kandik v arizona appeals breif
DESCRIPTION
This is the heart and soul of my case against the State of Arizona, it contains crucial legal precedence people need to familiarize themselves with inorder to resist the lawless ways this State has begun utilizing to underright their crashing economy and sliping grasp on power. Arizona has a billion deficite if you think they're gonna get that money from me or lawfully think again this time think hard, you are next.TRANSCRIPT
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STATE OF ARIZONA 4
V 5
STEPHEN KANDIK 6
7
2 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056 8
9
APPELLANT OPENING BRIEF 10
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS 11
DIVISION TWO 12
13
JANUARY 28, 2010 14
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TABLE OF CONTENTS: 19
20
* THE STANDING ISSUE 21
PAGES 3-17 22
STANDING CHALLENGE – CONSTITUTIONALITY CHECK 23
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*DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AN JUDICIAL FRAUD 25
PAGES 17-27 26
WITNESS SUPPRESSION – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 27
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*EXTRAODINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S 29
PAGES 27–30 30
EVASION OF DUTY TO INFORM ON ISSUE OF FACT 31
32
*DUE PROCESS DENIED AND VOID JUDGEMENTS 33
PAGES 30–45 34
LOSS OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND NULL 35
. JUDICIAL ORDERS 36
37
*SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 38
PAGES 45-48 39
JUDICIAL DISDAIN FOR SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT 40 41
*CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE 42
43
PAGES 49 44
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¶1 The Constitution, in the words of John 45
Adams, was written for a moral and religious 46
people; being wholly inadequate for people who 47
have no morals, no conscience and certainly no 48
principles or standards; who believe right and 49
wrong are situational, pliant to whatever their 50
agenda is. 51
52
THE STANDING ISSUE: 53
54
¶2 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS, I 55
FORTHWITH CHALLENGE ARIZONA'S CLAIM OF STANDING 56
IN THE CAUSE AGAINST ME. 57
*****"standing is a jurisdictional matter antecedent to 58
the right to relief." Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W. 3d 447, 59
451 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing State ex rel. Williams v. 60
Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 227 n.6 (Mo. banc 1982) 61
***** (...standing is “threshold requirement of every 62
case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. 63
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 64
343 (1975) (“The rules of standing … are threshold 65
determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”). 66
*****standing is a "jurisdictional issue which may be 67
4
raised by any party or the Court at any time City of 68
Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000) 69
(citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Miss. 70
1980)).P23. 71
72
¶3 FURTHERMORE: THOUGH I RAISED THE MATTER, 73
THE PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING 74
THAT THEY HAVE STANDING. 75
*****THE PLANTIFF ULTIMATELY BEARS THE BURDEN 76
OF ESTABLISHING STANDING. SEE Fink v. Golenbock, 77
238 Conn. 183,199 n.13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996) 78
*****THE PLANTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF 79
ESTABLISHING STANDING. SEE STORINO V. BOROUGH 80
OF POINT PLEASENT BEACH, 322 F. 293, 296 (3d Cir. 81
2003). 82
***** plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he 83
or she has standing. Sierra Club, 100 Hawai'i at 250, 59 84
P.3d at 885. 85
86
¶4 AS YET; ARIZONA, HAS NOT FACTUALLY PROVEN 87
THEY HOLD STANDING? AS OUTLINED IN THE ADJACENT 88
RULINGS THEY WILL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY 89
5
HAVE A LEGITIMATE "LEGAL" RIGHT, (TITLE OR 90
INTEREST...) NOT MIND YOU, A SUPPOSED, ASSUMED, 91
PRESUMED, CONJECTED OR HYPOTHETICAL RIGHT, BUT 92
RATHER ONE WHICH IS ESTABLISHED AS LEGAL. 93
*****Standing is the legal or equitable right, title, or 94
interest in the subject matter of the controversy which 95
entitles a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 96
Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Hradecky v. State, 264 Neb. 97
771, 652 N.W.2d 277 (2002). 98
*****‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial 99
machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the 100
jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual 101
or representative capacity, some real interest in the 102
cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or 103
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.’’ 104
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board 105
of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 717, 629 A.2d 333 (1993). 106
107
*****The purpose of an inquiry as to standing is to 108
determine whether one has a legally protectable interest 109
or right in the controversy that would benefit by the 110
relief to be granted. Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Hradecky v. 111
State, supra. 112
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*****Id. The litigant must have some legal or equitable 113
right, title, or interest in the subject of the controversy. 114
See, Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 115
263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540 (2002). 116
117
¶5 CAN A CLAIMANTS MERE ASSUMPTION OR 118
ASSERTION OF LEGAL STANDING SUFFICE IN SETTING THE 119
WHEELS OF JUSTICE ROLLING? IS THIS ADEQUATE? 120
ARIZONA IS LIKELY BANKING ON SUCH FAR FLUNG 121
FANCIFUL HOPES. YET THE LAW HAS MORE TO SAY ON THE 122
MATTER: 123
****”. . . A legislative enactment is conclusively 124
presumed to be constitutional unless it is clearly shown 125
that the act contravenes the state or federal 126
constitution." Caldis v. Board of County Comm'rs, Grand 127
Forks County, 279 N.W.2d 665, 669-72 (N.D. 1979). 128
****Constitutionally, "a statutory presumption cannot 129
be sustained if there be no rational connection between 130
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Tot v 131
United States, 319 US 463, 467; 63 S. Ct. 1241, 1245, 87 132
L.Ed.2d 1519 (1943) 133
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****"Substantive due process analysis requires a close 134
correspondence between legislation and the goals it 135
advances." Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 14, 595 N.W.2d 136
285. A court "may declare a statute unconstitutional on 137
substantive due process grounds if 'the Legislature had 138
no power to act in the particular matter or, having power 139
to act, [ ] such power was exercised in an arbitrary, 140
unreasonable, or discriminatory manner and [ ] the 141
method adopted has no reasonable relation to attaining 142
the desired result.'" Id. (quoting City of Fargo v. 143
Stensland, 492 N.W.2d 591, 594 (N.D.1992). 144
****Laws that interfere with "fundamental rights" are 145
"suspect" and demand "close scrutiny" by courts. Laws 146
cannot simply be passed on whimsy, but there must be a 147
"compelling state interest." Any law that would "chill" 148
exercising a right is "patently unconstitutional." It is a 149
well established right of the people "to be free to travel 150
throughout the length and breadth of our land 151
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which 152
unreasonably burden or restrain this movement." 153
Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618 (1969). 154
*****"Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often 155
necessary to the well being of an American citizen, such 156
as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all 157
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delegated powers that curtail or dilute them... to repeat, 158
we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen..." 159
Edwards v. California 314 US 160 (1941). 160
161
¶6 AS I CLEARLY POINTED OUT IN MY INITIAL 162
APPELLANT BRIEF, THERE IS NO CONFUSION, ARS 41-163
1722 THE AZ PHOTO ENFORCEMENT STATUTE COUPLED 164
WITH ITS ENFORCEMENT ARM A.R.S. 28-645 (A)(3)(a) 165
ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IN A BLATANTLY AND OVERTLY 166
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER BREACHING SECTION 13 167
ARTICLES 2,9,33, AS WELL AS,THE 9TH AMENDMENT OF 168
THE US CONSTITUTION. 169
170
¶7 I AM TRULY DISAPPOINTED THAT MY WITNESSES 171
AND I WHERE UNABLE TO HALT THIS ASSAULT ON THE 172
PEOPLES RIGHTS, IT GRIEVES ME TO STAND BY AN WATCH 173
AS ARIZONA'S CORRUPT GOVERNMENT IMPOSES UNFAIR 174
ILLEGAL AND UNDERHANDEDLY MANIPULATED PENALTIES 175
AGAINST TARGETED CLASSES OF CITIZENS, WHILE 176
OTHERS (LIKE CORPORATE FLEETS AND EVERY TYPE OF 177
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GOVERNMENT VEHICLES), ARE BEING EXEMPTED FROM 178
THIS WHOLE SCALE TREASON WHICH CONTRAVENES BOTH 179
CONSTITUTION'S. 180
¶8 I AM ANXIOUS TO HEAR HOW THE STATE WILL 181
JUSTIFY FINING AN INDIVIDUAL LIKE MYSELF AS A 182
REMEDY TO A PERCEIVED WRONG, WHILE AT THE SAME 183
TIME, SIMPLY OVERLOOKING AND IGNORING THAT SAME 184
VIOLATION, TO RECTIFY IT FOR GOVERNMENT AND 185
CORPORATE DRIVERS, WHAT IS THE RATIONAL FOR 186
PUNISHING SOME AND DISREGARDING THE ACTIONS OF 187
OTHERS. 188
189
¶9 THIS WRONG DOING HAS HAD A POWERFULLY 190
CHILLING EFFECT ON ME, THE VICTIM OF THE CRIME. I 191
HAVE GIVEN UP ON DRIVING IN ARIZONA EVER AGAIN; 192
THIS WAS THE PLACE OF MY BIRTH AND MY FAMILIAL 193
HOME. I AM A TALENTED SCENIC PHOTOGRAPHER AN 194
WISH I COULD SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY PHOTOS, SO 195
YOU COULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE MAGNITUDE OF 196
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LOSS TO MYSELF AND THE WORLD, RESULTING FROM THIS 197
TRAVESTY. EXTORTION RUN AMOK IN ARIZONA HAS 198
STRIPPED ME OF MY LICENSE, THOUGH I HAVE BEEN AN 199
EXEMPLARY DRIVER AND HAVE ONLY THIS SINGLE 200
ALLEGED OFFENSE CHARGED AGAINST ME FOR WELL OVER 201
A DECADE. 202
203
¶10 IN ANY CASE, FOR THE STATE TO PROVE 204
STANDING TO MY SATISFACTION AND APPARENTLY TO 205
THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY EARLIER COURTS (I PREY WE 206
ALL REVERENCE), A WINK AND A NOD WILL NO LONGER 207
SUFFICE. IT IS TIME FOR CLOSE SCRUTINY AND THE 208
AFORE MENTIONED AND FOLLOWING CASE LAW SHOULD 209
DEFINE THE STANDARDS ARIZONA SHOULD NEED TO 210
MEET. 211
****"Insofar as a statute runs counter to the 212
fundamental law of the land ,...(or state)...(constitution) 213
it is superseded thereby." (16 Am Jur 2d 177, Late Am 214
Jur 2d. 256) 215
**** "When an act of the legislature is repugnant or 216
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contrary to the constitution, it is, ipso facto, void." 2 Pet. 217
R. 522; 12 Wheat. 270; 3 Dall. 286; 4 Dall. 18. 218
219
****"It (the legislature or statutory laws) may not 220
violate constitutional prohibits or guarantees OR 221
AUTHORIZE OTHERS TO DO SO." Lockard v. Los Angeles 222
33 Cal2d 553; Cert den 337 US 939. 223
****"The State cannot diminish rights of the people." 224
Hertado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 225
226
¶11 CAN THE JUDICIARY SIMPLY ALLOW ARIZONA TO 227
PROFESS THAT THERE ARE NO INFRINGEMENT'S AND 228
THEREBY MOVE AHEAD WITH MORE ILLEGAL 229
PROSECUTIONS IF THAT IS THEIR INTENTION? 230
****“The court is to protect against any encroachment 231
of Constitutionally secured liberties.”It is the duty of the 232
Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the 233
Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments 234
thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis." Boyd v. 235
United 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885) 236
****No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert 237
its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles 238
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of the Constitution." Downs v. Bidwell 182 U.S. 244 239
(1901) 240
****"A rule cannot be simply (invented or) retained 241
when challenged. It must be shown valid, or be struck 242
down." Fox TV Station, Inc v FCC, Case No. 00-1222; _ 243
US App DC _; 280 F3d 1027, 1034; 2002. US App LEXIS 244
2575; 30 Media L Rep 1705 (19 Feb 2002). 245
****it’s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations, 246
those allegations must be based on facts; those facts 247
must establish where, when, why and how the legal right 248
was allegedly acquired.. Rule 602 Federal Rules of 249
Evidence. 250
****Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 251
433 433 (1868)...The (STATE) national government, 252
though supreme within its own sphere, is one of limited 253
jurisdiction and specific functions. It has no faculties but 254
such as the Constitution has given it, either expressly or 255
incidentally by necessary intendment. Whenever any act 256
done under its authority is challenged, the proper 257
sanction must be found in its charter, or the act is ultra 258
vires and void. 259
****"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if 260
they could be indirectly denied." Gomillion v. Lightfoot 261
364 U.S. 155 (1966) cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 262
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U.S. 649.644 263
****Mattox v. U.S., 156 US 237, 243.“We are bound to 264
interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it 265
existed at the time it was adopted.” 266
267
¶12 TO PUT A FINER POINT ON IT, AND 268
ELEVATE THE BAR BACK TO WHERE OUR CREATOR 269
AND FORMER MEN OF HONOR AND REASON, 270
INTENDED IT TO BE SET, I FURTHER ADD THE 271
FOLLOWING DECISIONS FOR ARIZONA'S WOULD 272
BE CONSTITUTION CRUSHING LEGAL MINIONS TO 273
HURDLE: 274
****Unconstitutional Acts are not Law. We must 275
distinguish form and substance. Not just anything 276
passed by legislators that have the form of a law, is in 277
fact, a law. To be a law, an enactment must be 278
constitutional, i.e., within the actual de jure authority of 279
the Legislature. This is res judicata. “All laws which are 280
repugnant to the Constitution are null and void.” 281
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176; 2 LE 282
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60 (1803). 283
****“Where rights secured by the Constitution are 284
involved, there can be no rule making or legislation 285
which would abrogate them.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 286
436, 491; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 287
**** “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no 288
rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; 289
creates no office. It is in legal contemplation, as 290
inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton 291
v Shelby County, Tennessee, 118 US 425, 442; 6 S Ct 292
1121; 30 L Ed 178 (1886). 293
****When laws (such as invented maximum numeric limits) 294
lack rational basis, they are invalid, and must be 295
stricken. See Industrial Union Department v American 296
Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607; 100 S Ct 2844; 65 L Ed 297
2d 1010 (1980). 298
****No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law 299
and no courts are bound to enforce it." Bonnett v. Vallier, 300
116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908) See also Bonnett v 301
Vallier, 136 Wis 193, 200; 116 NW 885, 887 (1908); 302
State ex rel Ballard v Goodland, 159 Wis 393, 395; 150 303
NW 488, 489 (1915); State ex rel Kleist v Donald, 164 304
Wis 545, 552-553; 160 NW 1067, 1070 (1917); State ex 305
rel Martin v Zimmerman, 233 Wis 16, 21; 288 NW 454, 306
15
457 (1939); State ex rel Commissioners of Public Lands v 307
Anderson, 56 Wis 2d 666, 672; 203 NW2d 84, 87 (1973); 308
and Butzlaffer v Van Der Geest & Sons, Inc, Wis, 115 Wis 309
2d 539; 340 NW2d 742, 744-745 (1983). 310
311
****"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", 312
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14(1954) 313
314
¶13 I NOT ONLY ASK THAT YOU DEMAND FULL 315
ADHERENCE TO THESE WELL ESTABLISHED PARAMETERS 316
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE DEMONSTRATION OF 317
STANDING, BUT THAT YOU ISSUE AN INJUNCTION 318
AGAINST FURTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF 319
THE STATE, UNTIL THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEIR 320
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ARE NOT BEING UNDERTAKEN IN 321
A MANNER WHICH CONFLICTS WITH SECTION 13 322
ARTICLES 2, 9, 33, AS WELL AS, THE 9TH AMENDMENT. 323
324
¶14 AT PRESENT THERE IS A JUDGE AND A SHERIFF 325
IN THE STATE AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHERS 326
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OF US TO WHOM THESE DEFIANTLY ILLEGAL 327
PROSECUTIONS ARE REPUGNANT AND DETESTABLE AND 328
WHO KNOW THAT JUSTICE DEMANDS THAT THIS BE 329
STOPPED. FURTHERMORE; EVENTUALLY, FULL 330
UNPROMPTED RESTORATION OF MY DRIVING PRIVILEGES 331
AND FAIR COMPENSATION FOR MY ATTORNEY'S 332
GRUELING TIRELESS HOURS WILL SOMEWHAT HELP TO 333
RECTIFYING THIS WRONG... 334
PRO SE RIGHTS 335
****PRO SE RIGHTS "Following the simple guide of rule 336
8(f) FRCP that all pleadings shall be so construed as to 337
do substantial justice"... "The federal rules reject the 338
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 339
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and 340
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to 341
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.". Conley v. 342
Gibson 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957) 343
344
****Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, 345
however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient"... "which we 346
hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 347
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drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519 348
(1972) 349
****Pro se pleadings are to be considered without 350
regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not 351
to be held to the same high standards of perfection as 352
lawyers Jenkins v. McKeithen 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959) 353
Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket 354
v. Cox, 456 2nd 233 355
356
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL FRAUD: 357
358
¶15 ACCORDING TO SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE MILLER, 359
MY RIGHT TO HAVE MY 8 SUBPOENAS ISSUED WAS 360
DENIED ME BECAUSE... (JUDGEMENT PAGE 4)... N0 361
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY SHALL BE PERMITTED ABSENT 362
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 17 B A.R.S.TRAFFIC 363
VIOLATIONS CASES CIV. PROC. RULES 13(b). HIS 364
DETERMINATION WAS FLAWED IN TWO CRITICAL WAYS. 365
366
¶1 6 (1) THIS WAS THE SAME INTENTIONALLY 367
DECEPTIVE CLAIM THAT L.S.M. LEVITT MADE. THE 368
PROBLEM WITH THIS ASSERTION IS THAT BOTH OF THESE 369
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INDIVIDUALS HAVE ENGAGED IN DUPLICITOUS FRAUD 370
ENDEAVORING TO SWEEP MY WITNESSES UNDER THE RUG 371
OF DISCOVERY. THESE PEOPLE ARE PAID TO KNOW AND 372
UPHOLD THE LAWS AND BOTH KNEW FULL WELL, THAT 373
ONLY TWO VERY SHORT PARAGRAPHS DOWN THE PAGE, 374
THE RULES CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY STATE “BOTH 375
PARTIES MAY SUBPOENA WITTINESS". 376
377
¶17 MY SUBPOENAS FOR SHERIFF PAUL BABEU OF 378
PINAL COUNTY, AND JUDGE JOHN KEEGAN OF 379
ARROWHEAD JUSTICE COURT, WERE EXCLUSIVELY FOR 380
PERSONS ONLY NO DOCUMENTS... AND NO RATIONAL OR 381
EXPLANATION WAS PROFFERED TO ME REGARDING THESE 382
STAND ALONE PARTIES. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DONE 383
BECAUSE TO FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE 384
HIGHLIGHTED IT, AS AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE, THIS 385
WAS AND IS AN INTENTIONAL PREMEDITATED ACT OF 386
DECEIT. JURISTS ALWAYS HAVE a "Higher Duty" to know 387
the Constitution and law, and to convey the truth of the 388
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law to citizens. ONCE WAS PERHAPS AN ERROR (LEVITT), 389
TWICE OUT OF TWO IS A PATTERN (MILLER). 390
391
******Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 392
(1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533. "Before.....imposing a fine, 393
judges are required to provide due process of law, 394
including strict adherence to the procedural 395
requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. 396
Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating 397
but an aggravating factor”. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 398
U.S. 377, 382 (1894) 399
400
*****Fraud. An intentional perversion of truth for the 401
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part 402
with some valuable thing belonging to him or to 403
surrender a legal right. A false representation of a 404
matter of fact… which deceives and is intended to 405
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal 406
injury. … It consists of some deceitful practice or willful 407
device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his 408
right, or in some manner to do him injury… (Emphasis 409
added) –Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, page 594 410
411
*****Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 412
480(1983).Fraud and deceit may arise from silence 413
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where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from 414
speaking an untruth. 415
416
****** "Fraud in its elementary common law sense of 417
deceit - and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears 418
in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 419
168 (7th Cir. 1985) - includes the deliberate 420
concealment of material information in a setting 421
of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary 422
toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the 423
litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately 424
conceals material information from them he is guilty of 425
fraud....” McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S 350, 371-372 426
427
*****Fraud, Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery 428
operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so 429
intended, by inducing him to part with property or 430
surrender some legal right. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2. 431
Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice 432
and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a 433
word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other 434
device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23 435
Am J2d Fraud § 2. 436
437
21
*****"Silence can only be equated with fraud where 438
there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an 439
inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally 440
misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking 441
behavior... This sort of deception will not be tolerated 442
and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately." 443
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. 444
Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 445
932. 446
*****“Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th 447
Circuit Court of Appeals to embrace that species of fraud 448
which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a 449
fraud perpetrated by the officers of the court so that the 450
judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner 451
of its impartial task of adjudicating cases that are 452
presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F. 3d. 453
689 (1968) j 7 Moore’s Federal practice, 2d ed., p. 512 ¶ 454
60.23 The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced 455
by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at 456
all, and never becomes final.” 457
458
*****"The parties are entitled to know the findings and 459
conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion 460
presented on the record." citing Butz v. Economou 438 461
22
U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, (1978). 462
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA 463
STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al. certiorari to the United 464
States court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 01-46. 465
2.535 U.S. 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962, 466
(2002). Argued February 25, 2002--Decided May 28, 467
2002. See also FRCPA Rule 52(a) and United States v. 468
Lovasco 431 U.S. 783 (06/09/77), 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. 469
Ed. 2d 752, and Holt v. United States 218 U.S. 245 470
(10/31/10), 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 471
472
*****A more alarming doctrine could not be 473
promulgated by any American court, than that it was at 474
liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to 475
decide for itself, without reference to the settled course 476
of antecedent principles.” Faye Anastasoff vs. United 477
States of America, 8th 41 Circuit Court, 2000. 478
479
*****No officer of the law may set that law at defiance 480
with impunity. All the officers of the government from 481
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and 482
are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou 98 S. Ct. 2894 483
(1978) 484
*****“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is 485
23
incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. 486
This is so even where the internal procedures are 487
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be 488
required. MORTON v. RUIZ, 415 U.S. 199, 380 (1974) 489
490
*****Due process is violated if a practice or rule offends 491
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 492
conscience of our people as to be ranked as 493
fundamental." Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105. 494
495
*****"Aside from all else, 'due process' means 496
fundamental fairness and substantial justice. Vaughn v. 497
State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879, 883." 498
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 500. 499
500
******Due Process is that which comports with the 501
deepest notions of what is fair and right and just." 502
Solebee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Justice 503
Frandfurter dissenting.) 504
505
*****"the right to... [trial by jury, to the writ of habeas 506
corpus, and to]... due process of law. It has been 507
repeatedly decided that these amendments should 508
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy 509
encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the 510
24
rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of 511
courts ...". GOULED v. UNITED STATES. United States 512
Supreme Court February 28, 1921 65 L.Ed. 647; 41 S.Ct. 513
261; 255 U.S. 298 514
515
*****18 USC §241 makes it a crime to conspire to 516
oppress a constitutional right 517
518
¶18 THESE CITATIONS MAKE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR 519
COURT ROOM FRAUD IS ALL TOO COMMON AND IS 520
ABHORRENT TO OUR WAY OF LIFE, AS WELL, IT 521
WARRANTS IMMEDIATE EFFORTS TOWARDS IT’S 522
RECTIFICATION. TO THE PUBLIC AND I, THERE IS NO 523
MISTAKING THAT THIS CALCULATED MANEUVERING TO 524
DENY MY WITNESSES WAS DONE, NOT ONLY TO ROB US 525
OF OUR MONEY, BUT ALSO OF OUR RIGHTS, LIBERTY AND 526
OF JUSTICE AS WELL, BY FORESTALLING THE 527
ADJUDICATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO 528
THE STATE RUN RACKETEERING RING. 529
530
¶19 WHILE YOU MAY CHOOSE TO PROVIDE LEGAL 531
25
COVER FOR THESE TRESPASSER /TRAITOR’S, BY 532
CLAIMING THAT THEY WERE SIMPLY MISTAKEN, 533
INCOMPETENT OR INEPT, AND I WOULD CERTAINLY 534
AGREE WITH YOU ON THAT, THE RECORD STILL POINTS 535
TO MUCH MORE SINISTER MOTIVATIONS. 536
537
¶20 EXAMINE THE COURT RECORDS OF THESE 538
JUDGES, YOU WILL SEE THAT THEY BOTH HAVE INFACT; 539
REPEATEDLY ALLOWED WITNESSES IN THE PAST. AND 540
THAT THIS WAS NOT A MEMORY LAPS, THEY WERE WELL 541
AWARE OF THE LINE THEY CROSSED. THIS WAS AN 542
INTENTIONAL EFFORT, ONE ENGAGE IN WITH MALICE OF 543
FOR THOUGHT, TO DENY ME DUE PROCESS AND OBSTRUCT 544
JUSTICE AND THIS IS A FEDERAL CRIME WHICH YOU NEED 545
TO ADDRESS. (Any judge or attorney who does not report 546
a judge for treason as required by law may themselves be 547
guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 548
2382.Under Federal law) THESE FELONS NEED TO BE 549
DISBARRED AND JAILED AND IT HAS FALLEN UPON YOUR 550
26
SHOULDERS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE EFFORTS TO BRING 551
THESE CULPRITS TO JUSTICE. 552
553
¶21 BY THIS MEASURE ALONE, THE "JUDGMENT" 554
WHICH STRIPPED ME OF MY DRIVING PRIVILEGES AND 555
MORE THEN A THOUSAND DOLLARS, IS AND ALWAYS HAS 556
BEEN VOID, IT IS INVALID AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN. 557
558
***** "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his 559
judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge 560
to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs 561
in the courthouse."".....When a judge acts as a 562
trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the 563
law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the 564
judges' orders are void, of no legal force or effect. When 565
judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or 566
they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge 567
without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the 568
law, and are engaged in treason The Court in Yates v. 569
Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 570
(N.D. Ill. 1962) 571
572
573
27
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S 574
¶22 (2) FURTHERMORE: JUDGE MILLER ASSERTED 575
THAT NO "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE'S" EXISTED 576
IN THIS MATTER, YET HE AFFORDED NO SUBSTANTIVE 577
ACCOUNT AS TO HOW HE ARRIVED AT THAT 578
DETERMINATION. IN MY RESEARCH, I FOUND NO 579
DEFINITIVE EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT CONDITIONS 580
COMPRISES A BASELINE STANDARD. HOWEVER: I DID TAP 581
INTO A COMMON THREAD SIGHTED AS A KEY COMPONENT 582
CONSISTENTLY. 583
¶23 {a}SUCH AS WHEN..."According to the FCC, an 584
STA can be granted in cases of extraordinary 585
circumstances where denying the grant would seriously 586
prejudice the public interest." I TAKE THIS TO MEAN, THE 587
FCC CAN BREACH IT'S OWN STANDARD PROTOCOLS, WHEN 588
IT SERVES THE GREATER PUBLIC INTERESTS. 589
¶24 {b}AND; IN "a judicial nomination 590
(a)"circumstance” is "extraordinary" when the result of 591
28
that nomination could have an "extraordinary" impact 592
upon the future of the country." I TAKE THIS TO MEAN, AN 593
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE EXIST, IF IN A GIVEN 594
SITUATION, THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE AN LASTING 595
ADVERSE EFFECT UPON A LARGE SEGMENT OF OR THE 596
ENTIRE POPULACE. 597
598
¶25 USEING THIS AS A GAGE, IT'S CLEAR TO SEE WHY 599
ARIZONA FELT IT NEEDED TO CURTAIL MY WITNESSES 600
FROM PUBLICLY DISMANTLING THE ALLEGED 601
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LAWFUL STATUS OF IT'S 602
EXTORTION PRACTICES. INDEED IT BECAME NECESSARY 603
BECAUSE THE STATE RECOGNIZED THAT THE 604
"CIRCUMSTANCES" INVOLVED WERE NOT ONLY 605
"EXTRAORDINARY", BUT IN FACT, "EXTRAORDINARILY 606
EGREGIOUS". EVENTUALLY THEY WILL BE ON THE HOOK 607
FOR RETURNING TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS STOLEN 608
FROM TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT LAW ABIDING 609
CITIZENS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW. 610
29
¶26 FOR ANYONE TO CLAIM THAT THIS SITUATION IS 611
ANYTHING LESS THEN AN EXTINCTION LEVEL EVENT FOR 612
THIS GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE IS DELUSIONAL 613
...THERE HAS BEEN NO MORE SIGNIFICANT ASSAULT ON 614
THE FREEDOMS OF ARIZONANS AND THEIR 615
CONSTITUTION SINCE MIRANDA. MILLERS LUDICROUS 616
CLAIM IS AN ABSURD ATTEMPT AT OBFUSCATION AT BEST, 617
AND DUPLICITY AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AT 618
WORST. AS ADDRESSED IN THE TRAILING COURT 619
DECISION, JUDGE MILLER SHOULD HAVE WENT ON 620
RECORD, CLEARLY EXPLAINING HIS RATIONAL. INDEED 621
WHAT QUALIFYS IN HIS EYES AS EXTRAORDINARY 622
CIRCUMSTANCES... I FOR ONE CAN'T WAIT TO HEAR. 623
*****"The parties are entitled to know the findings and 624
conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion 625
presented on the record." citing Butz v. Economou 438 626
U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, (1978). 627
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA 628
STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al. certiorari to the united 629
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 01-46. 630
30
2.535 U.S. 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962, 631
(2002). Argued February 25, 2002--Decided May 28, 632
2002. See also FRCPA Rule 52(a) and United States v. 633
Lovasco 431 U.S. 783 (06/09/77), 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. 634
Ed. 2d 752, and Holt v. United States 218 U.S. 245 635
(10/31/10), 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 636
637
"It is not the function of our government to keep the 638
citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the 639
citizen to keep the government from falling into error." 640
Perry v. United States 204 U.S. 330, 358 641
642
DUE PROCESS DENIED AND VOID JUDGEMENTS: 643
*****I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of 644
the States than permit it to invade, strike down, and 645
destroy the civil rights of citizens, A judicial power 646
perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded. ... 647
And if an officer shall intentionally deprive a citizen of a 648
right, knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is guilty of 649
a willful wrong which deserves punishment.” “ 650
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 1680 (1866) 651
(presidential veto message to Congress). at 1837 652
653
****"the evils of allowing intentional, knowing 654
31
deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far out 655
weighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might 656
attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil 657
rights." at 567 SANTIAGO V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 658
435 F.Supp. 136 659
660
¶27 AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT 661
ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS AND FRAUD, WITHOUT 662
ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OR CAUSE, MY SUBPOENAS FOR 663
WITNESSES WERE DENIED ME IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF 664
THE CITY'S LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE AS WELL AS... 665
666
******The sixth amendment and the due process clause 667
of the federal constitution guarantee to a defendant the 668
right to subpoena a witness...." State, v. Montgomery, 669
A61 So.2d 387, 392, (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985). The "defendant 670
has a constitutional right to compulsory process of 671
witnesses to produce testimony which is admissible in 672
the cause for which he is on trial." Krantz v. State, 405 673
So.2d 211,212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). 674
675
******This constitutional protection exists "because of 676
the fundamental unfairness which results from placing a 677
man on trial on a criminal charge and denying him the 678
32
means to compel the attendance of witnesses, within the 679
jurisdiction of the court, who are in possession of 680
material facts which show or tend to show his innocence 681
of the charge." Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811, 682
815(Fla. 1957). 683
684
******The "trial court has no more authority to refuse 685
to enforce for a defendant's benefit the production of the 686
evidence available to be procured and for which 687
compulsory process has been issued than to deny the 688
process itself in the first instance." Sims v. State, 867 689
So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 3dDCA 2004). 25. The right of the 690
Defendant to cross-examine witnesses and his right to 691
present evidence in opposition to or in explanation of 692
adverse evidence are essential to a fair hearing and due 693
process of law. Alexander v.State, 288 So.2d 538, 539, 694
(Fla. 3rd DCA 1974) 695
696
******"The facts and the law do matter and judicial 697
action by judges or the like must be in accords with 698
those presented to the court. This is to assure due 699
process of law and equal protection of the law..." E. g., 700
ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 -94 (1913); 701
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 702
96, 103 -104 (1963).” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.254 703
33
(1970). 704
705
******"clear violations of laws on reaching the result, 706
such as acting without evidence when evidence is 707
required,...are just as much jurisdictional error as is the 708
failure to take proper steps to acquire jurisdiction at the 709
beginning of the proceeding". Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 710
N.W. 209. 711
712
*****“The record must show that the statute was 713
complied with” In re Marriage of Stefini, 253 Ill. App. 3d 714
196, 625 N.E.2d 358 (1st Dist. 1993). 715
******Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 716
(1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 533. "Before.....imposing a fine, 717
judges are required to provide due process of law, 718
including strict adherence to the procedural 719
requirements contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. 720
Ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating but an 721
aggravating factor”. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 722
382 (1894). 723
724
******“In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must 725
proceed exactly according to the law or statute under 726
which it operates.” Whenever a judge does not exactly 727
comply with the statute, he/she has lost subject-matter 728
jurisdiction and all orders or judgments issued without 729
34
subject-matter jurisdiction are void, of no legal force or 730
effect. Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943) 731
732
******"Where a court's power to act is controlled by 733
statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited 734
jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such 735
matters must proceed within the strictures of the 736
statute."; In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 737
557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990). ALSO : Johnson v. Theis, 738
282 Ill.App.3d 966, 669 N.E.2d 590 (2nd Dist. 1996). 739
740
******[T]he authority of the court to make any order 741
must be found in the statute.” Levy v. Industrial Comm'n 742
(1931), 346 Ill. 49, 51, 178 N.E. 370, 371."); Skilling v. 743
Skilling, 104 Ill.App.3d 213, 482 N.E.2d 881 (1st Dist. 744
1982) 745
746
*****The Judge, by ignoring guidelines as set by law, 747
did lose jurisdiction in the matter. His acts then became 748
ultra vires or outside of the powers of his jurisdiction. 749
"Jurisdiction, although once obtained, may be lost, and 750
in such case proceedings cannot be validly continued 751
beyond the point at which jurisdiction ceases". Federal 752
Trade Commission V. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 75 L.Ed. 753
1324, 51 S.Ct. 587. 754
35
¶28 ALL THESE FINDINGS SPEAK TO THE FACT THAT 755
THE TASK OF JUDGING ENTAILS APPLYING ESTABLISHED 756
LAW, NOT SIDE STEPPING OR CONTORTING IT TO THEIR 757
OWN ENDS, THERE IS NO LATITUDE OR DISCRETION FOR 758
THAT, THIS SHOULD BE THEIR PRIMARY DUTY, AND THEY 759
HAVE EACH TAKEN A SOLEMN VOW TO FULFILL THIS 760
RESPONSIBILITY, SO I ASK YOU. 761
¶29 DID LEVITT AND MILLER KNOW THAT THEY WERE 762
TRAMPLING ON THE CONSTITUTION WHEN THEY 763
FORSTALLED MY WITNESSES AND DUE PROCESS? SHOULD 764
I REALLY CONCLUDE THAT THEIR INTENTIONS IN 765
TREADING ON MY RIGHTS WERE A WELL MEANING, 766
HONEST AND ABOVE BOARD EFFORTS TO RENDER 767
JUSTICE? PERSONALLY I'M NOT THAT NAIVE AND I DOUBT 768
YOU ARE EITHER. 769
¶30 FROM THE RECORD, WHY SHOULD WE NOT 770
BELIEVE, JUDGE MILLER EXAMINED THE SUBPOENAS FOR 771
WITNESSES, SIMPLY DISREGARDED THE ISSUE AND 772
MOVED AHEAD ANYWAY WHITEWASHING THE CASE, AS 773
36
THOUGH STANDING HAD NOT BEEN COMPROMISED? OR 774
SHOULD WE GIVE ALLOWANCES INSTEAD, IN THE 775
DIRECTION OF ASSUMING HIS JUDGELY SKILL SETS 776
AREN’T QUITE UP TO SNUFF, AND THAT THIS WAS ONLY 777
AN OVERSIGHT. IN EITHER CASE, THESE JUSTICES HAVE 778
CONVERTED THE COURTS INTO A RACKETEERING 779
COLLECTION AGENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION BE DAMD. 780
781
******The judge has a duty to continually inspect the 782
record of the case, and if subject-matter jurisdiction 783
does not appear at any time from the record of the case, 784
then he has the duty to dismiss the case as lacking 785
subject-matter jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any 786
case in which he does not have subject-matter 787
jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 788
200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens 789
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821), 790
and without any judicial authority 791
792
******“inspection of the record of the case has been 793
ruled to be the controlling factor. If the record of the 794
case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then 795
the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.” 796
37
The People v Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) 797
798
*****"If the record does not show upon its face the 799
facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be 800
presumed not to have existed.” Norman v. Zieber, 3 Or at 801
202-03 802
803
*****Void judgment; when the local rules of the special 804
court are not complied with. Where the judge does not 805
act impartially, Bracey v. Warden, U.S. Supreme Court 806
No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997) 807
808
****"The doctrine that where a court has once acquired 809
jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which 810
arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however 811
erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct 812
when the court proceeds according to the established 813
modes governing the class to which the case belongs and 814
does not transcend in the extent and character of its 815
judgment or decree the law or statute which is 816
applicable to it." In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 817
681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) 818
819
****Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot 820
go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act 821
beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of 822
38
it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. 823
They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even 824
prior to reversal." Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v 825
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson 826
v Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850); 827
Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 828
(1808). Also see Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340;” 829
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 830
41 S.Ct. 116 (1920). 831
832
****Violation of due process, Whenever any judge 833
engages in any act which is in violation of the Supreme 834
Law of the Land, the judge has lost jurisdiction. Johnson 835
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(1938) ;Pure Oil Co. 836
v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 837
(1956);Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936), (If 838
the court exceeded it's statutory authority. Rosenstiel v. 839
Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) 840
841
***** Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a 842
subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the 843
jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void." Armstrong v 844
Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921). 845
846
***** "Scheuer v.Rhodes, 416US. 232,94 S.CL 847
39
1683,1687 (1974). By law, a judge is a state officer. The 848
judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual 849
(in his person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the 850
law, when a judge does not follow the law, the Judge 851
loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders 852
are not voidable, but VOID, and of no legal force or 853
effect. 854
855
***** "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his 856
judicial function....it is not a judicial function for a judge 857
to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs 858
in the courthouse."".....When a judge acts as a 859
trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the 860
law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the 861
judges' orders are void, of no legal force or effect. When 862
judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or 863
they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge 864
without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the 865
law, and are engaged in treason The Court in Yates v. 866
Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 867
(N.D. Ill. 1962) 868
869
*****The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "Since such 870
jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court 871
but also the appellate court of its power over the case or 872
40
controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it ... 873
[would be an] unlawful action by the appellate court 874
itself." Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); 875
Miller, supra. 876
877
¶31 INTENTIONAL OR NOT, IT SHOULD BE VIVIDLY 878
CLEAR ARIZONA JUDGES ROUTINELY OPERATE OUT OF 879
BOUNDS, OR AS IF THERE ARE NO BOUNDRYS AT ALL. 880
THEIR ACTIONS AND THE RECORD SHOW CONTEMPT FOR 881
THE LAW AND PROOVE THAT SUBJECT MATTER 882
JURISDICTION WAS LOST IN THE VERY FIRST RULING 883
AND MINUTES OF THAT SHAM KANGAROO TRIAL, I WAS 884
SUBJECTED TO. 885
¶32 FOR THESE JURISTS THERE IS NO COVER, NO 886
LEGAL REFUGE, MY DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 887
AND CONSEQUENTLY THEIR VOID DECISION HOLDS NO 888
POWER, IT IS AND ALWAYS WAS INVALID, ALL THAT 889
REMAINS IS FOR YOUR HONORS TO DO, IS ACKNOWLEGE 890
THIS NULLTY AND FOR THE STATE TO PREPARE ITSELF 891
FOR A HANDS DOWN CIVIL RIGHTS PUMMELING. 892
41
******Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1574: 893
Void judgment. One which has no legal force or effect, 894
invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose 895
rights are affected at any time and at any place directly 896
or collaterally. Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 897
Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092. One which from its 898
inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, 899
without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or 900
support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, 901
and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or 902
enforcement in any manner or to any degree. Judgment 903
is a "void judgment" if court that rendered judgment 904
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the 905
parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due 906
process. Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901. 907
908
******"A void judgment is one rendered by a court 909
which....acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, 910
In re. Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan.App. 1999).In 911
re. Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill. App.Dist. 912
1993). In re. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of 913
Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 ( Kan. 1997). In re. 914
Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation 915
omitted).” Antoine, et al. v. Atlas Turner, et al. (6th Cir., 916
1995). In re. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5- Triad Energy 917
42
Corp. v. McNeil, 110 FRD 382 (S.D.N.Y.) 1986 918
919
*****Void judgment under federal law is one in which 920
rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 921
dispute or jurisdiction over parties or acted in manner 922
inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted 923
unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. 924
Amend. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 N.E.2d 1383 925
(Ill App. 5 Dist. 1983). 926
927
******Judgments entered where court lacked either 928
subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were 929
otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, 930
must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, 931
S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278 932
933
******When rule providing for relief from void 934
judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary 935
matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 936
F.3d 1307, ( Colo. 1994). 937
******"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of 938
jurisdiction." Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215. 939
940
****"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", 941
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14(1954), 942
43
******Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 943
2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, 944
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 945
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as 946
part of the costs, except that in any action brought 947
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 948
such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be 949
held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, 950
unless such action was clearly in excess of 951
such officer's jurisdiction. 952
953
Pro se 954
******The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude 955
when construing their pleadings and papers. When 956
interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common 957
sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C, v. 958
Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, 959
United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) 960
(Court has special obligation to construe pro se litigants' 961
pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 962
99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000). 963
964
******Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be 965
construed liberally and held to less stringent standards 966
44
than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably 967
read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to 968
cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, 969
poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's 970
unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. 971
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 972
(1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 973
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 974
U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines 975
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 976
(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 977
189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 978
42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held 979
to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); 980
Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). 981
982
******Moreover, "the court is under a duty to 983
examine the complaint to determine if the 984
allegations provide for relief on any possible 985
theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis. 526 986
R2dl33h 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. 987
Wilson. 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974) 988
989
******Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs 990
45
on appeal, even though they may be in artfully drawn but 991
the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, 992
Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts 993
will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants 994
against consequences of technical errors if injustice 995
would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 996
(D.C.Cir. 1996). 997
998
SEC 33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 999
1000
¶33 JUDGE MILLERS BLATANT DISREGARD OF MY SEC 1001
33 AND 9TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CLAIMS 1002
WERE INTELLECTUALLY DISINGENUOUS. INDEED, FOR 1003
HIM TO IGNORE SUCH AN ASSERTION, BASED SOLELY ON 1004
THE FACT THAT, I PROVIDED NO EARLIER SPECIFIC CASE 1005
LAW, IS AN EXERCISE IN TREASON. HE IS ENDEAVORING 1006
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTIONS BY SUGGESTING THAT 1007
ONLY RIGHTS PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED OR ESTABLISHED 1008
BY COURTS CAN BE UPHELD. WHEN THE VERY NATURE OF 1009
THESE RIGHTS ASSURANCES (9 AND 33), IS THAT THEY 1010
ARE, INFACT AS YET UNDELINEATED, OTHERWISE; THE 1011
46
DRAFTERS WOULD HAVE INTENTIONALLY LAID OUT 1012
EXACTLY WHAT THE ENTAILED RIGHT PROTECTIONS 1013
CONSISTED OF. 1014
1015
¶34 IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT CITIZENS POSSES 1016
YET UNASCRIBED RIGHTS, WHICH OUR COURTS THUS FAR, 1017
HAVE NOT EVOLVED ENOUGH TO IDENTIFY AND 1018
CATEGORIZE AS PROTECTED. THESE ETHEREAL RIGHTS 1019
CAN AN WILL NOT COME TO LIGHT, UNTIL INDIVIDUALS 1020
THEMSELVES, PERSONALLY ADVANCE ENOUGH TO 1021
RECOGNIZE AND VOICE THEM. THIS MIGHT OCCUR AT ANY 1022
GIVEN TIME (PERHAPS CENTURIES DOWN THE LINE) 1023
NEVERTHELESS; EVENTUALLY, THE JUDICIARY WILL BE 1024
RELIED UPON TO RECOGNIZE AN UPHOLDABLE THESE 1025
FORMERLY UNDIVULGED RIGHTS (OR GET OUT OF THE 1026
WAY FOR IT WOULD BE GODS WILL THEY WOULD BE 1027
HINDERING). THESE LAWS EXIST SEPARATE AND APART 1028
FROM ESTABLISHED AND ACKNOWLEDGED LAW, UNTIL 1029
TRIGGERED IN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF MEN AT THE 1030
47
BEHEST OF OUR CREATOR, WHEN WE HAVE BECOME 1031
HONORABLE ENOUGH TO BARE THEM (I.E., WHY ELSE ADD 1032
AMENDMENTS AGAIN AND AGAIN OVER TIME). 1033
1034
¶35 WHEN I DECLARED (IN MY BRIEF) MY GOD GIVEN 1035
RIGHT...NOT TO ALLOW THOSE PROFESSING TO GOVERN 1036
TO CHEAT THE PUBLIC AT LARGE BY ENGAGING IN FRAUD, 1037
AND RACKETEERING, THAT WAS A VASTLY MORE 1038
LEGITIMATE ASSERTION, THEN THE GOOD JUDGES 1039
SUGGESTION THAT WITHOUT SIGHTING SPECIFIC 1040
PREVIOUS PRECEDENCE, I HADN'T POSTULATED A VALID 1041
REDRESSABLE ISSUE. FOLLOWING HIS LOGIC, THAT 1042
WOULD MEAN IN THE VERY FIRST 9TH OR 33RD TYPE 1043
VIOLATION CASES EVER BROUGHT (AND ALL THOSE TO 1044
FOLLOW), THAT THE PLAINTIFFS CAUSE WOULD LACKED 1045
ACTIONABLE MERIT, BECAUSE THEIR WAS NO 1046
PREEXISTING CASE LAW TO SUPPORT HIS VIEW...THIS IS 1047
A CLEARLY FLAWED AND ABSURD ON ITS FACE, AN MORE 1048
LIKELY A CULPABLE LEGAL RATIONAL, WHICH NEEDS TO 1049
48
BE SWIFTLY STRUCK DOWN FOR THE TREASONIOUS 1050
OBSTRUCTIONIST BENCHISLATION NONSENSE THAT IT IS. 1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
49
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 1067
AND SERVICE 1068
1069
PURSUANT TO ARCAP 14(B), 1070
I, STEPHEN KANDIK, CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED 1071
BREIF (ACCORDING TO MICROSOFT WORD) CONTAINS 1072
7,722 WORDS. AND THAT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES 1073
COMPORTS TO ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS LAID OUT 1074
FOR E-FILLING. 1075
1076
1/28/2010 STEPHEN KANDIK 1077
210 S. SHERWOOD VILLAGE DR. 1078
TUCSON AZ 85710 1079
(520) 245-0527 1080
1081
2 COPIES OF THE FORGOING BRIEF 1082
WERE MAILED ON 1/28/2010 TO: 1083
1084
WILLIAM F. MILLS 1085
SUPERVISING PROSECUTOR 1086
P.O. BOX 27210 1087
TUCSON, AZ 85710-7210 1088
1089
RE: 2 CA-CV 2009-0180/ CT-20090056 1090
1091