juvenilejustice rec 20111

8/4/2019 JuvenileJustice Rec 20111

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Resolution, Reinvestment, and Realignment:

Three Strategies or Changing Juvenile Justice

Research and Evaluation Center

Jefrey A. Butts and Douglas N. Evans

September 2011


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Acknowledgementsth rpr a a pb by ra fr h n Yr cuytru a h A e. cay Fua Jh Jay c f craJu a h Rarh Fua f h cy Uvry f n Yr.Ay p r u pr h rpr ar h f hauhr a.

Rpr by la mar Vaquz.

Recommended citAtionBu, Jffry A. a dua n. eva (2011). Ru, Rv,a Ra: thr sra fr cha Juv Ju. nYr, nY: Rarh a evaua cr, Jh Jay c f craJu, cy Uvry f n Yr.

tABle oF contents

euv suary

iru 1

Py c 3

thr m f Rfr 7Ru m 7Rv m 8

Ra m 18

cu 24

Rfr 26

This is the rst of several reports on juvenile justice realignment from theRarh a evaua cr a Jh Jay c f cra Ju.

tHe AUtHoRsJffry A. Bu rr f h Rarh a evaua cr a Jh Jayc f cra Ju, cy Uvry f n Yr.

dua n. eva a Ph.d. aa a iaa Uvry a a rarhua h h Rarh a evaua cr a Jh Jay c fcra Ju, cy Uvry f n Yr.


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eXeCUTIVe SUMMARY |A v r ar h U sa afr 1995, hubr f yu ffr pa ur rra fa af, bu vry a a h a r. th r raa yuh arra ar h ay ha ay ppexpect. Incarceration sometimes uctuates in concert with crime rates

a . of, h vr ry.

th a f arra py a ra r. i apolicy choice. Some lawmakers invest heavily in youth connementfacilities. In their jurisdictions, incarceration is a key component of theyouth justice system. Other lawmakers invest more in community-based programs. In their view, costly connement should be reservedfr hr a ruy v ffr.

These choices are critical for budgets and for safety. If ofcials spend uh arra, hy vuay a h rur operate a diversied and well-balanced justice system. Correctional

u a h hh aa h arra bto dominate scal and programmatic decision making.

A ubr f a rz h prb a ary a h 1960a 1970. i cafra, Pyvaa, a w, ara arar ra vav p ru h afor expensive state connement and to supervise as many youngffr a pb hr u. dur h 1990,nrh cara, oh, a or p ar rfr.

th rfr ra ap by h a ar by ffrnames, but they generally rely on three sources of inuence:resolution (direct managerial inuence over system behavior);

reinvestment(nancial incentives to change system behavior); andrealignment(organizational and structural modications to altery bhavr).

th rpr rv h hry a vp f h raa aayz hr pa py, pra, a pub afy.

All three strategies have been used effectively to reform juvenilejustice systems, but this report suggests that realignment may be theb h fr ua rfr vr h r. Rfr rain juvenile justice are sustainable when they cannot be easily reversedby fuur pyar fa ffr buary aha pa vr.


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INTRODUCTION |Juvenile justice is changing. The declining crime rate is partlyrpb. wh r ra fa, h p f r b a pyar hav rar fr va. svra a ar

a avaa f h ppruy pr by ra rto reconsider the role of incarceration in juvenile justice. Building onreforms from the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers are nding that youthconnement costs can be lowered without endangering public safety.

The number of youth in secure connement has been declining as aruv ta. th n Yr t pubh a ra 2011 congratulating Texas ofcials for their leadership and thoughtful,decisive action in moving the state away from the prison modelof juvenile justice (July 9, 2011). The editors cited the states $100million investment in community-based programs and lauded thefact that the Texas youth inmate population dropped more than 60pr 2006. ohr ar a ra hav pra r

rfr cafra, i, mur, a oh.

th rfr b h h r r , bufalling crime rates allow lawmakers to increase their focus on cost-effectiveness and the impact of juvenile justice policy. Down-sizingcorrections is now a central theme in a growing number of juvenile

justice systems (National Juvenile Justice Network 2011). Do theseha rpr a pra hf py a pra, r arhy ry a prary ra h bu a ra fv r? w pyar aa h rfr f r ra bu rbu? s f h pa rvav h futhe get-tough movement of the 1990s now endorse policies that keeparra a u. ca ava ru h parrover time? Can todays reforms be locked down to survive thepa a a bu ba f rr?

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Violent crime index arrests per 100,000 U.S. residents

Afr 1995, v r ra a a a rup

Data source: Estimates calculated by John Jay College using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Young adults (ages 18-24)

Juveniles (ages 15-17)

Adults (ages 25 and older)

Juveniles (under age 15)

Year Arrested


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-70% -50% -30% -10% 10% 30% 50% 70%

Alabama (1,328)

Alaska (249)Arizona (1,488)

Arkansas (839)

California (13,309)

Colorado (1,688)

Connecticut (303)

Delaware (256)

District of Columbia (236)

Florida (5,895)

Georgia (2,692)

Hawaii (130)

Idaho (683)

Illinois (2,440)

Indiana (2,422)

Iowa (1,060)

Kansas (973)

Kentucky (944)

Louisiana (1,294)

Maine (215)

Maryland (787)

Massachusetts (961)

Michigan (2,659)

Minnesota (1,332)

Mississippi (413)

Missouri (1,226)

Montana (161)

Nebraska (773)

Nevada (1,052)

New Hampshire (157)

New Jersey (1,564)New Mexico (409)

New York (3,157)

North Carolina (1,014)

North Dakota (85)

Ohio (3,871)

Oklahoma (923)

Oregon (1,437)

Pennsylvania (5,034)

Rhode Island (291)

South Carolina (1,258)

South Dakota (507)

Tennessee (1,151)

Texas (5,831)

Utah (770)

Vermont (48)

Virginia (2,114)

Washington (1,382)

West Virginia (565)

Wisconsin (1,395)

Wyoming (247)

The number of juvenile offenders in residential facilities declined in most states between 2000 and 2008

Percent change in juvenile residential facility populations: 2000-2008

Source: Hockenberry (2011).Data Source: Juvenile Residential Facility Census 2000 and 2008 [machine-readable les]. OJJDP [producer]. Census Bureau [collector].Note: Numbers in parentheses represent each states total residential population on the 2008 census day.

National Total:The total number of offenders injuvenile residential facilities fell26% between 2000 and 2008.


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POLICY CONTeXT |sa a a pyar ar h U sa ar once crowded youth connement facilities. In a growing number of

jurisdictions, incarceration is no longer an automatic response for alltypes of juvenile law violations. States are increasing their investments arav arra, pay fr yu ffr. thha ar uppr by brahruh h f bravp, h ra raby f vaua rarh quy rv, a p by h U.s. supr currz h pa aur f a.

la vr a prva prvr ar a a rresponsibility for juvenile justice. Traditionally, juvenile connementwas managed by states while alternatives (not involving connement)r aa by a vr. Ur ha y, aymanaged programs suffered from low levels of nancial and political

support. It was cost-effective for city and county governments to sendar ubr f yuhfu ffr a u bau,unlike community programs, connement costs were paid by thea. th v ra arra a hhr, bu prv pub afy. th b rarh hha arra by f ru rv (muvy a.2010), a ay arba hr yuh prb, u pruaa u, upy, a bhavra hah u(Ha a Zbr 2006).

77,662

56,157

32,464

24,757

2000 2008

Number of juveniles in residential facilities: U.S. totals

Juv ffr ppua r pub ha prvafa b 2000 a 2008

Source: Hockenberry (2011).Data Source: Juvenile Residential Facility Census 2000 and 2008 [machine-readable les]. OJJDP [producer].Census Bureau [collector].

Public Facilities (down 28%)

Private Facilities (down 24%)


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tHe Role oF secURe conFinementThe scale of connement in the juvenile justice system is not simplya function of the rate and severity of juvenile crime. It is a productof numerous policy decisions made by lawmakers, budget ofcials,and justice practitioners. Actions taken by state legislators, judges,prosecutors, police ofcials, probation workers, and correctional facilityarar r h ay a ha yp f ffr arseen as suitable for connement.

Some juveniles, such as those charged with violent offenses or thosewith lengthy court records, are conned based solely on the severitya f hr a bhavr. th yuh, hvr, rary aup a sizeable portion of all conned youth. Many juveniles are placedin secure connement for reasons other than the offense(s) with whichhy r har. th ra h u h prv upprprovided by a youths family, the availability and cost of alternativesupervision and treatment resources, the proximity of the juvenilesh uh arav, a hr rpua fr ffv.

Debates over the proper use of youth connement have bedeviled

juvenile justice policy in the United States for more than a century, atleast since the juvenile court reformers of the Progressive Era ques-tioned the wisdom of placing delinquent youths in 19th Century hous-es of refuge (Mennel 1973; Platt 1969). Since the very beginningsof the juvenile justice era, reformers have tried to reduce the scale ofinstitutional connement by expanding the quality and availability ofcommunity-based alternatives.

Rarhr a qu h ffv f uaconnement. Studies have shown for decades that institutionalsettings for youth involve an inherent conict between control andtreatment. The organizational subculture of connement may actuallybr v rahr ha uppr (F 1981).

Juv rra u f v up hr a. i f h prhv u f yuhfu ffr a,rarhr f r ha 1,300 ru a ffrfr v yar afr hr appara ur (muvy a. 2010).th ru h ha h frquy f yuh ff vr h aura, a h h f a ffr p ua rbu uh h ra f .

A recent meta-analytical review of group care settings for children andyouth found no evidence that congregate care programs for court-vv yuh r r ffv ha yuh bhavr aru rv ha r prra vr ar rv

family-like, community-based settings (Lee et al. 2011).

mr arra qua rv. Pa yuh large, group connement facilities does not seem to be justied fromh prpv f ra ffv r h prv f fuurrv.


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So, why has secure connement remained the default dispositionfor so many juvenile offenders for so long? There are at least fourra:

1) iapaa Despite the rehabilitative rhetoric of the juvenilejustice system, what some people really want is for offenders to beff hr r a u f hr hbrh, f y fr a fh r yar. ev f rarh h ha arra

ru h vra r ra, pyar a h pub ay prfrconnement because it addresses our emotional needs for safety.

2) Rrbu Again, despite the treatment rhetoric of juvenilejustice, placing a youth in secure connement demonstrates thecommunitys disapproval of illegal behavior. In other words, the

juvenile justice system connes some youthful offenders because theydeserve it. In policy circles, this is often called accountability.

3) cv Connement just might be easier. There are f a b a fr ar fa, r f frv, uaa prra, rapra, a , ahr uppr a av fr yuh. Pyar ay uha ar pra a f ar u rahr ha ayar prra h uy.

4) irph Sociologists use the term isomorphism torb h pr ha a raza h h ar rb ahr vr , bau h aruur raby ffv bu bau avaau frbureaucracies to t in rather than to stand out (DiMaggio and Powell1983). In other words, connement may be the preferred policy foryuhfu ffr par u ur a f aa.


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Complicated Systems Require Complicated Reforms

n f p a pra r ha happ a yupr arr fr va h a. n aa ru vr hhrh a hu ru fra har r b vr fr pru.n abh prp fy f h yuh hu b uprv h

uy r pa a ur fay. th pra arleft to state and local ofcials and even to individual practitioners, andh a rab vara h ruur a aa f

juvenile justice systems.

i h U sa, vry a vr, a vry agovernment, decides for itself how to organize and operate the juvenile

justice system. Each jurisdiction chooses how to divide the responsibilityfr ha yu ffr a a bra r f a fragencies, prosecutors, defense attorneys, juvenile and family courts,prba a, rra u, r, raprvr, vuary raza, a yuh ava. A hmix are the school ofcials and behavioral health providers who often

work hand-in-hand with the juvenile justice system but are not part of it.

wh a yu pr up f a a bhavr,ha happ a b pa a uprab. A aenforcement agency must rst decide whether to make an arrest or toha h ar fray a h h fay. n, a uuayh h apprva f a ur, h p r prur r yp farav ay hhr h yuh hu b h (r

detained) pending court processing.

th prur (r a arav ay) h whether to le charges (or petition) against the youth, and if not,hhr rfr h ar fr fra uprv a a rv.If prosecuted, the youth may end up in court facing a judge who mightmake one nal attempt to get the youth and family to agree to anfra rv pa. Fa ha, h ur r hhr hfacts of the case merit adjudication (a legal nding of delinquency), andif so, what type of response (or disposition) should be ordered.

A f h ay hav a prfu ff h yu pra h r hr fay, bu h raa a pv made at the end of the process, when the court chooses the dispositionfr ah a. th h h ur hhr pa fr hyouth should involve some period of connement, or in the vernacular of

juvenile justice, whether the youth should be placed out of the home.


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THRee MODeLS OF ReFORM |All juvenile justice systems need some connement facilities. Evenh h b ffr f fa, u a raza,connement will always be a potential part of the response to youthcrime. The question addressed here is how connement resources

should be managed. In the past, secure connement was staffed andoperated by state governments, while non-connement services andcommunity-based programs were managed locally.

iarra y a uara ru rvor deter future crime. In the juvenile justice system, the average costof incarcerating one juvenile in a state facility may reach $100,000per year and sometimes even $250,000 (New York State JuvenileJustice Advisory Group 2010). The nancial burdens of incarcerationalone attract states to any strategy for reducing the scale of juvenileconnement and shifting young offenders into community programs.

tay, a r ubr f a h fr a az, r

exible juvenile justice system that provides connement whenary, bu y f a h hr rv a a arclearly inappropriate, and only if the connement facility is close to theoffenders home so that family ties may be maintained and communityrry a afrar pa a b ffv.

thr ar a ubr f ra fr ru h apprah juvenile justice systems that are still dependent on state-operatedconnement facilities. This report proposes three basic strategies:1) resolution, 2) reinvestment; and 3) realignment. The rest of thereport describes these approaches and how juvenile justice systemshav u h rfr pra a p ra urconnement for youthful offenders.

ResolUtion modelsRu h a raa h f ha h

justice system. Resolution approaches rely on leadership, managerialinuence, and will power. The most prominent reform efforts of the1970 a 1980 p h rv f arar aelected ofcials. In Massachusetts and Utah, for example, justiceadministrators worked with elected ofcials to reduce reliance onsecure facilities and to move young offenders into community-basedprograms and smaller, home-like settings. More recently, juvenile

justice leaders in Missouri used the resolution strategy to remakethat states approach to long-term placement for young offenders.

thr ffr ra ha h rv f arar apyar a b a prfu fr fr rfr.

In the 1960s, the Massachusetts juvenile justice system dependedon a few large connement facilities to deal with juvenile offenders.The facilities served as an incentive to use connement in local

jurisdictions throughout the Commonwealth. In 1969, however, statear a abu a apab a f ha ru hmaahu dpar f Yuh srv (mr 1991).


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In a few years, Jerome Jerry Miller and his team closed the stateslarge juvenile facilities and developed a network of community-basedprra a hr pa. Rarh h ha yuh rv h uy ha v f rv r ha yuh hr prvuy arra maahu (oh, mr, aCoates 1977). In a follow-up study, the National Council on Crime andDelinquency conrmed that the states community-based approachprotected public safety as well as the previous incarceration-focusedy bu a (krbr, Au a s 1989).

In the mid-1970s, political leaders in Utah faced their own juvenilecorrectional crisis. Utahs one large juvenile facility, the State Industrialsh, a ffv a aru. layr rpr hstates youth led a suit based on the facilitys poor condition.i arh f arav apprah, a ura by Fraassistance, state ofcials closed the training school and reducedthe number of secure beds statewide from 350 to 60. Community-ba prra a a ubr f a ra raunits were used to supervise juveniles in their own communities.Rarhr h a h Uah pr ar uthat shifting juvenile justice away from incarceration and toward

community-based programs did not worsen public safety and actuallyay hav ru ubqu ra bhavr (krbr 2005).

s h maahu a Uah rfr, hr a havemployed resolution-based strategies for reducing the use ofconnement institutions. The most heralded of these is the MissouriModel (Mendel 2010). During the past 20 years, Missouri ofcialsmoved hundreds of youth out the states traditional juvenilecorrections facilities and into community-based services anda, ray rbu ra prra. th a arpuaz apprah rv, vp a focused on youth development and behavioral change in family-like.

ea rfr h p rv a bvu ray, a haph f maahu, Uah, a mur h ha a r. Ahv rfr h aara ru, hvr,a ha ru ary ua rfr. Fr hra, a ubr f a pa hr rfr ra umore durable forces: nancial incentives and structural realignment.

ReinVestment modelsReinvestment refers to the use of nancial incentives to encouragestate and local governments to reduce spending on connement andto invest in community-based programs. In the adult justice system,

rv ra ar pr a a ra h frra pub afy a r (la V a. 2010).

A ubr f a vp rv av fr yuhfuffr a ary a h 1960 a 1970. Ur h arra,states paid for the costs of community-based programs while charginglocal jurisdictions for connement, sometimes on a sliding scale.The less severe a juveniles offenses, the more money countieswere required to pay for incarcerating that juvenile. States such ascafra, i, oh, a Pyvaa ap vary fr fh .


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Juvenile Justice Systems Have Their Own Language

Adjudication The court hearing in which a juvenile offender is judiciallyr hav a qu ff.Similar to a nding of guilt. Youth found to be legallyrpb fr a ff ar h rfrr a havbeen adjudicated.

darra An intentional process to reduce secure connementhruh hrr , pa u f arav, a py rv.

duaza Ay ffr ru h ppua f u r ru h pr ha ra py ua vr.

d Temporary holding of an arrested juvenile in a securefacility to ensure the youths appearance at subsequentur har r pr h pub afy p a

nal court disposition.

dp The court hearing in which a juvenile is ordered to complywith specic services and sanctions. Similar to impositionf . th ur rr ru fr h harare also referred to as the nal disposition of a case.

Ra Reconguring the justice system to expand the roles andrpb f a vr h ru r va h r r f a vr,especially in secure connement and residentialpa.

Rv Using nancial incentives to lower the demand for secureconnement of offenders and diverting the funds thatu hr b p arra :1) provide evidence-based and cost-effective alternatives

for individual offenders; and/or2) improve conditions in high-crime communities.

Ru Changing juvenile justice practice through leadership anddirect managerial action and relying on those inuences toua rfr py a prur.

sur Fay A locked residential facility for adjudicated juveniles,ra fr hrapuay r fa prison-like correctional institutions.


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The contemporary concept of justice reinvestment in the juvenilejustice system began with the establishment of the California YouthAuhry (cYA) 1941 a a f h cafra Prbasuby A f 1965. laar h cYA prv a secure placements for youth, but with the goal of keeping adjudicatedyuh h rahr ha b pa a uby default. Probation became a conventional sentence for low-level

offenders as counties nally had adequate resources and personnel tofu a pra prba prra.

By the 1970s, however, probation ofcers were supervising moreha hr h ubr f yuh r by h aaaar f h ay, ra r ha prba uprv arv r b ffv. mafu r h ffrba praa bau uh a v rucaseload management. Probation ofces in California responded byrfrr r ffr a rra u. crrapopulations rebounded, although the recidivism rate from the statesrra y a a b ary 50 pr (sh1972). State ofcials began to construct new institutions and toarra r ffrh pp f ha hy ha .

cAliFoRniA PRoBAtion sUBsidY ActTo reassert the philosophy of community probation for both juvenilesa au, h cafra laur a h Prba subyAct of 1965. The law offered nancial incentives to local communities uz prba a f a rr. th prrareestablished probation as the most cost-efcient method of dealingwith at least one-quarter of offenders that would otherwise be sent toa u. lar bv prba par urespond positively to nancial rewards for meeting their performancegoals. The Probation Subsidy Act provided counties with $2,000

to $4,000 in state funds for each otherwise eligible offender not a a fay (sh 1972).

th Prba suby A u vra v. cuhired more probation ofcers, supervisors, support staff, and aides toprv ffr uprv. th a hu a a uru. Fr 1965 1969, h pra f v ffr a pr rpp fr 23 pr 10 pr. mr ha45,000 ffr av a pr a r a uy prba a rhaba prra. thsuby A abh h pra f harb h a a u (sh 1972). dp u, hvr, h prra ba rauay

r pv u h r ubr f ffrentering the system in the 1970s, many for drug-ra r. th prra a rv upp prba r vr p fu a h uy v. i 1978, cafra h Prba suby A a rpa h a prra ha prv ra fu vuau (n 1996). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov


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PennsYlVAniA Act 148i 1970, Pyvaa uu hr pay uprvqu yuh hrown communities or connethem at the states expense.la u ha v vp prra

for adjudicated youth. With fewtreatment options available at the local level, judges were sometimesp arra yuh h ay hav b uab frcommunity-based treatment. To give counties nancial responsibilityfr hr pa , Pyvaa ap A 148 1976. th a rqur u vr 40 pr f h f yuh a fa bu a a 20 pr f h of community-based intervention (Aryna et al. 2005). The intent of thepolicy was to provide counties with nancial incentives to develop localservices for at-risk youth.

Act 148 demonstrated success within its rst decade. By 1984, youthplacements in connement declined 24 percent while placements uy prra ra 20 pr a pa ay ra prra r 52 pr. sa ub frlocal programming increased from $65 million to $114 million. Thepa rbur fr uy rv a ugreater exibility to develop programs that kept youth in their ownhomes during court-ordered treatment (Aryna et al. 2005).

The nancial mechanisms associated with Act 148, however,concerned both state and county ofcials. The state worried thatcounty spending would exceed projections while the counties fearedbeing locked into xed budgets if state supports were depleted priorto the end of a scal year. In the early 1990s, an amendment to Act

148 established needs-based planning and budgeting. Under the newy, Pyvaa u vp a pa f rv aub h f h rv ava. th apprah acounties greater exibility and it gave the state better information forbuary vrh.

wisconsin YoUtH AidsIn 1981, Wisconsin began to hold counties nancially responsible for

juvenile placements and to offer nancial support for counties willing fu a prra fr qu yuh. Bfr 1981, hstate paid for juvenile placements in secure facilities, but countiesr rpb fr a fu rqur rv yuh hr hu. i a ffr rvr h v, h dpar

f Juv crr (dJc) auh w Yuh A.

The goal of Youth Aids was to decentralize the nancial management ofjuvenile justice by distributing funds to counties in proportion to theirinvestments in community-based services. The formula for dispersingfunds to local governments incorporated three factors: each countystotal youth population, its proportion of the states total number of

juvenile arrests, and the proportion of secure placements coming from

http://www.dpw.state.pa.us


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ha uy. th a ar b vua ufor the cost of each juvenile placed in a state facility, anday ra fu r b u fr a prra.

By 1997, h Yuh A prra au fr 45pr f uy p quy rv.t vr hr har, h u u rvu frprpry a a ra a hy ha bfr, bu

Yuh A ray pa hr rur (subret al. 1999). Judges had more exibility to commitadjudicated juveniles to in-home dispositions, includingv uprv, r r, vuaand/or family counseling, vocational training, paymentof restitution to victims, and victim-offender mediation.Out-of-home placements were reserved for juveniles who had ru r rpa ff r fr h h aah vr. Pa u vary v f rrvfr a (.., fr h a rup h) vr (..,u a ur fa).

th Yuh A prra pr fu ha.Freezes in county allocations sometimes made it difcult for counties ar h r f yuh rv. A, u a r rqur u r f hr fu ha hy p pay fr rv. th r p u arhuay fr u ra rvu. dp h prb, YuhA a r h ru ur pa by 23 pr afrthe mid-1990s; in Milwaukee County alone commitments fell nearly 75pr b 1995 a 2005 (tyr, Zbr a l 2006).Of course, juvenile crime was also falling during this time period.th y qu hhr h u buaab ur ffr .

ReclAim oHioIn 1993, Ohio launched an ambitious juvenile reinvestment strategy ru h ubr f a u. ReclAimoh (Ra a equab cuy a la Arav the Incarceration of Minors) shifted the responsibility for juvenilearra u a pr u raffr ay rahr ha a u (m, Appaand Latessa 1997). The initiative relied on nancial incentives to keep

juveniles close to home. In the initial funding approach, counties wererpb fr 75 pr f h ay ra fr a ua bvru 50 pr f h ay ra fr a uy pa.

ReclAim oh ra pa ru

juvenile commitment rates and to support community-ba prra. i a ap a 1995. thnumber of juveniles committed to institutions operated byh oh dpar f Yuh srv (dYs) ranearly every year following the programs inception. On thehr ha, v r oh a ur ha 1990. Fa r ra ay hav ru hdemand for juvenile commitment resources.

http://www.wi-doc.com

http://www.dys.ohio.gov


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i fa, r aa h ha h rp dYs auayleveled off between 2005 and 2007, just after a brief increase in the

juvenile violent crime rate between 2004 and 2006. The real test ofReclAim oh u f a h v r ra rbu.

Still, when the costs associated with arresting, adjudicating, andprocessing juvenile offenders were taken into account the RECLAIMOhio initiative appeared to be cost-efcient (Lowenkamp and Latessa2005). th rv apprah u oh a appa policymakers of varying political perspectives as it provided judgeswith the ability to determine how individual juveniles were handled.i uppr r rhaba a ra h fadjudicated youth, but judges retained the authority to incarcerate

juvenile offenders as they saw t. This probably facilitated theap f rfr. cu a h ar u r rpa?

descHUtes coUntY commUnitY YoUtH inVestment PRoJect

In the mid-1990s, Deschutes County (which includes the city ofBend, Oregon) started a system known as community justice, whichstressed community and victim involvement in the justice process,h vr a auab z, a r rpar h har au by r. i 1997, a a f hcommunity justice philosophy, Deschutes adopted new policies thatled to the creation of the Community Youth Investment Project (CYIP).The CYIP shifted funding from costly state institutions to county-level

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

1,750

2,000

2,250

2,500

2,750

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Note: In all presentations of state-specic FBI arrest rates, under-age-18 arrests were obtained from Table 69in the annual FBI report, Crime in the United States. Rates were calculated after adjusting each years reporting

population in Table 69 using the states total percentage of residents under age 18 according to the U.S. Census.

The falling number of juvenile commitments in Ohio largely mirrorsthe decline in violent juvenile crime

Juvenile commitments

Data sources: Ohio Department of Youth Services and FBI (Uniform Crime Reports), Crime in the United States.

* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17in the state population.

Juvenile commitments to the OhioDepartment of Youth Services

Year

Juvenile violent crime arrest rate in Ohio

Juvenile violent crime arrest rate*


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Juvenile Justice Reinvestment Began in the 1970s

Pyvaa A 1481976

Rqur u pay 40% f uapa , bu sa rbur u upto 80% for community-based services.

w Yuh A1981

Allocated juvenile justice funds to counties basedon 3 factors: youth population, juvenile arrests,a ur pa. cu pa fr aconnement. Remaining funds could be used forcommunity-based services.

ReclAim oh1993

State provided counties with funds for community-based juvenile services, but allocations decreaseda h ubr f yuh a far. Fu h u vv.

dhu cuy, orcuy Yuh iv- Prra (cYiP)1997

State reimbursed county 100% for each juvenile a a fay h hr uhave been eligible for connement. County usedh fu prv prv prra a

community-based treatment for adjudicated youth.

nrh cara Juvcr Prv cu1998

eabh a JcPc ah uy vr -cal juvenile justice services. The state reimbursedcounties for up to 90% of the costs of community-ba prra.

Rpy i2004

cu rv a fu fr uyprograms if they reduced juvenile commitments tostate facilities by 25% within the rst year.

cafra sa B 6812007

cu pa varab f h sa fr of juvenile connement. Fees were higher foryuh fr ru ff.

ta cRu Prra (cRP)2009

sa pa fu fr u ha uevidence-based programs to intervene with youthoffenders locally rather than relying on the statessecure connement facilities.

Realignment Initiatives Emerged in 2000

way cuy (mi)Juv srv Rfr2000

Established a private juvenile case managementy rpa h pub prba ay.dv uy raph rv z, h prva prvr au rpby fr ajuvenile services in each zone, including residentialpa. sa ah fu h uy p

on juvenile services.cafra sa B 81,Para Ra2007

cu au rpby fr a yuffr p h har h a a f v ff. th a prv bra u vp aqua prraa rv a h a v.


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| 15 |

treatment and prevention programs for adjudicated andat-risk juveniles. It introduced strong incentives througha rfu h uy fr ha u havb urr a a ru f arra (appray$48,000 annually per youth). The county used two-thirdsof the reimbursements to treat juveniles in the communitya v h ra fu prv prra(may a Hb 2001).

th cYiP appar b ffv v h 78 prrp ua b ha f. th uysaved and reinvested $2 million in community-basedprograms within the rst three years, and 49 percent of juveniles inh prra r pa raua hh h h ahr 20pr ar hr ged h r h prra (mayand Holcomb 2001). Over the past decade, juvenile crime decreasedp a rh h uy ppua, qureferrals decreased 12.5 percent, and the juvenile recidivism ratera pr (dhu cuy 2010).

subqu vaua, hvr, hav y ru. Aoutside evaluation found that while the program was more cost-ffv ha a ua pa, h rv ra f

juveniles who completed the program was slightly higher (67 percent)ha yuh ra fr a uy (58 pr). o h hrha, h ap z f h uy a a a h appar by rarhr r arfuy ah rvaharar. th vauar u ha h ru r rbu (Haay 2004). i r f rv fr ru ffalone, however, the youth managed through CYIP re-offended slightly f ha h ra fr a u (g 2002).

noRtH cARolinA JUVenile cRime PReVention coUncils

Until the late 1990s, juvenile justice responsibilities in North Carolinar p b par. t prv vrh aefciency, the state passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Act in 1998.th A ra h dpar f Juv Ju a dquyPrv (dJJdP), hh au h u f h frrpar. [n: i 2011, h sa au ha r h par a v arr pub afy ay.]th dJJdP a har h vp prv, rv, arehabilitative programs targeting at-risk youth, and devising a formula r h au f fu ah uy hu rv spend on community-based services (Mason 1999).

th Juv Ju Rfr A rqur ah uy

abh a Juv cr Prv cu (JcPc)ha u a a h arav by har fa pa. eah JcPc u uy bras well as criminal justice and other local governmentpr, ur, hah a ra prvr,and non-prot representatives. In addition to evaluatingurr prra a vp ra treat juveniles, JCPCs submitted annual requests for

http://www.deschutes.org

http://www.juvjus.state.nc.us


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| 16 |

state funding to support community-based programming for delinquentjuveniles (Mason 1999). Programs could address individual, family, andacademic risk factors. If a countys funding request was approved, thea rqur h uy ah b 10 pr a 30 prf a aa.

Following passage of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, juvenile nrh cara f raaay. th ubr f

juveniles committed to the state dipped to 357 in 2010 from 1,360 in1998 (nrh cara dpar f Juv Ju a dquyPrv 2011). wh h a u a a par h vrar , h rp a pr ha h fara f yuh v.

c u fa afr h v ,suggesting that reductions in connement were not simply a reaction fa r. A oh, hvr, nrh carastabilized between 2005 and 2008, just as violent youth crime grewhy. i b pra fr pyar a prar r h rahp h fuur.

RedePloY illinoism afr ReclAim oh, Rpy i ba 2004 a ap prra fur u. th a f h p a ruyuh a fa. Prr auh h Rpyprogram, the state simply paid for juvenile commitments coming fromIllinois counties. The costs of institutional care averaged $70,000auay fr ah ffr, a h ary 2000 h sa f ispent more than $100 million per year incarcerating approximately1,800 juvenile offenders. Almost half the juveniles sent to state

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

nrh cara prary pp fa h vr r b 2004 a 2007

Juvenile commitments

Data sources: North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and FBI (UCR).

* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17 inthe state population. The FBI does not publish arrest data for youth under age 16 at the state level.

Youth violent crime arrest rate (under age 18)

Year

Youth violent crime rate*

Juvenile commitments (under age 16)


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| 17 |

facilities were charged with non-violentoffenses. Nearly one-third of all juveniles werecommitted for short-term court evaluations(i Juv Ju iav 2008).

th Rpy av aa a fu parpa u fr h prv ftreatment and intervention programs for at-

r yuh (u v r).th sa rbur u fr h fmanaging adjudicated youth at the local level. Individual sites receivedapproximately $6,000 annually for each youth, but to be eligible and torv fu, u ru ua 25 percent in the rst year (Illinois Juvenile Justice Initiative 2006).

Rpy i ura brar uy parpa community-based services for juvenile offenders. Individual countieswere free to devise and structure their programming for juvenileffr a a hy ahr a f ba a: rura rra u, pr u, h yuhauab, a prv yuh h ppru u (iJuv Ju iav 2008). cu u a vary frhabav prra, u bu uaaavay, py rv, h , arrpa ra, a hah ra, uba abura, fay uppr rv, a uy rrav bar.

The initiative showed promise in its rst year, possibly avoidingmore than $2 million in incarceration costs not including thepa av fr r rv (i Juv Juiav 2008). wh hr yar, h p u ha ru a u by 51 pr. th av aexpanded to 23 more of the states 102 counties.

texAs ReinVestmentIn 2007, Texas faced prison construction needs with a price tag of $2b (Rh cr 2010). th a aur p a invest in alternatives. Texas ofcials allocated $241 million to expanduba abu a a hah ra fr ffr a u f pr. ovr h yar, h ubr f rdropped, as did probation and parole revocations. The state adjustedits prison projections to just 10 percent of previous estimates (Councilf sa gvr Ju cr 2009).

In recent years, the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) charged $93,864 pa yuh a ur fay fr a yar (lv 2008).

The one-year re-arrest rate for youth released from TYC was 57percent, and the three-year re-incarceration rate uctuated between47 pr a 52 pr. Pyar bv h tYc signicant transformation. In 2007, the Texas legislature passedsa B 103, hh a afr ReclAim oh a pra more cost-effective method of handling adjudicated youth. [By 2011,h sa pr v r ha, au a pa rh ta Yuh c a Juv Prba c form a new juvenile justice agency.]

http://www.dhs.state.il.us


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| 18 |

t a h f yuh arra,sa B 103 prhb ua fr ar ffr.It provided counties with nancialv aa qu yuhay a fu r prra hau rv a ffv arav incarceration. The legislation provided $58

uy prba par uppr yuh rv a haadjudicated youth at the local level (Levin 2010a).

th ff r a. t tYc fa a ruthe state budget by $115 million (Right on Crime 2010). Localofcials placed 53 percent fewer juveniles in state institutions duringthe next three years saving another $100 million. Nearly halfh pur av by ta u r rur aprba par p v r yuh fr b pa tYc fa.

i 2009 h ta Juv Prba c (tJPc) ph c Ru Prra (cRP) prv uwith the ability to obtain state funds for community-based youthprra. th fu r avaab y fr u pto reduce commitments and to rely on evidence-based programsa arav. subqu fu au r ba ahcountys effectiveness, including its juvenile recidivism rate. In thef yar, tYc f ary 40 pr, u a a par h cRP (lv 2010b).

ReAlignment modelsResolution and reinvestment strategies focus on inuencing the f arar a pyar, hr hruh r

persuasion or nancial incentives. Both strategies can be effectivein reforming juvenile justice policies and practices, as this reportha ra. Bh ra, hvr, ar vurab brvr h h py vr ha.

Ra fu ruura arra. i pr recongure organizations and systems on a permanent basis.sruura harar, f ur, a a b ha, buit is more difcult to undo reforms implemented with structuralha ha rvr prura ara ha r aa a ruur. wh y rfr vv ha f a a h f bu, harr ba h ay f bu.

wAYne coUntY, micHigAnPrior to 2000, juvenile justice services in Wayne County were manageduh hy r hr a. th uy a urconnement by committing young offenders to state-run facilities.Juvenile court judges had few local options for handling adjudicatedyuh. c, hvr, r uppr h a fu. thresulted in excessive use of out-of-home placement.

http://www.tyc.state.tx.us


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| 19 |

i h 1990, h avra ay ppua f a fr way cuy a 700 hahr 200 yuh h fa u mha(way cuy chr & Fay srv 2010a).Wayne County spent up to $150 million each year toincarcerate juvenile offenders (Latona, Smith & Chaney2006). A au by h sa Aur gra 1999

a a vary f prb urru ajuvenile facilities, including escalating costs and highrecidivism rates. Two-thirds of incarcerated juvenilesrur h y h h f ra.The apparent philosophy of juvenile justice wasapaa u f rhaba. i hr,the juvenile justice system in Wayne County was not achieving itsofcials goal helping juveniles to nish school, secure jobs, and avoidadditional justice involvement.

County ofcials then signed an agreement with the Michigandpar f Hua srv hf h rpby frmanaging adjudicated youth to the county from the state. Fundsav fr ru ua r v a prra. U a f a a a fu, h uyimplemented a completely new structure for delivering juvenileservices. The Juvenile Assessment Center/Care ManagementOrganization (JAC/CMO) system was a totally privatized system inhh uba abu a a hah prvr a h aaar a yuh rr prv a rv a uprvfor juvenile offenders (Wayne County Children & Family Services2010a).

The countys JAC became the entry point for all juveniles referred bya fr. Afr a prary a by h JAc, ah

juvenile was referred to one of ve CMOs. Each CMO was responsiblefr a f h uy a ha cmo ha pfr ra a aa a Pa f car fr vry yuh rfrrfr ha ara, u a aa a a rv fr

juveniles and their families. The county provided the necessary fundingthrough contracts with the ve CMOs. In addition to overseeing allcommunity-based services, the CMOs were responsible for placing

juveniles in secure or non-secure residential facilities wheneverpa a .

The county developed a web-based Juvenile Agency Informationsy ab a h rva par r ay rv,ensure compliance with court orders, and assess the programs

u a a (way cuy chr & Fay srv2010a). th y ur auaby by rqur h JAc, aindependent and non-prot agency, to monitor and review the CMOsvry h a auhrz ha rv h ary.th rfr hp h uy ra fr a y fuon state-funded placement to one focused on local supervision andra. t prv a auaby, h uy au haf h f ay ra pa a fa (way cuychr & Fay srv 2010a).

http://www.co.wayne.mi.us


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| 20 |

th rfr way cuy u y hav b pbwithout a reliable source of funding. Michigans Child Care Fundis an uncapped, 50/50 cost-sharing agreement between the statea h uy. t b b fr h fu, way cuy arqur ub a aua prra pa a bu prpa h dpar f Hua srv. if apprv, h uy rvstate reimbursement for half the costs of any juvenile services coveredur h pa (way cuy chr & Fay srv 2010a).eb rv u a, ua uppr,uba abu ra, a hah rv, a fayrv (way cuy chr & Fay srv 2010b). thuy u ra havy hr fu ur a , uFederal Title IV-E funds, which can be claimed for economicallydeprived juveniles, and Medicaid, which can be used to cover the costsf ay hahar a bhavra hah rv.

th y a qu ufu. i 1999, h a a uytogether spent $113 million on residential care alone for Wayne Countyyouth. By 2010, the ve CMOs combined spent $88 million for all

juvenile services (Wayne County Children & Family Services 2010a).

th ubr f yuh a fa harpy. th avradaily population of Wayne County juveniles in state facilities droppedfrom 731 youth in 1998, to 40 youth in 2003, to just two youth in2010 (way cuy chr & Fay srv 2010b). mrvr,by 2010 no young offenders from Michigan were being held in out-of-a fa. oy a a arr, 200 mha yuh a ay vtime were conned in other states. Wayne Countys reforms helpedh uy a h a ru pur, a ha ua ppua, a abh a ruur frquy rv ha a ay pra a aa.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

th ra av way cuy vruay ajuvenile placements in state training schools

Average daily population in training schools

Data sources: Wayne County Children and Family Services (2010a, p. 5) and FBI (UCR, annual, Table 8). Offense dataprior to 2005 are adjusted to match subsequent years (see Table 8 notes in FBI reports).

* Total number of FBI Violent Crime Index offenses reported (all ages) per 1,000 city residents. The FBI does notpublish juvenile arrest data for individual cities.

** Average daily populations used because data for the ow of commitments were not available from Wayne County.

Total violent crime offense rate in Detroit, Michigan

Year

Average daily population of Wayne Countyyouth in Michigan state training schools**

Violent crime offense rate*


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| 21 |

cAliFoRniA senAte Bill 81By the 1980s the dominant philosophy of California juvenile justice hadhf fr ra arra a aar ra pubfears of rising crime. During this period, the population of juveniles incYA uy r ay, urpa 10,000 by 1996. th ra r a rra cYA fa, useveral deaths and 23 hour-a-day lockdowns (Krisberg et al. 2010).th r , appa , a prur fr acompelled the state to make changes in juvenile justice policy andpra.

In the early 1990s, the State of California shouldered the majority ofcosts for youth placed in CYA facilities. Counties paid as little as $25per month to hold one juvenile in CYA custody (Krisberg et al. 2010).th cafra aur ru a rqur fr u payfr yuh pa a a. th y a baon nancial incentives. Counties sending violent or serious offendersto the CYA paid a small at fee, but counties sending offendersadjudicated for minor offenses such as drug possession paid up to 100pr f h f .

New York Considers Realignment

la 2010, mayr mha Bbr a y Governor Andrew Cuomo each visited some of New York Statesfully staffed but nearly empty juvenile correctional facilities.mayr Bbr a ru by h y a aquafacilities, which he called relics of a bygone era, when troubledy r rpp fr hr fa a hpp r r rura ara (Bbr 2010).

sa a a pyar ba u abua ra ray ar h p way cuy a cafra. laar ha prvuyconsidered reinvestment bills known as Redirect New Yorkand Reinvest New York. The laws would have expanded stateuppr f arav a rqur h av b v uy prra (Fh cr: iv k 2011).

Ra n Yr u b urpry fab. th

a u rafr rpby fr 60 pr f a juveniles to local jurisdictions simply by realigning juvenilejustice in New York City; adding Rochester and Long Island wouldu ary 90 pr f a . A ay ray n Yr cy u b apab f rv300-350 juveniles each year, far fewer than the number of casesha ufuy way cuy, mha.

Ofcials in New York State agencies continued to doubth apay f rv prvr u aa a ra, bu aar r prh p a fuur ha r apa (gvrrPatterson Task Force 2009; Mattingly and Schiraldi 2010).


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| 22 |

The new incentives led to signicant reductions in CYA commitmentsbeginning in the mid-1990s, falling to fewer than 500 by 2005. Despiteor perhaps because of this progress, the cost of sending a juvenile a u aa by h a ay (by h par f hcafra dpar f crr a Rhaba) ra $225,000 per year (Ferriss 2010). State regulations made it difcult toru aff p h rra ppua.

i rp, h cafra aur ha a a a arealignment strategy. Senate Bill 81 transferred most juvenile justicerpb u. th purp f h a a rv abut the most violent juvenile offenders from state facilities and intoa prra (l Hvr c 2008).

Implementation of realignment was sometimes difcult. Localprobation departments may have had insufcient time to prepare.Existing programs had to be adjusted to accommodate the new classof juveniles being referred to county probation. Resources becamera ur h ra. Bau h rra fr padepended largely on current offense rather than a youths previousrecord of offending, juveniles with violent criminal histories but non-v urr ff r b b ra a h uyv. i a, a y a har h vruy pra a u r rqur rpr h ay a p a hhr u r ahv a (Dawood 2009). Still, realignment changed California juvenile justicefuaay a prhap pray.

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

0

1,500

3,000

4,500

6,000

7,500

9,000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

California lowered juvenile commitments more than 80 percent, andh ru u v h r prary rbu

Average institutional population

Data sources: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and FBI (UCR).

* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17.

Juvenile violent crime arrestrate in California

Year

Average population in CA institutions

(Monthly counts averaged for each year)

Juvenile violent crime arrest rate*


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| 23 |

cafra ra a h ufu a rfr ffrto date, and it appeared to be more resistant to crime uctuationsha r h rv ra puru by hr a.Between 2005 and 2007, the rate of juvenile violence in Californiara ary 20 pr bfr rpp aa. dur huctuation, the decline in juvenile commitments continued unabated.th u ha y ha ahv hruh ruurara ay b r pra ha rfr ra hruh

rv ra.

cafra u bu up h u f ra vafr pp r ha 80 pr. evuay, h atransferred responsibility for all non-violent youth to the counties. By2010, local jurisdictions were receiving nearly $100 million annually uprv a prv rv fr h yuh. sv rrafa pra by h a r , a h upa hr rpby u par uprv fr yuh b ra fr a fa. i 2011, cafra gvrrJrry Br prp h a yuh rr ayoutright. Juvenile justice experts in California believed that completera a a bu vab (shar 2011).


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| 24 |

CONCLUSION |sa a a vr h U sa ra up aarray f a, rv, a uppr fr yuhfu ffr. ofa pb h, h qua a pv urconnement. Incarceration is always a central issue in juvenile justice

policy and practice. In terms of public prominence, connement isprobably second only to policies that transfer youth out of the juvenilesystem and into the criminal (or adult) justice system.

Like criminal court transfer, connement is a gamble. Placing youngffr ur fa a ffv a f r hrbehavior for a short time, but its long-term impact is uncertain andrarh u ha h u qu ay uhthe benets. For this reason, state and local governments try torestrict the use of connement to cases in which it is demonstrablyary.

th rpr rb vav ra b u ar h

country to prevent the over-utilization of youth connement. Thesera ra ha pb ru h z f ay f yuh arra. ev h yuh rqur ra pa, hy hav b aay rrafa hur f fr hr h a fa. thy a buprv a rv rv hr u. if hy ube conned for some time they can be maintained in smaller facilitiesaa by r u.

Implementing these strategies, of course, is not simple. Public ofcialshoping to improve the juvenile justice system with the strategiesrb h rpr hu a a ubr f prara.

One of the rst issues to arise in any debate about these reforms quy. th rfr ra u h rpr ay brv ffry by a a ar u. lar ffavr uh rfr bau hy hav h rur pra hrown, independent juvenile justice systems, complete with securepa p. sar a rura ara, h hr ha,ay hav h rur prv apprpra rv frvry yp f yuhfu ffr. thy uppr fr h a.

Hybr rfr u b u h quy prb.i ar urba ara ha a affr aa a r ra f

rv p fr yuhfu ffr, a fu ra rayay b ffv. i ar u, a rvapprah ay b r ffv a u aa a a rur. sa u p vary apprahdepending on the sizes and locations of their local jurisdictions.


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| 25 |

Ahr ru py r h pby ha rr hsupply of juvenile connement resources could inadvertently increasea fr ra (au) arav, u pr. th ugured prominently in Californias preparations for realignment (LittleHvr c 2008). Ay ffr ha p a prarelated to juvenile connement must contend with the reasons thatconnement is often over-utilized.

Juvenile connement is partly a rational attempt to guard the publicafy a ru rv, bu a pary a pa aeven an emotional response to the publics fear of crime and ther f pyar ar ha far. Ru a urconnement will not eliminate the desire for connement. Reformingthe juvenile justice system too aggressively or too rapidly mayencourage justice ofcials to turn to the adult system.

Fay, ha ruur a py a aay hav uqu. th raa rfr way cuy, fr ap,may have introduced new and unwanted incentives in the juvenile

justice system. Some of the expanded funding sources in WayneCountys realigned system were from behavioral health agencies thatypay aa pur h a ar. i ba uary way cuy pa f qu ffrin terms of their disorders. While appropriate in some cases, thepervasive use of behavioral health terminology in a juvenile justice a ra fr f ba a a. Rfrr u barfu av rpa f av v h ahr.

sa pa p h yp f rfr rb hreport should study the efforts of other jurisdictions and learn the hy prv. Fr h ap rb hr, useem that realignment is the preferred strategy for long-termha. Ra ra ar y b r urab ha

hr rv r ru ra. whavr rahy h, a a a pyar hu puru rfryaay a rapary, h ffr r avaua ru.


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ReFeReNCeS |Arya, nu, er l, lz Rya, mar shr, daa shbr, a mar sr(2005). Keystones for reform: Promising juvenile justice policies and practices inPennsylvania. sa Fra, cA: Yuh la cr.http://www.jlc.org/mfc/keystonesforreform.pdf

Bloomberg, Michael (2010). Press Release 520-10: December 21, 2010. Ofce of the Mayorf n Yr cy. n Yr, nY.http://on.nyc.gov/pr520-10

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Ofce of Research (2010). 2010juvenile justice outcome evaluation report. sara, cA: cafra dpar fcrr a Rhaba.http://1.usa.gov/qwDK

cu f sa gvr Ju cr (2009).Justice reinvestment in Texas:Assessing the impact of the 2007 Justice Reinvestment Initiative. n Yr, nY: Auhr.

da, nr (2009).Juvenile justice at a crossroads: The future of Senate bill 81 inCalifornia. Berkeley, CA: Prison Law Ofce.http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/SB81report.pdf

dhu cuy (2010).Juvenile community justice: 2010 annual report. B, oR:Auhr.http://bitly.com/deschutesjj

dma, Pau J. a war w. P (1983). th r a rv: iuaisomorphism and collective rationality in organizational elds.American Sociological Review,48(2): 147-160.

F, Barry c. (1981). A parav aay f razaa ruur a asubcultures in institutions for juvenile offenders. Crime & Delinquency, 27(3): 336-363.

Frr, sua (2010). sbr a fr a rv hf cafra u.Sacramento Bee, may 30, 2010.http://bitly.com/ferriss2010

Fh cr: iv k (2011). Redirect New York. wah, dc: Auhr.http://www.fghtcrime.org/state/new-york/redirect-new-york

g, t (2002). Oregons experiments to reduce juvenile crime. wah, dc:Uvry f Pyvaa, Jrry l cr f cry, Fru cr & Ju.http://www.sas.upenn.edu/jerrylee/programs/fjc/paper_oct02.pdf

Governor David Pattersons Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice (2009). Charting anew course: A blueprint for transforming juvenile justice in New York State. New York, NY:Auhr.http://bitly.com/nytaskforce


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Haay, Jay (2004). Oregon demonstration program nds local treatment and preventionefforts more effective than incarceration of at-risk youth. Pr, nJ: Rbr wJh Fua.http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/044660.htm

Hbrry, sarah (2011). spa aay f Juv Ra Fay cu 2000and 2008: Total juvenile offender populations by state. Pittsburgh, PA: National Center forJuv Ju.

Hbrry, sarah, ma su, a Ahy say (2011). Juv RaFacility Census, 2008: Selected ndings.Juvenile Offenders and Victims: National ReportSeries Bulletin. Washington, DC: Ofce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S.dpar f Ju [ncJ 231683].https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfles1/ojjdp/231683.pdf

Ha, Barry a Ja Zbr (2006). The dangers of detention: The imapct ofincarcerating youth in detention and other secure facilities. wah, dc: Ju Pyiu.http://bitly.com/jpi2006

i Juv Ju iav (2006). Redeploy Illinois: SB1145 Fact Sheet. cha, il:Auhr.http://bitly.com/redeploy2006

i Juv Ju iav (2008). Redeploy Illinois Annual Report: Implementationand impact. cha, il: Auhr.http://bitly.com/redeploy2008

krbr, Barry (2005).Juvenile justice: Redeeming our children. thua oa, cA.: saPuba.

krbr, Barry, Ja Au a Para A. s (1989). Unlocking juvenile corrections:Evaluating the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. sa Fra, cA: naa

cu cr a dquy.

krbr, Barry, lh Vu, chrphr Hary, a sua marha (2010).A new erain California juvenile justice. oaa, cA: naa cu cr a dquy.http://bitly.com/krisberg2010

laa, car J., cyha J. sh, a da l. chay (2006).Advocating success: Agroundbreaking approach to juvenile justice. dr, mi: th Juv A cr.

la V, nay, Rba s. nur, Paa laha, A dyr, a cary Anaau (2010).Justice reinvestment at the local level: Planning and implementation guide.wah, dc: Urba iu.http://bitly.com/UI2010

Lee, Bethany R., Charlotte L. Bright, Deborah V. Svoboda, Sunday Fakunmoju and Richard P.Barh (2011). ou f rup ar fr yuh: A rv f parav u. Researchon Social Work Practice, 21(2): 177-189.

lv, mar. (2008). Measuring performance in the juvenile justice system. Au, tx:ta Pub Py Fua.http://bitly.com/Levin2008


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Levin, Marc (2010a). Getting more for less in juvenile justice: Innovative and cost-effectiveapproaches to reduce crime, restore victims, and preserve families. Au, tx: ta PubPy Fua.http://bitly.com/Levin2010a

lv, mar (2010b).Juvenile justice. Au, tx: ta Pub Py Fua.http://bitly.com/Levin2010b

l Hvr c (2008).Juvenile justice reform: Realigning responsibilities.sara, cA: Auhr.http://bitly.com/LittleHoover

lap, chrphr t. a ear J. laa (2005). Evaluation of Ohios Reclaimfunded programs, community correctional facilities, and DYS facilities: Cost-benet analysissupplemental report. Washington, DC: Ofce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.http://bitly.com/RECLAIM2005

Maloney, Dennis and Deevy Holcomb (2001). In pursuit of community justice: Deschutescuy, or. Youth and Society, 33(2), 296-313.

ma, Ja (1999). Reform act. Raleigh, NC: The North Carolina Department of JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention.http://bitly.com/nY6BWf

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