporate responsibility (CR) cannot be reduced to individual responsibility (IR)
5
Corporate Responsibility. Myth or Reality?
Contents
1. Pettit’s Argument
2. An Observation
3. A Critique
4. Towards an Alternative
6
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Irreducible Corporate Responsibility Thesis:
[ICRT] It is sometimes impossible to fully distribute the responsibility of a corporate agent to the individual members of that agent.
7
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Excuse Condition:
[E] An individual member of an organization cannot be blamed for a decision made by that organization if s/he disagrees with it.
8
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
The premise-based and conclusion-based procedures are strategically equivalent
Pettit’s argument fails for the case of outcome-oriented preferences
9
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Reasons for disagreement
[E*] An individual’s disagreement with the decision the organization of which s/he is a member affects the extent to which s/he can be blamed for that decision only if s/he disagrees with it for the right reasons.
10
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Reason-sensitive control
Culpable quality of will, faulty self-governance
Normative reasons
11
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Friend in distress examples:- “busy”- “reputation”- “school play”
Information requirements
From the individual to the collective level
12
Dictatorship
Preemptive War
p q r
(p q) s
s
WMDs? Sufficient Power?
Just War? Preemptive War?
A No Yes Yes No
13
Dictatorship
Preemptive War
p q r
(p q) s
s
WMDs? Sufficient Power?
Just War? Preemptive War?
B Yes No Yes No
14
Dictatorship
Preemptive War
p q r
(p q) s
s
WMDs? Sufficient Power?
Just War? Preemptive War?
C Yes Yes No No
15
Oligarchy
Preemptive War
p q r
(p q) s
s
WMDs? Sufficient Power?
Just War? Preemptive War?
A No Yes Yes No
B Yes No Yes No
C Yes Yes No No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
16
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
A recipe for distributing responsibility• Check the fault(s) of the corporate agent• Trace them to individuals
17
1. Pettit’s Argument * 2. An Observation3. A Critique * 4. Towards an Alternative
Collectivizing reason
Member and role responsibility
Corporate Responsibility (CR)- (ir)reducibility
a false dilemma
18
Conclusions
1. Information about normative reasons and faulty self-governance can be used for “tracing back” CR to IR.
2. A bottom-up approach to CR