knowledge, reality, and objectivity (ii

8/12/2019 Knowledge, Reality, And Objectivity (II

1/31

Mind ssociation

Knowledge, Reality, and Objectivity (II.)Author(s): H. F. HallettSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 49, No. 195 (Jul., 1940), pp. 303-332Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2250487.Accessed: 24/06/2014 11:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University PressandMind Associationare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access toMind.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 132.248.184.4 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:53:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mindhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2250487?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2250487?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mindhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup


2/31

III.-KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, ANDOBJECTIVITY (II.).BY H. F. HALLETT.

II.THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIVITY.

IT has beenmy purpose, o far, o lay bare and to discreditheuncriticizedresumptionhat ies at therootofall philosophicaltheoriesthat concernthemselves xclusivelywith the objectsofperceptionndthought,hatknowledges essentially subject-object relation, nd that the real as such must be the objectofcontemplation,whethernaively accepted, critically orrected,oramplified ydescription.This swhat condemn s " radicalobjectivism". Whether hese objects are regarded,with theidealists, s fallingwithin he nature of theknowingmind, or,with the realists, as independentexistences,their adequateapprehension s taken as the sufficientulfilmentf purelycognitive ndeavour. A complete ognition fthe natureofanentity s an objects thuswidely egarded s revealingts essen-tial nature s a real. It is true hat dealistshavegone omewhatfurthern claiming hat the nature of such objects is, at leastin part, determined y the activityof the cognizing ubject,and sometimes ven that objectivenature s in the end whollydetermined y that action,either n the finite ercipient r insome infinitemind: thoughBerkeleydeniedthat the objectsof our knowledgebelong to the creative mind of God afterthe same fashionas they exist in and for our finiteminds.'

I The divineconsciousnesss heldby Berkeley o differ rom hat ofman n two ways: (i) in beingdevoidof certain deas, e.g., hat ofpain,aboutwhichGod knowsbut with whichhe is not " acquainted ; and(ii) in the natureof his relation o the objects of his knowledge: God'sperceptions never ense-perception,orhe is the creator fall ideas orobjects and is thus not affected,s we are, by an " other . Yet God'sintellections analogous to ours, and is "properly and not merely";metaphorically analogous. Whenwe attributentellect o Godwedoso in the plain sense of the term, nd not as when we speak of " thefinger f God ". Nor is God's ntellect nalogous o ours s ours is saidto be analogous ovision; it is not a higher ind f apprehension,ut aperfectdition fourkind. Cf.HylcasndPhilonous, ial. III; Alciphron,Dial. IV, 18-21; Siris, 254, 289-90.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/31

304 H. F. HALLETT:Realists, on the otherhand, have not generally ttempted otake the nverse iewand to derive henature f theobjectfromsomeultra-objectiveource,havingpreferredo take the objectas positingtself, nd to regard t as an independent,nd not ametaphysically erived,existent. This has been due in greatpart, I think, o a certainanxiety est to make the object aderivedexistent houldlead, in the absenceof all clue to themode of its derivation, o an assertion of its unreality: asindeed t did whenKant derived omepart of its nature fromthe action of transcendenthings-in-themselves,-thoughere,itis true, he ssuewas somewhat louded1byhishavingderivedthe remainder rom he action of theego. Locke'sposition s,perhaps,morenearly 'proposn thisconnexion, orhe expresslydenied he derivation f any part of the character f " ideas ofsensation from hemind, egardinghem s causallyderived romreal things hatpartlyresemble hem, nd partly" answer othem.2 ThusLocke wouldseemto emphasize ealism ymaking

1 I.e., it clouded the factitiousissue between idealism and realismwiththeir commonassumption that " self" is essentiallysubjective mind, and" other" spatio-temporalobject. It is the substance of what I advancethat Kant's attempt to trace objectivity to the co-operative actions of" self" and " other" as things-in-themselves,o far from clouding themain metaphysicalissue, firstmade explicit in some degreethe principles,already implicit in the Spinozistic metaphysics of nature, that governthe emergenceof spatio-temporalentities.2 The case of our " ideas ofreflection is ratherdifferent,orpresumablythe mind contemplates its own operations, according to Locke, withoutany intermediaterepresentative. Thus the real operations of the mindneitherresemble nor "answer to " the ideas, but are identical with their" objective contents . I will not attempt to determinewhether thisreduces " contemplation" to " acquaintance ".My interpretationof the implications of Locke's treatmentof " innateideas and principles" may perhaps be disputed on the groundsthat (i) heallows that the mindis operative in the processesof deation and cognition(as the admissionof " ideas ofreflection , as well as the formaldefinitionof " knowledge" indicate); and (ii) our ideas of " secondary qualities ",at least, are held by Locke not to be taken, in theform n whichwe sensethem, romthings.Though the point is not essential to my main argument, et me say indefenceofmyinterpretation: (i) that so far as real existenceis concerned,

the operations of the mind are only held by Locke to be veridical wherethey ssue in relatedideas that " answerto " real things*; and (ii) that inso faras the actual content ofsecondary qualities is supplied by the mind,it is " extraneous and superinduced ". Unfortunately,Locke's officialaccount ofthe nature ofknowledgepreventsme fromclarifyingmydictumby confining t to the characterof veridical ideas: forknowledge is saidto be concerned, not with ideas simpliciter,but with their " agreements* I may not say " correspond with real things", forrelations belongonly to ideas and not to things.



4/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 305objects derivativesfrom operant real things,very much asBerkeleyemphasized dealism by makingthem derivatives fcognizing r creativeminds. But we must not, think, ccepteither he one pole or the otherwithout ssentialqualificationor limitation: for, on the one hand,we have no clue to themanner n which objects couldbe supposed to be derivedfroman action exclusively ognitive, he workofwhich s ostensibly,and indeedex hypothesi,o apprehend nd notto create; 1 and,on the otherhand, the derivation f ourostensible bjectsfrom" things that are still conceived as objects in theirprimarycharacters, nd even in their underlying nd supporting ub-stantiality,2 houghas objects concealed from directhumanapprehension,an hardlybe said to advancematters arbeyondnaive dogmatism.3Fromall this uncritical uasi-analysiswe must have recourseto a metaphysicallyeflective xamination fthe primary ataandproblemsfexperience. So far have beencontent o speakwith the many as if our primitive xperiencewere concernedwith data: the data of outer ense, and thedata of innercon-sciousness. And no doubt this is a proper characterizationof these elementary actors n human experience, nd dulyemphasizes he peculiar imitations fhumanknowledge. Butelsewhere I have pointedout that the term" datum" bearsreference rimarily o our empiricalprocedure, nd that whatis rightly o called in that reference,nd is regarded here asilluminating he tabula rasa of ourignorance, s equally rightly,regardedfrom the metaphysical standpoint,no more than" blindspot" in thetransparencyfperfect nowledge,o thatand repugnances-and that n spiteof all relations eingheld not to be" contained n the real existence f things (Essay, i, 25, 8). Whetherthese difficultiesouldbe resolved rmitigated y an admission fthereality f relations, lsewherempliedby Locke loc.cit., v, 6, 11), willnot enquire.I Truthdepending n thenon-interferencef cognition iththe objectcognized.Of course, do notdenythat with n infinite reative eing ction ngeneral nd cognitionmay be muchmorecloselyallied than in finiteexperiencewherenon-cognitivection s formative ather han creativein character.2 For thoughwe have no idea of substance s such, his s not becausesubstance s other hanobjective,but because the humanmindhappensto be limited o the apprehensionf its qualities, nd cannotpenetrateto itsrealessence. Othermindsmaybe better quipped, nd thus ppre-hend thistoo,andpresumablys an object f cognition.3It also conflicts ithLocke's own"historicalplain method.4Cf. Creativity,olitics, nd theA Priori (Arist.Soc. Supp. Vol. xii),"The A Priori ", pp. 172-177.



5/31

306 H. F. HALLETT:the metaphysicians apt to think of these primitive actors,not as data, but as " ablata", not as something ivento us andpresented, ut as something aken fromus and occulted. Itis this double perspective f the human mind that I wish toemphasizewhen saythatourmostprimitivexperience,quallywithmore developedcognitions, s that neitherof pure pre-sentationnor ofpure occultation ut ofwonder, nd ourmostelementary ognition quallywiththemorecomplicated xperi-ences of scientificonstructionnd philosophical peculation snot of data alone nor of ablata alone, but of data-ablataorproblemata,nd our typical cognitive ttitudethroughout neofquery nd unrest nd intellectual ffort.Further,hisdualityexhibits tself quallyin the efforts fthe empiricistnd thoseof the metaphysician,eading the one through processes ofconstruction,mplification,nd analysisof the data, and theother throughthose of speculationabout, and justificationand valuationof,the ablata. But in facteverydatum s by itsverynature, s givenbut not understood,blatum; and everyablatumby its verynatureas occult,necessarily atum: andit is thusthattheprimitive actors fhumanexperience,quallywith ts developedproducts, re never mere contentpresentedor occulted,but contentpresented s occulted,and thereforeproblematical.' Thus the empiricists not contentwith hisdata, and themetaphysicians unquietabout his ablata: it isthisdoubleperspective hatgivesrise to the nativerestlessnessofthe questioning umanmind; for to rest contentwithdatawould be to fallbeneathhumandignity, nd to neglect blatato makepretence o a statustranscendingumanity. We mustbegin where we findourselves: not with passivelyaccepteddata, nor with ablataevaded orrepudiated, ut withproblernatato be faced and engaged in a never-ending peculativeandexploratoryctivity.This polarityof human experience s exhibited, s I havesaid, not only n the complicated uestionsraisedby the more

1 It is this false start in empirical philosophythat determines ts specialproblems; fordatum as contentpresented,even as " objective content",is the ignis fatuus that misleads the epistemologicaltravellertowards thequagmires and swamps where the unhappy ghosts of engulfedempiricistspursue their unending " wild goose chase " for the subject among theobjects, or are condemned to a Danaidean attempt to hold the waters ofthe a priori in their a posteriorisieve. The corresponding danger tometaphysicalphilosophy s less notable, but not less urgent,when it leadsto neglect of factorsof experiencenot easily broughtwithin the sweep offine speculations, or long-establishedvaluations, or justificationsderivedfromdeep-seated prejudices.



6/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 307concrete bjects ofourdeveloped ognition, ut even at its veryroots, withthose simplest nd most primitive actors hat wecommonly egard s unquestionable ata: 1 thus have spokenof the necessity f having " recourse o a metaphysically e-flectiveexaminationof the primarydata and problemsofexperience : not that we are facedwith data and problems,but that every datum is itself,not so much a contentto beaccepted and used as object of intuition, asis of construction,or material for analysis, but as problem for metaphysicalelaboration nd solution.

Take, forexample,our outersense-data, r indeedany formof empirical ontent,whethernaturalor moral: we shall findthat tis as true o say that tis takenrom s as that tisgiven ous. I amgiven content hat, nbeinggiven, s also opposedtome: it is experienced s primarily"mine , yet onlymine asobject, ndthus" not-mine. It is given o meonly nso far s itremains ver gainstme: itisgiven,not as subject,but as object.The same metaphysical uality s even moreconspicuouswithourmoral xperience;forherewhat sgiven s always " rightthat doesnotseemgood,or a " good" that does notseemright.This is the primitive mpirical haracterof morality n finiteexperience; it bears theschema f moralobligation, nd is thesource of the Kantian principleof the essential oppositionof duty and inclination. The unsatisfactorinessfthis opposi-tion as it is expressedby Kant lies, not in its assertion s aprimary xperience, ut in the tendency o treat it as an in-corrigibleatum,nstead f s a problem,ndeed hemoralproblem.How can moralright nd moralgoodbe in essentialharmonynspiteoftheirprimitiveppearance n opposition? Here again,therefore,n moralexperience, here s givena " mine (i.e. a1Andconcerns ere, s in all cases,notonly heoccult ontent resented,but also, and even moreurgently, he objectificationnvolved. Moreurgently,ecausetheobjectificationmplicateslso thecontentwhichbyreasonof its resultant xternalitys no more than appearance. Theprinciples ereoperating ill, hope, become learer s we proceed; butit is importanto rememberhat what incapacitates contemplationis notthe" otherness" fthe" object but tsexternality,iz., tsspatio-temporal bjectivity:we have perfect knowledge of the " otheras we " enjoy it in "community.2Kant does, f ourse, armonizehem nrelation othebonumupremum,which s thegoodwill movedsolely by respectforwhat is right; buthe failsto showhow thebonumonsummatum,rhappiness roportionedto virtue,which s an essential onstituent f the summurnmonumi.e.virtue nd its congruent appiness), s in harmonywithmoralityn thecondition f the worldwithwhichmorality as to do,but only n a worldamplifiedr corrected y a moral heologyargelynventedor hepurpose.



7/31

308 H. F. HALLETT:duty that I respect) hat is " not-mine (i.e. a good thatdoesnotappealtome); or a " not-mine (i.e. an endout ofharmonywith my respectformorality) hat is " mine (i.e. a naturalgood). And this s theproblem fethicsrather hanan ethicalproblem: so also the metaphysicalduality of the empiricalgiven s theproblem fknowledge ather han an epistemologicalproblem. Further, he twoareessentially hesameproblem: forknowing s, afterall, a special formof practice,1nd must begoverned ythe sameorby analogousprinciples.Now thisproblem fthe metaphysical ualityofthe " givenin experience s susceptibleonly to metaphysical reatmentit must appear as an insolublemock-problem hen we attemptto deal with t on an empiricalevel and by empiricalmethods.How can what,as truth, s primarily mine be, in the sameact, as object," not-mine ? How can what,as right,s prim-arily "mine " be, in the same act, as repellent o me, " not-mine" ? How can what, as seductive, s primarily mine"be, in the same act, as wrong, not-mine ? If we take theseas empiricalproblemsconcerning bjectivecontent, o be re-solved by purelyempiricalmethods,we shall be led eithertomake the object a mere subjectivemodification, r, contrari-wise,to make the subjectthe passive mirror fan independentreal: in either ase excluding hepossibilityf a credible heoryoferror; we shalldefend ither puritanicalhatredofdelight,or a cyrenaicrepudiation f essential moral values: in eithercase excluding hepossibility f a credible heory f evil. Theduality of the givenmust be interpretedmetaphysically,ndsubjected o a metaphysical tiology.

I Humanknowing, think, olds n intermediatelace n the hierarchyof action: the actionconstitutinghe inseity f physical eality ies onone side of t; the creative ove "that wields he world on theother.Doubtless he attermaybestyled perfect nowledge, justas wemight,as a glossuponAlexander,escribe compresence ofobjects s a sortofdegradedknowledge.Withhuman ognition,nvolvings it does nitial uery ndsubsequentlearning,he cognitivection eems o bedegraded oconatus. Evenhere,however,heconatus is concernedwiththeattainment fknowledge,ndnot with knowingtself,whichat everystage is non-temporalction.Thus " seeing is an eternal ction, thoughwe thinkof it as havingtemporal uration. The " seeing itself s noprocess, nd takesnotime,though heremay be delay in the physical nd physiological rocessesinvolved.* With perfectknowledge ven these temporal factorsareabsent, nd creative ove involvesno conatus,or passage from otentiatoactus: it is actio pura and issues n actuspurus.* Sightqua sight s actio pura, thoughno such abstract enacting sextant: all sight s degraded yprocess, nd its objectthus nfected ithpotentia.



8/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 309I have justdrawn ttention o theneed for limitationo the

commonoppositionof theoryand practice: knowing s anaction; it is not a process. Even withhumancognitionwherelearning eemsto take precedence fcompleted nsight,we haveto deal,not witha process,butwitha-conatus:witha " move-ment , not from ontent o content, ut from otentia o actus.Thus just as morality s concerned, ot withobjectsof " con-templation, but with " enactings , so also cognition s notitself n object to be dealt withas contemplated ontent,butis an " enacting that is not itself temporal rocess, till essa causal process,even when it is conceivedas occurringn atime-series.For even in that relation t is a conatus nd nota process, nd thusbelongs o thesphere factionand notthatofobject. This is commonlyoncealedbythatmisleadingrickofstyle, o which have alreadymade reference, y which wesubstitute bstract ubstantives,uch as "knowledge , " judg-ment , "perception , etc., for the more precise gerunds"knowing", "judging", "perceiving", etc.; and whatevermaybe said ofthe stylistic dvantagesofthe substitution,ndits general noffensiveness,hichI do not deny (as my ownscript ndicates), here an be no doubtthat t constitutes mostfertile hannelof the fallacies risingfrom henatural" radicalobjectivism ofthe humanmind.1Therehas, undoubtedly,eennogreat carcity fphilosopherswilling o assentto the proposition hat knowing s an actionand not a content r processof contents: even forLocke,whodenied the derivationof "ideas " fromthe nature of mind,knowings not themerepassive reception fsuchcontents, utthe perception f their" agreementsnd repugnances ; and

I I donot wish o deny, rto be too ightheartedbout, hecomplexity,intricacy, nd even intellectual anger, f the problems aised by thedistinctions have emphasized. How, forexample, re we to deal in-tellectually, ot to say intelligently, ith entities hat are not rightlyconceived s objects,whenspeechand thought like appear alwaystoobjectifyheir ubjects How can we have and communicatenowledgethat snotcapableofbeing aken s knowledgefobjects How, ndeed,can we know,or be in any way aware of,or speak intelligentlybout,suchentitieswithoutnthe same actfalsifyinghem Onsome oftheseproblems have already ouched, nd I agree thatwe mustnotbelittlethemby restingontentwithfacile olutions r obscure xpressions:butneithermustwedeny heirncidencend insistence ntheground f em-piricist r positivist reconception. t is well to rememberhat it ispossible o have"knowledge f heunknowable becausewe can" enjoywhatwecannot contemplate, and also that his laim s tself paradox.We have hereproblems resented o us by the verynature of humanexperiencehatwe must aceand ifpossible esolve, utnever ttempt oconcealor cast aside as " nonsense .



9/31

310 H. F. HALLETT:it is generally ecognized hat the knowingmind does some-thingwhen t apprehendsts object,even though t does notqualify rcreate t. The nature fthisaction s more xplicitlyand adequatelyrecognized y Thomas Reid as " judgment 1(though this characterization verlooksthe very important" physical and " physiological actionor conatus fthetotal" self ), and this account s developed n greaterdetail in theCritick fPure Reason,and is the basis and differentiaf all"idealist " or " transcendental logic.2But what has not, think, eenproperly ealized s thatthisnon-temporalction s notunilateral ut bilateral, hatit is notmerely n actiondirectedby the " self towards he " other ,but that this s metand matchedby an inverse ctiontowardsthe " self issuing rom n active " other . This " re-actionis, ofcourse, cognitive , butnot in the same senseas that of" theself . Thoughknowledges bilateral t is notnecessarily,or indeed often,mutual. The "cognitive" action of theother may be named " appearing or " manifestationand it answers to the " contemplating or " apprehensionof the" self . The object s thusuniversally congress fnon-temporalactions of " self and " other , and not a passivegivencontent; or ifwe naivelytake its content s datum,we

1 " Instead of sayingthat . . . knowledge s got by putting ogetherand comparing impleapprehensions,e ought rather o say that thesimple pprehensions performedy resolving nd analysing naturaland originaludgment (Inquiry nto theHumanMind,ch. 2, sect. v)." A man whofeelspain udgesand believes hathe is really ained. Theman who perceives an object believes that it exists . . . nor is it in hispowerto avoid such judgment. And the likemay be said ofmemoryand of consciousness.Whetherudgment ught o be called a necessaryconcomitantf theseoperations, r rather partor ingredientfthem,I do not dispute. . . . If this determinationbe not judgment it is anoperationhathasgotnoname; for t isnotsimple pprehension,eitheris it reasoning (Essays on the ntellectual owersofMan, VI, i). Theonly intellectual owerfromwhichReid excepts udgment s " bareconception (loc.cit.),an exception hat s againand againrejectedbyhiseminentditor irWilliamHamiltonWorks fThomasReid, , pp.243,375,414,etc.): " In so far as there an be consciousnessheremustbejudgment. It willbe seenthatmydemand sfor n evengreaterxten-sionof theprinciple,o action n thesub-conscious,.e. to what appearsas thephysical nd physiologicalealms,where he term judgment"wouldbe unsuitable.2Which,however, regard s an all too fertile nion of logic andepistemology,nly n intentionessmischievoushanthe sterile ttemptto begetepistemologyut of logic. The rootvice in each case is thefailureto distinguish content from" action": the one treating"action" as "content" underthe name of " judgement"; the othersupposinghat"action" can be cozened utof"content .



10/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 311mustrememberhatepistemologicallyt is related o the" selfas an externallyontemplated,nd to the " other as an obscuremanifestation: he obscuritybeing attributable o the exter-nality hat arisesfrom he imperfect community of " self"and " other .The data of experience, hen, constituteno mere series ofcontents romwhich " self and " other must be constructedas complex objects, or amongwhichthey may be found,byinspectionor analysis,to lie secreted. " Self" and " otherare to be discovered,not as constructed r unmaskedobjects,but as active metaphysical ourcesof the objective contentsthatwe so easilytake to be the data ofexperience. These, asI have said, are always given as issuingfrom he congress f" self and " other , and thusas problemata.Nor, exceptaswe confine urselvesto that part of practicethat is theory,mustwe conceive heactionof he" self as limited o cognition,thoughthismay be the nearestapproachof the finite elftoactio pura. Equally, except as we conceive a perfection fknowledge hat is not distinguishable romcreativelove, weneed notsupposethatthe action of the " other involvesknow-ledge of the " self ; though warenessn someform, oweverelementarynd primitive,s unlikely ver to be wholly bsent.But to consider hiswouldbe to reverse herolesof" self and" other -a perfectly egitimateprocedure for the " other"is " self to itself,nd the " self is "' other to the" other ),but one which raises questionsmuchmorespeculative nd ob-scure." When I say that finite ognitions bilateral, hen, do

1But not unimportant, or it raises the interesting uestion, crucial fornatural theology,of the possibilityof the less perfectbeing's apprehendingthe existence and nature of the more perfectthat operates through it.I have said that the sculptor enjoys his tools and materials as he worksthrough and in them: 'but does the chisel " enjoy " the agency of thesculptor n the act ofsurrenderingo it ? Orarehisarmand hand " aware "in any primitive sub-conscious sense of their being used effectively orsome work whose nature and value transcends them ? If so, it may wellbe that we too can enjoy our action as a channel of Providence, thoughunaware of the values thus ensured. " If any man will do His willhe shallknow of the doctrine" (John vii, 17)-a principlewhich doubtless leavesopen the door to every conceivable species of fanaticism,but whichmayyet contain a simple truth that we know not how to apply. The handand arm and chisel of the sculptorknow nothingof the Apollo, and maythus most grosslymis-enjoytheir own obscurelyfelt " effectiveness asthey stirrender heirconatus to the master (fora good stonemasonmay bea bad sculptor). Effective for what ? So we may enjoy the generalsense that the " goodness of life " transcendsour worth; that our well-being is more completethan our own action in our empirical environmentcould ensure; that in the intellectual life there is often an inspiration



11/31

312 H. F. HALLETT:notmean that it is mutual,but that in the cognition f objectsthe finite ction or conatus f the " self" has congresswith thefinite ction or conatusof the " other ; and from his thereemanatesthe object that is externally ontemplatedby the" self , and that obscurely manifests the " other . Butfinite ognition rom ts very nature as a congressof conatusis mainly " learning , and never complete,though t is theripening f the conatus of the " self towardsactiopura forwhichobjectivitys transcendedn creativeove.In thespace that remains o me I proposebriefly o elaborateand illustrate hegeneralprincipleshus ndicated, y referenceto the distinguishable,ut essentially elated,realmsofSpace,Quality,and Time,withwhichperceptual nd scientificbjec-tivity are mainlyconcerned. The order of my treatment fthesetopicsmust not be takenas indicating n essentialorderof priorityn their emergence; they issue fromtheirmeta-physicalrootstogether,nd in thorough eciprocation. shallnot hesitate,therefore,o introduce ach in the exposition fthe others o faras itmayseemconvenient,nd I hopewithoutfallacy. (i) Space.It has oftenbeen suspected hat our original pprehension fspace is closelyconnectedwith ourmuscular nd kinaestheticexperience. Some such view was in fact formally dvancedby Berkeley,"nd there s muchto be said in itsfavour, t leastas an introductory henomenologicalnalogue of a morepro-found and discriminatingmetaphysical heoryof the natureand origin fspace. Its mainpoint,however, oes not clearlyappearif we confineurattention,s we mostreadilydo, to thespecialcase of visualspace. There can be littledoubtthat ournaturaltendency o place visual perceptionn the forefrontfepistemologicalnquiryand speculation s a pregnant ourceofconfusionnd unnecessary ifficulty.t maybe that visionis themosthighly evelopedof our senses, hemostpracticallymixed with our conscious powers; that the moral life nvolves the recog-nition of a demand that irrupts upon our natural motives. Just as thechiselor the hand of the sculptor by theirvery nature, conformation, ndtrainingare suited for surrenderto the agency of sculpting,so we mayfeel the impulse to surrenderour powers to some supra-personal agencyvaguelyconceivedas of transcendentvalue. Our " knowledge" of" God "may thus depend in the end upon our " enjoyed " suitabilityforsurrenderto agencythat transcendsus, and " towards" whichouragency s naturallydirected; and in that surrender we may "enjoy" a deity that we dowrongto attemptto contemplateas object.1Cf.Principles ofHuman Knowledge, ., sect. 116; De Motu, sect. 55.



12/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 313informative,nd even, in a sense, the most "intellectual";but thesequalities are precisely hosethatdisqualifyt fortheelucidation f the primary rinciples f objectivity. To traceand understandhe metaphysicaltiology fspacewemustturnfirst fall to the most primitive f our sense-experiences,iz.,thoseoftouch, oth" external and " internal , i.e. exploratorytouch and muscular nd articular ensation as we namethemwhen we interpret hem at a moresophisticated evel). Andwe must examine even these primitive xperiencesn relativeisolationfromwhatwe believeabout them on the basis of anexternalobservation f what we take to be their " organsand physiological nd physical" conditions, through he useof othersenses and other organs. That is, we must confineourselves o " di-aesthesis.1.

1Jmust add here a short xplanation f myuse of this term, hougha moredetailed ccountwillbe found n myarticles n " The Roots ofDuality n HumanKnowledge (Proc. Arist. oc., 1937-38, p. 168-188),and " On Things n Themselves (Philosophy, iv, pp. 155-179). Inthesearticles drew distinction,irst, etween sense-organe.g.,theeye) as an object of external ontemplation,orwhich t is theoccupantofnomore hana part of heobserver's isual pace, and as a functioning(i.e. seeing) ntity. Whenwe " look through the eye the onlywayinwhichwe can be said to " see" it is as thepercipient's hole ield fvisualspace withinwhichvisualobjectsare distributed. n the former fthetwoarticles eferredo I calledthisa " di-optrical perceptionf heeyein distinctionrom heordinary xternal pticalperception f t; and Iextended he visual analogyto otherforms f sense-perception,alling(e.g.) the touchinginger's erception f itself s perceptuallyctive, a" di-optrical touch-perception. aterthis struckme as rather nsatis-factory,nd n the atter f he wo rticles coined he erm di-aesthesisforthisform f awareness. I also saw the danger ttendant pon theextended se ofthevisual nalogy, o which have referredbove. Thereis, of ourse, sort fparadox n the ssertionhat he ye hat ees xternalobjectsas visuallydecorated ontours y opticalcontemplation,lso inthe very same act " sees" itselfby " di-optrical or " di-aestheticcontemplations the visual space withinwhich he optical objectsaredistributed. But, I think, he paradox s inherentn the situation farelativelysolatedvisualaction. If that action could be regarded s anindependenthing-in-itselfe shouldbe compelled o limit ts awarenessof tself o an " enjoyment of ts agency. As will be seen n mymainargument, owever, heobjectificationhich esultsnvision s a form f" contemplation fromthe co-operation of the " other" withthe " self",infectshe visual actiontself, hich hus bjectifiestself s visual pace.If the actionwereunaffectedy an " other thatvisualspacewouldbeempty,nd thuswould easeto be objective pace. The" visual action'senjoyment f tselfwould henfind o self-objectification,ndcontempla-tionwould disappear. This, in some sense, orrespondso the positionofthe nfinitens nse, and llustrateshedifficultyhat findnSpinoza'sview if t is his view )thatSubstance s such s " extended, or s Exten-sion, nd indicatesmyreason or egardingheAttributesnhistheorys21



13/31

314 H. F. HALLETT:Let us take first he case of a percipient rovided with a

tactual sense-organ apable of movement nd of the muscularand articularpercipiencenormally ssociated therewith. Thisis, of course,an externalor objective description f the situ-ation, nd we mustnotthink f thepercipient imself s gather-ing the principlesgoverning is percipience roman externalobservation f this kind. He mustbe confined o what he cancomeby n thecourse f he nner unctioningfthe" muscular ," articular , and " sense-organic apparatus that I haveexternally amed and described. He mustdepend solely uponthe direct nternal xperience f " di-aesthesis, forthisis theprimitive atumwithwhichall percipience egins, nd out ofwhich ll objectivitymust be capableofbeingelaborated.Now all thatour maimed nd blinkered ercipientan obtainby direct di-aesthetic erceptionwhenhis arm appears to anexternal bserver o move in sucha way as to bringhis fingerinto contactwith the table,is a seriesof " sensa" ofone kindfollowedby a terminal" sensum of another kind. In themoresophisticatednd ambiguous ccountof common ife,wesay he has a series of muscular nd articular sensa" locatedin the limb, followedby a tactual "sensum" located wherethe tip of the finger ouchesthe table; but all this is super-venient" rationalization, if the termmay be allowed n thisconnexion,-our experimental ercipient as only the series of" sensa and the terminal sensum : or so forthe momentI willsay. If it is objectedthat I am proposing n impossiblehypothesis, shall agree: no such percipient ould be actual.I go furthernd say thatthe very dea of the occurrence f aseriesofsensathat are no morethansensa, s evenworse s anhypothesis. In presentingmy methodologicalmonster, here-fore, crave ndulgence; formy ntentions to exhibit tsmon-belonging ore roperlyoNaturanaturata,nd not, as susually upposed,to Natura naturans. Spinoza's own authorityeems to be ambiguous:" Intellect, venthough nfinite, ertains o Natura naturata nd not toNaturanaturans (Ep. ix); yet " I meanthe same (as Substance)byAttributexceptthat it is called Attribute ithrespect o the ntellectwhich ttributesuchand such nature o Substance (ibid.). Cf." ByAttribute understand hat whichthe intellect erceives f Substanceas ifconstitutingts essence (Eth. , Def. iv); and Eth.i, xxix, Sch.:" By Natura naturans we are to understand . . . those AttributesofSubstance . . . But by Natura naturata I understand . . . all the modesofGod'sAttributesn so far s they reconsidereds thingswhich re nGod." Norcan thematter e regardeds incidental nd unimportant:for the "intellectualism"of Spinoza's metaphysics angs upon it: isExtension n Attribute fGod as Naturanaturans r only n objectifica-tion? Is Godaction robject For Spinoza, pparently, e is both.



14/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 315strosity y ndicatingheetiologyf xternalityr patio-temporalobjectivity.Ourpercipient,hen, s notmerelymaimedand isolated: heis by consequence extremelynaive, knowing nothing aboutarm,muscle, oint, finger, able,or even ofmoving. For therecan be no sensum fmotion: the series of sensamay show arelative uavityor continuityn its transitions, ut it remainsa seriesof sense-contents, hereasmoving s such is not a setof transitionsfcontents, ut an action, nd can onlybe repre-sentedobjectively hrough he, perhaps unnoted, ntroductionofactionor conatus: and this s no sense feffort.Thus, fthe description have so fargivenwere a completeaccountof the "di-aesthetic experience f our percipient,tis evident hat,sincemoving annot be sensed,neither an thedistancemoved by the sense-organ e sensed as content i.e.as space passed over). But, as I have been contending, hepercipients nevergivensuch a mere eriesofvarying ontents,but always contentsproceeding rom n active " other , andapprehendedn a perceptualconatus f the " self . All sensafrom he very start involve,if only as problem,derivationfromnon-objective self and " other , and whatI now con-tend is that the varied series of sensa apprehendedby ourpercipients nterpreteds,andtransmutednto, " kinaestheticserieswith " tactual limit, hroughheenjoyed gencyofthe" self , diminished y finiteness o conatusby congresswithits " other , whether hat " other be muscle, r sense-organ,or table (as we come to describe hem n completer nd moresophisticated erception). The sensa are related as stages ina spatio-temporalmovement hrough he strivingor conatusthat governstheir emergence. Thus the distance traced bythe finger n reachingthe table is the objectification f theconatus fthe " self governinghe occurrence fthe seriesofsensaup to the imitwhere heconatus s opposedbythe counter-conatus f the " other . Each sensum ontemplateds locatedaccording o the conatusgoverningts occurrence; and this istrueof the locationof the muscles nd joints equallywiththatofthefinger-tipnd table, though he latteropposesa counter-conatus o the striving f the " self , while the muscles andjointsdo so as " tools" rather han as " buffers. Yet iftheywereperfect ools, then, like the so-called" ether of space,theywould act as pure media, in whichthere s no location.'

1 It wouldperhapsbe truer o say thatthe perfectingf the " tool"transformst from oolto " medium . A " tool , in otherwords, s ahybrid etween " buffer and a " medium.



15/31

316 H. F. HALLETT:Normallywe take " kinaesthesis as leading to "touch ",and the distance of the object touched s the objectificationfthe total conatusgoverning he occurrence f the whole series;but at anytime we can re-focus ur attention nd consider hedistanceof an intermediatemuscular r articular ensum n thesameway. We then ontemplatehe muscle r ointas an objectat a distance, s we did the table; and this s facilitated, itherby limitinghe conatus t that sensumas whenwe say thatwerepeat hemovement),rby opposing n " other to its striving(as whenwe " feel the limb with he otherhand).'

The " distance ofa sensums thus the objectificationf theconatus overningts acquirementn congresswithan " other ,and therelativityfspatialmeasures risesfrom he ncongruityofphenomenalrobjective paceand itsgenerating etaphysicalor active conatus. In anotherpoint of view the relativity fthese measuresproves that space is not an ultimate but aderivative,and that the derivation s not phenomenal butmetaphysical.But it does notprovethat space is subjective.The accountofobjectiveperceptionhat I have given eavesthe percipient'swnbodyin thehappybut ambiguous ositionofbeingat once, nitself conatus i-aestheticallydenticalwiththe space within he qualitiedcontours fwhichthe strivingsunimpeded, et,externally,lso a separate object amongothersoccupying common pace. The pointofdifficultyn this ac-count is the correlation f the " di-aesthetic and external

In such a combinedmovementftwo imbsweobjectify more om-plex conatus of the " self , which s probably ypicalof that which iesat the root of the tri-dimensionalityf empirical pace. The detailedmetaphysicaltiologyf uch space iesbeyond othmypresent urposeand achievement." The other hand" is, of course,a sophisticateddescriptiont this tageof theargumentjustas is " muscle nd joint ).One very mportant ifficultyn expoundinghe genesisof space, andobjectivityenerally,s thedualr6leof" thebody as at once"object "for xternal erception,nd spatializedonatusfor di-aesthesis. This sa legacyof our ntermediatetatus nthehierarchyf being: a perfectagentwouldhaveno objective body , for t wouldhave no " other ,and thusno objectiveworld ither o limit ts agency r to constitutetsobjective field . Its objectiveworld, f any, would be a self-creation,and thus ndistinguishablento " body and " environment. At theother xtreme, beingon the lower hreshold fagencywould at once,by ts tenuity, e-substantializets objective niverse owards ualitativenonentity,nd contract ts " body towardsquantitativenonentity.Ourcommon istinctionetween thebody and ts" environingorldbelongs ssentiallyo ourmiddle tageofexistence,s neither erfect orevanescent:forus the " other is both" limit and " field , and theobject-world,y consequence,natomized s reciprocatingnd mutuallylimiting body" and "world ".2 Separate,butnotunrelated. The " body is resonanto nature.



16/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 317"bodies ": the " di-aesthetic bodyseems to be an obscurelyoccupied space of "muscular, articular, nd organic sensa,plusthepermeablepaceI onthe other ideofwhichiestheworldof qualitiedobjects; while the bodyas externally erceived sone among others moving in the permeablespace that liesbetween hem. Evidentlywhat s at issue here s theextensionof thecontours f thebodybeyond he skin to the objectsthatare perceived. As I have suggested n the last footnote, hisdifficultyoes not arise f we confine urselves,withour monster-percipient, o externaltouch-perception:for here the bodydoes extendup to the object,whichwemust touch f we are tohave directtouch-perceptionf it. But notably with sight,and perhaps lso withhearing, urperceptions normallycrossan interval f permeable pace lyingoutsideofthe eye or ear,and in no veryobvious senseappended o them. This is a dis-tinction fgreat mportance,nd one which ies at the rootofmy objectionto the selectionof vision as the typicalformofperceptionfor such an inquiryas the presentone. For itimplies furtheromplexitywhich, fattackedtoo soon or leftunnoted,must cloud our insight nto the operantprinciples fthe metaphysical eneration fspace.To meet this difficultyet us nextturnour attention o theperception f space as we find t in vision,and, less distinctly,in hearing. A good approachto the special conditions overn-ingthesemorehighly eveloped orms f percipiences bymeansof some suggestions f Descartes n his accountof vision n thefirstdiscourse of La Dioptrique. He there compares visualperceptionf distancewith he tactual perceptionfa blindmanexploringhis vicinitywith a stick.2 For the blind man the

1This" permeablepace " is not contemplated y externalouch,ut scertainlyo by sight, nd perhaps lso byhearing. Its tactual ontempla-tion s mediated hrough inaethesis.2 " I1 vous est bien sans doute arrivequelque fois, en marchant enuit sans flambeau, ar les lieuxun peu difficiles,u'il falloit ousayderd'un baston pour vous conduire, t vous aves pour lorspeu emarquer,que vous sentiespar l'entremise e ce baston es diversobiectsqui serencontroyentutourde vous . . . I1est vray ue cete ortede sentiment

est un peu confuse t obscure, n ceus qui n'en ont pas un long usage;mais consideresa en ceus qui, estantnesaveugles, 'en sont servis outeleurvie, et vous 'y trouveresi parfaite t si exacte qu'on pourroituasidire qu'ils voyentdes mains,ou que leur bastonest l'organede quelquesixiesme ensqui leur a este donne u defautde la veue. Et pourtirerune comparaison e cecy, e desire ue vous pensiesque la lumiere 'estautre chose,dans les corpsqu'on nomme umineux,u'un certainmouve-ment, u uneactionfort romte t fort ive, qui passe versnos yeuxparl'entremisee l'air et des autres orps ransparens,n mesme a9on ue lemouvement u la resistence es corps,que rencontreet aveugle,passe



17/31

318 H. F. EALLETT:tactualsensa are felt,not in his hand,but at the otherend ofhis bastonwhich he uses as a sort of extended imb. By thismeans the rangeof his tactual experiences greatly mplified;for instead of having to grope with his hands beyondtheirconvenient each n order o touch moredistant nd awkwardlyplaced objects, he can get his terminal tactual sensa aftershortenederiesof muscular nd articular ensa. Thus distanceis measuredby a newscale: there s, for di-aesthesis,"n in-tervalofpermeable pace betweenhis hand and theplace ofthetactualsensum, iz.,whatappears n external erceptions the" length fthe stick that sbeingused as hismediating tool .Now Descartessuggests hat we have herea rough nalogueofwhatoccurs n sight, houghnowthebaton s nota " materialthing, .e. does notappear for externalperceptions a qualitiedspatio-temporalontour: it is "light" (in one of the severalsensesof that term),or its " medium . For " di-aesthesis,however, part from he felt " weight" and other " qualitiesof the stick (as we call them n a moresophisticatedxternalperception), he "light " or " ether operates verymuch asdoes the blind man's baton which, s we have seen, is trans-formed nto permeable space or distance. Just as the blindman " feels the curb of the pavement that lies beyond hisconvenient irectreach, o I see a starfarbeyond he limits fmy optical systemor any possiblemovement f it, because a"medium" 1 extends frommy eye to the star,as the batonextendsfrom he blindman's hand to the curb. In thisway,as I have elsewhere said, "my eye touchesthe GreatNebula,and rests upon Orion . Along the baton there operates aconatus and counter-conatus; long the rigid "ether" thereoperates he " action and " reaction 3 that we call " light .vers sa main,par l'entremise e son baston. Ce qui vous empescherad'abord de trouver strange ue ceste umiere uisseestendre es rayonsenun nstant, epuis e soleil usques nous: car vousscavesque l'action,dontonmeut 'undes boutsd'unbaston,doitainsypasserenuninstantiusques l'autre t quelle y devroit asser nmesme orte, ncore u'il yauroit lusde distance u'iln'yena, depuis a terreusques ux cieux."1Bothbatonand " medium are, ofcourse, bjects ndthus, s such,make no qualitied ppearance n "di-aesthesis .2 Cf." OnThingsnThemselves" Philosophy,iv, oc.cit.),where hissubject s also discussed n a differentonnexion.3Equal andopposite, s thepressurend counter-pressurefthefingerandthetable. Newtonian action nd reaction have, believe, ome-times eenexpounded nterms f" force , andthis gain n terms fthetendency o produce changeof " motion ; but presumablyhe con-ception s concretenly n so far s we ourselvesxert nd " enjoy suchitaction inproducing ropposinghanges fmotion; and thecommontendencys, I think, o excludethis " enjoyed action, nd so reduce



18/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 319In visual " di-aesthesis this places the sensum t a distanceacrossthepermeable pace occupiedby the " medium , so thatthis,like the blindman's stick, s an extensionof the body,thoughnot occupiedby muscular, rticular, r organic ensa.A similar ccount can be given for hearing: foran externaldescription f auditionthe sensumwhich s felt n the ear istransferredo the far end of the columnof vibrant air thatextends fromthe ear to the bell; thoughforauditory" di-aesthesis the sound s foundwhere t is, viz., n thebell: thusmaking ar and " medium together total extended ar.

Now the principle hat is at work n thesemorecomplicatedcircumstancess still, think, hat of space as the objectificationof conatus: whatforexternalperception re more or less rigid,elastic, baston , " ether , " air", in thereal are enfranchizingco-operant actions , and thus in " di-vesthesis objectifiedas the permeable pace that forms he sphereof freeconatus.The "medium" or mediating"tool " magnifies he conatuswithoutchanging ts character: or,moreprecisely, his is itsfunction ua medium, houghclearly n the cases ofthe batonand the air there s the modificationf the conatus ongruentwith the operation f the " medium" as " tool" co-operatingwith the "self ", and as " buffer" opposing it. Thus the" medium" in so far as it modifies he conatusof the " selfis an opposing nd co-operating other , and appearsas object;in so faras it amplifieshe conatus fthe " self it belongs othe awto a formalquation. I do notdeny hatthis s legitimate or hepurposesof phenomenologicalcience. As to the exampleof " lightas such" action ndreaction, wecommonlypeak of the ight s passingfrom heobjectto the eye,andnot from he eye to the object; butDes-cartesholdsthatthe " action is inbothdirections,nd suggests, eatlybut somewhatnconvincingly,hat hismay account or octurnal ision:" Mesmevous pourres ysement ecider a question,qui est entre ux,touchante lieu d'oiu ient 'action ui cause e sentimente la veue: car,commenostre veuglepeut sentir es corpsqui sontautourde luy,nonseulement ar l'actionde ces corps, ors qu'ils se meuvent ontre onbaston,maisaussyparcellede sa main, orsqu'ils efont ue luy resister;faut l avouer ue lesobiects e la veuepeuvent stre entis, on eulementpar e moyen e l'action ui estant neux,tendvers esyeux,maisaussypar emoyende cellequi, estantdans psyeux, endverseux. Toutefoispource que ceteactionn'estautrechoseque la lumierel fautremarquerqu'il n'y a que ceux qui peuventvoirpendant es tenebres e la nuit,commeeschats, ans esyeuxdesquels lle se trouve;et que pour 'ordin-airedes hommes,ls ne voyent ue par l'actionqui vient des obiects:car l'experience ous monstreue ces obiectsdoivent stre umineux uillumines ourestre veus, et non point nos yeuxpour les voir (LaDioptriquw,iscours .). But the rejection f his suggestedxplanationofnocturnal isionneednotcarrywithttherejection fthe reciprocationof" action and " re-action in thecase ofvision.



19/31

320 H. F. HALLETT:it, and in " di-aesthesis appears as permeabledistance. Inthe case of tactual perception he " medium is the conatusthat is objectifieds physicalbodywith ts physical xtensions(e.g., the blindman's stick); with audition it is the conatusthat s objectifieds the " ear" and its circumambientir; andwithvision t is the conatus hat is objectifieds the eye withits focussingpparatusand humours nd the " rays of light(howevernterpreted)hat lie between he colouredobject andthe eye. The " etherof space" would thenappear to be anultimate r ideal " medium , so perfects to mediatenothing:theobjectificationfthe ultimate nity f " self and " other ;the spatial representationf thenon-spatialityf nfinitection;empty pace-a " Nothing hatnothings All actual "media"are thus in varyingmeasureboth " tools " and " buffers, inexternalperception ontemplateds lyingbeyondthe " sense-organ oftheperceiver, ut in close communication ith t; inthe perceiver's wn " di-aesthesis contemplateds permeablespace or distance, n the measureof theirperfections media;.but as qualitied objects interposed,n the measure of theiroppositionnd co-operation.'I have alreadysaid that it is no partofmypresent ntentionto enter nto the more difficulteduction f the details of thestructurefempirical pace as three-dimensional. he space ofphysicalobjectsappearsto be roughly uclidean and of threedimensions, hereas hespace I have considered s theobjectifi-cationof conatus s relatively ndifferentiatedxcept,perhaps,in relation o " distance . The schematization f our primitivespace to the morepreciseform s evidently orrelated n someway withthe conformation,tructure,nd distributionf oursense-organs.We must not trace t to these, of course, forthatwould involveus in a vicious circle; and it may not beeasy, even if possible,to trace it to its metaphysical ource.The distinction f threedimensionsn visual space is evidentlycorrelatedwith the distinction f the distanceof the sensumfromts extent;and the latter gainwith he complex haracteroftheeye,and especially heretina,which s notan elementaryvisual unit but a collection, ssociation,or system,of visual1The same is true n principle fthe objectivebody itself, nd evenof the sense-organ;whenthe latter functionsfficientlyt becomesa" transparency fordi-sesthesis,utwhen t functions adly t is inter-posed s a qualitied paqueness verthefield;thusdeafness onfuses heauditoryworld, ndthe" jaundiced ye draws veilof colourover hevisualworld. Themaindifferenceetweenhe body and itsenvironment,apartfrom ercipience,s one of ntimacyf control;this s evidentlyfunction,otofobjectivity,ut ofconatus.



20/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 321elements.' The same is trueof theorgans ftouch and hearing,thoughmore oosely-with the correlativeoss ofprecision orwhich theyare notable. This would seem to connectthe dis-tinction fdimensions,wo of extent nd one of distance, n someway with the co-operative omplexity f the conatus of the" self , or of ts " other , orboth, n addition o theoppositionthat generates istance; and this would assimilate he schema-tization fprimitivepaceto a sort f ormal uality ifferentiatedwithinthe general "roominess" of the latter: a suggestion,very eriouslyntended,utnot hereto be pursued, hat conveni-ently ntroduces s to the secondmain factorof objectivity,viz., Quality.

(ii) Quality.Objectivity s primarily onstitutedby spatio-temporality,so that its derivation s concernedmainlywiththe originationof space and timeratherthan withthat of quality.2 Never-theless, every empiricalobject possesses qualitative contentwithin ts spatio-temporalontours, o that it is necessary oincludesomediscussion f the principles overninghe presenceof objectivequality. My present reatments thus concernedrather with " qualitiedness " than with " quality ", for I cannotnow ventureseriouslyupon problems o esoteric, nd largelybeyondmy competence, s the deductionof the specific on-tentsofvisual,auditory, lfactory,nd other mpirical ualitiesfromthe conatusof the " self in congresswith that of its" other , even in abstractionfromtheir spatio-temporal is-tribution.3Apprehension f "self" and "other" is not, wehave seen,posterior o spatio-temporalistinction, ut is at its1The directionn which should ook for clarificationn thesubjectwouldbe a comparison f the structurefthe retinawith hatofthe totaltouch-organ,iz., the body as a whole: thoughwiththistheassociationofelementss freer wing o ourcapacity o movethe imbsrelatively oeach other-a capacitydenied o the" rods and cones . But thisagainmight e compared o the condition fthe blindman's baton,which s arigidorgan apable of beingmovedas a wholebut not appreciably ent

orstretched: ts efficiency,n fact, epending pon hisrigidity. Further,we mustnot forget hat we have two retisaecapableofeffectiveelativemotion, nd also thatthefocussingpparatus fthe eyegives t an advan-tageover he organ ftouch.2 Other han the precise formal uality to which have just madebrief eference, hich s introduced s the three-dimensional,uclidean(or other) tructure f empirical pace.3The matter annot, f course,be wholly gnored ven here. I havealso lightly iscussed he subject n Aeternitas,p. 175-179.



21/31

322 H. F. HALLETT:root. Quality is derivedfrom"'community,' and as appre-hended vinces t. Thus two agents n complete nd harmonious" community" etaintheirdistinctness s agents because theyare agentsand not objective contents ubject to the Principleof the Identity f ndiscernibles. This complete communityof distinct gents is, in fact, the relationof " love ", and theapprehensionfqualityas such is always of thischaracter venwhen he" community of" self and" other is limited y theopposition nd strife hat makes objective appearanceas thespatio-temporal istributionf quality. Knowledgequa know-ledge s actiopura and terminatesn the " self orthe" otheras things-in-themselves; nowledge qua human is mainlyconatusand terminates n qualitied spatio-temporal bjects:we learn.In dealing with themetaphysical eneration f space I havelaid emphasison one side only of the relationof " self and" other , viz., theiropposition nd mutual imitation. Thoughit is nottheirmutualopposition impliciterhat generates pace,but rather he conatus f the " self , it is theresistance o thatconatusby the " other that generatesthe contours of theobject withoutwhichspace wouldbe empty, nd thus nothingobjective, .e. not space. A " self withno " other to limitit wouldthusnot appear in " di-aesthesis as permeable pace,for di-aesthesis in thestrict ense of thedirect ontemplatingof an objectiveworldwould notarise. When,however,we passto the generationof quality, we must emphasizethe other"moment '' in the relation of " self " and " other ". Forthis relation,wherethere s objective appearanceof " otherto " self , is notmerely neofoppositionndmutual imitation,but also of "resonance" and mutualco-operation. It is fromthis that "qualitiedness" is metaphysicallyderived. Butagain, ust as space is generatednot by mereopposition ut bythe resistanceof the " other to the conatusof the " selfunder he conditionftheir ormal" community, so quality isgenerated, otfromheirmere "community (forn love's " en-joyment ofthe "other" the "community is complete,andyet withoutobjective qualitative appearance),but fromtheco-operation f the " other with the conatusof the " self"under he onditionftheirormal pposition.In orderto bringhome this distinction f the " moments

1Forthe ignificancefthisterm ee th-e iscussions f the symposiumon "The Moral Good as a Relation betweenPersons" in Hume andPresent ay Problems, rist. oc. Supp. Vol. xviii, sp. pp. 106-122, 44-178.



22/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 323ofthe relation f " self and " other , let us now suppose thatour maimed and blinkeredpercipient's actual organ is notpressed gainstthe table by a muscular ystem,ncluding setof muscularand articular ense-organs the description s, ofcourse, externaland sophisticated),but by some extraneousmeans: there s now presented tactual sensumwithout he" kinaesthetic sensa apprehendedas derivedfrom conatus(i.e. whatwe call " musculareffort): my contentions thatthis abstractiondoes not eliminate the awarenessthat thetactualsensumsderivedfrom hecongressf ctive " self andco-operant other , but only the more clearlydistinguishes"self " and " other as conatusother than that expressed s"muscular effort. The co-operant onatusthat issue in thetactual sensumbelongto that sensum tself n our experienceof it: for as given even in abstraction rom ll "muscular"effortt is a " mine that s alsoa " not-mine , somethinghatenactwithmy" other , ourcontour f" community, of mutualagencythat unites us withoutmerging s as agents; the ob-jectification f our inchoate" love ", and the faintanalogue ofprocreation.Let merepeat hat do not assert hatwehave,either ereorelsewhere, senseofactionor a senseof conationor a sense ofeffort: this is, indeed,the verything that I am concerned odeny. If therewere a sense of actionwe shouldnot need tohave recourse o metaphysical eneration. A sense of actionwouldobjectifywhat in itself s no object, and thus could onlyfalsifyt. Our apprehensionf action is not as objectivecon-tent, but as self-identitynd other-identity: n " objectlessrealization . The qualitythat s datum s notpassivecontent,but content hat is both" mine and " not-mine, an emana-tion ofthe co-operationfthe actionor conatus f " self and" other . I am not attemptingt the moment o deducethesensumfrom he co-operant ctions,though completeunder-standingwould,I think,requirethat also, but only to makeclearer he metaphysical elation o " self and to " other thatbelongs n actual experience o each sensum. So far as thisargument oesthesensumtselfmust emain,n Leibnizian hrase," occult "*.1

1 In spiteofthis elf-imposedimitation will dd the followingemarkson the etiology f quality: (i) It is noteworthyhat what s qualitied snot space n generalbut spatial extent,o that the genesisof quality ssomehow oundup with he differentiationf pace nto hree imensions:a topic detailed nalysisof which have also excludedfrommy maintreatment. But I suggested very eriously that take spatial extentto be correlated ith the complex haracter f the sense-organisms a



23/31

324 H. F. HALLETT:Let this, then,stand as my truncated ccountof the meta-

physical nterpretationfqualitiedness s it makes appearancewhole, nd ofeach sense-organ; nd to answermetaphysicallyo " theco-operativeomplexityf the conatus f the self', or of ts other',orboth" (p. 321). (ii) In Aeternitasloc. cit.) expoundedhegenerationfquality n termsof " creative ynthesis or " transformationithoutsuccession, to which hadbeen edby Spinoza'sdoctrine f he " affects(and especially cquiescentiand beattitudo);nd I indicatedthat thisdeduction asfrom hephenomenologicaltandpoint,ndthat nmyviewa metaphysical eduction f quality as a contraction, eformation,rdegradation f actionwould be moreappropriate:that is by nature.The main objections o phenomenologicalxposition hat starts fromprimitive ouch-quality, aken as identicalwith the " resistance" oropposition " of the " other", and interpreted s " impenetrability or"firmness in tsspatio-temporalocation, re a) that ttends ooverlookthepartplayedbytheco-operationf " self and " other at the contourmappedout bytheir pposition;and (b) that nregardinghe" higherqualitiesas spatio-temporalyntheses f variouslydistributed resist-ances , it canonly voidthe nterpretationfthesynthesiss aggregationorsystematizationy callingt a creativeynthesis:thus neffecteggingthe mainquestion, iz., hegenesis fthe" occult quality-contenthich,howevert maybe based nthesynthesisf" resistances, isnot denticalwith t, but is, ifnotsomethingmoreforwenever pprehend, .g.,boththesound ndtheaerialvibrations hat" produce it),at leastsomethingother. But, it maybe asked,does not an equal objection pply to theattempt o launcha metaphysical xposition For howdoes the con-traction, eformation,rdegradationfthe " enjoyed actionorconatusofthe" self or" other orboth ssue ncontemplatedbjective ontentunder their opposition? How does obstruction ield objectification;and whynparticularreactionsncongress bjectifieds contour ccupiedby such ndsuch ensa Evidently hequalifications a functionfthespatio-temporalization,nd particularlyfthe dimensions fextent:butwhatfunction I reply hat t mustbe takenas a functionot onlyofextent,ut also, and evenmorevitally, f time, nd we cannothope toformulaten adequate accountof thefunction ithout eferenceo thegenesis f thiscardinal actor. If we are ever to succeed n construingthecomplete olteace as at least t seems)from enjoyment to " con-templation, from n inse toan ab extra,t mustbe byreflectionpon hetotality fqualitied patio-temporalitys a concrete pigenesis: and forthat we are not yet prepared. (iii) We must have recourse, herefore,forthe present t least,to thephenomenologicalxposition. When wedo sowefind, think,hat withprimitiveouch-percipienceearebetterplaced than with the more characteristicuality-perceptionshere hequestion s of morevivid nterest, ut the answermoreremote. " Im-penetrabilityorspatio-temporal occupation that firstmakes patio-temporalontoursmpiricals fairly eadilydentifieds a spatio-temporalversion f active " opposition or " resistance. We then pass to thecomplicationfthis rising rom heextent ndspecial onformationfthecontourfmutualresistance,nd its synthesisnder he nisusformativusof heunity f he" self as it operateswithin he phere f he nteractionof" self and "other". Thusthe primitiveactual qualitygives placeto the " higher"qualities fcomplex ouch, ound, olour, tc., n relation



24/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 325in our sense-experience,elonging o spatial contoursbecausederiving rom he same congress f " self and " other , butexpressingheir o-operation, here hespatial contours xpresstheir ppositionndmutualresistance.'

(iii) Time.It is a phenomenologicalommonplacehat in the objectiveworldwe have to do, not withspace and time,but withspace-time, ndthough havegivenextended eason for herejectionof any spatializedversionoftime,we may neverthelessxpectto find metaphysical round or heirphenomenologicalssoci-ation. I shall contend that it arises fromtheir commonorigination romthe congressof the conatus of finite selfand itscomplementary other . We have seentheoriginationof a parallelunion of space and qualitiedness,ssuingfrom hissituation, nd givingriseto qualitiedspatial contours; but itto theappropriatelyresonant " synthesizingense-organ (as we say,using erms hat bearsophisticatedeferenceo external bjective ercep-tion),or " synthesizinggent (ifweemphasize hemetaphysicalourcesofobjectivity). As to thegenesistself, do not hinkhatwecandomuchmore han describe t as " creative ynthesis, and illustratet from urrecognitionhat,e.g.,seven dots " appear either s a heptagon, r asa cube,oras a pyramid;a very moothurface ressed t an acuteangle" feels fluid; the lowestpedal workof an organ s " felt rather svibratory ressure han as " note ; and so on. (iv) The phenomeno-logical xposition hus nvolves hegenerationfsensaunder hesyntheticactionof the " self as it is subjected o theopposition f the " otherwithwhicht s in some community. The" self thus ontemplatesnextended bject at a distancequalitiedby thatsensum r thosesensa,and thusmanifestingcongruent,ut nverse, yntheticonatus ractionin the " other . I say "inverse because our objectificationf the" other is based upon ts modeofaffectinghe"self , and notupon tsintrinsic ction (as analogically "red " object reflects, ut does notabsorb, he " red -is notinwardly ualified yit). Thus to theotherimperfectionsf " contemplation we must add its inveterateendencyto judge the "other" by its effectn the " self , and notby its innercausality,nd thusto regardt as nomore han means o theconatus fthe" self ; whereas n our" enjoyment ofthe" other there smutu.ality,wetake tas an end nitself, eenjoy tsco-operativeausality. (Cf."The MoralGoodas a RelationbetweenPersons : Humeand PresentDay Problems, rist. oc. Supp.Vol. xviii,pp. 144-178.)1 do notmean,of course, hat the contours xpressopposition otbased on formalco-operation;or the qualitiedness, o-operation otbased on formalopposition: opposition nd co-operation eciprocatethoughwithdifferingmphasis. Quality, s distinct rom ualitiedness,dependsevenmorenotablyon the co-operationf the " elements ofthecomplex self witheach other nd withthe " whole self n itsco-operation ith he " other .2 Cf.Aeternitas,hs.1 and2.



25/31

326 H. F. HALLETT:mustbe confessed hat these contoursfall shortof fullobjec-tivityby reason of their timelessness. The objects of experi-ence endure, and this further ssential factor of empiricalobjectivity rgently emands deduction. The insubstantialityof qualitied patialcontours rises from ur failure o farto dojusticeto the substantiality f action as a thing-in-itselfromwhich imeemanates.Action qua action (actiopura) terminatesn itselfas actuspurus:1 it is thusthat knowledgeua knowledges eternal ndcreative (as epistemologicaldealistshave realized,though Ithink that, limitingknowledge o " contemplation and itsderivatives, hey have wrongly pplied the principle),whileknowledge ua human " contemplation is generated n timeand terminates n objects. Human contemplations conatusripeningowards ctiopura, .e. it is learning;and it originates,as we have seen,in the congress f the finite self with ts" other . Thus its object, in the measureof its objectivity,transcends self and is temporal. This, ndeed, s theessenceof epistemologicalealism, hough t ignores he groundof thetranscendence f the object, taking it as self-posited.Theobjectsof humancontemplativepprehensionhus lie betweenthe eternalactus purus of the infinite eing-in-self,nd thetimeless otentia ura ofnon-being:theyare striving,nduringbeings,congruentwitha striving,nduring self or learningsubject. The characteristic bjects of such finiteexperience,therefore,re no meredata to be passively ccepted and thustimeless), orare they purecreata pontaneouslyositedby the" self (and thereforeternal). If, again,we describe hemas" constructions fromdata (i.e. as data in matterbut creatain form),we must not forget hat the " data " are from hestartdata-ablata, .e. problemata he solutionof which s im-perative; and that the "construction" is not extraneouslycreatedand superaddedto them,but is imperativelyducedas answer o the problems hat are set. So space is generatedby reaction; qualitiednessby co-action; and similarly, s weshallsee,time snota given utisgenerated yrelativenaction;but all sub specieconatus: the actiones uffering formalde-formationhrough heirmutualopposition, ssentially ualifiedas it is by their co-operativec;resonance . Thus time ismetaphysicallyerived rom ternity,nd itsgenesis s no merephenomenologicalrocessbut a metaphysical pigenesis hat,

1Cf." Per causamsui intelligod cujus essentia nvolvit xistentiam."(B.D.S.,Eth. , Def. ); " (Substantiae)ssentianvolvit ecessarioxisten-tiam (ibid., , vii).



26/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 327taken in abstraction rom he total efflux f objectivity,mustappear as an amazing xenogenesis. Again, fromthe side ofhumanlearning, ime is elaboratedas answerto the problemset bytheexperiencefa finitegent hat,qua agent, s eternal;but, qua finite,t once opposedby its " other and temporallyperseverant ithin he " field provided yit: at oncenegatedby itsdetermination,nd determinedy its negation.'The general rinciple overninghederivationfobjectivity ehave seen to be the dualityof the finite ctus ssuing rom hedualityofthe actiones hat are itsorigin: it is an actus-potentiaand notan actuspurus. The dualitys alreadyfaintly iscover-able in theform fproblemn theprimitive ata ofexperience:for very atum s at oncegiventothe " self qua subjectbythe"other , and,contrariwise,ivenbythe"self " to the"other"qua object. It is at oncea " mine that s " not-mine, and a"thine " that is " not-thine. Thus objectivityor qualitiedspatio-temporalitys the " Lebensraum providedforthe " ap-peasement ofthefinite ctus-potentia,ndourexternal trivinglife the ordered,but ever alien, development f the " selftowardsa " union of hearts" withthe " other . The actionofthe " self is " telescoped" to conatus n its relation o theobject, its creativity o striving,ts knowledge o learning, tseternity o time. Thusarisesfor hefinitegentthedistinctionof actus and potentia,nd the actuspurusofan ensin se is con-tracted,deformed, nd degradedto temporalobjectivityoreventum.The " end" of conatus s sought s " not-yet , butas accomplished s already "past": it is not eternal but" occurrent, i.e. a temporal nd transienthappening. Andthis is the datumuniversally f our subject-object xperience,viz., the problem f the natureof a given that can be both" not-yet and " past ", or to speakwithout nduesophistica-tion,of a giventhat is both" do-able and " done", theactusofwhich s differentiateds potentiandfactum.Further, he " temporality of this actus-potentiaif I mayso nameits problem-lookingforward o its solution)does notpertain o it in isolationfrom ts generating ctiones, ut onlyin its derivationherefrom. t is the eternity f ts originatingsourcethatgenerates he temporalityfthe eventum r object,and theduration f ts conatus: theseactionesntheirmperfect,but appropriate,ongress re degraded o conatus y opposition

1For the essence fempirical inituden thisregions notdivisionndpartialitasimrpliciter,ut this ualifiedyresponsiveness: hefinitegentis a microcosm,nd not a section f actiopura,and is thus n essentialrelationwithtsactive omplement. Cf.Aeternitas,p. 88-93, tpassim.)



27/31

328 H. F. HALLETT:and its concomitant resonance and mutualenfranchizement.By their mpoverishmenthe eternity f the actiones f " selfand " other generates the temporalityof the emanatedeventumrobject; and it is whenwe nvert hisorder fprioritythat we erroneouslyegard hegenerating self and " otheralso as temporal: taking hetemporalityftheobjectas datum,and temporally elating he " self to it, while dentifyingheobject withthe " other .1 We thus think of the " self asoccupying " specious presentunitingthe " not-yet withthe " just-past . This is the characteristic allacy of the" radical objectivist seekingto make the " self a temporalobject nstead of an eternalgenerating gent. The " speciouspresent , howeverspecious it may be (and undoubtedly s)in so far as its actuality s misconstrued s a duration-datumcombining ast and future lementswithoutproblem, s realas the eternal ction-origin enerating ime,and is indubitableevenas empirical roblematum. he " present that s nothingin time, an ideal non-durationaldivision of " past " and" future , and a problemforsubject-object xperience, omesinto tsownwhen t is recognized s the " eternal now' " thatgivesbirth o time,and is onlydescribable s a " now" at allin relation o thegenerationf the" past ", and as the" origin"of action, and thus also of the conatusafter a "not-yet .Temporal "action" is confinedto the present because itdefinest.It follows romwhat I have said that all contemplatedimeis past, and with it all objects and events. But past time

1 In theact ofgeneratingothspace and timethe" self posits tselfas the origin formeasurement;ut n tselft is "origin in a farmorevitalsensethan thismathematicaldiom onnotes: as fons et origo t isneither xternalnor temporal, ut internal nd eternal. The " now"and the " here are thusessentially riginal,nd onlyderive emporaland spatial statusor interpretation,espectively,y reflexive eferencefrom heir wnoffspring. husalso,thephrase, o muchbandied boutby divines," an eternalnow ", is least applicablewhere t is mostcommonlypplied,viz.,to thedivine xistence. For this s eternal ansphrase, nd incapableofbeing eferredo a time-series,ecause t has nogiven" other . But the phrase s applicablewith ome significanceothe " present"of a finite gentwhich n itself s the origin f time seternal,yet, n relation o the past timethat it has generated,nd animagined uture imeconceived ubspeciepraeteriti,omesto be falselyregarded,ub pecie emporis,s occupyinghe" moment of timedividingthese: a " moment that must n truth ither e without uration, rmustpossessa " duration that does not endurebecause ts past andfuture emain ogether ut unappeased. WVhats called the " speciouspresent is thusthe " eternalnow", but so far frombeinga speciousunificationf" past" and " future, it is an eternalmetaphysicalrigin,falsely onceived s phenomenologicallyelated o its ownemanation.



28/31


29/31

330 H. F. HALLETT:For the finite gentactio and actus are divorced, nd the scope.ofobjectivityongruentlyimited. It issuesfrom hierarchicalfamousdefinitionsf Spinoza that have givencommentatorsroundsfor uch varied nterpretations;nd also my ownattitude o it: " Persubstantiamntelligod quod inse est . . Idem per attributumntelligo,nisi uod ttributumicatur espectuntellectus(Ep. ix); " Per ttributumintelligo d quod intellectusde substantiapercipittanquam jusdemessentiam onstituens (Eth. I, Def. iv). The distinctionf Substanceand Attributes that perceived y the intellect etween ctiopura andactuspuru8s:but for pinoza twas not, s in myview t is, basedmerelyon the analogyofthe empirical istinction ffinite ctio and its actus-potentia, avingno applicationn thatform t the level of the infiniteens n se. Forhim ctiopura as ens n se actualizes tself s ensprose oractus-object,.e. as Attribute.Thus an Attributes no meredistortedor imperfectppearanceperceived nlyby finite ntellect: it maintainsits status s actus uruseven for ntellectusei. And this s the ultimatebasisof Spinoza'smagnificentssertion f the infinityf theAttributes:their bjectivityrespectuntellectusei) requires his nfinite ariety ooff-sethe incommensurabilityf " object and " agent . True, thisdemandwould apse fNaturanaturansactio ura)were aken s actualiz-ing tselfnon-objectively: ut in the absenceof a crediblemetaphysicaletiology f objectivity,uch a doctrine ouldprovide o basis for philo-sophyof objectivenature. Desideratinghis,Spinozawas impelled oassignobjectivity o Substance tselfby identifyingt with ts infiniteAttributes, aking he distinctionntellectualnd the identityreative,whilealso leaving hemutual istinctionsfthe infinite ttributess acharge ponthe transcendencyf the ntellectusei,whichs thus aid tohave as little orrespondenceithhuman ntellects theDog-starwith hebarkingnimal Eth. I, xvii,Sch.). The costofthe reconciliationftheincommensurabilityf" agency and " objectivity is thusthe majesticsuperstructurefthe nfinite ttributesbyus unknownnd nconceivableexceptfor Extension nd Thought: the latterof which s in factnot" objective at all, even f t is confinedo " contemplation); a trans-cendent ntellectusei capableofholdingn a single nique apprehensioninfinitensulatedvariations f actus (thatdepend upon their nsulationfor hemaintenancef theirdistinctionrom ctio); and the rather n-convincingeriesof phenomenologicalransitionsromAttributeso im-mediateModes, rommmediateo mediateModes, ndthe ast sheer ropthence o theremote initemodes: all conceived s " objectsexhibitingagency according o their tatus. Evidently, herefore,here s veryurgentneedfor omesuch simplificationnd " short-circuitingof theapparatusmetaphysicuss is madepossible y myderivationfobjectivityfrom inite gency, nd its consequent xclusion rom heinfinite.NowI trace ll thiscomplicationn the endto Spinoza'suncritical cceptanceof the subject-object iew ofknowledge. It is truethat in connexionwithhisdistinctionfkinds fknowledge e seems ften o approach heperceptionhat maginationdScientia ntuitiva redistinguisheds wellby typeas by relative ruth-claim.The close associationof ScientiaIntuitivawithAmor ntellectualiss evidence fthis; but in general asthe doctrine f Idea ideae,howevernterpreted,llustrates) e is an in-tellectualisteldfastbythe " contemplation-viewofknowledge, hich,as I havesaid,survives o far s we can understandt even for ntellectus



30/31

KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 331rangeofbeing hattranscends utanimates t; a rangeforwhichknowledge s not external ontemplation, ut enjoyedagency;and existence s not impervious bjectivity, ut action, and atbest creation. The individuality f agents, even when theyare finite,must not be defined s imperviousness,s if evenperfect njoyment f the " other by the " self necessarily-Dei. Theemphasiswhich have laidon " enjoyment as knowledge arexcellenceermitsmeto retain heassociation fknowledgend love, andindeed o identifyctiopurawithenjoyed reative ove actualizingtself,not as objectiveAttributes,nfiniteModes,and finitepsycho-physicalthings: " omnia quae ab aliquo infinito ntellectu oncipi possunt(Eth. , App.),but as the nfiniteierarchyf gents, ex summo imirumad infimum erfectionisradum (ibid.). For thus actiopura and actuspurus are genuinelydentical. If now it is said that the derivation fobjectivity rom gencys an attempt o " squarethe circle , since heyare evidentlyncommensurable, reply: that would be true of anyattempted henomenologicalerivation f " object from " gent," or" agent from object . Yet this s the only non-metaphysicallter-nativeto a sortof" Cartesian ualism for hosewhosimply ind gencyand objectivitympiricallyssociated; but it is not trueofthemetacphysical tiology, hichsinfactmadeurgent ythisvery roblem. If,again, t is said that t all comes n theendto verymuch he amethingwhether e invoke creation to explainwithSpinozatheoccurrenceffinite sycho-physicalbjectsrmodes, r,withhiscritic, heactuality ffinite gents hat bytheir ongressmake objective ppearance, reply:the mainpurpose fmydiscussion as been to indicatehow finitegents,throughheir gency,may appear s objects; but sofar s I knowno onehas yet ndicated owobjects, hroughheir bjectivity,an exertgency-the conception f "energy" and of its "conservation" sufficientlyillustrate hispoint. Further, gencys plainly rior o objectivity, orens in se is prior o ensab extra or evenenspro se); and it mustthusalso be prior n any " order f creation. But, finally,s to " creationitself: it maywellbe a questionwhether erightlyallthemetaphysicalderivationfobjects utofnothingbjectiveytheterm creation"* butnot that the actualizationffinitegentsbyactio ura requires o "crea-tion in the question-beggingenseofproductionut ofnothingt all,suchas is madenecessary yfailure o subordinatebjectivityo finiteagency. The actualizationof agents is directly nterpretables theessential ifferentiationfactiopura congruent ith ts absolute nfinity,intothe infinite ierarchyf finite gentsof everygradeofperfection.Now,as I have explained,hisdifferentiationf actiopura infinitas nota division fagency nto ections:thedistinctionfa finite self fromits complementaryother" is not the rending f an objective totum,but an essential oncentrationf inseity.And " selves mustthus beinfinitenhierarchicalrder s actiopura is infiniten power. It is thusthe inseity f actiopura infinitahatdeterminesheinfinite ierarchicaldifferentiationf finite selves . And thisabsolute nternal ifferentia-tion ofthehierarchyfagentswithinhe nfinite gent, quallywith herelative xternal bjectificationfthe agencyof finite selves and inrelation o them, s traceab

knowledge, reality, and objectivity (ii

Documents