Kant's Philosophy of Religion: The Relationship Between Ecclesiastical Faith

and Reasoned Religion

Michelle A. Rochard

A Thesis

in

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Concordia University Montréal, Québec, Canada

September 1998

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Kant's Philosophy of Religion: The R e l a t i o n s h i p Between Ecclesiastical F a i t h

and Reasoned Rel ig ion

Michelle A. Rochard

I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Kant rnakes an apparen t contradiction

i n Religion w i t h i n the Limits of Reason Alone w i t h respect to

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between r ea son and Sc r ip tu r e . A t t h e o u t s e t

o f Religion Kant S t a t e s t h a t h e a i m s t o discover whether

reason can be f o u n d t o b e c o m p a t i b l e and a t o n e w i t h

S c r i p t u r e . Kant goes about showing that reason and Scripture

are u n i t e d , however, h e a l s o m a i n t a i n s that r e a s o n a n d

S c r i p t u r e a r e d i s t i n c t irorn each other. Hence, h e s e e m s t o

l and himself i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . It i s my i n t e n t i o n t o

examine t h i s a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n to see how and w h y Kant

both u n i t e s and d i s t i n g u i s h e s reason and S c r i p t u r e , and t o

s e e w h e t h e r t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n poses a problem o r i s

necessary t o Kant's t a s k .

iii

1 would like to thank Professor Vladimir Zeman for requiring his students of Kant to write précis. It was through this tedious task that the philosophy of Kant finally (after a B.A. in Philosophy) began to make a little sense t o me. This tiny glimpse of understanding gave me, for the first time, the confidence to delve into Kant's philosophy, still with humility, but finally without fear. 1 would also like to thank Professor Zeman for allowing me free reign with this t h e s i s and encouraging me to develop rny own thoughts and ideas to see where 1 might take myself with this work.

1 w o u l d l i k e to extend m y sincere t h a n k s and appreciation to Professor Stanley French for al1 his interest and support over the past year. Working with him and learning from him helped to solidify my decision to continue in philosophy.

Of course, my greatest thanks must go to my parents. T h e i r support and f a i t h have allowed me to discover rny potentials and pursue my abilities. Finally, 1 would like to thank Darren for contributing to this thesis on a day-to-day basis in al1 the ways that are necessary yet invisible.

For O l i v e and Henry

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER

The Enlightenment and Reason

Reason and the Moral Law

The Pure Religion of Reason vs- Ecclesiastical Faith

TWO: THE COMPATIBILITY AND UNITY OF REASON AND S C R I P T U R E ~ * ~ o . - - * * ~ . . - -

Kant's System of Religion

Book One: 1s Human Nature Originally Good or Evil?

Book Two: How Can Good Combat E v i l ?

Hope

Book Three: The Ethical Commonwealth

Reason and Scripture United

THREE: THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN REASON ANDSCRIPTURE. . , . . , , ,

False and True Religion

Theology, Morality, and Religion

Kant's Definition of Religion: Revealed vs- Natural Religion

The Distinction between Reason and Scripture

FOUR: REASON AND SCRIPTURE UNITED AND DISTINCT,

What Kant Means by Unity

Unity Based on the Place of Morality

Completing Kant's Syst= of Religion: Book Four: Visible Church L i f e in Service to the Moral Good and the Pure Religion of Reason

A Looser Sense of Unity

A Necessary Contradiction?

vii

Two th ings f i l 1 the e n d w i t h ever new and increasinq wonder and a w e , the oftener and the more

steadily w e reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law w i t h i n me.

Critique of P r a c t i c a l Reason

INTRODUCTION

In the Preface to the Second Edition of ~ e l i g i o n w i t h i n

the L i m i t s of Reason ~ l o n e , ' Kant s t a t e s that his primary aim

or intention is to determine whether the pure religion of

reason, or, moral religion can be found to be compatible or

at one w i t h revealed religion, or, what may be called

historical, practical, ecclesiastical faith or Scripture.

Indeed, Kant attempts to establish how and why reason and

Scripture can be shown to be united to the extent that "he

who follows one ... will not fail to conform to the ~ther."~ However, after establishing an apparent unity between reason

and Scripture, Kant makes a clear and even adamant

distinction between moral religion and ecclesiastical faith

suggesting that ecclesiastical faith must be thought of in

contradistinction to pure moral religion. He notes that

there is only one true religion of reason which has to do

I m a n u e l Kant, R e l i g i o n within the L M t s of Reason Alone ( F i r s t E d i t i o n p u b l i s h e d i n 1 7 9 3 ; Second E d i t i o n publ i shed i n 1794), trans. Theodore M . Greene and Hoyt H . Hudson, (New York: Harper and Row, P u b l i s h e r s , 1960 ) , h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as Religion and i n f o o t n o t e references as "R" f o l l o w e d by the s t a n d a r d page number i n Greene and Hudson's e d i t i o n .

with moral disposition while ecclesiastical faith appeals

only to the senses. In this respect, ecclesiastical faith

remains always at a practical, phenomenal level, never

capable of reaching the heights of truly rational, moral

religion. Yet, Kant's aim is to show how revealed religion

or Scripture can be reasoned; he is attempting to show how

revealed religion can be brought w i t h i n the limits of reason

so that it can be united with the pure religion of reason,

It is my contention that Kant seems to land himself in an

apparent contradiction: o n the one hand, he a i m s to

demonstrate that reason is "not only compatible but at one"'

with Scripture; however, on the other hand, he wants to

m a i n t a i n that ecclesiastical faith is subordinate to pure

moral religion thereby rendering a clear distinction between

reason and Scripture . In order to understand how Kant establishes a unity and

at the same time a distinction between reason and Scripture,

it is necessary to place Kant's Religion in a philosophical

context. Although it is possible to approach Kant's

philosophy of religion from many different angles, it is my

intention to remain focused on specific philosophical

considerations. 1 will be interested in Kant's mm approach

to Religion to the extent that he extends his practical

philosophy to the realm of religion and theology, an

extension he already made in Grounding for the Metaphysics of

Morals and in the Critique of Practical ~eason . '

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for t h e Metaphysics of Morals in

f t is m y hope t a detennine and c l a r i fy h o w K a n t works

w i t h i n t h e l i r n i t s of h i s own p h i l o s o p h y ; that i s , his

approach to religion w i t h i n season's limits seems t o be

another attempt t o bridge t h e gap between t h e practical w o r l d

and t h e theoretical w o r l d . H a v i n g already establ ished God

and t h e H i g h e s t Good as rational p r inc ip le s towards which al1

h u m a n s strive i n t h e Critique of Practical Reason, Kant is

attempting to understand and justify our apparent need for a

re l ig ion w h i c h consists of practices, r i t u a l s , and S c r i p t u r a l

narratives t h a t are merely practical or sensory i n t h e sense

that they are o f t e n disconnected f r o m mora l i ty . A n d , even

when t h e s e practices are connected t o m o r a l i t y , why do w e

require such practices when our reason already directs us t o

the Highest Good?

W e s h o u l d n o t e that t h i ç q u e s t i o n represents t h e

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h o u g h t of t h e l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y

P h i l o s o p h e r s of t h i s t h e w e r e

E t h i c a l ~ h i l o s o p h y ( P u b l i s h e d i n l785), 2nd e d . , t r a n s . James W . E l l i n g t o n ( H a c k e t t P u b l i s h i n g Company 1994) , h e r e a f t e r referred to as Grounding a n d i n f o o t n o t e r e f e r e n c e s as " G W f o l l o w e d by t h e universal page number; Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Practical Reason ( P u b l i s h e d i n 17881, 3rd ed., ed. Lewis White Beck, ( P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1 9 9 3 ) . I n Adina ~ a v i d o v i c h , "How t o Read R e l i g i o n within the L i m i t s of Reason Aloneu ( ~ a n t - S t u d i e n , 8 5 , 1 9 9 4 ) , D a v i d o v i c h States t h a t i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d R e l i g i o n o n e must f irst read a n d be f a m i l i a r w i t h K a n t ' s C r i t i q u e of Judgment. While 1 agree t h a t r e a d i n g any of Kan t ' s p rev ious works w i l l no doub t shed l i g h t o n R e l i g i o n , 1 d i s a g r e e with Davidovichrs t h e s i s that reading Critique of Judgment, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y to o r w i l l h e l p i n a p p r o a c h i n g R e l i g i o n a n y more t h a n Grounding or C r i t i q u e o f P r a c t i c a l Reason, f o r example, is n e c e s s a r y o r can he lp . It can be argued t h a t any o n e of Kan t ' s works can l e a d t o a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f any o n e o f h i s o t h e r works. I t seems obv ious t h a t t h i s is how K a n t ' s u p h i l o s o p h i c a l systemw works. Thus, g iven tha t R e l i g i o n is Kan t ' s l a s t work, a case can be made t h a t r e a d i n g any of h i s p r e v i o u s w o r k s i s n e c e s s a r y to some d e g r e e t o u n d e r s t a n d Rel ig ion . However, exactly which of K a n t ' s works i s more n e c e s s a r y t h a n o t h e r s seems, t o m e , a matter of opin ion .

preoccupied w i t h trying to repais what rationalism in the

Enlightenment had done r o morality, faith and religion.

Thus, the context of Kant's Religion was the philosophical

spirit of the time: it was necessary to account for faith,

morality and religion within t h e limits of reason in such a

w a y t h a t reason d i d not destroy them but rather made them

necessary to the human condition.

Thus, Kant sets h i s sights on showing how reason and

Scripture are compatible and united. 1 will examine how Kant

establishes pure religious faith as moral disposition.

Because human nature has a propensity towards evil, a moral

disposition is required to constantly combat this evil. For

Kant, moral decisions are based on well-reasoned principles:

when one acts morally, one is acting rationally. So long as

one constantly disposes oneself to moral actions in an

attempt to fight off evil tendencies, one will become

evermore morally disposed. One who is morally disposed is

pleasing to God and thereby worthy of Godrs grace. Moreover,

morally disposed individuals unite to form an "ethical

commonwealthf~ which strives towards moral perfection and

exhibits the moral Kingdom of God on earth. In this way, the

ethical commonwealth directs itself towards a more fully

reasoned disposition and, in the end, it is ruled by the pure

religion of reason.

Kant unites moral religion and ecclesiastical faith by

showing how ecclesiastical faith can serve as a necessary

"vehiclew through which individuals can remain well-disposed.

It is in this respect that Kant is able to clab that one who

f o l l o w s t h e p r a c t i c e s o f ecclesiastical f a i t h , "under the

guidance of moral concepts," ' will not f a i l t o conform t o t h e

requirements of moral r e l i g i o n .

Given t h a t ecc les ias t i ca l f a i t h c a n be a n e c e s s a r y

v e h i c l e t o pu re m o r a l r e l i g i o n , one might a s k why Kant goes

t o g r e a t l e n g t h s t o show t h a t e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h and moral

r e l i g i o n are compatible, y e t , at the same tirne maintains t h a t

t h e t w o are d i s t i n c t - That is, i n order for Kant t o j u s t i f y

t h e need for t h e p r a c t i c e s of ecclesiastical f a i t h , he must

keep t h e s e p r a c t i c e s i n t h e i r p r a c t i c a l , s enso ry place . H e

c a n n o t a l l o w p r a c t i c e s t h a t fa11 i n t h e r e a l m of s e n s o r y

p e r c e p t i o n t o take on t h e r o l e o f an u l t i r n a t e d e t e r m i n i n g

ground of moral knowledge. That i s , what lies a t t h e base of

moral knowledge must be reasoned p r i n c i p l e s , o r , t h e r a t i o n a l

w i l l . M o r a l k n o w l e d g e cannot be based on s e n s o r y o r

e m p i r i c a l p e r c e p t i o n s i f w e are t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a p u r e

r e l i g i o n of r e a s o n . T h u s , there m u s t r e m a i n a c l e a r

d i s t i n c t i o n between e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h and moral r e l i g i o n .

In t h i s r e s p e c t , they c a n never be at one with each o t h e r .

Ecclesiastical f a i t h w i l l always remain a p r a c t i c a l vehicle

w a i t i n g t o b e s u p e r s e d e d by t h e p u r e r e l i g i o n o f r e a s o n .

Indeed, on Kant 's account, it is precisely this supersess ion

t h a t w e l l - d i s p o s e d i n d i v i d u a l s mus t hope f o r ; it is t h i s

supersess ion t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s true r e l i g i o u s f a i t h .

Given t h a t Kant appears to both u n i t e and d i s t i n g u i s h

ecclesiastical f a i t h and moral r e l i g i o n , it seems t h a t h e

l ands h h s e l f i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . However, 1 w i l l a t tempt t o

'R, 11.

c l a r i f y why t h i s contradict ion is necessary and unproblematic

for Kant. Kant is j u s t i f y ing common r e l i g i o u s p rac t i ces by

t ry ing to account for them within t h e limits of reason. B u t ,

h e is a l s o ensur ing that common p r a c t i c e s are not confused

with some kind of guaranteed a t t a inment of moral r e l i g i o n .

I n o t h e r words, going t o church does not , on i t s own, make

one moral. Kant is careful to make common r e l i g ion necessary

t o moral r e l i g i o n on ly i n a very p a r t i c u l a r way: f o r Kant,

it i s crucial t h a t whenever m o r a l i t y is i n Company w i t h

common re l ig ion , moral i ty always appears as the parent r a t h e r

than as t h e c h i l d of religion. Morality must always underlie

r e l i g i o n and m o r a l i t y w i l l always, i n t h e end, supersede

religion so long as reason has i t s way.

CEIAPTER ONE

THF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF KANT'S RELIGION

T o p r o p e r l y contextualize what Kant is doing in

Religion, 1 w i l l discuss t h e limits that Kant, himçelf , seems

to be p l a c i n g on o r working within i n his text. F i r s t , I

w i l l briefly examine how reason was viewed during the t i m e

t h a t Kant was writing Religion to shed light on why he may

have been motivated to bring r e l i g i o n within t h e l i m i t s of

reason. Second, 1 will discuss what Kant means by reason and

the moral law by closely examining his discussion of the wi116

in the T h i r d Section of Grounding wherein he moves from '*a

1 note t h a t i n t h e o r i g i n a l German t e x t of Religion ( D i e ~ e l i g i o n i n n e r h a l b der Grenzen d e r bloBen Vernunft) Kant u s e s " W i l l k u r W and u W i l l e n t o refer to t h e human will- u W i l l k u r " i s t r a n s l a t e d as t h e " e l e c t i v e w i l l " o r t h e w i l l t h a t is " v o l i t i o n e d " o r has t h e "power of choice"; " W i l l e w i s t r a n s l a t e d a s the " r a t i o n a l will" o r "wil l ." See John S i l b e r r s d i s c u s s i o n i n h i s e s say , "The E t h i c a l S i g n i f i c a n c e o f Kant's Religionm which is P a r t II of the ~ n t r o d u c t i o n t o Rel igion, pgs. l x x x i i i - l x x x i v n , x c i v - c x x x i v , and i n t h e T r a n s l a t o r l s P r e f a c e , p. cxxx ix . Al though the d i s t i n c t i o n between " W i l l k u r m and " W i l l e " is important , a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s behind t h e d i s t i n c t i o n a r e f a r beyond t h e s cope of t h i s endeavor. As w e l l , i n Grounding and i n t h e second Critique, Kant had not settled upon a d i s t i n c t t e c h n i c a l m e a n i n g f o r e i t h e r " W i l l e m o r w W i l l k u r n b u t used them a l m o s t interchangeably (see S i l b e r , p. lxxxiv) . Hence, because 1 am r e l y i n g on Kant ' s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e moral law and the w i l l as he p r e s e n t s it i n Grounding, "will" can be t aken a s both o r e i t h e r t h ê w i l l t h a t uchooses" f r e e l y , and/or t h e " r a t i o n a l w i l l . "

metaphys ics of moralsw t o a " c r i t i q u e of pure p r a c t i c a l

reason."' 1 w i l l a r g u e t h a t t h e s u p r e m e i n c e n t i v e o r

p r i n c i p l e of reason upon which w e act is t h e moral l a w or the

c a t e g o r i c a l imperat ive . A clear unders tanding of w h a t Kant

means by t h e moral law i s impor tan t i f one i s to p r o p e r l y

understand his system of r e l i g i o n . F i n a l l y , 1 will discuss

what Kant means by ecclesiastical f a i t h and t h e pure r e l i g i o n

of reason as w e l l as what he means by " re l ig ionw i n genera l ,

A l 1 of t h i s w i l l serve as a necessa ry back-drop o r c o n t e x t

fo r what Kant a i m s t o do i n Religion and it w i l l also serve

t o c l a r i f y t h e relationship between reason and Scripture .

The Enlishtenment and Reason

What c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e Enlightenment i n Europe dur ing

t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was t h e a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n .

Phi losophers pu t a l1 t h e i r faith i n t h e a u t h o r i t y of reason

and used reason as t h e i r prirnaxy standard of t r u t h . Reason

was used ta c r i t i c i z e and j u s t i f y a l 1 t h i n g s from m o r a l i t y

and r e l i g i o n to t h e state and nature. However, towards the

end of t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen tu ry , faith i n the u l t r a - c r i t i c a l

s t a t e of t h i n g s began t o waiver, P h i l o s o p h e r s began t o

question t h e a u t h o r i t y of reason because it seemed as though

reason began t o undermine t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t it o r i g i n a l l y

aimed t o j u s t i f y . Reason gave reign t o modern science and

cr i t ic ism leaving less and less room f o r freedom, God and

' G , 446.

morality. ' T h i s was t h e environment i n which Kant was working

i n Germany dur ing t h e l a s t decades o f t h e century. Kant, l i k e

o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s , w a s f a c e d w i t h t h e problem o f r e s c u i n g

r ea son from its own d e s t r u c t i o n , While Kant s t i l l w a n t e d t o

account for and defend the Enl igh tenment f s view of reason , he

was also sensitive t o t h e a t t a c k s t h a t reason was undergoing

as t h e views of Romanticism became more and m o r e a t t r a c t i v e .

The Romant ic v i e w w a s t h a t reason was no l o n g e r s i m p l y

accepted as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . Rather, reason had to be shown t o

a c c o u n t f o r t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t were c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a l t o

good life conduct . I f reason cou ld o n l y undermine r e l i g i o n ,

m o r a l i t y , freedom and those b e l i e f s t h a t were n e c e s s a r y for

t h e conduct o f l i f e , how could , and why should , r e a s o n hold

our f a i t h ?

I f Kant's ~ e l i g i o n is placed w i t h i n t h i s con tex t , it may

be sa id t h a t Religion c a n be seen as a n a t t e m p t t o r e s c u e

r e a s o n by o f f e r i n g an account o f m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n that

falls w i t h i n r e a s o n s l i m i t s . I n Religion, m o r a l i t y and

r e l i g i o n are not u n d e r m i n e d by r e a s o n ; r a t h e r , r e a s o n

j u s t i f i e s t h e m a n d makes t hem n e c e s s a r y t o human l i f e

conduct . Kant begins t h i s r e scue of reason i n Grounding and

i n t h e Critique of Practical Reason. I n t h e s e works, Kant

d e v e l o p s h i s n o t i o n o f " t h e p r a c t i c a l reason of t h e moral

l a w . "' I t i s t h r o u g h t h i s n o t i o n t h a t Kant a t t e m p t s , i n

Religion, n o t o n l y t o j u s t i f y moral and r e l i g i o u s beliefs,

bu t t o b r inq r e l i q i o n w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f reason. Thus, an

' Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of R e a s o n : German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, (Harvard Univers i ty Press) 1 9 8 7 , 1-2.

examination of Kant's d i s c u s s i o n of reason and the m o r a l law

i n Grounding is necessa ry i f w e are to unders tand what Kant

is doing i n Religion.

Reason and t h e Moral Law

I n order t o begin t o understand K a n t ' s s y s t e m o f

religion, a clear unders tanding of what Kant means by reason

and t h e m o r a l l a w is necessary . For this, 1 w i l l t u r n t o t h e

T h i r d S e c t i o n o f Kant f s Grounding t o examine his argument

t h a t t h e supreme " p r i n c i p a l of mora l i t y " i s "the fo rmula of

c a t e g o r i c a l imperative.

Kant b e g i n s the T h i r d S e c t i o n o f Grounding by s t a t i n g

t h a t :

The w i l l is a k i n d of c a u s a l i t y b e l o n g i n g to l i v i n g beings i n s o f a r as they are r a t i o n a l ; freedom would be t h e property of t h i s c a u s a l i t y that makes it e f f e c t i v e independent of any determinat ion by a l i e n causes."

I n o t h e r w o r d s , freedom is t h e p rope r ty which t h e w i l l

has a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e w i l l has t h e power t o act,

independent of a l i e n causes. I n this s e n s e , t h e w i l l i s a

kind of c a u s a l i t y t h a t has t h e power t o produce effects. As

'O G, 447 . Kant also suggests t h a t t h e determining ground for t h e maxims o f the w i l l is "pract ical r e a s o n a s suchW i n Part 1 , Book 1 of t h e Critique of P r a c t i c a l Reason, e n t i t l e d , 'Analytic of P u r e P r a c t i c a l Reason," p. 15-16. A l s o i n this Critique Kant provides the fundamental law o f p u r e practical reason or the first fo rmula t ion o f the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative: "So act t h a t t h e maxirn of your w i l l c o u l d always h o l d a t t h e same time as t h e p r i n c i p l e giving u n i v e r s a l law" ( 3 0 ) .

well, t h e w i l l , as independent f r o m alien causes, is its own

e f f i c i e n t cause; that is , the w i l l determines i t s e l f t o

c a u s a l a c t i o n ; t h e w i l l is itself "caused t o act c a u ~ a l l y . ~ ~ ~ '

Freedom i s t h e property or q u a l i t y which belongs t o t h i s

s p e c i a l k ind of c a u s a l i t y which is t h e w i l l . So t h e n , a free

w i l l a c t s in such a way which is not determined by any th ing

external or a l i e n to it.

This d e f i n i t i o n of freedom is negative i n so far as Kant

i s desc r ib ing what seems t o be a freedom which is opposed t o

n a t u r a l necessity. '' Freedom under n a t u r a l necess ity is

i n f l u e n c e d by causes o r e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s such as desires;

however t h e freedom which belongs t o t h e w i l l "is something

q u i t e d i f f e r e n t : it can be p r e s e n t o n l y i f t h e w i l l i s a

power t o produce e f f e c t s without being d e t e d n e d by anything

o t h e r t h a n i t s e l f . " T h i s c o n c e p t o f freedom is " p u r e l y

theoretical [and] n o t based upon any moral cons ide ra t i ons and

i n i t s e l f empty. " 1 4 However, i n o r d e r to inc lude the concept

of f r e e d o m and t h e w i l l i n the n a t u r e of o u r a c t u a l

exper ience so t h a t w e can unders tand how it p e r t a i n s t o us,

we must c o n n e c t t h e n e g a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of f r e e d o m t o a

p o s i t i v e one s o as t o show that freedom i s equivalent t o

H - J . Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study of Kant 's Moral Philosophy, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1 9 4 8 ) , 208-9.

1 3 G , 446-7. 1 note that Kant may not actually be opposing freedom and natural necessity i n a way that suggests a real opposition. Rather, he is using freedom and natural necessity i n an analogous way so as to equate freedom and autonorny i n h i s concept of positive freedom. See Gideon Yaffe, "Freedom, Natural Necessity a n d the Catego r i ca l Imperative," i n Kant-Studien 86, 1995, 446-458.

"Paton, 211.

autonomy. A positive concept of freedom means that the will,

though free from al ien causes, must have i n i ts causality a

concept of law which is binding. This lawfulness i s self-

determined and thus we are autonomous in our freedom and

wiïl. That is to Say, a will, so long as it is free, "must

be capable of imposing lawl ikeness on [its] ac t i ons , that is

of acting on universalizable ma~ims."~' A will imposes a law

on i t s e l f and is, i n t h i s s e n s e , self-determined or

autonomous. As a result, Kant concludes that freedom of the

will just is autonomy, or "the property which the will has of

being a law to itself ."16

W e see h e r e the formulation of the categorical

imperative taking shape. We can also begin to see the link

between freedom and autonomy and rationality or reason. The

ability to choose universalizable m a x i m s is an expression of

our freedom and a confirmation of our autonomy. This ability

is necessarily grounded in and subject to our reason. More

specifically, Ywe can begin to see why, if autonomous action

is to be independent of everything 'alien", it must be action

determined by season."" This is because autonomous action as

defined by Kant in his Formula of Autonomy i n the Second

Section of Grounding, is an action in which a rational being

chooses "in a such way that in t h e çame volition t h e maxims

'' Onor a O'Neill, "Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III" in her book, C o n s t r u c t i o n s o f R e a s o n : Explorations of Kant's Practical Phi lo sophy , (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 53.

of [his] action are also present as universal law."" In this

sense, maxims or autonomous action must hold equally for al1

rational agents, that is, they must be universalizable. The

authority of these actions, "if they have any, cannot derive

from any contingency of human life but only from the

requirements of reason, whatever those may be."lg Thus, if

reason has any authority, it will apply to al1 rational

beings ,

We can see then that we must be rational in a specific

sense; namely, our reason must rely on a capacity for

freedom, autonomy and thereby, be bound by a law. In this

sense, freedom and rationality are linked. However, if we

are not rational in this specific sense, but in s o m e other

sense, there will be a gap between our rationality and

freedom and so Kant's theory, as it pertains to morality,

will have no relevance or significance for us. That is to

Say, if we do not have reason in the s e n s e of having the

capacity for autonornous action, our will is neither free nor

bound to a law. In this case, no connection exists between

reason and freedom or autonomy, and as a result, there exists

no connection to or significance of any Law, moral or

otherwise. In order to assert that freedom and rationality

are linked, more work is required "to prove that freedoa-is

[indeed] a property of the will of al1 rational being~."'~

Kant states that "to every rational being possessed of a

le G, 43l/44O.

'O O'Neill, 1989, 5 4 .

447 .

w i l l w e must a l s o l end t h e idea of freedorn as the o n l y one

under which h e can act. w2' H e goes on to Say t h a t :

Reason must look upon i t s e l f as t h e a u t h o r o f i t s own p r i n c i p l e s independently of a l i e n inf luences . There fore as p r a c t i c a l reason, o r as t h e will of a r a t i o n a l being, it must be regarded by itself as f r e e S z 2

Al1 t h i s i s f i n e ; however, t o Say t h a t w e m u s t view

ou r se lves as free i s very d i f f e r e n t from saying t h a t w e are,

i n f a c t , free. Kant must s h o w t h a t the l i n k between r ea son

and freedom is an a c t u a l one i f he is t o a f f i r m t h a t freedom,

au tonomy a n d m o r a l i t y are i n fact c o n n e c t e d a n d h a v e

a p p l i c a t i o n t o us. Kant admi t s that t h i s tenuous account of

freedom can on ly l ead u s i n t o "a kind of c i r c l e , from which,

as it seems, t h e r e i s no way o f e scape .w23 I n order t o

e s c a p e f r o m t h i s c i r c l e , w e n e e d a l s o t o e s c a p e f rom a

metaphysics of morals :

[We n e e d to] i n q u i r e w h e t h e r w e do n o t t a k e o n e s t a n d p o i n t when b y m e a n s of f r e e d o m w e c o n c e i v e o u r s e l v e s as c a u s e s acting a p r i o r i , a n d a n o t h e r s t a n d p o i n t when w e contemplate ourse lves with r e f e r e n c e to o u r a c t i o n s as e f f e c t s which w e see before o u r eyes."

I n o t h e r words, w e need t o c l a r i f y t h e s t a n d p o i n t from

which w e are ( o r should be) conceiving freedom by engaging i n

a c r i t i q u e of p r a c t i c a l reason.

T h e main idea behind t h e n o t i o n of ' c r i t i q u e of r ea son r

i s t o " f i n d s tandards of reasoning by consider ing how w e can

and must d i s c i p l i n e our thinking."" What w e are looking f o r

i n o u r thinking is " s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e f f or "autonomy-" Reason,

w h i l e d i s c i p l i n i n g al1 o t h e r e n d e a v o r s , must a t t h e same

t i m e , d i s c i p l i n e i t s e l f i f t h e r e is t o be a n a u t h o r i t y of

r e a s o n . Moreover, r e a s o n , as its own d i s c i p l i n e , must be

autonomous; f o r any alien " a u t h o r i t i e s [to r e a s o n ] ( e . g .

s ta te , church, e x p e r t s , persona1 p r e f e r e n c e s ) is n o t reason,

but the abrogation of rea~on."'~

Reason, as a way of d i s c i p l i n i n g t h i n k i n g and a c t i n g ,

must m e e t t h r e e s t anda rds . F i r s t , r eason must be "negative"

i n so f a r a s it must lack a l 1 s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t ; second, it

must be "nonder ivat ive" i n t h e sense t h a t it must n o t invoke

a u t h o r i t i e s o t h e r t h a n r e a s o n ; a n d , t h i r d , i t must be

"lawlikeff in so f a r as it must use p r i n c i p l e s that al1 can

adopt . " I n t h i s respect, any concerns r e g a r d i n g t h e connect ion

between reason and freedom and autonomy can be addressed i n a

new way. T h a t is , w e do n o t have t o establish t h a t w e are

r a t i o n a l and t h e n p r o v e t h a t w e are f r e e , and t h e r e b y

autonomous and bound to a moral law. Rather , Kant, by means

of a critique of p r a c t i c a l reason, reverses h i s strategy.

That i s t o Say, i n s t e a d of a rgu ing from r e a s o n t o autonomy,

'' Onora O'Neill, "Kant on Reason and Religionw i n The T a n n e r Lectures on Human V a l u e s , V o l u m e 18, Edited by Grethe B . Peterson (University of Utah Press) 1997, 298.

he argues from autonomy t o reason.'' It is only because w e are

a u t o n o m o u s , s e l f - d i s c i p l i n h g b e i n g s t h a t we h a v e the

c a p a c i t y t o a c t on p r i n c i p l e s which w e c a n r i g h t l y c a l 1

p r i n c i p l e s of reason. Reason is its own a u t h o r i t y and c m be

j u s t i f i e d o n l y by showing through c r i t i q u e that autonomy i s

what c h a r a c t e r i z e s o u r t hough t and a c t i o n : "Autonomy does

n o t presuppose b u t r a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e s the p r i n c i p l e s of

reason and t h e i r au tho r i ty . "'' So w e s e e t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f r e a s o n as a n

u n c o n d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e c a n a p p e a l t o n o t h i n g e x c e p t

d i s c i p l i n e d autonomy i n th ink ing . W e can begin t o sense t h e

r e t u r n o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e here i n s o far as w e

have s e e n t h a t freedom i n t h i n k i n g means t h a t r e a s o n can

answer t o no laws other t h a n t h e ones it g i v e s i tself; t h a t

is, one ' s m a x i m s are s u b ject t o a l a w which the w i l l imposes

on itself and which, i n t h i s r e spec t , must be univessalizable

t o al1 o t h e r r a t i o n a l beings: t h i s j u s t is the c a t e g o r i c a l

imperat ive . Hence, the c a t e g o r i c a l impera t ive r evea l s itself

t o be that uncondi t ioned p r i n c i p l e of r e a s o n which has i t s

grounds i n freedom and autonomy. T h e c a t e g o r i c a l impera t ive

is t h e supreme principle of a l 1 r e a s o n because it is the

s t r a t e g y t h a t makes any a c t i v i t y , m o r a l o r o t h e r w i s e , a

reasoned one i n so f a r as it d i s c i p l i n e s any ac t ion or maxim

t o be autonomous. T h e c a t e g o r i c a l imperative guides u s i n

our thought and ac t ion t o t hose p r i n c i p l e s which can apply to

" Here we have Kant's Copernican t u r n . S e e t h e Critique of Pure Reason (Published i n 1781), t rans la t ed by Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press) 1929, B xvi-B xix.

everyone, that is, those principles or maxims that can be

made universalizable:

Both in thinking and in acting the self-discipline of reason is a matter of asking whether the ground of the assumption can be a universal principle. The supreme principle of reason, [ L e . the categorical imperative], both emerges from and disciplines human thought, action and communication. There is no gap between reason and autonomy because the authority of reason is grounded in autunomy . ' O

Moreover, the moral law tells us that we can act only on

maxims that al1 rational beings, that is, al1 members of the

Kingdom of Ends", could agree to act on. In other words, the

categorical imperative and the law of the Kingdom of Ends

w h i c h is t h e moral l a w appear t o be the same in so far as

they have the same formula.

We have seen that because we are autonomous and self-

disciplined, we are rational beings. Reason is its own

authority in so far as it is grounded in our freedom and

autonomy. Freedom and autonomy ensure that reason abides by

laws which reason imposes on itself and which are thereby

universalizable to al1 rational beings. Hence, what serves

as the unconditioned, supreme principle of reason is the

categorical imperative in so far as it disciplines any a c t i o n

or maxim to be autonomous.

With respect to pure will, or a will that has a moral

law, we have seen that freedom is the property that belongs

to the will. As well, the will is autonomous in so far as it

'O O'Neill, 1989, 5 9 .

'' The Kingdom of Ends is f o r Kant that group of b e i n g s who i n their duty to t h e moral l a w e x p r e s s u n i v e r s a l reason o r r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s Kingdom i s t h e end that al1 r a t i o n a l b e i n g s ought to strive for.

has the property of being a law to itself. So long as the

will is autonomous, it is r a t i o n a l and thus grounded in

freedom and autonomy- Freedom and autonorny ensure that the

will abides by those moral laws which it imposes upon itself,

and which are thereby universalizable t o al1 rational beings

possessed of pure will. That i s , a will binds itself to a

moral law precisely because it can be made universal to al1

rational beings.

The will is bound to the moral law in so far as our

reason relies on a capacity for freedom and autonomy. There

is no gap between reason and autonomy. So long as we are

free and autonomous we w i l l act in such a way so as to ensure

t h a t the maxim upon which we act can a t the same t h e be made

a universal law. The law which the will imposes upon itself

so as to be autonomous is the moral law and is the

categorical imperative. The will, as its own efficient

cause, has the p r o p e r t y of freedorn. T h e will is autonomous

i n so far as it imposes a moral law upon itself. Thus, the

will is rational and expresses this rationality in it maxirns

which are statements of our freedom and autonomy. A free and

autonomous will means b e i n g bound to the categorical

imperative and to a moral law which the will itself imposes.

The Pure Reliaion of Reason vs. Ecclesiastical Faith

True moral religion or the pure religion of reason can

be thought of in terms of that moral law w i t h i n us which

expresses the freedom and autonomy of our will to bind itself

to the duty of this law and serves as the only incentive that

determines the m a x i m s of Our will. Moreover, t h e s e maxims

are themselves contingent upon some supreme maxim that is

universal to al1 maxims. Acting in this way demonstrates

moral goodness and in this way we make ourselves pleasing to

God and worthy of H i s grace. ~ c t i n g in this way also

demonstrates our reason at work, for when we act morally, we

act rationally. Thus, so long as morality serves as the

foundation of our actions, the universal aspect of this

morality and our duty to the moral law makes us worthy of

grace and leads to moral perfection. When morality is

touched by grace the result can be thought of as a pure

religion of reason and also as a true moral religion. In the

pure religion of reason, Our morality is able to extend

itself to the idea of God so that w e are able to achieve a

universal religion wherein we can experience moral perfection

and the Kingdom of God on earth.

Practical or revealed religion, historical or

ecclesiastical faith, or Scripture can be thought of as those

worldly, sensory, empirical religions in which religious

tools rnay or may not aid us in maintaining our moral

disposition. These tools comprise Scriptural narratives,

common practices and rituals and can help us to attain moral

perfection only if morality Lies at their foundation. If

this is the case, our belief or faith in common religion or

ecclesiastical faith will fa11 within the limits of reason

because it will have the moral law and reason as its guide.

This is what Kant means when he speaks of religion within the

limits of reason alone. However, if morality is absent or

does not serve as the foundation for common religion or

ecclesiastical faith, the religious tools we follow become

essentially useless in our quest for moral goodness. In this

case, the belief and faith we hold will fa11 outside reasonrs

limits ,

Kant defines religion as "the recognition of al1 duties

as divine c~mmands.~'~ It is important to note that this

definition holds four very different senses of religion, al1

of which Kant refers to at various times and under the name

"religion. " 1 will be discussing Kant's definition as well

as the different senses of religion at length in what is to

corne; but, for now, it will suffice to distinguish between:

(1) revealed religion which is common, practical, historical,

empirical religion, or ecclesiastical faith wherein Scripture

is interpreted or revealed; (2) false (empirical) religion

which is revealed religion that recognizes theology as its

primary foundation; (3) true (empirical, universal) religion

which is revealed religion that recognizes morality as i t s

primary foundation; and, (4) the pure religion of reason or

moral religion which is true (universal) religion that

extends itself to the idea of God and unites its rational

members under God's guidance and grace toward the goal of

moral perfection and thereby achieves the Kingdom of God on

earth .

It seems apparent t h a t Kant, remaining w i t h i n his own

philosophical limits, is aiming to bridge the gap between t h e

p r a c t i c a l world of ecclesiastical f a i t h and the theoretical

world of t h e r e l i g i o n of reason. Indeed, h e e x p l i c i t l y

s ta tes i n t h e Preface t o t h e Second Edit ion of Rel igion, t h a t

his aim i n Religion i s t o discover t h e rational c o n d i t i o n s

for t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l i g i o n and then test one p a r t i c u l a r

r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n , namely, C h r i s t i a n i t y , t o s e e i f it

conforms t o t h e s e cond i t ions . " If a l 1 goes well, Kant

suggests t h a t w e w i l l be able Say t h a t reason and Scripture

or e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith are not on ly compatible, but a t one

wi th each o t h e r . W e w i l l see whether Kant can s u c c e s s f u l l y

u n i t e r e a s o n and S c r i p t u r e t o b r i d g e t h e gap o r w h e t h e r

reason and Scripture w i l l prove t o be too d i s t i n c t from each

other and, i n t h e end, unbridgeable.

"R, 11.

CHAPmR TWO

T m COMPATIBILITY AND UNITY OF REASON AND SCRXPTURE:

T o r e p e a t , Kant Sta t e s t h a t his primary aim o r i n t e n t i o n

i n Religion is to argue that r e a s o n a n d S c r i p t u r e are

compatible and a t one w i t h each other t o the e x t e n t that "he

who fo l lows o n e . , , w i l l not fail to conform t o t h e o ther ." 1

w i l l examine how Kant makes this argument from the fo l lowing

perspect ives . 1 w i l l map o u t what 1 t a k e t o be Kant's system

of r e l i g i o n as h e presents it i n Books One t o Three of

Religion. ~ r i m a r i l y , 1 w i l l examine t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between

what Kant calls "radical e v i l t f and "moral d i s p o s i t i o n * " A s

w e l L , I w i l l show how K a n t e s t a b l i s h e s a need f o r

ecclesiastical faith as a means t o a c h i e v i n g moral

p e r f e c t i o n , thereby u n i t i n g e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h w i t h t h e

pure r e l i g i o n of reason.

Kant s Svstem of Reliqion

Book One: 1s Human Nature Originally Good or Evil?

Book o n e of Religion is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y with t h e

question of whether human n a t u r e i s o r i g i n a l l y good or evil.

K a n t s h o w s that human n a t u r e c a n be considered t o b e

o r i g i n a l l y good i f w e o n l y l o o k at the p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s o r

"elements i n t h e fixed c h a r a c t e r and d e s t i n y " o f human

b e i n g s . That is, w i t h i n e v e r y human being resides t h e

p red i spos itions of "an imal i ty , " "humanity" and ' p e r s o n a l i t y . " Put a n o t h e r way, every human b e i n g is o r i g i n a l l y a " l i v i n g r f f

" r a t i o n a l f r a n d " a c c o u n t a b l e " being.' T h e s e o r i g i n a l

p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s are o r i g i n a l l y good i n so f a r as they do n o t

c o n t r a d i c t the moral l a w w i t h i n us. M o r e o v e r , t h e s e

p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e potential o r p o s s i b i l i t y of

every human being i n so far as they are o r i g i n a l and "enjoin

t h e observance o f t h e [moral] lawm and are t h e r e b y aimed

"toward qood. "' I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e s e o r i g i n a l

predispositions can be thought of i n terms of c o n s t i t u t i n g

what K a n t c a l l s t h e " d i s p o s i t i o n " of t h e moral a g e n t . '

Moreover, because this disposition is en jo ined with our duty

to t h e moral l a w , this "moral disposition" c a n be seen as

t h a t " u l t i m a t e subjective ground" w h i c h we freely choose and

by which we f r e e l y adopt t h e maxims of our will.' I n t h i s

sense, a moral d i s p o s i t i o n is maintained i n so far as w e

freely choose t o abide by the moral law. In other words, the

duty to t h e moral law and a moral disposition amount t o t h e

same t h ing . However , i f w e put aside the po tent ia l of human beings

t o obey t h e moral law and regard, instead, t h e ac tua l s t a t e

of human beings in t he i r moral decision-making and subsequent

a c t s , w e w i l l be forced to conclude t h a t human nature must

possess an o r i g i n a l and "radical" e v i L 5 For even in one's

very f i r s t moral act, o n e can adopt into one's m a x i m a

deviation from the moral l a w even though one i s conscious of

the moral l a w . This is apparent V r o m what w e know of man

through experience."' we need o n l y to l o o k a t t h e many

instances of act ions in which deviation f r o m the moral Law in

t h e f a c e of t h e m o r a l l a w is apparent . Although w e may

possess a duty to the moral l a w , we most c e r t a i n l y f a i l to

always a c t i n accordance with it. In other words, Kant i s

trying t o show that w e have a propens i ty towards e v i l which

while not a natural predispos i t ion , s t i l l renders us morally

evi l by nature.'

R, 2 0 ; G.E. Michalson, Jr., "Moral Regeneration and Div ine id in Kant" i n ~eïigious S t u d i e s , V o l u m e 25, Number 1 (Cambridge Univers i ty Press, March, 1989), 261.

R a d i c a l e v i l is p r e s e n t i n u s i n t h e fo l lowing way. We

have seen i n Grounding t h a t our reason is expressed through

t h e autonomous freedom of o u r w i l l to act on un ive r sa l i zab le

maxims.' T h i s freedom binds us t o t h e moral l a w . T h e moral

l a w i s the i n c e n t i v e of Our w i l l . Moreover, o u r freedom

requires that o u r maxims themselves must be con t ingen t upon

some u l t i m a t e s u b j e c t i v e ground o r supreme maxim that is

u n i v e r s a l to a l 1 maxims, and thereby "entwined with and, as

it were, rooted i n humanity i t s e l f . " ' T h i s supreme maxim is

t h e moral law o r what amounts t o our m o r a l d i spos i t ion .

E v i l does not r evea l i t s e l f because we choose a maxim by

which w e reject o r deny the m o r a l law. Again, a s Kant shows

i n Grounding, so long as we are free, w e are bound t o act i n

accordance with t h e c a t e g o r i c a l imperative o r t h e moral law.

T h e moral l a w imposes i t s e l f upon us by v i r t u e of t h e fact

t h a t w e are o r i g i n a l l y predisposed toward good o r possess a

moral d i spos i t ion . However, given that t h e moral law is t h e

i n c e n t i v e of our w i l l , w e rnight expect that when confronted

with moral decision-making w e would always sirnply adopt the

m o r a l law i n t o our s u p r e m e maxim t h a t s e r v e s as t h e

s u f f i c i e n t determining ground of o u r w i l l , and thus always do

t h e m o r a l l y good t h i n g . B u t , w e know from e m p i r i c a l

exper ience that w e do n o t always act i n a mora l ly good way.

Thus, w e must conclude that sane other incen t ive i n addi t ion

to and in opposition to the moral law is at work in the moral

decision-making pro ces^.'^

On Kant's account, the other incentive at work is the

law of self-love. Just as we are predisposed to depend upon

the incentive of the moral law in the determination of our

will, we are equally predisposed to depend upon the

i n c e n t i v e s of our sensuous nature, as they accord with the

law of self-love, to determine our will. '' That is to Say, in

the same way we choose a moral disposition which depends on

the moral law to serve as the ultimate subjective ground by

which we freely adopt the maxims of our will, we can also

freely choose the law of self-love as that ultimate

subjective ground by which we freely adopt the maxhs of our

will. However, unlike the moral law, if we were to adopt the

incentives of our sensuous nature into our rnaxim as the

determining ground of our will, t h e result would be a morally

evil act or a morally corrupt disposition. For as Kant has

demonstrated, a morally good act is one that has t h e moral

law (and no other law) as its incentive. In this sense, evil

reveals itself because we choose an ultimate determining

ground that results in maxims that adhere to the law of self-

love instead of to the moral law.

Because we are naturally predisposed to adopt both the

moral law and the law of self-love into our maxim as

incentives of our will, we c a n occasionally run into

problems. Because either incentive is, on its own, adequate

f o r de t e rmin ing t h e w i l l , a morally good act and a mora l ly

e v i l act w i l l r e s u l t n o t b e c a u s e t h e two i n c e n t i v e s are

d i f f e r e n t ; t h e distinction between good and evil does not l i e

i n the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i n c e n t i v e s which are adopted

i n t o t h e maxim, that i s , n o t i n the c o n t e n t of t h e maxim.

Rather, t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a morally good act and a

mora l ly e v i l act is how w e o r d e r t h e two i n c e n t i v e s when w e

adopt them into O u r m a x i m . l2

A morally good act is one i n which w e s u b o r d i n a t e t h e

i n c e n t i v e of sel£-love to the moral l a w and adopt the moral

l a w i n t o t h e u n i v e r s a l m a x i m of our w i l l as i t s s o l e

i ncen t ive ; t h e moral law is taken t o be t h e supreme condi t ion

of obedience. A morally evil act is one i n w h i c h w e

s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i n c e n t i v e of the moral l aw t o the law o f

s e l f - l o v e and adopt t h e s e n s u o u s i n c e n t i v e s i n t o t h e

universal rnaxim of our will as i t s incentive; t h e l a w o f

s e l f - l o v e is taken t o be the supreme condi t ion of obedience.

I n t h i s case, t h e mora l ly ev i l act r e v e a l s a 'Aradical" e v i l

i n s o f a r as t h e very ground of a l 1 our m a x i m s i s corrupted.

Thus, t o Say t h a t we are m o r a l l y e v i l by n a t u r e or t h a t w e

have a n a t u r a l propensi ty toward e v i l is to Say t h a t t h e r e is

a p ropens i ty o r tendency i n human nature t o reverse t h e o rder

incen t ives . ''

'' R , 31-32. W e can begin to sense a problem with Kant's doctrine of radical e v i l . Namely, it is d i f f i c u l t to determine i f Kant is s u g g e s t i n g that there is t h i s radical e v i l i n humans, or that t h e r e is o n l y a propensity to this r a d i c a l e v i l . I n other w o r d s , does an expression of r a d i c a l e v i l occur a f t e r we have actual ly chosen o u r sensuous nature over our moral nature? O r , is r a d i c a l ev i l expressed

It is important to understand how Kant deve lops h i s

doctrine of radical ev i l because h i s answer to the question

of whether human nature is o r i g i n a l l y good o r e v i l is

fundamental to his whole theory of r e l i g i o n . That i s , on

Kant's account, r e l i g i o n is poss ib l e only i f it is the case

that human nature contains w i t h i n it a predispos i t ion toward

good purpose together with an i r r e s i s t i b l e tendency towards

e v i l which must constantly be combated. T h i s tension between

when, i n a n a t t e m p t t o d o t h e r i g h t t h i n g , w e are weak and h a v e a tendency t o s i d e w i t h o u r sensuous na tu re? Although Kant does e x p l i c i t l y sugges t t h a t a n act t b a t is good i n appearance , y e t n o t a r e s u l t of o u r moral d i s p o s i t i o n , canno t qualify a s a morally good act (R, 32), s u r e l y , Kant c a n n o t be s a y i n g t h a t such a n act i s r a d i c a l l y evil. That is , it seems d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend t h a t Kant cou ld be s u g g e s t i n g t h a t one who a t t e m p t s t o d o a good a c t i o n and s u c c e e d s , b u t d o e s s o o u t o f some sensuous i n c l i n a t i o n or tendency , is r a d i c a l l y e v i l o r is engaged i n a r a d i c a l l y evi l act. It may be t h a t t h e a c t i o n c a n n o t q u a l i f y as a t r u l y moral a c t i o n , o n K a n t ' s tenns, b u t does t h e a c t i o n e x p r e s s a r a d i c a l e v i l ? O r , i s t h i s r a d i c a l e v i l e x p r e s s e d o n l y i n t h e s e n s u o u s i n c l i n a t i o n whereby t h e act i t s e l f is no t deenied r a d i c a l l y e v i l , and t h e one who performs t h e a c t i o n is n o t deemed r a d i c a l l y e v i l in general, b u t o n l y wrong ly i n c l i n e d o n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n ? Kant d o e s n o t a d d r e s s s u c h q u e s t i o n s i n Religion. Nor d o e s K a n t e v e r a d d r e s s t h e r e a s o n why w e c h o o s e t o a d o p t a n evil d i s p o s i t i o n over a moral o n e , when, i n h i s own words , w e are o r i g i n a l l y and n a t u r a l l y p r e d i s p o s e d toward goodness w h i l e we o n l y p o s s e s s a t e n d e n c y or i n n a t e p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d s e v i l . It may be t h a t Kant a v o i d s s u c h a q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e e x p l a i n i n g why we f r e e l y c h o o s e a n evil d i s p o s i t i o n "would i n v a r i a b l y e n t a i 1 e x p l a i n i n g a n a c t o f f reedom - which w o u l d b e t o show w h a t ' causesr an a c t of fxeedomm (Michalson, Jr., 262). Moreover, a s w e w i l l see, i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h e n e e d f o r e m p i r i c a l r e l i g i o n o r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h , Kant mus t p resuppose t h e e x i s t e n c e of r a d i c a l e v i l . P r a c t i c a l r e l i g i o n c a n o n l y be j u s t i f i e d i f it can be shown t o h e l p combat t h e e v i l i n h e r e n t i n humans who would o t h e r w i s e be on a path t o moral goodness, W e do n o t see t h e emphasis on this not ion of e v i l i n a n y of K a n t ' s p r e v i o u s e t h i c a l works. O n l y i n R e l i g i o n , w h e r e h e a t t e m p t s t o a c c o u n t f o r r n o r a l i t y and t h e c h u r c h , does h e n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e a d o c t r i n e of r a d i c a l e v i l . S e e A l a n Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, (Corne11 U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970), 209-231 and Michel Despland, Kant On History and R e l i g i o n , (McGill-Queen's U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973) 169-172, wherein Despland q u o t e s a letter from Goethe t o Herder i n which Goethe writes t h a t : "Kant has ignominiously d i r t i e d [ h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l mantle] wi th t h e shameful s p o t of r a d i c a l e v i l . "

good and evil in human nature is what makes religion

possible. Without this tension, religion would not be

necessary; indeed, without this tension, religion would not

exist. Without evil, we could easily fulfill the moral law to

become well-pleasing to God simply by always relying on our

moral incentive to determine our will. " Without evil we

would have no problem aîways doing the morally good thing.

But this kind of easy morality is insufficient to make

us pleasing to God. That is, w e cannot be judged to be

morally good if our ability to do good is never challenged.

Moral goodness can corne only as a result of obeying Our duty

to the moral law which, through our own disposition and

freedom, we impose upon ourselves. Obedience and duty to any

law exists only if there is a possibility to act contrary to

the demands of the law. In this sense, duty to the moral law

exists precisely because there is an evil incentive which

opposes and challenges Our duty. ~ h i s evil is necessary to

us. If our will can only be determined in one way, by only

one (good) incentive, then we are acting in the only way we

can. We are not acting out of duty or because we ought to

act in some way or other in o r d e r t~ obey the law. Being

well-pleasing to God requises that we act as we ought to in

every effort to obey the moral law."

Moral perfection is achieved only when we become well-

pleasing to God. However, because we are al1 necessarily

l4 Stephen Palmquist, "Does Kant Reduce Rel ig ion to Morality?" in Kant-Studien, 83, 1992, 141.

c o r r u p t e d by radical ev i l ( s o that w e can be d u t i f u l ) , w e

camot r e a l i z e the goal of pleasing God through mere moral i ty

a l o n e . To r e a l i z e this goal w e must d e t e r m i n e what , in

a d d i t i o n t o m o r a l i t y , is requi red so that w e can combat our

tendency toward e v i l i n order t o become morally good enough

to please God/

Book Two: How C a n Good Combat Evi l?

I n Book Two, Kant is concerned wi th t h e question of how

good can combat evil. More specifically, he is interested i n

how one who has been cor rup ted by ev i l so as to p o s s e s s an

"evi l heartw can undergo a change so t h a t o n e f s h e a r t can

become good." One who has a good heart can t h e n go on t o

achieve moral p e r f e c t i o n . But because w e possess a radical

e v i l , a "change of hear t f r cannot corne about simply by obeying

t h e moral law and a c t i n g i n a good way. Kant says:

For d e s p i t e the fa11 [ L e . , t h e necessary existence of e v i l i n our h e a r t s ] , t h e i n j u n c t i o n that w e ought to become b e t t e s men resounds u n a b a t e d l y i n o u r s o u l s ; hence t h i s must be within ou r power, even though what we are a b l e t o do is i n i tself i n a d e q u a t e and though w e thereby only render ourselves s u s c e p t i b l e of higher, and for us i n sc ru tab le , assistance. '"

What Kant is saying is that despite t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e

ought wi th in us, and, r ega rd le s s of what w e do, h o w good w e

act, o r how s t r i c t l y w e obey t h e moral l a w , w e can never , on

o u r own, f u l f i l l t h e moral l a w t o become good enough t o

p l e a s e God i n every one of ous actions: "[Wlhat we are able

t o do is i n itself h a d e q u a t e . " However, Kant is n o t h e r e

s u g g e s t i n g that m o r a l i t y is a l o s t cause. Kant is s a y i n g

t h a t even though w e cannot , by ou r se lves , b r ing about o u r own

moral revo lu t ion , by a c t i n g moral ly and obeying t h e moral l a w

w e "rendes ourselves susceptible of higheî ... a s s i ~ t a n c e , ~

Granted, such assistance is ' 5nscrutab leW t o our reason;

t h a t is , w e c anno t conceive of how t h i s a s s i s t a n c e cornes t o

u s nor can w e a d o p t this a s s i s t a n c e i n t o o u r maxims e i t h e r

for t h e o r e t i c a l o r f o r p r a c t i c a l use ; lg yet w e must r e a l i z e

t h a t t h i s a s s i s t a n c e is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of reforming an

e v i l h e a r t i n t o a h e a r t t h a t is good and p l e a s i n g t o God.

Thus, what becomes c r u c i a l t o a c h i e v i n g moral goodness is

t h a t one "must be able t o h o p t h r o u g h his own e f f o r t s t o

r e a c h t h e road which l e a d s t h i t h e r . . . b e c a u s e he o u g h t t o

become a good man.

We must remain d u t i f u l t o t h e ought with in u s and "hopen

t h a t through t h e s e e f f o r t s w e w i l l a r r i v e a t t h a t p o i n t where

w e render o u r s e l v e s s u s c e p t i b l e o f h i g h e r a s s i s t a n c e , o r ,

more s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h a t w e make o u r s e l v e s worthy of God's

"grace." W e mus t a lways keep o u r s e l v e s d i s p o s e d t o m o r a l

a c t i o n i n an ongoing at tempt t o ward o f f e v i l tendencies.

H e r e w e have two impor tant n o t i o n s i n Kant 's r e l i g i o u s

system: g r a c e and hope. Kant c l e a r l y sugges t s t h e n o t i o n of

"grace" as a necessary addition to our good works:

Here, then, is that surplus ... over and above the profit from good works, and it is itself a profit which is reckoned to us by grace. That what in Our earthly life...is ever only a becgning (namely, becoming a man well-pleasing to G o d ) should be credited to us exactly as if w e w e r e already in full possession of it - to this we have no legal claim....thus the decree is always one of grace alone. 2L

Thus, in osder for one to undergo a conversion of heart

from e v i l to good, one must regard oneself as good in the

eyes of God yet not fully good in one's own eyes. That is,

one must do good in the belief that one will experience grace

and thereby conversion. It is this belief that is tantamount

to religious belief and religious salvation:

Good works are necessary from the moral perspective of practical reason; and grace is necessary from the non- moral perspective of theoretical reason. Kant's view is that, if salvation is going to happen, both of these requirements must be rnetez2

Here we have what amounts to Kant's notion of practical

faith. Because God's grace is inscrutable to us, we can

neither know when this grace is manifested to us or if we

have received and accepted this grace. Al1 we have access to

is our own moral duty and our own good works. Thus, we must

do our best, practically speaking, and trust or have faith

that God will lend his grace. We must never fool ourselves

into believing that following our moral duty and the moral

law is enough, on its own, to bring about salvation; we can

never make ourselves worthy to be accepted by God. Rather,

R, 70.

" Palmquist, 142,

we must adopt a p r a c t i c a l f a i t h and t ry to live a good life

so that we can make ourselves worthy to be made acceptable by

God." It is by doing good works t h a t we can rationally

conceive of ourselves as having received G o d f s grace even

though we will never know for certain when and i f t h i s grace

has been rendered upon us. Through practical faith, we

exhibit a hope in Goci's grace. 2 4

Hope

I t can be said that in Religion Kant is attempting to

answer t h e third question which he b e l i e v e s characterizes t h e

ta sk of t h e philosopher, namely, the question of "What may 1

hop? " 2 5 In order to grasp h m morality works within us, t h a t

is, in order to understand Our moral ambitions, intentions

" Pa lmqui s t , 1 4 3 .

" Kant's n o t i o n of divine grace is a l s o somewhat prob lemat i c . Kant States t h a t because radical e v i l i s " i n e x t i r p a b l e by human powersm ( R , 32), w e r e q u i r e d i v i n e a s s i s t a n c e . However, with this necessary a p p e a l t o d i v i n e a i d , Kant seems t o be r e p u d i a t i n g h i s r e q u i r e m e n t for human autonomy and freedom. S e e Davidov ich , 4 and Wood, 209 , 232-248, A l s o , see M i c h a l s o n , Jr. , 264-266 . M i c h a l s o n s u g g e s t s t h a t Kant's a p p e a l to d i v i n e aid does n o t "weaken o u r own moral r e so lve" or t h r e a t e n Our freedom and autonomy b e c a u s e Kan t b a l a n c e s his c l a i m t h a t w e are m o r a l l y l imited w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t : "we must s t r i v e t o do a l1 t h i s is i n our power t o r e g e n e r a t e o u r s e l v e s , even though that by itself is not enough - i t s n o t b e i n g enough does not r e l i e v e u s of t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make t h e effort [and t o use o u r freedom and autonomy as far as t h e y can t a k e u s ] . W e might Say t h a t , for Kant, w e 'merit' Godrs g r a c e when w e d o o u r i m p e r f e c t best."

'' P a l m q u i s t , 135. Palmquist n o t e s t h a t Kant poses t h e first two q u e s t i o n s of "What c a n 1 know?" and "What ought 1 t o do?" t o g e t h e r with t h i s third question of "What may 1 h o p e ? " i n t h e Critique of Pure Reason, B 832-833.

and actions, Kant is suggesting that we must t u r n to t h e

notion of hope. What commits us to moral action is seeking

an answer to the question of "What may 1 hope?" W e are

compelled t o act morally precisely because the answer to t h e

question is t h a t we may h o p for Godts grace.

However, Kant never says explicitly that we are supposed

to hope for Godfs grace. He only says that we are to hope

that through our own efforts we can make ourselves worthy to

receive grace. Kant i n s i s t s that we must transform Our own

"cast of mindm and "grounding of charactertr to become as good

as we cari? Indeed:

[Mlan flatters himself by believing either that God can make him eternally happy without h i s having to become a better man, or else, if this seems to him impossible, that G o à can certainly make him a better man without his having t o do anything more than to ask for it."

W e have seen already Kant's insistence t h a t we obey our

moral duty and t rus t in Godfs grace. However, because Kant is

not clear about exactly what we may hope for, the question

arises as to whether we are supposed to hope for our own

worldly transformation or whether w e are supposed to hope for

grace, In other words, do we hope t h a t we can transform

ourselves through our own moral duty so that we may become

good enough to receive grace? Or, do we strive to obey our

moral duty and then hope for God's grace? These questions

may not seem so distinct, however, they are important because

within them lies the relationship between religion and

moralitv. or more sr>ecifically, t h e relationship between what

'6 R, 47.

Kant c a l l s true moral religion, or the pure r e l i g i o n of

reason and practical religion, or histoxical, ecclesiastical

faith or Scripture.

To clarify, if our hope lies in transforming ourselves

through the practices or actions of ecclesiastical faith in

order to become good, we may conceni ourselves with practical

religion. W e may follow s o m e ecclesiastical faith or other

believing that in doing so we are making ourselves go&. The

problem here i s n o t that we place our hope in these

practices, but rather that we may b e g i n to place more

importance on the practices themselves rather than on what

t h e s e practices are supposed to help us achieve. Hope i n our

own transformation might be necessary so long as w e remernber

that our duty i s to morality and not to the practices

themselves ,

If Our hope lies in God's grace then regardless of the

h i s t o r i c a l Scripture we may follow, w e are always looking

beyond the practices to achieve some kind of truly moral

state. That is, we do n o t c o n s i d e r that t h e practices i n

thernselves make us good; rather, the practices serve only to

keep us well directed so that we become well-pleasing to God.

True moral goodness and true moral perfection is achieved

only when God judges us to be good enough so that He lends

his grace.

It seems that Kant is suggesting that we can hope both

for our own transformation and for grace. However, so long

as we hope fo r grace it seems that we keep our goal of moral

perfection clear i n mind and thus remain within reasonfs

limits. In hoping for transformation we must be cautious not

to step out of reason's limits and we must constantly remind

ourselves of our moral goal. In other words, Kant is not

saying that religious practices or ecclesiastical faiths have

no place in achieving moral perfection. In fact, he is

saying j u s t the opposite. Following religious practices and

Scripture can help us to attain our goal of moral perfection

so long as w e real ize that underlying these practices is

morality itself. That is, if we engage in the practices only

for the sake of the practices themselves, w e are not acting

morally and we are not acting rationally. For Kant, one acts

rationally only when one is acting morally. And to act

morally, we must obey the duty of the moral law within us for

duty 's sake; to act morally is to adopt the moral law as our

only incentive in the determining of our will. Following

religious practices out of duty not to the practices

themselves, but out of duty to our moral law, brings not only

the historical or practical religion within the limits of our

reason, but also, such duty is essential to achieving the

pure religion of reason.

It might be s a i d that Kant leaves the answer to the

question of hope open because he does n o t want to rule out

practical religion as a legitirnate means to achieving moral

perfection. If he were t o l i m i t hope to grace, he would

eliminate the possibility that religious practices can help

us remain morally disposed. And of course, if he were to

limit hope to worldly transformation, his whole notion of

grace, and thereby his whole religious system would collapse.

Kant's task is to bring religion within the limits of reason,

and he can do this so long as duty to the moral law remains

at t h e foundation of every moral and/or religious act or

practice.

Tt is at this point that we can begin to see h o w Kant

rnakes practical, ernpirical religion a part of morality and

the pure religion of reason. However, Kant rnakes another

step before explicitly stating that moral religion and

ecclesiastical f a i t h are compatible and at one with each

other.

Book Three: The E t h i c a l Commonwealth

In Book Three, Kant shifts his concern from the

religious salvation of the individual believer to the moral

community or what he calls the "ethical commonwealth." It is

in his notion of the e t h i c a l commonwealth that w e can really

begin to understand the role that practical religion or

Scripture plays in attaining moral perfection or in Ythe

founding of a Kingdom of G o d on earth.r-2B

Kant recognizes that maintaining a moral disposition is

difficult because we live in close proximity to others and,

as a result, we tend to have a corrupting influence on each

other due to the radical evil which we al1 possess."

However, because those of us who are trying to live good

l i v e s have a cornmitment t o m o r a l a c t i o n , w e m u s t j o i n

t o g e t h e r a n d u n i t e as i n d i v i d u a l s a i m e d towards m o r a l

p e r f e c t i o n t o f o m a whole system or s o c i e t y of well-disposed

persons. I n f a c t , Kant States t h a t w e have a d u t y towards t h e

human race and a s o c i a l goa l t o promote moral p e r f e c t i o n as a

s o c i a l g ~ o d . ' ~ W e must v i e w o u r s e l v e s as a " p e o p l e of G o d f f

who u n i t e under what Kant ca l l s a " v i s i b l e " c h ~ r c h . ~ ' T h e

v i s i b l e church can be thought of as a n ecclesiastical f a i t h

wherein Scr ip tu re serves "as a group of n a r r a t i v e s t h a t o f f e r

a temporal mode1 o r symbol of a r a t i o n a l (hence a t empora l )

s t ructure"" a n d , thereby, reveals a n i n t r i n s i c m o r a l

foundation.

T o exp la in , a visible church i s one i n which S c r i p t u r e

i s i n t e r p r e t e d and read so as t o r e v e a l i t s u n d e r l y i n g moral

s t r u c t u r e . S c r i p t u r e i n t e r p r e t e d as such keeps it w i t h i n

r ea son ' s l i m i t s and Kant demands t h a t any S c r i p t u r a l t e x t of

a visible church ought t o be read i n t h i s way: " t h i s [ sac red]

n a r r a t i v e must a t al1 t i m e s be t a u g h t and expounded i n t h e

i n t e i e s t s of mora l i ty . "" For Kant, m o r a l i t y s h o u l d never be

e x p o u n d e d according t o a S c r i p t u r a l t e x t ; r a t h e r , a

S c r i p t u r a l t e x t , i f it is w i t h i n t h e limits of reason, can be

expounded, and, indeed, ought t o be expounded acco rd ing t o

t h e m o r a l i t y w h i c h is i n t r i n s i c t o it. I n t h i s way, t h e

people who u n i t e t o g e t h e r under t h e v i s i b l e c h u r c h always

'O R f 89,

'' R, 88-93.

'' O'Neill, 1997, 294 .

'' R, 123.

work under the assumption that a higher, more divine wisdom

than their own is at the root of the moral legislation which

they prescribe to themselves. The members of this church

m u s t believe that G o d is g u i d i n g them to unite and work

together:

We ... require the presupposition of another idea, namely, that of a h i g h e r moral B e i n g through w h o s e universal dispensation the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in tbemselves, are u n i t e d for a common end "

Thus, what lays under the elements of visible church

life and Scripture are the abstract demands of purely moral

religion or what Kant cal1 the "church in~isible."'~ T h e s e

demands stipulate that w e cannot s imply sit back and wait to

realize our hope of G o d r s g r a c e . Rather, hope in our own

transformation commits us to moral action. Therefore, even

though w e work under the assumption of G o d r s guidance, we

must act as though everything depended upon us:

To found a moral people of G o d is therefore a task whose consummation can be l o o k e d for not from men but only from God Himself. Yet man...must proceed as though everything depended upon him ....[ A] true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) Kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by men .... Only on this condition dare he hope that higher wisdom will grant the completion of h i s well-intentioned endeavors . ' " In this respect, the visible church can be thought of as

a "vehicle" to the pure religion of reason. That is, w e must

u n i t e i n t h e e m p i r i c a l d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d , h i s t o r i c a l

s t a t u t e s and ecclesiastical faiths of t h e v i s i b l e church i n

order t o direct o u r s e l v e s towards an evermore f u l l y reasoned

f a i t h and u l t i m a t e l y towards the p u r e r e l i g i o n of reason."

Aowever, though members of t h e e t h i c a l commonwealth are us ing

t h e v i s i b l e c h u r c h as a v e h i c l e t o t h e pure r e l i g i o n of

reason, they are n o t to act as though their church is merely

a v e h i c l e : they must act as though e v e r y t h i n g depends on

them. P u t another way, members must hope f o r Godrs grace but

must assume that t h e y are on their own i n a c h i e v i n g t h e

h ighes t moral good. In t h i s way, members w i l l always do t h e i r

very best t o act morally-

A s m e m b e r s move closer and closer t o achieving t h i s

g o o d , t h e e l e m e n t s of the v i s i b l e c h u r c h o r t h e i r

ecclesiastical faith become more and m o r e d ispensable u n t i l ,

at last, it i s s u p e r s e d e d by t h e p u r e r e l i g i o n of r e a s o n

which w i l l rule over them, "so t h a t God may be i n alLrf"

Reason and Scr ip ture United

W e can now understand w h a t Kant means when h e States

that reason and S c r i p t u r e are not on ly compatible but at one

with each other, t h a t he who f o l l o w s one ( u n d e r the

guidance of moral concep t s ) w i l l n o t f a i l to conform t o the

~ther."'~ Practical ecclesiastical faith serves as a means to

keeping us morally disposed as well as a rneans to combating

evil. To achieve moral perfection, w e must hope for our own

moral transformation and for Godrs grace. To undergo a moral

transformation we must remain dutiful to the moral law. What

aids in maintaining this duty to the moral law is engaging in

practices and rituals that remind us of this duty in so far

as morality underlies them. We engage in the practices out

of duty to the moral law. Moreover, achieving moral

perfection requires that we join together with other morally

disposed individuals under a visible church in an effort to

combat evil and promote moral goodness. By uniting under a

visible church we put ourselves in a position whereby we can

hope to receive G o d r s grace and achieve not only moral

perfection, but the pure religion of reason. In this way,

ecclesiastical faith and reason are not only compatible but

at one with e a c h other in so far as following an

ecclesiastical faith that has an underlying morality keeps us

dutiful t o the moral l a w and thereby serves as a vehicle to

the pure religion of reason.

So long as reason guides us, we are compelled to act

morally. However, obeying Our duty to the moral law so that

we remain morally well-disposed requires that w e constantly

combat evil. To combat this evil we must join forces with

other well-intentioned individuals to form a commonwealth

whose practices, by means of their intrinsic morality,

enhance and encourage moral behavior and keep us directed

towards moral perfection. So long as w e follar practices and

Scriptuses that are guided by moral concepts, we remain

morally disposed and bound to the moral l a w w i t h i n us. In

t h i s w a y , the ecclesiastical f a i t h or visible church under

which members of t h e commonwealth are united f a l l s w i t h i n

reason's limits.

CKAPTER THREE

TEE NECESSARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN REASON AND SCRIPTURE

W e have seen i n t h e previous c h a p t e r t h a t Kant c l e a r l y

u n i t e s moral o r reasoned religion and ecclesiastical f a i t h or

S c r i p t u r e t o make them no t o n l y c o m p a t i b l e but a t one w i t h

e a c h o t h e r , However, Kant makes two clairns t h a t seem t o

suggest a clear d i s t i n c t i o n between r ea son and Scr ip ture .

F i r s t , Kant says t h a t the pure r e l i g i o n of r ea son w i l l

e v e n t u a l l y "rule over ail" and f r e e i t s e l f from " t h e agency

of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h W w h i c h "becornes b i t by bit

d i spensab le rg8 so t h a t w e w i l l a c h i e v e t h e Kingdom of G o d on

earth . ' I n o t h e r words, Kant is saying t h a t t h e pure r e l i g i o n

o f r ea son w i l l , i n t h e e n d , supersede or take the place of

ecclesiastical f a i t h , thereby r e n d e r i n g ecclesiastical f a i t h

nonexis ten t a t some po in t . However, one t h i n g can on ly t a k e

t h e p l a c e of o r r e p l a c e ano ther t h i n g i f t h e two t h i n g s are

i n some s e n s e d i s t i n c t from e a c h other. It seems h a r d t o

imagine how t w o t h i n g s that are united so t h a t t h e y are a t

one with e a c h o t h e r can a t t h e s a m e tirne u n d e r g o a

supersess ion so that one p a r t of t h e union takes t h e p l a c e of

R I 112-

t h e o t h e r p a r t . I f t h i s is what happens, t h e n it seems t h e

t w o t h i n g s canno t be i n union o r at one w i t h each other, for

u n i t y means the coming together of two t h ings . Unity does n o t

mean t h e rep lacement o r consumption and demise o f one t h i n g

by a n o t h e r t h i n g . Thus w e must examine e x a c t l y what Kant

means when he suggests t h a t t h e pure r e l i g i o n of reason and

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith are at one with e a c h other y e t the

former w i l l eventually supersede the latter.

Second, Kant is adamant i n Book Four that w e not make

t h e mi s t ake of reversing t h e priority of the m o r a l i t y t h a t

u n d e r l i e s t r u e r e l i g i o n over t h e mere ly p r a c t i c a l aspects of

ecclesiastical f a i t h t h a t although a means t o moral r e l i g i o n ,

are not themselves a c o n d i t i o n for a c c e p t a n c e by God. Tha t

i s , w e must be clear that t h e r e is a d i s t i n c t i o n be tween

Valse religion" and "true r e l i g i o n . " Kant does n o t want u s

t o c o n f u s e moral r e l i g i o n w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f

eccles ias t ical f a i t h . Moreover , w e are n e v e r t o confuse

w h i c h of these must h o l d our p r i o r i t y . Thus, it does n o t

seem t h a t t h e u n i o n and c o r n p a t i b i l i t y o f mora l reason and

S c r i p t u s e guarantees that "he who follows one. ..will no t fail

t o conform t o t h e o t h e r . " Kant says t h a t f o l l o w i n g a good

course of l i f e by obeying t h e moral l a w is alone pleasing to

GodeZ Moreover, Kant demands that a d i s t i n c t i o n be m a d e

between moral religion and ecclesiastical f a i t h so that when

w e u n i t e t h e m , w e do so i n t h e p r o p e r o r d e r : " S o much

depends , when w e wish t o unite t w o good things, upon t h e

order i n which they are u n i t e d ! True enlightenment l ies i n

R, 167.

this very d i s t i n c t i o n . .."' Again, it seems w e need t o clasify

what Kant is d o i n g w h e n he c l a i m s t h a t moral religion and

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h are a t one with each other and, at t h e

same t h e , demands t h a t they remain d i s t i n c t from each other.

To unders tand why and how Kant makes t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n

between moral religion and eccles ias t ica l f a i t h 1 w i l l

examine t h e d i f fe rence between what Kant calls false r e l i g i o n

and true r e l i g i o n - As well, 1 w i l l c l a r i f y t h e difference

between theology, moral i ty and r e l i g i o n so as t o shed even

more l i g h t on Kant's distinction. '

False and True Relicrion

Kant c o n s i d e r s false religion t o be the m i s t a k e n

assumption t h a t p r a c t i c e s of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h are i n

themselves p l e a s i n g t o God. To c l a r i f y , Kant recognizes t h a t

these practices have their place i n k e e p i n g u s morally

disposed. However, these p r a c t i c e s are only unon-moralw

a s p e c t s of r e l i g i o n ; t h a t i s , they are a c t i v i t i e s o r

practices i n our empirical religion whkh can be related to a

R, 167 , emphasis added.

Palmquist , 134-139. Palmquist examines t h i s d i f f e r e n c e between theology, m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n t o de fend h i s t h e s i s t h a t Kant i s n o t r e d u c i n g r e l i g i o n t o morality i n a p u r e l y " e l i m i n a t i v e m way. To unders tand Palmquistrs d i s t i n c t i o n between what he c a l l s " e l h i n a t i v e r e d u c t i o n i s m " v e r s u s " e x p l a n a t o r y r e d u c t i o n i s m " see p . 129-131 . Although 1 w i l l be f o l l o w i n g his argument f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between theology, mora l i t y and r e l i g i o n , I am doing s o i n t h e con t ex t of my own argument that Kant is making a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between moral r e l i g i o n and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h .

moral end, b u t are n o t i n themselves mora l ly good o r bad.'

Engaging i n t h e s e p r a c t i c e s because w e believe t h a t these

p r a c t i c e s themse lves are p l e a s i n g t o G o d does n o t result i n

moral goodness. Because these p r a c t i c e s alone have no m o r a l

worth, we can never achieve moral goodnesç sa long as w e view

them as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . V iewing p r a c t i c e s i n t h i s way

amounts t o f a l s e r e l i g i o n o r w h a t Kant c a l l s " r e l i g i o u s

i l l ~ s i o n . " ~ T h e s e p r a c t i c e s o n l y h a v e a p r o p e r place i n

keeping u s m o r a l l y d i sposed and on ly take on a moral v a l u e

when w e keep them a t t ached t o rnorality by viewing them o n l y

as a means t o a moral end. Non-moral religious a c t i v i t i e s

are morally l e g i t i m a t e and part of t r u e r e l i g i o n on ly i f t h e y

serve a s a means f o r keeping us morally disposed. And, t h e y

can only serve as a means f o r keeping us morally d i sposed i f

w e engage i n them n o t for t h e i r own sake, which detaches them

from mora l i t y , b u t because we keep them a t tached to m o r a l i t y

by r e c o g n i z i n g them as a rneans by which w e can upho ld Our

duty t o t h e m o r a l l a w and become pleas ing t o God.

T r u e r e l i g i o n i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of o u r p u r e m o r a l

judgment and reason. That is, i n t r u e r e l i g i o n w e are a w a r e

t h a t e c c l e s i a s t i c a l p r a c t i c e s o r non-moral a s p e c t s o f

empi r i ca l r e l i g i o n are themselves a r b i t r a r y and c o n t i n g e n t .

None of t h e s e p r a c t i c e s are essential t o t h e service of God

genera l ly or u n i v e r s a l l y because such p r a c t i c e s a r e done on ly

f o r t h e s a k e of one chusch which deems them d i v i n e and are

t h e r e f o r e restricted t o one p e o p l e . Thus, true r e l i g i o n

' Palmquist, 145; R, 157-158.

R, 158.

compr i ses t h o s e l a w s a n d practical p r i n c i p l e s which a r e

uncondi t ioned and which have been r e v e a l e d to us t h rough

reason to be intrinsically pleasing to God. Such laws and

p r i n c i p l e s are u n i v e r s a l i n s o far as t h e y m a n i f e s t t h e

service t h a t God, Himself demands.' In o t h e r words, i n t r u e

r e l i g i o n , w e maintain o u r obedience t o the moral l a w wi th in

us. True r e l i g i o n r e c o g n i z e s m o r a l i t y as i t s p r i m a r y

f o u n d a t i o n , W e must be aware t h a t this is o u r duty. B y

upholding this duty w e f u l f i l l a moral service which is f i r s t

and foremost f r e e and thereby t h e service t h a t God demands.'

Moreover, by obaying t h e m o r a l law, w e remain clear that o u r

endeavors towards t r u e r e l i g i o n always take p r i o r i t y over

merely re l ig ious pract i ces :

Hence whoever ass igns p r i o r i t y to obedience to s t a t u t o r y laws, [ s t i l l ] r equ i r ing a revelat ion, as being necessary to r e l i g i o n , and regard this obedience n o t merely a s a means t o t h e mora l d i s p o s i t i o n b u t as t h e o b j e c t i v e condi t ion of becoming immediately well-pleasing t o God, and whoever thus places endeavor toward a good course of l i f e below this h i s t o r i c a l f a i t h ( i n s t e a d of r e q u i r i n g t h e l a t t e r , which can be w e l l - p l e a s i n g t o G o d o n l y conditionally, t o adapt i t s e l f t o t h e former, which a lone is intrinsically w e l l pleasing t o Him) - whoever does t h i s t r a n s f o r m s t h e s e r v i c e of God i n t o a mere fetishism and p r a c t i c e s a p s e u d o - s e r v i c e w h i c h is subversive t o al1 endeavors toward true religion.'

The point that Kant is t r y i n g t o make here is t h a t f a l s e

r e l i g i o n and true r e l i g i o n have t o be viewed as s e p a r a t e and

d i s t i n c t because w i t h o u t t h i s d i v i s i o n w e run t h e r i s k of

b u i l d i n g our "visible" churches or var ious r e l i g i o n s on t h e

foundation of, what are essentially, non-moral activities.

That is, we run the risk of making some arbitrary, non-moral

activity the basis of morality - we make the mistake of believing that our morality is ensured by simply engaging in

the religious activities. This is not to Say that religious

practices do not serve some purpose in morality; but, Kant

wants to be sure that morality is the first basis. He wants

to be sure that morality comprises the foundation of

religion, so that any religious activity that we engage in

will always have morality as its motivation. Thus, religious

activities are never done for their own sake, but, rather,

for the sake of the moral law that underlies them. In this

way, we will not lose sight of Our ultimate endeavor toward

true religion which is universal in so far as it is guided by

morality, by reason, and by God. This is what Kant means

when he says that we must be careful to keep the non-moral

practices and the practical moral principles of empirical

religion in their proper order.

Theoloav, - Moralitv, and Reliaion

To make the distinction between false and true religion

even clearer, 1 move now to the difference between theology,

morality, and religion. In order to understand the

difference, I will return to the Preface of the First Edition

of Religion to examine Kant's assertion that:

[Mlorality ... stands in need neither of t h e i d e a of another Seing over [man], for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an i n c e n t i v e other than the [moral] law itself. ... Hence for its own sake morality does not need religion at all. ..it is self sufficient....But although for its own sake morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to such an end, taken not as the ground, but as the inevitable consequence of maxims adopted as conformable to that end .... Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself t o t h e idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same t h e can and ought to be man's final end."

In this assertion we can begin to see the structure of

Kant's whole religious system. Kant is suggesting that even

though morality is self-sufficient in so far as religion is

not needed to explain it, morality is nevertheless related to

religion to the extent that its final end or ultimate purpose

cannot be realized if morality is l i m i t e d to itself: we

cannot realize the goal of moral perfection through mere

morality alone. Thus, Kant is here making a distinction

between the ground of morality and the consequence or end of

morality. Indeed, the ground of morality is self-sufficient

because al1 this requires is our own, human practical reason:

reason is at work when we obey Our duty to the moral law

within us. However, with respect to the consequence of

morality, we have already seen that, "what we are able to do

is in itself inadequate. "" Rather, we must look beyond mere

morality to that "higher assistance" o r "powerful moral

Lawgiver" which can complete the goal of making us morally

'O R, 3-6.

" R, 40; Palmquist, 134.

perf ect . Because this "higher assistance" is inscrutable to

us or lies beyond our practical reason (though it is not

outside of (pure) reason), we must hope to discover something

other than mere morality and higher assistance which can

bridge the gap between the practical and the theoretical.

For Kant, this "something other" is religion in so far as

through religion, morality extends beyond itself to the idea

of God." In this way, "morality leads ineluctably to

religion."

To, clarify, Kant is saying that rnorality is "the final

end (of creation) or "man's final end-" In this sense,

morality serves the interests of humanity in so far as it

provides humankind with its purpose. However, for morality

to best serve humankind, or, for our moral purpose to best be

fulfilled, we must view morality as something "outside of

mankindeM That is, the i dea of God must be conceived, not

only as a necessity, but as an actuality, if morality is to

fulf il1 its teleological purpose." The "idean of God is, for

Kant, conceived through religion; thus, the goal of morality

becomes a reality through religion, In other words, we can

only hope to achieve moral perfection and receive grace if we

can conceive of a B e i n g who guides us and shares our goal."

" Palmquist, 134-

l' Ibid., 135- E e r e we have Kant * s moral proof of the existence of God, For a discuss ion of Kant's r e j e c t i o n of t h e o n t o l o g i c a l , cosmological and teleological proofs, see Theodore M. Greene's essay, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religionw which is Part 1 of t h e Introduction t o Religion, p. x l i i - x l i i i .

It is important to realize that Kant is not suggesting

that religion is identical to, or a sub-category of morality.

Rather, Kant is saying that morality, as a self-sufficient,

practical ground, can only realize its purpose when the

knowledge of God (i-e., theology), serves as its theoretical,

inscrutable consequence. What brings ground (morality) and

consequence (theology) together is religion.

Kant's Definition of Religion: Revealed vs. Natural Religion

Although we can now begin to understand the distinction

between morality, theology, and religion, in order to really

be clear about the distinction, we will examine the

definition of religion that Kant gives in Religion. Kant

States :

Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of al1 duties as divine comands. That re l ig ion in which 1 must know in advance that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as rny duty, is t h e revealed religion (o r the one standing in need of a revelation); in contrast, that r e l i g i o n in which 1 must first know t h a t something is my duty before 1 can accept it as a divine injunction is the natural religion."

Here we can understand Kant to be saying that revealed

religion takes theology as its foundation: we must know

first that the command is divine or cornes from G o d before we

obey it as a duty. Revealed religion means that the idea of

G o d is in t erpre ted a n d p r e s e n t e d t h r o u g h Scriptural

narratives and practices which we regard as God's comands.

l5 R, 142-143.

W e f o l l o w the n a r r a t i v e s and practices because we view t h e m

as commands from God. Thus, our sense of duty o r m o r a l i t y

depends on r e l i g i o n or t h e idea of God as it is revealed.

Our m o r a l i t y depends on the narratives and p r a c t i c e s t o show

us t h a t God wants u s t o obey His duties. Revealed religion

c o n s t i t u t e s what w e m i g h t t h i n k of as common, everyday

re l ig ions or ecclesiastical f a i t h s which conform t o t h e i r own

Scriptural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , practices and rituals which t h e i r

members follow out of duty t o God.

Natural r e l i g i o n , i n c o n t r a s t , takes mora l i ty as its

foundat ion : w e must know first t h a t t h e command is a duty

b e f o r e w e can a c c e p t it a s a d i v i n e command. Natural

r e l i g i o n means that our sense of duty o r morality cornes frorn

our own moral l a w within us and depends on our reason. Thus,

ou r d u t i e s t o the moral law are regarded as commands from God

o n l y because they conform t o t h e moral l a w . I n t h i s case,

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith or r e v e l a t i o n is no t necessary t o know

what Our duties axe.

Kant dis t inguishes between revealed and n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n

t o rnake t h e fol lowing points. Although t h e essence of a l 1

religion is c o n s t i t u t e d by " the (subjective) performance of

al1 human duties as d i v i n e commands, "16 i i f we must know that

t h e s e commands a r e divine i n order to view them as our duty,

t h e r e s u l t is that w e r e l y on a r e l i g i o n which has theology

or r e v e l a t i o n as its s o l e basis. This means t h a t w e do n o t

r e l y on reason and t h e moral l a w to guide our morality; thus ,

the r e l i a i o n w e conform t o r u n s t h e r i s k of being o n l y a

l6 R, 100.

53

false religion. Moreover, the characteristic of this

religion is that it has to be Ulearned.wL7 That is, this

religion can only spread among people to the extent that i t s

elements can be taught or learned. In this sense, it may not

be objective or universal. And we know that for Kant, true

religion is universal in so far as morality or duty to the

moral law must serve as its foundation. If we rely only on

revealed religion ta inform us of our duties and moral

actions, we reject the need for reason. Thus, we end up

following revealed religion for purely dogrnatic reasons: we

do what we are told to do, not out of duty to our own reason

and interna1 law but out of obedience to some externally

imposed law. We express neither our freedom or autonomy, but

only our "tutelage."" Thus, no matter how good our actions

appear to be and regardless of h m many good acts we perform,

if our duty is only a result of knowing first that something

is a command £rom God through revelation, Our actions lack

reason and moral goodness, and thus can only be considered

expressions of radical evil and a "perversity of the heart."lg

Again, the essence of al1 religion is constituted by

u t h e (subjective) performance of al1 human duties as divine

commands." Now, if we must know t h a t something

t h e moral law) in order to view it as a divine

is a duty (to

command, the

l' T h i s is a reference to Kant's motta i n h i s essay "What is Enlightenment?" (first published in 1784) that we release ourselves from our " s e l f - i n c u r r e d tutelageff and "[hlave the courage to use [Our] own reason i lr

result is that we rely on a religion which has morality and

reason as its sole basis. This means that we rely on reason

and the moral law to guide our morality. The characteristic

of t h i s natural religion is that "everyone can be convinced

through his own season."" In this sense, natural religion

is universal in so far as it requires no teaching or learning

of revelation. It is accessible to any reasonable person.

However, as 1 have already said, natural rel igion means that

we need only know that something is a duty to the moral l a w

before w e can regard it as a command from God. But, the

question arises a s to how we are to conceive of God's

commands without the a c t u a l i t y or t h e reality of the i d e a of

God. That is , i f natural religion has morality as its sole

foundation, how do we corne to accept our duties as divine

commands if we do not allow that t h e idea of God is revealed?

When Kant says that morality can only extend itself to the

idea of God through religion, he means, through revealed

religion. Mere mosality does not, on its own, present us with

the idea of God. The idea of God is only made available to

us when it i s revealed through Scriptural narratives,

practices and rituals.

What Kant is trying to show is t h a t revealed religion

alone cannot lead to moral perfection. And, indeed, revealed

religion can run the risk of being simply a false religion.

Likewise, natural religion a l o n e cannot lead to mora l

perfection: we get stuck within the limits of morality. When

Kant says that the essence of religion is the recognition of

a l 1 d u t i e s as divine commands, he means that t h e p u r e

r e l i g i o n of reason is c o n s t i t u t e d by r e v e l a t i o n which rather

than being lea rned , has morality at i t s foundation so that it

can be u n i v e r s a l l y apprehended through reason. In this way,

w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t our d u t i e s t o t h e m o r a l law are t h e

commands of God. But p r i o r i t y must be given t o our duty t o

m o r a l i t y . That i s , morality must serve as t h e p r i m a r y

foundation t o which revelation is added. Only when moraiity

and revelation work i n this way can w e hope t o achieve moral

perfection o r t h e pure u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o n o f r e a s o n .

Moreover, on ly when morality and revelation work i n t h i s w a y

can revealed r e l i g i o n fa11 within the limits of roason and be

c o n s i d e r e d a t r u e (empirical) r e l i g i o n - So l o n g as a

revealed r e l i g i o n o r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith tas moral i ty as its

founda t ion , it can be considered a "visiblefr church whose

S c r i p t u r e , practices and r i t u a l s l e g i t i m a t e l y h e l p t o keep

i t s members m o r a l l y disposed and u n i t e d u n d e r God f o r a

common end.

The D i s t i n c t i o n Between Reason and S c r i ~ t u r e

W e c a n understand now why Kant makes a necessary

d i s t i n c t i o n between moral r e l i g i o n and ecclesiastical faith,

true religion and false r e l i g i o n , and, theology, moral i ty and

(reasoned) r e l i g i o n . E c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h will amount o n l y

t o a false r e l i g i o n i f it takes t h e o l o g y as its sole

f o u n d a t i o n . K a n t makes a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

ecclesiastical faith and moral, reasoned r e l i g i o n to show

that ecclesiastical faith does not simply guarantee a path to

moral goodness or moral perfection. If ecclesiastical faith

only amounts to a false religion, then regardless of how

strictly we may follow its commands, we will never undergo

the change of heart that is necessary for moral goodness and

acceptance by God. Ecclesiastical faith in this sense can

never be at one with reasoned religion because it lacks the

moral foundation that is necessary to transform it i n t o a

true religion. Therefore, revealed religion or Scripture that

takes only theology as its sole basis must be thought of as

distinct, not only from true religion, but from reasoned

religion as well-on this point, Kant is adamant. Moreover,

because the narratives and practices of revealed Scripture or

ecclesiastical faith are, on their own, dispensable and not

necessary in the pursuit of moral perfection, true religion

must free itself from "the agency of ecclesiastical faithW so

that the pure religion of reason can ''rule over all." The

pure religion of reason must take the place of or supersede

ecclesiastical faith if we are to achieve the Kingdom of G o d

on earth.

So it seems that what Kant leaves us with, at this

point, is that moral religion and ecclesiastical faith are

compatible and at one with each other, while at the same

time, separate and distinct from each other. Thus, it

appears that Kant lands himself in a contradiction. However,

in what is to corne, 1 will argue that this apparent

contradiction is unproblematic for Kant. As well, I will

show why this apparent contradiction is necessary for Kant if

he his to complete his task.

CHAPTER FOUR

REASON AND SCRIPTURE: UNITED AND DISTINCT

We have seen that Kant establishes reasoned rel igion and

ecclesiastical f a i t h as both united and d i s t i n c t . T o

understand how Kant c a n s u g g e s t t h e s e two seerningly

contradictory views, it is necessary to examine and emphasize

exactly what kind of union Kant has in mind when he suggests

t h a t reason and Scripture are u n i t e d . Based on how Kant

uni tes reason and Scripture, we will determine whether Kant's

system of religion i s successful in bringing religion within

the lirnits of reason a l o n e . That is to Say, we will

determine whether Kant is able to show how revealed religion

can conform to the conditions of t h e pure religion of reason

i n such a way t h a t bridges the gap between the prac t i ca l

world of ecclesiastical faith and the theoretical world of

the religion of reason.

What Kant Means bv Unity

Based on what 1 have presented up to n o w , 1 will

approach unity in two ways . First, 1 will examine the

particulas way i n which Kant views morality. It seems clear

to me t h a t his v i e w of morality dic ta tes exactly how or in

what way he attempts to unite reason and Scripture. That is

to Say, in order t a understand how Kant u n i t e s reason and

Scripture, we must be clear about how Kant views morality,

and, more importantly, where Kant places morality. Second, 1

will argue that when Kant suggests that reason and Scripture

can be united, he means this in somewhat loose or open sense.

That is, Kant is n o t suggesting that reason is s t r i c t l y

un i ted to one particular Scripture (namely, Christianity).

Rather, reason can be united with any Scripture that meets

the moral and rational requirements.

Unity Based on the Place of Morality

In Book One of ~ e l i q i o n or in the first stage of Kant's

religious system, we saw t h a t moral action depends on

properly ordering the incentives of our will: t h e incentive

of t h e moral law must be taken as the supreme condition of

obedience and subordinate the incentive of the l a w of self-

love. So long as we adopt the moral law into t h e universal

maxirn of our will as its sole incentive, the r e s u l t will be a

morally good act. Thus, to be morally good, w e must do our

best not t o reverse t h e order of i n c e n t i v e s . The moral law

must be our primary incent ive.

I n Book Two or the second stage of Kant ' s r e l i g i o u s

system, w e saw that i n o r d e r t o make o u r s e l v e s worthy t o

r e c e i v e G o d ' s g r a c e , w e must h o p e b o t h f o r o u r own

transformation o r c h a n g e of heart and for God's grace.

However, we must be careful that i n our attempt t o transform

ourselves , w e keep morality as our primary duty. W e must not

make t h e mistake of p l a c i n g t o o much i m p o r t a n c e on t h e

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l p r a c t i c e s that serve as aids i n o u r

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n so that w e forget what these p r a c t i c e s are

h e l p i n g u s to achieve. Again, w e see here a suggest ion of

p r i o r i t y o r proper order ing: moral i ty must remain our primary

duty over mere ecclesiastical prac t ices .

I n Book Three or t h e t h i r d stage, w e saw t h a t an e t h i c a l

commonwealth i s u n i t e d under a v i s i b l e church and guided by

God towards a common end. S c r i p t u r e plays a key r o l e i n t h e

visible church i n so f a r a s it i s i n t e r p r e t e d and read s o as

t o reveal i ts underlying moral structure. It i s this

i n t r i n s i c moral s t r u c t u r e of Sc r ip tu re t h a t helps t o keep t h e

members of the commonwealth w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d and mora l ly

d i s p o s e d . A n d , it i s o n l y when m o r a l i t y serves a s t h e

f o u n d a t i o n of t h e visible church that t h i s church can be

t h o u g h t o f as a v e h i c l e t o t h e p u r e r e l i g i o n of r e a s o n .

Again, Kant makes clear t h e p r i o r i t y of mora l i ty as the sole

foundation f o r visible church life.

Finally, i n Book Four, Kant distinguishes between true

and f a l s e religion t o ensure t h a t moral r e l i g i o n i s n o t

confused with practices of ecclesiastical faith that are

disconnected from morality. Yet again, Kant is adamant that

we do not reverse the priority of the rnorality that underlies

true moral religion oves the merely practical aspects of

ecclesiastical faith.

In other words, Kant makes it char that at every level

of his system of religion rnorality holds a crucial place: in

the ordering of things, morality must always serve as the

primary foundation and duty to morality must always be the

first priority if religion is to fa11 within reason's limits

and if we are to achieve moral perfection. Thus, in his

system of religion, the particular way in which Kant views

morality is that morality is seen as primary; the particular

place that Kant gives to morality is that it serves as the

foundation.

It i s in Book Four or in the final stage of his

religious system that Kant, after suggesting that reasoned

religion and ecclesiastical faith are at one with each other,

clarifies exactly what kind of union he has in mind based on

the place he gives to morality. Let us return to Book Four

to examine more closely how Kant completes his religious

system by uniting, yet, at the same t i m e , distinguishing

reasoned religion or the highest moral good and

ecclesiastical faith or common church life.

Completing Kant's System of Religion: Book Four: V i s i b l e Church Life i n Service to t h e

Moral Good and the Pure ~ e l i g i o n of Reason

As w e have seen in the previous chapter, Kant s u g g e s t s

that u n i t i n g r e a s o n e d r e l i g i o n and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h

"depends . . . upon the o r d e r i n which t h e y are u n i t e d . "' A s

w e l l , Kant suggests t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n must e x i s t between

reasoned r e l i g i o n and ecclesiastical f a i t h precisely so they

can be united in the proper order: "True enlightenment lies

i n t h i s very d i s t i n c t i o n . . . "' It is clear t h a t the kind of union Kant has i n mind is

one i n w h i c h the two t h i n g s united maintain t h e i r own

distinctive ident i ty . In o the r words, by union Kant does not

mean t h a t the two t h i n g s blend i n t o each other i n a way t h a t

makes thern i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e £rom each other. Thus, when

Kant suggests t h a t r e a s o n and Scripture are "not only

compatible but at onew with each other, he does not mean that

r eason and Scripture are so i d e n t i c a l t h a t t hey cannot be

distinguished from each other. H e o n l y means t h a t they are

united to t h e e x t e n t t h a t "he who follows one, . .wil l not f a i l

to conforrn to t h e o ther , "

W e can t h ink of unity i n terms of how a p i t i s un i t ed t o

the f l e s h of a peach ta t h e extent that e a t i n g t h e flesh w i l l

reveal t h e p i t and without t h e p i t t h e f l e s h could n o t grow;

t o g e t h e r t h e p i t and t h e flesh make t h e p e a c h , yet the p i t

and f l e s h are not so identical to each o the r that they cannot

be distinguished as ' I p i t " and "fleshU; pit and flesh

maintain a s e p a r a t e i d e n t i t y i n t h e i r union as " p e a ~ h . ~ Now,

reason and Scripture are not e n t i t i e s like "pit" and "f l e sh ."

However, the analogy gets at t h e kind of unity Kant has in

mind when he suggests that reason and S c r i p t u r e are a t one

w i t h each o t h e r . Indeed, in t h e Preface t o t h e Second

E d i t i o n Kant States that he r ega rds e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h o r

revealed r e l i g i o n as '#the w i d e r s p h e r e of faith, w h i c h

i n c l u d e s within i t s e l f " t h e pure r e l i g i o n of reason as a

"narrower [ s p h e r e ] (not like two circ les e x t e r n a l to o n e

another, but like c o n c e n t r i c circles ) . "' Thus, we get t h e

idea that although e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith and reasoned religion

are un i t ed as one circle within another , t hey remain d i s t i n c t

as t w o c irc le s that rnake up the o n e w i d e sphere. I f w e

remind ourselves of Kant's view of morality, w e can begin t o

c l a r i f y how unity depends on t h e proper ordering of t w o

d i s t i n c t th ings .

Kant has said tine and time again t h a t ecclesiastical

faith or revealed S c r i p t u r e can o n l y fa11 w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s

of reason and keep us morally disposed and well-pleasing to

God if our belief in e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith and i t s p r a c t i c e s

o r r i t u a l s are c o n n e c t e d t o morality. What must underlie

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith and Scripture is our duty to the moral

law w i t h i n us. E c c l e s i a s t i c a l p r a c t i c e s and narratives can

only serve as a means t o keeping u s directed to our moral end

and as a n aid t o remaining d u t i f u l ta the moral l a w when

m o r a l i t y serves as the primary motivating f a c t o r behind t h e

p r a c t i c e s and n a r r a t i v e s . Only when the moral l a w lies at

the foundation of religious actions can t hey take on a moral

v a l u e and be e x p r e s s i o n s o f o u r freedom, autonomy a n d

r a t i o n a l i t y . And, it is on ly when e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h has

mora l i ty as its sole foundation that it can qualify as a true

visible church and as a v e h i c l e t o the p u r e r e l i g i o n of

reason . S o , t o r e p e a t , to engage i n moral a c t i o n , w e must

proper ly o rder and choose t h e moral l a w over t h e law of s e l f -

l ove as t h e primary i n c e n t i v e of o u r w i l l . To become mora l ly

good by transforming Our h e a r t s and hoping f o r God's grace we

must properly o r d e r o u r d u t y t o t h e moral l a w oves d u t y t o

t h e m e r e p r a c t i c e s of ecclesiastical faith. T o be a rnember

o f the e t h i c a l cornmonweal th and s t r i v e t o w a r d s moral

pe r f ec t i on , w e must prope r ly reveal t h e i n t r i n s i c mora l i t y i n

S c r i p t u r e a n d v i e w t h e v i s i b l e church as a v e h i c l e t o

ach i ev ing t h e moral Kingdom of God on e a r t h . And, f i n a l l y ,

an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h can on ly serve as a vehicle t o t h e

pure r e l i g i o n of r e a s o n when the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h i n

q u e s t i o n has u n i t e d , i n the proper order, revea led r e l i g i o n

o r theology with n a t u r a l religion o r m o r a l i t y t o form a true

u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o n that c a n lead t o t h e p u r e r e l i g i o n of

r ea son . And, of course t h e p roper o r d e r o f t h i s un ion has

t h e morality t h a t is i n t r i n s i c to natural religion as t h e

primary foundation. I n t h i s way, t h e r evea l ed r e l i g i o n added

to t h i s moral foundat ion i s ensured t o reveal moral i ty i n i t s

S c r i p t u r e . T h e r e s u l t is an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h o r v i s i b l e

chu rch t h a t uses Scripture based on m o r a l i t y and r e a s o n t o

u n i t e i ts rnembers under t h e gu idance of God toward t h e pure

r e l i g i o n of reason. The r e s u l t is an empirical religion t h a t

f a l l s within t h e limits of reason alone.

T o c l a r i f y , w e remember from the prev ious c h a p t e r that

K a n t made a c l ea r distinction between false and t r u e

r e l i g i o n , a n d t h e o l o g y , morality and r e l i g i o n . T h e s e

d i s t i n c t i o n s he lped t o c l a r i f y h i s distinction between m o r a l

religion and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith. Kant insists on this

d i s t i n c t i o n for t w o reasons. F i r s t , he wants t o be s u r e that

w e do no t assume t h a t revealed r e l i g i o n which takes t heo logy

as i t s s o l e founda t ion l eads t o moral p e r f e c t i o n . I n o t h e r

words, going t o church every Sunday and adhering t o t h e rules

of some e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h o u t o f du ty t o God does n o t , on

i t s own, c o n s t i t u t e a morally good l i f e o r make us well-

pleas ing t o God. Second, Kant a l s o wants t o be sure t h a t w e

do not assume t h a t n a t u r a l religion which takes m o r a l i t y as

i t s sole foundation l e a d s t o moral p e r f e c t i o n . T h a t i s ,

a c t i n g i n accordance w i th o u r reason and fo l lowing Our duty

t o t h e moral l a w can only t a k e u s so f a r . Moral p e r f e c t i o n

canno t be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h mere m o r a l i t y a l o n e . What is

required is a cuming together f i r s t of natural ( r e a s o n e d )

r e l i g i o n o r m o r a l i t y which sets t h e founda t ion , and second ,

revealed r e l i g i o n or Scripture which extends mora l i t y t o t h e

idea of God. T h u s , when natural r e l i g i o n a n d revealed

r e l i g i o n , moral religion and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h , r ea son and

Scripture are u n i t e d , they are done so i n a very particular

way: they m u s t be u n i t e d i n the p r o p e r o r d e r so that

m o r a l i t y is the f i rs t b a s i s o r t h e founda t ion of r e l i g i o n ,

w h i l e t h e rules, r i t u a l s and reve la t ions are the structure o r

t h o s e aspects of r e l i g i o n that keep u s morally well-disposed

i n so f a r as they a r e b u i l t on top of the moral foundat ion.

Another way ta think of t h i s is that reason and t h e moral l a w

r e p r e s e n t the "coreM around which r e v e l a t i o n is added o r

formed. I n this w a y , r eason and S c r i p t u r e are u n i t e d , b u t

they a l s o remain d i s t i n c t ; that is, i n order f o r them t o be

u n i t e d i n the proper o r d e r so t h a t m o r a l i t y s e r v e s as

f o u n d a t i o n o r core and r e v e l a t i o n s e r v e s as the added

s t r u c t u r e , it must be poss ib le t o d is t inguish between them.

I n t h i s sense , u n i t y can be thought of i n a sornewhat

l o o s e r s e n s e than what it may have i n i t i a l l y seemed. N o t

o n l y does t h e u n i t y t h a t Kant has i n mind a l l o w f o r a n

i n t e r n a 1 d i s t i n c t n e s s , b u t Kant i s also s u g g e s t i n g t h a t a

union between reason and any e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h can occur

so l o n g as t h e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h u n i t e s m o r a l i t y a n d

r e v e l a t i o n i n t h e proper o r d e r . I n o t h e r words, a l though

Kant uses C h r i s t i a n i t y as h i s test case t o determine whether

C h r i s t i a n i t y , as a revea led religion, can be brought wi th in

reason 's l i m i t s , he i s not suggesting t h a t t h e union between

reason and r e v e l a t i o n is strictly l i m i t e d t o C h r i s t i a n i t y .

Instead, Kant is suggesting t h a t t h e union between reason and

Scripture depends on t h e s t r u c t u r e o r f o r m of the set of

b e l i e f s a n d h o p e s w h i c h Scripture l a y s o u t and t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s is open t o reasoned i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or

lies within the l i m i t s of reason. And, the only s t r u c t u r e o r

form of S c r i p t u r e t h a t can be i n t e r p r e t e d within r e a s o n ' s

limits is one which has moral i ty as its primary basis .

A Looser Sense of Unitv

We know that Kant is using Christianity as h i s

Scriptural test case to detemine whether revelation falls

within reasonrs limits. It can be said that Kant is assuming

the role of a Uphilosophical theologian." That is, he is not

merely attempting to defend uecclesiastical faith by

appealing to church authority to guide h i s reading of

S c r i p t u r e m ; s u c h is the role of the "biblical

theologian ... whose defense of faith does not appeal to reason."' Kant is discussing Christian Scripture to determine

whether it can be reasoned . He is approaching "religion

within the limits of reason alone by way of interpretation of

the sacred t e x t s of one tradition," namely, Christianity.

We recall that Scripture, as Kant is uslng it, may be

understood "as a group of narratives that offer a temporal

mode1 or symbol of a rational.. .structure. "' In this s e n s e ,

it may be s a i d that Kant is using Scripture in a symbolic

way. For example, Kant uses the stoq of Adam's sin and the

expulsion from Eden in a symbolic way to demonstrate how

moral principles are subordinated to natural inclinations:

Holy Scripture (the Christian portion) sets f o r t h this intelligible moral relationship in the form of a narrative, in which two principles in man, as opposed to one another as heaven is to hell, are represented as persons outside him; who not only pit their strength against each other but also seek (the one as manrs

' O'Neill, 1997, 291.

' Ibid., 294.

accuser and the other as his advocate) to establish their claims l e g a l l y as before a supreme judge.'

Kant also outlines the fa11 of the Evil Lord who becomes

Godfs traitor. Again, it may be said that Kant uses this

story in a symbolic way to show how a Kingdom of evil set up

in defiance to the good principle gave rational beings t h e

possibility of freedom, and more importantly, the possibility

to overturn ev i l (which , as descendants of Adam they al1

possessed), in favor of the disposition to goodness and t h e

moral worthiness of God.' Kant is trying to show how t h e s e

Biblical dramas may be read as symbolizing the conflict

between the moral principle and the principle of

subordinating morality to desire. Moreover, he is trying to

explain that the subordination of morality to inclination is

a freely chosen evil j u s t as the return to moral awareness

and a moral predisposition is a freely chosen good. Through

t h e s e stories we can symbolically u n d e r s t a n d the

interrelationship between freedom, knwledge, and morality in

ourselves. Kant reminds us, with reference to Horace, t h a t ,

"Under another name the tale is told of you."' In other

words, Kant recognizes that "a story does not have to be

literally true, or even...taken from the Bible, in order to

be read in the interests of moralityawg

R, 73.

' R, 73-4.

' R, 37; O'Neill, 1997, 295.

@ OFNeillf 1997, 295. See also Despland, 151.

It is not d i f f i c u l t t o unders tand t h a t myths, B i b l i c a l

s t o r i e s , o r S c r i p t u r e can be i n t e r p r e t e d symbol ica l ly so as

t o reveal the r e l a t i o n between knowledge, m o r a l i t y and hope.

However, as we have seen, Kant suggests t h a t n o t only can w e

read S c r i p t u r e as a symbol of m o r a l i t y , but i n t e r p r e t i n g

S c r i p t u r e w i t h i n r e l i g i o n w i t h i n t h e limits of reason demands

that S c r i p t u r e ought t o be read i n t h i s way. Again, t h e

point here, fo r Kant, is not simply that S c r i p t u r e ought t o

be i n t e r p r e t e d "in t h e i n t e r e s t s of rnoral i ty ;" b u t , r a t h e r ,

h i s p o i n t is that bringing o u t t h e moral meaning of Sc r ip tu re

p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t a t e x t of S c r i p t u r e has t h i s i n t r i n s i c ,

moral meaning.1° B u t , a l t h o u g h he makes use of C h r i s t i a n

r e fe rences , Kant is no t sugges t ing t h a t C h r i s t i a n Sc r ip tu re ,

i n p a r t i c u l a s , holds some s p e c i a l moral w i s d o m . Indeed, h e

S ta t e s t h a t t h e Bible is no more than a book t h a t has " f a I l e n

i n t o men's bands."" H e is simply using Christian Scr ip tu re as

h i s c h o i c e of example and p o i n t of r e fe rence t o expla in t h a t

sacred t e x t s ought always t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t s

of m o r a l i t y i f t h e y are t o be connected t o m o r a l i t y and i f

they are t o prove useful i n t h e p u r s u i t of moral per fec t ion .

Perhaps, i f Kant w a s not in f luenced by h i s eighteenth-century

European conce rns , b u t was i n s t e a d w r i t i n g amidst an Asian

c u l t u r e fo r example, h i s use of C h r i s t i a n S c r i p t u r e would

have been replaced by ~ s l a m i c , Hindu or Buddhist S c r i p t u r e s ,

Thus, what is important t o Kant is not t he s p e c i f i c Scr ip ture

O'Neill, 1997, 297.

" R, 98.

i t s e l f , b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t t h e S c r i p t u r e ho lds i n t r i n s

moral meaning which can be revealed symbolically.

Thus, w e see that what is important is not s p e c i f i c a l l y

Chsistian Scr ip tu re , but sacred texts of any t r a d i t i o n . What

is at i s s u e f o r Kant i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t h e q u e s t i o n of

"whether morality should be expounded according to t h e Bible

o r whether t h e Bible should not r a t h e r be expounded according

to rn~rality?"~' We can unders tand here t h a t i n t h e place of

"Bible ' can appear t h e name of any sacred t e x t . The po in t i s

that the same q u e s t i o n w i l l apply. The p o i n t is also t h a t

t h e answer to this ques t ion w i l l always be t h e same for Kant:

morali ty rather than Scripture w i l l always cornes first."

In t h i s respect, Kant i s d e f e n d i n g moral r e l i g i o n .

However, to u n d e r s t a n d how he defends r e l i g i o n w i t h i n the

limits of reason a l o n e we must remind ourselves what reason,

for Kant, c o m p r i s e s . Reason, as a way of d i s c i p l i n i n g

th inking and a c t i n g , must m e e t t h r e e standards. Reason must

be "negat iverm "nonderivative," and "lawlike." A l 1 reasoned

ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g , i f t h e r e are any, have to meet t h e s e

three standards."

The f i r s t t w o s t a n d a r d s are met by t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l

theologian i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Kant States that:

Scriptural exegesis " w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f reasontr may n o t a p p e a l to r e v e l a t i o n , state o r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , o r h i s t o r i c a l s c h o l a r s h i p , let a lone a u t h o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s on which t r a d i t i o n s of b i b l i c a l

" O'Neill, 1997, 298.

theology rnay build. Equally, scriptural exegesis within the limits of reason does not appeal to the no less suspect uauthority" of individual religious experience, conscience, or feeling-a mode of interpretation that Kant thinks leads to enthusiasm or fanaticism."

However, to understand why Kant believes that reference

to Scripture and accepted traditions plays an important part

in achieving reasoned religion, we must turn to the third

standard of reason, namely, lawlikeness.

Kant states that the philosophical theologian needs to

engage with Scripture because:

[Tlhe authority of Scripture ... as...at present the only instrument in the most enlightened portion of the world for the union of al1 men into one church, constitutes the ecclesiastical faith, which, as the popular faith, cannot be neglected, because no doctrine based on reason alone seems to the people qualified to serve as an unchangeable nom. l6

I n other words, Kant is recognizing that "the

philosophical theologian has to reason in ways that engage

with actual religious conceptions as they are held and

cherished by the people"" of a certain time and i n a certain

place. In order for reasoned religion to be lawlike, it must

be sensitive to the audience which happens to be adherents of

particular religious traditions; it must appeal to i t s

audience in a universal way. Thus Kant notes that "it

is . . . p ossible that the union of men into one religion cannoi

feasibly be brought about or made abiding without a holy book

'' O'Neill, 1997, 299; R, 101, 104-5.

l6 RI 103.

l7 O'Neill, 1997, 300.

and an ecclesiastical f a i t h based on it. So it seems t h a t

reasoned r e l i g i o n must engage w i t h popu la r sacred t e x t s and

t r a d i t i o n s i f it is t o have a w i d e appeal. Again, w e see

here that K a n t is j u s t i f y i n g practical r e l i g i o n as a

neces sa ry aid t o a c h i e v i n g reasoned r e l i g i o n . Sacred t e x t s

must b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a w a y t h a t not o n l y reveals t h e i r

i n t r i n s i c m o r a l i t y b u t also appea l s t o their audience i n a

universal way i f t h e y are t o f u l l y m e e t t he requ i rements of

reason. That i s , " r e l i g i o n w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of reason n o t

rnerely may b u t must interpret a c c e p t e d texts, and t h e i r

o rd inary recep t ion . "lg I n t h i s way, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m e e t s t h e

t h r e e s t a n d a r d s o f r e a s o n and s u p p o r t s r e l i g i o n w i t h i n t h e

l h i t s of reason. M o r e specifically , [Wlhen Kant speaks of h i s approach t o r e l i g i o n as l y i n g within t h e limits of reason h e d o e s n o t mean t h a t he i d e n t i f i e s a unique set t o reasoned beliefs or hopes, b u t only that he i d e n t i f i e s a range of b e l i e f s o r hopes whose s t r u c t u r e places them w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of reason. 'O

Again, he is n o t c la iming t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r sacred t e x t

or a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n and i t s S c r i p t u r e lies

w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of reason. R a t h e r , h e is c l a i m i n g t h a t

f a i t h and hope i n some popular ecclesiastical t r a d i t i o n holds

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f reasoned i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Moreover, t h e

s t r u c t u r e of some set of b e l i e f s o r hopes c a n be viewed as

co inc id ing with r ea son o r f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e limits of reason

when t h a t structure r e v e a l s an i n t r i n s i c rno ra l i t y . Thus,

le R, 123.

'' O'Neill, 1997, 301.

'" Ibid., 302.

when Kant says that r eason and Scripture are compa t ib l e and

a t one w i t h each other, he is n o t sugges t ing that r eason is

s t r i c t l y u n i t e d t o C h r i s t i a n S c r i p t u r e i n p a r t i c u l a r . H e is

saying t h a t s o long as any S c r i p t u r e can be revealed t o

e x h i b i t i t s i n t r i n s i c moral founda t ion it w i l l fa11 w i t h i n

reasonrs limits; and, so long as w e follow some Scripture or

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h t h a t has this m o r a l f o u n d a t i o n , o u r

b e l i e f , f a i t h and hope i n t h i s S c r i p t u r e is open to reasoned

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . W e must remenber t h a t Kant is using C h r i s t i a n S c r i p t u r e

o n l y as a n example o f how we c a n determine w h e t h e r a

S c r i p t u r e f a l l s within t h e l i m i t s o f r e a s o n . H e i s n o t

s ay ing t h a t reason and C h r i s t i a n S c r i p t u r e are s t r i c t l y at

one with each o t h e r to t h e exclusion of al1 other Scr ip tu res .

He is o n l y saying that because C h r i s t i a n Scripture can be

i d e n t i f i e d as a r a n g e of b e l i e f s and hopes t h a t h o l d t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y of reasoned i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it can be considered

a " v i s i b l e " church t h a t can act as a "vehicle" t o t h e pure

r e l i g i o n of reason. So long as S c r i p t u r e is guided by moral

concepts o r has m o r a l i t y at its foundat ion, "he who fo l lows

[it] ... will not fail t o conform t o t h e other [Le., reason]."

Thus, when Kant says t he re is a union between reason and

S c r i p t u r e , he means it i n a somewhat loose sense. B y uloosef8

1 mean only t h a t Kant i s n o t suggesting a strict u n i o n

between reason and one p a r t i c u l a r S c r i p t u r e . Ra ther , Kant is

saying t h a t reason and (any) S c r i p t u r e a r e un i ted only i f the

S c r i p t u r e i n question can act as a v e h i c l e t o t h e p u r e

r e l i g i o n of reason. And, Scripture can on ly ac t as a veh ic l e

i f it c a n be r e v e a l e d t o hold an i n t r i n s i c mora l meaning

which unites people under G o à for a common end.

A Necessarv Contradiction?

So it seems t h a t t h e apparen t c o n t r a d i c t i o n that Kant

makes by u n i t i n g and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g reason and Scripture i s

r e a l l y unprob le rna t i c f o r h i m . I t seems that t h e a p p a r e n t

c o n t r a d i c t i o n may n o t be a con t r ad ic t ion a t a l1 i n s o far as

Kant seems t o account for how reason and S c r i p t u r e are t o be

cornbined so t h a t they can work together a s two sepasa t e parts

t h a t make up one union . Indeed, i f the way i n w h i c h Kant

un i t e s reason and S c r i p t u r e i s , i n fact, a con t r ad ic t ion t h e n

i t seems t h a t s u c h a c o n t r a d i c t i o n is necessary f o r

completing Kant's system of religion.

1 suggested at t h e o u t s e t t h a t K a n t seems t o be

a t tempt ing t o bridge t h e gap between the p r a c t i c a l world of

ecclesiastical faith a n d t h e t h e o r e t i c a l w o r l d of t h e

r e l i g i o n of reason. H i s t a s k i n Religion is t o e s t a b l i s h t h e

r a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l i g i o n and t o

tes t one p a r t i c u l a s revealed r e l i g i o n t o see i f it conforms

t o t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . I n o t h e r words, h e is h o p i n g t o

demonstrate t h a t reason and Sc r ip tu re can be u n i t e d i n a way

t h a t br idges the gap between them.

What Kant has shown by means of h i s r e l i g i o u s system i s

that revealed r e l i g i o n o r ecclesiastical faith can u n i t e with

r e a s o n a n d t h e m o r a l l a w t o r e s u l t in a t r u e , e m p i r i c a l

r e l i g i o n that q u a l i f i e s as a v i s i b l e church and as a vehicle

t o t h e pure r e l i g i o n of reason only when t h e moral l a w serves

as t h e foundation. Thus, t h e t e s t case of C h r i s t i a n i t y as a

revea led r e l i g i o n is shown t o qualify as a l e g i t i m a t e t r u e

r e l ig ion only i n as much as it i s shown t o be contingent upon

moral i ty . C h r i s t i a n i t y , as a true e m p i r i c a l r e l i g i o n , has

m o r a l i t y as i t s prirnary f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s means t h a t

Christian Scripture, p r a c t i c e s , rituals, etc . , must be

followed no t o u t of duty t o God, but o u t of duty to t h e moral

law wi th in us. I f C h r i s t i a n i t y places too much emphasis on

i t s theology so that good actions become defined as d u t i e s t o

God, C h r i s t i a n i t y runs t h e r i s k of d isengaging i t s e l f £rom

i t s moral f o u n d a t i o n . Once it is s e p a r a t e d f r o n a moral

bas i s , it can no longer q u a l i f y as a visible church or as a

veh ic l e t o reasoned r e l i g i o n and i t s members cannot achieve

moral per fec t ion o r Godf s grace. '' What bridges t h e gap between t h e pract ical w o r l d of

'' It i s here t h a t we c a n s e n s e t h e u p r o a r o f C h r i s t i a n s i n r e sponse t o Kan t ' s Religion when Books One and Two were first p u b l i s h e d i n 1 7 9 2 . K a n t is n o t s u g g e s t i n g t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y h a s no place i n mora l l i f e - i n d e e d , h e i s t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h the v e r y o p p o s i t e by showing how C h r i s t i a n i t y can b e b r o u g h t w i t h i n r e a s o n ' s l i m i t s a n d remain connected t o m o r a l i t y . Bowever, i n K a n t ' s system o f r e l i g i o n , C h r i s t i a n i t y is t h r e a t e n e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is made c o n t i n g e n t upon m o r a l i t y . ~ h r i s t i a n i t y i s e q u a t e d w i t h a n y o r al1 o t h e r revealed r e l i g i o n s t h a t m u s t t a k e m o r a l i t y as f o u n d a t i o n a l i f t h e y hope t o q u a l i f y as a t r u e e m p i r i c a l religion. I n t h i s s e n s e , C h r i s t i a n i t y ho lds no s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e o v e r any o t h e r revealed r e l i g i o n s t h a t m a i n t a i n m o r a l i t y as a basis . A s a r e s u l t , Kant was sevefely r e p r i m a n d e d and much o f h i s work o n r e l i g i o n w a s c e n s o r e d ( u n d e r King F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m II) b e c a u s e h i s v i e w s , as he expressed t h e m i n Religion were s e e n as b e i n g subversive t o t h e e s t a b l i s h e d C h u r c h 8 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y . See Greene's d i s c u s s i o n i n Par t I V , "The P u b l i c a t i o n of "Re l ig ion w i t h i n t h e L i m i t s of Reason a l o n e " of h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y essay t o Religion, p. xxx i i -xxxv i i .

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h and t h e theoretical world of reasoned

r e l i g ion is a true empirical r e l i g i o n t h a t uni tes revela t ion ,

practices and r i t u a l s together wi th our duty t o the moral l a w

and takes moral i ty o r the moral law as i t s primary motivating

foundation. Ecclesiastical f a i t h and t h e p u r e r e l i g i o n of

r ea son a r e u n i t e d i n so f a r as a true e m p i r i c a l r e l i g i o n

b r i d g e s t h e g a p b e t w e e n t h e m i n s u c h a w a y t h a t

ecclesiastical f a i t h can serve as a v e h i c l e to t h e pure

re l ig ion of reason

Members u n i t e d under a t r u e r e l i g i o n do t h e i r b e s t t o

remain w e l l disposed. Their e f f o r t s are aimed towards

exh ib i t i ng t h e moral Kingdom of God on ea r th so far as they

can br ing it to pass i n t h e hopes ' tha t higher wisdom w i l l

g rant the completion of [ t h e i r ] well-intentioned endeavors . ''" I n this way, t h e m e m b e r s move c l o s e r toward moral goodness

u n t i l t h e p r a c t i c a l elements of their e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h

becorne more and more dispensable. Eventually, t h e members

are ru l ed by t h e pure r e l i g i o n of reason which supersedes

t h e i r e cc l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h and a l 1 are m e t by God.

This supersess ion of t h e pure r e l i g i o n of reason over

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h does not mean t h a t Kant i s completely

doing away wi th e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h . I t may be t h e case

t h a t eventually, when w e have f i n a l l y become well-pleasing t o

God, e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h becomes dispensable. However, t o

reach that l e v e l of moral goodness where w e are pleas ing t o

God requires t h e prac t ices of ecc l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h . In other

wusds, ecc l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h o r revealed rel igion is necessary

" R, 9 2 .

to keep up m o r a l l y d i s p o s e d . T h e p r a c t i c e s , rituals and

S c r i p t u r a l narratives extend our morali ty t o the idea of God,

Kant is t ry ing t o show t h a t p r a c t i c a l r e l i g i o n plays its p a r t

i n our quest f o r moral p e r f e c t i o n so long as t h e p r a c t i c a l

r e l i g i o n has duty to the moral l a w at i t s foundation. I n

this way, p r a c t i c a l r e l i g i o n , ecc le s i a s t i ca l f a i t h o r

S c r i p t u r e is uni t ed t o the pure r e l i g i o n of reason i n so far

as ecclesiastical f a i t h keeps us moral ly disposed and un i t ed

w i t h o t h e r w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d i n d i v i d u a l s so t h a t w e are

directed towards moral p e r f e c t i o n , the hope of God's g r a c e

and achieving the Kingdom of God on earth. However,

ecclesiastical faith and reasoned r e l i g i o n are d i s t i n c t from

each o the r i n so far a s e c c l e s i a s t i c a l i a i t h can sometimes be

disconnected from mora l i ty and, as a result, can p lay no part

i n a c h i e v i n g moral perfection. Thus it is n e v e r the case

t h a t ecclesiastical f a i t h , on its own, w i l l fa11 within t h e

limits of reason. Kant wants t o be clear about this.

CONCLUSION

It can be said that in Religion Kant is taking what he

did in the Critique of Practical Reason and in Grounding one

step further. In t h e s e two works, Kant establishes that God

and the Highest Good are rational principles towards which

al1 rational humans strive. However, in R e l i g i o n , Kant wants

to address the question of h m and why our reason holds these

goals. In R e l i g i o n Kant establishes that through our reason

we have the ground of morality. B u t this morality is not

enough by itself to achieve the Highest Good. Moreover, this

morality must be related to some end or consequence towards

which it is directed. This end is God and the Highest Good

or moral perfection. Thus , as we know from Kant's two

previous works, reason and morality have God and the Highest

Good as their rational end. But, the question remains as to

how we get from ground to consequence? How do we u n i t e

morality and God to demonstrate that they are necessarily

related? In Religion Kant shows that ground and consequence

are brought together by a true empirical religion or an

ecclesiastical faith that infuses us with a teleological

purpose by extending its moral foundation to the idea of God.

In other words, what bridges the gap between Our practical

moral founda t ion o r grounds and t h e t h e o r e t i c a l end of a

"powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of rnanki~~d"'~ is a true

empir ical r e l i g i o n which u n i t e s reason and the moral l a w wi th

revelation o r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l faith s o that moral i ty extends

i t s e l f t o the idea of God- In this way, e c c l e s i a s t i c a l f a i t h

o r S c r i p t u r e i s u n i t e d t o reasoned r e l i g i o n , and, more

importantly, p r a c t i c a l r e l i g i o n is brought w i t h i n t h e limits

of reason alone. Reason j u s t i f i e s the need for religion; it

does not undermine it, We can on ly hope to complete t h e task

t h a t m o r a l i t y s e t s for u s when w e can i n t e r p r e t o u r moral

experience as being guided by God. Thus, through r e l i g i o n w e

can i n t e r p r e t our duties as divine commands from G o à based on

Our knowledge that t h e s e duties are first and foremost duties

t o the moral law,

PRIMARY BIBLI-HY

B e i s e r , Frederick C . The Fate of Reason: G m a n Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. H a r v a r d University Press, 1987.

Davidovich, A d i n a . " H m to Read ~ e l i g i o n w i t h i n the L i m i t s of Reason Alone" in Kant-Studien, 85, 1994, 1-14.

Despland, Michel. K a n t On History and Religion. McGill- Queenfs University Press, 1973.

Kant Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, Third Edition, ed i ted by Lewis White Beck. Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1993.

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