khrushchev era politics and the investigation of the kirov...

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1 SeeAllaKirilina,Neizvestnyi Kirov(Moscow:OLMA-PRESS,2001).Kirilinaistheworld’sforemostexperton theKirovassassinationandmyownaccountof themurderand itsconsequencesowesagreatdealtoher.Kirilina’spublicationsbetween1989and2000makeaconsistentandstrongcasethattheassassinNikolaevwasalonegunman.Kirilina,appar-entlyfollowingtheconclusionsofSovietinvestigatorsin1967andlater,hasarguedthatpost-Stalin Soviet investigations of the assassinations were heavily influenced by politi-calstruggles.J.ArchGettymadethesameargumentearlierinOrigins of the Great Purges(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985),pp.216-217.

* IwouldliketothanktheSlavicResearchCenterofHokkaidoUniversityfortheForeignVisitingFellowship(2005-2006)thatenabledmetocompletethisarticle.Iwouldalsoliketo thank YaleUniversityPress andeditor JonathanBrent inparticular for funding tworesearchtripstoMoscow.

Khrushchev Era Politics and the Investigation of the Kirov Murder, 1956-1957

Matthew Lenoe

TheassassinationofSergeiKirov,Leningradpartychief,onDecember1,1934,wasapoliticalsensationinsideandoutsidetheUSSR.Althoughthekill-er,adisgruntledCommunistnamedLeonidNikolaev,insistedinearlyinterro-gationsthathehadactedalone,Sovietpolicecouldnotacceptthis.InaSovietculture where even rotten vegetables on store shelves could signal counter-revolutionarysabotage,investigatorsinterpretedthemurderasaconspiracybyhostilecapitalistpowers,internal“classenemies,”orboth.UnderStalin’sdirection, senior officers of the security police (NKVD/UGB)pinnedtheblamefortheassassinationonStalin’sformerrivalsintheCommunistPartyleader-ship, the so-called “Left” and “Right” oppositionists. Within four weeks ofthekilling,aSovietmilitarytribunalsentencedtodeathNikolaevandthirteenalleged co-conspirators, almost all of them former members of the so-called“ZinovieviteOpposition” inLeningrad. Then in January1935Soviet courtsconvictedGrigoriiZinovievandone-timeallyLevKamenevof“moralcom-plicity”inKirov’smurder,supposedlybecausetheyhadfosteredoppositionistmoodswithintheparty.Thesetrials,oftheso-called“LeningradCenter”and“MoscowCenter”respectively,beganabrutalpurgeofthepartyleadership.1

Inthefouryearsthatfollowed,Stalinandhissecuritymenusedtorture,blackmail,andthreatstodevelop“evidence”againstnearlyallofStalin’spastopponentsamongthepartyleaders.ChargesofconspiracytokillKirovandotherSovietleaderswerecentraltotheshowtrialsand“GreatTerror”of1936-1939, inwhichStalinexecutedor incarceratedmuchof the“OldBolshevik”leadershipand reinforcedhisownsupremepower. In theend,Stalin’suse

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of the murder led some observers to conclude that the dictator himself hadorderedKirov’skilling.2

Many senior NKVD officers also lost their lives in the political intrigues thatfollowedtheKirovmurder.Stalin’ssuspicionoflocalLeningradNKVDofficers was strengthened by the death of Borisov, one of Kirov’s bodyguards, inanapparentautoaccidentthedayafterthemurder.Soonafterthisthecen-tral NKVD arrested Leningrad NKVD chief Filip Medved, his deputies Za-porozhets and Fomin, and other Leningrad officers on charges of negligence in guardingKirov.WhenStalindecidedtoarrestlongtimeNKVDchiefGenrikhIagodafortreason(spring1937),thesecurityservicesre-arrestedMedvedandthe other Leningrad officers, tortured them to collect “evidence” against Ia-goda,andultimatelyexecutedmostofthem.

TheKirovmurderdidnotloseitssensationalorpoliticalqualitiesovertime.Inthe1950sand1960scommentatorsintheWestdescribedthemurderas the first act of the Terror, postulating that Stalin had arranged the killing as partofagrandplottojustifytheexterminationofpartycadres.AfterStalin’sdeath,Sovietleadersalsoundertooktoinvestigatetheassassinationinthelarg-ercontextoftheTerror.Between1955and1967thePresidium/Politburooftheparty Central Committee created five different commissions to study the show trialsof1936-1938andtheannihilationofpartycadres.3Eachre-examinedtheKirov murder. But all of these investigations were driven primarily by theCommunistParty’sneedtomakesenseoftheTerror,andbythepoliticalagen-dasofparty leaders (the latterpointhasbeenmademost forcefullybyAllaKirilina).4Inthecourseofrevisionandrevisionofrevision,theoriginalfactsoftheKirovcasewerealmosthopelesslyobscuredbyrumor-mongering,Sovietsecrecy,andmyth-making,bothCommunistandanti-Communist.

Tounderstandthefactsofthemurder,andStalin’susethereof,itisneces-sarytoexcavatethehistoryofthevariousSovietinvestigations.Apartfromthird-orfourth-handrumors,alloftheevidencethatwehaveaboutKirov’skilling was filtered through these investigations. This article examines the his-tory of the first full-scale investigation after Stalin’s death, conducted in 1956-1957 following Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” to the Twentieth PartyCongress.

2 ForthecasethatStalinorderedKirov’smurder,seeBorisNicolaevsky,Power and the Soviet Elite(NewYork:Praeger,1965);RobertConquest,The Great Terror(NewYork:Macmillan,1968);idem,Stalin and the Kirov Murder(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989);andAmyKnight,Who Killed Kirov?(NewYork:HillandWang,1999).

3 N.PetukhovandV.Khomchik,“Deloo‘Leningradskomtsentre’,”Vestnik verkhovnogo suda SSSR5(1991),pp.15-18;“Kratkaiaspravkaorezul’tatakhvyiasneniiaobstoiatel’stvubiist-vaS.M.Kirova,”Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyiarkhivnoveisheiistorii(RGANI),f.6[Komitetpartiinogokontrolia],op.13,d.117,ll.1-18.

4 SeeAllaKirilina,L’assassinat de Kirov: Destin d’un stalinien, 1888-1934(Paris:Seuil,1995),p.223;andGetty,Origins,pp.216-217.

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The PoliTics of De-sTalinizaTion

TheexposureduringtheKhrushchevyearsofStalin’smurderousabuseof power was due to political conflicts as much as to abstract ideals of truth andjustice.Stalin’sdeathopenedadesperatesuccessionstrugglebetweenhiscollaboratorsinthepartyleadership.ContinuingpracticesestablishedbySta-linhimself,LavrentiiBeriia,NikitaKhrushchev,GeorgiiMalenkovandtheirrespective allies scrambled to find or fabricate compromising information on oneanotherandtoposeasreformers.Compromisingoneanotherwasnotdif-ficult, as all of the rivals were directly implicated in the mass violence wrought bytheStalinistregime.Khrushchev,thevictorinthesuccessionbattles,provedthemasterofmobilizingarchivaldocumentsandpartymemoryagainsthiscompetitors, but Beriia, the first loser, employed the same tactics. It was Be-riiawho,justdaysafterthedictator’sdeath,begantheprocessofreexaminingStalin-eralegalcasesand“rehabilitating”someofthoseconvicted.Simultane-ously,heaccumulatedinhissafematerialsincriminatingotherpartyleaders.AftertheotherCentralCommitteePresidiummembersarrestedBeriiaonJune26,1953,theyportrayedhimasthemastermindofstateterrorandaforeignspy.InthenextfouryearsKhrushchevtookthemantleofwhiteknight,defeat-inghisrivalsMalenkov,ViacheslavMolotov,andLazarKaganovichinpartbyusingtheKGBtoexposetheirparticipationinStalin’sterror.Thus,ironically,the conflict between Stalin’s henchmen led step-by-step toward exposure of the atrocitiestheyandtheirdeadleaderhadcommitted.5

The rehabilitation of “repressed” persons was a complex struggle inwhichpoliticalpowerandthecreationofacoherentpartyhistoryoftheStalinyears were tightly bound together. It was confined to party and professional elites,withthenarod,“thecommonpeople,”excluded.Participantshadsun-drymotivations.PartyleadersandapparatchikshadaninterestinchangingtheStalin-erarulesofpoliticalstruggle, inwhich thepenalty fordefeatwasoftenarrestordeath.CommunistsurvivorsofprisonsandlaborcampssoughttodriveastakethroughtheheartofStalinism.Stalin’sclosestdeputiesinthelate1930s,Molotov,Malenkov,andKaganovich,soughttoevaderesponsibil-ityfortheTerror.Khrushchevaimedtosecurehisownpositionaspartyleaderbyexposingthem.Otherplayers,mainlyassociatedwithKhrushchev,workedtocreateauseable,heroicpartyhistorythatwouldnonethelessacknowledgeStalinistterror.ThishistorywouldlegitimatetheruleofareformedCommu-nistParty.Yetothers,suchasDmitriiShepilovinJune1957andMikhailSu-

5 V.Naumovand Iu.Sigachev, eds.,Lavrentii Beriia, 1953. Stenogramma iiul’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia,” 1999), passim;N.Kovaleva,A.Korotkovetal,eds.,Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, 1957. Steno-gramma iiun’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty(Moscow:Mezhdunarodnyifond“Demokratiia,” 1998), pp. 419-421 (Rudenko’s discussion of Beriia’s incriminating files on otherleaders,andMalenkov’seffortstocontrolaccesstosamefollowingBeriia’sarrest).


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slovinJune1956,wishedtoputthebrakesonpublicreevaluationoftheStalinyearsbecause theybelievedsuchdiscussionunderminedthefoundationsofCommunistrule.Atthesametimetheydidnotadvocateareturntofull-blownStalinistrepression.

Feuds,friendships,andfactionalresentmentsgoingallthewaybacktothe days of the revolution shaped the battle over de-Stalinization. AnastasMikoianquietlyencouragedsurvivingcomrades fromtheBolshevikrevolu-tioninBakutoresearchandpublicizetheGreatTerror.VeteransoftheLenin-gradPartyleadershipwhosurvivedStalin’spurgeofthecityorganizationinthenotorious“LeningradAffair”of1949-1950provedeagertoattackMalen-kovforhisroleinorganizingthoserepressions.IvanSerov,whorantheKGBfrom1954-1958,andRomanRudenko,chiefprosecutorfortheUSSR,hadcon-nectionswithKhrushchevdatingbacktothelatter’syearsasheadoftheUkrai-nianpartyorganizationfrom1939-1941.Therearemanymoreexamples.

Thus,theusualdistinctionsbetweenreformersandStalinists,or“liberals”and“conservatives,”whichstilltendtodominatediscussionoftheKhrushchevyears,donotcapturethecomplexityofthepoliticalbattlesaround“rehabilita-tion”andacknowledgmentoftheTerror.ThehistoryoftheKhrushchev-eracommissionsthatreexaminedSergeiKirov’sassassination,andultimatelytriedtocreateanewnarrativeofSoviethistory,mustbeunderstoodinthiscontext–ofdesperatestrugglesforpowerandanequallydesperatedesiretoescapefromtheStalinistnightmareandreturntotherevolutionarydreamsof1917.

The invesTigaTors

WithinoneyearofStalin’sdeath,NikitaKhrushchevemergedasthemostpowerfulmaninsidethe“collectiveleadership”oftheparty.6Intheearlyex-pansionofhispoliticalnetwork,Khrushchevsecuredtwoappointmentswithgreatconsequences forde-Stalinization–RomanA.RudenkoasChiefPros-ecutoroftheUSSR(July1953),andIvanA.SerovasheadoftheKGB(March1954).7

Rudenko was a Khrushchev client. As first secretary of the Ukrainian Re-publicCentralCommittee,Khrushchevpromotedhimin1942fromchiefpros-ecutorofLuganskprovincetoassistantprosecutoroftherepublic.Rudenkoserved in the post from 1942-1944 and then as Chief Prosecutor of Ukrainefrom1944-1953.Inaddition,hegainedinternationalfameasthechiefSovietprosecutorattheNurembergNaziwarcrimestrialin1945-1946.Inhismem-

6 WilliamTaubman,Khrushchev: The Man and His Era(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2003),pp.240-241, 258, 264. Dmitrii Shepilov confirms the importance of Khrushchev’s appointment as first secretary in September 1953 (Shepilov, Neprimknuvshii[Moscow:“Vagrius,”2001],p.294).

7 OntheappointmentofRudenko,seeNaumovandSigachev, Lavrentii Beriia,pp.216-217.OnSerov’sappointment,seeTaubman,Khrushchev,p.264.

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oirs,KhrushchevclaimsthatheprotectedRudenkoagainstaccusationsmadeagainsthimduringtheGreatTerror,andimpliesthatRudenkowasindebttohim.8

Ivan A. Serov also had longtime ties to Khrushchev. Serov began hiscareer as an artillery officer but transferred into the NKVD in February 1939. As newly appointed commissar Beriia purged the NKVD of officers associated withN.I.Yezhov(thesecondNKVDpurgeintwoyears),hepromotedmassesofnewrecruits fromthepartyand theRedArmy. Serovwasone. InSep-tember1939SerovbecameNKVDchieffortheUkrainianRepublic,whereheworkedcloselywithKhrushchev,andwithGeneralGeorgiiZhukov.DuringthisperiodSerovranthe“cleansing”oftheoccupiedcityofLvovof“bourgeoisandnationalistelements”(i.e.massdeportations)andparticipatedinthemassexecution of captured Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940. Soon after Serov’stransferfromtheUkrainianpostinFebruary1941,GermanyandheralliesinvadedtheUSSR.Duringthewar,Serov,asoneofthedeputychiefsof theNKVD,specialized inmassarrestsandmassdeportations fromareasrecapturedbytheRedArmy.HetookpartinthedeportationsoftheKalmyks,Chechens, Ingush,andVolgaGermans,and thepurgesof suspectedcollab-oratorsand“bourgeoisnationalists” inUkraine,Poland,andLithuania. AsNKVDchieffortheFirstBelorussianFrontlateinthewar,hemaintainedcloseworkingrelationshipswithbothKhrushchevandZhukov.9

SerovservedatthecenterofStalin’sstatesecurityapparatus,andhewasdeeplycompromised.Notonlyhadhetakenpartinmassrepressions,buthewas also implicated in lucrative illegal business dealings while stationed inoccupiedLvov(1939-1941)andoccupiedGermanyafterWorldWarII.Mul-tipleobservershaveconcludedthatSerovwasKhrushchev’screatureduringthepost-Stalinyearspreciselybecausehisshadypastmadehimvulnerabletopressure.Khrushchev’srivalsfearedSerovbothbecausehewasaKhrushchevloyalistandbecauseofhisStalinisthistory.10

Khrushchev’sownmentorshadbeenKaganovichandStalinhimself,andhispoliticalstyleafter1953resembledStalin’sinanumberofways.11Theseincludedhisrelianceontrustedcronies,hisreadinesstounderminestealthilyandthenabandonthosesamecronies(thiswasSerov’sfate),hisuseofcompro-misedpersonsinkeypositions(i.e.SerovandRudenko),hispretendmodesty

8 OnRudenko’sbiography,seeN.S.Khrushchev,Vospominaniia. Vremia. Liudi. Vlast’,vol.1 (Moskva:“Moskovskienovosti,”1999),p.144,n.29,pp.185-186,vol.3,p.572;NaumovandSigachev, Lavrentii Beriia,p.480.

9 N.V.Petrov,“Pervyipredsedatel’KGBgeneralIvanSerov,”Otechestvennaia istoriia5(1997),pp.23-42.SourcefoundthroughTaubman,Khrushchev,p.741,n.48.

10 Ibid.;Shepilov,Neprimknuvshii,pp.159,269,353-354;Taubman,Khrushchev,p.370,andAnastasMikoian,Tak bylo – razmyshlenie o minuvshem (Moskva:Vagrius,1999),p.607.

11 ThisobservationismadebyShepilov(Neprimknuvshii,p.397),Taubman(Khrushchev,p.241),andSergoMikoian,AnastasMikoian’sson(Stalinism as I Saw It[WashingtonD.C.:KennanInstituteforAdvancedRussianStudies,1991],p.43).


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covering a ravenous hunger for adulation, and his predilection for keepingthosearoundhimguessingbymaintainingatleasttwodifferent“lines”onagiven issue. On the other hand, Khrushchev was more flamboyant than Stalin, moreimpulsive,andalotlessbloodthirsty.

OnetacticthatKhrushchevmayhavelearnedfromStalinwastherecruit-ment of the repressed to agitate for the overthrow of the party officials who hadrepressedthem.Asearlyas1953MikoianandKhrushchevsponsoredthereturnofhigh-rankingCommunistsaccusedof“counterrevolutionarycrimes”fromexile,laborcamps,andprison,andtheyusedthesereturneesagainsttheirpoliticalrivals.12OneearlyreturneefromthecampswhobecamecrucialtotheinvestigationoftheKirovmurderwasOlgaShatunovskaia.Bornin1901,Sha-tunovskaiawasthechildofaJewishlawyerinBaku.SheattendedthesamegymnasiumwiththechildrenofSurenShaumian,theleaderoftheBakuBol-sheviks.In1917ShatunovskaiathrewherselfintotheBolshevikrevolutionarymovementinBaku.Inadditiontoheractivitiesasastreetactivist,sheservedasShaumian’ssecretaryandheadoftheBakuCouncilofPeople’sCommissarsPressDepartment in themonthsafter theOctoberRevolution. WhenTurk-ishforceshelpedMensheviksandAzerbaidjaninationalistsoverthrowSovietruleinBakuinSeptember1918,Shatunovskaiawascapturedandbyherownaccountnearlyexecuted(thenewregimedidexecuteSurenShaumianand25otherleadersoftheBakuSoviet,turningthe“twenty-sixcommissars”intoBol-shevikmartyrs).Released,shejoinedtheBolshevikundergroundmovementintheCaucasus,workingcloselywithAnastasMikoian,amongothers.13

In the following years Shatunovskaia started a family and establishedherself as an important party official, serving in Baku, Briansk, Siberia, and Moscow.ShewasactingchiefoftheMoscowPartyCommittee’sDepartmentofLeadingPartyOrganswhentheNKVDarrestedherinNovember1938onchargesofTrotskyiteactivity.DuringherimprisonmentShatunovskaiasentseveralletterstoMikoiandisputingthecaseagainstherandseekinghishelp.Some of these appeals reached Mikoian through her childhood friend LevShaumian,sonof theBakucommissar. Mikoiansimplyignoredthebulkofthem.14

WhenM.A.Bagirov,authorofoneofthedenunciationsthatledtoSha-tunovskaia’sarrest,washimselfarrested inMarch1954Shatunovskaiapeti-

12 Reabilitatsiia – kak eto bylo. Dokumenty Prezidiuma TsK KPSS i drugie materialy,vol.1 (Mos-cow:Mezhdunarodnyifond“Demokratiia,”2000-2004),pp.116-117.OneexamplewasthecampsurvivorA.I.Snegov,whoafterreleasefromthecampswasaprosecutionwitnessatBeriia’strialandlaterbecameaprominentadvocateofde-Stalinization.SeeTaubman,Khrushchev,pp.277-278,KhrushchevspeechtoLeningradaktiv inReabilitatsiia,vol.1,p.133,andbiographicalmaterialonSnegovinReabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.891.

13 SeeOlgaShatunovsky(sic),“GoneCentury:MemoirsEditedbyJanaKutinandAndreiBroido,”www.caida.org/broido/ola/ola.html,rasskazy1,2;andbiographicaldataonSha-tunovskaiainReabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.904.

14 Shatunovsky,“GoneCentury,”passim;Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.904.

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tioned Khrushchev for release from her sentence. Notified of her rehabilitation inMay,Shatunovskaiamadeherway toMoscow,where, she later recalled,Khrushchevinvitedherforaprivatemeeting. Khrushchev’sassistantssoonprovidedherwithanapartmentinthecapital,acar,andapositionasChiefControllerofthePartyControlCommission.Khrushchevtoldherhewantedto accelerate rehabilitation. In the coming years Shatunovskaia became themostdedicatedproponentinsidethepartyapparatusofthetheorythatStalinhadorganizedKirov’skilling.15

Shatunovskaia’slonghistorywithMikoianandhiscircleisacriticalpartofthestoryoftheinvestigationintoKirov’sassassination.Asalreadynoted,Shatunovskaia worked closely with Mikoian in the Baku underground andclaimedinoldagethathehadbeenhersuitor.Shealsohadattendedgymnasi-umwithLevShaumian,whomMikoianineffectadoptedaftertheexecutionofhisfather.16In1954-1955thesethreeBakuCommuneveteranslaidtheground-work for Khrushchev’s complete overturn of the official history of Stalin’s rule attheTwentiethPartyCongress.

Mikoian’smemoirspresentLevShaumianasinstrumentalintheearlyre-habilitationeffortsof1954-1955.Shaumianhimselfhadneverbeenrepressed.But,whileworkinginthepartyapparatusasaneditorofnewspapersandlatertheGreat Soviet Encyclopedia,hedidmaintaincontactwithsomeinthecamps.FollowingStalin’sdeath,manyimprisonedCommunistsusedShaumianasanintermediarytopetitionMikoianforreviewoftheircases.MikoiansaysthatitwasShaumianwho“broughttome”ShatunovskaiaandrepressedCommu-nistA.I.Snegov,andthathe(Mikoian)inturnbroughtthemtoKhrushchev’snotice.17 ShatunovskaiaandSnegov,Mikoianwrites, “openedmyeyes toagreatdeal,tellingmeoftheirarrests,thetorturesusedduringtheinterrogationprocess,andthefateofdozensofouracquaintances...”18

ApproximatelyhalfayearbeforetheTwentiethPartyCongressofFebru-ary1956,MikoianclaimsthatheaskedShaumiantodosomequietresearchinto the fate of delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934. Specifi-cally,hewantedalistoftheCentralCommitteemembersandcandidatemem-berselectedatthatCongresswhowerearrestedorexecutedduringtheTerror.WhenShaumiangavehimthelistaboutonemonthlater,Mikoianclaimsthathewas“shocked.”HewenttoKhrushchevandpersuadedthelatterthattheyweregoingtohavetotackletheissueofStalinistrepressionsattheTwentiethPartyCongress.19ItisworthnotingthatwhatevergeneraldesireMikoianand

15 Shatunovsky,“GoneCentury,” rasskaz20; informationonBagirovcase inReabilitatsiia,vol.1,p.407,n.61.

16 Mikoian,Tak bylo,p.90. 17 In their memoirs Khrushchev and Mikoian competed for the credit for initiating de-

Stalinization. Therefore it is difficult to determine precisely who was first in touch with SnegovandShatunovskaia.

18 Mikoian,18 Mikoian,Tak bylo,pp.589-590. 19 Ibid.,pp.590-592.


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KhrushchevfelttoreviewStalinisthistoryandrehabilitatethedictator’svic-tims,therewasalsoaveryconcretemotivationforbringingtheissueupattheforthcomingcongress.AttheJuly1955plenarymeetingoftheCentralCom-mittee,KhrushchevandMolotovclashedopenly.20 Mikoian’sconversationswithShaumianwouldhavecomeafterthatplenum,andoneofthepurposesofShaumian’sresearchwasprobablytogathermaterialcompromisingMolotov.

Around the time that Mikoian asked Shaumian to research the fate ofthe1934CentralCommittee,healsorequestedthatShatunovskaiasendhiman official letter recounting a story she had told him related to the Kirov as-sassination. Theletterwasforthcoming.InitShatunovskaiadescribedcon-versationsshehadwithoneDr.Kirchakovandanurse,DusiaTrunina,whilehospitalizedat theKolyma laborcamp in1943-1944. Kirchakov, shewrote,hadhearddirectly fromFilipMedved (headof theLeningradNKVDat thetimeofKirov’sassassination),aneyewitnessaccountofStalin’sinterrogationoftheassassinNikolaevthedayafterKirovwaskilled.WhileexiledtoKolymain1937MedvedsupposedlytoldKirchakovthatwhenStalinaskedNikolaev“Why did you kill Kirov?” Nikolaev accused officers of the Leningrad NKVD of providing him with the murder weapon and “persecuting” him until heagreedtoassassinateKirov.WhenNikolaevsaidthis,guards“beat(him)ontheheadwiththeir(pistols),hecollapsed,andtheycarriedhimout...”21

Shatunovskaia’stalewasthird-handbyherownaccount–MedvedhadsupposedlytoldKirchakov,whotoldher.Thestoryalsocontainsanumberofobviousfactualerrors.Forone,itplacesZaporozhetsintheinterrogationroomwithStalin,Medved,Nikolaev, Iagoda,andanumberofotherLenin-grad NKVD officers. But multiple sources indicate that Zaporozhets was not in Leningrad at the time. At several points the story conflicts with the account of MikhailRosliakov,whowaswaitingatthetimeofinterrogationinaroomonefloor below, in case Stalin wanted to interview him. For example, Rosliakov heard that Nikolaev had been carried into the interrogation “in a semi-con-sciousstate”andinitiallyfailedtorecognizeStalin.Hesupposedlycriedandrepeatedthewords“WhathaveIdone,whathaveIdone!”Hedemonstratedonlya“foggy”recollectionofevents.22

MikoianforwardedShatunovskaia’slettertoKhrushchevwithanoteontheenvelope–“ToComradeN.S.Khrushchev–tobeopenedonlybyhim.”23KhrushchevevidentlyputtheletterontheagendaofthePresidiumofDecem-ber31,1955.Theonlyrecordofthemeetingisa“workingsummary”ofthediscussion,whichindicatesthatPolitburomemberNikolaiBulganinreadtheletteroutloud.WhilehewasreadingKlimentVoroshilovinterruptedwithashoutof“Lies!”MolotovnotedthathewaspresentwhenStalininterviewed

20 Taubman,Khrushchev,pp.266-269. 21 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.816,n.5. 22 Mikhail Rosliakov,22 MikhailRosliakov,Ubiistvo Kirova(Leningrad:Lenizdat,1991),pp.45-46. 23 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.816,n.5.

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Nikolaevand“noonewashit.”Mikoianassertedthat“Stalinwasextremelyupset.TheChekistshadahandinthewholething.”Khrushchevagreedthat“ifyoulookatthebusiness,itdoesn’tsmellright,”andproposedinterview-ingDr.KirchakovandthedriverofthecarinwhichBorisovdied.Molotov,perhapsafraidofwhatchargesmightsurfaceinoralinterrogations,expressedskepticismthatinterviewswouldprovideusefulinformation,andsuggested“checking the documents.” The Presidium resolved to look at the files of the 1930scasesagainstIagoda,Yezhov,andMedved.24

Khrushchev,withthehelpofMikoianandhisassociates,wasclearlypre-paringforaseriousdiscussionofStalinistrepressions(atleastagainstCom-munistsafter1934)attheforthcomingpartycongress.Molotov,Kaganovich,Malenkov, Voroshilov, and other party leaders outside Khrushchev’s innercirclehadtobenervous. Khrushchev,whocontrolledtheKGB(Serov),andthe USSR prosecutor’s office (Rudenko), and had key allies in the Army and the party’sControlCommission,hadtheupperhand.HewasabletoforceaveryuncomfortablediscussionoftheStalinistyearsonhisrivalsonhisownterms.Atthesametime,hispowerwasnotunlimited.Heproceededcautiously,us-ingMikoian’speople,whomhecouldalwayscastloose,todotheresearch,andforbearingtochargeMolotovandtheothersdirectlywithcollaborationintheTerror.ThediscussionofShatunovskaia’sletterwastypical.KhrushchevandMikoian suggested that something “didn’t smell right,” and that NKVD of-ficers might have had something to do with Kirov’s murder. Shatunovskaia’s letter did imply that Stalin might have been involved, but Khrushchev andMikoiandidnotgothatfar.

Khrushchev’scolleagueshadmuchtofear,buttheyhadtoproceedcare-fully. They acceded to the proposal for an informal inquiry into the Kirovmurder. At other Presidium meetings in the months before the TwentiethParty Congress Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Malenkovallvoiced their support for revealing to thePartyCongresssomeofStalin’sunjustified persecutions of Communists. At the same time they called for do-ing so “with a cool head,” and for reaffirming Stalin’s great accomplishments in building socialism. In reply a chorus of junior Presidium members whosupportedKhrushchev(Aristov,Saburov,Suslov,Pervukhin,andothers)in-sistedthatthePresidiumhadtotellthecongress“everything”(Suslov),thatStalinhadnogoodpoints(Pervukhin),andthatStalinistrepressionswerenot“faults”but“crimes”(Saburov).ByearlyFebruary1956everyoneknewwhatthepartylinewas–evenKaganovichwassaying“wecan’tdeceivehistory...Khrushchev’sproposalforareport(onStalinistrepression)iscorrect.”25

In the meantime, the Presidium appointed a commission consisting ofjuniorPresidiummembersPeterPospelov,P.T.Komarov,AverkiiAristovand

24 Reabilitatsiia,vol.1,p.296. 25 SeenotesonPresidiumsessionsofNov.5,1955,Feb.1,1956,andFeb.9,1956inReabilitat-

siia,vol.1,pp.275-276,308-309,349-351.


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Nikolai Shvernik to investigate issues related to “rehabilitation.” Pospelovwaschair.OnFebruary9thiscommissionreportedtothePresidiumon“rea-sonsforthemassrepressionsagainstmembersandcandidatesoftheCentralCommitteeelectedattheSeventeenthPartyCongress.”AlmostcertainlythecommissionreliedinpartontheevidencegatheredearlierbyLevShaumian.Usingdocuments thatwere top secretat the time, the commission reportedthat1.5millionpersonswerearrestedand681,692executedin1937-1938.Thereportstatedthatof139membersandcandidateselectedtotheCentralCom-mitteebytheSeventeenthPartyCongress,98werearrestedandshot–numbersKhrushchevusedinhis“SecretSpeech”weekslater.Itdescribedthemethodsbywhichcaseswerefabricatedagainsthigh-rankingpartymembersin1937and after. It also identified as key to the Terror’s development Kirov’s murder andthesubsequentLawofDecember1settingupspecialtribunals(thetroiki).Therewasnodiscussionof thepossibility thatStalinhaddeliberatelyorga-nizedtheassassinationhimself.26

The “MoloTov coMMission”

OnFebruary25,1956,attheconclusionoftheTwentiethPartyCongress,Khrushchevgavehis“SecretSpeech,”denouncingStalin’s“cultofpersonal-ity,”hisarrestsandexecutionsofpartymembersafter1934,andhisfailuretopreparefortheNaziattackontheSovietUnioninJune1941.KhrushchevalsoacknowledgedStalin’s supposedaccomplishments (suchas industrializationoftheUSSR).Hedidnotsuggestthatthereweresystemicproblemsotherthan“thecultofpersonality,”nordidhequestiontheforcedcollectivizationofag-riculture,ortheexpulsionofTrotskyites,“Rightists,”andotheroppositionistsfromtheparty.

Followingupon theFebruary9Pospelov reportandMikoian’s earlierquestion to Lev Shaumian, Khrushchev addressed the question of the massannihilationofCentralCommitteemembersaftertheSeventeenthPartyCon-gress. HeattributedtheexterminationtoStalin’suncheckedpower,butdidnot offer more specifics. Immediately following this part of the speech, he notedthat“massrepressionsandgrossviolationsofsocialistlegality”beganafterKirov’smurder.Withregardtotheassassinationitself,hesaid:

OnehastonotethatthecircumstancesconnectedwiththemurderofCom-radeKirovaretothisdaybefoggedwithmuchthatisincomprehensibleandmysterious, and demand careful investigation. There is reason to believethatsomeoneamongthosechargedwithguardingComradeKirovaidedthemurdererNikolaev. Oneandonehalfmonthsbefore themurderofKirovNikolaevwasarrestedforsuspiciousbehavior,butwasreleasedandnotevensearched. ThefactthattheChekistattachedtoKirovendedupdeadinanauto“accident”onDecember2,1934whilebeingdriventointerrogationis

26 Reabilitatsiia,vol.1,pp.317-348.

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extremely suspicious. After the murder of Kirov the leading officers of the LeningradNKVDwereremovedfromtheirpostsandgivenverylightpun-ishments,butin1937wereshot.ItisconceivablethattheywereshotinordertocleanupthetracesoftheorganizersofKirov’smurder.27

Khrushchev’s speechrevealshim tobea“masterofdosing”almostasgreatasStalinhimself.HedidnotdirectlystatethatStalinorotherpartylead-erswereinvolvedinpreparingKirov’smurder.ButbyplacinghissuggestionthattherehadbeenaconspiracytokilltheLeningradpartyleaderimmediatelyafterhisdiscussionof thedestructionof theCCmembershipafter1934andhisnotethattheorgyofkillingfollowedKirov’sdeath,hesignaledhisreadi-ness to accept a specific narrative of the Terror. This would be one in which Stalinhimselfand/orhisclosestassistantsatthetime(Molotov,Kaganovich)hadplotted thekilling to justify thesubsequentexterminationofpartycad-res. ThisnarrativewouldmakesenseoftheTerror,anditwouldalsobringKhrushchev’smajorrivalsforpower–Molotov,Kaganovich,andMalenkov–crashingdown.Itwouldexonerate“true”BolshevismofresponsibilityfortheTerror,layingitallatthefeetofStalinandhisclosestlieutenantsin1934-1938.ItwouldalsoexoneratejuniormembersoftheBolshevikleadershipwhosupportedKhrushchev in1956– they“hadno idea”about themassrepres-sionsinthe1930s.

Many party officials, ambitious or afraid, or both, responded with alacrity toKhrushchev’ssignal.ThisresponsefollowedtheStalinistpattern,inwhichsubordinatesrushedtocarryoutwishestheleaderexpressedonlyinhintsandinsinuations.Pospelovwasonesuchsubordinate.

AspartofhisworkonthecommissiononStalinistrepressionscreatedonDec.31,1955,PospelovpreparedareportonKirov’smurder,whichhepre-sentedtothePresidiumonApril23,1956.ThisreportisimportantforthelightitshedsbothontherumorsabouttheassassinationreportedbyShatunovskaiainher1955letterandtheconstructionofanalternativehistoryofthemurder.Pospelov andhis colleagues looked intoShatunovskaia’s letter, summoningthedoctorandnurseshecitedtoMoscowforinterviews. Dr.Kirchakovin-dicatedhehad notheardthestoryhetoldShatunovskaiaaboutNikolaev’sin-terviewwithStalindirectlyfromformerLeningradNVKDchiefMedved,butfrom an ex-NKVD officer, Olskii. The nurse Trunina simply averred that, like Shatunovskaia,shehadheardthestoryfromKirchakov.28

In short, the story that Nikolaev denounced the Leningrad NKVD officers inhis interviewwithStalinwasnot third-hand,but fourth-hand (Medved toOlskii to Kirchakov to Shatunovskaia) when Shatunovskaia put it to paper.PospelovconcludedthatKirchakov’stalecouldnotbereliedupon.

In discounting Kirchakov’s story, Pospelov was not covering for Sta-lin.Intheremainderofhisreport,heconstructedacasethatStalindidorder

27 Khrushchev,Vospominaniia,vol.2,pp.758-759. 28 “ZapiskaP.N.PospelovaobubiistveKirova,”Svobodnaia mysl’8(1992),pp.64-71.


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Kirov’smurder.Hedidsobyusingmaterialsfrom1937-1938investigationsof Iagoda, Enukidze, Zaporozhets, and the Leningrad NKVD officers accused ofmurderingBorisov.Inotherwords,inordertoimplicateStalin,hechosetorelyon“evidence”thatwasextractedundertortureintheprocessoffabricat-ingacaseagainstarrestedNKVDchiefIagoda.Theconfessionsobtainedbytorture for thegreatStalinist showtrialswereofcourseuntrustworthy,andmanyofthosewhoconfessed(includingIagoda)retractedtheirconfessionsincourt. Pospelov’sversionofthecrimeduplicatedtheMarch1938showtrialversion,exceptthatStalinreplacedthe“Right-TrotskyiteCenter”asthesourceoftheordertokillKirov.29

AverylikelyinterpretationofPospelov’sreportisthis.Theauthor,anold Stalinist (like everyone at the top of party in the 1950s), was producingwhatheknew“theboss”(onceStalin,nowKhrushchev)wanted.RegardingShatunovskaia’sfourth-handtaleastoofar-fetchedevenforhispurposes,hecherry-picked the 1937-1938 confessions, which at least were on paper andusuallysignedbytheirsupposedauthors,toproduceacoherentstoryofhowStalinhadKirovkilled.HegeneratedthenarrativethatKhrushchevdemand-ed.NowitwasuptoKhrushchevhow,when,andinwhatforumtousethatstory-line.

Khrushchev’s“SecretSpeech”onde-Stalinizationsetoffafurorthatre-sembledatraditionalBolshevik“self-criticism”campaign.Atupperlevelsofthepartypotential targetsof thecampaign (i.e.Molotov,Malenkov,Kagan-ovich)publiclyapplaudedbutstrovetoprotectthemselvesbycovertobstruc-tionism and delaying tactics. Inside the CC executive apparatus officials like PospelovworkedtoproducetextsthatKhrushchevmightneedinpursuitofthecampaign. Professionalelitesand lower-rankingpartymembersvictim-izedbyStalinspokeoutagainsthim.Atpublicmeetingsafewevendaredtodiscusstheresponsibilityoftheentirepartyleadershipforthereignoffear.AtsomeworkplacesemployeestoredownordefacedportraitsofStalin.Mean-whileStalin’sdefenderswereat leastasvociferous. InGeorgiatherepublicleaders imposed martial law after pro-Stalin riots on the anniversary of thedictator’sdeath.Sovietsecurityforceskilledtwentypeopleinthesuppressionoftheriots.30

Anintegralpartofany“self-criticism”campaignwaslettersofdenuncia-tion“frombelow.”AfterpartymeetingsinLeningradexplainingKhrushchev’sspeech, former police and NKVD officers began sending letters to the province partycommitteeconcerningtheKirovmurder.Oneletter,fromV.M.Iakush-ev,caughttheattentionofFrolKozlov,LeningradpartychiefandKhrushchevally. In late Marchor earlyApril,Kozlovwrote toKhrushchev that “From

29 “ZapiskaP.N.Pospelova,”pp.66-71. 30 On the disorders in local party and professional organizations following the “Secret

Speech,”seeReabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.21-65.

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Iakushev’sevidenceitisclearthatBorisov’smurderwasaccomplishedaccord-ingtoaplanworkedoutbeforehand.”

V.M.IakushevwasinfactakeyNKVDinvestigatorinthe1937construc-tionofboguschargesoftreasonandmurderagainstGenrikhIagodaandformerleadersofthe“RightDeviation”BukharinandRykov.EvidencegatheredbyIakushevandotherswasthebasisfortheMarch1938showtrialofthesemen.In1937IakushevhadtorturedthedriverofthetruckinwhichBorisovdied,Kuzin, and the two escorting NKVD officers, Vinogradov and Malyi, until all finally confessed to killing Kirov’s guard. In the narrative concocted by Iaku-shev and his fellow “investigators,” Zaporozhets feared that Borisov wouldrevealIagoda’ssupposedconspiracytomurderKirov.SoheorderedBorisovkilled.Aplanwashatchedtodoawaywithhimundertheguiseofacar“ac-cident.” WhenKuzinwasdrivingBorisovtoLeningradpartyheadquartersforinterrogationbyStalinthedayafterKirov’skilling,Malyihadgrabbedthesteeringwheelandrunthetruckoffthestreetagainstawall.Simultaneously,Vinogradov,ridinginthebackofthetruckwithBorisov,smashedthelatter’sheadwithabludgeon,killinghim.31

ThestoryofBorisov’smurderdevelopedfortheshowtrialofIagodaetal,ishighlyunreliable.Evidencefromthe1934-1935investigationandothersourcescontradictsthe1937-1938narrativeIakushevpresentedonalmostev-erypoint. Moreover, in1937Kuzin,Malyi, andVinogradovalldeniedanywrongdoinginBorisov’sdeaththroughseveralweeksoftorture(apparentlyten days in Kuzin’s case). And finally, Malyi and Vinogradov recanted their confessionsattheircourthearingonSeptember2,1937.32

Iakushevwasaperpetrator,atorturer,andacollaboratorinStalin’sfab-ricationoffalsecriminalcases.His1956letterseemstohavebeenapreemp-tivestrike–byprovidinghisversionofeventstoparty leaders,henotonlyinsuredhimselfagainstprosecution,butalsocurriedfavorwiththem.Kozlov,Khrushchev’sassociate,wasbuyingwhatIakushevhadtosell.InhislettertoKhrushchev,Kozlovalsoacceptedwithoutquestionotherdubiousevidence,suchasaccountsofplotsagainstKirov’s lifegivenbyM.A.Volkova,apsy-chologicallyillcompulsivedenouncerStalinhadusedintheaftermathoftheKirovmurdertoarrestdozensofLeningradersonboguschargesofterroristplots.Basedonsuchdubiousclaims,Kozlovconcluded“Thesefactsdemon-strate,obviously,thatseveraldifferentplansforkillingKirovwereworkedoutintheorgansoftheMVD(i.e.NKVD).”33

On April 13, 1956 the Presidium created a commission to investigate“materialsoftheopentrialsofthecasesofBukharin,Rykov,Zinoviev,Tukh-achevskii, andothers.” This commissionwould look into theKirovcaseaswell,butitisimportanttonotethatitsmandatewasmuchbroader–ineffect,

31 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.36-38. 32 Kirilina,Neizvestnyi Kirov,pp.344-349. 33 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.38.


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toexplainthatpartoftheTerrordirectedagainsttheupperlevelsoftheCom-munist Party. At first glance, the composition of the commission was strange. Ofninemembers,three,Molotov,Kaganovich,andVoroshilov,hadbeenin-volvedat thehighest level inorchestrating theTerror,and thuswere them-selvespotential targetsof investigation. Theywere,however,outnumberedbythesixmembersofthecommissionfromthejuniorranksoftheCCleader-ship,allofwhomsupportedKhrushchevduringthisperiod–MikhailSuslov,EkaterinaFurtseva,Shvernik, Aristov,Pospelov, andRudenko. Shvernik, aKhrushchevsupporterduringtheThaw,hadjustbeenappointedchairmanofthePartyControlCommissiononwhichShatunovskaiaserved.34

PuttingMolotov,Kaganovich, andVoroshilovon the commissionmayhavebeena sop to themand toothersnervousaboutwhere theparty’s in-vestigationoftheTerrormightlead.Itmayalsohavebeenanexerciseinha-rassmentanddisciplinarypowerbyKhrushchev.AtthecommissionsessionsMolotovandtheotherswouldbesubjecttoinsinuations,badgering,andgen-erallyuncomfortablediscussions.Finally,Khrushchevmayhaveconsideredthat getting the signatures of the veteran Stalinists would be the final valida-tion of commission findings. Given the party tradition of unanimous approval ofsuchreports,hemayhavehopedthatallthreecouldultimatelybeforcedintosigningwhateverreportthecommissionissued,and,perhaps,incriminat-ingthemselves.35

The coMMission invesTigaTes

On April 16 the Molotov commission met for the first time. All members were present except for Rudenko, the head of the prosecutor’s office, who was representedbyoneofhisdeputies,Baranov. AlsopresentwasSerov. ThecommissionbeganitsworkwithaconsiderationoftheKirovassassination,or-deringSerovandBaranovtopreparereportsonKGBandprosecutorialdocu-mentsrelatedtothecase.Membersresolvedtomeetagaininoneweek.36

Inresponsetothecommission’srequest,SerovandBaranovforwardedonApril20a“ReportonInvestigativeMaterialsintheCaseoftheVillainousMurderofS.M.Kirov.”Attachedtothereportwerecopiesofselectedmate-rials from the case and a note that commission members could examine alldocumentsrelatedtothemurderatKGBheadquarters.37Thisreport,andtheminutesof thecommissionmeetingofApril23thatdiscussedit, reveal tworadicallydifferentagendasatwork.Ontheonehand,theApril23commis-

34 SeeA.I.Melchin,Nikolai Shvernik: Biograficheskii ocherk(Moskva:Politizdat,1977),pp.208,216.ShvernikwasappointedonFebruary27,1956,attheplenumoftheCentralCommitteethatimmediatelyfollowedtheXXthPartyCongress.

35 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.70. 36 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.43,l.1. 37 EmailtoauthorfromM.Iu.Prozumenshchikov,deputydirectorofRGANI,Sept.5,2005.

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sionmeetingresolved,probablyat thepromptingofMolotovandhisallies,thatNikolaev’smurderwasa“political”act,anddismissedquestionsabouttheassassin’spsychologicalstate.CommissionmembersaskedBaranov,theKGB,andthePartyControlCommission(Shvernik)toansweraseriesofques-tions related to the official 1934-1935 version of the crime. These questions boileddownto:wasNikolaevaZinovievite?WhatwerehistiestoZinovievitegroups?WhatactivitiesinLeningradweretheZinovievitesuptobeforethemurder?Wasn’ttheguardBorisovmurdered?Thesequestionsareattribut-able to the desire of Molotov and his allies to defend at least the 1934-1935versionofthecrime(thatZinovievsupportersinLeningradandMoscowwereresponsible). Inthisversionofevents,NikolaevwasaZinovievite terrorist,andhencehistrial,thetrialsofKamenevandZinoviev,andprobablyalsothelater show trials of 1937-1938 were all justified.38

OntheotherhandtheApril23sessionalsorequestedthattheUSSRpros-ecutor“presenttothecommissionmaterialsonthevalidityandlegalityofthepreliminary investigation, inquest, and trial” of the accused in the first trial of theKirovcase.Apparentlysomemembersofthecommissiondidnotwanttoaccept the December 1934 court findings that Zinovievites had plotted the mur-der. And reports produced in late April by the KGB and the prosecutor’s office tookpreciselythisdirection.SoonafterApril23SerovsentthecommissionaKGBreportansweringtheirinquiries.ThismemorandumpresentedNikolaevasalonegunmanandarguedthattheNKVDfabricatedcriminalcasesagainsttheZinovievites. ItusedcitationsfrominterrogationsandthestenogramoftheDecember1934trialofthe“LeningradCenter”(i.e.theassassinNikolaevandhisthirteensupposedZinovievite“co-conspirators”)toarguethatnosuch“Center”hadeverexisted.ItdemonstratedthatthetrialhadviolatedstandardSovietrulesforcriminaltrials.Theauthorsalsoanalyzedthechangingtesti-monyofthewitnessesinthedeathoftheguardBorisov,contendingthatthe1937-1938 “confessions” implicating NKVD officers in murdering him were bogus.ThusSerovprovidedsupportforthelinethat“theTerrorwasnotjusti-fied,” presumably the position taken by at least some of the other Khrushchev supportersonthecommission.39

ThelateApril1953KGBreportendedwithanimportantcodacoveringthe trial of Leningrad NKVD officials for negligence in the Kirov case in Janu-ary1935. Thiscodaimpliedthat therehadbeenaconspiracytoassassinateKirov,notamongZinovieviteoppositionists,butwithintheLeningradNKVD.ItdidsobyemphasizingthefailureoftheLeningradNKVDtoprotectKirov,thelackofwritteninstructionsforKirov’sguard,thefactthattheLeningradNKVDhaddetainedandreleasedNikolaevoncebeforethemurder,andthe“soft”punishmentmetedout toMedvedandhissubordinates in1935. ThereportalsocitedtestimonytakenbytheKGBfromformerLeningradNKVD

38 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.43,l.2. 39 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.1,ll.10-53.


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officer P.M. Lobov. Lobov had claimed in April 1956 that while working at the Kolymalaborcamp(sometimein1935-1937)ZaporozhetshadtoldhimaboutaconversationbetweenStalinandNKVDchiefIagodainearly1935.Suppos-edly Stalin had told Iagoda to take it easy on the Leningrad NKVD officers chargedwithnegligenceintheKirovcase,andtorestorethemtoregulardutiesafteradecentintervaloftime.40

Thistestimonydeservesspecialattention.Lobov,whohadbeenZaporo-zhets’deputyinLeningrad,wasclearlyhintingthatStalinhadlettheLenin-gradNKVDoff lightlyforareason–perhapstheirnegligencehadnotbeenunwelcome.ThisopenedapossiblelineofinquirythatwouldpointfromtheLeningradNKVDtoStalin.

WhileLobov’stestimonyseemsdramatic,thereareseriousproblemswithit.First,hisstoryaboutStalinwasfourth-handbythetimeitwascommittedtopaperin1956–IagodahadsupposedlytoldittoZaporozhetswhotoldittoLo-bov,whotoldittotheKGBin1956.Second,his1956depositionwasprobablytainted by earlier testimony against fellow Leningrad NKVD officers during the Great Terror. Lobov may have testified in 1937-1938 that Iagodahador-dered soft treatment of the Leningrad NKVD officers, because they had helped inthesupposedanti-Soviet/anti-StalinplottokillKirov.Andin1956hemayhave decided to confirm his 1937 testimony, regardless of its truth or falsity, andwithimportantchange–havingStalinratherthanIagodaissuetheordersforsofttreatment.Whateverthecase,intheyearsafter1956Lobovwouldre-peatedlyenlargeuponhistestimonyuntilZaporozhetsatKolymawastellinghimthewholestoryofaputativeStalin-Iagoda-ZaporozhetsplottokillKirov– again, almost precisely the storyline of the 1938 show trial of Iagoda andtheleadersofthe“Right-TrotskyiteBloc.”Itisalsoworthnotingthatin1939LobovhadwonareductioninhissentencebykillingformeroppositionistG.Sokol’nikovinjailonBeriia’sorders.Lobovwasamurdererandatelleroftalltales.

Serov’sreportoflateApril1956,then,presentedonecompletelineofar-gument,againstMolotov’sclaimsthattherehadbeenarealZinovievitecon-spiracytomurderKirov.Italsohintedatasecondlineofargument,thatStalinhimselfhadorderedtheassassination.TheKGBonlyinsinuatedthis,offeringitupforpossiblefuturedevelopment.Asfarasweknow,thischargewouldnot be made explicit, even within the secret confines of the Central Committee, untilthewinterof1960-1961.

AsecondresponsetotheMolotovcommission’squeriesofApril23camefrom the USSR prosecutor’s office. This was a report on the “materials on the validityandlegalityofthepreliminaryinvestigation,inquest,andtrialinthecaseofthemurderofS.M.Kirov.”Theprosecutor’smemorandumrepeatedthecontentsofthetwoKGBreportsalreadyanalyzed,albeitwithsomediffer-entdata.TheauthorscontendedforcefullythatNikolaevwasalonegunman,

40 Ibid.,ll.47-52.

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psychologicallydisturbed,whohadnoconspiratorialconnectionstoanyoftheotheraccusedinthetrialoftheLeningradCenter.TheyarguedthatthetrialofNikolaevandhisputativeco-conspiratorswasanobviousfabricationthatwas “in direct violation” of Soviet law. In short, the prosecutor’s office took astronglyanti-Molotovposition.UnliketheKGBreports,thismemorandumdidnotdiscussBorisov’sdeathortheissueofLeningradNKVDnegligenceinorganizingKirov’sguard.41

The April 1953 reports by the KGB and USSR prosecutor’s office are in-dispensable for any evaluation of evidence in the Kirov case. Many of thedocumentspresentlyavailableinthecase(apartfromhearsay,suchasthatre-ported by Alexander Orlov) were first released to the Molotov commission as attachmentstothesereports.ThereportsthemselvesindicatethepositionthattheKGBleadership(Serov)andtheUSSRprosecutor(Rudenko)weretakingwithregardtothecommission’sinvestigation,andthustheyhelpustogaugepossiblebiases in thedocumentsreleased. WouldSerov, forexample,haveconcealed evidence against Stalin or evidence against Leningrad NKVD offi-cersinApril1956?Giventhefactspresentedabove,thisseemsveryunlikely.KGB reports in April undermined Molotov’s claims that there was a largeroppositionistconspiracyagainstStalin,andprovidedsomesupportforargu-mentsthatStalinhimselfhadorderedthemurder.InadditionitisclearthatSerovwasKhrushchev’smanthroughoutthisperiod.Therewasnoreasonforhimnottobe.Khrushchevcontrolledthesituationinthespringof1956.AndhehadmadeitclearbothintheSecretSpeechandinPresidiummeetingsthathewasinterestedin“solving”theKirovmurder,andthatthesolutionmightimplicateStalinorhisclosestlieutenantsatthetimeinthemurder.

In spite of the KGB and prosecutor’s reports, Molotov, famous for hisstubbornness,continuedtodefendthevalidityoftheStalinistversionofKirov’smurder.42AtaMay9,1956meetingtheMolotovcommissionmembersfailedtoreachaconsensusinterpretationoftheassassinationandtrialofthe“Lenin-gradCenter”thatfollowed.Therefore,theyresolvedtolayasideconsiderationofthecaseforthemomentandmoveontoinvestigatelatertrials.Thecommis-sionwouldreturntotheKirovaffairatalaterdate.43

Inthemeantimereactiontothe“SecretSpeech” insideandoutsidetheUSSR led to doubts among some Central Committee leaders about furtherpublicrevelationsofStalinistrepression. IntheUSSRthepro-Stalinriots inGeorgiaandnumerousreportsofpartymembersquestioningtheentireSovietsystematmeetingscauseduneasiness.Thenthe“SecretSpeech”wentpublicontheinternationalscene,astheNew York Times publishedthetextonJune4,

41 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.1,ll.153-194. 42 SeetheexpostfactocommentsonMolotovcommissionworkbyAristovattheJuly1957

plenumoftheCentralCommitteeinKovaleva,Korotkov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,p.189.

43 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.43,l.3.


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1956.InlateJunethousandsofstrikersinthePolishcityofPoznandemanded“BreadandFreedom,”whileinHungaryparticipantsinayouthforumestab-lishedbythepartyleadershipturnedontheCommunist leader,MatyasRa-kosi.InJunetheItalianjournalNuovi ArgumentipublishedaninterviewwithItalianCommunistleaderPalmiroTogliatiinwhichthelattersuggestedthatunderStalintheSovietUnionhadundergone“abureaucraticdegeneration”(thiswasTrotsky’soldformulaaboutStalinism).InresponsetheCentralCom-mittee Presidium tasked Pospelov with drafting a resolution on the “SecretSpeech.”Thedraft,withminorchanges,wasapprovedbythePresidiumonJune30,1956underthetitle“OnOvercomingtheCultofPersonalityanditsConsequences.”44

SovietreformersofthetimeandmanyWesternhistorianscametoviewtheJune30,1956Presidiumresolutionasafundamentalsetbackto,orevenareversalofde-Stalinization. Suchclaimsgotoofar. WorkcontinuedontherehabilitationofpartymembersrepressedintheTerror,onrestoringtherightsofdeportedpeoplesandformerPOWs,andoncompensatingreleasedcampsurvivors for property confiscated at the time of their arrest or sentencing.45The resolution was an attempt to effect a fine balance, not a course reversal. It reaffirmed that Stalin had made great mistakes and committed many crimes, but that he was a genuine fighter for socialism. Flaws in his personality, noted by Lenin, together with the pressures of fighting capitalist enemies without andtheircollaboratorswithin,hadbeentoomuchforStalin,andthedeplor-ableresultwasthecultofpersonality.The“cultofpersonality,”theresolutionstated,was“incontradictiontothenatureofSovietsociety(stroi).”Itwasanaliengrowththatneededtoberemoved.Atthesametime,theSovietpeople“were justified in their pride that our Motherland was the first to build the road tosocialism.”46

TheJune30resolutionseemstohaveemboldenedMolotovandhissup-portersontheinvestigativecommission.Protocolsofthesevenmeetingsbe-tweenMay10and July30, 1956, combinedwithotherevidence, suggestanescalatingstrugglebetweentheMolotovgroupandtheyoungerKhrushchevbackers.Inthisperiodthecommissionexamineddocumentsofthemajortri-alsof1935-1938providedbySerovandRudenko.OnMay30,memberswereunprepared to deliver a scheduled written report to the Presidium on its find-ings,andresolvedinsteadtopresentanoralsummary. OnJune1, thePre-sidiumagreed topostpone the report. Questionsputby thecommission toSerov on July 25 suggest that Molotov was pushing hard his view that thedefendantsinthetrialswereguiltyofatleastsomeofthecharges.Thecom-missionaskedSerovtoprovideinformationonmeetingsoftheaccusedwithTrotskyitesabroad,onBukharin’spossibleconnectionswiththeoldSocialist

44 SeeTaubman,Khrushchev,pp.283-294,Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.128,132-148. 45 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.162-163,172,181-183,172-176. 46 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.146.

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RevolutionaryParty,andonNikolaev’s connectionswith foreignconsuls inLeningrad.OnJuly30thecommissionresolvedtoreturntodiscussionoftheKirovmurder,requesting“detailedconclusions”onthematterfromRudenkoandSerovbeforebreakingforthesummerholidays.47

Khrushchev’spoint-manonthecommission,Aristov,continuedtoworkwithSerovontheKirovmurder.OnJuly18,1956SerovsentamemorandumtoAristovheaded“ontheresultsofinvestigationofM.N.Volkova’sletteronthemurderofS.M.Kirov.”VolkovawasacompulsivedenouncerStalinpulledoutofamentalhospitalonDecember2,1934andused topurgeLeningradof supposed anti-terrorist plotters. In May 1956 she sent a denunciation totheCC,claimingthatshehadknownNikolaevpersonally,thathehadbeenamemberofacounterrevolutionaryorganizationdedicated toassassinatingKirov,Molotov,andVoroshilov,andthatsomeparticipantsintheconspiracywerestillaliveandwellinLeningrad.TohismemoonthisdenunciationSerovattachedaKGBreportthatdestroyedVolkova’scredibility.Accordingtothereport,Volkovahadbeenanagentofthesecurityorgansfrom1931.Shehada history of denouncing friends and acquaintances as counterrevolutionaryplottersbothbeforeandafterKirov’smurder.From1948-1955theLeningradsecurityorganshadreceived90lettersofdenunciationfromVolkovaandgen-eratedelevenvolumesofmaterialinvestigatingthem.Shehaddenouncedherboyfriendwhenhebrokeupwithher,herdaughter,andmanyneighborsandacquaintances,allofcapitalcrimes.48

SerovconcludedthatVolkovawaswhollyunreliable.GiventhatSerov’sletterwasaddressedtoAristov,itseemsthatthelat-

terhadprobablyaskedforaKGBevaluationofVolkova’sdenunciation.Thedenunciation itself could have been used by Molotov or his antagonists ontheMolotovcommission.Itsuggestedawide-rangingconspiracytomurderKirov,true,butonedirectedagainsttheStalinistleadershipasawhole(whichwould fit the 1938 show trial version of events). The KGB debunked the de-nunciationcompletely. It isworthnotingthatalatercommission,onwhichShatunovskaiaplayedadecisiverole,wouldreturntoVolkova’sevidenceinan effort to find evidence implicating Stalin in the murder.

Lateinthesummer,theKGBproducedyetanotherreportontheKirovmurder,inresponsetotheMolotovcommission’sJuly30demandfor“detailedconclusions.”ThismemorandumsquarelyopposedtheeffortsofMolotovandhisallies tosuggest that therehadbeenarealZinovieviteconspiracytokillKirov.Theauthorsmarshaledagreatdealofevidencefromthe1934-1935in-vestigationstoarguethatNikolaevwasalonegunmanandBorisovhaddiedinanautoaccident.TheyalsowentovertestimonyabouttheKirovmurderinthelatershowtrials,demonstratingthatthedefendants,includingIagoda,werealmostcertainlyinnocentofanyconspiracy.

47 RGANI, f. 6, op. 13, d. 43, ll. 4-10. For Presidium decision postponing Molotov commission47 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.43,ll.4-10.For Presidium decision postponing Molotov commissionForPresidiumdecisionpostponingMolotovcommissionreport,seeReabilitatsiia,vol.2,p.114.

48 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.163-167.


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InthisreportSerovomittedanyevidencethatmightpointtoaconspiracybyStalin,Iagoda,and/or local NKVD officials to kill Kirov. Yet KGB investi-gatorscontinuedtogathersuchevidence,evenifitwasdubious.OnJuly20,Lobov, Zaporozhets’ former deputy discussed above, enlarged on his Apriltestimony.NotonlyhadZaporozhetstoldhimaboutStalin’sordertoletLen-ingrad NKVD officers off easily, Lobov said, he had also told him that the Leningrad NKVD had detained Nikolaev multiple times,49 and that Iagoda,through Zaporozhets, had ordered Nikolaev’s release. Here again, Lobov’stestimonyfollowedthestory-lineoftheMarch1938showtrialonthepurport-edconspiracytomurderKirov.50

WhydidSerovleaveoutmaterialsuggestinganupper-levelconspiracytomurderKirov?Perhapsheandhisstaffbelievedthatavailablematerialwasfalse(astheybelievedwithVolkova’sletter).Perhapsalsotheywererespond-ingtothenewdoubtsaboutpublicdenunciationofStalin.AlmostcertainlytheychosetofocustheirmemorandumonrefutingMolotov’scontentionthattherehadreallybeensomekindofanoppositionistplottoassassinateKirov.

TheMolotovcommissiondidnotmeetagainuntilNovember19,1956,perhapsbecausethediscussionshadreachedanimpasse,perhapsbecausetheSovietleaderswereoccupiedwithsummerholidays,theSuezwarinEgypt,andrevolutioninHungary. Butwhenitdidmeet,membersmovedquicklytoproduceareporttothePresidium.AfterdiscussionofnewmemorandaontheKirovmurderfromSerovandRudenko,thecommissionchargedRudenkowithpreparingadraftreporttothePresidium.OnDecember4thecommis-sionapprovedRudenko’sdraft,recommendingminorchanges.51

The commission’s December 1956 conclusions were an incoherent andcontradictory mess, but an overall victory for Molotov. The memorandumemphasizedthatbecausetherewererealenemiesinsideandoutsidetheSo-vietUnioninthe1920sand1930s(Trotskyites,kulaks,Rightists,theGermansand Japanese) the repressions of the period were justified. Because Kirov had fought Zinovievites and Trotskyites in Leningrad, they hated him. The re-sultwasNikolaev’sshootingofKirov. Thereportstated thatNikolaevhad“sharplyanti-Sovietattitudes”andstronglyimpliedthathewasaZinovievite.Nikolaevknewpersonallysomeof theex-Zinovieviteswhowere triedwithhim.52Atthesametimethememorandumadmittedthattherewasnoconclu-siveevidenceof“criminalties”betweenNikolaevandtheotheraccusedinthe

49 Evidence from the1934-1935 investigation indicates thatNikolaevwasdetainedby theNKVDjustoncebeforethemurder,thatnopistolwasfoundonhim,andthathisbriefcase(althoughnothisperson)wassearched.

50 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.13,ll.7-45. 51 RGANI,f.6,op.13,d.43,ll.11-12. 52 Onlypartlytrue,basedonevidencefromthe1934-1935investigationandthetranscriptof

thetrialofthe“LeningradCenter.”ThreeofthedefendantshadnevermetNikolaevbeforethetrial,andafourthmaynothave.SeeKirilina,Neizvestnyi Kirov,pp.284-294.

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“TrialoftheLeningradCenter.”Indeed,theLeningradCenterassuchprob-ablyneverexisted.53

Thecommissionfoundthatthesentencesinthe1935trialofthe“MoscowCenter” supposedly headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev were justified. The Zinovieviteleadersreallydidbearresponsibilityforencouragingterrorismbystrugglingagainstthepartymajority.Ontheotherhand,therewasnoevidencethatZinoviev,KamenevortheirassociatesweredirectlyinvolvedinplottingKirov’smurder.Yet,therewasnoreasontoreviewtheconvictionsofthe1936-1938showtrials,becausetheprincipalsinthosetrialshadunderminedthecon-struction of socialism in the USSR. The implication was that while no specific crimecouldbehungonthenecksoftheex-oppositionleaders,theyhadstilldeservedexecutionforstrugglingagainst“theparty.”54

Finally, thereportconcededthatStalin’sunlimitedpowerhadallowedhimtoundertakeafull-scaleattackonthepartyitselfinthewakeofKirov’smurder,aidedby“careeristsandprovocateurs”intheNKVD.

TheDecember1956reportwasacut-and-pastejobofmutuallyexclusivepropositions, some fromSerov’sandRudenko’s reports, someharkingbacktotheeraoftheshowtrialsthemselves.Khrushchevevidentlywasunhappywithit.Givenhisactionsandstatementsbeforeandafterwards,itseemsquitelikelythathehadwantedacompleterejectionoftheshowtrialverdictsandsome sort of indictment of Stalin. On December 14, 1956 the Presidium re-solvedto“takenoteof”theMolotovcommission’sreportandorderitbacktowork. ThePresidiumalsoputSerovonthecommission(previouslyhehadattendedsessionsonlyasarapporteur,notasamember).Presumablythiswasbecause Khrushchev wanted to strengthen his influence on the deliberations.55

In the following months relations deteriorated between Khrushchevandanumberofotherpartyleaders.Molotov,Kaganovich,Voroshilov,andMalenkov must all have feared the personal consequences of further publicde-Stalinization. Butothers, includingBulganinandUSSRForeignMinisterShepilov, also came to view Khrushchev as out-of-control and dangerouslypower-hungry.De-Stalinizationwasnottheonlyissueforthisgroup.TheywereafraidofKhrushchev’saccumulationofpower, theywereafraidofhiscontroloftheKGBthroughSerov,andtheywereappalledatsomeofhispolicyinitiatives,mostnotablyhisJanuary1957proposaltodecentralizethemanage-mentofindustry.TherewasalsoageneralperceptionthatKhrushchevwasarashbig-mouth,exacerbatedbyhisboastinMay1957thattheSovietUnionwouldsoonproducemoremeatanddairyproductspercapitathantheUnitedStates.56

53 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.204-207. 54 Ibid. 55 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.207-208. 56 Taubman,Khrushchev,pp.300-306;Kovaleva,Korotkov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,pp.

10-13;Shepilov,Neprimknuvshii,pp.36-38,387-396.


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AlthoughKhrushchevhasbeenportrayedasunawareofthewidespreaddissatisfactionwithhispower,57 thereissomeevidencethathewasdeliber-atelypushingaffairstowardsaconfrontation.ShepilovandPetrDemichev,aKhrushchevassistantin1957,bothbelievedKhrushchevknewthattheattempttoremovehimwasintheworks.ShepilovassertedthatSerov,whowaseaves-droppingontheotherpartyleaders,musthavetoldhim.58PuttingtheseclaimstogetherwithKhrushchev’saggressivebehaviortowardsMolotov,Malenkov,andKaganovichinthespringof1957,itappearsquiteplausiblethattheSovietleader was pressing towards a final showdown with his rivals.59

DuringthisperiodofheightenedtensiontheMolotovcommissioncontin-uedtoproducereportsthatwereunpalatabletoKhrushchev.OnApril8,1957the commission met for the first time after a four-month hiatus, with Serov now on board as a full member. Participants chose to define a narrow issue for investigation,namelythedeathofKirov’sguardBorisov.SerovandRudenkowereassignedtoprepareadraftreporttotheCentralCommittee.OnApril13thecommissiondiscussedthedraft,butapparentlyAristov,Khrushchevallyandaggressivede-Stalinizer,wasunhappywithit.ThecommissionagreedtopostponepresentationofareporttotheCentralCommitteefortendays,whileAristovgatherednewmaterialsonBorisov’sdeath.Unfortunately,wedonotknowwhatmaterials,ifany,Aristovprovided.60

On April 23, after some discussion, commission members assignedRudenko,Serov,andPospelovtopreparebytheendofthedayanotherdraftmemorandumonBorisov. Apparently theywereunderpressure topresenttheir report quickly to the Presidium. The final report was, like the December memorandumonthe1930sshowtrials,anawkward,inconclusivedocument.Theauthorswrotethat“doubts”aboutBorisov’sdeathwereunderstandable–hewastheonlyoneseriouslyhurtinthetruckaccident,andhisfailuretomaintainacloseguardonKirovledtothelatter’sdeath. Butthe1937testi-monyofthedriverandguardswhoaccompaniedBorisovonDecember2wasextractedundertorture,andwasthereforeuntrustworthy.Hence,therewasnohardevidenceoffoulplay. Thecommissionstatedthatsinceeventshadoccurred so long ago, there was no possibility of finally determining the truth, andthereforetheinquiryshouldbeclosed.Thereportconcludedthatthecom-

57 TaubmanacknowledgesclaimsthatKhrushchevknewabouttheJune1957overthrowat-temptagainsthim,butconcludes,“Thelastthing(Khrushchev)lethimselfbelievewasthatthepowerandgloryhecravedwereabouttobetakenfromhim,”Taubman,Khrushchev,pp.316-317.

58 Ibid.;Shepilov,Neprimknuvshii,p.393. 59 FurtherevidenceforthispropositionisBrezhnev’sclaimattheJune1957plenumoftheCC

thatthe“anti-partygroup”madetheircoupattemptagainstKhrushchevinpartbecausePartyControlCommissionchiefShvernikwaspresentingdocumentstothePresidiumontherehabilitationofCommunistrepressedattheordersofMolotov,Malenkov,andKaga-novich.Kovaleva,Korotkov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,p.245.

60 RGANI,f.6.op.13,d.43,ll.14-15.

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mission stuck by its December conclusion that the “terrorist Nikolaev” hadkilledKirovforpoliticalreasons,withthe“connivance”ofpersonsinchargeofKirov’sguard.61

Again,Molotovseemstohavesucceededinplacingkeyelementsofhisversionofeventsintothedocument.Nikolaevwasa“politicalterrorist”andhedidhavethehelpofKirov’sguard–again,arepetitionoffragmentsofthestorylinefromtheMarch1938trialofBukharinetal.WhereasSerov’sAugust31,1956memorandumhadconcludedthatBorisov’sdeathwasanaccident,theApril23,1957commissionreportassertedthatnoconclusionwaspossible.It is true that claims that the Leningrad NKVD officers connived in Kirov’s death and killed Borisov could be (and later were) fit into a storyline in which StalinorderedKirov’sassassination.Howeverthesewerealsokeyelementsofthe1938versionofthemurderincriminatingthe“Right-TrotskyiteBloc.”ItislikelythatMolotovsupportedtheirinclusionintheApril1957reportbecausehewasstrugglingtomaintainthevalidityoftheshowtrialsandtheStalinistversionoftheKirovmurder.

Khrushchev, however, was determined to expose the Molotov group’stiestoStalinistterror.OntheafternoonofApril25thePresidiummettodis-cusstherehabilitationofTukhachevskii,Iakir,andUborevich,thegeneralsex-ecutedfortreasonin1937,aswellasothercases.KhrushchevthrewdownthegauntlettoMolotovandcompany.DuringdiscussionoftherehabilitationofE.E.Rubinchik,aformerfactorydirectorconvictedforsabotagingthedesignofanamphibioustank,Khrushchevstatedsarcasticallythat“myfriendGeor-gii Malenkov played an unseemly role in this affair.” When the PresidiumconsideredtheTukhachevskiirehabilitation,Khrushchevchallenged,“lettheoldmembersofthePolitburotellushowtheydecidedthequestionofbring-ing Iakir to trial, how this first step was prepared.” Marshal Zhukov seconded Khrushchevwith“we’vegottogettothebottomofthis.”AccordingtoBre-zhnev’saccounttwomonthslater,attheJune1957CCplenum,Khrushchevasked at this meeting, “What are we going to do with those guilty of theseexecutions?Willwereturntothisissue,orwillwejustcontinuetokeepourmouthsshutaboutthem...”62

DefeaT of MoloTov anD The “anTi-ParTy grouP”

DuringMayRudenkoandSerovcontinuedtopressrehabilitationinadi-rectionthattheoldPolitburocohortcouldnothaveliked.OnMay18,1957thetworecommendedtherehabilitationofAkmalIkramov,triedandconvictedtogetherwithBukharinintheMarch1938trialofthe“Right-TrotskyiteBloc.”Ikramov was the first rehabilitee from among those convicted in the open show

61 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.269-270. 62 Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, pp. 270-271. For Brezhnev quote, see Kovaleva, Korotkov, Molotov,

Malenkov, Kaganovich,pp.245-246.


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trialsoftheTerror.Intheirmemorandum,SerovandRudenkodebunkedtheevidence presented against Ikramov, including his own “confessions.” TherehabilitationsmovedonestepclosertotheleadersoftheRightthemselves,BukharinandRykov,andtoacompleterejectionoftheshowtrials.63

OnJune18,1957tensionsbetweenKhrushchevandtheMolotovgrouperupted.WiththesupportofsevenofelevenfullmembersofthePresidium,the old Stalin guard attempted to fire Khrushchev from the post of First Sec-retaryoftheCentralCommittee.ForfourdaysPresidiummemberslockedinintense debate, with the majority of full members savaging Khrushchev forarrogance,incompetence,andconstructionofhisowncultofpersonality.AnumberofKhrushchev’s rivals complained thatSerovwas spyingon them,andtherewasapparentlyaproposaltoremoveSerovasKGBchief.Kaganov-icharguedthatKhrushchev’ssupposedsympathieswiththeTrotskyitesweremotivatinghiseffortstoreviewthegreatshowtrialsoftheTerror.

TheKhrushchevfactionfoughtback.ZhukovandShvernikdenouncedMolotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov’s prominent roles in the Terror, withZhukovapparentlyreadingaloudfromarchivaldocuments.Khrushchevral-liedcandidatemembersofthePresidiumandanumberofCCsecretariestohisside. Behind the scenes Serov and Zhukov flew dozens of Central Committee memberstoMoscowonmilitarytransportaircraft.Withthemilitary,theKGB,andthemajorityofthepartyelitebelowPresidiumlevelonhisside,Khrush-chevforcedhisopponentstoagreetoafullsessionoftheCentralCommittee,whichbeganonJune22.64

KhrushchevwasinundisputedcontroloftheCCplenumthatfollowed,which was devoted to denunciation of the “anti-party group” of Molotov,Malenkov, and Kaganovich. These three, together with Shepilov, were ex-pelled from their leadership posts and from the Central Committee. ThreeotherfullPresidiummembers,Pervukhin,Saburov,andBulganin,“confessed”theirerrorsearlyintheplenumandgotoffwithdemotionsforthetimeinbe-ing.KhrushchevletVoroshilovoffthehook,moreagestureofcontemptthananythingelse.65

TheJune1957CCplenumwasaboveallaboutthehistoryoftheStalinera.WithKhrushchevvictorious,dozensofCentralCommitteemembersjos-tledtodenounceMolotov,Malenkov,andKaganovichforparticipatingintheannihilationofpartyhigher-upsunderStalin.Furtsevareferredtotheir“mon-strouscrimes,”Brezhnevdenouncedtheir“fanaticalapproachtocadres,”andKozlovcriticizedMalenkov’sleadingroleintheexecutionofLeningradleaderKuznetsovin1949.66SpeakersciteddocumentsfromtheKGBarchivesonthe

63 Reabilitatsiia,vol.2,pp.271-272. 64 Taubman,Khrushchev,pp.317-320;Kovaleva,Korotkov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,pp.

14-15,183;Shepilov,Neprimknuvshii,pp.393-396. 65 Kovaleva,Korotkov, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,p.567. 66 Ibid.,pp.199-201,205,246,250,258.

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scale of repressions, with Khrushchev himself giving total numbers for therepressedintheTerrorthathadpreviouslyonlybeenrevealedatPresidiummeetings–1.5millionarrested,681,692shotin1937-1938.67Serovhadama-jorpartinthedenunciationofKaganovich,describinghisleadershipofmasspurgesinUkraineandhismarginalnoteof“kudos”(privetstvuiu)onanarrestlist.68RudenkosavagedMalenkovandKaganovichforobstructingtheinves-tigations into theStalinera, andMolotov for justifying themurderofpartycadres.69

Aristov inparticular shed lighton thehistoryof theMolotovcommis-sion,albeitfromthepointofviewoftheKhrushchevites.Accordingtohim,“wesaton that commissionendlessly. Thedebateswereextremelyharsh.”Voroshilov“justgotoutraged,”whileKaganovichandMolotovsaid the tri-alsduringtheTerrorwere“correct,”“intheinterestsoftheparty,”and“therightthingtodo.”SerovandRudenkoprovideddocuments,Aristovsaid,thatultimatelyforcedMolotovandKaganovichtorecognize“maybehalf”ofthecrimescommitted.Kaganovichconfessed“therewereexcesses,”whileMolo-tovstated,“thereweregoodpoliticalreasonsforallofthat.”BecauseofSerovandRudenko’sservicesinprovidingdocumentsonthecrimesoftheStalinistleadership, Aristov said, the anti-party group had aimed to fire Serov after Khrushchev’sremoval.70

Therealbomb-throwerwasV.N.Malin,headoftheCentralCommitteeGeneral Affairs Department (obshchii otdel) and one-time Leningrad official whohadwitnessedKuznetsov’s trial in1949. Malinasserted that themassexecutionsof the later1930swerenot justStalin’sdoing. “No,KaganovichandMolotov–they’reguilty(too).I’llgofurther–Kirov’sghosthangsoverMolotov. LethimanswerwhyMedvedwasdestroyed,whyEnukidzewasdestroyed... ThecaseofKirov’sassassinationisacasethathasnotyetbeendeeplyexamined.Basedonthedocumentarymaterialswehave,I’mpreparedtosaythat.”71

Inhisconcludingspeechtotheplenum,KhrushchevdisavowedMalin’sassertions, but somewhat in the manner of a Mafia boss ruing the excessive enthusiasmofhisenforcers.“Irespect(Malin),buthehashischaracter,yester-dayyousawthatcharacter.”Malinmayhavetakenthingstoofar,Khrushchevindicated, but he was also giving an implied threat about what accusationscouldbedeployedagainstthe“anti-partygroup.”Indeed,laterinthesamespeech,KhrushchevreturnedtotheKirovmurder,andwhilehedidnotmen-tionMolotov’sname,hedidindicatethatfurtherinvestigationwasnecessary.

67 Ibid.,p.479. 68 Ibid.,pp.176,247. 69 Ibid.,pp.417-419. 70 Ibid.,pp.188-197. 71 Ibid.,p.429.


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Istillcan’tmakesenseofallthecircumstancesofKirov’smurder...It’snotclearwhy,afterKirov’sdeath, itwasnecessary tokillBorisovwhenStalinarrivedinLeningradandBorisov–Kirov’sguard–wasbeingdriventoanin-terrogation.TheykilledBorisovandsaidthathediedastheresultofanautocrash...Whoneededthis?It’sclearthatthiswasnecessarytocoverthetraces(oftheplottomurderKirov).EventodayIdonotbelievethatZinovievhadanythingtodowiththis. WehadabattleofideaswithTrotskii,Bukharin,andZinoviev,andwesmashedthem.ButafterKirov’smurderhundredsofthousandsofheadswerelaidontheexecutionblock. Whywasthisneces-sary?Eventodaythisisamystery,anditwouldbeagoodthingtolookinto.ButdoesMolotovget it? No. Hetremblesbefore this,he fearsevenhintsaboutthisquestion;Kaganovichisinthesamesituation.72

IftheKGBorotherinstanceshaddocumentsthatmightconnectStalinoranyof the“anti-partygroup”toKirov’sassassination,directlyor indirectly,Khrushchevsupportersatthisplenumwouldhaverevealedthem,oratleastmentionedtheirexistence.Noonewas“covering”forStalinatthismoment–theKhrushchevitesrevealedmanyofhismostheinouscrimes,aswellasthecollaborationofMolotov,Kaganovich,Malenkov,Beriia,andothers inmassmurder.Malin’sassertionthatKirov’sghost“hungoverMolotov”hastobeviewedasspeculativehyperboleaimedatintimidatingMolotov.

Khrushchev’swordstotheplenumontheKirovmurderarerevealing.InordertosuggesttheinvolvementofStalinandtheMolotovgroupintheas-sassination,Khrushchevresortedtothe1937-1938showtrialversionofevents,andtotestimonyextractedundertorture(thatofthetruckdriverinBorisov’sdeath). Indoingsoheomittedanyreference to the1934-1935 investigationresults.InsteadhepresentedassimpletruthaversionofBorisov’sdeaththatwasunsubstantiatedanddubious.

conclusion

ThestorylineinwhichStalinconspiredtokillKirovhadgreatpoliticalutilityforpartyreformersintheKhrushchevyears.ItcouldbeusedtoindictKhrushchev’srivalsMolotov,Kaganovich,andMalenkovformassmurderofpartycadres.Itcouldalsobeusedtoexoneratetherestoftheparty,andLe-ninismingeneral,fortheTerror.Stalinandafewhenchmenwereresponsiblefor“distorting”Leninism,andkillingmillions.InthisvisionKhrushchev,andevenStalin’ssupposedvictimKirov,representedthe“genuine,”“humanitar-ian”Leninism, theLeninismof the future. Thiswas thedirection inwhichsome Khrushchev supporters, such as Mikoian, Aristov, and Shatunovskaiawerepushingduring theThaw. Khrushchevhimself,not surprisingly,wassympathetictotheirefforts.

But there were obstacles to presenting the “Stalin killed Kirov” tale tothe public as official party history. First, there was not good evidence for the

72 Ibid.,p.479.

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story.Second,makingitpublicmighthaveunpredictableconsequences.TheexperienceofdisordersinsideandoutsidetheUSSRfollowingtheTwentiethPartyCongresshadgivenmanypartyleaderspause.AlthoughKhrushchevhintedagainattheTwenty-SecondPartyCongressinOctober1961thatStalinmighthaveorganizedtheKirovassassination,thisversiondisappearedfromtheSovietpressafterhisfall. Notuntil late intheperestroika era did official Sovietpublicationspickupthestoryagain.

khrushchev era politics and the investigation of the kirov...

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