G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA,petitioners,vs.SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, C.J.:On appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision3and resolution4of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions5and order6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents.The relevant facts are undisputed.Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7and his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab initio;2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves;4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to payP60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally cut;P50,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings;5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.8On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners,9this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the defenda[n]t herself;3. Ordering defendant to payP30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees illegally cut;P20,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.10In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;]3. Ordering defendants to payP20,000.00 for the six (6) forest trees illegally cut;P20,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.11The three complaints12commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less thanP20,000.00.Petitioners opposed,14contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.15The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,16to no avail.17Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining OrderEx Parte18with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues, viz:FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20In their memorandum,21respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review by this Court.Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22In their Supplemental Memorandum,23petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a)Raymundo v. CA24which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b)Swan v. CA25where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c)Santos v. CA26where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d)Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.28It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.30The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.31An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.32There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner33and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.34The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;35(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed38[their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];39(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40and(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.41These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.42Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,viz:Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;x x x.In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less thanP20,000.00, to wit:Civil CaseNo. Lot No.Assessed Value

51886195P1,030.00

54336196-A4,500.00

54346196-B4,340.00

7529-A1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44of or for cancellation of title45to or to quiet title46over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance)exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereinwhere the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."49The cases ofRaymundo v. CA50andCommodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar.Raymundoinvolved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees ofP10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor canCommodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporationprovide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."Worse, the cases ofSwan v. CA52andSantos v. CA53cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints inSwanandSantoswere filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. InSwan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. InSantos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.54In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less thanP20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.IN VIEW WHEREOF,the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005]CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO,petitioners, vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR,respondent.HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution[2]denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.The AntecedentsOn September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein,inter alia, as follows:2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[]fathers co-heirs;3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.[3]The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:a. actual damages, as follows:a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting toP1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case atP1,500.00 each schedule;a.2. attorneys fees in the amount ofP20,000.00 andP500.00 for every court appearance;b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine; andc. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.[4]The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.[5]He averred that(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceedP20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC.[6]The petitioners opposed the motion.[7]They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which wasP200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof isP3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value.On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8]denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim.[9]Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention[10]making common cause with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.[11]During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value ofP5,950.00.[12]On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; andDismissing defendants counterclaim.SO ORDERED.[13]Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. Thefalloof the decision is as follows:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.SO ORDERED.[14]The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15]of R.A. No. 7691.The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.[16]Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE,ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMINGIN TOTOTHE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[17]The Ruling of the CourtThe lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is anaccion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount ofP3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for damages exceedingP20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.The petition has no merit.It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.[18]The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was anaccion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was anaccion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. Anaccion reinvindicatoriais a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, anaccion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases.The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determinedby the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.[20]The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint.[21]The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.[22]Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 wasP5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less thanP20,000.00.[23]We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:The determining jurisdictional element for theaccion reinvindicatoriais, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceedsP20,000, and the MTC, if the value isP20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this isP5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the courta quo.[24]It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[25]Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceedingP20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.[26]Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:On July 8, 1994, an information3for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.7The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult toimmediatelystop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hourfor the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide")with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Codewhen the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12The said provision thus reads:Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15that:It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16Later, in People v. Casiano,17the Court explained:4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (overP200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25the Court ruled:While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOCShipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)Similarly, in the subsequent case ofSta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998];Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29the Court clarified that:Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances inTijam vs. Sibonghanoy. InSibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA.Sibonghanoyis an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:Lachesis defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule.Estoppelby laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies,lachesshould have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.InSibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.Clearly, the factual settings attendant inSibonghanoyare not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu ofSibonghanoy.Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.37The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x xIndeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174497 October 12, 2009HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE AURELIA CENSERO SEBE and LYDIA SEBE,Petitioners,vs.HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD RESOURCE CENTER,Respondents.D E C I S I O NABAD,J.:This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actions involving real properties with assessed values of less thanP20,000.00.The Facts and the CaseIn this petition for review on certiorari1petitioners seek to reverse the Order2dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment of documents, reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an action where the assessed value of the properties is less thanP20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration3but the court denied it.4On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City5a complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed value ofP9,910.00, plus damages.6On November 25, 1999 they amended their complaint7to address a deed of confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevillas Answer8to the complaint. The Sebes claimed that they owned the subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his Answer9Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so his wife and children substituted him.10Parenthetically, with defendant Veronico Sevillas death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this case.11On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of less thanP20,000.00. Under the law,12said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed value of the property exceedsP20,000.00,13otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.14The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration.15They pointed out that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and the cases of De Rivera v. Halili16and Copioso v. Copioso.17The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court there said that, since it also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts of lease on which the opposing parties based their rights of possession, the case had been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, civil actions, which were incapable of pecuniary estimation, came under the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now the RTC).18The Sebes pointed out that, like De Rivera, the subject of their case was "incapable of pecuniary estimation" since they asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the validity of the affidavits of quitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties.19Thus, the RTC should try the case.The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the assessed value of which was allegedlyP3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that the case comprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property. It sought the annulment of contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages. In other words, there had been a joinder of causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the case properly fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here, petitioners argued that their case had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those involved in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebess motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.20Before the Huguete, cancellation of titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did not exceedP20,000.00.The IssueThe issue in this case is whether or not the Sebess action involving the two lots valued at less thanP20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.The Courts RulingWhether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.21The gist of the Sebess complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40 years of two unregistered lots22in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered by Tax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value ofP9,910.00.23On June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.24Being illiterate, they relied on Sevillas explanation that what they signed were "deeds of real estate mortgage" covering a loan that they got from him.25And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership over the two lots to Sevilla forP10,000.0026were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary public.27Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant Sevilla applied for28and obtained free patent titles covering the two lots on September 23, 1991.29Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to defendant Technology and Livelihood Resource Center forP869,555.00.30On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale covering the two lots.31Upon closer examination, however, their signatures had apparently been forged.32The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making them sign such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla already got titles to them as early as September.33At any rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his name.34Then, using force and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants35and harvested that planting seasons yield36of coconut and palay worthP20,000.00.37Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them to hire a lawyer38and incur expenses of litigation.39Further the Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the years.40They were also entitled to moral41and exemplary damages.42They thus asked the RTC a) to declare void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b) to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay themP140,000.00 in lost produce from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the complaint,P30,000.00 in moral damages,P100,000.00 in attorneys fee,P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and such amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix.43Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the distinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include real actions involving property with an assessed value of less thanP20,000.00.44The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129,45as amended,46to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in excess ofP20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. ThusSEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation.(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside Metro Manila involved in the suit isP20,000.00 and below, as in this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. ThusSEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.But was the Sebess action one involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it or one the subject of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the documents of conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and, second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.1avvphi1An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.47Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself."48"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds.49While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in law.50Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation or nullification of a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendants lack of title to real property. Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.51Nestled between what distinguishes a "title" from a "certificate of title" is the present controversy between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of them has valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificates of title covering them?The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred ownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevillas favor. The Sebes alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them into signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan that they got from him.Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidence of ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second, to possess and enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and their corresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners.52The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two lots. These would merely follow after the tr