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The Fukuda Government and the Politics of the Sino-Japanese Peace TreatyAuthor(s): Hong N. KimSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Mar., 1979), pp. 297-313Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643695.

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THE

FUKUDA

GOVERNMENT

ND

THE

POLITICSOF THE SINO-JAPANESE

PEACETREATY

Hong

N. Kim

THE

CONCLUSION

OF

a

Sino-Japanese Treaty of

Peace

and

Friendship

became a

pending issue for

Tokyo and

Peking as a

result of the

Sino-Japanese Joint

Communique

of

September 29,

1972,

which

stipulated

that

the two nations

should

conclude a treaty of

peace

and

friendship

to

improve

relations with each

other.

However,

the

proposed treaty was not regarded as an urgent matter at that time, for

most of the

outstanding

issues

which had long

marred

relations between

Peking

and

Tokyo,

including the

normalization of

diplomatic

relations,

had been settled.

The more

pressing problems,

requiring

the immediate

attention

of both

governments, were to work

out bilateral administra-

tive

agreements

on

such

important

matters as

trade, civil

aviation,

shipping,

and

fisheries. When

most of these

agreements

had been

con-

cluded by

the fall

of

1974,

both

sides

agreed

to

negotiate the

proposed

peace

treaty.

Beginning in the fall of 1974, Japan's conservative LDP govern-

ment

attempted

to conclude

the

proposed treaty

under

the

stewardship

of

three different Prime Ministers

(i.e.,

Kakuei

Tanaka,

Takeo

Miki,

and .Takeo

Fukuda), but

it

was

not

until

August 12,

1978,

that the

Sino-Japanese treaty

was

signed.

The

purpose

of

this

paper

is to

ex-

amine the

factors which

have

shaped

recent

Sino-Japanese

relations

with

special

emphasis

on

the

Fukuda

government's

handling

of the

treaty

negotiations with

Peking from

the time of

its

inauguration

in

December 1976 to

the

actual

signing

of

the treaty

in

August

1978.

Although the two nations held preliminary conversations on the

proposed peace

treaty

as

early

as

January 1974,

when

Foreign

Minister

Masayoshi

Ohira

visited

Peking,

it was

not

until

the fall

of

1974 that

297

?

1979

by

the

Regents

of

the

University

of

California

0004-4687/79/030297

+

17$00.50

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298 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979

Peking became serious about the treaty negotiations with Tokyo. As

the money-power political scandal involving Prime Minister Kakuei

Tanaka began to cloud the future of the Tanaka government, which

had been friendly toward China, Peking decided to initiate peace

treaty negotiations.

In

November 1974, Chinese Foreign Vice-Minister

Han Nien-lung visited Japan to sign a Sino-Japanese agreement on

shipping.

In

his

talks

with the Japanese Foreign Ministry's

officials,

Han

agreed that the proposed peace treaty should be drafted on the

basis

of

the

Sino-Japanese

Joint

Communique

of

1972, and that con-

troversial territorial issues, such as sovereignty over the Senkaku Is-

lands, should be shelved to facilitate the treaty-making process. As a

result,

both

Tokyo

and

Peking

were

quite optimistic

about the

pros-

pects for the prompt conclusion of the proposed peace pact.

With the

abrupt change

in

the

cabinet

in

Japan

in

December

1974,

Chinese

leaders became

apprehensive

about

the future

of

Sino-Japanese

relations.

Despite

the known liberal

foreign policy posture

of the

new

Japanese

Prime

Minister

Takeo

Miki,

his

cabinet included

a

number

of

powerful

conservative leaders

of

the

pro-Taiwan group-e.g.,

Takeo

Fukuda,

Hirokichi

Nadao, and Etsusaburo

Shiina.

To

dissipate

Pe-

king's misgivings

about the new

government's

China

policy,

Miki

sent

a

personal message

to Premier Chou

En-lai

through Shigeru

Hori

when

the latter visited Peking on January 15-21, 1975. Hori returned from

Peking

with

a

message

to Miki from Chou

who

indicated that the pro-

posed treaty

could be

signed

within three

months.'

From

January 16, 1975

to

early May 1975 Sino-Japanese treaty

talks took

place

in

Tokyo

between

Japanese Foreign

Vice Minister

Fumihiko

Togo

and Chinese Ambassador

to

Japan

Chen

Chu.

In

spite

of

initial

optimism expressed by

both

sides,

the

treaty negotiations

were deadlocked

by

March

1975, largely

because

of

China's

insistence

on

an

anti-hegemony

clause.2 The Chinese

officially proposed

the

incorporation of Article 7 of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communi-

que

in

the proposed peace treaty

which

stipulated,

in

part: Neither

country

should seek

hegemony

in

the

Asia-Pacific

region

and each is

opposed

to efforts

by any

other

country

or

group

of countries to estab-

lish such

hegemony.

The

Chinese

argued

that

the inclusion of

such

a

provision

was logical

as well as

necessary,

since

both

sides

had

agreed

to draft

the treaty

on the

basis of

the

1972 joint communique. Appar-

ently

under

pressure

from

pro-Taiwan

LDP

leaders who

had

opposed

the

proposed peace treaty by effectively utilizing

the

anti-hegemony

issue, the Miki Government began to resist inclusion of the anti-

1

On January 17, 1975,

Premier

Chou

En-lai told Yoshihiro

Inayama,

a

powerful

Japanese

business

leader,

that the

proposed treaty

with

Japan

could

be

signed

within three

months. See Asahi Shimbun, January

17, 1975.

2

For

a detailed analysis

of

the anti-hegemony issue, see Tadashi

Shibauchi,

Haken Mondai to

Tsuna hiki sareru Nihon,

Chuo

Koron, July 1975, pp. 154-157.

See also Joachim

Glaubitz, Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign

Policy,

Asian Survey,

16:3 (March 1976), pp. 205-215.


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300 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979

with Japan, and it was only in the fall of 1977 that serious discussions

on the suspended

treaty negotiations between Tokyo and Peking re-

sumed.

By the summer of 1977, the political situation in both China and

Japan had

stabilized.

In

Japan, a new LDP government headed by

Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, which had replaced the Miki govern-

ment

in

December

1976, succeeded

in

weathering the political crisis

created by the Lockheed scandal and

thwarted the opposition parties'

attempts to

win a

majority

in

the Upper House elections of July 7,

1977. Meanwhile,

in China the new pragmatic leadership headed by

Chairman Hua

Kuo-feng was consolidating its power. At the 11th Party

Congress held in

Peking

in

August 1977, the Gang of Four and their

followers were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, and the

new

leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping (who

had

made his third political comeback in July) was firmly established.

Against this

background, renewed interest

in

the reopening

of

the

treaty talks began to surface both in Japan

and

China.

As

early

as

May

30, 1977, Prime

Minister Fukuda had indicated that his government's

next

major diplomatic task

would

be

the

conclusion of

a

peace treaty

with

Peking because

his

government

had

successfully

handled the con-

clusion of a

Japanese-Soviet interim fisheries agreement

and had

as-

sured itself of the Diet's ratification of the Japanese-South Korean

continental shelf

agreement. Fukuda

also stated that

he

would

not

be

bound

by the four

principles expounded by ex-Foreign

Minister Kiichi

Miyazawa as the

basis

for

the inclusion of the anti-hegemony

clause

in

the proposed

peace treaty.5 Furthermore,

Fukuda

indicated

his

will-

ingness to send a

personal letter expressing

his

interest

in

resuming

treaty negotiations

through Shigeru Hori, the

Lower

House

Speaker,

who

was

planning to

visit

China

in

June.

A

few

days

later,

however,

Fukuda modified

his

position, apparently

under the

pressure

from

pro-Taiwan LDP leaders who counseled against rushing into treaty

talks

with

Peking.

Fukuda's

apparent

turnabout

in

turn necessitated

the

postponement

of

Hori's

China

trip.

By the fall of

1977, pro-Peking

LDP

Dietmen

began

to

express

re-

newed interest

in

the

resumption

of

the

Sino-Japanese treaty negotia-

tions.

Following

their visit to

Peking

in

September,

the

LDP

Dietmen

belonging

to the Dietmen's

League

for

Sino-Japanese Friendship (e.g.,

Seigo Hamano, Hideji Kawasaki,

Zentaro

Kosaka) urged

Prime Minis-

5

In his testimony before a Diet committee

on

November 7,

1975, Foreign

Minister Miyazawa indicated Japan's

willingness to accept

the

Chinese demand for

the inclusion of the anti-hegemony

clause in the proposed peace treaty,

if

China

would accept the Japanese viewpoint on the meaning of anti-hegemonism.

Spe-

cifically, Miyazawa listed

the

following

four

points: (1)

the

anti-hegemony

prin-

ciple

is

not

directed against any

specific third country ; (2) Japan

and China do

not envisage any joint action against a hegemony-seeking third country ;

(3) this

policy represents

a

principle applicable

to all parts of the

world ;

and (4) anti-

hegemonism does

not

run counter to the United Nations Charter.

See Asahi

Shimbun, November 7, 1975.


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SINO-JAPANESE

PEACE TREATY

301

ter

Fukuda to adopt

whatever

measures

were necessary

to reopen

the sus-

pended

treaty

negotiations

with Peking.6

A

similar

view was

expressed

by Yohei

Kono and

members

of the New

Liberal Club,

who

conferred

with Vice Premier Teng in Peking in September 1977. Teng and other

Chinese

leaders

told

the Japanese

delegates

that the

Sino-Japanese

peace treaty

could be

signed

in

one second

if

only

Prime

Minister

Fukuda

made

up his

mind

on the

treaty.

Despite Peking's

urging,

Fukuda

remained

cautious

on the

treaty

issue.

Among

other

things,

Fukuda did

not

want to aggravate

Japanese-Soviet

relations

in the

face

of the approaching

Japanese-Soviet

long-term

fisheries treaty

negotia-

tions.

Fukuda was

also keenly

aware

of

the attitude

of the

pro-Taiwan

elements within

the

LDP

who

were

opposed

to

an early conclusion

of

the treaty with Peking. Finally, Fukuda refrained from making any

bold moves

toward

Peking

while

there was

no substantial

progress

be-

ing made

in

Sino-American

relations,

a fact

which

had become

appar-

ent

following Secretary

of State

Cyrus Vance's

trip

to China

in

August

1977.

It became increasingly

clear,

however,

that

Prime

Minister

Fukuda

would

not

be able to stall too long

on the treaty

issue, for

there was

a

growing

consensus

among

the leaders

of big

business

(e.g.,

Keidanren)

that

Fukuda should

tackle the treaty

issue as

soon as possible.7

They

were convinced that China would import more from abroad to push

ahead its ambitious

modernization

program

under the

leadership

of

Chairman

Hua

and

Vice Premier

Teng. For the

Japanese

big

business

community,

which was facing

increasing

difficulty

in

its

trade

relations

with

Western Europe

and the

United States,

the China

market

seemed

a

logical

alternative.

Japanese

business

leaders

assumed

that

the

Chi-

nese would play

coy on

economic agreements

until

the Japanese

had

moved

ahead on

the

treaty

issue. Adopting

a

similar

position,

the

tra-

ditionally

cautious

Japanese

Foreign

Ministry

officials had

recom-

mended that Fukuda resume the treaty talks by November 1977. Their

reasoning

was

based

on three

factors:

(1)

the

political

foundation

of

the

Hua

Kuo-feng regime

was firm

and

stable;

(2)

the

Sino-Japanese

peace

pact

was

a

prerequisite

to

the

signing

of a

long-term

trade

agreement

between Japan

and China;

and

(3)

if

Japan

accepted

the

Chinese

proposal

for

the

inclusion

of

the

anti-hegemony

clause in

the

main

text of the

treaty,

China

would

accommodate

the

Japanese

desire

to

dilute

the

political

implications

of

the

anti-hegemony

clause.8

On November

28,

1977,

the

Fukuda government

decided

to

in-

struct Ambassador Shoji Sato to investigate the possibility of resuming

6

Asahi Shimbun

sha, Asahi

Nenkan

1978

(Tokyo:

Asahi

Shimbun

sha,

1978),

p. 236.

7

In the spring

of 1977,

the Keidanren

leaders signed

a

petition urging

the

early

conclusion

of the Sino-Japanese

peace treaty.

See Sekai

no naka

no Shin

Nitchu

(8),

Yomiuri

Shzimbun,

August

20, 1978. See also, Tracy Dahlby,

Planning

the

Peace

Pact, Far

Eastern Economic

Review,

November 25, 1977, pp.

8-9.

8

Asahi Shimbun,

November

7, 1977.

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302

ASIAN

SURVEY,

ol.

XIX,

No.

3,

March1979

the treaty negotiations with Chinese authorities

and

report the results

to the Prime Minister. At

about

the same time,

Prime

Minister

Fukuda

indicated his positive posture toward the treaty issue by appointing

Sunao Sonoda, an ardent advocate of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty,

as the new Japanese Foreign Minister. Returning from Peking on De-

cember 1, Ambassador Sato conveyed his impression that China would

accept unconditionally Japan's proposal to resume treaty negotiations,

if it were made officially by Prime Minister Fukuda.9 At a press

con-

ference, Sato added that the Chinese were

in

agreement with

him

that

Japan and

China

should not set any preconditions to the reopening

of

the treaty talks, but he admitted that

China

had not changed its

basic

position

on

the anti-hegemony

issue.

In spite of Ambassador Sato's optimistic report, Prime Minister

Fukuda did

not

make any

immediate

positive

move

to

resume

the

treaty talks. In Fukuda's policy speech to the Diet on January 21, 1978,

he merely repeated his previous

remarks that

his government

would

make further efforts to reopen the treaty talks, adding that

the time

for

pursuing

the

negotiations

is

growing ripe. 10 Initially,

Fukuda

had

intended to say that

the time

for the conclusion

of

the treaty

is

ripe.

But at

the last

moment

he

decided

to

replace

that

sentence

with a

more cautious phrase. Fukuda's statement

on

the

treaty

issue fell short

of the expectations of many political observers who had anticipated a

more positive

move on the

part

of

the Japanese

Prime

Minister.

Although Fukuda and his aides denied it, it was suspected that the

Prime Minister had retreated from

his

positive stand

on the

treaty

issue to a more passive posture out of fear that, despite apparent en-

thusiasm on the Chinese side, negotiations could bog down over the

anti-hegemony issue.

In such a

case,

Fukuda

could be

blamed

for

bungling a major foreign policy issue,

and

he wanted

more

spadework

done

on

the

controversial

anti-hegemony

clause before he

would

officially initiate treaty talks with China. Another major factor that

influenced

Fukuda's

overly

cautious attitude toward the

treaty

issue

was the pro-Taiwan

leaders' advice

not

to conclude

the

treaty

until

after the inauguration

of

Chiang Ching-kuo

as

the new

President

of

the

Republic

of China

in

May 1978.

There

were

reports

that

former

Prime

Minister Nobusuke

Kishi,

an influential

pro-Taiwan

leader and

Fukuda's

political mentor, urged

Fukuda not to

resume

the

treaty

talks

until May. Finally,

Fukuda

may

have

wanted

to

delay

the

treaty

until

late spring or summer

of

1978,

so as

to

utilize the

political

windfall

of

the treaty in his bid for reelection to the LDP presidency (hence the

premiership)

in December

1978.

Thus,

Fukuda

instructed Ambassador

Sato

to probe

further

on the

treaty

issue

with

China,

but

did

not

in-

struct

him

to

resume

official


9

Asahi

Shimbun,

December 13, 1977.

10

Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 1978 (evening edition). See also, Japan Times,

January 22, 1978.


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SINO-JAPANESEPEACE TREATY 303

Following

the

Prime

Minister's

instruction,

Ambassador Sato

held

the first

round of preliminary talks

with

Chinese

Foreign

Vice Minister

Han

Nien-lung

in

Peking

on

February

14.

Encouraged

by

the flexible

position

shown by the Chinese on the anti-hegemony

issue,

another

round

of

preliminary

talks between Ambassador

Sato and

Foreign

Vice

Minister Han took place on

March

4.

Although

details of the

talks were

not

revealed, both Prime Minister Fukuda and Chief

Cabinet

Secre-

tary Shintaro Abe indicated their

satisfaction

with

the

progress

of

the

Han-Sato

talks. However, there

was

no indication as

to

when

Prime

Minister

Fukuda

would give

his

blessing

to the

initiation

of

full-fledged

treaty

negotiations with Peking.

By March

1978,

it had become

quite

clear that the

new

Chinese

leadership was more flexible in its approach to the pending treaty issue

with

Japan.

In

his

talks with

Komeito's

Secretary-General

Junya

Yano

on

March

14,

Chinese

Vice Premier

Teng Hsiao-ping

indicated that

the inclusion

of

the

anti-hegemony

clause

in

the

proposed peace

treaty

would not mean

joint

Sino-Japanese

action

against

a

third

power,

nor

would the

application

of such

a clause necessitate joint consulta-

tions between

Peking

and

Tokyo,

for each

country had its own

foreign

policy

and

should

make

its

decisions accordingly. Teng Hsiao-ping's

statement

alleviated the Fukuda

government's apprehension that the

incorporation of the controversial clause would jeopardize Japan's

relations

with

the Soviet Union.

Peking's

softer

approach to the

anti-

hegemony clause could be attributed to

its anxiety to

improve rela-

tions with

Japan,

which was

capable

of

providing the

needed

tech-

nological

know-how

for China's

modernization

programs.

Earlier,

on

February 16, 1978, Chinese

and

Japanese business

groups

had

signed

a

long-term

trade

agreement,

which

called

for

the

two-way

trade of

$20

billion

for

the

next

eight years.

Under

the trade

agreement, Japan

would

increase

its

oil

imports

from

China

from about

seven

million

tons in 1978 to 15 million tons by 1982, while exporting about $10 bil-

lion worth

of industrial

plants

and

equipment

and

construction

ma-

terials

to

China. The

signing

of the

long-term

trade

agreement

clearly

indicated

that Peking

was

eager

to

expand its trade with

Japan

in

the

hope

of

securing the

technical

know-how

needed

for

its

underdeveloped

economy.

These

developments

in turn

convinced

many

Japanese

eco-

nomic and business leaders that

a

peace treaty

with

Peking

would

pro-

vide a more

stable

foundation for the

expanding

Sino-Japanese trade

relations.

Also, many politicians

began

to

think

that

in

view of

China's

flexible position on the anti-hegemony issue, the peace treaty could

be

signed

without too much

difficulty

between

Tokyo

and

Peking.

On

March

23,

Prime

Minister

Fukuda, apparently

encouraged by

Teng's

statement

on

the

anti-hegemony

issue,

announced

his

decision

to

seek

resumption

of the

treaty

talks with

Peking.

The

incorporation

of

the

anti-hegemony

clause

in

the

treaty

would

not

endanger Ja-

11

Asahi Shimbun, March

15, 1978.


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304 ASIAN

SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979

pan's foreign

relations with Moscow, according

to a position paper

prepared by the

Foreign Ministry officials, if

Japan and China added

another clause to

the treaty which would clarify that the clause would

not entail joint action by Tokyo and Peking.'2

To resume

treaty negotiations, however,

Fukuda had to persuade the

pro-Taiwan

hardliners within his own party,

many of whom belonged

to his own

faction. Immediately after Fukuda

announced the decision

to

seek the

resumption of the treaty talks with

Peking, the pro-Taiwan

Asian Problems

Study Group (APSG), headed

by Hirokichi Nadao,

notified the

Fukuda government of its opposition

to the early signing

of

the peace pact

with Peking. In a position paper entitled Our Con-

tention

on

the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty,

the pro-Taiwan group

listed a number of reasons for their opposition to the proposed treaty-

the adverse impact of the treaty

on

Japanese-Soviet relations, the

weakening

of

Taiwan's international position, and

the shelving

of

the

territorial issue

on

the

Senkaku

Islands-contending

that the

failure

to

clarify the territorial

dispute over the Senkaku Islands might weaken

Japan's claim over

these islands

in

the long run.

The APSG's anti-treaty

activities

were

supported by the hawkish Seirankai, another pro-Tai-

wan

and

anti-Peking group

within

the

LDP.

At

the

LDP's

Foreign

Policy

Research

Council's

meetings

held on

March 30,

and

April 7

and 11, these pro-Taiwan elements vehemently opposed the signing of

the

proposed peace treaty with Peking. When it became

apparent

that

Japan and China could work

out

a

compromise on the

anti-hegemony

issue,

these

anti-treaty groups

demanded the Fukuda

Government to

seek the immediate

cancellation

of the

anti-Japan

clause in

the Sino-

Soviet

alliance

pact

of

1950

which

would remain

in

force, nominally

at

least,

until 1980.

They

also

demanded Chinese

acceptance

of

the

Jap-

anese

claim over the

Senkaku Islands as

a

condition for

signing

the

treaty with

Peking,13 even though

both

Japan

and

China

had

earlier

agreed to shelve the Senkaku Islands and other territorial issues.

Against

the

backdrop

of

intensifying opposition

to the

resumption

of

the

treaty

talks with

Peking by

the

pro-Taiwan groups,

Prime

Min-

ister

Fukuda

apparently

decided

to

postpone

sending Foreign

Minister

Sonoda

to

Peking

to

resume

treaty

talks.

However,

such a

move

in-

evitably disappointed Peking

which was

anticipating

immediate re-

sumption

of the

treaty

talks at this time.

Whatever

hope

there

was

for the

resumption

of the

treaty negotia-

tions

was dashed on

April

12

with the

intrusion of

armed

Chinese

fish-

ing boats in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands (in Chinese,

tiao-yu-tai ),

which

were

claimed

by Tokyo,

Peking,

and

Taipei.

The

sudden

and

unexpected appearance

of

armed Chinese

fishing

boats in-

furiated

the LDP's

pro-Taiwan members,

who

demanded

that

the

12

Asahi

Shimbun,

March 21 and 23,

1978.

13

Takeshi

Uehara, Fukuda Shusho

sono

tayorinasa

no

Kenkyu,

Chuo

Koron,

June

1978, pp. 53-55.

See

also,

Asahi

Shimbun,

March

30, 1978

(evening

edition).


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TREATY 305

Fukuda government

stop negotiating a peace

treaty with

Peking unless

China accepted

Japan's claim to the islands.

The Fukuda

government

immediately

lodged a protest

with the Chinese government,

demanding

the withdrawal

of the ships from Japan's

territorial waters.

Although

the Fukuda

government

indicated the desirability of

discussing the

Senkaku incident with the

Chinese to prevent

the recurrence

of such

incidents, it

maintained that the Senkaku

incident had

nothing to do

with

the

treaty problem, and

that Tokyo should handle

the two issues

separately. The pro-Taiwan

Dietmen insisted,

however, that the Fu-

kuda

government

should not bypass the

territorial issue

in the forth-

coming treaty

talks with

Peking. They also refused to

accept the Chi-

nese

government's

official

explanation that the incident

was acciden-

tal and not intentional, contending that the intrusion by the Chi-

nese ships

was an intentional

act of invasion. 14

While

it

is

difficult

to ascertain why

the Chinese

fishing boats

staged the

Senkaku incident from April

12 to 16, it

is strongly sus-

pected that

the Chinese

adopted calculated

shock tactics to pressure

Prime Minister Fukuda into

making a

decision on the treaty talks.

Fukuda had disappointed Peking repeatedly

by his indecision

on the

treaty issue,

and there were strong indications

that the

Chinese were

irritated by

his indecisive behavior. In April

1978, for instance,

former

Upper House President Kenzo Kono told the press that Chinese Am-

bassador

to

Japan

Fu

Hao had criticized

Prime Minister

Fukuda's loss

of

interest

in

resuming the treaty talks,

adding

that China

could wait

for

several

months or even

a

year.15

Although

both Kono

and the Chi-

nese

Ambassador later denied the story,

rumors

persisted

that

China

did not trust

Fukuda.

In

view of Fukuda's

sharp drop

in

popularity

in

Japan (e.g.,

20% approval

according

to the

Yomiuri

Shimbun's

opin-

ion

survey released

on

April

14),

the

Chinese

wanted

Fukuda to

take

action

on

the treaty issue,

whether

positive

or

negative.

Finally,

it

is

also plausible that Peking wanted to thwart any attempt by the LDP's

pro-Taiwan

hardliners

to

encourage

the

Fukuda

government

to

take

up the Senkaku Islands

issue in the

treaty negotiations. By inaction,

Peking

could

have emboldened

these

elements;

however, by taking

a

calculated

risk,

the

Chinese

aimed to assert

their

claim

over

the

Senkaku

Islands.

On

May 10, having

formally

settled the

Senkaku Islands

incident

caused

by

the

appearance

of the Chinese

fishing

boats

in

the

territorial

waters

claimed

by Japan

and

China,

the two nations moved a

step

closer to the resumption of treaty negotiations. The settlement was

reached

at a

meeting

between

Ambassador

Sato and

Foreign

Vice

Minister

Han

Nien-lung

after

Sato

accepted

China's

explanation

that

the incident

was accidental.

The

Japanese

decision to settle the

14

Japan

Times, April 22,

1978.

15

Asahi

Shimbun, April 20,

1978. See also, Masaru Ogawa,

Premeditated

'Accident', Japan

Times Weekly, April

29,

1978.


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306

ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979

Senkaku

incident in order to proceed with the resumption

of treaty

talks came after Prime Minister Fukuda's meeting with

President

Carter in Washington on

May 3. Fukuda was encouraged by Washing-

ton's support of Japan's

intentions to conclude the proposed peace

treaty with Peking. On

his way back from Washington,

Fukuda de-

clared in

Honolulu that he hoped the treaty would be

concluded be-

fore June.

By the end of May

1978,

the Fukuda

government

formally pro-

posed

the

opening

of

treaty negotiations

with

Peking.

This

decision

was conveyed to the Chinese Foreign

Vice

Minister Han

Nien-lung by

Ambassador

Sato

on May

31,

who

expressed Japan's hope

for

the re-

sumption of talks

in

late

June.

The

Chinese

agreed

to

study

the

Jap-

anese proposal. Two weeks later, on June 14, Japan and China agreed

to reopen negotiations

some time

in

early July. Japanese

Foreign

Min-

istry

officials said

that

the

treaty

talks

would

begin

in

Peking

first

on

the

working

level between

Ambassador Sato and

Chinese

Foreign

Vice

Minister

Han. The Fukuda

government

would send

a

team of

Foreign

Ministry officials led by

Yosuke Nakae, Director General of

the Min-

istry's

Asian Affaiirs

Bureau,

to

Peking

to

help

Ambassador Sato.

The

scenario

worked

out

in

Tokyo

was

that

Sato would

carry

the

negotia-

tions

as

far as

he could

go

with the

Chinese

officials and

then wait

for

Foreign Minister Sonoda to arrive in Peking to settle the remaining

issues.

According

to

the

Japanese Foreign Ministry,

the

major

subjects

of the

forthcoming talks would include:

(1)

the

anti-hegemony

clause; (2)

the

1950

Sino-Soviet

Treaty

which

designated

Japan

as

a

common

enemy

of

Peking

and

Moscow;

and

(3)

the

Sino-Japanese ter-

ritorial

dispute

over the

Senkaku

Islands.16

Against the backdrop

of

the imminent resumption of peace ne-

gotiations,

the

Soviet

Union

stepped up

its

campaign

to

dissuade

the

Fukuda government

from

signing

the

proposed treaty

with

Peking.

On

June 19, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Dmitri Polyansky lodged a for-

mal

protest

against

Japan's

concluding

a

peace treaty

with

China. The

Soviet

statement indicated

that

the

Soviet

Union

might

have to revise

its

policy

toward

Japan

if the

treaty

contained an anti-Soviet

clause.

It

stated

further that Moscow

could not remain an onlooker

during

the

Sino-Japanese

moves

to

sign

the

treaty which,

it

claimed,

would

have a

serious

effect on Soviet

national interests.

Japanese

attempts

to

alleviate Moscow's

grave

misunderstanding

of

Japan's foreign policy

were

unavailing,

and

Polyansky

refused to

accept Japanese

explana-

tions. But Polyansky's formal protest was the first since the spring of

1975

when

Moscow had

officially

asked

Japan

to

scrap

its

plans

for

a

peace treaty

with

China.

Commenting

on the Soviet

protest,

Fukuda

said that his

govern-

ment

would

go

ahead

with

the

treaty despite

Moscow's

objections.

Chief Cabinet

Secretary

Shintaro

Abe

also

indicated

that

the Fukuda

16

Japan Times, June 15, 1978.


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SINO-JAPANESE

PEACE TREATY 307

government had

no intention of changing its plans, adding

that the

pact was designed only to strengthen Japan's friendship with China

and was not directed at any third country. In short, the Fukuda gov-

ernment was

demonstrating its belief that the treaty was a bilateral

issue with China and that Japan should not be pushed around by a

third power in

the conduct of its own foreign relations.

On

July 21,

1978, the Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations were

formally resumed.

Initially, Japan had wanted to hold the talks on

July 3, but the

Chinese suggested a later date on the grounds that

Foreign Vice

Minister Han Nien-lung was ill. But other developments,

such as China's

deepening crisis with Vietnam in the wake of the mas-

sive exodus of

ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China in the summer

of

1978 and China's unhappiness at the joint Japanese and South

Korean exploration of oil resources in the continental shelf, may have

been the real

causes for the delay. By the time the negotiations were

resumed,

it

became

apparent

that

the only major issue to be ironed

out between the two sides was the anti-hegemony issue.

The

Fukuda

government's

basic

approach was to allow the inclu-

sion

of the anti-hegemony clause in the main text of the treaty but

to

add another provision

stipulating that

it was a

general principle not

directed

against

a

third country. The addition of such a qualifying

provision in the main

part

of

the text,

it

argued, would eliminate any

anti-Soviet nuance

in

the

anti-hegemony provision. On the basis of

such a

strategy, the

Fukuda

government drafted

a

five-article treaty

and presented

it

to

China on

the second day

of

the treaty talks in

Peking

on

July 22.17

The Chinese

negotiators indicated their apprecia-

tion of the

anti-hegemony

clause in

the

Japanese draft,

but

argued

that the

Japanese proposal

for the

inclusion of both

the

anti-hege-

mony

clause

and

the

third nation

clause

was

contradictory

and

in-

compatible. Thus,

by

the

beginning

of

August,

it

was

apparent

that the

treaty talks focused on Japan's proposal to include in the treaty a

clause stipulating that

the

planned treaty

was

not

aimed

against any

third

country.

The

Japanese

third

country

clause

had

been taken

from

a

pas-

sage

in

Article 7

of

the

1972

Sino-Japanese

Joint

Communique

which

stated

in

part:

Normalization

of

Sino-Japanese

relations is not di-

rected against any

third

country.... However,

the Chinese

negotiators

were

opposed

to the

Japanese

version

of

the

third

country

clause

which

would

dilute

the

political implications

of the

anti-hegemony

clause. According to Chang Hisiang-shan,Vice President of the China-

Japan Friendship Association,

the

Chinese

therefore

suggested

the

fol-

lowing wording:

The

establishment

and

development

of

friendly

relations

between

the

two countries

are

not

directed

against any

third

country. '8

In

response,

the

Japanese suggested:

the

treaty

is not

di-

17

For

the text of the Japanese

draft treaty,

see Asahi

Shimbun, July

22, 1978.

18

Asahi Shimbun,

August 6, 1978. See also, Japan

Times, August 6,

1978.


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308

ASIAN SURVEY,

Vol.

XIX, No. 3, March 1979

rected against any particular country instead

of

any specific country

as originally proposed. Chinese negotiators did not accept either ver-

sion

but

came

up

with

yet

another

revised version of its original pro-

posal, which the Japanese refused to

accept. Thus, after 12 rounds of

talks between Ambassador Sato and

Vice Foreign Minister Han, there

still

was no

agreement

on the

treaty

issue.

To break the stalemated

negotiations in Peking, Fukuda decided

to

dispatch Foreign

Minister Sunao Sonoda

to Peking.

The

decision

was made on

August

6

following

a

strategy meeting held at Fukuda's

summer resort residence

in

Karuizawa. Attending the conference were

the

Foreign

Minister and Yosuke

Nakae,

who

had

just returned

from

Peking to

make

a

progress report

on

the


Fukuda

made the decision when it became apparent that both Japan and

China

had a

tight diplomatic

schedule

in

the

latter half of

August.

Sonoda

was

to hold an annual

consultation

meeting

with

his Indian

counterpart

in

Tokyo

from

August

14,

while

Chairman

Hua

and

Foreign

Minister

Huang

Hua

were

scheduled

to visit

Eastern

European

countries

at

approximately

the

same

time.

Furthermore,

it

was

evident

by then that

a

political settlement was necessary to find a break-

through

in

the third

country

clause.

Arriving in Peking on August 8,

Foreign Minister Sonoda held a

series of meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on the

treaty

issue. At about the same

time,

the

Japanese negotiators pre-

sented

a

compromise plan

which weakened the

wording

of the contro-

versial third

country

clause

in

the

proposed treaty. Japan's

revised

version

read:

The

treaty

shall not

impair

the

position

of either

signa-

tory

in its relations

with

any

third

country. 19

The

revised provision

was much more

general

than the

original

version which

stipulated:

The

treaty

is

not

directed

against any specific

third

country.

In

his

meeting

with the Chinese

Foreign

Minister on

August 9,

Sonoda

ap-

parently succeeded in securing Chinese acceptance of the revised ver-

sion,

and Sonoda

appeared

confident

that

the

treaty

would

be

con-

cluded

during

his visit

in

Peking.

With the

compromise

reached on the

third

country clause,

China

and

Japan

had removed

the chief stum-

bling

block

to the

treaty.

The broad

agreement

was worked out

on

August 10 at the

15th

round

of

working

level

talks

on

the

basis

of

the

Huang-Sonoda

talks.

Immediately following

the

agreement,

the

Japanese delegation

sought

Prime Minister Fukuda's

approval

of

the draft

treaty

in

the

hopes of finalizing the wording of the treaty text by the next day.

Fukuda then conferred

with

leaders

of

the LDP to

seek

their consent

to the terms of the

proposed peace

pact.

The

hardliners within

the

LDP

were reluctant

to

go along

with

the

terms

proposed, largely be-

cause

of

unsettled

issues

in

Sino-Japanese

relations.

They insisted that

the

treaty

should

recognize Japan's

sovereignty

over

the disputed Sen-

19

Asahi

Shimbun,

August 8,

1978.

See

also,

Japan

Times, August

9, 1978.


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SINO-JAPANESEEACETREATY

309

kaku Islands.

Reflecting this sentiment, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Chairman

of the

LDP'

Executive Council, urged Fukuda to seek clarification on

this issue.

Meanwhile, Foreign

Minister Sonoda met with

Chinese Vice

Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on August 10 to discuss a number of issues,

including the

problem of the Senkaku Islands and the

Sino-Soviet

treaty of 1950 clause classifying Japan

as

a

common enemy of

the two

signatory

powers. The talks were

designed to secure an

understanding

with

China

on these

issues so important to the

pro-Taiwan

hardliners

within

the LDP.

Teng told Sonoda that

the Chinese government would

not allow a recurrence of the type of

incident that had taken

place

near the

Senkaku islands in April.

Teng also indicated that China was

ready to take the necessary steps to

scrap the Sino-Soviet treaty of

alli-

ance

in

1979.20

These developments clearly satisfied

Fukuda, who instructed For-

eign Minister Sonoda

to sign the

treaty on August 12, following an

extraordinary

cabinet meeting that approved the Prime

Minister's de-

cision.

A

similar

endorsement

of

Fukuda's decision was made

by the

Executive Council of the ruling LDP

on the same day, despite

the pro-

tests of

a

few pro-Taiwan hardliners such

as Masayuki Fujio,

Koichi

Hamada, and

Masayuki Nakayama.

Signed by

the

foreign ministers

of

the two countries at the Great

Hall of

People

at

7 p.m. on the

evening of August 12, the treaty came

almost

six years

after

the

two countries

had

established

diplomatic ties

and followed

nearly

four

years

of

arduous

negotiations.

Consisting

of a

preamble and

five

articles,

the

treaty

incorporated virtually

all

the

major principles

enunciated

in

the

1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Commu-

nique.

In

the

preamble, each country

pledged

to

respect

the

principles

of

the

U.N.

Charter,

and to contribute

to

the

peace

and

stability

of

Asia

and

the

world.

The

treaty then

listed five

articles.

The

first

pledged Japan and China to develop peaceful and friendly relations

based

on

the

five

principles

of

peaceful

coexistence and

to

settle

all

disputes peacefully

without

resorting

to force or

the

threat of

force.

The

second

article

dealt

with

anti-hegemonism:

The

contracting

parties declare

that

neither

of them should seek

hegemony

in

the

Asia-

Pacific region

or

in

any

other

region

and that

each

is

opposed

to efforts

by any

other

country

or

group

of

countries

to

establish

such

hegemony.

The

third

called for the

promotion

of economic

and cultural

relations

and

personnel

exchanges,

and

the

fourth article

stipulated:

The

pre-

sent treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party re-

garding

its relations

with third

countries.

(Japan clearly

hoped

to

mollify

Moscow

with

this

provision.)

The

fifth

article

stipulated

that

the

treaty

would

remain

in force for ten

years,

after which it could

be

terminated with

one

year's

advance notice

by

either

signatory.21

20 Japan Times, August 12 and 13, 1978.

21

For

an

English

text

of

the

treaty,

see

Japan Times, August 13,

1978.


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310 ASIAN

SURVEY,Vol.

XIX, No. 3,

March

1979

The

treaty

was hailed by

leaders

of the

ruling

LDP

as well as

all

opposition

parties

except

the

Japan

Communist Party

as

an epoch-

making

event

that brought

a new page

in the history

of

Sino-Japanese

relations and that of Asia at large. Leaders of Japan's business com-

munity

also welcomed

the

signing

of the

treaty, expressing

their

hopes

that

bilateral

trade would

be further

expanded.

Yoshihiro

Inayama,

chairman

of Nippon

Steel Corporation

and President

of the

Japan-

China Economic

Association

called the pact

an axis for promotion

of

peace

in

the world. 22

The United States welcomed

the

signing

of

the

new

treaty, commenting

that

it

would

contribute

to

the

peace

and

sta-

bility

in

Asia. Moscow,

however, reacted with

an angry

denunciation

of

the pact, saying

that

it was

far from

persuaded

by

Japan's

insistence

that the new pact was not directed against the Soviet Union. The

Kremlin

leaders denounced

Japan

for capitulating

before Peking's

insistence

on

the

inclusion

of the

anti-hegemony

clause

in the

treaty

and

warned

that Japan

might

have

damaged

its

national

interests and

its

relations

with

the Soviet

Union.

Moscow

was,

however,

far

more

critical

of

China than

Japan,

condemning

Chinese

leaders

as great

Han chauvinists. 23

The Soviets' denunciation

of the treaty

notwithstanding,

it was

ratified by

the Standing

Committee

of the

National

People's Congress

of China on August 17, 1978, and by both houses of the Japanese Diet

by

October 18,

1978.

On

October 23,

the instruments

of ratification

were

duly

exchanged

between the

Chinese

and

Japanese

Foreign

Min-

isters

at

a

ceremony attended

by Prime

Minister

Fukuda

and Chinese

Vice Premier

Teng

Flsiao-ping

in

Tokyo.

According

to an

opinion

survey

conducted

by

the

Asahi Shimbun

in

October

1978, 87%

of the

Japanese

respondents

supported

the

Sino-Japanese peace

treaty.

Although

it is

still too

early to evaluate

the

full significance

of

the

Sino-Japanese

treaty,

a

few basic conclusions

can

be drawn. First,

the

treaty has clearly signaled a Chinese victory over the Russians in their

bitter rivalry

to court industrially

advanced Japan

and

came

as

a tre-

mendous blow

to

Moscow.

Since

1956,

the

Soviets

had

attempted

to

sign

a similar treaty with Japan,

but

these efforts

had repeatedly

floun-

dered,

largely because

of

Moscow's

stubborn

refusal

to return four

small islands in the Kurile

chain

to Japan.

The

Kremlin's

unhappiness

over the Sino-Japanese

pact

also stemmed

from

Moscow's

uneasiness

about

China's

attempts to

build

a broad united

front

encircling

the

Soviet

Union.

The timing

of the treaty

signing,

coming only

a week

before Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Romania and Yugoslavia in

Russia's

backyard,

intensified

the bitter

Soviet

response. Furthermore,

the Russians

were

also apprehensive

about the prospects

of Sino-

Japanese

economic

and technical

cooperation,

which could

work

against

Russian

interests.

22

Ibid.

23

Washington

Post,

August

13,

1978.


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SINO-JAPANESE

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TREATY

311

Second,

the

treaty is

expected to

improve

trade

relations

between

Tokyo

and

Peking.

China has

been

trying

to

obtain

industrial

hard-

ware,

technology,

and

capital

from

Japan and

Western

countries.

From

Peking's perspective, Japan is well equipped to provide the technical

know-how

for

China's

development.

In

economic

terms,

the

Sino-

Japanese

nexus is

symbiotic:

Japan

has

immense

technical

assets but

no

raw

materials;

China

has raw

materials,

including oil,

but

lacks the

technological

know-how

needed to

modernize its

underdeveloped

econ-

omy.

Thus,

the

Chinese

government

is

clearly

eyeing

Japan as a

major

market for

Chinese

exports

and a

valuable

source

of

technology

and

financing

for its

modernization

programs.

The

signing

of the

long-

term

trade

agreement

on

February

16,

1978,

clearly

indicated

the will-

ingness of both countries to facilitate bilateral economic and trade re-

lations.

In the

wake of

the

new treaty,

there are

strong

indications

that

the

two-way

trade

could total

$80

billion

over the

next

13 years

(1978-

1990),

instead

of $20

billion

for the

eight year

period

(1978-1985)

as

provided

in

the

February

16

agreement.

The

new

agreement for the

extension

of

the

time

span as

well as the

increase of

the

trade volume

was

worked out

during

International

Trade

and

Industry

Minister

Toshio

Komoto's

visit to

Peking in

September

1978.

By

the fall

of

1978,

Japanese

sources

reported

that

Peking

had signed

contracts for

about $5 billion worth of industrial plants and goods, including a steel

mill

to be

built near

Shanghai

(i.e.,

Poashan)

with

a total

annual

ca-

pacity

of

six

million

tons, and

another $5

billion worth

of

contracts

in

the

offing

with

various

Japanese

firms.

Inevitably,

it

created

a

kind

of

China

boom

for

the

hitherto

depressed

Japanese

steel, chemical-

fertilizer,

and

textile

industries.

Third, the

signing of

the

bilateral

peace

treaty is

expected

to

facilitate

political

consultation

between

Tokyo

and

Peking.

Foreign

Minister

Sonoda

and

Chinese

leaders

have

agreed

to

establish

regular

ministerial meetings between the two countries in order to promote

mutual

understanding

and

cooperation

on

matters of common

interest.

During

International

Trade

and

Industry

Minister Toshio Komoto's

visit to

Peking

in

September

1978,

Chinese

and

Japanese

leaders

agreed

to

hold

bilateral

economic

ministers' conferences on a

regular

basis. In

addition,

increased

diplomatic

contacts

between

Tokyo

and

Peking

(e.g.,

Teng's

flamboyant visit to

Japan in

October

1978)

are

expected

to

improve

bilateral

political

relations

between

Tokyo

and

Peking.

Fourth,

there

are also

clear indications

that

Japan

and China

will

increase their cultural and personal exchanges. Already Peking has

decided to

send

a

large

number

of

Chinese

students to

Japan

for train-

ing;

Fukuda

indicated his

government's

willingness

to

welcome

these

exchange

students from

China,24

about

500

of whom

are

expected

to

24

Japan

Times,

August 22

and 27,

1978.

Reportedly,

China is

planning

to

send

as

many as

10,000

students and

trainees to

Japan

within the

next few

years. See

Shukan

Asahi,

October

2,

1978, p.

158.

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312 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol.

XIX, No.

3, March 1979

arrive

in

Japan in

1979.

In

addition, necessary preparations

and

ar-

rangements

are being worked out

between Tokyo and

Peking

for

the

training of thousands

of Chinese

at various industrial

plants

in

Japan.

Also, there are growing indications that more Japanese and Chinese

will cross

the

Yellow

Sea to visit each

other.25

Fifth,

the successful handling

of the

Sino-Japanese treaty negotia-

tions

improved

Prime Minister Fukuda's

image and enhanced

his

popularity both

within and

outside the ruling

LDP. As Fukuda's pop-

ularity

rose in the fall

of 1978, many

predicted that he

would be

un-

beatable in

the LDP's

presidential

election in December

1978.

To the

surprise of

many,

however, Fukuda was

defeated

in

the

primary

elec-

tion

by

Masayoshi

Ohira, the LDP's

Secretary-General,

who

enjoyed

the support of the pro-Peking elements within the LDP. Ohira had

been

instrumental in hammering

out the

Sino-Japanese

rapproche-

ment in

1972 as well as

several

administrative agreements with

Peking

from

1972-1974 in his

capacity as

Foreign

Minister.

Thus,

Fukuda's

failure to

retain the LDP's

presidency, and

hence the premiership,

should not be

attributed to the

China treaty but

to

other factors

such

as the complicated

factional

politics within the

LDP and the introduc-

tion of

the new

primary election system in

the LDP's

presidential

election. In

spite of

his

unsuccessful bid for

reelection, Fukuda

should

be credited with putting an end to the thorny China problem that

had

plagued the LDP

for nearly three decades.

Clearly

Fukuda could

legitimately claim that

the

conclusion of the Sino-Japanese

peace pact,

which

had eluded his

predecessors, was the crowning

achievement of

his

administration

in

foreign

relations.

Finally, the

Sino-Japanese

peace treaty also

promises in a sense

the

dawning

of

a new

era

of

cooperation among Japan,

China,

and

the

United

States. The U.S.

welcomed

the

treaty

by saying

that

it contri-

buted

to

stability

and security

in East Asia. The U.S.,

which has

endorsed the anti-hegemony principle since 1972, encouraged Japan

to

do the same.

Washington also

had other reasons to be

pleased

with

the

conclusion of

the

treaty. According to a U.S.

official, the increas-

ingly closer

ties

between Tokyo

and Peking would make it

unnecessary

for the

U.S.

to choose between

China

and

Japan,

a choice

the

U.S.

had

often been

required to make in

the previous

half century26

Fur-

thermore,

the

flexibility shown by the Chinese in

treaty

negotiations

with

Japan

also

encouraged the Carter Administration to

believe that

some

compromise could

be

reached

with

Peking

in

normalizing

Sino-

American relations, especially on the bothersome Taiwan issue. Viewed

in this

perspective,

President

Jimmy Carter's

dramatic announcement

of

December

15, 1978,

for

the establishment of

full-fledged

diplomatic

25

During

1977, more

than

23,400 Japanese

visited

China,

while

4,039

Chinese

visited Japan.

26

Richard

Holbrooke, U.S.

Policy

in

Asia:

Changing

Perspective, Current

Policy

(Washington,

D.C.: U.S. State

Department), No.

24,

June

1978, pp.

2-3.


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SINO-JAPANESE

PEACE

TREATY

313

ties between

Washington

and

Peking on January

1, 1979 should

facili-

tate the development

of

a general framework

of accommodation

and

cooperation

between Washington,

Tokyo, and

Peking.

The emergence

of a triple entente, coupled with the expected abrogation of the

Sino-Soviet alliance

pact in

1980,

clearly signals the beginning

of a

new

era

of international

relations

in East Asia.

HONG

N. KIM

is Professor

of Political

Science

at West

Virginia

University, Morgan-

town.

kim - 1979.pdf

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