korzeniewicz - the labor politics of radicalism: the santa fe crisis of 1928

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The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928 Author(s): Roberto P. Korzeniewicz Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 1-32Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2517628Accessed: 11-06-2015 19:38 UTC

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Hispanic Amiiericatn Historical Revietw 73: 1 Copyright (C 1993 by Duke University Press ccc ool8-2168/93/$1.50

The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928

ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ

O N December 4, 1928, President Hipolito Yrigoyen of Argentina ordered federal troops into Santa Fe province to put an end to a major wave of labor unrest.

The historical literature makes little or no mention of this federal intervention and its surrounding events, treating the Santa Fe crisis as a minor footnote to the last Yrigoyen administration.' This essay will demonstrate that the 1928 events warrant greater analytical inquiry.

This article has benefited from comments by Len Berkey, Elizabeth Bruimfiel, Ann For- sythe, David Rock, Mark D. Szuchman, Norma Wolff, anid an anoniymiious reviewer for the HAHR. The research for this study was made possible in part by a grant from the Program for Inter-Institutional Collaboration in Area Studies (Uniiversity of Michigan) and a Faculty Development Grant from Albion College. I would also like to thanik the Fundaci6n Simn6 Rodriguez (Buenos Aires) for providinig easy access to its archival hioldinlgs.

Citations refer to the following periodicals, all from Buenos Aires except as noted: La Antorcha (LA), Bandera Proletaria (BP), Boletin de Ser-vicios de la Asociaci6ni del Tiabajo (BSAT), Buenos Aires Herald (BAH), La Capital, Rosario (LC), El Diario (ED), La Inter- nacional (LI), La Naci6n (LN), El Obrero Mtunicipal (EOM), La Prensa (LP), Revietv of tlle River Plate (RRP), the Standard (TS), La Vangitardia (LV).

1. Evein David Rock clharacterizes these evenits as "a peripheral labour issue." By the early 1920S the Radicals had abandoned their efforts to develop close ties to labor, anid Yri- goyen's decision to send troops to Santa Fe was imiade "to appease the armyiv anid btuttress its confidence in the government." David Rock, Politics i71 Argentina, 1890-1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), 244. Virtually no ilmenl- tion of the 1928 events can be found in the following works: Char-les Bergquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentitna, Veniezuela, atnd Colomrlbia (Stani- ford: Stanford Uniiv. Press, 1986); Gabriel del Mazo, "La segunda presidencia de Yrigoyeni," and Roberto Etchepareborda, "Antecedentes de la crisis de 1930," both in La segunda presidencia de Yrigoyen, ed. del Mazo anid Etchepareborda (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de Am6rica Latina, 1986), 5-105, 107-58; Julio Godio, El movimiento obrero argentino (1910- 1930) (Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1988); Rubens Iscaro, Origen y desarrollo del nouvirniento sindical argentino (Buenos Aires: Anteo, 1958); Sebastian Mai-otta, El mrlovimnienlto sindical argentino, vol. 3 (Buenios Aires: Calomino, 1970). A brief paragraph on these evenlts appears in Carl Solberg, "Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912-1930," Jornal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13:1 (Jani. 1971), 18-52.



2 | HAHR I FEBRUARY I ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ

Between May and December of 1928, Radical provincial officials in Santa Fe implemented a series of policies designed to develop closer ties between their party and the labor movement. These labor policies were attacked by business organizations, conservative political leaders, and the mainstream or nonlabor press, which accused the provincial authorities of inciting labor unrest and undermining social stability. Even the labor press joined conservative commentators in portraying the Radical officials as demagogic political leaders manipulating labor issues to advance their own careers. Yrigoyen's decision to send troops to the province of Santa Fe was primarily a response to pressure from business and conservative groups. But in a larger context, the Santa Fe events illustrate the social pressures and institutional tensions that characterized Radical efforts to develop a viable political strategy toward labor. The 1928 crisis can serve as a guide for examining in greater detail the relationship between provincial and national labor politics during the interwar period, and for tracing the early development of a populist discourse in Argentina.

The May Strikes

In 1928, labor conflict spread through the province of Santa Fe and the city of Rosario, the most important economic region of Argentina after Buenos Aires. Rosario had always been an epicenter of labor ferment in Argentina, but these strikes were broadly perceived as the first resurgence of labor organizing in the city since 1923.2

The strikes began among Rosario dockworkers demanding higher wages. Conforming to national trends, labor organizing at the port had been undermined since the early 1920S by business discrimination against unionized workers. But in 1928, falling wages and "unspeakable abuses" provoked a series of small strikes by dockworkers who handled grain and cement. Although trade unions in the port were virtually absent during the early stages, informal networks strengthened the workers' bargaining power. The strikers were also abetted by a strong harvest: "The docks are crowded with steamers, and there is a great quantity of wagons ready to be loaded and unloaded." Furthermore, the demand for higher pay caught some steamship companies in a bind: the shippers had sold for April transport, and May contracts called for six hundred thousand tons of grain to be loaded in Rosario.4 The success of these initial strikes en-

2. See BP, Mar. lo, 1928, p. 2, Aug. 11, p. 3; BAH, May 11, p. 6; LP, July 29, p. 20;

LN, May 18, p. 5; TS, May 20, p. 4. 3. LN, May 18, 1928, p. 5. See also BP, May 8, p. 5, May 19, p. i, aind June 2, p. 3;

and LA, May 26, p. 1. 4. BAH, May 8, 1928, p. 5, May 9, p. 5.



THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928 3

couraged workers in other ports to raise their own demands, and labor conflicts soon involved more than seven thousand dockworkers along the river border of Santa Fe province.

Employers initially expected the Rosario strike to be quickly resolved in their favor. But unrest intensified on May 8 when Luisa Lallana, a young woman distributing pamphlets supporting the port strike, was killed at the entrance to the waterfront in a confrontation involving picketers and nonstriking workers.5 The mainstream press reported her death as an accident, but labor sympathizers branded it a "barbaric assassination" committed by a member of the Liga de Trabajadores, an organization of nonunion workers supported by employers and conservatives.6 The death of Luisa Lallana was followed on May 9 by a 24-hour citywide general strike that affected factories, transportation, businesses, and schools. The general strike was strongly condemned by business organizations.

Rosario's Federacion Obrera Local organized a demonstration of seven thousand to accompany Luisa Lallana's body to the cemetery. The general strike itself was accompanied by violent confrontations. Demonstrators stoned public buildings and vehicles, and the police arrested dozens of people. In one particularly violent clash, the police forcibly dispersed hundreds of strikers who had tried to burn a streetcar after forcing its passengers off The strikers reportedly stoned the police, who responded with a barrage of gunfire that seriously wounded a striker and a young boy. The youth died soon afterward.7

Even after the general strike ended, violent clashes continued at the port between strikers and nonstriking workers, who were protected by federal security forces provided by the navy. Solidarity strikes spread throughout the province, often giving local workers an opportunity to press their own demands. On May 15, railroad engineers decided to stop bringing trains to the port, claiming that their lives were in danger. Em- ployers perceived this action as a grave escalation of the conflict.8

5. The picket lines were characterized as composed of "loquacious or pathetically unl- appealing women anid children." BAH, May lo, 1928, p. 1. On female participation see BP, June 2, p. 3; LI, Oct. 13, p. 2.

6. BAH, May lo, 1928, p. 1; LN, May 9, p. 13. This and several other violent events undermined the prestige of the Asociaci6n del Trabajo in the late 192os. See LN, May 21, 1928, p. 1, and May 25, p. 13; and Argentine Republic, Congreso Nacional, Diario de sesiones de la Cainara de Diputados, 5 July-Aug. 1928, tomo 2 (Buenos Aires, 1928), 214-37. For an alternative perspective, see BSAT, May 20, 1928, pp. 217-19. On the events that followed the death of Luisa Lallana, see LV, May lo, p. 3; BP, May 19, p. 1; EOM 9:log (May 1928), 1; TS, May lo, p. lo; BAH, May lo, p. 1, and May 11, p. 6; LN, May lo, p. 1, and May 14, p. 3; LA, May 26, p. 1; BSAT, Nov. s, p. 483.

7. LV, May lo, 1928, p. 3, and May 25, p. 1. See also LP, May lo, p. 21; LN, May lo, p. 1; and BAH, May lo, p. 1.

8. LN, May 16, 1928, p. 5, May 17, p. 1, May 19, p. 1, and May 20, p. 1.



4 I HAHR I FEBRUARY I ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ

On May 20, Rosario's labor federations rallied in solidarity with the dockworkers and in protest against the violence. At one of these rallies, union members declared a new general strike for the following day. This strike paralyzed the city and brought violence to the streets as groups of strikers reportedly attacked shops, factories, caf6s, and schools.9 Automo- biles and streetcars were stoned and burned, and several individuals were beaten. In one widely reported instance,

several large gangs of workers, including many women and children, set forth in search of provisions for their homes. Marching in ranks like soldiers, and armed with sticks and iron bars, they advanced in three columns from separate directions toward the Urquiza Market. The stall holders were given the opportunity of getting out as quickly as they could, and, after a lapse of five minutes provided for the evacuation, the raiders poured into the building and stripped it bare of fruit, meat, and vegetables. The raiders then visited two of the other principal markets and repeated their wholesale holdup.'0

Employers and a number of newspapers complained that the lack of adequate protection had allowed "several raging crowds" to demonstrate, carrying sticks and improvised red flags that had been stolen from con- struction sites. "On the improvised red banners, knives had been fixed in the manner of spears, and the men who formed the rear guard shot their guns into the air."11 According to the Buenos Aires Herald, the strike was characterized by "mob law. . . . Matters grew so serious during the weekend that the police had to raise barricades in the streets to hold back armies of desperate strikers bent on gaining the city." The port strike was developing "into what may almost be termed the forerunner of a national industrial crisis." 12

The Union Obrera Local (affiliated with the syndicalist Union Sindi- cal Argentina, or USA) extended the general strike for another 24 hours. The city was again brought to a halt. "The few automobiles that could be seen on the streets carried small flags with the green cross and were driven by their owners, for the most part doctors." 13 Most of Rosario was in the dark, for three thousand street lamps had been destroyed during the first day of the strike; but observers noted that the absence of poten-

9. The strikers were join-ed by "other elements and youths." LP, May 22, p. 20. The labor press attributed violent acts to "numerous grouLps of maleantes, rateros, y elemrlentos de la escoria politica de comite, who [took advanitage of] police indifference." BP, JuLne 2, p. 3. See also LN, May 2o, p. 1, and May 21, p. 1.

lo. BAH, May 22, p. 1.

11. LN, May 22, p. 1.

12. BAH, May 22, p. 1; see also BSAT, June 5, pp. 241-43.

13. LP, May 22, p. 15.




tial victims resulted in fewer muggings than usual. Strikebreakers were again attacked, reportedly by groups of youths. La Nacion complained that banks had been forced to close by threats from "a band of [about four hundred] types, with wild appearance and revolutionary demeanor, among whom young men predominated and women were not lacking, carrying improvised weapons." 14

Exporters hitherto had been unwilling to negotiate with the striking dockworkers, arguing that "there was no guarantee that the union would carry out any arrangement or agreement that might be entered into."' 5 But in the midst of the general strike, dockworkers notified employers that the Union Sindical Argentina was willing to declare a national general strike in their support. Faced with this threat, port employers agreed to provide a 12 percent wage increase to their striking dockworkers. Em- ployers and labor representatives met on May 22 at the Bolsa de Comercio (stock exchange) and reached a preliminary agreement, bringing the port strike to an end.'6

The labor press applauded this outcome as a major defeat for employers who had sought to divide and undermine labor organizations.'7 The mainstream press, on the other hand, reacted with dismay. Earlier in the month, the Buenos Aires Herald had warned that the labor movement could threaten the existing social order by replacing "capital tyranny with labor domination." The outcome of the port strike discouraged the Her- ald's editors, for "the laboring man has suddenly arrived at the conclusion that the capitalistic camp has lost its power and force. The agitators are cock-a-hoop. . . . We are much afraid that this country is to see worse before it sees better." 18

Radical Labor Policies in Santa Fe

The strikes had begun to reveal a rift between employers and a new provincial administration headed by Santa Fe's Radicals. The strikes escalated immediately after the inauguration of the new governor, Miguel Go6mez Cello, on May 9, and followed Yrigoyen's election to the presidency in April. Labor sympathizers acknowledged that the transition between ad- ministrations was "complicating the existing situation, for many police officers are not in the mood to keep order, knowing they will be re-

14. LN, May 22, pp. 1, 9; see also LP, May 23, p. 15; LA, May 26, p. 1. 15. BAH, May 11, p. 1. 16. LN, May 23, p. 1. 17. BP, May 26, p. 1, and June 30, p. 1; LV, May 25, p. 1. i8. BAH, NMay 11, p. 6; May 25, p. 6.




moved at any moment."'9 Some strikers attributed the conflicts directly to the situation that "the rulers who took over the provincial government on May 9 had committed themselves to help, but now in power were not keeping their word."20 The strikes quickly came to be perceived as a litmus test of the Radicals' friture labor policies.

In a series of provincial and national elections in early 1928, Radi- cal supporters (Personalistas) of Yrigoyen did markedly better than his opponents (Antipersonalistas) in the party. The success of the Persona- listas in Santa Fe's February gubernatorial elections was particularly significant, for the Antipersonalistas had controlled the province throughout the 1920S. Gomez Cello was a longtime Radical party member who had been mayor of the city of Santa Fe early in that decade. As mayor he had developed a reputation for an efficient and honest administration that had eradicated deficits from the city's budget. Building on this reputation in a province characterized by recurrent fiscal deficits and overbearing taxation, Gomez Cello forged a strong political alliance among contend- ing personalistic factions in the province.2' The strength of this alliance assured Gomez Cello's election, but its heterogeneity all but guaranteed more political friction after his inauguration, particularly over labor policies.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, electoral competition with the Socialists and government control led Radical leaders nation- ally to seek closer ties with urban workers and labor groups in order to appeal to labor as a constituency. But even in the late l910S and early 1920S, the first Yrigoyen administration (1916-22) was responding to escalating labor unrest with repressive measures, undermining its own efforts at alliance. The rift between the Radical party and the trade unions widened during Marcelo T. Alvear's administration (1922-28). But many provincial and national party leaders continued to perceive the establish- ment of close ties with labor as crucial to the very survival of the Radical party. This was clearly the case among top Radical leaders in Santa Fe province.

More generally, labor support was crucial to the success of Yrigoyen's supporters in the 1928 elections. David Rock contends that workers voted for the Personalistas in response to propaganda that romanticized Yri-

19. LV, May io, 1928, p. 3; TS, May io, p. io. 20. LP, May 22, p. 14. See also LP, July 9, 1928, p. 9; BAH, May 8, p. 5, and May 1i,

p. 6. 21. The Santa Fe factions are briefly discussed in Leoncio Gianello, "Santa Fe (1862-

1930)," in Historia argentina contemporanea 1862-1930, Academia Nacional de la Historia, vol. 4, sec. 1 (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1967), 143-90; Mantiel Goldstraj, Anos y errores (Buenos Aires: Sophos, 1957); Hector J. Iniigo Carrera, La experiencia radical, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: La Bastilla, 1980). See also LP, May ii, 1928, p. 13.




goyen's personal role in improving working conditions during his first administration.22 Other analysts suggest that Radical party members viewed the 1928 elections as a potential turning point that would transform radicalism into a "new Left" that in turn would create "a social democracy with a clearly nationalistic character."23 The course of events discussed in this essay tends to support this interpretation. The Radical party had won electoral support by advocating greater social justice and promising profound institutional reforms. For this reason, the labor policies of the newly elected authorities were scrutinized by all interested parties (including workers and employers) as a key indicator of future developments. The interested parties, furthermore, recognized that their ability to shape the direction of those policies early in the game would significantly affect their long-term bargaining power under a Radical administration.

Gomez Cello emphasized in his inaugural speech that future policies would be guided by "the great enterprises of social, political, and economic reparation espoused by radicalism," and that he would seek "the faithful execution of the laws protecting workers, projecting into these ideas new norms that can ensure a healthy environment, equitable salaries, and comfortable housing." More directly, immediately on taking office the new governor ordered police to restore calm and avoid blood- shed.24 Despite these gestures, some mainstream periodicals briefly hoped that the new Radical authorities would abandon their reformist rhetoric. After all, during his first administration, Yrigoyen had not tolerated disruptive strikes: "The outcome of [his] volte-face was the Semnana Tragica, which at least served to clarify the atmosphere and to encourage business to hold on for better times, which eventually arrived with the Alvear administration." 25

Once Gomez Cello's administration had taken office, however, employers charged that the new authorities were failing to maintain law and order. In the early stages of the port strike, exporters complained that despite effective federal protection inside the port area, strikers could take advantage of less restrictive conditions along the access routes. The press commented that in surrounding neighborhoods, "and in the cosmopolitan coffee shops scattered along the Avenida Belgrano and adjacent streets," there was virtually no police presence to enforce order among the large crowds of workers.26

22. Rock, Politics in A -gentina, 234. 23. Roberto Etchepareborda, "La segunda presidencia de Hip6lito Yrigoyen y la crisis

de 1930," in Historia argentina contemporanea, vol. 1, sec. 2 (1965), 355. 24. LN, May lo, 1928, p. 5. 25. BAH, May 18, 1928, p. 6. See also BAH, May 11, p. 6. 26. LN, May 14, 1928, p. 3.




To address these concerns, Rosario's main business organizations met with the incoming chief of police to inquire how his administration intended to protect "the interests of capital" and particularly the "freedom of work," or the right of nonstriking workers to cross picket lines.27 The business groups portrayed labor unrest as a challenge to basic constitutional rights, and called for the state to defend those rights. This important feature in their political discourse was accompanied by a second dominant theme: labor unrest was caused not by true workers but by professional agitators and extremist ideologies foreign to the workplace and the pueblo. Mainstream newspapers attacked "the revulsive action" of these "enemies of our nation" and called for unions to rid themselves of these "parasites of social dissidence," for "they persist in making every strike action a revolutionary event; from every spark they want a social bonfire."28 These images were invoked to delegitimate the actions and demands of labor organizations, and to justify the call for state action against "subversive" forces.

The new police chief, Ricardo Caballero, was a political appointee of the new governor. His conduct during the strikes had disturbed the business community. One newspaper complained that police commanders had ordered officers not to intervene in strikes, and reported that Caballero had been seen enthusiastically greeting a group of strikers and ordering nearby police forces "to be very careful not to proceed," a comment that brought "warm applause from the striking elements."29

Caballero had provided crucial support for Gomez Cello's election, so much support that throughout 1928 his opponents asserted that Caballero had become de facto governor of the province. He had joined the Union Civica Radical as a teenager in the early 189os, and had been briefly arrested during the unsuccessful Radical uprising of 1905. He was elected lieutenant governor of Santa Fe in the crucial elections of 1912, a year in which he mediated conflicts involving Santa Fe's tenant farmers. He served repeatedly in both chambers of the Argentine Congress during the late l910S and 1920S. He enjoyed a personal relationship with Yrigoyen, though it was briefly strained in 1916 over internal party disputes. Since 1916, the Radicals of Santa Fe had experienced a growing rift between northern and southern caudillos, and Caballero was among the stron- gest of the latter. According to Gabriel del Mazo, his Senate speeches

27. LV, May io, 1928, p. 3; BAH, May 9, p. 5; TS, May io, p. 1o; and LN, May 14, p. 1, and May 15, p. 5. See also LN, May 21, p. 1, and May 22, p. 9; and LP, May 22, p. 20.

28. LP, June 5, 1928, p. 14. Also, LN, May 15, p. 5; BAH, May 23, p. 6; LP, June 17, p. 20, and July 20, p. 19; RRP, Nov. 2, p. 5; and LC, Nov. 23, p. 4, and Dec. 1, p. 5.

29. LN, May 22, pp. 1, 9, and May 23, p. i; and BP, June 2, p. 3.




represented "the most vigorous expression of Radical thought on social relations." 30

For Caballero, the ultimate objective of democracy was "the conquest of economic freedom for the working masses," or "social justice, within the limits and nature of our nationality." Labor was to become a crucial source of future support for the Radical party. Caballero urged political authorities to maintain their independence in the face of capital-labor conflicts, and spoke against employer organizations that believed themselves to be "owners of elements of the state" and opposed "the political and economic redemption of the pueblo."3' Economic freedom would allow workers to "realize their destiny in all walks of life and reach all the summits of the spirit"; by eliminating social problems, this "last stage of democracy" would permit workers "the real exercise of freedom." Social reforms would also transform workers into a middle class. This was important, for the social upheaval that had followed World War I had produced "moments of real terror among government representatives and the ruling and historical classes of almost all countries," but "current civilization has found in the middle class . . . the conditions of intelligence, valor, and discipline that it has needed to save itself." These views were compatible with the predominant Radical doctrine.32

The imperative of social renovation and solidarity could be met through state action and law, preventing both the merciless exploitation of materi- alistic society and the brutal violence of sectarian revolutions. Caballero took pains to distinguish himself from both communism and "Cesarismo," emphasizing his strong belief in "the idea of nationality and patria" as well as private property and traditional family structures.33 He argued that the Santa Fe administration represented a socially conscious Radicalismo oriented toward "the protection of the dispossessed classes," and that this orientation distinguished "the economic faction of the party" from others

30. For biographical details, see Ricardo Caballero, Yrigoyen, la conspiraci6n civil y militar del 4 defebrero de 1905 (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1951); idem, Discursos y docutmlentos politicos del Ricardo Caballero, ed. Roberto A. Ortelli (Btuenos Aires: Sociedad de Ptibli- caciones El Inca, 1929); Roberto Etchepareborda, "Aspectos politicos de la crisis de 1930," in La crisis de 1930, ed. Etchepareborda, Ricardo Ortiz, and Jtuan Orona (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986), 15-60; Gabriel del Mazo, La primera presidencia de Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986), 112; and LV, May 0o, 1928, p. 3. See also LP, May 9, p. 19, and May 13, p. 21.

31. Caballero, Discursos, i6, ii6, io8, 243; idem., i6, 265. 32. For the quotations, see Caballero, Discursos, 23, 27-28, 30, 44. For Radical doc-

trine see also Rock, Politics in Argentina, 127.

33. Caballero also attacked "determinist materialism," Einstein's theories, and for- eigners ("they lack love for the country, its traditions, and its history"). Caballero, Discursos, 17, 31, 87, 94, 117, 127, 314, 551.




that "pretend to transform this force into an exclusively political group, without any ultimate objectives on behalf of the welfare of the people."34

Given Caballero's philosophy, it is not surprising that the May events triggered an onslaught of protest from employers and the mainstream press. Rosario's Bolsa de Comercio complained about the strikes not only to Gomez Cello and Caballero but also to the federal minister of the interior, "in case the ultimate outcome of these events requires the intervention of the Superior Government of the Nation."35 La Nacion asserted in an editorial that Rosario's strikes threatened a strategic economic sec- tor and thereby required federal action to ensure "both public peace under the rule of law, and individual and collective rights."36 Rosario's Federacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias called for Caballero's dismissal, charging that he had failed to guarantee that he could "contain the overflow of suppressed passions" that accompanied demonstrations.37 Rosario's merchants and other employers began calling for a 24- or 48- hour lockout in protest against the police chief. Caballero left Rosario to meet with Yrigoyen and Alvear in Buenos Aires, forcing Gomez Cello to deny rumors that these meetings presaged the police chief's resignation. Business did not yet have a united front against Caballero, however. The chamber of commerce stopped short of demanding his resignation. Politi- cal sympathies were rumored to exist between Caballero and the chamber president, who defended the police chief while denying the existence of "personal or political compromises." 38

On the provincial level, conflicts among the Personalistas had intensified after the inauguration of the new administration. Dickering over the distribution of state resources, the Personalista faction split into two main groups: Caballeristas, who shared the police chief's labor policies, and a group of "intransigent Young Turks," who eventually ended up with little of the provincial budget. Conflicts were also reported between Ca- ballero and the province's vice governor, but not just over the distribution of public jobs and political appointments. They involved a substantial dispute over the future direction of the Radical party's labor strategy.39 In these terms, the provincial debate was bound to reach national proportions. Principally, conservatives hoped to persuade Yrigoyen publicly to

34. Ibid., 18-21, 266, 453-54. 35. LN, May 23, 1928, p. 5; and LP, May 23, p. 15. 36. LN, May 22, p. 6; see also May 23, pp. 1, 6, and May 28, p. 4; and LP, May 23,

p. 12. 37. LN, May 29, p. 5, and May 31, p. 5. 38. LN, May 31, p. 5. See also May 27, p. i6. 39. On the "Young Turks," see BP, Aug. 4, 1928, p. 4; also LC, Nov. 27, p. 4; LN,

Dec. 5, p. 1. On the vice governor, see LV, July 5, p. 6; LN, May 5, p. 8. On the strategy dispute, see BP, Aug. 4, p. 4.




disapprove of Caballero's labor policies. Furthermore, Santa Fe's new legislature was widely expected to impeach the provincial mninistro de gobierno for failing to counteract local authorities' passivity during the Rosario strikes.

The provincial legislature, however, failed to meet, due to an effort by the provincial executive to force new elections to achieve "the necessary majority to develop harrmonically the duties of government."40 In a few weeks Gomez Cello closed the legislature and asked the national congress to order a new provincial election. Many provincial legislators condemned this action as arbitrary and called on the federal government to ensure "the constitutional exercise of our legislative functions." 4' The broader conflict between Personalistas and Antipersonalistas, however, made it difficult for either Alvear or President-elect Yrigoyen to take any immediate action.

For the time being, political conditions at the national level strengthened the power of the provincial authorities. In his successful campaign, candidate Yrigoyen had built an effective national coalition of forces against his Radical opponents. During the transition period between the April election and the October inauguration of the new administration, relations grew tense between the outgoing Alvear administration and the newly elected candidate. Alvear briefly considered the possibility of intervening in Santa Fe province, as Rosario's exporters demanded, and he sent federal troops to the city's port during the May strikes. But he was unable actually to replace Santa Fe's provincial authorities. Because of the overwhelming defeat of Antipersonalista candidates, Alvear lacked the political capital necessary to take any actions that could be construed as an attack on the Personalistas. Yrigoyen, on the other hand, was concerned with ensuring a smooth transition to his own administration and was unlikely to support any drastic measures that could alienate his supporters, particularly in a key province such as Santa Fe. These dynamics enhanced the autonomy of provincial leaders in relation to both the national government and party authorities in Buenos Aires.

Labor's Response to Caballerismo

The new political climate also enhanced the bargaining power of workers, who exploited the opportunity to raise a broad range of demands. Labor unrest in Rosario virtually exploded after early May 1928, and organized political factions in the labor movement found themselves struggling to provide leadership to a militant rank and file. At the same time, these fac-

40. LV, June 8, p. 1. 41. LV, June 21, p. 6.




tions searched for an appropriate response to the labor policies of the new provincial administration. In particular, they came to perceive Caballero as a political threat, vying for the electoral support of the working class and undermining the labor movement's independence in the process. Their antagonism toward Caballero was significant, for it limited their willing- ness to support the provincial administration in a potential confrontation with national authorities.

Between the inauguration of the Radical provincial authorities in May and Yrigoyen's deployment of federal troops in December, specific and general strikes spread throughout Santa Fe province. The number and scale of these conflicts generated a growing sense of empowerment and ex- ceptionality among Rosario's workers. Both the press and activists across the political spectrum frequently observed that working-class neighborhoods in the city were developing a sense of virtual autonomy. The reaction these trends provoked from business, the mainstream press, and conservatives became a fundamental influence on Yrigoyen's decision to terminate Caballero's labor policies by force.

Strikers repeatedly brought transportation to a halt. For example, a streetcar strike began on July 3, and was highly disruptive: "Many em- ployees and workers who live in the suburban neighborhoods are opting to miss work rather than face the possibility of . . . spending the night in the city center."42 The press noted that the few working buses were over- loaded: "The public has traveled on the front fenders, on the hood, hang- ing from side windows and in clusters from both running boards and the rear platform, exposed to all the dangers of traffic. Happily, no accidents have been recorded."43 Strikes also interrupted the city's public services, contributing further to "an atmosphere of malaise and justified fear that keeps neighbors nervous and withdrawn in their homes."44 A telephone strike forced many banks, offices, and factories to rely on bicycle messen- gers to deliver urgent communications; even the police had to deploy 50 mounted officers to relay messages between downtown Rosario and the suburbs.45 These labor conflicts were magnified by at least seven general strikes in Rosario during the same eight-month period.

Sabotage and violence were constant features of these conflicts, although strikers complained that employers themselves were committing the illegal acts to frame workers.46 The strikes involved a broad range of

42. LP, July 4, 1928, p. 20, and Jtlly 5, p. 19. 43. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also LV, July 12, p. 3; LP, July 6, p. 21, and July i8, p. 19.

44. LP, July 25, p. 19. See also LP, July 29, p. 29, Oct. 15, p. 29, aild Nov. 9, p. 14. 45. LP, Jtlly 26, p. i8; LV, July 25, p. 3I 46. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also July 25, p. 19, aind Oct. 7, p. 22; RRP, Jtuly 13, p. 11,

July 27, p. ii, and Oct. 12, p. 5; LN, Nov. 17, p. 5; LV, July 29, p. 3, Sept. 27, p. 3, aind Nov. 6, p. 3.




demands, including recognition of labor organizations, wage increases, union regulation of employment, paid sick leave, and enforcement of union-negotiated contracts. Carpenters struck to improve working conditions and reduce hours, but also to reduce the unemployment that resulted from technological innovations. Textile workers demanded an end to "the vexations they must endure," and the elimination of "petty despots who even threaten the honor of the poor women exploited by capitalist selfishness."47

What caused employers even greater concern was that the strikes stimulated new patterns of government intervention in labor conflicts. In mid-July, city officials warned the streetcar company that it would face daily fines unless it restored services. The firm nevertheless would not recognize a union. Its board of directors in Brussels would agree to a 10 percent wage increase only if city authorities reciprocated by lower- ing municipal taxes from 8 to 4 percent.48 Angrily, the city council sus- pended its efforts to mediate the strike, while the mayor warned the company to restore services or face the punishment of having the city seize all its equipment and facilities.49 The mayor subsequently presented the city council with a plan for the municipalizacion of the company, which was approved on July 30 with broad political support, including that of both the Progressive Democrats and the Communists. The streetcar firm's management capitulated with greater flexibility in labor negotiations and eventually reached a final agreement (with the help of the Belgian consul) that provided an eight-hour workday and a 13 percent wage increase.50

The city took similar action during a strike at the telephone company, also in July, once again pressing the employer to meet the strikers' demands. Management in turn demanded greater protection; but Police Chief Caballero replied that it was impossible to "place an officer behind each employee who comes to work" and criticized the firm for paying "hunger wages." Once again, city officials pressured the firm by threatening to impose daily fines unless services were immediately restored. In another case, the city ultimately intervened with the Sociedad de Elec- tricidad to restore services, after threatening fines and other measures.5'

47. LV, Nov. 6, p. 3. See also July 24, p. 3, July 29, p. 3, and Auig. 24, p. 3; LP, July 25, p. 19, Sept. 9, p. 21, and Sept. 13, p. 18.

48. LV, July 12, p. 3, and July 25, p. 3; LP, July 18, p. 19, and July 23, p. 19. 49. LP, July 25, pp. 3, 19, and July 26, p. 18; LV, July 25, p. 3. 50. LP, July 13, p. 14, July 14, p. 19, July 27, p. 18, July 30, p. 21, July 31, p. 20, anid

Aug. 3, p. 21; LV, July 27, p. 3, and Aug. 3, p. 1. 51. LP, July 25, p. 19. For more on this strike and Caballero's response, see LP, July 6,

p. 21, July 8, p. 20, July 28, p. 19, and July 29, p. 20. For the city's action, see LP, July 26, p. 18, and July 29, p. 20. On the electric company, see LV, Nov. 6, p. 3; also LV, Oct. 7, p. 23, and Oct. 25, p. 4.




In all these cases, the attitude of municipal authorities strengthened the bargaining power of workers.

What's more, at times strikers and city authorities openly demon- strated considerable sympathy for each other. For example, a delegation of workers was on its way to announce the start of the streetcar strike; "as they passed the police station, located three blocks from the union hall, many insistently cheered the chief of police, Caballero."52 Some anecdotal evidence also suggests close ties between the Santa Fe Radicals and anarchist sympathizers, but greater research is needed to ascertain the actual extent of these contacts.53

Beyond these occasional expressions of sympathy by the rank and file, however, support for Caballero from the leaders of organized labor was less forthcoming. The established political factions in the labor movement all took an ambivalent stance toward the new provincial administration, dealing pragmatically with Radical authorities over strike-related issues and seeking to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the favorable labor policies.

The different labor factions strove to adapt their language to the new political opportunities by portraying employers as the subjects of foreign capital, and labor demands as the embodiment of the true national interest. Thus the Socialists emphasized that "thousands of proletarian house- holds suffer the African tyranny of foreign capital," which showed nothing but "insolence" and "contempt for this country." They defended the new patterns of state regulation emerging in Santa Fe as "contributing perhaps to greater respect for the country by foreign capitalism."54 The Commu- nists raised similar arguments: "The axis of our future activity must be the struggle against imperialism." The Commiiunists accused Yrigoyen of developing close ties with "imperialist sharks."

The Socialists also endorsed state regulation by asserting that it was needed to protect the interests of both workers and consumers.56 Govern- ment had the responsibility to ensure the availability of services; it would thereby demonstrate that "until the time comes to establish more normal relations between the state and the companies that own and exploit public services, there are many ways of letting foreign capital know that it cannot use the country as a colony from which to extract excessive profits."57

52. LP, July 4, p. 20.

53. Ifigo Carrera, La experiencia radical, 308. For some of this anecdotal evidence, see Rock, Politics in Argentina, 120-21; LV, May 25, 1928, p. 1; LI, Jan. 12, 1929, p. 6.

54. LV, July 26, 1928, p. 1, July 31, p. 1, and Sept. 18, p. 3. See also LP, July 30, p. 21;

and LV, Nov. 23, p. 1.

55. LI, Oct. 20, p. 5, and Oct. 27, p. 1. See also LP, July 30, p, 21.

56. LV, Aug. 3, p. 1, and Sept. 18, p. 3. 57. LV, July 26, p. 1, July 31, p. 1, anid Aug. 3, p. 1.




Furthermore, the Socialists used the example of the United States to argue that rural workers should receive higher wages so as to strengthen Argen- tina's internal market. According to the Socialists, employers in Argentina failed to understand that the nation's progress could be measured only by general welfare, not by the wealth of employers.58

Caballero himself elicited a more confrontational attitude from the different labor factions, which perceived him as a demagogue and an op- portunist seeking to make inroads into their constituency. They initially hesitated about whether to respond to Caballero as a political challenge or to support his initiatives. Although the Socialists stopped short of openly endorsing the police chief, at times they acknowledged that "Rosario's police generally observed during this strike a conciliatory attitude that has precedents in countries such as France." They attributed this to an effort by the new provincial authorities to protect the strong popular support they had received in the election.59

For the syndicalists, the police chief had "embarked on the same current of ideas that inspired them," although they had neither spoken directly with him nor had felt obliged to follow his pronouncements. It was "not the purpose of workers to meddle in matters that were more likely to be of interest to politicians than to workers."60 On the other hand, they acknowledged that the burgueses were strongly against the police chief, "who this time did not want to be Falcon and did not want there to be a Radowitzky. "6' The syndicalists ultimately characterized Caballero as a politician who only pursues electoral ends," seeking labor support in

response to "the imperative needs of Caballerismo, which faces the danger of losing forever its current status through a lack of support from the 'high[est] Party authority."' However, "The bourgeois state, responding to the inflexible laws of the capitalist machine, cannot serve the ends of the revolutionary cause of labor even if one hundred Chiefs of Police honestly pursue these goals."62 Despite these criticisms, the syndicalists accepted and actively pursued government mediation in labor conflicts.63

For the Communists, Caballero represented a version of Radical ide- ology: "While there are relatively peaceful relations between proletarians and the bourgeoisie, Yrigoyenismo can successfully carry out its dema-

58. LV, Nov. 27, p. 2, aind Nov. 30, p. 1.

59. LV, July 24, p. 3. See also LV, Jtuly 11, p. 6, Jully 13, p. 3, JuIly 25, p. 3, JVly 27.

p. 3, and July 29, p. 3. 6o. LN, May 22, p. 1.

61. BP, June 2, p. 4. Buenos Aires police chief Ram6n Falcon repressed strikers in the early l900S and was killed in revenge by the anarclhist Sim6n Radowitzky ini 9gog. See also BP, May 26, p. 3.

62. BP, Aug. 4, p. 4. See also BP, Aug. 11, p. 3. 63. LN, May 18, p. 5, and May 20, p. 1; BP, June 2, p. 3.




goguery; but when class struggle assumes vast proportions and deepens, Yrigoyenismo shows its true face in the bloodiest repressions. 64The Com- munists ridiculed Governor Go6mez Cello as a tool of Caballero and in- sisted that "bourgeois rulers, although they may sometimes look like anti- imperialists and fancy themselves to be laborites, act like what they are as soon as they come together as a cartel: servants of national exploiters and foreign imperialists."65 The principles and actions of Caballero, an "ex-anarchist leader," corrupted the labor movement by deceiving "more effectively than the politics of social democracy. It is the American type adapted to South America, more agile and cunning.... Our party and all class-conscious workers must carry out an energetic offensive to lay bare the nature of Caballerismo, its petty-bourgeois essence. 66

Similarly, the anarchists applauded the labor upsurge in Rosario but cautioned about Caballero. On a self-critical note, they acknowledged that traditional politicians had trumpeted more effective nationalist slo- gans to labor, strengthening the "demagogic politics of Peludismo" and the personal standing of leaders such as Caballero.67 But the anarchists attacked workers who sympathized with the police chief, charging that such sympathy revealed "how terribly naive the proletariat is in trusting the promises of a government that, like all governments, will distribute sablazos and bullets when this is convenient to its plans."68

Each faction deplored the political strategy represented by the police chief and attacked the competing factions for negotiating with Caballero. The syndicalists and Socialists published repeated diatribes against the anarchists, who in turn criticized the syndicalists for seeking official mediation in strikes and playing to the labor strategies of the Santa Fe Radi- cals. The Communists attacked the Socialists for divorcing themaselves from labor and the anarchists for supporting bombings that played to "reaction." The anarchists themselves were divided.69

These different factions all feared Caballero's potential impact because they suspected that Rosario's workers, despite their militancy, remained uncommitted to the specific ideologies or programs of the Left. Evaluating the city's labor unrest, an anonymous militant declared that despite the intensity of the strikes, "the norms of the ongoing and disciplined action of the proletariat, based on stable organization and firm and methodical

64. LI, Oct. 20, p. 5. 65. LI, Jan. 5, 1929, p. 7. 66. LI, Jan. 19, 1929, p. 4. 67. LA, Oct. 27, 1928, p. 2.

68. LA, July 6, p. 4, July 27, pp. 2-3, and Sept. 21, p. 4. 69. For various examiiples of these accusatioins, see BP, June 30, 1928, p. 4; LA, Sept. 9,

p. 2; LI, Oct. 27, p. 5, anid Nov. 17, p. 3; LV, Oct. 13, p. 5, anid Nov. 20, p. 4. On the anarchists' divisioins, see LA, May 26, p. 2, June 9, p. 4, and Nov. 30, p. 1.




procedures, have not yet taken root in the labor movement." The strikes had responded to economic conditions but also to "political circumstances that have allowed the free exercise of strikes."70 The Left saw most local trade union leaders as responding to general actions rather than promoting them. According to the syndicalists, labor organizations needed to keep up with a militant labor movement "both so that [the movement] does not wane, and so that it is not depicted [by political cartoonists] with a lion's body and a mouse's head. "7'

While the established political factions in organized labor feared for their shallow roots among the rank and file, Caballero apparently never could build, or even attempt to build, institutionalized mechanisms of political support among Rosario's trade unions. The Radical leaders in Santa Fe remained committed to mobilizing popular support through the electoral process, and to using their party structure as the most important organizational framework. This strategy had served as the basis of electoral success in early 1928, but it came to represent a political vulnerability later in the year.

The Escalating Offensive

As labor unrest intensified, business organizations and the mainstream press pressured federal authorities to assume responsibility for ensuring public safety and the right to work in Santa Fe. Business leaders not only criticized the passive attitude of the police but openly accused the police chief of directly promoting unrest.72 Business and the press also complained that labor unrest in Rosario was undermining the national economy and "our credit as an exporting country in the international markets."73 Rosario's Federacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias and principal business organizations met in July to criticize the police chief and the governor. After agitated debates, the group declared a citywide lockout beginning July 12, to protest the lack of security and attract federal attention.7'

The lockout lasted 48 hours. Grain merchants and wholesalers handed out signs announcing "closed due to the lack of guarantees," which merchants were to place in shop windows; but police ordered them removed. The Socialists claimed that the lockout was effective among wholesalers

70. LV, Nov. 13, p. 4. 71. BP, June 2, p. 1. See also May 26, p. 2, and Jtunie 9, p. 4; LP, Jully 4, p. 20.

72. For example, LP, Jully 5, p. 13, and July 9, p. 9. See also LV, Jtly 8, p. 3, and July 27, p. 3; LP, May 11, p. 14, July 18, p. 19, and July 25, p. 19.

73. LP, July 6, p. 21. See also July 27, p. 18, Aug. 3, p. 14, and Aug. 21, p. 13.

74. LP, Jtuly 12, p. 20; LV, July 12, p. 3.




but not in retail shops, and accused wholesalers of threatening nonstriking merchants with commercial retaliation to enforce the lockout. The labor press reported that some supporters of Caballero "refused to close their establishments, arguing that they were not members of either the Bolsa or the Camara Sindical and that, in addition, they disagreed with the lockout. " 75 The syndicalists pointed out that the shops of these dissidents were attacked by demonstrators, showing that employers applied the concept of "freedom of work" only to labor. The press reported that the lockout was very effective; nevertheless, the action clearly contributed to a sense of crisis, a "state of disorientation in public opinion."76 Following the lockout, Rosario's Federacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias declared that all legal means had been exhausted in the province and beseeched the protection of national authorities. A few days later, the same organization all but explicitly called for federal intervention.77

Governor Gomez Cello countered that employers were being inflexible in their negotiations with strikers. Force by the police was not an acceptable course of action: the real root of labor unrest was the "economic malaise of the workers," and the use of force would only aggravate matters.78 The president of the Bolsa de Comercio responded that business organizations were calling not for the use of force against strikers but for protection against violent acts.79 Public authorities were being called on to ensure social peace, "marking the true road of collective and individual prosperity, which does not reside in the blind struggle of interests but in their harmony; nor in a routine and frequent leisure that consumes without creating, but in the labor that produces comfort and wealth."80

As labor unrest continued, the political offensive against the police chief intensified.8' Caballero frequently reiterated that by intervening, the city sought to "promote faithful understanding between the parties, so there would be neither vencidos ni vencedores, nor injuries to any dignity, for [the last] is equal among workers and patrones." Accordingly, "the forces of the province will not be at the service of privilege, and the police will not be transformed into persecutors of workers, either of those who

75. BP, Aug. 4, p. 4. 76. LV, Julv 12, p. 3. See also July 13, p. 3; LP, July 13, pp. 12, 19, and July 14,

p. 19. The niational congress debated whether to lau-nch an official investigatioll of the Salnta Fe cIisis, but Personalista representatives argued that ani internal party dispute was drivinig political evenits and that provinicial authorlities had sufficient conitrol over these imiatters. This ended the official debate oni the events. See LV, July 13, pp. 1-2; and Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones, 214-37.

77. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also July 11, p. 18; July 16, p. 8; aind July 27, p. 18. 78. LP, July 13, p. 19. See also July 8, p. 20; aind LV, Jtuly 9, p. 3. 79. See LP, July 14, p. 19. 8o. LP, July 18, p. 19. 81. LP, Aug. 3, p. 14, Aug. 21, p. 13, anid Oct. 7, p. 23.




strike or of those who serve."82 Furthermore, "Radicalism does not accept class struggle. To the contrary, it endeavors to avoid it. . . . We conceive of the state as an indispensable instrument for maintaining social equilib- rium, contemplating all interests . . . but serving in particular to protect the helpless and the weak from the selfishness of the strong."83 The duties of the police as an institution were to "keep order, to guarantee lives and property, but not to lend their assistance so that powerful enterprises can exploit their workers with hunger wages."84

The situation remained a virtual stalemate until November. Despite strong pressure from employers and the mainstream press, both the outgoing Alvear administration and the incoming Yrigoyen government hesitated to send troops to Santa Fe. But by the end of November, two new developments had shifted the balance of power. First, Rosario held municipal elections, and the results were widely perceived as a major defeat for the police chief. This lowered the potential political cost to the federal administration of launching an official offensive against Caballero. About the same time, massive labor unrest spread rapidly to agricultural areas in southern Santa Fe province. Business and the press stepped up the pressure.

In the municipal elections of November 11 the Radicals aligned with Caballero won 11,718 votes out of a total of 42, 145, compared to 12,830 for the opposing Radical factions and 10,431 for the Progressive Democrats. Although these returns produced only minor political realignments in the city council, the mainstream press hailed the election as a major defeat for Caballero. La Nacion reported that the citizens had voted against "a state of anarchy," and that the results made it imperative for the provincial governor to dismiss Caballero.85 For the Buenos Aires Herald, "Lincoln's aphorism that you cannot fool all of the people all of the time has been amply proved in Rosario," for the laboring class "has expressed its disap- proval of the chief of police-a pleasing proof that, at heart, Argentine labor is sound enough and that noisy demagogues in no way represent it." 86

These interpretations of the elections bore a measure of truth. The results represented a major setback for Caballero's political strategy. The disruption of daily life that resulted from heightened labor unrest had con-

82. LP, Sept. 23, p. 20, and Oct 6, p. 19. 83. LP, Oct. 6, p. 19. See also Aug. 13, p. 20, and Oct. 7, p. 8. 84. LV, Sept. 24, p. lo. For more on Caballero's responise, see LP, Sept. 25, p. 19, anid

Oct. 6, p. 19. 85. LN, Nov. 17, p. 5, and Nov. 18, p. 8. El Diario comiiplainied that the governlor's dis-

missal of Caballero was improbable; "the chief of police is the oinly one who rules in Rosario and in the provinice." ED, Nov. 22, p. 3. See also Nov. 17, p. 3.

86. BAH, Nov. 20, p. 6. See also Nov. 23, p. 6, and Nov. 28, p. 6; and ED, Nov. 14, p. 1.




siderably eroded Caballero's support among the voters (although how this erosion varied across the social spectrum must be learned from further research). Even among workers, the political capital Caballero accrued from his labor policies was probably limited, principally because the gains workers made still seemed to result from labor conflicts and trade union activities in which other political factions predominated. From this point of view, the election results exposed the vulnerability of Caballero's labor policies.

The elections represented a turning point in the business offensive against Caballero. Drawing new strength from the results, the Federacion Gremial protested to the federal interior ministry, criticizing the "lack of guarantees" of order in the city and pointing out "the uselessness of its pre- vious protests before municipal authorities." According to the federation, Caballero was "instigator and solely responsible" for labor unruliness in the province, warranting his removal from office. Rosario's major business organizations agreed to call for Caballero's dismissal and to send a delegation to Yrigoyen to request that "he use the means that the Constitution puts at his disposal to reestablish the guarantees we are currently deprived of." Joining the chorus, a group of dissatisfied Rosario Radicals published a manifesto denouncing the provincial administration and calling for federal intervention .87

By late November federal authorities found these demands more com- pelling as labor unrest spread to the southern agricultural areas. There had already been a brief spurt of rural labor conflicts in July, and Rosa- rio's Sociedad Rural had called on the provincial governor to intervene. Gomez Cello had responded that resolution efforts were under way and that reinforcements would be provided to protect "free workers." Rural organizing was led by the carters (conductores de carros) in protest against the increasing use of trucks to transport grain. Complaining that "gasoline threatens to triumph over blood," they demanded that loads be allocated equally to trucks and horse-drawn wagons and that truck-owning farmers not be allowed to transport their neighbors' harvest.88

The new rural unions included other agricultural wage workers, both men and women. The unions called for better wages, union regulation of employment, and improved working conditions. In one strike, workers demanded that employers justify all firings before the union; other stipu- lations included "good food in abundance, including half a liter of wine

87. For the federation's protest, see LP, Nov. 18, p. 22; LN, Nov. 18, p. 5; ED, Nov. 21,

p. 1; TS, Nov. 22, p. 4. On the delegation, LN, Nov. 22, p. 7, and Nov. 24, p. 4. On the Radicals' ml-anifesto, ED, Nov. 21, p. 3.

88. For the governor's statemiient, see LP, July 4, p. 20, July 5, pp. 13, 19, anld Jully 11,

p. 18. For the carters' demands, see BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6; see also BP, Jain. 21, 1929, p. 1.




per meal to each worker, and clean, fresh water. The workers will have 40 minutes for breakfast, an hour and a half for lunch, and half an hour for the afternoon snack." Syndicalists and Communists both were active among these rural trade unions, and the mainstream press suggested that competition between the factions aggravated labor unrest.89

As the new strikes spread, the Sociedad Rural told Go6mez Cello that the approaching harvest demanded measures to "broadly ensure the freedom of work." It also informed the federal minister of agriculture of its appeal.90 The Federacion Agraria Argentina said that tenant farmers were being squeezed between the grain prices offered by merchants and the wage demands of the workers, and alleged that groups of workers were threatening employers who wanted to hire nonunion personnel. Delegates from this group and the Fraternidad Agraria met with Yrigoyen to press the need to investigate rural labor unrest.9' Rosario's chamber of commerce urged the provincial governors of Santa Fe and Cordoba to deploy the rural police to "protect the freedom of work and energetically per- secute the hotheads (exaltados) who are wiping out individual rights and property." 92

Observers reported that the countryside was overwhelmed by chaos. The Liga Patriotica Argentina denounced local authorities and called on Yrigoyen to take appropriate measures, declaring, "fear spreads every- where. During the night, bands of ruffians in automobiles travel the roads, howling, shooting off their guns, and burning the fields wherever they can. God help us!" Similar pleas were made by the Sociedad Rural and by local tenant farmers, who announced that they had decided "to cross their arms and wait for government intervention and the effective guarantee of the freedom of work."93 Rumors circulated that farmers had been killed by strikers. The harvest was in danger; as La Nacion warned, "almost the whole south of the province will be left in a state of pure misery if the conflict is not resolved in the coming week."94

Not all press reports confirmed this situation, however. As late as

89. On the rural unions, see BP, Dec. 29, 1928, p. 1. On their demanids, LN, Nov. 25, 1928, p. 7. On factional inivolvement, BP, Jan. 14, 1928, p. 2, Jan. 21, p. 1, May 12, p. 5, Aug. 11, p. 2, Oct. 20, p. 2, and Nov. 17, p. 3; LI, Oct. 20, pp. 2, 7; LP, Jtly 4, p. 20, Aug. 21, p. 13, Sept. 21, p. 19, Oct. 15, p. 20, Nov. 27, p. 18, and Dec. 4, p. 16; LV, Jan. 1,

p. 23, Oct. 8, p. 8, Oct. 20, p. 4, Oct. 24, p. 1, Oct. 31, p. 4, Nov. 1, p. 4, Nov. 2, p. 3, Nov. 8, p. 3, and Nov. 19, p. 32.

go. LP, Nov. 22, p. 14. See also LN, Nov. 21, p. 3. 91. LN, Nov. 27, p. 4; see also Nov. 23, pp. 1, 11.

92. LP, Nov. 22, p. 19, and Nov. 23, p. 22. See also LN, Nov. 23, p. 11, Nov. 25, p. 8, and Nov. 26, p. 6.

93. On the tenant farmers, see LN, Nov. 25, p. 1. On the Liga's statement, LP, Nov. 22, p. 17; and BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6.

94. LN, Nov. 26, p. 1.




November 22, even conservative La Prensa saw no signs that force was warranted: workers were seeking to organize legally, and employers' alarm was typical during the labor shortages that accompanied each harvest. Within a few days, however, the same newspaper called for public authorities to "repress with energy any act that implies a limitation on the freedom of work."95 Reports on the extent of the rural violence remained contradictory even on the eve of the military intervention. In spite of these ambiguities, late November and early December witnessed an intensified campaign by business and the mainstream press for federal action to curb labor unrest in Santa Fe.96

The campaign was not without contention. The business organizations and their sympathizers in the press portrayed the strikers and their demands as illegitimate, but the labor press responded with a similar attack on employers. The Socialists applauded provincial authorities for their re- straint in placing "the welfare of the native population before the bastard interests of foreign speculation. At stake is a principle of good and healthy nationalism, linked to the situation of our rural peonadas." They attributed the business attack to "the grain speculators of Rosario, effectively aided by the Yrigoyenist anti-Caballeristas of Santa Fe," and blamed those factions for introducing "creole politics" into the efforts of rural workers.97 Communist writers complained that tenant farmers were calling for police action against strikers despite having experienced repression themselves during their conflicts with landowners over rents. "The colonos must fight against their exploiters and not against their exploited."98

Responding to the pressure from business, the federal department of labor sent an inspector to Santa Fe in late November. The inspector attributed much of the unrest to syndicalist militants, and observed that the sons of tenant farmers were being forced to join the rural unions. The farmers protested that "they wished to have the freedom of choosing their peones, particularly because, in this line of work, el peon hace vida en familia con el colono, and they could not allow in their houses persons who did not enjoy their confidence." Moreover, the rural unions intended to maintain a high level of unrest "once the current conflict is resolved." Tenant farmers and merchants urged the federal administration to "guarantee the freedom of work on the basis of justice and harmony between capital and labor."99

95. LP, Nov. 22, p. 14; ibid., Nov. 24, p. 20, and Nov. 26, p. 12. 96. LN, Nov. 30, p. 1, and Dec. 2, p. 3; LP, Nov. 27, p. 18, and Dec. 1, p. 21; ED,

Nov. 29, p. 1; and BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6. 97. On the peonadais, see LV, Nov. 25, p. 1; see also ED, Nov. 26, p. 3. Oin "creole

politics," LV, Nov. 30, p. 1; and LP, Dec. lo, p. 12. 98. LI, Dec. 1, pp. 1, 6. 99. LP, Dec. 4, p. l6; BSAT, Dec. 20, pp. 557-59. See also LP, Nov. 24, p. 20.




In the face of these escalating pressures, Santa Fe provincial authorities portrayed themselves as caught in the middle. The ministro de gobierno argued that his administration was already mediating and controlling labor unrest. Caballero assured the Sociedad Rural that the authorities would protect the harvest, for "the conditions of rural work do not allow the presentation of lists of demiands at mom-ients when reaping the harvest is urgent." The Sociedad Rural broadcast Caballero's statement on radio. Police reinforcemients were sent from Rosario to troubled rural areas.'00

But these conciliatory measures did not satisfy the principal business organizations. A delegation fronm the Federacion Gremial met with Yri- goyen on November 26 to declare that Rosario's labor problems involved "continuous and systematic subversive acts that local authorities are in- capable of repressing" and that "all the malaise of the working class is the work of professional agitators who act with the authorities' tolerance." The federation therefore requested federal protection "to reestablish public calm." 101

Yrigoyen received a second delegation of employers from Santa Fe two days later. They reiterated the complaints about the inaction of the provincial authorities, who "stimulate strikes and consent with their passivity to attacks on property, persons, and institutions." This delegation explained that labor demands in the rural areas were difficult to meet, given the competitive pressures faced by local producers in foreign markets. They were not calling for outright violence against strikers, the delegation said, but given "that the intensity and extension of the [strikes] already exceed local and provincial jurisdictions to encompass much larger areas that appear like a stain over the Argentine map," they asked for "an extreme but certain recourse that can restore peace." The demands were endorsed by the national Sociedad Rural in Buenos Aires.102

Yrigoyen assured these groups that the federal government would not allow these events to continue because he understood that "in all areas of the country, the action of the central power must procure the harmony and welfare of society in general," and his administration would therefore adopt "the necessary measures to remedy that state of affairs, in defense of the trabajo nacional" and "the tranquility of society." 103 In a few days, the interior minister sent Go6iez Cello a telegram calling on provincial authorities to "reestablish the routine of work," and warning, "if Your Ex- cellency does not feel capable of dealing with the situation, or if you are

ioo. LN, Nov. 25, p. 4, and Nov. 26, p. 1; and LP, Nov. 26, p. i6. lol. LP, Nov. 27, pp. 1, 16; ED, Nov. 25, p. i, and Nov. 26, p. 1; and BAH, Nov. 28,

p. 6. 102. LP, Nov. 29, pp. 1-18; LN, Nov. 9, p. 1; BSAT, Dec. 5, PP. 529-34.

103. LN, Nov. 29, p. 1; LP, Nov. 27, P. 16, anid Nov. 2-9, p. 17.




of the opinion that you have not sufficient means to do so, kindly inform this government of the fact so that it may take the measures it deems necessary."104

La Prensa applauded the presidential statement for rebutting the political doctrine of Caballero, reestablishing an appropriate role for state agencies, and signaling a "healthy evolution" in the labor policies of the national administration. El Diario made similar points, referring to Caballero and fellow leaders as "provincial caudillejos with Commu- nist pretensions," and declaring that "order, discipline, and liberty are the bywords of the healthy population of the countryside, and the national executive power must intervene so that these bywords do not become a myth. . . . In the last elections, the pueblo rosarino already signaled the road to follow: War on anarchy, war on bolshevism." Observed the Buenos Aires Herald: "Affairs are no longer within the political arena. The men who are protesting most vehemently are not politicians and never have been. They are the businessmen, producers, and traders of the province. No government can afford to close its ears to clamor from such a source." 105

The provincial nministro de gobierno again responded that the instances of labor unrest "lack the overriding importance given to them by alarm- ist indicators, and cannot be reasonably or justifiably attributed to the conduct of the government." Discontent among workers was ultimately the result of the situation inherited by the current administration. Em- ployer organizations should act at times of "public tranquility" to promote national policies aimed at resolving economic problems, rather than falling into "the uncertainty brought by labor agitations, under the mistaken assumption that they will immediately cease by the simple virtue of intervention by the authorities."'06 Santa Fe's governor earlier had given a similar response to the Interior Ministry, suggesting that "lowly motives" were responsible for making labor unrest a central political issue.'07 But these attempts at dissuasion failed to reverse the course of events.

The Federal Response

Finally, on December 2, 1928, Yrigoyen ordered a regiment of mounted infantry to Santa Fe. He justified his action by declaring that provincial authorities had failed to protect employers, and society in general,

104. LP, Dec. 1, p. 16; BAH, Dec. 2, p. 3; TS, Dec. 2, p. 4; LN, Dec. 4, p. 2.

105. LP, Nov. 28, p. 16; RRP, Nov. 30, p. 7, made similar commllents. ED, Nov. 27,

p. 1; see also Nov. 29, p. 3, and Nov. 30, p. 3; LN, Nov. 27, p. 8, and Dec. 6, p. 8. BAH, Nov. 30, p. 6; see also LN, Nov. 30, p. 7.

1o6. LP, Dec. 2, p. 9. 107. LN, Dec. 2, pp. 1, 8; LP, Dec. 2, p. 9.




from "disruptive elements that are alien to the agricultural activities of the province." According to the text of Yrigoyen's order, "the whole pueblo, [which is] cultured, healthy, and aware of the importance of the existing circumstances, wished to obtain immediate guarantees and reassur- ances, depositing all this trust in the action of the executive power of the nation."'08 The next day, the Tenth Cavalry was sent to Rosario to coordi- nate the federal forces and to help "maintain order and the freedom of work." The troops were housed at the headquarters of the Sociedad Rural. Small military units and representatives from the ministry of agriculture were dispatched to areas of labor unrest, where they were "very well received by rural commerce and the farmers." The arrival of the army had dampened the rural strikes, allowing employers to hire nonunion workers and forcing many organizers to abandon their efforts.'09

The startled provincial authorities responded with alarm. Caballero rushed back from the city of Santa Fe to meet with federal representatives. Caballero, Gomez Cello, and other officials met frequently over the next few days; it was rumored that the provincial ministers, at great effort, had finally persuaded the governor not to resign in protest. On the other hand, the vice governor, Elias de la Puente, publicly criticized Gomez Cello, complaining that "the situation in which the province finds itself is a consequence of having ignored my loyal advice." The intervention was also supported by Santa Fe senator Armando Antille, who called for new provincial elections: "The permanence of sefior Gomez Cello in the government represents a danger to party unity and institutional stability." 0

The stock and grain exchanges were also satisfied with the executive measures "to safeguard the agricultural wealth of the region," and applauded the troops' arrival in a special letter to Yrigoyen."'1 The Fed- eracion Gremial hailed "the measures adopted to ensure tranquility and trust for the hardworking pueblo of the second province of the republic," and other business organizations were equally enthusiastic."12 In a few days, the minister of agriculture announced that "since the arrival of the national troops, the rural strike has become completely paralyzed." 113

Nevertheless, the Federacion Gremial complained that strikes continued to hurt businesses in Rosario. General Marcilesi, commander of the troops

1o8. LP, Dec. 3, p. 9. For additional reports, see LN, Dec. 3, p. 1. 109. LP, Dec. 4, 1928, p. 16, Dec. 6, p. 22, and Mar. 8, 1929, p. 21; LN, Dec. 4, 1928,

pp. 1, 2.

lo. De la Puente was quoted in LP, Dec. 4, p. 21; Antille in LC, Dec. 7, p. 5. See also LN, Dec. 3, p. 5, and Dec. 4, p. 2; LP, Dec. 5, p. 18, and Dec. 6, p. 22; LC, Dec. 9, p. 5.

ill. Bolsa de Cereales, Memnoria e informe (1928-29) (Bulenos Aires, 1929), 65; LP, Dec. 4, p. 16.

112. LN, Dec. 4, p. 2; anid RRP, Dec. 7, p. 7. 113. LP, Dec. 5, p. 18.



2-6 | HAHR I FEBRUARY I ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ

in Rosario, responded that he had "received instructions from the national government to intervene in any conflict where guarantees are lacking." Businesses needed only to request his protection for the troops to be mo- bilized "to guarantee the freedom of work." The press reported that these declarations stimulated commercial and stock market operations."14

Most of the mainstream press also responded with enthusiasm. A front- page editorial in El Diario challenged Gomez Cello's assertions that there were no major disorders in the province: "That attitude is so improbable that one wonders whether sefior Go6mez Cello is the [governor] of the province of Santa Fe or a delegate of Moscow's Third International." A subsequent editorial declared that a preferable solution would have been for the governor to fire Caballero, for the federal forces were likely to "leave the governor under the thumb of Rosario's chief of police, the official [responsible for this problem] who espouses revolutionary communism." El Diario urged a broader action to ensure "the regular functioning of permanent institutions," but continued to support the military intervention: "We applaud any measure taken by the government to prevent discord, anarchy, terror, and bolshevism from ruling in our country, a country of liberty, of work, and of respect." La Nacion and the Buenos Aires Herald also hailed the federal action."5

Other newspapers dissented. La Prensa had already stated its opinion that the strikes fell under the jurisdiction of provincial authorities: the stability of elected authorities had never been endangered, the situation in rural areas had greatly improved over the past few days, and the Rosario strikes had been virtually settled. The provincial authorities had failed to safeguard the freedom of work, but this did not allow the federal administration to "reach beyond its constitutional limits." The authorities of Santa Fe had been freely elected, and could only be sanctioned by ballots. The affair, said La Prensa, reflected a split among the Radicals over the closing of the provincial legislature and over the provincial administration's en- dorsement of "the doctrinaire anarchism of Rosario's police chief . .. and his ambiguous theories about the attitude befitting public authority when struggles between patrones and asalariados explode." Yet these internal party disputes over appropriate labor strategies failed to justify the federal action. In Rosario, La Capital raised similar reservations."16 But the reservations were ridiculed by the Buenos Aires Herald.

114. For Marcilesi's statement, see LP, Dec. 6, p. 22. See also LN, Dec. 7, p. 6. 115. ED, Dec. 3, p. 1, Dec. 4, p. 3, Dec. 5, p. 1, and Dec. 7, p. 1; LN, Dec. 3, p. 6;

BAH, Dec. 4, p. 6. 116. LP, Nov. 30, p. 11, Dec. 3, p. 13, Dec. 4, p. 21, and Dec. 6, p. 22; LC, Dec. 3,

P. 3.




If ever a government merited presidential censure, it is that of Santa Fe, yet some of our contemporaries see a violation of provincial autonomy! Possibly, by a strict interpretation of the letter of the Consti- tution without regard for its spirit, they can make up an argument in support of their case, but we should be sorry to see such a thesis generally adopted. What it means, in reality, is that local authorities would have the right, in any circumstance, to do exactly as they pleased. Property might be destroyed and even human life sacrificed without the victims' having any chance of redress.117

The Review of the River Plate commneinted that the federal action hadl saved the province's harvest, and "there could be no greater immorality than allowing the bread grain that God has made to grow in this boun- teous season to fall to the ground and rot for want of the right of way to go ahead with the harvest."" "8 La Nacion's correspondent even remarked that the troops should have been accompanied by arimiy planes, for their patrols over rural areas would have brought "tranquility to homes in the couintryside." 119

Even La Capital soon shifted from a critical to an openly suLpportive position. In an editorial published a few days after the troops arrived, it explained that although it still suspected constitutional violations in the action, "the inefficiency or passivity of the provincial governmeint in repressing the excesses that came to characterize the rural strike in Santa Fe undoubtedly imposed this position on the national executive in the face of the imperative and unavoidable duty to guarantee public and private interests." Although the measure may have been excessive, "the fact is that it has produced an undeniable feeling of relief among the agricultural- ists, industrialists, and merchants of the province," improving conditions for "cooperation and harmony between capital and labor" by "suppressing the causes of the disturbances and disorders that have diverted the rural workers' movement." 120

The syndicalist press referred to the troops as malo'n blanco and compared the intervention in Santa Fe to the repression of strikes in Patagonia earlier in the decade: "We had supposed that the Argentine army was des- tined for greater missions, and that conscripts, largely sons of the pueblo, would not be placed in the situation of having to fire at their own fathers or brothers." 121 It attacked the Federaci6n Agraria Argentina as "reaction-

117. BAH, Dec. 4, p. 6. Along similar linies, see Dec. 5, p. 6. ii8. RRP, Dec. 7, p. 9. 119. LN, Dec. 4, p. 9, Dec. 5, p. 1. 120. LC, Dec. 5, p. 4. 121. EOM 9:123 (Dec. i6, 1928), 1. For the synidicalist r-esponise, see BP, Dec. 22, p. 3.

Also, BP, Dec. 12, p. 1.




ary and bourgeois" and accused "the bourgeois press" of carrying out an offensive against strikers "by order of foreign capitalists." The capitalists in question were the "grain sharks" "speculators sitting in Holland, France, North America, etc., and with branches in Buenios Aires, Rosario, and other cities, who through scandalous and criminal maneuvers fix the price of grain in all countries of the world according to their wishes." 122

The Socialists condemned the use of the army in labor conflicts and characterized the intervention as an "armed invasion of the province." 12:3

Some sectors of the labor press remained optimistic about the future of the movement. The syndicalists themselves declared that "the reaction- ary sirens of capitalism can blast, inciting a response. But this no longer matters, nor does it scare anyone; their screams are like smoke, which vanishes in the air." 124 But the swift effect of repression on the rural and urban labor organizations dispelled that optimism. Soon after the intervention, the Union Sindical Argentina held a rally in Rosario to protest the army's presence; although it was a Sunday, only 150 people attended.'25 Recognizing the impact of the intervention, the anarchists offered a more pessimistic prognosis: "It is the beginning of a repression that will not take long to be savagely unleashed over the entire movement. Rosario's current situation should teach us to struggle against it in its true spheres: . . . the high spheres of the national government, a government of despotism, cowardice, and dictatorial excess." 126

Although the labor press criticized the federal measures, labor organizations failed to raise a strong response to the intervention. This was partly because of continuing factional struggles. The syndicalists met with Yrigoyen within days of the event and reportedly blamed most of the rural disruptions on "the subversive action" of elements from outside the syndicalist labor federation. They also informed the president that they were stopping their organizational drive in the province.'17 The Social- ists and anarchists denounced syndicalist union members for obtaining credentials from the army that allowed them to organize in the Santa Fe area. The syndicalists first called these accusations falsehoods, but later argued that such negotiations with the military were necessary to continue an effective struggle.'28 These factional divisions further undermined the labor movement's bargaining power. Even the anarchists recognized that

122. BP, Dec. i, p. i, anid Dec. 12, p. 4. 123. EOM 9:124 (Jani. 1, 1929), 1; LP, Dec. 11, 1928, p. 21.

124. BP, Dec. 1, p. 1. 125. LP, Dec. 17, p. 21.

126. LA, Mar. i6, 1929, p. 4. 127. LP, Dec. 5, 1928, p. 18. 128. LP, Dec. 9, p. 7. See also BP, Dec. 12, pp. 1, 3-4, aind Dec. 29, p. 1.




unions were fighting among themselves in Rosario rather than promoting solidarity with the rural workers.'29

The leading labor periodicals likewise failed to keep the focus on the Santa Fe events. By mid-December, the Communist press was giving priority coverage to police repression of the rally held to protest Presi- dent Hoover's visit to Buenos Aires. The anarchist paper was following the arrest of two anarchist militants whom the police had accused of terrorist activities. If these sectors of the press touched on the Santa Fe events, it was to condemn the Yrigoyen administration as a bourgeois dictatorship that served imperialism and capitalist reaction. Conflicts between the federal administration and provincial authorities, as well as ongoing disputes in the Radical party, were perceived by most labor organizations to involve an internal struggle in the bourgeoisie, and participation in this struggle was not viewed as a viable or promising course of action for labor.'30

In the second week of December, Caballero issued a lengthy document announcing his resignation as Rosario's police chief. After reviewing the events that had taken place in Santa Fe since May, Caballero accused employers of conducting a repressive offensive against labor.'3' La Prensa criticized his statement, noting that the police chief had been well aware of the political consequences of allowing labor unrest to continue. La Nacion declared that the social policies of Rosario's police chief were in- compatible with the national constitution, and characterized Caballero as a desorbitado. The Buenos Aires Herald sneered, "Rosario must be a very wicked city indeed, for apparently there is only one truthful man in it.... [The] press, Bolsa de Comercio, Sociedad Rural, Bolsa de Cereales [grain exchange], and private individuals . .. are unmitigated liars . .. joined in an unholy conspiracy to make the virtues of the chief of police appear as vices." By the middle of December, Caballero was reportedly attempting to meet with federal officials in Buenos Aires, but public authorities were avoiding him, reportedly under instructions "from sefior Yrigoyen . . . so as not to receive the document of resignation he had brought." 132

Yrigoyen's response to the Santa Fe events was undoubtedly influenced by the personal challenge represented by Caballero, who had designed his own labor strategy to assert himself as the leader of a new Radical faction. But Caballero's efforts to implement this strategy at the provincial level were greatly constrained by the tensions they generated on both a local

129. LA, Jan. 12, 1929, p. 4. 130. LI, Dec. 15, 1928, p. 6, and Jani. 1, 1929, p. 1; LA, Jani. 12, 1929, p. 4. 131. Caballero, Discursos, 513. 132. LP, Dec. 12, 1928, p. 20, anid Dec. 13, p. 15; LN, Dec. 4, p. 9, anid D)ec. 14, p. 6;

BAH, Dec. 13, p. 6; LC, Dec. 15, p. 5; see also Dec. 10, p. 5.




and national scale. Caballero continued to pursue some of his tactics after the 1930 coup that unseated Yrigoyen. His subsequent political career, however, was not based on the type of alliances and discourse that he culti- vated in L928.133 The Radical party continued to lack a strong and coherent labor strategy, remaining "indecisive, moderate, and contradictory" in its policies toward labor.'34

Despite the federal intervention in Santa Fe, business organizations and the mainstream press continued to criticize the Yrigoyen administration for lacking stable labor policies. After the December events, the newspapers began to complain that strikes had not been totally eradicated in the province, and there was a persistent perception that the Yri- goyen administration was associated with rising conflict and uncontrollable violence throughout the country.'35 Furthermore, Yrigoyen continued to make gestures designed to promote labor support; for example, declaring May 1 a national holiday in L929.136 These activities raised doubts about the Radical administration's true sympatlhies. Also criticized was the highly personal manner in whiclh Yrigoyen sought to intervene in labor conflicts. Such a strategy, critics complained, distracted his administration from other important matters.

Political opposition to the Yrigoven administration among these sectors, however, remained moderate. For business and the mainstream press, the federal intervention bode well for the country's future. No major labor conflicts obstructed the next harvest, and labor unrest declined, except for a brief upsurge in August 1929. Noting that Argentina was en- joying high rates of growth in agriculture, industry, foreign investment, and immigration, the Buenos Aires Herald declared, "It is our conviction that Argentina is on the verge of a great industrial and commllercial boom. All is bright and healthy in our particular garden. Let others dream of

133. In October 1930, for examiiple, the press r-eported that Caballero was cr-eatinlg a new political agruipaci6no called Radical Sudista. Dturinig the regimiie of Agustini P. Jtusto, Caballero was appointed pr-esident of the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal (1932-36). He onice againi became a niationial seniator for Sanita Fe in 1937-43 and vice presidenlt of the Seniate for- 1941-43. See LP, Oct. 17, 1930, p. 20; Qtuient es qtuien eni la Ar-gentinla, 1958-59 (Btlenlos Aires: Kraft, 1959), 150.

134. This characterizationi of the Radicals' labor policies belongs to Jos6 Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thotight (Stainford: Stanifor-d Univ. Press, 1963), 224.

135. LP, Dec. 24, 1928, p. 9, Jani. 27, 1929, p. 18, aiid Fel. 8, 1929, p. 22.

136. LP, May i, 1929, p. 15. The admiiniistr-ation even forced the Jockey Clib to canlcel its scheduled r-aces, saying that the holiday was initenided as a day of r-est in all activities.

137. LP, Aug. 4, 1929, p. 14. Diego Abad de Sanitillain suggests that "due to his whole upbr-iniging, [Yirigoyeil] could niot be a i-uler who had clear-ly thought about social pr-oblems, but his patriarchalism could compenisate in part for this deficiencv." Abad de Sanitillhin, "El movimienito obrero ar-genitinio anite el golpe de estado del 6 de setieimbre de 1930," in La crisis de 1930. 2: Memorias, ed. Federico Pinedo et al. (Btuenos Aires: Cenitr-o Editor de Am6rica Latina, 1986), 209-22, 214.




war and military power. Our future, in all its greatness and brightness, depends on peace and work. There is no reason why Argentina should not have an abundance of both." 138 The reversal of these expectations with the onset of the depression in 1929, of course, led directly to the military coup of 1930.

Conclusions

In all likelihood, the federal intervention in Santa Fe not only showed the limits of Caballero's labor strategy and political discourse, but also undermined the long-term stability of the Yrigoyen administration. Strong pressures from business and the mainstream press lowered the government's threshold of tolerance for labor unrest and pushed the administration into a repressive posture, more moderate than but similar to the one adopted by the first Yrigoyen regime in the late l910S and early 1920S.

The action also undermined popular support for Yrigoyen, which partially explains why the labor movement did not actively defend his administration at the time of the 1930 coup. The administration's national legitimacy was eroded by its use of federal intervention to resolve political disputes with provincial governments it did not like. Moreover, this use of force helped erode the legitimacy of democratic processes, fortifying a political language that justified the use of coercive measures as necessary for the defense of national interests and the defeat of subversion.

Labor unrest played an important role in shaping the political language of powerful elites, conservatives, and labor organizations. The provincial authorities in Santa Fe, for example, promulgated a political rhetoric that called for the state to assume a more active role in mediating conflicts between workers and employers. This notion was not terribly innovative, for business and the mainstream press were also asking state authorities to increase their regulation of labor-capital conflicts. But the political discourse of Radical leaders such as Caballero went beyond the defense of these regulating functions to call, in the name of social justice and economic freedom, for the active defense of labor interests against capitalist exploitation. In an attempt to broaden the appeal of this discourse, provincial authorities also advocated the protection of consumers from unscrupu- lous private enterprise, and national interests from the ravages of foreign speculation.

Beyond the insights they provide into the relationship between the Radical party and the labor movement and the evolution of state regulation of capital-labor conflicts, the 1928 events in Santa Fe illuminate

138. BAH, Dec. 11, 1928, p. 6.




the ongoing formation of labor identity in Argentina. For example, many elements of the political images, rhetoric, and alliances that emerged at this time reappeared later in the interwar period, particularly after the 1943 coup. In this sense, these earlier attempts to develop a closer institutional relationship between the labor movement and political parties provide a sound basis on which to evaluate the fundamental continuities and discontinuities in the origins of populism.



korzeniewicz - the labor politics of radicalism: the santa fe crisis of 1928

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