The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 9 | Number 3 | Article ID 3699 | Feb 22, 2012

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Kim Jong-il and the Normalization of Japan-North KoreaRelations　　金正日と日朝関係の正常化

Wada Haruki

Kim Jong-il and the Normalization ofJapan-North Korea Relations

Wada Haruki

Translated by Rumi Sakamoto andMatthew Allen

When I heard the sudden news of the death ofNorth Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il, I felt as if Ihad been struck by lightning. Since his miraclerecovery from the 2008 stroke, he had beenbusy travelling in and outside North Korea.Both he and others around him would havebeen concerned about his health, and alsoprepared for this moment. His death must havebeen such a huge regret for Kim himself, whowas single-mindedly focusing on keeping hispublic promise to open a ‘big gate’ for a‘powerful and prosperous Korea’ by the 100thanniversary of the birth of his father, Kim Il-song in 2012. As one Japanese who has beenhoping for normalization of Japan-North Korearelations for the last 10 years, I could not butgrieve over the death of the leader of ourneighbouring country, who, more than anyoneelse, hoped to realise this goal. The Japanesegovernment and people have lost their bestchance to achieve normalization. The lastdecade has now become a lost decade.

Japan for Kim Jong-il

Kim’s death featured on Japanese TV

Kim Jong-Il became Number Two in the partyand in the state under Kim Il-song, and for 20years worked as the designer and producer of apartisan state. After his father’s death, hebecame head of state and ruled the countryunder a new system of what was known as the‘military-first’ state for 19 years. I will leave theevaluation of his work during this period foranother occasion. For the moment, I think whatis necessary is to confirm what Kim Jong-ilplanned to do in relation to Japan, and thewords he used to convey this to the Japanese.

In October 2000, Kim Jong-il sent his second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok to theUS. President Clinton sent US Secretary ofState Albright to North Korea on October 23.She remembered that Kim was an ‘intelligenthuman being’ who was ‘isolated but well-informed’ and ‘neither desperate nor worried.What he wanted was a normal relationship withthe US.’ She concluded that the President’svisit to North Korea was needed and that waswhat President Clinton hoped for, too.However, when Gore lost to Bush in the US

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presidential election at the end of the year,Clinton’s planned visit was cancelled.

Kim Jong-il then turned his attention to Japan.At the end of 2000, he approached PrimeMinister Mori Yoshiro to conduct secretnegotiations and suggested they aim to resolveall outstanding issues simultaneously at aNorth Korea-Japan summit. In 2001, PrimeMinster Mori sent Chief Cabinet SecretaryNakagawa Hidenao to Singapore to meet aNorth Korean delegation. North Korean specialenvoy Kang Sok-ju, the Deputy Minister forForeign Affairs, said that North Korea wouldwithdraw the demand for the compensation forsuffering and damage brought about by Japan’scolonial rule, and instead accept economic aid.In terms of the abduction issues, he responded‘please solve it’ in the summit meeting or ‘wewill respond to it fully.' (Mori Yoshiro, Shokun,December, 2002).

Now optimistic, Kim Jong-il announced a neweconomic policy in 2001, expecting diplomaticrelations to change. A New Year’s Day JointEditorial of the three state-run newspapersannounced the policy of ‘reconstructing thewholesale economy of the people with moderntechnology.’ The word ‘reconstruction’ is atranslation of the Russian ‘Perestroika’. Inorder to perform ‘Perestroika’ North Koreaneeded to acquire modern technology fromoutside. New methods and new ways ofthinking were seen as necessary. The JointEdi tor ia l demanded that the nat ion‘fundamentally reform our ideas, thoughts,fighting spirit and working styles to fit thedemands of the new century.’ They were goingto acquire modern technology from Japan.

However, on hearing Prime Minster Mori’sstory, leaders in the Ministry of Foreign Affairshesitated. Soon after making a joint statementover Irkustk with President Putin, Mori wasforced to resign. Kim’s idea did not materialise.

However, Kim Jong-il did not give up. When theKoizumi cabinet was born, he directly

approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,where it was dealt with by Tanaka Hitoshi, theHead of the Asia-Pacific Bureau. Tanaka, underthe guidance of Koizumi, began secretnegotiations in September 2001.

There were more than twenty meeting betweenTanaka and Mr. X from North Korea’s NationalDefense Commission, and they continued tillthe end of summer 2001. During this time,President Bush called North Korea a part of‘the axis of evil’ in his State of the UnionSpeech, publicly expressing hostility towardsNorth Korea. Therefore, Koizumi and Tanakacontinued secret negotiations without lettingthe US know about them.

The secret negotiations finally resulted in aJapan-North Korea summit meeting held inPyongyang on September 17, 2002,. Anothersummit took place on May 22, 2004. These twosummits were historic meetings, and I must saythat they became a reality because of thepersistence of Kim Jong-Il.

2002 Summit

A record of the two Japan-North Korea summitshas been produced by Japan's Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA). They are of course topsecret documents. A partial summary of thefirst summit was made available to the pressimmediately after the meeting, and wasreported in various newspapers. The top secretdocuments remained closed to the public; butfinally in 2009 NHK acquired them from MOFAand made a documentary: an NHK Special,“The Secret Record: Japan-North KoreaNegotiation – unknown attack and defense overthe ‘nuclear issue’”, aired on November 8.

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Kim Jong-il and Koizumi Junichiro inPyongyang, September 17, 2002

In this documentary, Tanaka Hiroshi andYabunaka Mitoji (senior leaders in MOFA in2001), as well as Saiki Akitaka (senior leader inMOFA at the time of the broadcast of thedocumentary) made appearances and explainedthe content of the summit meetings andnegotiations. Therefore, we can assume thatMOFA leaked this top secret document with theclear intention to defend its position. Japan hadjust experienced an unheard-of change ofgovernment with the birth of a Democrat Partygovernment that called for the end of the ruleby bureaucrats. It is, therefore, understandablethat MOFA attempted to defend itself in thismanner. Naturally, the documentary explainsthat despite the efforts of the Prime Ministerand MOFA, negotiations did not go wellbecause of the bad attitude of North Korea andof Kim Jong-Il.

Although leaking this secret document was aserious and possibly criminal act – likeMainichi’s Nishiyama Taikichi’s report, whichexposed secret documents concerning therevers ion o f Okinawa – i t was neverproblematised, and this issue was not referredto in the documentary. Putting aside theseissues, the NHK documentary based on thissecret document is an exceptional resourcethat communicates the true voice of Kim Jong-il. In combination with newspaper reports ofSeptember 18th, let us examine the two Japan-North Korea summit meetings.

The participants in the first summit were PrimeMinister Koizumi, Tanaka Hitoshi, the head ofthe Asia Pacific Bureau, MOFA, Abe Shinzo,Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Koizumi’ssecretary, Iijima Isao. At the beginning of thesummit meeting Kim said, ‘since the PrimeMinister himself has set an example by visitingPyongyang, North Korea and Japan will nolonger be near but distant countries, rathertrue neighbours.’ Newspapers reported thatKim continued on to say, ‘Together with thePrime Minister, and through our jointdetermination, we want to open a new page inthe history of bilateral relations between theDPRK and Japan.’

These words are a straightforward expressionof Kim’s desire to normalize Japan-North Korearelations. The NHK documentary does notexplain how Koizumi responded to Kim.According to newspaper reports, the PrimeMinister stressed that he ‘will work seriouslytowards normalization,’ demanded a ‘sincereresponse’ in terms of abduction and securityissues, and stated his wish that the summitmeeting would become a ‘chance to advanceJapan-North Korea relations substantially.’Koizumi’s words, too, were positive.

Kim Jong-il continued: ‘The relationshipbetween the two countries was good up untilToyotomi Hideyoshi. In order to normalizebilateral relations, the basic issue that needs tobe resolved is the settling of the past. We hopefor a sincere response from Japan.’ Theimplication that the problem started withHideyoshi’s 1592 invasion was a slightpressure, made with the intention of requestingthat Japan reflect over compensation for theircolonial rule of Korea.

Koizumi’s response to this has been reported inthe press. The Prime Minister expressed hisintention to reflect over, and apologise for thesuffering and damage that colonial rule causedto the people of North Korea, and based on thisspirit promised to offer economic aid. Kim Jong-

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il understood and accepted the Prime Minster’sstatement, and said he was ‘prepared to make ajudgement based on the whole situation,’ andthat he ‘would like to discuss it following aJapanese formula.’ It was thus reconfirmed thatif Japan offered to reflect and apologize, NorthKorea would accept economic aid ascompensation.

Newspapers reported their exchanges over theabduction issue. Referring to the informationhis office received that 13 Japanese wereabducted, five were alive and eight had died,Koizumi said it was a ‘huge shock’ and that he‘objected strongly’. He demanded North Korea ‘continue investigation, return the survivingabductees, and ensure they take propermeasures to prevent the recurrence of suchregrettable acts.’ Kim responded as follows:

‘ I would l ike to explain theabduction issue. We have carriedout investigations, includinginternal investigations. Its contextis the decades of hostile relationsbetween us, but it is truly anunfortunate incident. I want to talkabout it frankly. We have created aspecial investigation committee,and its conclusion was the reportwhich we have communicated toyou. Personally, I think that theseincidents took place in the 1970sand early 1980s because certainelements in the special agencybecame impulsive and werecarr ied away by what theyconsidered heroic actions. Thereare two reasons for their actions.First, in order that North Koreanagents could learn the Japaneselanguage; and secondly, so thatNorth Korean agents could travelto the Republic of Korea usingother people's identities. Now thatI have learned of these things,

those who were responsible havebeen punished. No such incidentswill occur again in the future.’

The documentary then reported his next words:‘I want to apologise now; it was regrettable. Iwill take appropriate measures to prevent ithappening again.’

Following these words, Abe Shinzo appeared inthe documentary, stating that he thought ‘KimJong-Il was rather timid. We should go aheadand push.’

Such a statement shows a lack of a politicaljudgment. Although the ultimate responsibilityclearly lies with Kim Jong-il as Head of State,he offered an incredibly honest explanation,getting into such details which are well beyondnormal expectations for an official stateexplanation, and apologised. Here I sense KimJong-il’s political decision-making power andstrong will to solve the issue.

The same thing was repeated in relation to theissue of the suspicious boats and Korean coastguard ships entering Japan’s territorial waters.This too, was reported in the press. PrimeMinister Koizumi said he was determined toinvestigate the incident in the East China Seain the previous year, and demanded that NorthKorea ensure such a regrettable incident wouldnot happen again. To this Kim Jong-i lresponded as follows:

‘We have inves t igated thesuspicious boats incident, andlearned what really happened justrecently. I did not know about this.Special services used the boats aspart of an unauthorized trainingexercise…. I had not imagined thatthey had gone to such extremes.[..] I tell you that this kind of thingwill not happen from now on. It isour internal problem, but we have

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a number of special services, andnow want to treat them as aremnant of the past.’

This also was a surprising comment. He couldnot have said such a thing if he was concernedabout affecting the morale of the specialservices. But Kim Jong-il dared to say as much.And from then on, North Korean coast guardships have not entered Japan’s territorialwaters, and there has been no drug smugglingeither. We can see that Kim Jong-il kept hispromise.

Prime Minister Koizumi said that it wasnecessary to create a place for a dialoguethrough Six-Party Talks in order to buildregional trust, and that he needed Kim’scooperation. Kim Jong-il responded as follows:

‘Whether Six-Party or Four-Party,it would be good to create such aconsultative organization. I believethat regional trust-building willoccur along with the normalizationof relations between countries.North Korea is prepared toparticipate in such a dialogue.’

We can see that the Six-Party Talks startedwith this agreement between Japan and NorthK o r e a , a s e m p h a s i z e d b y t h e N H Kdocumentary.

On nuclear issues, Kim Jong-il initially objectedand expressed hostility towards the US:

‘The nuclear issue is between theUS and North Korea. This is not asubject to discuss with Japan. TheUS does not keep promises. Itseems that the US has no desire toimprove relations with NorthKorea. It called North Korea partof the axis of evil.’ ‘The US only

pays lip service. It does not takeaction. Do we fight, or do we talk?We suspect that we will perhapshave to actually fight.’

But at the same time, in the end, Kim Jong-ilhoped for a discussion with the US:

‘If President Bush wants to talk, weare prepared to talk. The US needsto show good faith. Japan is a USally. It is an Asian country with thestrongest relationship of mutualtrust with the US. I would likeJapan’s leader, Prime MinisterKoizumi, to make an effort to solvethis problem.’

At the end of the meeting, the two leaderssigned the Japan-North Korea PyongyangDeclaration and pledged ‘early realization ofnormalization of diplomatic relations.’ Whenthe meeting was over and they parted, KimJong-il said to Prime Minister Koizumi: ‘let usmeet again once diplomatic relations arenormalized. I expect a significant outcome fromyour actions.'

Kim Jong-il thought that the PyongyangDeclaration had paved the way forward for thenormalization of diplomatic relations, and thatother elements of the normalization processwould be readily facilitated through discussionsbetween diplomats. However, as we know, afterthis summit meeting Japan-North Korearelations suddenly cooled because the Japaneseattitude changed. No further normalizationdiscussions took place and Japan-North Korearelations worsened.

2004 Summit meeting

The second Japan-North Korea summit meetingtook place on May 22, 2004. The fact that thefamilies of the five returnees were still left in

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North Korea weighed heavily on Prime MinisterKoizumi’s mind. He determinedly decided tovisit Pyongyang for the second time. We canassume that North Korea naturally expectedfrom Koizumi a renewed determination andnew ways to approach the normalization ofdiplomatic relations. On the other hand, theinternational environment of the time was evenharsher, as the US had begun the Iraq War.

Prime Minister Koizumi held a pressconference at Haneda Airport, in which hestated that he wanted to make this occasion ‘achance to normalize the abnormal relationsbetween Japan and North Korea, to change therelationship from hostility to friendship,opposition to cooperation.’ For this second visitto North Korea, Prime Minister Koizumi wasaccompanied by Yamazaki Masaaki, the deputychief Cabinet secretary, Yabunaka Mitsuji, thehead of the Asia Bureau, MOFA, and the PrimeMinister’s secretary, Mr. Iijima. According tothe NHK documentary, at the opening of themeeting Kim Jong-Il stated: ‘it is good that thePrime Minster has visited North Korea for thesecond time,’ He continued:

‘I would like to tell you about myconcerns. If after this meeting wedon’t act on the what we discuss, itwould mean that I had only a bitpart to play to the Prime Minister’slead role, and nothing positive willbe gained. Last time, we hadthought that the abduction issuew a s s o l v e d s i n c e w e t o o kcourageous measures. But as soonas the Prime Minister returned toJapan there appeared somecomplex issues. This disappointedus. We had thought that even indemocratic societies the leaderwould have authority; but we weredisappointed to learn that theauthority of the Prime Minister asthe head of the government

crumbled so easily.’

The NHK documentary did not report howPrime Minster responded to this very importantstatement, instead merely offering a generalexplanation: ‘to this, Koizumi repeatedlydemanded that the abduction issue be solved inmeetings’; but this is clearly a deception. Prime Minister Koizumi must have expressedhis sense of regret over what happened afterthe last meeting, and he must have expressedthat this time there was no reason to worry,that he was determined to press on with thenormalization process, and that he hadexpressed this determination at the Hanedapress conference. Without such an affirmation,Kim Jong-il could not have had a meeting withKoizumi again. Kim Jong-il believed Koizumi'swords.

What Prime Minister Koizumi demanded in thissummit was ‘a thorough investigation of thetruth about the eight abductees, who,according to North Korea, had died’ and therepatriation and visits of the families of the fivereturnees. Kim Jong-il accepted this, andpromised to re-investigate the case. He alsopromised to return the children of the Hasuikeand Chimura families, and allow a meetingbetween Soga Hitomi and her husband andchildren in a third country. Koizumi, on hispart, promised 250,000 tons of food aid andmedical supplies worth $10 million.

In the rest of the summit meeting, PrimeMinister Koizumi expressed his frank opinionsregarding North Korea’s nuclear development,and Kim Jong-il responded well. Kim Jong-ilexplained the intentions behind North Korea’snuclear armament clearly:

‘The Prime Minister compared thebenefit of nuclear weapons to thebenefit of economic aid, but we donot think in this way. What wewould like to tell you today is that

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t h e r e i s n o b e n e f i t i n o u rpossessing nuclear weapons. TheUS arrogantly thinks that theyhave the means to launch apreemptive attack on us. This onlymakes us feel bad. We cannotremain silent if the other party isgoing to hit us with a stick. Wecame to possess nuclear weaponsfor our survival. If our right tosurvive was guaranteed, therewould be no need for nuclearweapons.’

Kim Jong-il did not hide the fear he felt whenSadaam Hussein’s regime was destroyed byAmerica’s Iraq War:

‘America puts aside what it isdoing and insists that we need togive up our nuclear capacity first,but that is out of the question. Thetotal abandonment of its nuclearprogram is something that isforced on a defeated nation. Butwe have not been defeated by theUS. They are trying to disarm usunconditionally like they did toIraq, and we cannot accept it. [..]Judging from the state of the worldtoday, I am convinced that we areright to think that we shouldpossess nuclear capacity in orderto maintain our right to survive. Ifthe US says it is going to attack uswith nuclear weapons, and we justwait in silence, doing nothing, thenwe’ll end up like Iraq.’

How can we challenge this logic of Kim Jong-Iland persuade him to stop North Korea’sdevelopment and possession of nuclearweapons? In the context of the manner inwhich America proceeded with the Iraq War,Japan’s supportive role in it, and Japan’s

protection under the US nuclear umbrella,what logic are we to use to persuade NorthKorea to disarm? The questions are sharplythrown back at us. The dialogue of persuasionthat Prime Minister Koizumi attempted neededto be developed.

But this time, too, Kim Jong-il ultimately hopedfor a dialogue with the US. He made adesperately passionate request.

‘Through the Six-Party Talks, wehope to sing a duet with the US.We will sing with the US till welose our voice. For this to succeed,I w o u l d l i k e t o a s k o t h e rne ighbor ing coun t r i e s t oaccompany it with an orchestra. Agreat orchestra’s backing willmake the due t sound evensweeter.’

Here is the picture of Japan-North Koreanegotiation

In the press conference that followed thesummit meeting, too, Prime Minister Koizumirepeated his Haneda statement concerning hisdetermination to ‘normalize the abnormalrelations.’ However, the agreements reached atthe 2004 meeting were made meaninglessfollowing the Japanese government’saccusations concerning the cremated bones ofabductee Yokota Megumi at the end of thatyear. With repeated nuclear testing andsanctions imposed since 2006, Japan-NorthKorea relations completely broke down. It hasbeen five years since then, and now manypeople are calling for negotiations. We need tothink carefully what it is that is necessary tonegotiate.

The two Japan-North Korea summit meetingsand the Pyongyang Declaration are shiningexamples of successful negotiations betweenJapan and North Korea. They demonstrate the

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first steps taken towards, and the goals to begained from, Japan-Korea negotiations. Theyare a lesson that Kim Jong-il left behind for thenew leaders of North Korea. At the same time,the Japanese government should now alsoreturn to where those two meetings left off –the attitudes towards negotiations, the firststeps taken in the process, and the goalsachieved – and restart negotiations from there.

This article was translated from the March,2012 issue of Sekai (World).

Wada Haruki is Emeritus Professor of theInstitute of Social Science, Tokyo Universityand a specialist on Russia, Korea, and theKorean War. His many books include ChosenSenso zenshi (A Complete History of theKorean War), Kita Chosen – Yugekitai kokka nogenzai (North Korea –Partisan State Today),and Dojidai hihan – Nicho kankei to rachimondai (Critique of Our Own Times – Japan-North Korea Relations and the AbductionProblem). His Complete History of the KoreanWar will be published in English translation in2013.

Rumi Sakamoto is Senior Lecturer in theSchool of Asian Studies, the University ofAuckland, New Zealand, and a Japan Focusassociate. Matthew Allen is professor and headof the School of History and Politics, Universityof Wollongong, Australia, and a Japan Focusassociate.They are the coeditors of PopularCulture, Globalization and Japan.

Recommended citation: Wada Haruki, 'KimJong-il and the Normalization of Japan-NorthKorea Relations,' The Asia Pacific Journal, Vol10, Issue 9, No 3, February 27, 2012.

Articles on related subjects:

• Bruce Cumings with an introduction byRuediger Frank, North Korea’s DynasticSuccession

• Ruediger Frank, North Korea after Kim JongIl: The Kim Jong Un era and its challenges

• Ruediger Frank, Power Restructuring inNorth Korea: Annointing Kim Jong Il’sSuccessor