knapp revs kolnai 2003 on disgust

7/29/2019 Knapp Revs Kolnai 2003 on Disgust

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International Phenomenological Society

On Disgust by Aurel KolnoiReview by: Christopher KnappPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 523-526Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041063 .

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conventions annot exist withoutpeople, and claims about the existenceofconventions o requirepeople amongtheir ruth-makers.So I thinkElder is mistaken o think hat this view of modality eads toanti-realismbout objectsand to paradoxicalconclusions.But in thatcase wehave no reasonto think hat realobjectmusthave an essence hat'sdiscover-able purely mpirically,nd so the factthatcommon senseobjects mostly ailto pass the testofflankingniformitiess no knockagainstthem.As a result,thecommon senseontologistmayresteasy even ifthearguments f Part IIIfail,concluding hatthe best way to defend familiar bjectsmay not be toclaim that theyhave purely empirically iscoverablenatures,but rather toreject hevalidity f this riterion.But whether r not its attempt o defend roughly ommon sense ontol-ogy using a naturalistic pproach to modality ultimatelyucceeds,there smuch to admire n Real Natures nd FamiliarObjects. t is a concise,clearlywritten nd original tudy hat stakes out important ewterritory.t deservescareful ttention y naturalists, ho mayfind heempirical est formodalityof particularnterest; y austereontologistswithnaturalisticympathies, homay find themselves hallengedto acceptinga broader ontology;and bydefenders f a common senseontology,who mayfind id and comfort n itsresponseto causal redundancy rgumentsnd arguments gainstaustere on-tologies.All readerswill no doubt findmuch to reflectn about the role ofour understandingfmodalityn debatesabout common senseontology.AMIE L. THOMASSONUniversityfMiami

On Disgust, urel kolnoi Edited,and with an Introduction y barry smithand carolyn korsmeyer.Chicago and LaSalle, MIT Press,111.: pen Court,2004.Pp. viii,120.Contemporarynalytic philosophers f emotionrarelyrefer o the work ofearly wentieth-centuryhenomenologists.ut thephenomenologicalspectsofemotion re central o severalof the mostprominentssuesin that iterature,includinghe nature femotion-dependentroperties,nd theappropriate oleof emotionsn moral and political ife.Consequently, emightwellprofit romthe nsights f thosewho have honedtheirpowersofphenomenologicalntro-spection nd putthem o the taskof analyzingwhat t is liketo have an emo-tional response. Reading Aurel Kolnafs essays on disgustwould be anexcellent lace to start.On Disgustcontainstwo essays by Kolnai "Disgust" and 'The StandardModes ofAversion:Fear, Disgustand Hatred" as well as an excellent ntro-ductionto themwritten y its editors,BarrySmithand CarolynKorsmeyer.

CRITICAL NOTICES 523

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The first f Kolnai's essays,originally ublished n 1929,appearshere n Eng-lish forthefirst ime.The secondessaywas written round 1970and publishedinMind n 1998.Two of the centralundertakingsf theseessays are to analyzethe inten-tional attitude haracteristicf disgust, nd to givea phenomenologicalnaly-sis of thosethings hattypicallylicitdisgust n us. I will recount ome ofthehighlightsf theseanalyses, nd thensuggesthow theymightbear on sometopicstakenup in more recent iscussions.To read Kolnai's account of the intentionaltance we adopt when we feeldisgust s to be immersed n the details of a very omplicated esponse.Thereis,ofcourse, he awareness f our visceral ejection f thedisgustinghing thenausea, the "shuddering".Kolnai, however, ocuses on the moresubtle, nd

oftenmorecognitive,ndertones f thisrevulsion. irst, here s "a low evalua-tion of theobject,a feeling f superiority"42). We hold disgusting bjects nsuch low esteem hat we do not evendeignto see them s posinga threat;weexperience hem as merely isturbing,lbeit sometimes owerfullyo. This isborne out in thefact that an awarenessof our own existence s only dimly nthebackground f a disgustresponse.Whereasbeingafraid nvolves vividawarenessof our selves as vulnerable, isgustrefers ack to theone who feelsit only insofar s it calls attention o our beingtoo close to the disgustingobjectforcomfort. ut even in this wareness f our proximityo thedisgust-ing object,thedisgusting bject itself akes center tage,for t is experiencednot onlyas near,but as wanting o be nearer.Disgusting hings eemto be"shamelesslynd unrestrainedly"orcinghemselvespon us; they eemto be"grinningnd smirkingnd stinkingmenacinglyt us" (41).What makesdisgust o peculiar,however, s that with all thisdeprecatoryrevulsion here oexists n attraction. erhaps uniquely mongthose emotionsthat we think f as speciesofaversion, isgust s ambivalent bout itsobjects;we are drawn to them t the same timethat we reject hem.Kolnai payscloseattention o how we lingerupon the minutiaeof disgusting hings.Again incontrast o thosethingswe fear,we are fascinatedwith hesensiblefeatures fdisgusting hings.As Kolnai puts t,withdisgust thetipofthe ntention en-etrates heobject,probing nd analyzingt,as itwere, nd becomingmmersedin its motions or its persistence"39). And our scrutinys far fromdisinter-ested; t s motivated yan attraction e feel owards hatwhichdisgusts s,bythedisgusting bject's"macabreallure" 42). Disgust,Kolnai explains, ontainsa hidden nvitation o "lay hold of theobject, ither y touching, onsuming rembracingt" (43), and thusbetrays "shadow of desireforunion" with t. 46)So at the same timethat we experience isgusting hings s forcinghemselvesuponus,wehavean urge ogo forward nd immerse urselves nthem.Towards which objects do we have such a complex and ambivalentresponse?Kolnai offers catalogueof typical isgust licitors nd thewaydis-gust presents hem o us, including oth the obvious elicitors f "physical"dis-524 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH



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gust putrefaction,xcrement,odilysecretions,rawling nimals and insects,theproximityf other humanbodies,disease and deformation and the lessobvious elicitors f "moral" disgust satiety, xcessive or misplacedvitality,"over-clever ntellectualitywithout rigor or backbone" (67), mendacity,betrayal, pinelessness,entimentality.or each entryn thiscatalogue,Kolnaiidentifieshespecific ature f thedisgust hat heobjectelicits nd the featuresresponsible orelicitinghosefeelings. ut he devotesmostattention o articu-lating ndmotivatingishypothesis oncerning hat the tems n thecataloguehave in common.All disgustinghings,Kolnai claims,giveus the impressionof "a surplusof life" that s not "structuredypurpose" 72) and that, n itsprofligate itality, xpresses longingfor death. And while it requiresmorecharity o find ome of theseputative ssociations s compelling s others itis easy to see thatswarmingnsectsdevouring carcassmight voke thoughtsof life nd death; t s lesseasyto see that lie does so on thewhole,Kolnai'streatment akeshisanalysisof what underlieshedisgustingnessfthings ur-prisinglyersusasive.Manyof theaspectsofdisgust hat Kolnai's emphasizes re rather ifferentfrom hoseemphasized n the researchby experimental sychologistshat hasbeen a more natural ource of insight or nalytic hilosophers. his differenceofemphasisnotonly helpsfill n our understandingf thedisgustresponse,talso illuminatesome issuestakenup by contemporary hilosophers.Kolnai'sanalysis s particularlyermane o recent heories ccording o which n objectis disgustingfand only f t is "appropriate" o be disgusted yit. If,as somehaveclaimed, heappropriatenesst issue s either artly r wholly matter fan objectactuallypossessing hepropertieshatthedisgust esponse resentstas having, isgustingnessill turn ut to be a very eculiar valuative roperty.In order o be disgusting,n objectwould nfacthave to be bothrepulsivendalluring;t wouldhave to be decidedlynferioro us but at the sametimepos-sessqualities hatmake it desirable o layhold of; it would have to be capableof forcingtself pon us and be worthy f our fascination.ndeed,disgusting-ness wouldbe so peculiar propertyhatmanyof thethingshat recommonlythought o be disgusting ould turnout to lack it. For, ifKolnai is right, hedisgust esponse ftenmputes ropertieso its elicitors hatthey o not n factpossess.Excrement,or nstance,s notcapableofforcingtself ponus; there snothing esirable boutmalicious ies;nor s there nythinglluringboutbeingbetrayed.Now, Kolnai's analysis fthephenomenologyfthedisgust esponseis hardlyuncontroversial,nd so it is certainly pen to theoristswho are con-cernedthattheir ccountof disgustingnessot be undulyrevisionaryo chal-lenge ts details.Perhapsnotevery pisodeof beingdisgustednvolvesfindingthedisgustinghingdesirableor alluring, or nstance.But this s a discussionthat swellworthhaving, nd one thatKolnai's analysis ertainly rovokes.Anotherarea in which Kolnai's treatmentoins current oncerns s theproperplace of disgust n our moral and political ives.Some contemporary

CRITICAL NOTICES 525



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theorists old thatdisgust s a sociallybeneficialmotionbecause thelpspolicethe bordersof sociallyacceptablebehavior.But givenKolnai's analysis, hesephilosopherswillhave to confront he fact thatdisgust s a corruptiblenfor-cer. For after nitially urning s away from he things hatdisgustus, thisemotiondraws us back to them, nd invites s to flirt,s itwere,with hepos-sibility f transgressinghe boundariesof social acceptabilitynd embracingthe taboo. This is what Kolnai refers o as the "eroticism f disgust" 60). Ifwe wanted to insure hatpeople not eat a certainfood,making hemfeeldis-gustedbyitmaynot be the beststrategy,s is amply hownbythe tastemanyhavedevelopedfor heese that tinks f putrescence.imilarly,fwe wantpeo-ple to categoricallyvoid certain ehaviors,making hemfeeldisgustedmaybecounterproductive,s it could lend those behaviors n allure thattheyprevi-ously acked.It is not onlythose who recommend isgust s a social emotionthat willfindKolnai's analysis hallenging;ome of those whodecry t is as an emotionthat we should struggle o overcomewillbe challenged s well. One putativegroundfor striving o overcomedisgust n social life is that disgust s anexpression f our discomfort ithbeingembodied.But,these critics ay,ouranimal nature s a fact bout ourselves hatwe shouldcelebrate, otdenigrateand reject.Kolnai's analysis fwhat underlies isgust s morenarrow, owever.It is not discomfort ithanimal natureper se thatdisgust xpresses, ut dis-comfortwith nimalvitalityhat s not structuredy purpose.And it is far essclear that t is inappropriateo recoil at lifethat has no otherpurposebut tocarry ut the ife ycle.Our being iving reatures s indeed a wondrous hing;but,arguably,tis not a wonder o be wastedon itself.Despite predatinghe current iscussions bout disgustbyas much as threequarters f a century, olnai's essaysread more ike a contemporaryontribu-tion to them than a historical ext. And insofar s his analysis emphasizesaspectsofdisgust hatanalyticphilosophers ave largelyneglected,he contri-bution he makes is one thatshouldhelpus developmore subtle and sensitiveaccounts of disgustingnessnd the role it shouldplay in structuringur lives.Combine this withtheveryhelpfulntroductiony its editors in whichtheyexplainKolnai's historical ontext, ecode some of the argon thatappearsinthe essays, and situate his understandingf emotion in the contemporarytheoreticalandscape and On Disgust s poised to make a lasting mpactonourunderstandingfthisfascinatingmotion.CHRISTOPHER KNAPPBinghamtonniversity

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knapp revs kolnai 2003 on disgust

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