kevin ring sentencing

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ))

Plaintiff, ))

v. )) No. 1:08-cr-00274-ESH

KEVIN A. RING, ))

Defendant. ) )

UNITED STATES’ SENTENCING MEMORANDUM REGARDING FACTORS TOCONSIDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3553The United States, by and through its undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits thissentencing memorandum regarding factors to consider pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 indetermining the appropriate sentence for defendant Kevin Ring, whom a jury convicted ofconspiracy, payment of an illegal gratuity, and three counts of honest services fraud. The Courthas previously determined that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended sentencing range is46 to 57 months of incarceration. DE 289. For the reasons stated herein, the Governmentrecommends that the Court sentence Ring to a sentence within the Guidelines range—50 months. In addition, the Government does not recommend that Ring pay a fine, but that Ring be orderedto pay the mandatory special assessments of $500, serve a period of three years of supervisedrelease, and perform community service in lieu of a fine.

I. Applicable Sentencing LawAs stated by the Supreme Court in Gall v. United States, “a district court should begin allsentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” 552 U.S. 38, 49(2007). The Guidelines range should be “treat[ed] as ‘the starting point and the initial

Case 1:08-cr-00274-ESH Document 292 Filed 10/11/11 of 39

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benchmark’ for sentencing.” United States v. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2011)(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49). “Then, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue forwhatever sentence they deem appropriate,” the court is required to consider all of the sentencingfactors Congress identified in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and undertakes “an individualized assessmentbased on the facts presented.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50). In this case, as noted above,the Court has determined that the total offense level for Ring’s conduct is 23, with a guidelinesrange of 46 to 57 months of incarceration. DE 289 at 42. II. Section § 3553 Factors Strongly Support A Guidelines SentenceAs noted above, the Supreme Court has declared that “[a]s a matter of administration andto secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initialbenchmark.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines remain an indispensableresource for assuring appropriate and uniform punishment for federal criminal offenses. While the Guidelines are the starting point used to ensure nationwide consistency, thisCourt must also consider all of the sentencing considerations set forth in § 3553(a). Thosefactors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristicsof the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense,to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need toafford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes ofthe defendant; (4) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training,medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (5) the guidelines andpolicy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarrantedsentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of


Further, courts have recognized that the harm to the public’s confidence in its elected1officials is one that is not adequately considered by the sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Saxton, 53 Fed. Appx. 610, 613 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming three-level upward departurewhere fraud caused non-monetary harm of “loss of public confidence and trust in electedofficials”). 3

similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). As described below, the relevant sentencing factors warrant the imposition of asentence within the applicable Guidelines range of 46 - 57 months of incarceration.A. Section 3553(a)(1) -The Long-Term and Extensive Nature and

Circumstances of the Offense Support a Guidelines Sentence of

IncarcerationIn fashioning a reasonable sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the Court mustconsider the nature and circumstances of the offense. The serious and long-term nature of thispublic corruption scheme supports a Guidelines sentence of 50 months.The decline of public confidence in our democratic institutions in general and in ourpublic officials in particular is a loss that cannot be lightly cast aside. Courts have repeatedlyrecognized that the type of harm caused by defendant Ring is an intangible harm that can neverbe measured in dollars, and is one that cannot easily be remedied: Government corruption breeds cynicism and mistrust of electedofficials. It causes the public to disengage from the democraticprocess because, as the Court stated at sentencing, the public beginsto think of politics as ‘only for the insiders.’ Thus corruption has thepotential to shred the delicate fabric of democracy by making theaverage citizen lose respect and trust in elected officials and give upany hope of participating in government through legitimate channels.1United States v. Ganim, 2006 WL 1210984, at *5 (D. Conn. May 5, 2006). The serious nature of Ring’s criminal conduct and blatant violations of the public trust,and the direct and adverse impact upon the integrity of the federal government and the citizens’


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confidence therein, call for the imposition of terms of imprisonment consistent with the

Guidelines range and, concomitantly, negate any requested downward sentencing variance or

departure. The criminal acts alleged in the Indictment and demonstrated at trial spanned

many years and targeted the highest levels of the executive and legislative branches of

government. Indeed, the evidence presented at trial established that Ring engaged in, and helped

manage, an orchestrated scheme to use exclusive, high-priced tickets, trips, even a “low-show”

job for a congressional spouse, and other things of value to corruptly influence public officials.

See, e.g., GX-KR 327 (email between Ring and Todd Boulanger, a co-conspirator who emailed

Ring from an MCI suite during March Madness in which he was drinking beers with David

Ayres, Chief of Staff to the United States Attorney General, to which Ring responded “Glad he

got a chance to relax. Now he can pay us back.”). After the Department of Justice awarded

Ring’s client a $16.3 million grant, Ring sent the following email to his co-conspirators:

Don’t thank me - thank your friends on the Hill and in the

Administration. In fact, thank them over and over this week -

preferably for long periods of time and at expensive establishments.

Set aside time to think about thanking them. Thank them until it

hurts - and until we have a June bill that reflects the fact that our

client is about to get a $16.3 million check from the Department of

Justice.

GX-KR 332.

Ring’s own words unequivocally established that he was corruptly linking things of value

to official acts. See, e.g., GX-KR 112 (Ring emailing Albaugh, “You are going to eat free off

our clients. Need to get us some abstinence money.”). But the corpus of Ring’s efforts to

corrupt public officials was not limited merely to free meals. The evidence at trial established

that Ring spiked the steady provision of things of value with high-priced items, including


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initiating efforts to secure a free Caribbean trip for a Member of Congress and his Chief of Staff.

In one email proposing this free trip, Ring wrote to Jack Abramoff:

[P]lease give [Congressman] Doolittle a call when you get a chanceas well. He was such a good soldier, doing everything we asked ofhim, and then going beyond the call of duty by chairing the hearingfor 3 hours. I know you are great about making sure he gets his fairshare of contributions, but if Hernan is feeling generous, this wouldbe a very opportune time to get something to Doolittle. Also, I knowhe and David [Lopez] are still interested in visiting PR wheneverpossible.

GX-KR 225. In another email in which Ring and Abramoff discuss the free Caribbean trip for

Congressman Doolittle and his Chief of Staff, David Lopez, Ring says to Abramoff, “I don’t

think they want to have too many scheduled visits or activities.” Abramoff responds, “They

don’t need to have any scheduled activities.” GX-KR 226.

Although Ring was not a public servant when he committed his crimes, his illegal activity

is no less threatening to the public’s trust or the integrity of the government. The evidence

presented at trial, particularly Ring’s own words, demonstrated that Ring went much further than

his co-conspirators, managing his and his co-conspirator’s activities with a very specific principle

of using large things of value to target only public officials who would provide a “return” on

their “investment,” as evidenced by Ring’s own words: “I hate when we spend all that money and

don’t get any return on our investment.” GX-KR 553; see also GX-KR 552 (“We want anyone

who will really, really help us with specific stuff.”). Out of pure greed and in his never-ending

attempt to be the top lobbying group in town (see, e.g., GX-KR 555 (“F #5; we’re going to be #1

this year”)), Ring selfishly attempted to turn public officials from serving their constituents to

serving Ring and his co-conspirators. In one such example, Ring and Abramoff provided the


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wife of a Congressman with a $5,000 a month job, insisting that she not work too hard because

“she ha[d] responsibilities at home as a mother and wife.” GX-KR 243. Ring could not have

made his motive for this low-show job any more clear—she was the wife of a Congressman who

was “such a good soldier,” GX-KR 225, who, even in the words of the Congressman, behaved

like a “subsidiary” of Ring’s lobbying firm. GX-KR 238.

Ring demonstrated an unwavering commitment to this principle, rewarding public

officials with illegal gratuities when they came through for his clients. In one such example,

Ring sent an email to Abramoff asking to reward DOJ official Bob Coughlin for his specific

official acts: “Bob Coughlin helped on the school and is now looking for tickets to the Wizards

on both March 15th and 18th. Do we have 4 tickets available for either or both games?” GX-KR

341. Abramoff, demonstrating his commitment to the same principle, responds, “Totally!!!!

Give him ccs[—third row seats—]for both games, please.” GX-KR 341.

In his sentencing memorandum, Ring asserts as a mitigating factor that “virtually all of

the things of value given to public officials by Mr. Ring were local meals and tickets to sporting

events.” DE 290 at 20. But the corpus of the bribe does not make the crime any less egregious.

Indeed, it does not matter if Ring bribed public officials with “meals and tickets” or a suitcase

full of cash. Both have the ability to corruptly influence a public official and pervert our

democratic institutions of government. The material fact is that a jury convicted Ring of

participating in a scheme to bribe public officials. Ring also asserts that he is entitled to an

increased level of leniency because of his profession as a lobbyist. See DE 290 at 28 (arguing

that “the guidelines are of limited value because this case is [] distinct” given that Ring was “a

registered lobbyist”). But the law does not discriminate based on a defendant’s profession, and


To make matters worse, Ring—a licensed attorney who worked on the Senate Judiciary2

Committee and published a book analyzing the dissenting opinions of Justice Scalia—displayed

nothing short of an absolute disregard for the rule of law. When coordinating invitations to

public officials with Boulanger for the Super Bowl trip described above, Ring instructed

Boulanger not to provide to the House and Senate Ethics Committees with any names of the

public officials they were targeting for the free Super Bowl trip. GX-KR 558. Ring’s underlying

criminal conduct constitutes blatant and repeated violations of the public trust, warranting the

imposition of a term of incarceration as contemplated by the applicable Guidelines range.

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Ring’s profession as a lobbyist does not entitle him to any special privileges, immunities, or

leniency. Rather, he should be treated not as a “lobbyist,” but as a felon convicted of

participating for years in an extensive scheme to corrupt numerous public officials with the goal

of improperly securing millions of dollars.2

B. 3553(a)(2) Factors Support a Guidelines Sentence to Reflect the Seriousness

of the Offense and Provide Adequate Deterrence

A prison sentence for Ring consistent with the calculated Guidelines range is essential to

accomplish the relevant purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3553(a)(2); that is: “(A) to reflect the seriousness

of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

[and] (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct[.]” For years, Ring corruptly sought

to trade money, gifts, tickets, and trips for the official acts of high-ranking government officials.

As demonstrated above, Ring sought to conceal the nature of his activities by instructing his co-

conspirators not to disclose the names of public officials they were targeting with a free trip to

the Super Bowl. But for this criminal investigation and holding Ring and his co-conspirators

accountable, Ring might well have continued with his corrupt scheme to pillage federal funds

and taxpayer dollars with impunity. The proposed punishments in this case—which include

terms of incarceration as prescribed by the applicable Guidelines range—fit his serious crimes.


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Section 3553(a) is not limited to the necessary sentence to deter Ring from engaging infurther criminal conduct (specific deterrence), but also includes consideration of deterring otherpotential criminals from engaging in similar conduct (general deterrence). See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The plain language of the statute . . .also militates against limiting the authority of the court to specific deterrence. . . . We note thatthis conclusion comports with the longstanding and uncontroversial practice of consideringgeneral deterrence in sentencing.”). From the standpoint of general deterrence, moreover, theproposed Guidelines sentence of incarceration will send a strong message to all current andfuture government officials and employees, and all who seek to corruptly influence those publicofficials, that corruption and violations of the public trust will not be tolerated. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2008) (highlighting need for generaldeterrence in public corruption prosecutions). It will also send a strong message to members ofthe business community that government contracts must be awarded based upon merit and theactual needs of the government agency, rather than the amount of a bribe or kickback or lavishingpublic officials with meals and entertainment. Ring, in a draft of his autobiography, understood how his own story involving corruptioncould inform others who were determining how to behave in the lobbying and political world:The other purpose [of this book] is to give people a better sense of thelobbying profession: what it does, what it shouldn’t do, and explainits symbiotic relationship with Members of Congress; and finally, intelling my story, I hope to provide a cautionary tale about what canhappen when you make a corrupt bargain for early success andmoney.


Ring even argues that he should receive a below-the Guidelines sentence because a3

newspaper quoted two of the twelve jurors in this case as opining that the case was a waste of

time and money. DE 290 at 29-30. While Ring eagerly cites these two selective quotes from

individual jurors, he ignores the jury’s loudest and only unanimous statement: he is guilty of

participating in a scheme to bribe and corrupt public officials.

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The Court should impose a period of incarceration within the Guidelines range in order to show

that Ring and others should not engage in “a corrupt bargain for early success and money.” A

sentence of incarceration would be the appropriate “cautionary tale” and afford adequate

deterrence to anyone who, like Ring, considers engaging in criminal conduct and winning at any

cost. Those involved in lobbying or those being lobbied at Capitol Hill will pay close attention

to the sentence that Ring receives. This case has been the subject of significant media coverage,

and a sentence within the suggested Guideline range will be a clear deterrent to others who seek

to corrupt the nation’s political system. A below-the-Guidelines sentence may have the exact

opposite impact and demonstrate that, there is no “cautionary tale” and that those who push the

outer edges of the law will never be punished if they cross the line into illegality.

In his sentencing memorandum, Ring acknowledges the importance of deterrence to the

sentencing Guidelines, but he argues that media coverage of this case has provided sufficient

deterrence. See, e.g., DE 290 at 34 (“For different reasons, the Court does not need to impose a

harsh penalty in order to advance the goal of general deterrence. Mr. Ring’s case has been

exhaustively covered in the general press and also in publications geared toward Capitol Hill and

the lobbying community.”). But media coverage cannot substitute for general deterrence, and

Ring offers no authority to the contrary. This is particularly true when some of the media3

coverage is generated by the public officials who received Ring’s bribes and illegal gratuities.

See, e.g., John Doolittle, The Growing Criminalization of American Politics, The Daily Caller


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(Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://dailycaller.com/2010/11/30/the-growing-criminalization-of-

american-politics/. Indeed, Ring’s argument could have the perverse effect of encouraging co-

conspirators to generate media coverage of their case so that, if convicted, they can receive a

below-the-Guidelines sentence. But in fact, the opposite holds true. Because of the media

coverage in this case, there could be a dramatic negative impact if the public sees a minimal

sentence of incarceration for a criminal who for years was involved in corrupting the integrity of

the government and scheming to bribe public officials. Such a below-the-Guidelines sentence

will risk inviting more criminal activity; minimal deterrence will be achieved and no one will

have learned from Ring’s “cautionary tale” of his “corrupt bargain for early success and money.”

On a similar note, Ring argues that legislation Congress passed in response to Ring’s

criminal activity substitutes as sufficient deterrence. See DE 290 at 34-35 (arguing that

Congress’ enactment of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (”HLOGA”)

addressed many of “nebulous” nature of “the honest services fraud statute pre-Skilling”). Ring’s

argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Skilling, which held that the honest

services fraud statute unambiguously criminalized the conduct at the core of Ring’s conviction.

More importantly, legislation enacted in response to the defendant’s criminal activity cannot

substitute for general deterrence. Rather, the fact that Ring’s criminal conduct was so notorious

that it earned the attention of Congress demonstrates the egregious and serious nature of his acts

and how his crimes negatively affected the democratic process. Thus, passage of HLOGA in

response to Ring’s criminal activity is an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor.

Indeed, Ring makes an extraordinary request for a departure or variance from a

Guidelines of sentence of 46 to 57 months to probation because, among other reasons, he failed


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to truly understand his conduct was criminal, he has numerous redeeming qualities, and hepromises to never again engage in criminal conduct. Ring’s advocacy crystalizes the inherentchallenges for the Court in sentencing white collar criminals—excellent defense lawyers who canpaint a picture of a defendant that identifies only the positive traits of the defendant and is craftedto appeal to the better nature of the sentencing judge. But, the Court must be careful not to focusjust on this one defendant. While the nature and characteristics of Ring are one factor toconsider, § 3553 specifically recognizes that the Court should be aware of the message thatsentencing a defendant like Ring to a below-the-Guidelines sentence could send to other potentialwhite collar criminals around the country. Probation for white collar defendants, and the impacton the general deterrent effect, were specifically considered when Congress passed theSentencing Reform Act:[It is our] view that in the past there have been many cases,particularly in instances of major white collar crime, in whichprobation has been granted because the offender required little ornothing in the way of institutionalized rehabilitative measures ... andbecause society required no insulation from the offender, without dueconsideration being given to the fact that the heightened deterrenteffect of incarceration and the readily perceivable receipt of justpunishment accorded by incarceration were of critical importance.The placing on probation of [a white collar criminal] may be perfectlyappropriate in cases in which, under all the circumstances, only therehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a sentence maybe grossly inappropriate, however, in cases in which thecircumstances mandate the sentence's carrying substantial deterrentor punitive impact.S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 91-92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274-75 (emphasisadded). In this situation, the Court cannot focus only on the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,


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but must consider the broader impact that Ring’s sentencing could have on others considering

whether to cross the line into illegality.

Not only Congress, but numerous courts have recognized that because of the tendency to

under-punish those who engage in economic and corruption offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines

serve a particularly important purpose in determining the appropriate sentence for criminals who

violate what society has called “white-collar crime.” For instance, the Supreme Court in

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375 n.9 (1989), noted that the Senate Report on the

Sentencing Reform Act “gave specific examples of areas in which prevailing sentences might be

too lenient, including the treatment of major white-collar criminals.” Accord United States v.

Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Guidelines reflect Congress’ judgment as to

the appropriate national policy for [white-collar] crimes....”); United States v. Mueffelman, 470

F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the importance of “the minimization of discrepancies between

white- and blue-collar offenses”). In United States v. Martin, the Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit remanded a below-the-Guidelines sentence for resentencing of a white-collar

defendant and provided the following explanation:

Our assessment is consistent with the views of the drafters of § 3553.

As the legislative history of the adoption of § 3553 demonstrates,

Congress viewed deterrence as ‘particularly important in the area of

white collar crime.’ S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. Congress was especially concerned

that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, ‘[m]ajor white collar

criminals often [were] sentenced to small fines and little or no

imprisonment. Unfortunately, this creates the impression that certain

offenses are punishable only by a small fine that can be written off as

a cost of doing business.’ Id.

455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006).


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This Court certainly has the power to sentence the defendant to probation or minimal jailtime, but § 3553 specifically urges the court to consider the deterrent effect of the punishment. AGuidelines sentence, as advocated by the Government, will send a critically important message ofdeterrence to others who are confronted with the opportunity to commit similar crimes—the riskof punishment is not worth committing the crime. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar PleaBargaining & Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 724 (2005) (“[W]hite-collar crime is more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity,so it should be a prime candidate for general deterrence. An economist would argue that if oneincreased the expected cost of white-collar crime by raising the expected penalty, white-collarcrime would be unprofitable and would thus cease.”); Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“Defendants inwhite collar crimes often calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white collar crimestherefore can be affected and reduced with serious punishment.”). Society is served not just bydeterring Ring from further crimes, but by preventing others like Ring from committing thesecrimes of choice.Deterrence in corruption cases is perhaps the most important factor of all of the § 3553(a)factors. The federal government simply does not have the resources to investigate everypotentially corrupt transaction or to perform integrity audits of public officials to ensure thattaxpayer funds are not being diverted for private benefit. The people of the United States rely, asthey must, on the integrity of our public officials and those businessmen and lobbyists thatinteract with them. The sentence in this case must, therefore, be sufficiently severe to deterpublic corruption by all of those involved in the political process—whether public officials orthose who seek to influence them. The message should be clear that corrupt conduct is not


Defendant noted that a sentence of incarceration would have would have an adverse impact4on his family. The purported impact on the defendant's family is not so far outside the heartlandin criminal cases as to warrant a downward departure or variance. While any trauma caused toRing’s family due to sentencing is deeply regrettable, it is important to note that the cause of thetrauma is Ring’s own wrongdoing not merely on a single occasion, but repeatedly over the spanof several years. Moreover, the loss of employment or the loss of Ring’s emotional support as aresult of sentencing is a consequence common to all criminal defendants - white collar or bluecollar. The financial and emotional hardships suffered as a result of a criminal conviction, whileundoubtedly real, hardly make the defendant’s situation unique. Indeed, the same hardshipswould likely be endured by virtually any white collar defendant. If these natural and foreseeableconsequences of Ring’s criminal conduct meant that he should not have to go to prison, then fewdefendants would ever be incarcerated. 14

tolerated, and if the corrupt conduct is discovered, the punishment will be just, appropriate, andsevere enough to counter the damage that the corrupt conduct has had on democracy. While it isaxiomatic that the Government cannot catch and punish everyone involved in corruptionoffenses, when the purveyors of corruption are found and convicted, they must be punishedappropriately. A conviction without punishment is no deterrent at all. Indeed, a convictionwithout incarceration for such egregious and highly profitable corruption of public officials andgovernment institutions will only invite future offenders.C. Section 3553(a)(1) History and Characteristics of the DefendantAnother Section 3553(a)(1) factor that the Court must consider in fashioning anappropriate sentence is the history and characteristics of the defendant. In his submission, Ringsets forth numerous positive character traits that identify a thoughtful, aggressive and intellectualman and a loving father. Taken together, Ring’s submission suggest that his misconduct was aseries of errors and misunderstandings that stand in sharp contrast to the extraordinarily positiveand honest person identified in the letters of support. Thus, Ring argues, the Court should acceptthat portrait and fashion a sentence of probation. The government respectfully disagrees. 4


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As the defendant notes, “the profiles reflected in the letters directly conflict with a mannow convicted of public corruption offenses.” DE 290 at 10. Indeed, they do. The Governmentdoes not dispute Ring’s many positive character traits. But, the letter writers have seen only oneside of Ring – Ring kept the truth of his corrupt and deceitful conduct even from those who knewhim best. The dual nature of Ring is exemplified by one of the letter writers who proclaims Ring’sinnocence and defends typical D.C. lobbying practices. During an interview with the FBI, theletter writer was shown Ring’s words describing his transformation from a policy-focused stafferto an aggressive lobbyist for Abramoff. The letter-writer expressed surprise because, eventhough Ring was one of her closest friends, Ring had never discussed any of these thoughts withher - including that Ring wanted to cash out by becoming a lobbyist or the “corrupt bargain forearly success and money.” Ring’s friend was shocked by the emails that Ring sent and received,including a staffer saying how she was “earning my sigs sushi,” and Ring’s response—“exactly. I will keep you occupied.” GX KR 277. When shown passages from the book and Ring’semails, the letter writer stated unequivocally that this is not “how she knows Ring.” Indeed. thatis the challenge for the individuals writing letters asking for leniency for Ring—Ring has shownthem only part of his nature. The other parts of Ring—captured in his emails and in his owndraft autobiography—expose the unpleasant sides of Ring. Incredibly thoughtful, but incrediblycompetitive. Even though his closest friends may not know that less pleasant side of Ring, thewords in the emails and the person describing himself in his draft autobiography are undeniably apart of Ring. Ring made clear that he was a faithful devotee to the Abramoff style oflobbying—“Taught how to lobby; answer is always yes; do anything to win.”


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While the letter writers make valid points regarding the positive aspects of Ring, a morecomplete description of the history and characteristics of the defendant support a sentence withinthe recommended Guidelines range. The government respectfully submits that the Court shouldconsider two major factors in understanding the history and characteristics of Ring: 1) Ringshows little remorse for his criminal conduct – defendant appears upset over the fact that he wasprosecuted, not that he engaged in wrongful acts; 2) in contrast to the position that one of Ring’sredeeming qualities is “honesty,” DE at 290 at 7, Ring’s actions repeatedly demonstrate that heputs his own interests above others and that he will lie, repeatedly, to protect or enrich himself. 1. Ring’s Lack of Remorse Supports the Guidelines SentenceThe defendant has demonstrated minimal remorse for the illegal conduct of which thejury convicted him. Ring continues to deny that he had intent to corrupt public officials, and hefails to acknowledge that he acted improperly by giving things of value to publicofficials—claiming instead that he gave the things of value for friendship or as part of the typicalpattern of relationship building. Such an argument was specifically argued to the jury and suchan argument was rejected when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty ofthe corruption offenses.Indeed, Ring’s lack of remorse stands in sharp contrast to what Ring had argued in hisprevious submission that he should be given a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See DEat 258 at 38-42. Then, Ring argued that he was merely contesting a legal issue about whetherwhat he considered to be normally lobbying was a violation of the honest services fraud statue. As the Court correctly found and is made clear in this submission, Ring was not arguing theapplicability of the law; rather, Ring is arguing that he lacked corrupt intent. The jury was


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presented with the evidence, correctly instructed on the contours of the law, and specifically

rejected Ring’s position.

In describing the contours of the offense and why he should receive a probationary

sentence, Ring focuses primarily on three public officials—Congressman Doolittle, John

Albaugh, and Bob Coughlin. Ring provides various explanations for each focusing on the

specific relationships. Importantly, Ring had the opportunity (and did) present these arguments

to the jury, but the jury, looking at the totality of the evidence, specifically rejected Ring’s claim

of innocence. Moreover, in focusing on just those three, Ring ignores the much larger pattern of

corruption of which he was a part—indeed, the larger pattern of corruption for which he was an

organizer and manager. Ring did not seek to corrupt only those three officials. He sought to

corrupt many more—David Lopez, Peter Evich, Greg Orlando, David Ayres, and Jennifer Farley,

among others. Ring also managed the corruption of other lobbyists, including Neil Volz and

Todd Boulanger, and all of the public officials they sought to and did corrupt. Ring’s

contemporaneous description of his lobbying rarely focuses on the relationship between personal

friends, but instead focuses on the transactional nature of how the things of value were tied to the

official acts performed. See, e.g., GX KR 430 (“Can I promise him tickets on or near the ice? I

want to motivate him.”) Whether Ring did so inherently or was trained to think in transactional

terms by Abramoff is not material. Ring took corrupt acts, repeatedly, not just with the three

officials that were part of the three honest services fraud counts for which he was convicted, but

the many other public officials Team Abramoff rewarded with things of value with the hope that

they would turn into the corrupt champions like Doolittle, Albaugh, and Coughlin.


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2. Ring’s Repeated Dishonesty Demonstrates His History and CharacteristicsIn assessing the history and characteristics of the defendant, the Government stronglydisagrees with one of the main themes of Ring’s sentencing memorandum and the letterssupporting his request for probation. Ring appears to argue that one of his strongest virtues is hishonesty. DE 290 at 7. The Government submits that during the course of the conspiracy, thedefendant did not demonstrate honesty but instead engaged in a pattern of misconduct thatdemonstrated his selfishness and dishonesty—stealing from clients in a variety of ways and thendoing whatever he could to protect himself. Ring himself acknowledged in his draftautobiography that he “lied about things big and small.” Rather than Ring’s honesty being one ofhis strongest virtues, the repeated lies are indicative of the history and characteristics of thedefendant.• Fraudulent Billing While the Court may be aware of the time sheets that Ring and his fellow lobbyistscompleted (identifying which public officials they lobbied, what was discussed and which clientshould be charged for the meeting), what was not presented at trial, but what is not seriously indispute, is that Ring frequently fraudulently billed his clients. Specifically, Ring and others,acting on Abramoff’s direction, would inaccurately record the number of hours billed to a clientin order to show the client or the lobbying firm that more or different work had been done thanhad actually been performed. As client manager for the Choctaw, Ring routinely inflated thenumber of hours worked or expenses incurred for his clients—including inflating the Choctaw


For example, Ring emailed Abramoff in coded language regarding inflating the hours on the5

Choctaw’s bill. On February 4, 2002, Defendant emailed Abramoff the following: “How muchdoes GT bread cost Choctaw? $1.50 per loaf plus or minus a few cents. This loaf cost $1.19 andI was wondering if I should increase the price or leave as is. Know what I mean? Kevin Ring” Abramoff responded to Defendant: “The loaf should cost no less than $1.50.” Ring did notmerely inflate the hours, but his use of coded language is evidence that he knew that suchfraudulent billing was wrong.

While Ring did not defraud his clients to the same extent as Abramoff and Scanlon, he did6

receive client funds totaling $135,000 from Scanlon and $25,000 from Abramoff.

19

tribe’s bill to reach $150,000 every month. Similarly, Ring routinely inflated bills for his clients5

to include hours that Scanlon worked even though Ring knew that Scanlon never did any of that

work. Such fraudulent billing stands in sharp contrast to the portrait of a dedicated lobbyist who

is working hard for his clients. Indeed, Ring had no concerns about defrauding his clients, which

he did nearly every month. Yes, Ring inflated the bills at Abramoff’s direction, but Ring was a

willing participant in Abramoff’s efforts to pump up revenues for their lobbying firm.

Indeed, Ring did not just defraud clients for the benefit of his firm, but he lived a lavish

life at the expense of the clients who had placed their trust in him. Ring claims that he did not

rip off his clients in the same way that Scanlon and Abramoff did. But this assertion is belied by6

the evidence presented at trial. The clients gave Abramoff and Ring all sorts of assets (an

essentially unlimited expense account and millions of dollars in tickets) and assumed that Ring

would use those assets (food, drink, sporting tickets) to benefit the client by legitimately lobbying

on their behalf. The evidence presented at trial established that Ring misused client funds in an

extensive scheme to corrupt public officials. According to Ring, he merely used the funds to

benefit himself and his “friends.” Ring argues that the gifts actually were not bribes or gratuities

because the gifts were not related to professional activities, but rather were personal in nature.


As the Court may recall from Abramoff’s guilty plea and restitution order, Abramoff7

defrauded his clients in two ways through grass roots public relations services - 1) through

Scanlon and Scanlon’s grass roots entity CCS, and through a separate grass roots public relations

20

Even if completely true (which is rebutted by the jury’s verdict), Ring’s argument does not reflect

well on the history and characteristics of the defendant. If believed, such an argument means

only that Ring stole from his clients to benefit himself—essentially that Ring stole money from

those who trusted him to use that money to advance their interests. If believed, rather than using

the assets to benefit the client, Ring lied to Abramoff to convince him to give the hottest tickets

to his friends rather than those who “did dirt” for the team. If believed, rather than corrupting

officials, Ring is acknowledging that he had no concerns about simply stealing from clients so

that he and his buddies could live the high life, drinking $300 bottles of wine, eating $70 steaks,

and grazing on thousands of dollars of sushi—all the while knowing that those costs would be

passed on to his clients. His claim that he was “swept away” of the excesses of Capitol Hill is

merely a poor excuse for his improper behavior. The evidence demonstrates that Ring’s actions

were not an aberration standing in sharp contrast to the honest inner core which the letter writers

claimed to have experienced. The nature and characteristics of the defendant demonstrate that,

time and again, he took advantage of those who trusted him in order to benefit himself and those

close to him.• False Paperwork to Conceal Theft of $25,000 of Client FundsIndeed, Ring did not limit his selfish conduct to padding his expense report but chose to

create false paperwork to conceal client funds that Abramoff fraudulently transferred to him. In

January 2004, Ring used a shell entity he had created, KAR Consulting, to open a bank account

for the purpose of receiving $25,000 from Grassroots Interactive LLC (“GRI”). GRI had7


entity, GRI, which Abramoff controlled and which did not involve Scanlon. 21

received funds from many clients for the purpose of providing grass roots services - much ofwhich GRI never provided. Rather than inform his clients that no grass roots services wereprovided, Ring was willing to take money from GRI. At Abramoff’s direction, Ring evencreated a false invoice claiming that the $25,000 was for “consulting services,” when no suchservices had been performed. When press stories began to expose Abramoff’s defrauding ofclients with Scanlon, Ring got nervous and attempted to return the $25,000. Ring’s return of thefunds was not due to his innate “honesty” and concern about doing the right thing—Ring wasonly concerned about getting caught—even after he had dummied up false invoices to concealthe fraudulent transfer.• Repeated Lies to Conceal the Theft of $135,000 in Client Funds Ring’s desire to not get caught for his wrongful conduct with GRI was not an isolatedincident. Ring repeatedly lied to protect himself from another time that he had defrauded a client– this time for $135,000. As this Court is undoubtedly aware, in March 2002, Ring helped toconvince the Pueblo of Sandia Native American Indian tribe (the “Sandia”) to hire Scanlon forgrassroots lobbying work—a contract worth $2.75 million to Scanlon and his companies. At thesame time Ring agreed to reduce the lobbying fees that GT would charge the Sandia. Scanlonpaid Ring a lump sum of $135,000 for Ring’s assistance in referring the client and brokering thecontract, and purportedly to make up for the loss that Ring suffered. In his motion, Ringattempts to gloss over the fact that he defrauded his clients and that he paid it back only after thefraud was discussed in the press and he was fired for the misconduct.


Ring’s theft of $135,000 was much more than a personal failing. Ring violated his fiduciary8

duties to the Sandia by failing to inform them of the $135,000 payment and affirmatively lying to

the tribe about his receipt of that $135,000. Indeed, Ring’s actions had ramifications far beyond

that of the Sandia Peublo. Prior to the $135,000 payment, Ring became aware that Abramoff and

Scanlon were splitting the proceeds of contracts between Native American Indian tribes and

Scanlon’s entities. Ring, knowing that Scanlon was doing little to earn the $2.75 million, tried to

cover up Scanlon’s failings with the Sandia as the tribe became more and more dissatisfied with

Scanlon’s work product. Eventually, Ring lied to attorneys representing GT when questioned

about these transactions. Not only did Ring lie about the kickback arrangements, but Ring failed

to protect his clients’ interests and exhibit the loyalty that so many letters claimed Ring

possesses. Knowing that Scanlon and Abramoff were ripping off his own clients, Ring failed to

inform his other clients, like the Choctaw, that Abramoff was receiving kickbacks from Scanlon.

Ring knew about the kickback scheme, but he chose not to tell any of his clients. If Ring had

22

But, in contrast to those that proclaim Ring’s “honesty,” Ring did everything he could to

keep from getting caught and to preserve his reputation as the “wonk” and the future of GT,

rather than yet another dishonest lobbyist who stole money from his clients. Only after lying to

investigators for GT on four separate occasions and only after being confronted with email

evidence that conclusively demonstrated that Ring had stolen the money and then lied about it,

did Ring eventually admit that he lied and that he had taken the Sandia’s money—$135,000.

The Government does not fully detail the extent of Ring’s false and misleading statement

in this sentencing memorandum. In previous briefings, the Government has set forth the various

ways that Ring misled, made material omissions, and just plain lied in order to protect himself.

Whether those false statements were done simply to save his job, obstruct the DOJ/FBI and

Senate investigations, or some of both, is not something the Court needs to decide at this time.

What the Court can and should consider in fashioning an appropriate sentence is that Ring

repeatedly misled those seeking the truth. Ring told false stories and misled the investigators that

were trying to determine whether he, like Abramoff and Scanlon, had stolen funds from clients.

Simply put, Ring lied to save himself and conceal the theft of $135,000 from his clients. In8


been the dedicated lobbyist that the letters describe, more focused on the needs of his client than

the receipt of his own kickback, many tribes would not have been victimized by Scanlon’s and

Abramoff’s criminal conduct.

The Government categorically and unequivocally denies Ring’s accusation that unnamed9

prosecutors or agents instructed him to lie and implicate innocent people, an accusation Ring

raises for the first time almost a year after a jury convicted him of corrupting public officials.

Moreover, Ring’s interpretation of the facts is clearly at odds with the jury’s verdict. While Ring

maintains that he did not seek to corrupt Congressman Doolittle or his staff, a jury found

otherwise and convicted Ring of doing just that. The Government also vigorously denies

Richard Hibey’s claim that the former Chief of the Public Integrity Section sought to use a

prosecution of Ring as a vehicle to change the way lobbying is done on Capitol Hill. As the

Government argued at trial, and as the jury found, Ring did not engage only in legal lobbying, he

also participated in a scheme to influence public officials with bribes. Indeed, the Court

specifically instructed the jury that there was nothing criminal about lobbying public officials and

Ring could not be convicted of participating in such activity. Rather, the jury’s verdict clearly

reflects its conclusion that Ring sought to influence public officials by corruptly influencing them

with things of value, that is, bribes and illegal gratuities.

23

fashioning an appropriate sentence, this Court should explicitly consider the lies and obstruction

that Ring committed in order to conceal the fraud against the Sandia—the nucleus of facts that

serve as the basis of the pending obstruction of justice counts.

• Ring Falsely Claims the Government Told Him to Lie

In light of the above, Ring’s claim that he is an “honest” person with “integrity” at his

core is simply without any merit. Indeed, Ring’s insinuation that the Government was pressuring

him to lie in order to implicate Congressman Doolittle seems particularly far-fetched. To be

clear, the Government did no such thing. A more accurate recounting of the facts demonstrates9

that the Government never told him to lie, but instead asked him to admit the corrupt conduct

that the jury has now found beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring argued before the jury that his use

of things of value given to Congressional staffers and Congressman Doolittle were not given

with corrupt intent, but rather were just the typical tools of the lobbying trade or merely gifts


24

given in friendship. Thus, according to Ring, he could not have criminal intent to corruptCongressman Doolittle and others. Unfortunately for Ring, twelve jurors decided beyond areasonable doubt that Ring did have the intent to corrupt public officials, including CongressmanDoolittle. The Government’s refusal to accept a plea that failed to include all of Ring’s criminalconduct is not asking Ring to lie. It is simply demanding that Ring acknowledge the fact of hiscorrupt intent that twelve jurors have now found beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring’s claim thathe could not plead guilty because he could not send others to jail is particularly disingenuousbecause Ring was specifically offered a plea deal in which he would be required to acknowledgehis own corrupt conduct, but he would not be required to testify against any otherindividuals—including Congressman Doolittle. Ring’s claim to be acting only in the interest ofrighteousness—and not out of self-interest—is deceiving and without any merit. • Letters Supporting Ring Should be Viewed SkepticallyAs a whole, the Government does not seek to address the letters that were written onRing’s behalf. The Government, however, objects to letters written by certain individuals whoappear to be denying that corrupt conduct occurred, describing Ring’s “honesty” and otherpositive virtues. While Ring had every right not to call any witnesses to testify on his behalfduring the trial, Ring’s attempt to put uncorroborated statements before this Court—statementsthat are inconsistent with the evidence and contrary to the jury’s finding—without subjectingthese witnesses to cross-examination is entirely disingenuous.


Certain letter writers challenge the jury’s verdict and argue for leniency for Ring, but some10

of them are speaking either out of their own self interest or simply lack credibility in their

allegations. Some of them participated in the fraudulent billing of the clients, just like Ring.

One letter writer allowed his parent’s company to be used as a conduit to disguise a $25,000

check of client funds taken from GRI given to another lobbyist. Other letter writers have

previously submitted grossly inaccurate statements in previous submissions to the Government or

made sharply contradictory statements during interviews with the Government. Ring could have

allowed them to testify before this Court, but he chose not to. Consequently, the Government

urges the Court to view with skepticism the letters from individuals who were associated with the

criminal conspiracy or the defense of Mr. Ring, but choose not to testify before this Court. If

Ring is planning on allowing any of the letter writers to testify on Ring’s behalf during

sentencing, the Government requests adequate notice of who will testify so that the credibility of

the witnesses may be properly impeached.

25

While the Government has concerns over a number of letters, Ring’s choice to submit a10

letter from former Congressman Doolittle is particularly egregious. Ring could have chosen to

have Doolittle appear before this Court and subject himself to cross-examination at trial. Instead,

Ring selectively quotes the self-serving statements of the recipient of Ring’s bribes—including

putting forth such conclusory statements as “at no time was I ever corrupted by Kevin Ring in

any of his dealings with me nor did I feel that Kevin ever attempted to corruptly influence me or

members of my staff.” DE 290-1 at 41.

Although Doolittle claims that Ring did not intend to corrupt him, a jury found otherwise.

Doolittle’s denials of corruption in his relationship with Ring would ring hollow during cross-

examination when it would be made clear that the “low-show” job that Julie Doolittle received

from Abramoff and Ring was not the only “low-show” job that those seeking official acts from

Congressman Doolittle created for his wife. Ring should not be allowed to proffer half-truths for

the Court to consider as “mitigation” or evidence of his honesty, while failing to give the Court

the full ability to assess Doolittle’s credibility.


26

Similarly, Doolittle Chief of Staff David Lopez could have testified during Ring’s trialsand stated unequivocally that he was not corrupted by Ring, subjecting himself to cross-examination before the jury. Lopez also was involved in other questionable activities that wouldundoubtedly have put his own credibility into question, such as suspect relationships with otherlobbyists, significant “gifts,” like household appliances, to Lopez from Congressman Doolittlepaid for by campaign expenses, or thousands of dollars of “consulting fees” paid to Lopez fromCongressman Doolittle’s campaign funds. The Court should reject requests of leniency for Ringfrom a beneficiary of Ring’s bribes who refuses to subject himself to cross-examination. D. Section 3553(a)(2)(C) Protecting the Public from Further CrimesAnother factor for the Court to consider in fashioning an appropriate sentence underSection 3553 is whether the defendant would commit further crimes. While the Governmentacknowledges Ring’s lack of criminal activity post-indictment, the Government is deeplytroubled that, even after the jury’s verdict, the defendant continues to deny that his conduct wascriminal. A defendant’s lack of remorse and unwillingness to accept the criminality of hisactions suggest that a defendant might engage in similar behavior if given another opportunity. “Courts have routinely considered such factors in sentencing, and rightly so: a defendant’sunwillingness to acknowledge responsibility and express regret reflect directly on the likelihoodof recidivism, and the danger a defendant might pose to others if released.” United States v. AbuAli, No. 09-4705, 2011 WL 304827, *7 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011). The Government, however,recognizes that Ring is extremely unlikely to commit further crimes, if for no other reason than itis unlikely he will ever be given the opportunity to commit such crimes.


27

E. Section 3553 (a)(2)(D) Sentence to Provide Needed TreatmentAlthough the Court can consider whether the defendant needs any treatment in fashioning

the appropriate sentence, the Government agrees with defendant that no treatment is necessary.F. Section 3553(a)(3) Kinds of Sentences AvailableThe Government acknowledges that there are many types of sentences available for

punishing criminal acts. Ring argues that he has been punished enough because he has lost his

job, his reputation and any financial security. DE 290 at 23. He complains that his house was

searched (pursuant to a valid search warrant) and that he was arrested (pursuant to a valid arrest

warrant). DE 290 at 23-24. Ultimately, Ring complains that the “stain of felony convictions”

DE 290 at 23, is punishment enough. The Government respectfully disagrees. Ring is

complaining about the natural consequences of leading a multi-year criminal corruption scheme.

Ring may bear “the stain of felony convictions,” but a white-collar defendant deserves no greater

leniency merely because of the color of his shirt. Ring was blessed with great financial and

professional success. Ring chose to commit criminal acts that put those blessings in jeopardy.

While probation, community service and weekends in jail are all theoretical alternative

sentences, the lengthy period of incarceration called for by the Guidelines strongly suggests that

the alternative forms of sentences are inappropriate. Indeed, Ring’s willingness to engage in

criminal activity despite his limitless opportunities, education, and financial and professional

success is an aggravating factor, not a mitigating factor. This Court should consider the

sentencing alternative that is most appropriate for his serious crimes—incarceration for a period

within the recommended Guidelines range.


28

G. Section 3553(a)(4) Guidelines Sentence

The Court’s calculation of defendant’s Guidelines range is as follows:

Offering or Giving a Bribe 2C1.1(a) 10

Specific Offense Characteristics

More Than One Bribe 2C1.1(b)(1) +2

Elected or High-Level Decision-Making Official 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) +8

Aggravating Role in the Offense

Manager or Supervisor 3B1.1(b) +3

============================================================

TOTAL 23

Guidelines Range 46-57 months

H. Section 3553(a)(6) The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities

Does Not Prevent Imposition of a Guidelines Sentence

The Court should sentence the defendant to a period of incarceration within the

Guidelines. Such a sentence is consistent with the sentences received by Ring’s co-conspirators,

and should not be impacted by the lack of charges against unindicted co-conspirators.1. Sentencing Disparities with Co-Conspirators Are JustifiedIn his sentencing memorandum, Ring avers that “[g]iven the unique features of the

present case, the sentences given to Mr. Ring’s alleged co-conspirators provide a much more

meaningful guide.” DE 290 at 24. But despite Ring’s efforts to elevate the sophistication of his

case, it is not unique. And despite his post-conviction protestations of innocence, his

participation in a conspiracy is no longer “alleged”—that changed as soon as a jury returned a


The Government notes that Abramoff’s guideline calculation was a 31 (108 to 135 months)11and Scanlon’s guideline calculation was a 24 (51 to 63 months).29

verdict of guilty. Finally, Ring is not similarly situated with his co-conspirators. While heasserts that the sentences given to his co-conspirators should guide the Court, Ring omits the factthat his co-conspirators are in an entirely different position—they pleaded guilty and cooperated,acts that were reflected in their sentences. It would significantly undermine the sentencingGuidelines do a great injustice to give Ring the benefit of his co-conspirators’ acceptance ofresponsibility and cooperation. Indeed, a request that Ring be treated similarly to his co-conspirators is completely without support in the facts or law. By advancing this position, Ringargues that the first cooperating witness who pleads guilty establishes the ceiling of punishmentfor any future defendant. Such is not, and cannot, be the case. Ring’s position is inconsistentwith the Guidelines, which specifically factor in acceptance of responsibility and cooperation. The Court is very aware of the specific sentences that others in the conspiracy received. See DE 289-1. As the Court has undoubtedly recognized, the differences in the Guidelines calculations between the co-conspirators reflect the differences in the factual circumstances ofthe co-conspirators. With the exception of Abramoff and Scanlon, Ring has the highest11Guidelines range of any of the co-conspirators—46 to 57 months of incarceration. Ringcompares himself to others in the conspiracy who have much lower guidelinescalculations—Volz, Albaugh, and Coughlin have much lower Guidelines calculations: Volz(Level 15, 18 to 24 months), Albaugh (Level 16, 21 to 27 months), and Coughlin (Level 8, 0 to 6months). The recommended sentence for any of these defendants was, at most, half of what theCourt has determined for Ring. Moreover, those Guidelines calculations do not include the


30

Government’s 5K recommendation for each of the defendants. The Guidelines ranges are

reflective of the differences in culpability between Ring and the rest of the co-conspirators.

The differences between Ring’s and the co-conspirators’ Guidelines calculation rest in

part on the different role each took—and the manager or supervisor enhancement that was

appropriately applied to Ring. Ring’s co-conspirators, whether lobbyists like Volz or Boulanger,

or public officials like Coughlin and Albaugh, did not receive the enhancement of

Manager/Organizer. Ring’s role as Chief Operating Officer of Team Abramoff is sufficiently

distinct to appropriately distinguish the facts of his conduct from many of the other co-

conspirators. Additionally, Ring, unlike many of the co-conspirators, recruited many public

officials into the conspiracy—including Doolittle, Lopez, Evich, Orlando, Albaugh, Coughlin,

Farley, and others.

Similarly, Ring received the enhancement for multiple bribes (2C1.1(b)(1) +2) due to his

involvement in seeking to corruptly influence and reward public officials at high levels in

numerous Congressional offices and different executive branch agencies. Volz’s corruption was

focused almost entirely in a single office. Albaugh and Coughlin were only responsible for their

own individual corruption and neither was involved in the corruption of other offices. Ring, in

contrast, had direct relationships with senior officials in numerous offices and sought to corrupt

numerous public officials. The +2 enhancement for multiple bribes is reflective of the greater

scope of Ring’s corruption than his co-conspirators and is a valid basis for a disparity between

Ring and the other co-conspirators.

Another major factor for the court to consider in evaluating the appropriate sentence for

Ring is that disparity between the sentences of co-conspirators is justified if one co-conspirator is


The Government notes that David Safavian, although convicted by a jury of far lesser12

offenses involving false statements and obstruction related to a trip to Scotland provided by

Team Abramoff, was sentenced to more than a year in jail.

31

in a different position than other co-conspirators. Ring, unlike nearly all of his co-conspirators,

has not accepted responsibility and has shown little remorse for his criminal conduct because he

still does not believe that the acts he took were criminal. Unlike Ring, the co-conspirators who

have pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility stand in a fundamentally different place. In

addressing the issue of disparate sentences, Justice O’Connor, sitting by designation, noted in

United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010), that the district court’s reliance on,

among other things, the defendant’s “lack of remorse” supported differences between the

defendant’s sentence and that of the co-defendants. Specifically, Justice O’Connor noted that

most of the defendants “accepted responsibility, pleaded guilty, and cooperated.” Thus, Ring’s

sentence can, and should, be longer than others who have accepted responsibility for their actions

and assisted the government in the investigation and prosecution of others.12

2. The Lack of Charges Against Unindicted Co-Conspirators Is Not RelevantIn an odd twist of logic, Ring first proclaims that he had no criminal intent to corrupt

public officials, DE at 290-1 at 6-7, 12-13, but then suggests his should receive a below-the-

Guidelines sentence those same public officials he did not intend to corrupt have not been

prosecuted. DE 290 at 21-23. As the Court recognized in its recent opinion, it would be

improper to consider the Government’s choice to not bring criminal charges against other

individuals. As this Court is aware, whether criminal charges are brought against unindicted co-

conspirators is not a relevant factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence for Ring. Reducing a

sentence because criminal charges were not brought against some individuals require the Court to


32

opine on whether the Executive Branch appropriately exercised prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors retain “broad discretion” to determine when it is appropriate to bring charges andwhom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n.11 (1982). The SupremeCourt described the role of judicial review regarding prosecutorial discretion in Wayte v. UnitedStates, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985):This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decisionto prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factorsas the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value,the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationshipto the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readilysusceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent toundertake . . . . Examining the basis of a prosecution delays thecriminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjectingthe prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, andmay undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing theGovernment’s enforcement policy.See also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that the UnitedStates Attorney is under the direction and control of the Executive, and therefore must havebroad discretion over his duties of prosecuting offenses against the United States). The potential harm of judicial review of prosecutorial discretion described by theSupreme Court extends into sentencing. As this Court recognized, precisely this issue wasaddressed in United States v. Scott, 631 F. 3d 401 (7th Cir. 2011). In Scott, the defendant arguedthat notwithstanding Wayte, failure to prosecute others could be taken into consideration under §3553(a). The Seventh Circuit responded:If we were to adopt the defendant’s argument, a prosecutor would beeffectively required to always charge all coconspirators – regardlessof the wisdom of that choice – simply to prevent the court from usingthe prosecutor’s discretion in one case against the prosecutor inanother case. This essentially forces the hand of the prosecutor or


For example, the additional $7 million that the Choctaw received related to Ring’s corrupt13

activity could have been better spent on prisons for other tribal communities who faced more

serious and immediate public safety issues.

33

penalizes him for exercising his discretion in the manner that he

chose, leaving the prosecutor with no meaningful discretion at all.

Scott, 631 F.3d at 407. The Seventh Circuit concluded that there can be no disparity between the

defendant’s sentence and the co-conspirator’s sentence when the latter does not even exist, and,

thus, § 3553(a) does not apply to uncharged co-conspirators. For the Court to incorporate the

failure to charge others in Ring’s sentence, it would have to review why the United States did not

charge others, which both interferes with the separation of powers and is not readily subject to

judicial cognizance. Other courts have agreed with the conclusion reached by the Seventh

Circuit that disparity in punishment between the defendant and uncharged individuals does not

fall within the parameters of § 3553(a). See United States v. Lacson, 177 Fed. Appx. 751, 752

(9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (holding that any consideration of the disparity in punishment

between the defendant and other uncharged individuals does not properly fall under one of the

factors listed in § 3553(a)).I. Section 3553(a)(7) Payment of Restitution Should Not Affect SentenceWhile restitution is part of the § 3553 factors to consider, the Government notes that the

Court need not consider restitution in fashioning a sentence for Ring. While the appropriations

that Ring obtained corruptly could have gone to more deserving entities the other potential13

recipients are not identifiable victims and, thus, are not entitled to restitution.

Similarly, Ring’s payment to the Sandia of the $135,000 that was defrauded as part of the

kickback scheme is not restitution. Ring did return the funds until after the fraud was exposed


34

and he was fired for his misconduct. But, if Ring believes that the $135,000 is restitution, Ring

is, in some ways, acknowledging the criminality of the kickback. And, thus, Ring would be

responsible for restitution not merely for the $135,000 that he personally received, but for the full

amount of the Sandia kickback (over $1 million) because, as he acknowledges in his letter, he

knew that Scanlon was paying Abramoff (although not the amounts). Indeed, it could be argued

that because Ring was aware of the Scanlon-Abramoff kickback back in early 2002 and took

steps to conceal the kickbacks, and went so far as to personally profit from the kickback scheme,

that Ring was a knowing and willing participant in the “gimme five” kickback scheme. If Ring

were a knowing and willing participant, he would owe restitution for the full scope of the

kickback scheme, at least $20 million. Indeed, if in 2002 Ring had reported the kickback scheme

(and displayed the type of moral rectitude that the letter writers apparently attribute to him), Ring

could have prevented numerous tribes from being victimized out of millions of dollars. Ring,

however, did not act in that way. Instead, he kept silent about the kickbacks and even lied about

it when asked. III. FINEThe Government notes that the recommended Sentencing Guidelines fine is between

$10,000 and $100,000. The sentencing commission determined that such a fine is appropriate

given the seriousness of the offense even when that large a fine is combined with the guidelines

recommended 46 to 57 months of incarceration. The Government, however, recognizes the

defendant’s severe financial hardship makes it impossible to pay a fine. Thus, the Government

does not recommend that the Court impose any fine. However, the Government recommends


35

that in lieu of a fine that the defendant provide community service during his period of

supervised release following his period of incarceration.IV. Bond Pending AppealIn his sentencing memorandum, Ring has asked for bond pending appeal. Section

3143(b) of Title 18, which governs a defendant’s release pending appeal, requires a defendant to

show by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the

community and that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of

law or fact likely to result in reversal, a new trial, a sentence that does not include a term of

imprisonment, or a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total amount of time

he has already served. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). The Government agrees with Ring that he is not

likely to free or pose a physical or violent danger to the community, and that his prospective

appeal will not be for the purpose of delay. Ring, however, has not established that he will raise

a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal, a new trial, a sentence that does

not include incarceration, or a reduced sentence.

Courts have defined the phrase, “substantial question,” as “one that is fairly debatable or

fairly doubtful. In short, a substantial question is one of more substance than would be necessary

to a finding that it was not frivolous.” United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.

1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts have also interpreted § 3143(b) to

require that a court find, inter alia, the following to grant bail pending appeal:

(1) that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact; and (2)

that if that substantial question is determined favorably to defendant

on appeal, that decision is likely to result in reversal or an order for

a new trial of all counts on which imprisonment has been imposed.”


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Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 24 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also United States v.Smith, 793 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1986) (interpreting “substantial question” to require “that theissue on appeal be significant in addition to being novel, not governed by controlling precedentor fairly doubtful.”). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has defined “substantial question” as one that is“close” or that “could very well be decided the other way.” United States v. Perholz, 836 F.2d554, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In his memorandum, Ring merely identifies five issues he intends to raise on appeal asexamples of substantial questions. Dkt. No. 290 at 41-42. But Ring fails to offer any analysis asto how these issues satisfy the definition of a “substantial question of law or fact.” A merebullet-point description of potential appellate issues is insufficient for a court to determinewhether the defendant should be granted bond pending appeal. See, e.g., United States v.Tolliver, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1616, *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 2006) (denying the defendant’smotion for bond pending appeal because the defendant’s motion “merely refers the court toappellant’s voluminous district court filings, without addressing the substance of the argumentsappellant intends to raise on appeal”). Specifically, Ring identifies the following five issues thathe will raise on appeal: (1) Whether evidence of campaign contributions was properly admittedto establish Ring’s intent when he provided things of value other than campaign contributions;(2) Whether McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 251 (1991), should apply, as a generalmatter, to lobbyists; (3) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support an honest services fraudconviction under Skilling; (4) Whether Coughlin’s conduct constituted an official act; and (5)Whether the Government’s description to the jury of the intent required was so incorrect as towarrant a new trial.


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None of these issues are substantial questions of law, as defined by the D.C. Circuit, andall have been previously addressed by this Court. Merely because Ring intends to ask the D.C.Circuit to adopt a legal ruling never before adopted by any other court (e.g., extendingMcCormick to lobbyists who corruptly influence public officials, thereby creating a FirstAmendment protection of bribery), it does not mean that this unreasonable legal position couldvery well be decided either way. In the absence of a substantial question, Ring cannot validlyassert that the successful appeal of such issues would result in either a reversal, a new trial, or areduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total amount of time he has alreadyserved. The evidence at trial of Ring’s guilt was overwhelming, and included numerous emailsmemorializing Ring’s own participation and management of this corrupt scheme. As addressedin the Government’s responses to Ring’s post-trial motions, none of the issues raised by thedefendant in support of his request for relief under Rules 29 or 33 of the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure satisfy the substantial question requirement. Therefore, Ring has not raised asubstantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal, a new trial, or a sentence less thanthe time he has already served. Therefore, the United States respectfully requests that, at the conclusion of the sentencinghearing, the Court order a date within 90 days for Ring to report to prison to begin serving hisprison sentence. A grand jury indicted Ring three years ago, and nearly a year has passed since apetit jury convicted him of five counts of corruption. And perhaps most importantly, a juryfound that Ring’s corrupt criminal activity began over a decade ago, “at least as early as January2000.” Dkt. No. 2 (Indictment) at 6. Accordingly, Ring should begin serving his sentence within90 days.


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CONCLUSION

Ring was the second-in-command of a corruption scheme that shook the nation’s

confidence in its public officials and compromised the integrity of our government. Team

Abramoff, and its Chief Operating Officer Kevin Ring, sought to corrupt numerous public

officials with expensive meals, exotic trips, tickets to exclusive concerts and sporting events, and

a low-show job for a Congressman’s wife. While all corruption offenses undermine citizens’

faith in democracy, Ring (along with his co-conspirators) contributed greatly to the recent decline

in the trust of government and reinforced the belief that the political system is rigged in favor of

those that would use their wealth to lavish gifts on public officials and corruptly influence the

manner in which our nation’s limited tax dollars are spent. Ring entered a “corrupt bargain for

early success and money,” and this Court should appropriately punish him for his crimes.

Accordingly, the Court should sentence Ring to a Guidelines sentence of 50 months

incarceration, followed by a period of three years of supervised release.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK SMITHChiefPublic Integrity Section

DENIS J. MCINERNEYChiefFraud Section

Dated: October 11, 2011 By: /s/ Nathaniel B. Edmonds NATHANIEL B. EDMONDSAssistant Chief, Fraud SectionPETER M. KOSKITrial AttorneyPublic Integrity SectionU.S. Department of Justice1400 New York Ave, NWWashington, D.C. 20005


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing Sentencing

Memorandum with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification

of such filing to the attorneys of record for the defendant.

/s/ Nathaniel B. Edmonds NATHANIEL B. EDMONDSAssistant ChiefFraud SectionCriminal DivisionU.S. Department of Justice

October 11, 2011


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