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1Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.14114

DAVIDKING,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.SYLVIA BURWELL,SECRETARYOFHEALTH

ANDHUMANSERVICES,ETAL. ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF

APPEALSFORTHEFOURTHCIRCUIT [June25,2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS andJUSTICEALITOjoin,dissenting.TheCourt holds thatwhen thePatientProtection and

Affordable Care Act says Exchange established by theStateitmeansExchangeestablishedbytheStateortheFederalGovernment.Thatisofcoursequiteabsurd,andtheCourts21pagesofexplanationmakeitnolessso.

IThePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActmakes

major reforms to theAmericanhealth-insurancemarket.Itprovides,amongotherthings,thateveryStateshall...establish an American Health Benefit Exchangeamarketplace where people can shop for health-insuranceplans. 42U.S.C.18031(b)(1). AnditprovidesthatifaStatedoesnotcomplywiththisinstruction,theSecretaryofHealthandHumanServicesmustestablishandoper-atesuchExchangewithintheState. 18041(c)(1).AseparatepartoftheActhousedin36BoftheInter-

nalRevenueCodegrantspremiumtaxcreditstosubsi-dize certain purchases of health insurance made on Ex-changes. The tax credit consists of premiumassistanceamounts for coveragemonths. 26 U.S.C. 36B(b)(1).Anindividualhasacoveragemonthonlywhenheiscov-

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

ered by an insurance plan thatwas enrolled in throughan Exchange established by the State under [18031].36B(c)(2)(A). And the law ties the size of the premiumassistanceamounttothepremiumsforhealthplanswhichcoverthe individualandwhichwereenrolled inthroughan Exchange established by the State under [18031].36B(b)(2)(A). The premium assistance amount furtherdepends on the cost of certain other insurance plans of-feredthroughthesameExchange.36B(b)(3)(B)(i).This case requires us to decide whether someone who

buysinsuranceonanExchangeestablishedbytheSecre-tarygetstaxcredits. Youwouldthinktheanswerwouldbe obviousso obvious therewould hardly be a need forthe Supreme Court to hear a case about it. In order toreceiveanymoneyunder36B,anindividualmustenrollinaninsuranceplanthroughanExchangeestablishedbytheState.TheSecretaryofHealthandHumanServicesisnotaState. SoanExchangeestablishedbytheSecre-tary isnot anExchangeestablishedby theStatewhichmeanspeoplewhobuyhealth insurancethroughsuchanExchangegetnomoneyunder36B.Words no longer havemeaning if anExchange that is

notestablishedbyaStateisestablishedbytheState.ItishardtocomeupwithaclearerwaytolimittaxcreditstostateExchangesthantousethewordsestablishedbythe State. And it is hard to come up with a reason toincludethewordsbytheStateotherthanthepurposeoflimitingcreditstostateExchanges.[T]heplain,obvious,andrationalmeaningofastatuteisalwaystobepreferredtoanycurious,narrow,hiddensensethatnothingbuttheexigencyofahardcaseandtheingenuityandstudyofanacute and powerful intellect would discover. Lynch v.Alworth-Stephens Co.,267U.S.364,370(1925) (internalquotation marks omitted). Under all the usual rules ofinterpretation, in short, theGovernment should lose thiscase. But normal rules of interpretation seemalways to

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

yieldtotheoverridingprincipleofthepresentCourt:TheAffordableCareActmustbesaved.

IITheCourtinterprets36Btoawardtaxcreditsonboth

federal and state Exchanges. It accepts that the mostnaturalsenseofthephraseExchangeestablishedbytheStateisanExchangeestablishedbyaState. Ante,at11.(Understatement, thy name is an opinion on the Afford-ableCareAct!) Yet the opinion continues,withno sem-blance of shame, that it is alsopossible that thephrasereferstoallExchangesbothStateandFederal.Ante,at13. (Impossiblepossibility,thynameisanopinionontheAffordableCareAct!) TheCourtclaimsthatthecontextand structure of theAct compel [it] to depart fromwhatwouldotherwisebethemostnaturalreadingoftheperti-nentstatutoryphrase. Ante,at21.IwholeheartedlyagreewiththeCourtthatsoundinter-

pretationrequirespayingattention to thewhole law,nothoming in on isolated words or even isolated sections.Contextalwaysmatters. Letusnotforget,however,whycontextmatters:Itisatoolforunderstandingthetermsofthelaw,notanexcuseforrewritingthem.Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law

must accept and apply the presumption that lawmakersuse words in their natural and ordinary signification.Pensacola Telegraph Co.v.Western Union Telegraph Co.,96 U.S. 1, 12 (1878). Ordinary connotation does notalways prevail, but the more unnatural the proposedinterpretation of a law, themore compelling the contex-tualevidencemustbetoshowthat it is correct. Todaysinterpretation is notmerely unnatural; it is unheard of.WhowouldeverhavedreamtthatExchangeestablishedbytheStatemeansExchangeestablishedbytheStateor the Federal Government? Littleshortofanexpressstatu-torydefinitioncouldjustifyadoptingthissingularreading.

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

YettheonlypertinentdefinitionhereprovidesthatStatemeans each of the 50 States and theDistrict of Colum-bia. 42 U.S.C. 18024(d). Because the Secretary isneitheroneofthe50StatesnortheDistrictofColumbia,that definition positively contradicts the eccentric theorythat anExchange established by the Secretary has beenestablishedbytheState.Farfromofferingtheoverwhelmingevidenceofmeaning

neededto justifytheCourts interpretation,othercontex-tual clues undermine it at every turn. To begin with,other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between theestablishment of an Exchange by a State and the estab-lishmentofanExchangebytheFederalGovernment.TheStates authority to set up Exchanges comes from oneprovision,18031(b);theSecretarysauthoritycomesfroman entirely different provision, 18041(c). Funding forStatestoestablishExchangescomesfromonepartofthelaw, 18031(a); funding for the Secretary to establishExchanges comes from an entirely different part of thelaw, 18121. States generally run state-created Ex-changes; the Secretary generally runs federally createdExchanges. 18041(b)(c). AndtheSecretarysauthoritytosetupanExchangeinaStatedependsupontheStates[f]ailure toestablish [an]Exchange. 18041(c) (empha-sisadded).ProvisionssuchasthesedestroyanypretensethatafederalExchangeisinsomesensealsoestablishedbyaState.Reading the restof theActalso confirms that,as rele-

vanthere,thereareonlytwowaystosetupanExchangeinaState:establishmentbyaStateandestablishmentbythe Secretary. 18031(b), 18041(c). So saying that anExchange established by the FederalGovernment is es-tablishedby theState goesbeyondgivingwordsbizarremeanings;itleavesthelimitingphrasebytheStatewithnooperativeeffectatall. Thatisastarkviolationoftheelementaryprinciplethatrequiresaninterpretertogive

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

effect, if possible, to every clauseandword of a statute.Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). Inweighingthisargument,itiswelltorememberthediffer-ence between giving a term a meaning that duplicatesanotherpartofthelaw,andgivingatermnomeaningatall. Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselveswhetherout of a desire to add emphasis, a sense of belt-and-suspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant for doublets(aidandabet,ceaseanddesist,nullandvoid). Lawmak-ersdonot,however,tendtousetermsthathavenooper-ation at all. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174(1803). So while the rule against treating a term as aredundancyisfarfromcategorical,theruleagainsttreat-ing it as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretiveprinciples get. TheCourts readingdoesnotmerely givebytheStateaduplicativeeffect;itcausesthephrasetohavenoeffectwhatever.Makingmattersworse,thereaderofthewholeActwill

comeacrossanumberofprovisionsbeyond36Bthatreferto the establishment of Exchanges by States. Adoptingthe Courts interpretationmeans nullifying the term bytheStatenot justonce,butagainandagain throughouttheAct. ConsiderforthemomentonlythosepartsoftheAct thatmentionanExchangeestablishedbytheStateinconnectionwithtaxcredits:

x The formula for calculating the amount of the taxcredit, as already explained, twicementions an Ex-change established by the State. 26 U.S.C.36B(b)(2)(A),(c)(2)(A)(i).

x TheActdirectsStatestoscreenchildrenforeligibilityfor [tax credits] under section 36B and for anyotherassistanceorsubsidiesavailableforcoverageob-tained through an Exchange established by theState. 42U.S.C.1396w3(b)(1)(B)(C).

x The Act requires an Exchange established by the

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

State to use a secure electronic interface to deter-mine eligibility for (among other things) tax credits.1396w3(b)(1)(D).

x TheAct authorizes an Exchange established by theStatetomakearrangementsunderwhichotherstateagenciesdeterminewhetheraStateresidentiseligi-ble for [tax credits] under section 36B. 1396w3(b)(2).

x TheActdirectsStatestooperateWebsitesthatallowanyone who is eligible to receive [tax credits]undersection 36B to compare insurance plans offeredthrough an Exchange established by the State.1396w3(b)(4).

x One of theActs provisions addresses the enrollmentofcertainchildreninhealthplansofferedthroughanExchange established by the State and then dis-cussestheeligibilityofthesechildrenfortaxcredits.1397ee(d)(3)(B).

It is bad enough for a court to cross out by the Stateonce. Butseventimes?Congressdidnot, by theway, repeat Exchange estab-

lishedbytheStateunder[18031]byrotethroughouttheAct.Quitethecontrary,clauseafterclauseofthelawusesa more general term such as Exchange or Exchangeestablished under [18031]. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.18031(k),18033;26U.S.C.6055.Itiscommonsensethatany speakerwho says Exchange someof the time,but Exchange established by the State the rest of thetime,probablymeanssomethingbythecontrast.Equating establishment by the State with establish-

mentbytheFederalGovernmentmakesnonsenseofotherparts of the Act. The Act requires States to ensure (onpain of losing Medicaid funding) that any Exchangeestablished by the State uses a secure electronic inter-

7Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

face to determine an individuals eligibility for variousbenefits (including tax credits). 42 U.S.C. 1396w3(b)(1)(D). HowcouldaStatecontrolthetypeofelectronicinterface used by a federalExchange? TheAct allows aState to control contracting decisions made by an Ex-change established by the State. 18031(f)(3). WhywouldaStategettocontrolthecontractingdecisionsofafederal Exchange? The Act also provides Assistance toStates to establish American Health Benefit Exchangesand directs the Secretary to renew this funding if theState ... ismaking progress ... toward ... establishinganExchange. 18031(a).DoesaStatethatrefusestosetupanExchangestillreceivethisfunding,onthepremisethat Exchanges established by the Federal GovernmentarereallyestablishedbyStates?Itispresumablyinorderto avoid these questions that the Court concludes thatfederal Exchanges count as state Exchanges only forpurposes of the tax credits. Ante, at 13. (Contrivance,thynameisanopinionontheAffordableCareAct!)It is probably piling on to add that the Congress that

wrote the Affordable Care Act knew how to equate twodifferenttypesofExchangeswhenitwantedtodoso.TheActincludesaclauseprovidingthat[a]territorythat...establishes ... an Exchange ... shall be treated as aState for certainpurposes. 18043(a) (emphasisadded).Tellingly, itdoesnot includeacomparableclauseprovid-ingthattheSecretary shallbetreatedasaStateforpur-posesof36BwhensheestablishesanExchange.Facedwith overwhelming confirmation that Exchange

established by the State means what it looks like itmeans, the Court comes up with argument after feebleargumenttosupport itscontrary interpretation. Noneofits tries comes close to establishing the implausible con-clusionthatCongressusedbytheStatetomeanbytheStateornotbytheState.TheCourtemphasizesthatifaStatedoesnotsetupan

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

Exchange,theSecretarymustestablishsuchExchange.18041(c). It claims that the word such implies thatfederalandstateExchangesarethesame. Ante,at13.Toseetheerrorinthisreasoning,oneneedonlyconsideraparallel provision from our Constitution: The Times,PlacesandMannerofholdingElections forSenatorsandRepresentatives, shallbeprescribed ineachStateby theLegislaturethereof;buttheCongressmayatanytimebyLaw make or alter such Regulations. Art.I, 4, cl.1(emphasisadded). JustastheAffordableCareActdirectsStates to establish Exchanges while allowing the Secre-tarytoestablishsuchExchangeasa fallback, theElec-tionsClausedirectsstatelegislaturestoprescribeelectionregulationswhileallowingCongresstomakesuchRegu-lationsasafallback.Wouldanybodyrefertoanelectionregulationmade byCongress as a regulation prescribedbythestate legislature? Wouldanybodysaythata fed-eral election law and a state election law are in all re-spects equivalent? Of coursenot. Theword such doesnothelp theCourt onewhit. TheCourtsargumentalsooverlooks the rudimentaryprinciple thata specificprovi-siongovernsageneralone. Evenif itweretruethattheterm such Exchange in 18041(c) implies that federaland state Exchanges are the same in general, the termestablishedbytheState in36Bmakesplainthat theydifferwhenitcomestotaxcreditsinparticular.The Courts next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery in-

volvesotherpartsoftheActthatpurportedlypresupposethe availability of tax credits on both federal and stateExchanges.Ante,at1314.ItiscuriousthattheCourtiswilling to subordinate the express words of the sectionthat grants tax credits to themere implications of otherprovisionswithonlytangentialconnectionstotaxcredits.Onewouldthinkthatinterpretationwouldworktheotherway around. In any event, each of the provisions men-tioned by the Court is perfectly consistent with limiting

9Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

taxcreditstostateExchanges.Oneofthemsaysthattheminimum functions of an Exchange include (alongsideseveral tasks that have nothing to do with tax credits)settingupanelectroniccalculatorthatshowstheactualcostofcoverageaftertheapplicationofanypremiumtaxcredit.42U.S.C.18031(d)(4)(G).WhatstopsafederalExchanges electronic calculator from telling a customerthathistaxcreditiszero?AnotherprovisionrequiresanExchangesoutreachprogramtoeducatethepublicabouthealth plans, to facilitate enrollment, and to distributefairandimpartialinformationaboutenrollmentandtheavailability of premium tax credits. 18031(i)(3)(B).What stops a federal Exchanges outreach program fromfairlyandimpartiallytellingcustomersthatnotaxcreditsareavailable? AthirdprovisionrequiresanExchangetoreport information about each insurance plan soldincludinglevelofcoverage,premium,nameoftheinsured,and amount of any advance payment of the tax credit.26 U.S.C. 36B(f)(3). What stops a federal Exchangesreportfromconfirmingthatnotaxcreditshavebeenpaidout?The Court persists that these provisions would make

little sense if no tax credits were available on federalExchanges. Ante, at 14. Even if that observation weretrue, it would show only oddity, not ambiguity. Lawsoften include unusual or mismatched provisions. TheAffordableCareActspans900pages;itwouldbeamazingif its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other.ThisCourtdoesnotreviselegislation...justbecausethetextaswritten createsanapparentanomaly. Michigan v.Bay Mills Indian Community,572U.S.___,___(2014)(slip op., at10). Atany rate, theprovisions citedby theCourt are not particularly unusual. Each requires anExchangetoperformastandardizedseriesoftasks,someaspects ofwhich relate in someway to tax credits. It isentirely natural for slightmismatches to occurwhen, as

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

here, lawmakers draft a single statutory provision tocover different kinds of situations. Robers v. United States,572U.S.___,___(2014)(slipop.,at4).Lawmak-ers need not, and often do not, write extra languagespecifically exempting, phrase by phrase, applications inrespecttowhichaportionofaphraseisnotneeded. Ibid. Roamingevenfartherafieldfrom36B,theCourtturns

totheActsprovisionsaboutqualifiedindividuals. Ante, at1011. QualifiedindividualsreceivefavoredtreatmentonExchanges, although customerswho are not qualifiedindividualsmayalso shop there. SeeHalbig v.Burwell,758F.3d 390, 404405 (CADC2014). TheCourt claimsthattheActmustequatefederalandstateestablishmentof Exchanges when it defines a qualified individual assomeonewho(amongotherthings)livesintheStatethatestablished the Exchange, 42 U.S.C. 18032(f)(1)(A).Otherwise, the Court says, there would be no qualifiedindividuals on federal Exchanges, contradicting (for ex-ample) the provision requiring every Exchange to takethe interests of qualified individuals into accountwhen selecting health plans. Ante, at 11 (quoting18031(e)(1)(b)).Pureapplesauce.Imaginethatauniver-sitysendsaroundabulletinremindingeveryprofessortotake the interests of graduate students into accountwhensettingofficehours,but thatsomeprofessors teachonly undergraduates. Would anybody reason that thebulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor hasgraduate students, so that graduate students mustreallymeangraduateorundergraduatestudents?Surelynot. Just as one naturally reads instructions aboutgraduate students tobe inapplicable to theextentapar-ticular professor has no such students, so toowould onenaturally read instructionsaboutqualified individuals tobeinapplicabletotheextentaparticularExchangehasnosuch individuals. There is no need to rewrite the termStatethatestablishedtheExchange inthedefinitionof

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

qualified individual, much less a need to rewrite theseparate term Exchange established by the State in aseparatepartoftheAct.Leastconvincingofall,however,istheCourtsattempt

touncoversupport for its interpretationinthestructureof Section 36B itself. Ante, at 19. The Court finds itstrange thatCongress limited the tax credit to stateEx-changes in the formula for calculating theamount of thecredit, rather than in theprovisiondefining the range oftaxpayerseligible forthecredit. HadtheCourtbotheredtolookattherestoftheTaxCode,itwouldhaveseenthatthe structure it finds strange is in fact quite common.Consider, for example, themanyprovisions that initiallymaketaxpayersofallincomeseligibleforataxcredit,onlytoprovidelaterthattheamountofthecreditiszeroifthetaxpayersincomeexceedsaspecifiedthreshold.See,e.g., 26U.S.C. 24 (child tax credit); 32 (earned-income taxcredit);36(first-time-homebuyertaxcredit). Orconsider,for an even closer parallel, a neighboring provision thatinitiallymakestaxpayersofallStateseligibleforacredit,onlytoprovidelaterthattheamountofthecreditmaybezero if the taxpayers State does not satisfy certain re-quirements. See 35 (health-insurance-costs tax credit).OnebeginstogetthesensethattheCourtsinsistenceonreading things in context applies to established by theState,buttonothingelse.Forwhatitisworth,lawmakersusuallydrafttax-credit

provisions the way they doi.e., the way they drafted36Bbecause the mechanics of the credit require it.ManyAmericansmovetonewStatesinthemiddleoftheyear. Mentioning state Exchanges in the definition ofcoveragemonthratherthan(astheCourtproposes)inthe provisions concerning taxpayers eligibility for thecreditaccounts for taxpayerswho live inaStatewithastateExchange forapartof theyear,butaStatewithafederal Exchange for the rest of the year. In addition,

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

36B awards a credit with respect to insurance planswhich cover the taxpayer, the taxpayers spouse, or any dependent ...of the taxpayerandwhichwereenrolled inthrough an Exchange established by the State.36B(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If Congress had men-tioned state Exchanges in the provisions discussing tax-payers eligibility for the credit, a taxpayer who buysinsurance from a federal Exchangewould get nomoney,evenifhehasaspouseordependentwhobuysinsurancefromastateExchangesayachildattendingcollegeinadifferentState.ItthusmakesperfectsenseforExchangeestablishedby theState toappearwhere itdoes, ratherthanwheretheCourtsuggests. Evenifthatwerenotso,ofcourse,itslocationwouldnotmakeitanylessclear.TheCourthasnotcomeclosetopresentingthecompel-

ling contextual case necessary to justify departing fromtheordinarymeaningof the termsof the law. Quite thecontrary, context only underscores the outlandishness ofthe Courts interpretation. Reading the Act as a wholeleavesnodoubtabout thematter: Exchange establishedbytheStatemeanswhatitlookslikeitmeans.

IIIForitsnextdefenseoftheindefensible,theCourtturns

to the Affordable Care Acts design and purposes. Asrelevant here, the Act makes three major reforms. Theguaranteed-issue and community-rating requirementsprohibit insurers from considering a customers healthwhendecidingwhethertosellinsuranceandhowmuchtocharge, 42U.S.C. 300gg, 300gg1; its famous individ-ual mandate requires everyone to maintain insurancecoverage or to pay what the Act calls a penalty, 26U.S.C. 5000A(b)(1), and what we have nonethelesscalledatax,seeNational Federation of Independent Busi-ness v.Sebelius,567U.S.___,___(2012)(slipop.,at39);and its tax creditshelpmake insurancemoreaffordable.

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

The Court reasons that Congress intended these threereformstoworktogethertoexpandinsurancecoverage;andbecausethefirsttwoapplyineveryState,somustthethird. Ante,at16.This reasoning suffers from no shortage of flaws. To

beginwith,eventhemostformidableargumentconcern-ing the statutes purposes couldnot overcome the clarity[of] thestatutes text. Kloeckner v.Solis, 568U.S. ___,___,n.4(2012)(slipop.,at14,n.4).Statutorydesignandpurpose matter only to the extent they help clarify anotherwise ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintainwithastraightfacethat36Bisunclear?Tomentionjustthe highlights, the Courts interpretation clashes with astatutorydefinition,renderswordsinoperativeinatleastseven separate provisions of the Act, overlooks the con-trast between provisions that say Exchange and thosethat say Exchange established by the State, gives thesamephraseonemeaning forpurposesof tax creditsbutanentirelydifferentmeaningforotherpurposes,and(letus not forget) contradicts the ordinary meaning of thewordsCongressused. Ontheothersideoftheledger,theCourt has come up with nothing more than a generalprovisionthatturnsouttobecontrolledbyaspecificone,ahandfulofclausesthatareconsistentwitheitherunder-standingofestablishmentbytheState,andaresemblancebetween the tax-credit provision and the rest of the TaxCode. Ifthatisallittakestomakesomethingambiguous,everythingisambiguous.Having gone wrong in consulting statutory purpose at

all,theCourtgoeswrongagaininanalyzingit.Thepur-poses ofa lawmustbe collected chiefly from itswords,not from extrinsic circumstances. Sturges v. Crown-inshield,4Wheat.122,202(1819)(Marshall,C.J.).Onlyby concentrating on the laws terms can a judge hope touncovertheschemeof the statute,ratherthansomeotherschemethatthejudgethinksdesirable.Likeitornot,the

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

expresstermsoftheAffordableCareActmakeonlytwoofthe three reforms mentioned by the Court applicable inStates that do not establish Exchanges. It is perfectlypossible for themtooperate independentlyof taxcredits.Theguaranteed-issueandcommunity-ratingrequirementscontinue to ensure that insurance companies treat allcustomersthesamenomattertheirhealth,andtheindi-vidualmandatecontinuestoencouragepeopletomaintaincoverage,lesttheybetaxed.The Court protests that without the tax credits, the

number of people covered by the individual mandateshrinks, and without a broadly applicable individualmandate the guaranteed-issue and community-ratingrequirements woulddestabilize the individual insurancemarket. Ante, at 15. If true, these projections wouldshowonlythatthestatutoryschemecontainsaflaw;theywould not show that the statute means the opposite ofwhatitsays. Moreover,itisaflawthatappearedaswellin other parts of theAct. A different title established along-term-care insurance program with guaranteed-issueand community-rating requirements, but without anindividualmandateorsubsidies. 80018002,124Stat.828847(2010). Thisprogramnevercameintoeffectonlybecause Congress, in response to actuarial analyses pre-dictingthatthe[program]wouldbefiscallyunsustainable,repealedtheprovisionin2013.Halbig,758F.3d,at410.How could the Court say that Congress would neverdream of combining guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements with a narrow individual mandate,when it combined those requirementswithno individualmandateinthecontextoflong-term-careinsurance?Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Ser-

vicesoriginallyinterpretedtheActtoimposeguaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements in theFederalTerritories,eventhoughtheActplainlydoesnotmaketheindividualmandateapplicablethere. Ibid.;see26U.S.C.

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5000A(f)(4); 42U.S.C. 201(f). This combination, pre-dictably, [threw] individual insurance markets in theterritoriesintoturmoil. Halbig, supra,at410.Respond-ingtocomplaintsfromtheTerritories,theDepartmentatfirst insisted that it had no statutory authority to ad-dresstheproblemandsuggestedthattheTerritoriesseeklegislative relief fromCongress instead. Letter fromG.Cohen, Director of the Center for Consumer Informationand Insurance Oversight, to S. Igisomar, Secretary ofCommerce of the Commonwealth of Northern MarianaIslands (July 12, 2013). The Department changed itsmind a year later, after what it described as a carefulreview of [the] situation and the relevant statutory lan-guage. Letter from M. Tavenner, Administrator of theCentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices,toG.Francis,Insurance Commissioner of the Virgin Islands (July 16,2014). HowcouldtheCourtpronounceitimplausibleforCongress to have tolerated instability in insurancemar-kets inStateswith federalExchanges,ante, at 17,wheneven the Government maintained until recently thatCongressdidexactlythatinAmericanSamoa,Guam,theNorthern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the VirginIslands?Compounding its errors, theCourt forgets that it isno

moreappropriatetoconsideroneofastatutespurposesinisolation than it is to consideroneof itswords thatway.Nolawpursuesjustonepurposeatallcosts,andnostatu-toryschemeencompassesjustoneelement.Mostrelevanthere, the Affordable Care Act displays a congressionalpreference for state participation in the establishment ofExchanges:EachStategetsthefirstopportunitytosetupits Exchange, 42 U.S.C. 18031(b); States that take upthe opportunity receive federal funding for activities ...related to establishing an Exchange, 18031(a)(3); andtheSecretarymayestablishanExchange inaStateonlyas a fallback, 18041(c). But settingup and running an

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Exchange involve significant burdensmeeting strictdeadlines, 18041(b), implementing requirements relatedtotheofferingofinsuranceplans,18031(d)(4),settingupoutreach programs, 18031(i), and ensuring that theExchange is self-sustaining by 2015, 18031(d)(5)(A). AStatewouldhavemuch lessreason to takeon thesebur-densifitscitizenscouldreceivetaxcreditsnomatterwhoestablishesitsExchange.(NowthattheInternalRevenueService has interpreted 36B to authorize tax creditseverywhere, by the way, 34 States have failed to set uptheir own Exchanges. Ante, at 6.) So even if makingcredits available on all Exchanges advances the goal ofimproving healthcare markets, it frustrates the goal ofencouraging state involvement in the implementation oftheAct. Thisiswhatjustifiesgoingoutofourwaytoreadestablished by the State to mean established by theStateornotestablishedbytheState?Worst of all for the repute of todays decision, the

Courts reasoning is largely self-defeating. The CourtpredictsthatmakingtaxcreditsunavailableinStatesthatdonotsetuptheirownExchangeswouldcausedisastrouseconomic consequences there. If that is so, however,wouldntoneexpectStatestoreactbysettinguptheirownExchanges?AndwouldntthatoutcomesatisfytwooftheActsgoalsratherthanjustone:enablingtheActsreformsto work and promoting state involvement in the Actsimplementation? TheCourtprotests that theveryexist-ence of a federal fallback shows that Congress expectedthatsomeStatesmightfailtosetuptheirownExchanges.Ante, at19. So itdoes. Itdoesnot show,however, that CongressexpectedthenumberofrecalcitrantStatestobeparticularly large. The more accurate the Courts direeconomicpredictions,thesmallerthatnumberislikelytobe. ThatrealitydestroystheCourtspretensethatapply-ing the lawaswrittenwould imperil theviabilityof theentireAffordableCareAct. Ante, at 20. All in all, the

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Courtsargumentsaboutthelawspurposeanddesignarenomoreconvincingthanitsargumentsaboutcontext.

IVPerhapssensingthedismalfailureofitseffortstoshow

thatestablishedbytheStatemeansestablishedbytheStateortheFederalGovernment,theCourttriestopalmoff the pertinent statutory phrase as inartful drafting.Ante, at 14. This Court, however, has no free-floatingpower to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.Lamie v.United States Trustee,540U.S.526,542(2004)(internal quotationmarks omitted). Onlywhen it is pa-tentlyobvioustoareasonablereaderthatadraftingmis-takehas occurredmay a court correct themistake. Theoccurrenceofamisprintmaybeapparentfromthefaceofthe law, as it is where the Affordable Care Act createsthreeseparateSection1563s.Ante,at14.ButtheCourtdoes not pretend that there is any such indication of adrafting error on the face of 36B. The occurrence of amisprintmayalsobeapparentbecauseaprovisiondecreesan absurd resulta consequence somonstrous, that allmankindwould,withouthesitation,uniteinrejectingtheapplication. Sturges, 4Wheat., at 203. But 36B doesnot come remotely close to satisfying that demandingstandard. It is entirely plausible that tax credits wererestricted to state Exchanges deliberatelyfor example,in order to encourage States to establish their own Ex-changes. We therefore have no authority to dismiss thetermsofthelawasadraftingfumble.Let us not forget that the term Exchange established

bytheStateappearstwicein36BandfivemoretimesinotherpartsoftheActthatmentiontaxcredits.Whatarethe odds, do you think, that the same slip of thepen oc-curredinsevenseparateplaces?NoprovisionoftheActnone at allcontradicts the limitation of tax credits tostateExchanges.AndasIhavealreadyexplained,usesof

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thetermExchangeestablishedbytheStatebeyondthecontextoftaxcreditslookanythingbutaccidental.Supra,at6. Iftherewasamistakehere,contextsuggestsitwasa substantivemistake in designing this part of the law,notatechnicalmistakeintranscribingit.

VTheCourtsdecisionreflectsthephilosophythatjudges

shouldendurewhateverinterpretivedistortionsittakesinordertocorrectasupposedflawinthestatutorymachin-ery. Thatphilosophy ignorestheAmericanpeoplesdeci-siontogiveCongress [a]lllegislativePowersenumeratedintheConstitution. Art.I,1. TheymadeCongress,notthisCourt,responsibleforbothmakinglawsandmendingthem. This Court holds only the judicial powerthepower to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it.We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do notworkoutinpractice,justasthepeoplelacktheabilitytothrowusoutofofficeiftheydislikethesolutionsweconcoct.Wemust always remember, therefore, that [o]ur task is toapplythetext,nottoimproveuponit. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Indus-tries Corp.,493U.S.120,126(1989).Trying to make its judge-empowering approach seem

respectful of congressional authority, the Court assertsthat itsdecisionmerelyensuresthattheAffordableCareAct operates the way Congress meant [it] to operate.Ante, at 17. First of all, whatmakes the Court so surethat Congress meant tax credits to be available every-where? OuronlyevidenceofwhatCongressmeantcomesfrom the termsof the law,and those termsshowbeyondall question that tax credits are available only on stateExchanges.Moreimportantly,theCourtforgetsthatoursisagovernmentof lawsandnotofmen. Thatmeansweare governed by the terms of our laws, not by theunen-actedwillofourlawmakers. IfCongressenactedintolaw

19Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

somethingdifferentfromwhatit intended,thenitshouldamendthestatutetoconformtoitsintent.Lamie,supra,at542. Inthemeantime,thisCourthasnorovinglicense...todisregardclearlanguagesimplyontheviewthat...Congress must have intended something broader. Bay Mills,572U.S.,at___(slipop.,at11).Even less defensible, if possible, is the Courts claim

thatitsinterpretiveapproachisjustifiedbecausethisActdoesnotreflectthetypeofcareanddeliberationthatonemightexpectofsuchsignificantlegislation.Ante,at1415. Itisnotourplacetojudgethequalityofthecareanddeliberation thatwent into thisoranyother law. A lawenacted by voice vote with no deliberation whatever isfully as binding upon us as one enacted after years ofstudy, months of committee hearings, and weeks of de-bate. Much less is itourplace tomakeeverything comeoutrightwhenCongressdoesnotdoitsjobproperly.ItisuptoCongresstodesignitslawswithcare,anditisuptothepeopletoholdthemtoaccountiftheyfailtocarryoutthatresponsibility.Rather than rewriting the law under the pretense of

interpretingit,theCourtshouldhaveleftittoCongresstodecidewhattodoabouttheActslimitationoftaxcreditstostateExchanges. IfCongressvaluesaboveeverythingelse the Acts applicability across the country, it couldmaketaxcreditsavailableineveryExchange.Ifitprizesstate involvement in the Acts implementation, it couldcontinue to limit tax credits to state Exchanges whiletakingotherstepstomitigatetheeconomicconsequencespredicted by the Court. If Congress wants to accommo-datebothgoals,itcouldmaketaxcreditsavailableevery-where while offering new incentives for States to set uptheir own Exchanges. And if Congress thinks that thepresent design of theActworkswell enough, it could donothing. Congress could also do something else alto-gether,entirelyabandoningthestructureoftheAffordable

20 KINGv.BURWELL

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

CareAct. TheCourtsinsistenceonmakingachoicethatshould be made by Congress both aggrandizes judicialpowerandencouragescongressionallassitude.Just ponder the significance of the Courts decision to

takematters into itsownhands. TheCourts revisionofthelawauthorizestheInternalRevenueServicetospendtensofbillionsofdollarseveryyearintaxcreditsonfed-eralExchanges. Itaffects thepriceof insurance formil-lionsofAmericans. ItdiminishestheparticipationoftheStatesintheimplementationoftheAct.Itvastlyexpandsthe reach of the Acts individual mandate, whose scopedepends in part on the availability of credits. What aparodytodaysdecisionmakesofHamiltonsassurancestothe people of New York: The legislature not only com-mands the purse but prescribes the rules by which thedutiesandrightsofeverycitizenaretoberegulated.Thejudiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over ... thepurse; no direction ... of the wealth of society, and cantakenoactiveresolutionwhatever.ItmaytrulybesaidtohaveneitherFORCEnorWILLbutmerelyjudgment. TheFederalistNo.78,p.465(C.Rossitered.1961).

* * *Todays opinion changes the usual rules of statutory

interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act.That, alas, is not a novelty. In National Federation of Independent Business v.Sebelius,567U.S.___,thisCourtrevisedmajor components of the statute in order to savethem from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congresspassed provides that every individual shall maintaininsurance or else pay a penalty. 26 U.S.C. 5000A.ThisCourt,however,sawthattheCommerceClausedoesnotauthorizeafederalmandatetobuyhealthinsurance.So it rewrote the mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567U.S., at ______ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 1545).TheActthatCongresspassedalsorequireseveryStateto

21Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

acceptanexpansionof itsMedicaidprogram,orelserisklosing all Medicaid funding. 42 U.S.C. 1396c. ThisCourt, however, saw that the Spending Clause does notauthorizethiscoercivecondition. Soitrewrotethelawtowithhold only the incremental funds associated with theMedicaid expansion. 567 U.S., at ______ (principalopinion) (slip op., at 4558). Having transformed twomajor parts of the law, the Court today has turned itsattentiontoathird. TheActthatCongresspassedmakestaxcreditsavailableonlyonanExchangeestablishedbytheState. ThisCourt,however,concludesthatthislimi-tationwouldprevent therestof theAct fromworkingaswellashoped. Soitrewritesthelawtomaketaxcreditsavailable everywhere. We should start calling this lawSCOTUScare.PerhapsthePatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct

willattain theenduringstatusof theSocialSecurityActortheTaft-HartleyAct;perhapsnot.ButthisCourtstwodecisions on the Act will surely be remembered throughthe years. The somersaults of statutory interpretationtheyhaveperformed(penaltymeanstax,further[Medi-caid] payments to the State means only incrementalMedicaidpaymentstotheState,establishedbytheStatemeans not established by the State)will be cited by liti-gantsendlessly, to theconfusionofhonest jurisprudence.Andthecaseswillpublish foreverthediscouragingtruththattheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesfavorssomelawsoverothers,andispreparedtodowhateverittakestoupholdandassistitsfavorites. Idissent.

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