Participation and Predication in the "Sophist" 251-260Author(s): Richard J. KetchumSource: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1978), pp. 42-62Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182028Accessed: 14/02/2009 08:26

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Participation and Predication in the Sophist 251-260

RICHARD J. KETCHUM

While a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in bringing to light the philosophical sense of the Sophist one problem, or cluster of problems, has resisted analysis.' The problem is that Plato seems to use a particular form of sentence ambiguously; the fact that he does so seems to reveal a fundamental confusion on Plato's part.

It will be easier for me to describe the problem as well as my strategy in attempting to solve it, if I first introduce some terminology. In the Sophist, particularly 251-260, Plato frequently appeals to the fact that one Form participates in another Form to explain or justify other claims.2 For example, "Change is, because it partakes of Being" (256A 1) and "Motion is different because it partakes of the Different" (256B2-3). I will call those sentences which are either explicitly or implicitly justified by an appeal to participation "first-order sentences." Further, we find throughout the dialogues sentences of the form "the F (is) . . ." where "the F" is (1) an abstract noun with or without the definite article or (2) the definite article followed by a common noun, mass term, adjective or participle.3 Some such sentences can be paraphrased without loss of sense as "the Form, the F (is) .... ," while the vast majority of them cannot. "Beauty is eternal" can be so paraphrased. "The sophist is a wage earner" cannot. I will call those sentences which can be so paraphrased "Form-predications."

Now it is argued that Plato uses sentences of the form "the F (is) .. sometimes to express a Form-predication and sometimes to say something about the nature of the F or perhaps about the nature of particular F's. The fact Plato vacillates between these two types of predication not only obsc- ures whatever philosophical point he may be making but also shows that Plato was confused about the nature of Forms.

I think, however, that there is a plausible reading of the Sophist which shows Plato to be in no way confused as to the meaning of such sentences. None of the first-order sentences of the Sophist, I will argue, are Form- predications. After arguing that the text forces this conclusion on us (Part I), I will try to make the conclusion plausible (Part II) by describing a type of predication, different from Form-predication, in terms of which all of the first-order sentences of the Sophist can be consistently understood. A consequence of my interpretation is the rather surprising thesis that no-

42

where in the Sophist with the exception of those passages in which the friends of the Forms are discussed, does Plato mention the Forms of the middle dialogues. I will conclude (Part III) by explaining how I think those passages which seem to mention Forms are to be understood.

I

A: It is repeatedly stated or impled that the sentence "Change rests" is false (252D6-8, 255A10-BI, 256B6-7). The Forms of the middle dialogues, however, are at rest.4 Unless Plato has revised this aspect of his theory of Forms, "Motion rests" is not a Form-predication; it does not mean "The Form, Motion, rests."

There is in the Sophist itself some reason for believing that Plato no longer thinks of Forms as unchanging. The Eleatic Stranger argues (248A-249A) that there is at least an apparent contradiction in the claims: (a) Forms are unchanging and (b) Forms are known. For isn't a thing that becomes known altered, at least in respect to its being known?

The ES does not, however, conclude that Forms change. He merely concludes that changing things are beings. In fact, he immediately proceeds to argue (249B8-D4) that there must be things which are at rest if there is to be intelligence. There is every reason to believe that this argu- ment is intended seriously. The passage, 249B8-C8, is analagous to Par- menides 135B in which, after an aporetic discussion critical of the theory of Forms, a central tenet of that theory is reaffirmed. In light of this reaffir- mation of the changelessness of the objects of knowledge, it is doubtful that Plato would say that it is "by the greatest necessity impossible for Change to rest," (252D9-10) if "Change rests" means "The Form, Change, rests." The Form, Change, in some respects at least, is at rest.

We need not appeal to Plato's prior writings, however, to show that in the Sophist "Change rests" is not a Form-predication. At 255A10-B 1 we are told that change would rest if change partook of Rest, for in that case change would be forced to become the opposite of its own nature. The falsity of "Change rests" is due to the fact that "Change" and "Rest" are opposites, a fact which is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of "Change rests," understood as a Form-predication. The point is that Plato understands "Change rests" as a claim about the nature of change, or perhaps changing things, not as a claim about the nature of the Form, Change. We do not say what change is when we say that it rests. It is for this reason that "Change rests" is false.

It is not in itself important that neither "Motion rests" nor "Rest moves"

43

are Form-predications. What is important is that Plato makes it abun- dantly clear that they are not Form-predications. The objects of knowledge are at rest, we are told. But we are reminded three times in very strong language that Change does not rest. The falsity of "Change rests" stands or falls with the falsity of "Rest moves." Both of these sentences are false because they make an erroneous assertion about the nature of change and rest respectively. They are not false because they misrepresent the nature of Forms in general and thus of these Forms in particular.

The vast majority of first-order sentences in the Sophist are, however, most naturally understood as Form-predications. For example, Change is said to be different (from the same) because Change partakes in Difference (with respect to the same) (256B2-4). Contemporary scholarship is in almost universal agreement that "Change is different from the same" here means "The Form, Change, is different from the Form, Sameness." But if this is correct how are we to understand Plato when he tells us twice (256B6-7 and 255A10-B3) that if Change partook of Rest then change would rest. If the participation of one Form in another is used to explain Form-predications then Motion does partake of Rest. As a Form-predi- cation "Motion rests" is true. As matters stand, however, we know that participation is not used at 256B6-7 and 255A10-B3 as a potential explan- ation or justification of a Form-predication. It seems then that "Change is different from the same" can not be, in this context, a Form-predication.

The argument is strengthened if we accept Ackrill's conclusion that "the words introduced by &t give an expansion or analysis" of the words that follow.5 If Plato's talk of participation is intended to inform his readers how a corresponding sentence is to be understood we have even more reason to believe that the first-order sentences are not of radically different types. I will not argue the point here, but it is difficult to see what other philo- sophical justification the references to participation might have.

Of course it may be that Plato, consciously or unconsciously, uses "par- ticipation" ambiguously or, if not ambiguously, at least in a very mislead- ing fashion.6 I trust that this suggestion will become less attractive as I offer other reasons for believing that the first-order sentences of the Sophist are not Form-predications. B: A further problem for those who would read "Change is different from the same" as a Form-predication is that such a reading forces us to see Plato as using the predicate "is different" equivocally. If "Change is dif- ferent from the same" means "The Form, Change, is different from the Form, the Same," then "is different from" here means, "is not identical to" whether Plato was aware of this or not. But in 257B-258C Plato is dealing

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with negative predication, or negated predicates, and here it seems dif- ference cannot be non-identity. Consider for example: "8i y&p ,uil xoXbv ix&auronr 0eyy6ye6,a, Totv5o ovx NXXov TVOs t'TepOv EOTLV i ris Toi xaxoi3 OVuEs" (257D10-l 1). If "e'Eipov" has the sense of non-identity here then " Trs roU xaXoi 4Vaews" must (a) mean "the Form, Beauty" or (b) be shorthand for "everything that is beautiful." But there is nothing which is different only from the Form, Beauty. Nor is there anything which is different only from everything which is beautiful. Understanding this sen- tence intensionally, as it no doubt should be, does not help matters. It is obviously not the case that to say that something is not beautiful is to say that it is different from nothing but each and every beautiful thing.7

Edward Lee, by stressing the analogy of the parts of Difference to the parts of Knowledge, has provided what seems to me to be the best inter- pretation of 257C7-258A5 to date.8 To make a long story short, the not- beautiful is (the) other than beautiful just as mathematics is (the) knowl- edge or science of numbers. "The other than beautiful" is the correct answer to the Platonic question "What is the not-beautiful?" To say that something is not beautiful is to say that it is other than beautiful. If this is Plato's point in 257C7-259A5 then the sense of 258D10- 11 is clear even though its precise translation is not: "Each time we call something not- beautiful (we say) that this is other than nothing but beautiful;" or perhaps, "What we call, from time to time, (the) not beautiful is (the) other than nothing than beautiful." Both translations, I think, reveal, albeit in somewhat stilted English, the sense of 258D 10-1 1. Needless to say, "is other than" in these translations does not mean "is not identical to." If on the other hand "Change is different from the same" is a Form predication, then "different from" is used equivocally in the narrow space of two Stephanus pages; "The Different" names two kinds, not one, though Plato nowhere as much hints that this is so. C: There is a corollary to this apparent inconsistency in the text. Assume that "Change is different from the same" is a Form-predication. Plato tells us that "Change is not the same" follows from this sentence (256A3-5). So it seems, "Change is not the same" must also be a Form-predication asserting the non-identity of two Forms. The "is" in this sentence is the "is" of identity and on this all the commentators seem to agree.9 Plato, we also know, thought that the sentence "Change is the same" is ambiguous. He makes it fairly clear that one of its meanings is "Change is the same (as itself)" (256Al 1-B l), a sentence in which the verb "to be" is the copula. The ambiguity of "Change is the same" is then due to the ambiguity of the verb "to be" and this is true whether or not Plato realized it. The problem is

45

that there is very good reason to doubt that lato blames the ambiguity of "Change is the same" on an ambiguity of the verb "to be". If he does not, we must conclude that Plato was confused as to the correct solution of a problem which was of his own making and which it was his expressed purpose to solve. This conclusion, I take it, is to be avoided if possible.

Owen10 and Frede"l have forcefully argued that Plato does not dis- tinguish the "is" of identity from the copula in the Sophist. Rather than repeat these arguments in detail let me briefly summarize the consider- ations which I think prove the point: (1) the verb "eivU" does not occur once in the passage in which Plato explains the consistency of "Motion is the same and not the same" (256A1 I-B4).12 This it seems is poor practice if the verb "to be" is under scrutiny (2) "eIvaL" occurs only once in the problem sentence "Tiiv xivmnav 8i TOCVTOV T' EcvLaL xviL [Li ToWnT6v".which again seems poor practice if the solution is to be that the verb is used with different meanings. (3) Ackrill argues that '4LETEXEL OaT'pov TpoS. . ." is the philosophers' version of "oivx ?'rTLV" when "E?TLV' iS the identity sign.13 Surely the passage he appeals to to justify this reading, 256AlO-B4, demands that we see "ierLEXEL OkoXTEpv OVpOS. . ." as the philosophers' version of "is different from .. ." where the verb is the copula. Thus, "LETE'' Xf

Oacripov 'rrpos.. ." becomes the philosophers' version both of a negative identity claim and an affirmative predication. This again seems poor practice if Plato is trying to point out to us the difference in meaning between the "is" of identity and the copula. (4) Plato's proof that "the different" and "being" are not two names for one kind (255C8-EI) makes no sense without the assumption that one and the same Form, Being, is in some sense spoken of when we utter sentences both of the form "The F is G" and "The F is the F" or "The F is F".

M. Frede tries to avoid the conclusion that Plato was confused as to the correct disambiguation of "Change is the same" by claiming that Plato distinguishes not two meanings but two uses of the verb "to be."114 It becomes clear that Frede thinks of the difference in use as capable of determining a difference in truth value: "Change is different," for example, is true or false depending on the use of the verb "to be'".5 The meaning of the verb "to be" however, is said to be invariant. This inter- pretation seems to give back to Plato with one hand what was taken from him with the other. Some clarification of Frede's distinction between use and meaning is at least called for.

"Change is not the same" is not a first-order sentence, i.e., one which is justified by participation. It does, however, follow from "Change is dif- ferent from the same" which is justified by participation (256B 1-4). The

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inference from "Change is different from the same" to "Change is not the same" is of course valid when both sentences are understood as Form- predications. Since there is strong evidence that neither of these sentences are Form-predications what is needed is some other way of understanding them that leaves the inference valid.

A summary of the argument may be helpful at this point. A: Change is different because Change partakes of Difference and Change would rest if Change partook of Rest. Now, "Change rests" is not a Form predication. So, unless "participation" is used ambiguously, ""Change is different from the same" is not a Form-predication. B: Difference or Otherness is called upon both to explain why change is other than the same and to explain why the not beautiful is the other than beautiful. If "Change is other than the same" is a Form-predication then "difference" is used ambiguously by Plato. C: If Plato was not confused as to the correct disambiguation of "Change is the same" then, it seems, neither "Change is not the same" nor "Change is different from the same" are Form-predications. If we are to make sense of the text, we must explain the consistency of "Change is and is not the same" without appealing to an ambiguity in the verb "to be" and thus without claiming that "Change is not the same" asserts the non-iden- tity of the two Forms.

Such then is the evidence, presented as forcefully as I can, that first-order sentences are not Form-predications. The evidence can be seen as showing that the Sophist is replete with inconsistencies, confusions and inaccu- racies. I will presently try to provide a more charitable view of it. Before doing so, however, let me indicate two solutions both of which misfire.

The fact that "Change rests" is false suggests that the object-language sentences of the Sophist are disguised universally quantified statements ("UQS" for short), or what Vlastos has called Pauline predications.16 If "Change rests" means the UQS "(x) [x is changing D x is at rest] or the Pauline predication "Necessarily (x) lx is changing D x is at rest]" then it is plausibly said to be "by the greatest necessity impossible" (252D9- 10) that change should rest. Every attempt to interpret such first order sentences as "Change is different from the same" as Pauline predications or UQS's is, however, futile. "(x) [x is changing D x is different from anything that is the same (as itself)]" is false. "(x) [x is changing D x is different from the Form, Sameness]" is true enough but this can hardly be what is intended by "Change is different from the same." For "Change is the same as itself' (256A12-B1) but "(x) [x is changing D x is the same as the Form, Change]" is false. The possibilities are endless but I will not bore the reader any more than I have already by arguing against a thesis that is implausible to begin with.

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Perhaps, the predicates of the object language sentences are to be seen as serving to define the concept mentioned or expressed by the subject term.-7 Again this suggestion works well for "Change rests." "Rests" in no way serves to define "change", and thus "Change rests" is false. It is however, primafacie implausible to suggest either that "is different from the same" serves to define 'Change" or that Plato thought of such predicates in this way. In fact, the text of the Sophist itself makes it clear that participation is not used to justify definitions or partial definitions. First, we are told that if the F is different this is so by virtue of the fact that the F partakes of Difference not by virtue of the nature of the F (255E3-6). But a definition, complete or partial, answers the question "What is the F?" It is tells us what the nature of the F is. Second, there is a relationship among kinds men- tioned in the Sophist which is (a) distinct from participation and (b) used to justify or explain sentences which are definitional in nature: namely, the part/whole relationship of 257Cff. Mathematics is a part of the kind, Knowledge, and thus mathematics is (a) knowledge; it is the knowledge of numbers. The not-beautiful is a part of Otherness and thus the not- beautiful is (an) other; it is the other than beautiful.18 In such sentences the predicates can easily be seen as serving to define their subject terms. They are explained by the part/whole relation, however, not by the participation relation. When not-being is defined at 258A7-E3 participation drops completely out of the picture.

Perhaps what is needed is a type of predication which (a) reflects con- ceptual relations but (b) is weaker than the genus/species or definien- dum/definiens relation. There may be something in this suggestion but as it stands it is so much philosophical doubletalk. I doubt that talk of conceptual ties and concepts is much clearer or more illuminating than talk of participation and Forms.

II

In this section I hope to show: (1) that there is a type of predication, exemplified by sentences in both Greek and English, which is different from Form-predication, UQS and Pauline predication; (2) that under- standing the first-order sentences of the Sophist as being of this type solves or facilitates the solution of the problems discussed above.

In both English and Greek, sentences of the form "the F (is).. ." which cannot plausibly be understood as UQS's or Pauline predications are common. Some examples of such sentences in English are: "The whale swims" (or "is a swimmer"). "The defensive back intercepts passes," "The

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troika was invented by a Russian," and "Love is different from respect."1)9 The existence of a paralyzed or confined whale and an irresponsible or immoral defensive back does not falsify the first two of these sentences. "All troikas were invented by Russians" seems not even to make good sense unless heard as "All kinds of troika were invented by Russians."

The claim that two sentences exemplify the same type of predication may mean that they can be similarly paraphrased into quantificationalese or some language which makes the referent(s) of the subject terms more obvious. This is what I meant when I argued that "Change rests" was not a Form-predication, on the grounds that its truth value changed when paraphrased as "The Form, Change, rests." It is fairly clear that by this criterion the sentences listed above are of radically different types. "The whale swims" plausibly becomes "Normal, healthy whales are able to swim" or, "Typically, whales are able to swim" or, "Whales are able to swim always or for the most part." "Typically, defensive backs are able to intercept passes" is probably true but seems somehow to miss the point of "The defensive back intercepts passes." The point of the statement would more likely be that it is the function or duty of halfbacks to intercept passes or that defensive backs, when acting in the capacity of defensive backs, try to intercept passes. It is not at all clear that "The troika was invented by a Russian" can be seen as a statement about troikas. Examples need not be multiplied beyond necessity. If one's criterion for whether or not the sentences "The F is G" and "The H is J" are the same type of predications is that they are plausibly paraphrased in the same way into statements which seem to mention F's and H's respectively, then the sentences listed above are different types of predications.

There is however a way of understanding these statements as being of the same type. Some statements of the form "The F is G" are plausibly paraphrased by "The F is a kind of - which is G". I will call those which are paraphrasable in this way "kind-predications" (as distinct from "Form-predications"). I will call a Greek sentence a kind-predication if its English translation is so paraphrasable. The blank in the above schema is to be filled by any term which answers the question "What kind of thing is the F?" If no answer is immediately forthcoming, "thing" is to be supplied in the blank.

All of the sentences listed above are kind-predications. "The whale is a kind of animal that swims," "The troika is a kind of conveyance which was invented by a Russian," etc., fairly obviously preserve both the truth value and the sense of their originals. Form-predications are not, in general, kind-predications.20 "The whale is a kind of animal which is eternal," (or,

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"is motionless") is false, or nonsense. While all sentences of the form "The F is G" which are plausibly understood as UQS's may also, it seems, be understood as kind-predications, the converse does not hold. "The troika was invented by a Russian" is a kind-predication but is not a UQS, for example. Of course, whether or not a sentence is a Form-predication, a UQS, or a kind-predication will often have to be determined by the con- text. Many will remain ambiguous. "The Sophist possesses apparent knowledge" (233C 10) for example can be understood as either a kind- predication or a UQS but not as a Form-predication. "Change is different from rest" can be see either as a Form-predication or a kind-predication, but not as a UQS. The vast majority of sentences of theform "the F is .. ." which are intelligible to an ordinary philosophically unsophisticated Greek or English speaker are kind-predications.21 Some kind-predications will be unintelligible to the man on the street because they contain technical terms, e.g., "the different is ?rpos 'rTEpov" (255D 1). Others will be difficult to understand because of their abstractness, e.g., "Motion is." In general, however, one needs to hold no special theory of language or ontology to understand a kind-predication.

I do not offer the distinction between Form-predications, UQS's, and kind-predications as a means of solving any pposophical problem. I do offer it as an interpretive device. I think that the first-order sentences of the Sophist are kind-predications. That is, I think that if the first-order sen- tences found there are understood as being of a type which is intelligible to the philosophically unsophisticated ordinary man, as Form-predications are not, the problems discussed in Part I either dissolve or become manageable. In Part III I will argue that Plato as much as tells us that these entences do not mention Forms. First, however, let us see whether or not they can all consistently be interpreted as kind-predications. A': "Change rests" understood as a kind-predication is false, as is "Rest changes". "The whale walks" and "The whale is a kind of animal which walks" are false because they tell us nothing about what kind of thing the whale is. For the same reason "Change rests," and "Change is a kind of thing that rests" are false. More importantly, "Change is different from rest" is true understood as a kind-predication. "Change is a kind of thing which is different from rest" or "Change is a kind of thing which is other than rest" are obvious truth. Understood in this way, "Change is different from rest" is no more or less a statement about Forms than "Change rests," or "The whale swims." "Change is different from rest", unlike "Change is invisible" and "Change is eternal," can be seen as a commonplace truth of everyday English presupposing no particular philosophical theories. The

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same holds mutatis mutandis for Greek. We have more call to point out things like "Love is different from respect" and "Awe is different from reverence." "Change is different from rest" can, nevertheless, be under- stood as making the same sort of point, whatever a deeper analysis may show that point to be.

The fact that "Change is at rest" and "Change is different" can be paraphrased in the same way into "kind-talk" in no way proves that the verb "to be" occurs univocally in these two sentences. I know of no way of proving this. The fact that both of these sentences are kind-predications, however, should alleviate one's inclinations to believe that it must occur equivocally in them or that these two sentences must be understood as exemplifying radically different types of predications. C': We know that "Change is the same" is ambiguous, for "Change is not the same" is not its contradictory. It is fairly clear that the ambiguity Plato sees in "Change is the same" can be at least partially brought out by the English paraphrases: "Change is the same (as itself)" and "Change is sameness." It seems that a good case could be made for claiming that the ambiguity of "Change is the same" is due to the fact that "the same" is ambiguous. This interpretation is particularly attractive since it is "the same" and "not the same"' which Plato tells us we do not "say in the same way" when we say "Change is the same and not the same." But Plato does not attribute the ambiguity of this sentence to the ambiguity of any parti- cular word in it. What he does is give one reason for believing that change is the same and another reason for believing that change is not the same and leaves it at that. The fact that the reasons given are not themselves contradictory is no doubt intended to encourage us to accept with equanimity the apparent contradiction.

I think it will be easier to see what is or isn't going on in 256A7-B4 if we first look at a passage from the Euthyphro in which Plato makes a similar point. Euthyphro has proposed as a definition of the holy that "What all the gods hate is unholy and what they all love is holy" (9D2-3). Socrates presents an argument against the definition and concludes as follows:

But if, dear Euthyphro, the pleasing-to-the-gods and the holy were the same, then if the holy is loved because it is holy so too would the pleasing-to-the-gods be loved because it is dear to the gods; and if the pleasing-to-the-gods were pleasing to the gods because it is loved by the gods so too would the holy be holy through being loved. But you see now that the opposite is the case since they are completely different from each other ... and it seems, Euthyphro, that when you answered

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the question, "What is holy?" you did not want to reveal to me its being [oVoaial You only told me a quality [i%Oos] of it, namely to be loved by all the gods ( IOE9-1 I B 1).

In this passage it is clear that "the holy is loved by all the gods" is understood by Plato to be true. This sentence does not, on the other hand, answer the question "What is (the) holy?" Understood as a proposed answer to this question it is false. Plato, however, does not try to clarify matters by distinguishing the meanings of words. He expresses the dis- tinction between the two ways of understanding this sentence by saying that it is a rraOos of the holy to be loved by the gods, but to be loved by the gods is not the ovixa of the holy. It is assumed that "the G" is the answer to the question "What is the F?" if and only if the G is the ovi'aa of the F. The reason that the pleasing-to-the-gods is not the ovaot'a of the holy is that the holy is different from the pleasing-to-the-gods. The inference is not argued for nor need it be. It is simply assumed that if "The F is different from the G" then "The F is not (the) G." The inference is in no more need of justification than an instance of modus ponens. That the holy is different from the pleasing-to-the-gods has been proven by the failure of sub- stitutivity of these predicates salva veritate. The same technique is used in the Sophist.

Let me now return to the Sophist. The object-language sentences of the Sophist I suggest are kind-predications. In the language of the Euthyphro they assert a na'Oos of some subject. Plato as much as says this at 255E4-6 when he says that the kinds are different from one another not by virtue of their own nature but because of participation. Change is different from the same not by virtue of its own nature but because of participation in Difference. If I tell you that Change is the same as itself or different from sameness I do not tell you what the nature of change is, or what kind of thing change is, though I do tell you something about that nature or kind. In the same way, when I tell you that the Holy is loved by all the gods I do not tell you what the nature of the Holy is but I do tell you something about the Holy. I am suggesting that we understand "Change is the same as itself' or "Change is a kind of thing which is the same as itself' as analogous to "The Holy is loved by all the gods" or "The Holy is a kind of thing which is loved by all the gods." Plato's use of'"IrXeTLvL" in the Sophist is analogous to his use of "'rraOos" in the Euthyphro. He uses both terms to signal the fact that a particular sentence says something about a nature but does not state what the nature is; it does not state the owVsia of the nature or kind in question.

The fact that Change is not the same follows from the fact that Change is

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different from the same. It is simply and correctly assumed both in the Sophist and in the Euthyphro that a speaker of Greek will accept the inference. The question as to whether the verb "to be" means the same in "Change is the same" and "Change is not the same" simply doesn't arise. If the Euthyphro passage can be understood without assuming that Plato is making a point about the meaning of the verb "to be" then so too can Sophist 256A2-B4.

"Change is not the same (Sameness)" is not a kind-predication. "Change is a kind of thing which is not the same (or Sameness)" is not a happy paraphrase of "Change is not the same (Sameness)". But this is as it should be. It is the denial of a purported definition of Change. Nor is "Change is not the same" justified by participation. Rather, it follows from a sentence that is so justified. "When [we call Change] not the same [we do so] because of its blending with difference through which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but different, so that it is once again correctly spoken of as 'not the same'." (356B2-4).

Let me summarize Plato's point as I see it. "Change is the same" is a true statement when understood as a claim about the nature of change. But it is false when understood as a claim asserting what (the nature of) change is. Why? Because change is different from the same (Sameness) and thus change is not the same (Sameness). "Change is the same" is true but does not answer the question, "What is Change?"

It is possible then to understand 256A2-B4 without assuming that Plato is distinguishing meanings of the verb "to be". The arguments presented in Part I of this paper I think show that he must be so understood. So much then for Plato's view of the matter. Can't it be nevertheless maintained that the "is" in "Change is the same" simply is ambiguous? Isn't it true, whether Plato realizes it or not, that the truth value of "Change is the same" depends upon whether or not the "is" here is the copula or the "is" of identity? B': For reasons that will become obvious let me first try to answer another question raised in Part I of this paper. Recall that there is some reason to believe that "is different from" or "is other than" is used ambiguously by Plato. In "Change is other than the Same" (256A3), for example, it seems that "is other than" has the sense of "is not identical to". At 257C 10-1 1, on the other hand, it can't have this sense. It rather seems to have the sense of "other than" as in "Medusa is other than beautiful." If, however, "Change" and "the same" do not function in this sentence as the proper names of Forms, then "is different from" does not have the sense of "is not identical to." What sense does it have then? Perhaps the sense of "is other

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than" in "Medusa is other than beautiful". I know of no way of proving that "is other than" occurs univocally in "Medusa is other than beautiful" and, e.g., "respect is other than love." I am fairly confident, however, that there is no way of showing that it occurs in these sentences equivocally. To be sure, "Respect is not the same as love" is a reasonable paraphrase of 6"Respect is other than love" while "Medusa is not the same as beautiful" approaches nonsense. But reasonableness of paraphrase does not show sameness of meaning. If it did we could show not only that "other than" means "snot" but also that "not" is ambiguous. For "Medusa is not beautiful" is a reasonable paraphrase of "Medusa is other than beautiful" and "Love is not respect" is a reasonable paraphrase of "Love is other than respect." If "other than" means one thing when it occurs before an adjec- tive and another thing when it occurs before an abstract substantive it seems that "not" must also be ambiguous in this way.

Apart from the truth of these matters, it is clear that Plato sees no ambiguity in these two uses of "other than." For Plato, "repos" has a sense broad enough to include both what we call non-identity as well as whatever sense the English phrase "other than" has in such sentences as "Medusa is other than beautiful." "Not" he tells us signifies something different (257B3-C3). He finds evidence for this principle in the fact that "Change is different from the same" entails "Change is not the same." He uses the principle to explain the fact that the not-beautiful is (the) other-than- beautiful. C': If"is other than" in "Change is other than the same" does not mean "is not identical to" then it seems there is no reason for believing that the "is" in "Change is not the same (or Sameness)" is the "is" of identity. After all, how is a statement asserting the non-identity of two Forms to follow from a statement which isn't about Forms at all? If it makes sense to ask whether or not Plato held a theory of Forms when he wrote the early dialogues then "Change is not the same" can be understood as analogous to "the holy is not the god-loved" without assuming that the "is" of identity occurs in these sentences. Again, I know of no way of proving that the "is" in "Change is not the same" means the same as the "is" in "Change is the same (as itself)." But I am fairly confident that there is no way to show that "is" does not mean the same in these two sentences. To be sure, "Love is not the same as respect" is a reasonable paraphrase of "Love is not respect." If this is what is meant by calling "Love is not respect" an identity statement or the denial of one, well and good. But it is quite misleading to do so. For in "Change is not the same as the different," understood as a kind-predication, "the same as" does not mean "identical to". To claim

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that it did would be to think of Platonism and the theory of Forms as a logical consequence of such sentences.

Up to this point I have argued that the first-order sentences of the Sophist are not Form-predications. I have allowed that there are a number of Form-predications in the Sophist; "Both (Change and Rest) partake of the Same and the Different," (355B3) is an example of a Form-predication. There is very little that is 'unPlatonic' about my thesis up to this point. The truth or falsity of the first-order sentences depends in some sense on the existence of Forms and relations among them.22

III

There is, however, a serious textual objection to my thesis which may have been troubling the reader for some time. The distinction I have drawn between sentences justified by participation, first-order sentences on the one hand, and obvious Form-predications on the other is not as sharp as I have made it appear. If the thesis of this paper is correct, then 255E4-6, 256B1-4, B6-7, D8-9, D12-EI, 257A5-6, and 259A6-8, to mention only the most obvious passages, are all a certain kind of nonsense. Consider 259A6-8 for example: "Tor pv ETEpov RErotuXOV TOD 'OVTOS ?mTL zV &lt T(XV'T1V

rv9 >?EOEV, OV iV LXrv YE OV o T?XV &XX ?TTpOV." "TO ?TEpOV" is both the subject of the Form-predication "TO iEV ETEpOV p?ETWtt0V TOV OVTOS" and the subject of the first-order sentence "o' >v ?E'pov ... ?aTL ... ETEpOV." It is as though one said, "Red is a color and what my book is," or perhaps "it is possible for something to be red just because it (i.e., red) is a property." The E S constantly speaks as though the thing that participates in "the G" is identical to the thing that is G because of that participation. It seems that if those sentences which mention participation are Form-predications then so too are the first-order sentences justified by them.23

The correct answer to this objection is, I think, that those sentences which mention participation are not Form-predications, that Plato no- where in the Sophist refers to the Forms of the middle dialogues except in those passages which discuss the beliefs of the friends of the Forms.

Anyone familiar with the middle dialogues knows that Plato uses the word "EI1os" to distinguish such things as justice, being, health, etc., from such things as Socrates, a beautiful face, a bed, etc. Part of understanding what Plato means by "'Ethos" in these dialogues is knowing what things he would call E'Mn and what he would refuse to call ei';. Now clearly this aspect of the meaning of the word is carried over to the Sophist. In the Sophist justice would and Socrates would not be called an a,8os. One who

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does not know this does not know what Plato means by the word "CtMos". Now, I think that one understands completely what Plato means by "Etlos" in the Sophist if he understands what things Plato would and what things he would not call ri&a. He does not mean "intellgible, non-sensible, divine, eternal object by virtue of partaking in which a sensible object comes to have a certain character" as he did in the middle dialogues. In the Sophist, to speak of the E18os, ?yvoS or 18Ea, change, is just to speak of change. Plato may have believed that justice is eternal, divine, etc., when he wrote the Sophist. But if he did, he did not say or imply that he did.

When Plato says that the F partakes of the G he is saying just that the kind-predication "the F is G" is true. Put less anachronistically, by "the F partakes of the G" Plato means "'The F is G' is true when understood as a sentence which (a) does not mention the Forms of the middle dialogues and (b) is not definitional, but rather, asserts a u6Oos of the F."

I have in a sense already argued for the interpretation outlined in the last two paragraphs. The first-order sentences of the Sophist are not Form- predications. The syllipses listed above show that sentences in which Plato tells us that one kind participates in another cannot be Form-predications. The interpretation of the last two paragraphs describes what is meant by such sentences when reference to the Forms of the middle dialogues is taken from them. I will try to strengthen the argument as follows: First I will try to show that the Sophist makes good philosophical sense when Plato's talk of participation and kinds is understood as I indicated above, i.e., that we can understand Plato's philosophical motives for speaking of forms participating in one another on my interpretation. I will then argue that Plato as much as tells his readers both that he does not use the term "E'8Los" to refer to the Forms of the middle dialogues and that to speak of a form participating in another form isjust to say that a corresponding Greek sentence is true.

I think that Ackrill24 is correct in arguing that the "&&" in such sentences as "..T. aT11 y TiV TOXVTOV 8 TO IETEXELV aXv 7'VT' a'VTO (256A7-8) is the "&8&' of analysis. It makes little or no sense to think of the words intro- duced by "6&&" as giving a reason for believing, or a causal explanation of the fact stated by the preceding words. Rather the words following "&L&"

give an analysis or expansion of the preceding words.25 The clause intro- duced by "61a' merely tell us how the preceding words are to be under- stood. I have argued that the preceding words, first-order sentences, are to be understood as kind-predications. Plato's talk of participation can be underszood then as a means of indicating to his readers that certain sen- tences are to be understood as kind-predications. Surely nothing in the text

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demands that Plato's talk of participation amounts to any more than this. If Ed Lee is right, however, and I think he is, Plato speaks of Forms

partaking in one another not only to indicate that a corresponding sentence is not a Form-predication but also to indicate that it is not definitional or quasi-definitional in nature.26 Participation is contrasted with the part/ whole relationship. If the F is G because the F partakes of G, then by "the F is G" one is not claiming that it is the very nature of the F to be G. If, on the other hand, the F is a part of the G, then in Lee's words, the G serves to constitute the being of the F. The point can be made less anachronistically by saying that if the F is a part of the G then the F is by its very nature G. Thus Plato can easily be seen as using participation to indicate that a sentence is neither a Form-predication nor a definitional or quasi- definitional predication.

Plato then could have had good reasons for speaking of forms blending on the present interpretation. It is a device which when used in conjunction with others distinguishes between types of predication.

I also think that Plato as much as tells us that the words "W18os" and '4LITeXELv" no longer mean what they meant in the middle dialogues. A number of passages in the Sophist can be read as attempts on Plato's part to disassociate the argument of the ES from the theory of Forms. First, Plato seems to go out of his way to tell us that the Sophist was written after the Parmenides (217C4-7), a dialogue in which, (a) the theory of Forms was criticized, (b) there is a long series of arguments concerning almost ex- clusively sentences of the form "the F is G" which are clearly not intended as unambiguous Form-predications and (c) it is suggested, if not stated, that the arguments mentioned in (b) are about "e'e&1" (135D8-E4). The upshot of (b) and (c) is that Plato has already there used the word "e?toS" not to refer to the Forms of the middle dialogues but rather as meaning just "such things as justice, health, the one, etc." Second, the theory of Forms is again criticized in the Sophist itself (248A4-249B6). The decisive passage, however, is 251C8-D3: the ES introduces theurgument that some kinds blend and some do not by telling us that the argument is directed to the protagonists of all theories previously mentioned and these include the theory of Forms as well as materialism. Here we are told explicitly that the arguments which follow will presuppose the truth of none of the previously mentioned theories. Surely an argument which assumes that the con- troversial theory of Forms is true could not reasonably be said to be intended for, to be likely to convince, materialists who doubt their exis- tence,27 as well as monists and pluralists who do not even consider their existence. The ES does not proceed to prove that forms exist. The argu-

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ments that some kinds blend and some do not are egregiously fallacious when read as arguments for their existence. I do not see how one can avoid concluding that Plato did not think that the arguments of 251 D5-252E7 proved that the Forms of the middle dialogues blend, whatever such a conclusion might mean.

The argument that Plato tells us what he means by "eZ8os" and T'rExrLv" requires some, but not much, reading between the lines. If the

argument of the preceding paragraph is correct then there is nothing left for Plato to mean by "e'18os" except "justice, the one, health, etc." He could of course mean more than this by telling us how he intends to use the term. But this he does not do.

This argument can be strengthened. Plato nowhere explicitly defines the new technical terms '4JLyv1vvxL," "bffLXOLVWVELV," etc. Nor does he explain explicitly how to understand the familiar technical terms, ",ReTE'Xev," "pTaapXc436tveLv," etc., which now occur in an entirely new context, i.e., one in which they express a relation between kinds.28 Now surely Plato must have been aware of the fact that he owed his readers an explanation of how these terms are to be understood (This is seen by "reading between the lines."). Plato must have known that his talk of blending etc. is metaphorical or technical and that the metaphor cannot be understood by extrapolation from earlier dialogues. If so, it is reasonable to assume that the "arguments" that kinds blend were intended in part to explain what is meant by "blending".

If we look at the arguments that kinds blend we find that Plato asserts "the F partakes of the G" on the grounds of the truth of "the F is G" where this sentence (1) in some cases cannot be understood as definitional and (2) in some cases cannot be understood as a Form-predication and (3) can always be understood as a kind-predication. Since all of the sentences which are said to entail a blending relation can be understood as kind- predications it is reasonable to assume that Plato in these arguments is telling us that blending introduces kind-predications. Put less anachronis- tically, blending introduces sentences which (a) are not about the Forms of the middle dialogues and (b) do not say what a thing is by its very nature.

The truth of "Motion blends with Rest" and "Rest blends with Motion" stands or falls with the truth of "Motion rests" and "Rest moves". 252D32- 10 makes it clear that neither "Motion rests" nor "Rest moves"9 are Form-predications. Their falsity follows from the fact that rest and motion are opposites, a fact which is irrelevant to their truth as Form-predications.

"Man is separate from the others and by itself' entails "Man blends with the separate, the by-itself and Being" (extrapolated from 251 B5-C6 and

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252B9-10). It is clear that "Man is separate. . ." is not a Form-predication. It is a consequence of a philosophical theory which denies the existence of predication, a theory which is intelligible without assuming that it is com- mitted to the theory of Forms. Though Plato believes both of the above sentences to be false, it is clear that participation is not here used to introduce a sentence which would, if true, be definitional.

Finally, "Motion is" and "Rest is" entail respectively "Motion blends with Being" and "Rest blends with being" (25 1 E7-252B6).29 "Motion is" is clearly not definitional on any reading of the troublesome verb "to be". We do not explain the nature of something by telling someone that that nature is. Nor is "Motion is" a Form-predication for the context makes it clear that it is entailed by "Something moves". Clearly "Something moves" does not entail "the Form, Motion is" and Plato must have known this. It is hard to argue that "Motion is" is a Kind-predication due to the vagueness of the predicate. My own guess is that Plato often uses sentences of the form "The F is" to mean "There is such a thing as The F". "Something moves" does entail "There is such a thing as motion". This explanation of what is meant by "The F is" also seems to fit 257E9-10 and 258C2-3.

Let me conclude by cautioning against a possible misunderstanding of my argument. I have tried to show that the E S does not mention the Forms of the middle dialogues outside the context of discussing the friends of the Forms. But the SOPHIST should not be read as repudiating the theory of forms. The truth of that theory is irrelevant to the argument of the Sophist. This is as it should be. A man who doubts the obvious, i.e., that there are false statements, is hardly going to be dissuaded by an argument which presupposes as controversial a theory as the theory of Forms.

University of California Santa Barbara

1 The problem has been discussed by R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd Edition (Oxford, 1953), 250-264; I. M. Crombie, A n Examination of Plato's Doctrine: 11, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (London, 1963), 401-410; M. Frede, "'Pradikation und Existen- zaussage," Hypomnemata, Heft 18, (1967) 9-99; and G. Vlastos, "On Ambiguity in the Sophist" in Platonic Studies, (Princeton, 1973), 270-322, among others, while it is alluded to by G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being" in Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, G. Viastos, ed., (Garden City, 1971), 233, note 20. 2 1 will assume that J. L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259" in Vlastos, ed., op. cit., has shown that "Wri-xELv", ",X4TaXcvr,.v" and "xoLVwCVeV" (with the genitive) are used synonymously by Plato. I also assume that "yivos", "Eo80S" and "'8sia" are used synonymously. 3 I will speak of a sentence being of form "The F (is).. ." only where the context of the sentence makes it clear that the subject expression is not a definite description. "(is). . ." is

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intended to represent any predicate expression with or without the copula. 4 For the meanings of "aor&os", "xivlns" and their cognates see G. Vlastos, op. cit., 272, n. 5. While the argument of this subsection is similar to those of Vlastos, Robinson and Crombie, considerations of space prevent me from pointing out agreements and disa- greements. 0Op. cit., 211-212.

6 M. Frede (op. cit., 38) appeals to 260D6-E3 as evidence that "partakes" is ambiguously used by Plato. But G. E. L. Owen (op. cit., p. 253, n. 51) has corrected the error.

7M. Frede's (op. cit., pp. 88-9) attempt to retain the sense of 'non-identity' for "'E'rEpov" in the passage, I think, fails. He translates 257D 10-1 1 as: "Was wir jeweils 'nicht schon' nennen, ist wesentlich verschieden vom Schonen." The 'ist' is a definitional 'is', 'wesent- lich' is a translation of "ovx axXXoV TLVOS . . A and 'Schbnen' means 'was schon ist.' The passages Frede quotes tojustify his translation of"oux&XXovrnvos. . .",Charm, 167BI I-Cl, 168D3-4 and Sophist 247E3-4, do not support his point. For each of these passages retain their sense when this phrase is translated literally. 257D 10-11 does not. Also the evidence Frede cites for translating "rs ToD xaXov Otaews" as "was schbn ist" is, it seems to me, weak. Granted that in the Sophist "4voLs of x" is often used to mean simply "x", it does not follow that "x" functions as shorthand for "what is x." One passage Frede cites in support of this translation in fact counts against his interpretation. "i Oax'rpov

40uLs" in i oaTOrpoV RLo 4vU0LS 10iVEraL xaraxiExcpRatr(a6aL" (257C7) can not mean "what

is different." 8 "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," Philosophical Review, 81 (1972) 267-281. 9 Owen seems to agree with Frede on this point. Owen says that Plato distinguishes different uses of the verb 'to be' (op. cit., 256) and that "The use of the verb 'to be' on which the E S rests his conclusion [that Motion "is not, as a matter of identity, all those things which it is predicatively" (Owen's italics)] is the connective use distributed between identity and predication" (p. 254). On Frede, see below. Perhaps, however, Owen's disclaimer (p. 251, n. 47) that disagreement with Ackrill on the question of Plato's having distinguished senses of the verb 'to be', "does not at all carry disagreement on his substantial issue, that Plato succeeds in distinguishing predications from statements of identity," if correctly understood, is an anticipation of my interpretation. See above pp. 51ff. 10 Op. cit. 257-8. 11 Op. cit. 71-2. 12 Whether "ov y&p 6S.av ?'t;l iErv *ViT-PravrTorv xexi Ri -Ta'r6v, 6[oiws rdp1xadRv" is trans-

lated as "when we call it the same and not the same" or as "when we say it (is) the same and not the same" the point is the same. "-kTL" is at its most implicit in the explanation. 13 Op. cit. 212-13. 14 Op. Cit. 12-29. Frede, I think, has performed the important function of clarifying 255C8-E 1. 'Being' and 'the different' are not two names for the same kind because 'Being' is both "'npbs 'repov" and "xaO' a{o'r" while 'the different' is only "-rp6s irrpov". That is, a thing is both itself and other things, e.g., green, hot, tall; while a thing is different only from things other than itself. But it in no way follows that the verb 'to be' has two uses, particularly where difference in use determines difference in truth value. Perhaps an analogy will be helpful. "Is the same height as" might be distinguished from "is taller than" by the same argument. I am the same height as myself as well as many other things but I am only taller than things other than myself. Thus "the equi-tall" and "the taller"

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are two names for different kinds. Clearly it does not follow that "I am the same height as myself' is true or false depending on the use of "the same height as." 15 ibid. p. 69 and also Frede's comments on 255E14, pp. 67ff. 16 Op. cit. 272-3. 17 i.e., are the B2 predicates mentioned by Owen in "Didactic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms", Aristotle on Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen, Oxford (1968), 108. 18 There is an interesting disanalogy between the relationship of mathematics to knowl- edge and that of the not-beautiful to difference. Mathematics is a kind of knowledge but the not-beautiful is not a kind of difference as, e.g., qualitative difference is. Perhaps this is Plato's point in Statesman 263B7- 10: All kinds (e';CS) of x are parts (Lipq) of x but not all parts of x are kinds of x. 19 I discuss English sentences only to avoid having to argue about the specific meanings of sentences found in the dialogues. The following four sentences from the dialogues exemplify respectively the same features as their English counterparts: "xai y&p otvri1 [fl iTXarEda v&px'il TOV &Ei 'rrXaoL&toVTa xai &arro6 Wvov vapx&v -Trowt," (Meno, 80A6-7); "qxv'aVTLx6s pkv &px XEpX;bL xaXC7s XpaE'raL" (Cratylus, 388C5); ".. .ek mla-

TaiplqV To T-s xEOaXiS 46&pwAxov;; (Charmides, 155EI-2); "E'TEpOV Si E'TLV TO pv TE Xvi xo00ov Tis oranXw S av'rT" (Charmides, 166B2-3). 20 There are of course the troublesome sentences "The invisible is not an object of perception," "The uncreated is eternal," etc. 21 The question as to whether or not those sentences which correspond to the part/whole relation among Forms can also be understood as kind-predications is difficult to answer. Let me assume that not only "Mathematics is a science" but also "Justice is a virtue" and "Red is a color" are truths reflecting the part/whole relationship. Only a philosopher would have occasion to say "Mathematics is a kind of science which is a science." But consider "Mathematics is a kind of thing which is a science," "Justice is a kind of thing which is a virtue," or "Red is a kind of thing which is a color." For my part I am tempted to respond, "No! Justice is a kind of virtue. To say that it is a kind of thing which is a virtue suggests that justice isn't a kind of virtue." It is at least true that "justice is a kind of virtue" is a far more natural paraphrase of "Justice is a virtue" than "Justice is a kind of thing which is a virtue." In the same vein, "The whale is a kind of swimmer" seems objection- able as a paraphrase of "The whale is a swimmer" on the grounds that though the whale may exemplify one kind of swimmer, it is not one kind of swimmer, as, e.g., the animal that swims by using tins and the animal that swims by using webbed feet are kinds of swimmers. Be that as it may, it is not part of the thesis of this paper that sentences corresponding to the whole/part relationship cannot also be understood as kind-predi- cations. Plato makes it clear, I think, that he intends the whole/part relation to be different from participation. He does not make it clear whether or not one sentence can be ambiguous between a kind-predication and a quasi-definitional predication. I also think that we ought not expect a rote technique for determining whether or not a particular sentence exemplifies one or the other of these relationships. If "&vxaTecraRiuv'qV" (253D6) and "`EpLexogivas" (D8) are meant to signify the same as participation, then 253D5-E6 tells us that it is the philosopher who, by dialectic, determines whether or not kinds are related by participation or as part to whole. I do believe however that the difference between sentences justified by participation on the one hand and by the part/whole relationship on the other is at least partially reflected in the difference between "The F is a kind of thing which G's" and "The F is a kind of G" respectively. 22 The crux mentioned by Owen ("'Plato on Not-Being," op. cit., 233, n. 20.) may also be

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solved by my interpretation. To be sure, "rest", "being", etc., do not function on my interpretation as the names of abstract entities in the passages mentioned by Owen: 255E1 1-14, 256A3-5, D5-8. I am simply not sure however whether or not my interpre- tation of these passages renders them consistent with Owen's interpretation of the pro- blematic 256D I l-E6. 23 Two of the apparent syllipses listed above involve the sentence "Motion rests" (255A10-B1 and 256B6-7). Thus it seems that the objection must be faced by those who think that "Motion rests" is not a Form-predication, viz.: Owen ("Plato on Not-Being," op. cit., 267, additional note), Frede (op. cit., 34), Malcolm ("Plato's Analysis of T6 ov and T6 yLi ov in the Sophist, " Phronesis 13 (1967) 140-1, n. 21) and perhaps Crombie (op. cit., p. 410). The objection does not apply to Vlastos who thinks that "If Motion partook of rest then motion would rest" means "If the Form, Motion, partook of the Form, Rest, then the Forms, Motion and Rest, would be so related that everything that is in motion is at rest." (op. cit., p. 274, n. 13). 24 Op. cit., pp. 211-12. 25 1 disagree however with Ackrill's interpretation of the type of analysis introduced. See above, p. 46. Frede (op. cit., 12-29) and Owen ("Plato on Not-Being", op. cit., 253-8) have

shown that Plato does not speak of participation to distinguish an existential from a copulative meaning of the verb 'c'vtvaL." 26 Op. cit., 267-281. 27 The reformed materialists have been convinced that some things are non-sensible but have hardly been convinced that the full blown theory of Forms is true. 28 The attempt to read "participation" in the Sophist as synonymous with its use in the middle dialogues leads to reading first-order sentences as Form-predications. 29 I read Xr-yoL.v av oviUv as "would say nothing true" instead of Ackrill's reading (op. cit., 203) "would say nothing meaningful." The arguments of Ackrill are I think easily met. Ackrill first points out that the arguments are dialectical showing only that if one holds a given theory he must also admit that forms blend. When one is arguing for such an obvious truth as that some predications are true or meaningful, however, I think that no other type of argument is available. Are there premises which are more obvious than this conclusion? Ackrill next objectsthat "it is completely mysterious why the thesis that no forms combine should entail that the theories are false." I submit that it is equally mysterious why the thesis should entail that the theories are meaningless. To make sense of these arguments they must be read as explanations of what is meant by form blending.

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