korsmeyer hume

Hume and the Foundations of TasteAuthor(s): Carolyn W. KorsmeyerSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Winter, 1976), pp. 201-215Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430377 .

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CAROLYN W. KORSMEYER

Hume and the Foundations of Taste

CRITICAL OPINION of Hume's aesthetic theories has been rather fundamentally divided between those who find his views innova- tive, critically sensitive, and logically sound, and those who hold that his theory of beauty is hopelessly inconsistent with his tendency to parrot traditional neoclassical standards of taste. Certainly on the face of it there is rather strong evidence for tne claim that Hume was of two minds where aesthetics and aesthetic standards are concerned, for lhe at least seems to be a(lvancing two different kinds of views, which do not sit easily togethier.

The term "beauty," Hume argued, does not designate any property of objects but simply signifies the pleasure that human beings sometimes feel under certain circumstances. Relatedly, he equates taste with sensitivity, or an ability to feel aesthetic pleasure in response to certain works of art. If beauty is id(lentified with a p)ar- ticular kind of pleasure, if aesthetic and artistic value is measured by the feelings of the individual perceiver, then one would expect that there would be no grounds for asserting that one aesthetic judgment or expression of pleasure is preferable to any other. People differ, and so do their tastes. However, it becomes clear when reading Hume's writings on criticism,1 that tastes, on his account, are not so subjective that no standards can be discerned. In fact, it is quite evident that Hume considered some artistic and literary tastes preferable

CAROLYN W. KORSMEYER is assistant professor of philosophy at the State University of New York (t Buffalo.

by far to others. It is his failure to continue speaking as a relativist that largely has brought about puzzlement regarding his aesthetics and has given rise to the charge that he harborecd inconsistent tend- encies which led him both to embrace a theory which by all rights ought to be a subjective relativism, and also to advocate standards of taste quite in keeping with eighteenth-century tradition. Katherine Gilbert is among those who suggest that the logical consistency of Hume's thought was overwhelmed by the residual force of the neoclassical standards which still held sway in England, for she includes Hume in her castigation of empiricist aesthetics, wvhich, in her words, " . . . had a refractory tendency to rejoin, after a short independ- ent journey, the well-worn highroad of seventeenth-century reason and neoclassic taste." 2

Examples abound in which Hume certainly seems to have done an about-face on his theoretical analysis of beauty; for if he is adamant in his claim that aesthetic judgments are expressions of sentiment, manifestations only of a subjective pleasure, he is equally adamant in his essays on criticism that certain works of art are objectively superior to others and the opinions of some critics more worthy of attention than others.

I shall attempt to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in Hume's aesthetics by examining his theory of beauty and his views on art in the context of his general theory of human nature.3 Hume's major work on taste is one of his later essays, and



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if we bear in mind the chronology of his works, we shall obtain some picture of the progress of his thought from the Treatise (1739) to "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757). It is my belief that if we view the Treatise as containing an analysis which logically precedes the later work, then we will be able to resolve some of the anoma- lies present in the latter and thereby find some firmer foundation for what seems to be Hume's uncritical reaffirmation of established standards of taste.

The idea that beauty is subjective and is identifiable with some factor of the human constitution rather than a quality of an object was not original with Hume. In particular, philosophers of the "inner sense" school had already developed this view as part of their theories of morals and taste. Kemp-Smith has argued convinc- ingly that Hume's approach to philosophy was "through the gateway to morals" 4 and that his immediate stimulus in this enter- prise was the inner sense theory of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747). Hutcheson was no less an aesthetician than a moralist, and a comparison of the two theories is fruitful. Although Hume adopted many of Hutcheson's ideas as his own, the changes he made mark important steps in the development of aesthetic theory.

Hutcheson, himself inspired by Locke's theory of ideas, is the leading philosopher of the inner sense school, so called because it maintained that ideas of beauty, virtue, and the like are the objects of a sense rather than of the reason.5 The aesthetic sense is not like one of the ordinary five senses, but is an internal sense which de- pends for its stimulus on the ideas perceived by the five external senses. The specific object of the internal sense- whether aesthetic or moral-is a pleasure which arises due to the constitution of the human being to be pleased by exposure to particular external objects.6 Thus "beauty" names no quality in objects at all; it simply refers to the pleasure a percipient takes in certain situations.

Hutcheson was writing partly in an effort to refute the sort of theory of beauty that Hobbes defended, so he was careful to dis-

tinguish the pleasures perceived by the inner sense from the pleasures which come about through the fulfillment of appetite or desire.7 Aesthetic or moral pleasures are disinterested-without personal interest; they do not indicate the satisfaction of a previous selfish desire.

Already we may note several important similarities between this theory and Hume's. Hume does not speak of an "inner sense," but rather more generally of an "internal sentiment or feeling," and he retained the idea that beauty is non-rational, that it is sensed, and that it is a pleasure. "Pleasure and pain," he says in the Treatise, " . . . are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence." 8 And, like Hutcheson, Hume stressed that aesthetic pleasure is disinterested in character.9 Dis- interestedness is one aspect of empiricist aesthetics which has carried over into many contemporary theories, as we shall note later. "Disinterestedness" for both Hutcheson and Hume signifies that aesthetic (or moral) pleasure is not self-directed, does not arise from self-love or the fulfillment of one's own appetites. This will become particularly important when we discuss Hume's theory of sympathy and its relation to taste.

One of Hume's most noticeable depart- ures from Hutcheson's theory is his apparent refusal to commit himself to any surmise about the "real" qualities in those objects which are perceived as beautiful, qualities which are correlated with aesthetic pleasure and which can be considered the causes of the perception of beauty. Hutcheson took care to argue that his location of beauty in feeling or pleasure does not entail the relativity of aesthetic judgments.10 Due to the fact that human beings, their inner senses included, are constituted in a similar fashion, the objects which are perceived as beautiful are accorded a good deal of consensus. True, there are factors which can interfere with the functioning of the inner sense and cause diversity of taste, such as custom, education, prejudice, and the association of ideas,1" but even with these hindrances,

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taste is not just a matter of individlual idiosyncrasy. In every instance of positive aesthetic perception, we can correlate the pleasure perceived with some quality of the object under consideration. Although it is still the case, says Hutcheson, that in itself the object dloes not possess any quality whiclh is beauty, human beings are constituted such that they regularly enjoy the perception of objects which possess the qualities of uniformity and variety.

The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is Uni- formity amidst Variety; . . . what we call Beau- tiful in Objects . . . seemns to be in a compound ratio of Uniformity and Variety so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity."2

Thus although we cannot ascribe the quality beautiful to any object in itself, human nature is by and large uniform, and we observe that wlhenever one feels aes- tlletic pleasure, the occasion for this feeling is the presence of uniformity and variety in the object perceived. The inner sense, the organ of taste, is sensitive to these qualities. Therefore, although beauty is subjective, aesthetic judgments are not individually relative, for they can be correlated with objective properties which are common to all aesthetic objects.

Hume refrains from grounding thle pleasure of beauty in some such specific, correlated quality of objects, and his refusal to extend his theory to such a claim is deliberate. This is clear from his comment in "Of the Standard of Taste," whiclh can be seen as a salvo directed particularly against Hutcheson's compound ratio:

The sentiments of men often differ with regard to beauty and deformity of all kinds, even while their general discourse is the same. There are certain terms in every language which import blame, and others praise; and all men who use the same tongue must agree in their application of them. Every voice is united in applauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, spirit in writing; and in blaming fustian, affectation, coldness, and a false brilliancy. But when critics come to par- ticulars, this seeming unanimity vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expression."3

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It is safe to surmise that Hume did not adopt anything like Hutcheson's compound ratio, partly on the grounds that it merely disguises genuine diversity of taste. As he says, we may be fooled into thinking that we have reached an agreement on aesthetic standards when we compare our similar general principles, but if we apply them to particular objects, we are likely to discover that our actual preferences are dlecidedly different.

On the face of it, with no substitute for thle compound ratio, Hume would seem to be leaving himself open to a relativistic conclusion, wlhere every aesthetic pleasure is equal to every other, where no aesthetic object is to be considered preferable to any other, since each of us has our own individlual inclinations, and where there is no foundation for a universal standardl of taste. Many of his own comments directly support this interpretation. He says, for example, of the elements of a particular poem, "If they are found to please, they cannot be faults, let the pleasure which they produce be ever so unexpected and unaccountable." 14

In fact, of course, Hume is not a relativist, althouglh his reasons on tills score may seem incomplete if they are gleanedl only from those of his writings which are specifically devoted to criticism or aesthetics. The most accessible and oft-quoted answer to the question of relativity comes from the essay "Of the Standard of Taste," where Hume mediates between what lie sees as two incompatible but equally common-sensical views on judgments of taste: on the one hand, he presents tlhe view tliat they are indisputably relative, as any examination into the tastes of different cultures, or of individuals witlhin the same culture reveals; and at the same time, he acknowledges that some judgments of taste are beyond a doubt better than others.

To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an inquiry, as to prctend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the disposition of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter; and the proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dis- pute concerning tastes. . .



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But though this axiom, by passing into a proverb, seems to have attained the sanction of common sense; there is certainly a species of common sense which opposes it, at least serves to modify and restrain it. Whoever would as- sert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be thought to defend no less an ex- travagance, than if he had maintained a mole- hill to be as high as Teneriffe. . . . The principle of the natural equality of tastes is then totally forgot, and while we admit it on some occasions, where the objects seem near an equality, it appears an extravagant paradox, or rather a palpable absurdity, where objects so d(lispro- portionate are compared together.15

It is the latter position which Hume seeks to vindicate, and he sets out to discover the grounds for universal standards in aesthetic judgments, standards which he defines broadly as "similarities of sentiment."

It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.58

Although it is a late work, in many ways this essay is strongly reminiscent of Hutche- son's thinking, for here Hume argues that unless it is defective or impeded by the interference of custom, prejudice, or education, the internal sentiment of every individual will be excited by the same or by similar objects.

Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or im- perfection in the organ. A man in a fever would not insist on his palate as able to decide concerning flavors; nor would one affectedl with the jaundice pretend to give a verdict with regard to colors. In each creature there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and sentiment.17

Again, as with Hutcheson, our similar constitution determines that we are all capable of enjoying the same art. How- ever, unlike Hutcheson, Hume resolves the conflicting intuitions between the relativity and the universal validity of judgments of taste by concentrating not on the qualities

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of works of art but on the nature of the sentiment which finds them of value. Last- ing aesthetic judgments, about which those of good taste agree generation after generation, are only possible given a proper climate for the exercise of critical judgment.

A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting . . . we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace ancl discern it."

In this essay Hume says very little about the "form" which makes for artistic quality; he says more about the "sentiment"- the faculty which is the mark of a good critic. Good critics, according to him, are both born and made: a natural "delicacy" of taste is the foundation for critical judgment.

Where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphori- cal sense.19

In addition, a good critic must judge from much experience and practice, for initial exposure to an unfamiliar work is always confusing and one's first sentiment vague. The critic must exhibit a facility for forming comparisons on the basis of this practice, and must form judgments with a mind which is free from prejudice. This quality is perhaps most important if one is to attempt a standard of taste valid for different times and different cultures, for good critics must possess the ability to transcend the predilections of their own times in order that their tastes not be dictated by merely conventional preferences. Not only great experience, but a flexible point of view is a condition for the lasting validity of the exercise of a delicate taste. The quality of "good sense" allows the critic to check and regulate the interference of prejudice or other factors that would inhibit objective judgment.



Hume and theFoundations of Taste

Development of these five qualities- delicacy of sentiment, practice, comparative judgment, freedom from prejudice, and good sense-produces someone who readily perceives the qualities in objects for which the sentiments of all of us have a natural affinity. Presumably, if we all developed these ideal qualities to their fullest extent, rarely if ever would we dis- agree on matters of taste. But because critical sentiment is easily befuddled by limited experience, prejudice, or dullness of the senses, in fact there is a great deal of disparity among the tastes of even those of our own culture. Either through experience or through the fortunes of birth, some of us are more sensitive to the suble- ties of art than others, and if we rely solely on our own inclinations, we are likely to err in our artistic preferences. Therefore, we should emulate the taste of persons of recognized good judgment, since by following tlheir example we shall develop our own tastes accordingly and learn to par- take of the reputedly finer aesthetic pleasures.

Wherever you can ascertain a dlelicacy of taste, it is sure to meet with approbation; and the best way of ascertaining it is, to appeal to those models and principles which have been established by the uniform conse;it andl experience of nations and ages.20

While probably no person is entirely free from some limitation on the critical faculty, still good, if not perfect, critics do exist; their superior abilities stand out in society just as great art emerges from history.21 The "ideal" critic whose sentiment is of the highest sensitivity, whose experience and practice is vast, and whose sense allows perfect freedom from prejudice, can perhaps best be viewed as an abstraction, a compilation and distillation of the good judgments of competent critics of all ages. Time is a reliable filter for passing fads and poor judgments, and the verdict of history cancels out individual foibles and produces a universally valid consensus concerning great art. Therefore, according to Hume, although rules of art cannot be codified, standards of taste do emerge as

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one takes a long look at human society and history and sees how that art which is best suited to please the human frame attains an unquestioned superiority over other, ephemeral creations. The ability to perceive that quality which makes it so suited is the mark of the delicate taste.

Universality of critical assessment is made possible by the uniform workings of the internal sentiments, as we have seen, but also by the existence of qualities in objects to which that sentiment is sensitive.

Though it be certain that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external, it must be allowedl, that there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.22

However, this mysterious quality, along with the "principles of art" to which he frequently refers, remains unanalyzed and unexplained in this essay.

Partly because of this silence on the nature of half of the source for the universality of tastes which Hume claims to establish, by itself "Of the Standard of Taste" is unsatisfactory as a refutation of aesthetic scepticism. The judgment of history seems a weak counter to the very real diversity of tastes which he so con- vincingly describes; real differences of preference he settles in favor of traditional opinion, admonishing those whose opinions differ to put aside the evidence of their own pleasure, ignore the dictates of their own sentiments, and strive to pattern themselves after recognized critics. A reader of unorthodox tastes (or perhaps one anticipating a more sceptical statement from a philosopher like Hume) is likely to find the conclusion of this essay an unwar- ranted capitulation to tradition and a de- nial of the nature of the pleasures and sentiments Hume had posited in his earlier work. Furthermore, Hume's reluctance to discuss the qualities of art which good critics come to perceive may be taken by an unsympathetic reader to be a veiled circularity, where "good art" is "that art which is appreciated by the delicate taste," and "delicate taste" is a "disposition to appre-



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ciate good art." Some hints regarding the qualities of art which good critics perceive and which should have universal appeal would clear up any suspicion of circularity by grounding a factor of the standard of taste in the art object itself. We are left wondering in what way we are so constituted as to have the same aesthetic preferences, and to what characteristics of objects is the delicate taste sensitive?

One may also be dissatisfied with Hume's failure to come to terms with what he clearly recognizes to be truly irrecon- cilable differences of taste:

But notwithstanding all our endeavors to fix a standard of taste, and reconcile the discordant apprehensions of men, there still remain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humors of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country. ... But where there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation . . . in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the con- trary sentiments.23

But is not such irreconcilability of taste exactly the problem which would inspire one to advocate aesthetic relativism? Where, now, is the model of sensitive, ex- perienced critics? The removal of Hutche- son's principle of uniformity and variety, while perhaps progressive, seems to have left a gap in Hume's search for a standard of taste.

In fact, "Of the Standard of Taste" is but the end product of a process of reasoning which begins with the Treatise. By looking at some of Hume's earlier philosophical works, which deal more compre- hensively with the relationship of beauty and of taste to his general theory of human nature, we can obtain a clearer picture of what it is about human beings that renders our tastes similar, and what qualities in art the delicate taste can sense. Even those parts of Hume's early theory which he modified in later writings provide important background for understanding how

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the establishment of a standard of taste is possible. Hume's theories of aesthetics are all too often regarded as interesting ap- pendages to his more solid philosophy. In fact, if one reads his "solid" works looking for clues as to the sources of a standard of taste, one sees that the answer "we are all constituted similarly, so we all feel alike" is shorthand for Hume's complex analysis of the whole human being. A look at this analysis indicates that there are actually several related sources for a standard of taste.

In the Treatise, in the opening comments concerning beauty and deformity, Hume asserts that,

. . . beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the primary constitution of our nature, or by custom or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul.24

Since "caprice" is more likely to result in idiosyncrasy than consensus, and "custom" to yield merely conventional agreement, on the fact of it, the "primary constitution of our nature" seems to promise the best grounds for intersubjective uniformity of taste.

It must be admitted that sometimes Hume speaks of this primary constitution as if a further analysis of aesthetic perception is impossible, and as if we must simply accept the unanalyzed fact that human beings are formed in such a way that they enjoy perceiving certain objects. Hume states at one point that certain sources of pleasure are simply matters of "unaccountable" fact:

Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for; Others may be resolved into principles, which are more general.25

At these times, it seems as if the character of aesthetic objects must remain as the "je ne sais quoi" so often invoked in the eighteenth century. Though one must be somewhat circumspect at any attempt to analyze Hume's objects of beauty, there is a good deal of evidence that he at least speculated on a further examination, both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry Concerning




the Principles of Morals. The natural beauty of certain qualities, as we shall see, can be connected with Hume's theory of utility and his designation of the useful as an aesthetic category. Hume discusses at least three kinds of beauty which can be traced directly or indirectly to utility, and whether or not there remains a final, unanalyzable kind, tliese three provide ample foundation for a standard of taste.

In the Enquiry, Hume is concerned with usefulness and utility primarily as moral categories, but they have just as much im- portance for his analysis of beauty. Use- fulness is both a moral and an aesthetic quality, whether it belongs to an object which we actually employ or not. The mere appearance of something which is functional, especially when its function benefits mankind, is pleasing. As early as the Treatise Hume noted that "The order and convenience of a palace are no less essential to its beauty, than its mere figure and appearance." 26 And in the Enquiry he remarks that the use or purpose of an object in fact aesthetically determines the shape it should take:

What praise, even of au inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose! And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity, if we can show the neces- sity of that particular construction for the use intended!27

Hume is rareful to stipulate that inclu- sion of usefulness as an aesthetic category does not affect the disinterested character of beauty. True, when the useful object belongs to us we may have a personal or selfish interest in it as well, but its functional beauty we perceive disinterestedly. Proof of this is the fact that we admire usefulness in objects which have nothing to do with us at all; the mere appearance of usefulness is aesthetically pleasing.

Usefulness is agreeable, and engages the approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, useful? For what? For some body's interest, surely. Whose interest, then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the

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character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however, remote, are not totally indifferent to us.28

In short, usefulness is for Hume an aesthetic quality in its own right, which can be perceived as beautiful regardless of the actual use or benefit one may derive from the object under view.

From usefulness we may step to utility as a pleasing quality; utility is a broader, more general category which includles not only qualities which are immediately practical, but also those which appear in a general way to benefit society or mankind. It is rather evident that such qualities are morally pleasing, but it is also the case that when an object appears to have a utilitarian quality, that it is aesthetically pleasing as well. This would be the case, for example, of a piece of architecture which looks (as well as actually is) spacious, accommodating, warm, and so on. The moral principle which Hume recommends as "obvious and natural" would apply equally well to aesthetics:

Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself nowise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that every thing, which con- tributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good will.29

It is clear from this passage that our aesthetic appreciation of utility is made possible by another of Hume's fundamental principles of human nature: sympathy. Hume calls sympathy the great cause of uniformity of character. "Sym- pathy" not only carries the ordinary con- notation of feeling for others, but also indicates the concern that we have for the way that others view us.30 As far as aesthetic enjoyment is concerned, sympathy can work two ways. It can bring us pleasure when we contemplate objects which bring happiness or benefit to others:

In every judgment of beauty, the feelings of the person affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure.31



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Sympathy also ensures that our attention will be engaged when we contemplate the passions of imaginary situations as por- trayed in art. Art has the power to move us all, partly because we all can identify with common human emotions, even when they affect fictional characters.

We enter, to be sure, more readily into sentiments, which resemble those we feel everyday: But no passion, when well-represented, can be entirely indifferent to us; because there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at least the seeds and first principles. It is the business of poetry to bring every affection near to us by lively imagery and representation, and make it look like truth and reality: A certain proof, that, wherever that reality is found, our minds are disposed to be strongly affected by it.2

Utility gives us pleasure for the same reasons: We have sympathy with others, as well as a natural concern for the well-being of society, as it affects us and others. Therefore when an object has the general appearance of, or is evocative of, a general good for mankind, it is aesthetically pleasing as well.

This conclusion from a general view of human nature, we may confirm by particular instances, wherein the force of sympathy is very remark- able. Most kinds of beauty are deriv'd from this origin; and tho' our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, 'tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures.33

Sympathy can in fact be viewed as one key to understanding how pleasures can be disinterested, for it is the principle of human nature which dictates that our en- joyments and affections and concerns extend beyond self-love.34

We have thus far analyzed what might be considered two "levels" or sorts of beauty: the pleasure that actually useful objects can bring, and the more general effect of utility which produces pleasure when appearing as a quality of objects. There remains to ask the question, can all beauty be similarly analyzed? We have concentrated our analysis on examples of practical art, such as architecture, but will this analysis extend to all beauty and all art? Will what Hume calls "beauty of form," in particular, turn out to be im-

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mediately agreeable to our nature because of some utilitarian property? Although the answers to these questions cannot be incon- testibly determined from Hume's writings, I would suggest that the response is very likely "yes."

When Hume speaks of "beauty of form," he does not describe it in what we would ordinarily consider a "formal" way. Al- though presumably it is something akin to Hutcheson's "original" beauty, it is not analyzed by Hutcheson's method, which focuses on the simplicity or complexity of design. Hume's next comment most certainly hints at an explanation of "beauty of form":

There is no rule in painting more reasonable than that of balancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanc'd, is disagreeable; and that because it conveys the ideas of its fall, of harm, and of pain: Which ideas are painful, when by sympathy they acquire any degree of force and vivacity.35

In another passage of the Treatise, Hume also links utilitarian beauty with the formal design of an object:

The order and convenience of a palace are 11o less essential to its beauty, than its mere figure and appearance. In like manner the rules of architecture require, that the top of a pillar shou'd be more slender than its base, and that because such a figure conveys to us the idea of serenity, which is pleasant; whereas the con- trary form gives us the apprehension of danger, which is uneasy.36

And in the following passage from the Enquiry, Hume comments explicitly on the connection between form and function:

A ship appears more beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide and swelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precise geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whose doors and windows were exact squares, wvould hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a human creature, for whose service the fabric was intended.37

If any aesthetic quality is to remain unanalyzable, the "je ne sais quoi" of beauty, it is formal beauty of line, color, and de-




sign. Yet unlike otlhers of his age, Hume did not speculate about the purely formal combinations of lines, shapes, and colors that might give rise to aesthetic pleasure.38 On the other hand, he clearly did explore thle idea that our enjoyment of proportion and composition is grounded in our perception of formal qualities which are associated with pleasurable or painful situations traceable to a broad concept of utility. Qualities evocative of unstable, dangerous, threatening, and therefore painful situations would be perceived as ugly or deformed; wlhile qualities evocative of serenity, cheer, calm, and so on are associated with situations which are pleasurable and hence are perceived as beautiful. For related reasons, certain formal qualities are appropriate to certain subject-matter in works of art. An artist chooses heavy, (lark colors to portray a storm, yet may paint a family scene with serene tones and balanced lines.39

Such an analysis of aesthetic qualities, if not completely articulated by Hume, surely is congruent with his principle of association. A formal design which resembles qualities which are themselves pleasurable will give rise to a pleasure of its own. (Im- pressions, it will be remembered, which associate by resemblance, can merge in association and take on new character of their own.)40 Beauty, then, is not the same thing as utility or utilitarian pleasures, but its source, its stimulus, is the perception of these qualities, much in the way in which the compound ratio gives rise to aesthetic pleasure in Hutcheson's theory.

That Hume's "immediately and natu- rally agreeable" qualities have their source in utility meets with an obvious and important objection: Utility cannot be the basis of beauty, one could argue, because if it were there would be no distinction between the clumsily functional artifact and the equally functional artifact of graceful design. Since Hume is evidently aware that the combination of good design and utility is the optimum arrangement in aesthetic objects which also have a practical function, it is a distortion to collapse the two qualities into one.

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Certainly, Hume retains a distinction between actual functional value and pleasing shape and color, two kinds of beauty which meet in the early version of "form follows function" which he maintains. But pleasing shapes, pleasing lines, colors, and combinations of the three are pleasing for a reason. This reason is that formal qualities themselves carry a message that ad- dresses the passions and elicits pleasure or pain. A dark, heavy line, in the appropriate context, may be clumsy and threatening or embarrassing, painful feelings which are perceived as ugly. A smooth, solid shape may be serene and secure, and hence pleasurable and beautiful. (This kind of view, incidentally, does not entail the view that art must have a pleasant subject-matter in order to be beautiful or enjoyable. Shapes, rhythms, designs, and so on which by themselves might be seen as ugly could be entirely appropriate and enjoyable when used to dramatize a tense or exciting subject. Hume shared Hutche- son's opinion that anything which art imitates, pleasant or unpleasant, gives pleasure to a spectator.)41

This objection is reminiscent of another argument that purports to separate beauty and utility: Burke's famous refutation of the beauty of "fitness" in his Enquiry, (1757). While granting that fitness-the appropriateness of shape or construction of an object for its appointed function- may be an accompaniment of beauty, he sought to demonstrate that fitness may equally well be present in an object which is ugly:

... I am apprehensive that experience was not sufficiently consulted. For on that principle, the wedge-like snout of a swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, the little sunk eyes, the whole make of the head, so well adapted to its offices of digging, and rooting, would be ex- tremely beautiful. The great bag hanging to the bill of the pelican, a thing highly useful to this animal, would be likewise beautiful in our eyes. The hedgehog, so well secured against all assaults by his prickly hide, and the porcu- pine with his missile quills, would be then considered as creatures of no small elegance.42

Burke's objection misses the mark with Hume's theory, and this fact points up a



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difference between the utilitarian beauty of Hume and the fairly popular theory of "fitness" of other eighteenth-century philosophers. Fitness, appropriateness of proportion or shape to a given end, takes its direction solely from the natural purpose of the object considered. Thus an object might be perfectly suited for rooting out truffles or consuming kitchen garbage, and the very qualities that make it "fit" for such purposes make it ugly to human eyes.43 If Hume's "beauty of form" does have the utilitarian roots that I think it may, the "fitness" of beautiful form is considered not only in relation to an object's purpose, but also in relation to a human standard. Unbalanced columns are un- attractive not just because they may not be appropriate for a building, but because of lack of balance in itself makes human beings uneasy. A utilitarian analysis of beauty, therefore, need not force one to admit hogs or porcupines into one's pur- view of "beauty."

It should also be borne in mind that as an aesthetic concept, utility must be con- strued in as comprehensive a manner as possible. An irregular chopped hole in a wall may be functional in the narrow sense that it allows light and fresh air into a room. But its appearance will be neither beautiful nor utilitarian, because it does not look suitable to illuminate, ventilate, and make comfortable a room which one would like to occupy.

Viewing this analysis as background ma- terial indicating the development of Hume's thought, we are now in a position to flesh out the schematic answer to the problem of relativism suggested in "Of the Standard of Taste." As human beings, our similar constitutions dictate that we have similar needs, fears, and desires. The same sorts of things help or hurt us, and in our interaction with others and with the world we share common passions. Therefore, by a natural association of ideas, we take pleasure in the same kinds of aesthetic qualities. The principle of sympathy further binds us together and urges us to agreement in matters of artistic taste. We are sensitive to the pleasures and the

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pains of others which, along with their passions, are somewhat infectious. Cer- tainly this infectiousness, or our ability to relate to situations which do not actually affect us, is the key to our becoming in- volved in the subject matter of art. What is more, sympathy also makes us care about the opinions that others have of us. It is a conforming influence which further urges us to consensus.44

It has been argued that after the Trea- tise, Hume abandoned his earlier theory of sympathy as a fundamental explanation for human behavior.45 Certainly he no longer engages in the elaborate analyses of a sym- pathetic reaction which he describes in the Treatise. But at least with regard to the activity of the aesthetic sense, I tend to agree with Stewart, who sees no significant disparity between the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning Morals.

Because what [Hume] says about sympathy in the Enquiry does not contradict what he says in the Treatise, and is far vaguer, I conclude that he is simply trying to propagate his views on the relative contributions to moral judgments of reason and the moral sense, and is trying to do so without asking his readers to endure an elaborate explanation of how a moral sense is possible.48

(The same would hold true, needless to say, for the aesthetic sense.)

We can now also surmise about that quality in objects to which the delicate taste is sensitive. The appropriateness of passions represented in art for the full sympathy of the observer, the way in which the form of a work of art perfectly fits the subject-matter, the proportions and designs of art in relation to its function or purpose -these sorts of considerations in all their complex manifestation are objects for the internal aesthetic sentiment. The prac- ticed taste can sense these qualities; the unpracticed can learn by experience. Of course even if we have located a source for the aesthetic sentiment within Hume's theories of usefulness, utility, and sympathy, we are still not in a position to formulate any general principle of beauty or artistic success. No such formula could avoid the problems confronting general principles of




art which Hume exposes in "Of the Stand- ard of T'aste."47 The development of consensus regarding standards of taste is still dependent upon delicacy, experience, and the other factors Hume outlines that have to do with the condition of the perceiving subject. It is, however, possible to supple- ment these subjective factors with a source of aesthetic pleasure about which Hume speculates throughout his work, thus count- ering the objection that his theory is dam- aged by its lack of objective grounds for judgments of taste.

Not only is there evidence for a utilitarian foundation for Hume's analysis of beauty, in another sense there are also utilitarian reasons why we would be well- advised to develop the kind of taste that is recognized as refined. Refined taste not only makes us more sensitive to the subtler pleasures of beauty, but also it is good for us. In "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Pas- sion" Hume stresses the point that the development of a taste which is perceptive of all the nuances of beauty and ugliness also renders our own character calmer and happier. Unlike delicacy of passion, which makes us over-sensitive and susceptible to every vicissitude of fortune, delicacy of taste makes us develop the "tender emotions" and lead a more well-balanced life.48

The utilitarian element in Hume's aesthetics has escaped critical emphasis, I suspect, because of the trends that Anglo- American aesthetic theory took after the eighteenth century.49 It is well-recognized that contemporary aesthetic theories owe much of their shape to the empiricist theories of the eighteenth century, but in acknowledging their roots, twentieth-century aestheticians have tended to imprint the de- rived theory onto the original. The concept of aesthetic disinterestedness, in particular, has evolved into something rather different from the original notion. It no longer means just "without selfish concern," but also con- notes "without concern for practical considerations," "without concern for purposes," or in the famous words of Edward Bullough, "disengaged or out of gear with practical life."50 These concepts extend much further than either Hume's or

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Hutcheson's stipulations that selfish love or self-interest not be a part of aesthetic pleasure.

Looking at Hume's philosophy as a whole, it should come as no surprise to find that his aesthetic theory is interwoven with his theories of man as a social being, who develops in relation to his environ- ment. The principle of association and the principle of sympathy both work to influence our aesthetic judgments andl refer- ences such that from the simplest design, which inspires pleasure with its comfortable or dynamic lines, to the most complex work of literature, which by sympathy engages our passions, our aesthetic tastes reflect our existence in a social setting. Our tastes, then, are not determined solely by individual inclination, because they are complexly interwoven with the network of social relations which bind us together and mold our likes and dislikes, our pleasures and our pains.

In the final analysis, Hume's advocacy of a standard of taste does not seem to be the inconsistency it has been labeled. We should understand that Hume's philosophy of beauty and aesthetic sentiment was not an assertion of aesthetic scepticism but an attempt to explain prevailing patterns of artistic preference from an analysis of the principles of human nature. Hume himself never expected that his theory would be taken as an attempt to destroy standards of taste, as he makes clear in "The Sceptic":

Were I not afraid of appearing too philosophical, I should remind my reader of that famous doctrine, supposed to be fully proved in modern times, "That tastes and colors, and all other sensible qualities, lie not in the bod- ies, but merely in the senses." The case is the same with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the reality of the latter qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or moralists. Though colors were allowed to lie only in the eye, would dyers and painters ever be less regarded or esteemed? There is a sufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind, to make all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners. And as it is certain, that the discovery above mentioned in natural philosophy, makes no alteration on action and con-



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duct, why should a like discovery in moral philosophy make any alteration?51'

Hume's major essay on aesthetics cannot be rendered entirely free from anomaly and ambiguity, even given some elucida- tion about the qualities and principles of art to which the good critic becomes at- tuned. Ironically, perhaps it is Hume's very talent as an essayist that makes the final acceptance of a standard of taste dif- ficult, so convincing is his initial descrip- tion of the multiplicity of tastes.52 In the opening pages of "The Standard of Taste" he argues that differences of aesthetic preferences are so prevalent that they pervade the most homogeneous group, yet he ends the same essay with an assurance of wide- spread uniformity of taste. Even his ex- planations of critical sensitivity and of the development of delicate taste cannot wholly reconcile these disparate observa- tions. The more variety that must be ac- commodated beneath the umbrella principles of taste, the utilitarian foundations of which can be at least partially discov- ered, the more general and less illuminat- ing is Hume's own standard of taste. One may even suspect that he might be as wary of determining a principle of taste on the broad foundation of utility as he was of Hutcheson's formal analysis of "uniformity amidst variety."

In many respects, however, Hume confronted the issues that Hutcheson had earlier tried to resolve and emerged with richer results. Although his reluctance to fully articulate the source of the perception of beauty can be frustrating, the theory he advocates is more usable than Hutcheson's blanket principle of uniformity and variety. In fact, in Hume's rejec- tion of even such a general formal principle for art, we can see a further depar- ture his criticism takes from the neoclassical method, which emphasized the im- portance of following rules in the construction and evaluation of works of art.53 Hume's principles of taste relate art to the demands of human nature. The general theory that utility lurks behind every perception of beauty, is a highly flexible

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principle which accommodates a good deal of the genuine diversity of taste that in- evitably occurs in a group of people of different ages, experience, and exposure to art. To put it crudely, one's needs and desires-and correspondingly one's ideas about what is good in life-are different at some times than at others, and when these complex bits of human character make their influence felt on the internal sentiment, they result in a rather expectable diversity of aesthetic preference. Thus Hume can say:

A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amorous and tender images, than a man more advanced in years, who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical reflec- tions, concerning the conduct of life, and mod- eration of the passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favorite, Horace at forty, and perhaps Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavor to enter into the sentiments of others, and divest ourselves of those propensities which are natural to us.54

Actual, precise standards of taste must remain only half-articulated in order to allow for natural fluctuation of inclination. But the general sources of at least three kinds of beauty can be found and used to explain both agreement and patterns of disagreement in taste. Given the enormous multiplicity of works of literature and art which constitute objects for the internal aesthetic sentiment, Hume was probably wise to generalize as little about them as he did.

1 The term "criticism" was used in Hume's time to refer not only to commentary on particular works of art or literature, but also to general discussion of what we would now call "aesthetics."

2 Katherine Gilbert, in K. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, A History of Esthetics, (New York, 1961, [first published, 1946]), p. 233.

A more scathing censure of Hume can hardly be found than that of the historian of criticism, George Saintsbury, who finds Hume's artistic judgments both disagreeable and inconsistent with his identification of beauty with sentiment. Re- ferring to a negative remark Hume makes about Bunyan, in "Of the Standard of Taste," Saints- bury says,

. . . this very acceptance of a conventional judgment-acceptance constantly repeated through-




out the Essay-is almost startling in context with the alleszermfnlmend tendency of some of its principles. A critic who says that "It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori" is in fact saying "Take away that bauble!" in regard to Neo- classicism altogether; and though in the very same page Hume repeats the orthodox cavils at Ariosto, while admitting his charm on the next, having thus set up the idol again, he proceeds once more to lop it of hands and feet and tumble it off its throne by saying that "if things are found to please, they cannot be false; let the pleasure which they produce be ever so unexpected and unaccountable." The most di- sheveled of Romantics, in the reddest of waist- coats, could say no more (A History of English Criticism, [New York, 1911], p. 285).

Opinions onl Hume's criticism have ranged rather widely. Those who telld to side with Gilbert and Saintsbury include: John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, (New York, 1963); John Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (1932). On the other hand, Hume has his defenders: Teddy Brunius, David Hume on Criticism, (Uppsala, 1952), esp. Chapter 1, James Noxon, "Hume's Opinion of Critics," JAAC, \Vol. XX, No. 2 (Winter, 1961) 157-162; Redding G. Sugg, Jr., " Hume's Search for the Key With the Leathern Thong," JAAC, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Fall, 1957) 96-102.

3 That this systematic approach is consonant with his overall intention is clear from Hume's comments in the Treatise and the Abslract, where he indicates that the study of the various branches of philosophy is inseparable from the study of human nature. See A Treatise of HLuman Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford, 1960, [1888]), pp. xix-xx. Also a letter "To Dr. George Chayne," in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg, (Oxford, 1932), p. 16; Speaking of past philosophies, Hume wrote:

Everyone consulted his Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue and Happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved to make my principle of Study, and the Source from which I would derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality. 4 Norman Kemp-Smith, The Philosophy of David

Hume, (New York, 1966 [1941]), p. vi.

Hutcheson's contention that all moral and aesthetic judgments rest not on reason or on re- flectively considered empirical data, but solely on feeling (is) the main influence in opening to Hume his "new Scene of Thought" (p. 41).

5Hutcheson disagreed with the seventeenth- century school of Cambridge Platonists, who argued that reason discovers the qualities of goodness and beauty in objects.

Throughout this paper I use the term "object" to refer to any thing, scene, situation, or work

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of art which can be the focus of aesthetic experience, or the stimulus of aesthetic pleasure. Thus "object" may refer to a tree, a painting, a piece of literature, a concerto, and so on, and is not meant to limit the range of aesthetic experience in any way.

7"And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nlor any Prospect of Advan- tage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity in an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will make an Object grateful, nor View of Detrinment, distinct from Immediate PainL in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards of Threatenings, or we may in external Conduct ab- stain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pur- sue the Deform'd but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the Same." Frances Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, (Lon- don, 1726, [second ed.]), Section II, Article 14.

Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. 3, (London, 1839), 40-41.

8 Treatise, p. 299. 9 This point is made throughout Hume's writ-

ings, but he is especially explicit in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Hume: Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Green and Grose, (1898), Vol. 2. See 204f.

10 Hobbes maintained that, since beauty is pleasure and pleasure is self-directed, aesthetic judgments are going to reflect personal concerns only and hence will be individually relative.

11 An object which is generally found pleasant may appear disagreeable," . . . as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation" (Hutche- son, Sect. 1, Art. 7). "The association of ideas

.. is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancies in the Sense of Beauty as well as the external Senses" (Ibid., Sect. VI, Art. 11).

12 Ibid., Sect. 11, Art. 3. Hutcheson distinguishes between two different

kinds of beauty: absolute or original beauty, which pleases in itself without comparison to something else, and comparative or relative beauty, which is beauty of imitation. The quote refers to absolute beauty, which is the focus of most of Hutcheson's examination.

13 Hume, in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, ed., J. W. Lenz, (New York, 1965), p. 3. See also Treatise, p. 14.

4Ibid., p. 8. '5Ibid., pp. 6-7. 16 Ibid., p. 5. An aesthetic judgment for Hume

appears to be an expression of aesthetic pleasure. The emotivist elements in Hume's thought are discussed in Lenz's introduction.



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7 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 8Ibid., pp. 8-9. My italics. l9Ibid., p. 11. 20 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 21 Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind (Ibid., p. 19). 22nIbid., p. 11. 23Ibid., pp. 19-20. 24 Treatise, p. 299. Hume shares with Hutche-

son an occasional ambiguity of terminology. Here, for example, "beauty" refers to a "constitution of parts" rather than a pleasure perceived by sensitive individuals. (Hume says on the same page that pleasure and pain are the very essence of beauty and deformity.) This ambiguity appears now and again but should not cause any serious confusion, for both Hume and Hutcheson clearly opt for the identification of beauty with pleasure. Any qualities in objects correlated with this pleasure are to be viewed as causes of beauty, not as beauty themselves. Cf. the famous passage:

Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not, in any proposition, said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The beauty is not a quality of the circle. ... It is only the effect, which that figure produces on the mind . . . (Enquiry, in Green and Grose, Vol. 2, 263). 25 Treatise, p. 590. 26 Treatise, p. 299. See also p. 361. Hume was

not alone in singling out utility or functionality as an aesthetic category; it was often mentioned in treatises concerning taste as "beauty of fitness." Compare, for example, Hogarth's famous passage from The Analysis of Beauty (1753):

The bulks and proportions of objects are gov- ern'd by fitness and propriety. It is this that has established the size and proportion of chairs, tables, and all sorts of utensils and fur- niture. It is this that has fix'd the dimensions of pillars, arches, etc., for the support of great weight, and so regulated all the orders in architecture, as well as the sizes of windlows and doors, etc. Thus though a building were ever so large, the steps of the stairs, the seats in the windows must be continued of their usual heights, or they would lose their beauty with their fitness: and in shipbuilding the dimensions of every part are confined and regulated by fitness for sailing. When a vessel sails well, the sailors always call her a beauty; the two ideas have such a connexion! (Wm. Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty, Chapter 1, "On Fit- ness," [London, 1753; Scolar Press facsimile, 1971, Menston, Yorkshire, England]). 27 Enquiry, in Green and Grose, V'ol. 11, 202. 28 Ibid., p. 206. 29Enquiry, p. 207. 30 Treatise, p. 316. 21Enquiry, p. 211.

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32 Ibid., p. 210. 23 Treatise, pp. 363. 34 Cf. Treatise, p. 590. 35Ibid., pp. 364-365. 38 Ibid., p. 299. 37Enquiry, p. 202. 38 By contrast, there is Hutcheson's ''ratio of

uniformity amidst variety" and Hogarth's "smooth, serpentine line," to mention but two outstanding examples.

39 Hume's theory is interestingly similar to many contemporary theories of aesthetic qualities. See Monroe Beardsley's discussion of "regional qualities" in Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, 1958); and Rudolf Arn- heim, Toward a Psychology of Art, (Los Angeles, 1966), to mention just two.

40In comparison to ideas,

. . . impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole (Treatise, p. 366).

"See Hume's "Of Tragedy," in Lenz, pp. 29-37. 42 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into

the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. J. T. Boulton, (Notre Dame, 1958; paperback ed., 1968), p. 105.

Burke also argued that because beauty appeals to the imagination and the passions and fitness to the understanding, the two cannot be merged. Hume agreed that the reason is not the "perceiver" of beauty, but did not agree that the two could have no mutual influence.

But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection (Enquiry, in Green and Grose, Vol. 11, p. 172).

431 I pass over the objection that one could also make to Burke, that he has a limited taste and therefore does not recognize functional beauty in all objects. Certainly some of his intuitions on this score seem overly narrow, (he mentions lions and birds in flight as other counter-examples to beauty as fitness). Yet I think to take this objection too far would be as counter-intuitive as some of Burke's own judgments, and I am content to agree with him that neither pigs nor horseshoe crabs are beautiful, no matter how functional their designs.

44Hume honestly confronted the fact that social pressure and the opinions of others may be a real factor in the formation of one's tastes. (He adds "authority" to sympathy as an influence in forming opinions, at one point-Treatise, p. 321.) We also find that from a consideration of pride, we come upon an extra-aesthetic foundation for the standards of taste:




. . if we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all nations andl ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and(l humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we canl know pretty nearly, what will either increase or diminish his passions of this kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from noting but a differenlce in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very incon- siderable. Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indlifferent to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, anI(l that their pride and vanlity will not be affected by these advantages (T7eatise, 280-281).

45 Kemp-Smith, p. 151. See also Mary Shaw Kuypers, Studies in the Eighteenth Cenltury Back-

ground on Hume's Empiricism (New York, 1958), p. 102.

4 Stewart, p. 329. 47 "Of the Standard of Taste," in Lenz, p. 3. 48"0f the Delicacy of Taste and Passion," in

Lenz, pp. 26-27. 49W. H. Halberstadt begins an exploration of

the aesthetic implications of usefulness in "A Problem in Hume's Aesthetics," JAA C, Vol. XXX,

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No. 2 (Winter, 1971) 209-214. See also the lengthy work of Oliver Brunet, Philosophic et Esthetique chez David Hume (Paris, 1965), esp. chapter VI, "Le Gout et sa Norme."

50E. Bullough, "Physical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," (1912), in E. Vivas and M. Krieger, The Problem of Aesthetics (New York, 1953), pp. 396-405.

51 "The Sceptic," in ILenz, p. 125. Cf. Hume's comments on the passions:

. . in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any other part of natural philosophy ("A Disserta- tion on the Passions," ili Green and Grose, Vol. 11, p. 166).

52 By his own admission, Hume was dtlividedl throughout his work between the temptations of scepticism and those of common sense. See Kemp- Smith, pp. 487f.

53 Brunius remarks (pp. 118f.) that Hume's neo- classicism was by no means rigid or traditional, because the reasons he uses to support his critical judgments do not appeal to rules of art.

54 "Of the Standard of Taste," in Lenz, p. 20.



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