kosovo's path towards the nato partnership for peace (pfp) programme

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POLICY PAPER:

KOSOVO’S PATH TOWARDS THE NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) PROGRAMME

CO-AUTHORS: Mentor VRAJOLLIPëllumb KALLABA

This project is supported by Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS)

Prishtina, KosovoPrill, 2012

Qamil Hoxha, 2-210000 Prishtina, KosovoElectronic Address: [email protected]; Official Webpage: www.qkss.orgTel: +381(0) 38221420

© CopyrightsALL RIgHTS RESERVED BY: KOSOVAR CEnTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (KCSS)1

1 All views expressed in this policy brief are of the authors’ and may not necessarily represent the donor’s view

TABLE OF COnTEnTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIOn.. ........................................................................................................ 5

THE NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) PROGRAMME .................................. 6 ITS IMPACT On THE WESTERn BALKAnS ............................................................. 6 WHAT IS nATO PARTnERSHIP FOR PEACE PROgRAMME?............................. 6 nATO PFP PARTnERS In EASTERn AnD SOUTH-EASTERn EUROPE ......... 7POLITICAL CHALLEngE........................................................................................................ 8 CHALLEngES DERIVIng FROM FOUR nOn-RECOgnIZIng COUnTRIES ...................................................................................................................... 9 DOMESTIC SUPPORT AnD STRATEgIC VISIOn .............................................. 12InSTITUTIOnAL CHALLEngES......................................................................................... 14 InTERnATIOnAL MILITARY PRESEnCE - KFOR ................................................ 14 KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE ..................................................................................... 15 BILATERAL AnD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIOn OF KSF ............................ 19RECOMMEnDATIOnS ......................................................................................................... 21 TO nATO .......................................................................................................................... 21 TO THE MInISTRY OF KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE ........................................... 21 TO KOSOVO gOVERnMEnT .................................................................................... 21 TO THE FOUR nOn-RECOgnIZIng COUnTRIES (SPAIn, SLOVAKIA, RUMAnIA AnD gREECE) ......................................................................................... 22BIBLIOgRAPHY....................................................................................................................... 23 LEgISLATIOn AnD STRATEgIES ............................................................................ 23 InTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................. 23 REPORTS AnD ARTICLES ......................................................................................... 23

5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIOn

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICO International Civilian Office

KFOR Kosovo Force

KSF Kosovo Security Force

MKSF Ministry for Kosovo Security Force

nATO north Atlantic Treaty Organization

PfP Partnership for Peace Programme

PSOTC Peace Support Operations Training Centre

RACVIAC Regional Arms Control Verification and

Implementation Assistance Centre

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

UnSC United nations Security Council

6RRUGA E KOSOVËS DREJT

PROGRAMIT TË NATO-S PPP

ITS IMPACT On THE WESTERn BALKAnS

WHAT IS nATO PARTnERSHIP FOR PEACE PROgRAMME?

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme, as an initiative of the north Atlantic Treaty Organization (nATO), was launched in 1994, following the corresponding Brussels Summit.2 This initiative has been considered an important strategic step has engendered favourable conditions for joint cooperation between nATO and the former Warszaw(a) Pact, including other post-communist states in Europe.3

Since the outset of the initiative, the role of the PfP Programme has been crucial in determining the forthcoming processes of Euro-Atlantic integrations which occurred in Europe over the last two decades. In several reports and academic journals, this has been considered as being half-way to nATO integration. In general, the concept of nATO’s PfP is based on the principle of solidarity which states that the ‘instability in any part of Europe would constitute a threat to its members’.4 As a result of this approach, nATO extended its engagement beyond efforts to maintain security in the territories of the member countries, cooperating more on a regional and global security level. Indeed the nATO PfP Programme precedes the whole process of nATO integration and membership, which is the ultimate step towards long-term peace and stability.

2 For more details about the Brussels Summit, 1994 please open the link: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9401-3.htm

3 See the publication: nATO Partnerships, DoD needs to Assess U.S. Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program, 2010, http://books.google.com/books?id=7kdp1AIozMMC

4 See the Article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1549072.stm

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PARTNERITETI PËR PAQE (PPP)

nATO PFP PARTnERS In EASTERn AnD SOUTH-EASTERn EUROPE

In total, to date, there are 34 states which have signed the PfP. Out of those, 22 countries are only currently participating in the Partnership for Peace Programme (the majority of these countries hail from Eastern/South-Eastern Europe or Eurasia)5, whereas theremaining12 countries were consequently granted full nATO membership.

numbering among the countries that joined the PfP Programme are some from the Western Balkans; with the exception of Kosovo. Albania (1994) and Macedonia (1995) were the first ones to sign the PfP, followed more recently by Croatia (2001). The latest round of the PfP agreement in the region took place at the Riga Summit in 2006 where Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia joined the PfP.

5 See the list of countries which joined the nATO PfP programme: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm



POLITICAL CHALLEngES

In comparison to other countries in the region, the challenges of Kosovo for joining the Euro-Atlantic processes are far more complex. The Assembly of Kosovo declared Independence on the 17th of February 2008, after two years of unsuccessful negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade mediated by the United nations. The resulting Declaration of Independence was based on the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,6 a document led by Marti Ahtisaari - a Special Envoy appointed by former Un Secretary general. The Proposal Plan concluded that Kosovo should be granted Independent Status that should be supervised for a period of 5 years by international missions such as the International Civilian Office (ICO), the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and nATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Until now, Kosovo has been recognized by 89 Un Member States7, which include the majority of the most powerful Western democracies8, On the other hand, there are still some important states which have not recognized Kosovo. Among those countries two are permanent members of Un Security Council (UnSC)9, as well as five European Union member states.10 four of which are also nATO11 members. Their refusal to recognise Kosovo has significantly slowed down Kosovo’s path towards regional, European and Euro-Atlantic integration, regardless of efforts made by the Kosovo government.

6 The “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” is widely known also as the Ahtisaari Plan or Ahtisaari’s Proposal Plan. To see the full contain of this document please open the following link: http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf

7 On 13 March 2012 Sao Tome and Principe has been the 89th country which recog-nized Kosovo. For more information about the list of countries who recognized Kosovo see: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1,33

8 See the list of countries that recognized Kosovo: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33

9 These countries are: Russia and China. Russia represents the most problematic country when it comes to recognition of Kosovo considering that it is has been consistently supportive of the official political line followed by Belgrade

10 The 5 EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo to date are: Spain, Romania, Slovakia, greece and Cyprus Persertije

11 These 4 nATO countries are: Spain, Romania, Slovakia and greece.

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Indeed, despite the high level of nATO’s direct involvement in Kosovo for more than a decade and irrespective of the fact that all Kosovo’s neighbouring countries have already signed PfP-s with nATO, Kosovo continues to remain the only country in the region that has not entered into PfP accession negotiations. As matter of fact, and arguably for well-known reasons, there have been no proper conditions in Kosovo which could support the prospect of Kosovo signing the PfP agreement until now. Kosovo was still in the process of capacity building and as such could not assert its candidacy to join Euro-Atlantic accession agreements. Hence this can be seen as the reason why Kosovo institutions did not officially apply to nATO to start the process of eventually signing the PfP.12 These delays were not only attributed to political constraints, but can also be attributed to the internal security transition which has been occurring over the last four years. However, considering that now the Kosovo security sector has entered its final stage of strategic review, the expression of interest for Euro-Atlantic integration is finally getting a higher priority on the institutional agenda. Therefore, at this stage it is very important to analyse challenges that Kosovo might face due to those 4 nATO non-recognizing countries and other potential pitfalls regarding the nATO integration process.

CHALLEngES DERIVIng FROM FOUR nOn-RECOgnIZIng COUnTRIES

In the case of nATO integration, the main problem consists on the attitude of 4 nATO members that have, to date, not recognized Kosovo, such as: Spain, Slovakia, greece and Romania. The rejection of formal recognition of Kosovo makes the contractual relationship between nATO and Kosovo highly complicated. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, the statement by the north Atlantic Council remained unchanged: “Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence yesterday, nATO reaffirms that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UnSCR 1244, as agreed by Foreign Ministers in December 2007, unless the Un Security Council decides otherwise.’’ 13

12 Interview with Ibrahim gashi, deputy Foreign Affairs Minister,18.02.2012

13 Statement by the north Atlantic Council after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, nATO, 2008-02-18 available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-025e.html



This had implications on the mandate of the nATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR), which still maintains its presence under the legal framework of UnSC Resolution 1244. Moreover, these four countries were not even influenced by the advisory opinion of International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 22nd July 2010 which concluded that ‘the Declaration of Kosovo’s Independence of the 17 February 2008 did not violate the general international law’14.

nevertheless, this research did not discover any active attempts by these countries to hamper or stop further Euro-Atlantic integration vis-à-vis Kosovo and as a corollary; the situation is more advanced than the EU integration process. The fact that one of the most “proactively” hesitant countries towards Kosovo in the EU is Cyprus, a could make progress more difficult, however, it is not a nATO member and therefore may not produce significant problems for Kosovo and its path towards PfP.

Another important indicator which could be considered as promising for Kosovo’s path towards the PfP Programme, and consequentially attaining full nATO membership is linked to the political consent provided by all member states, including four of the non-recognizing countries, in the Standing-To of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)15. While details on the KSF will be provided in the following part of this policy brief, it is worth mentioning that through participation in KFOR training and advice programmes, Romania and greece have both supported the efforts for the consolidation of KSF. This research discovered that there is currently a greek contingent which is still present in Kosovo, including Romanian advisors and trainers.16 On the other hand, while Spain and Slovakia do not directly support the efforts for consolidating KSF, these countries have never displayed any intent to block the process.

There are arguments stating that the limited participation in the KFOR mission by non-recognizing countries is also related to their pragmatic approach. Therefore, there is no clear argument as to whether the withdrawal of the

14 For more details please read the ICJ final decision asserting “Accordance with the International Laws of the Unilateral Declaration of the Independence in Respect of Kosovo” in the following link: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf

15 See the Article: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm

16 See the Article: http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf

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Slovak17. as well as Spanish contingents is totally interrelated with their attitude towards the statehood of Kosovo, but it is also fair to state that their withdrawal is also related to their own internal problems and defence budgetary cuts. Over the 10 years of their presence in Kosovo, Spain provided an important contribution to the KFOR mission. In total, over the period 22,000 Spanish soldiers served in Kosovo while in 2000 nATO appointed the Spanish Lieutenant general Juan Ortuñoas the head of KFOR mission18. This clearly highlights that Spain had quite substantial financial burden, therefore it is logical to argue that financial considerations predominantly dictated Spanish attitude towards KFOR’s mission.19 On the other hand, Slovakia announced intentions to reduce their contribution the moment when nATO decided to downsize the mission, declaring that budgetary restrictions and the improvement of the security situation in their area of operation as their main reasons for leaving20, or withdrawing its forces from Kosovo.

At the same time, however, there are several additional important positive indications that might have softened the approach of the non-recognizing countries towards Kosovo. The latest agreement between Prishtina and Belgrade over the participation of Kosovo in regional initiatives (despite the internal reactions and dissatisfactions) may prove to be an important factor and might improve Kosovo’s chances regarding more significant regional and international integration processes21. including the nATO PfP Programme22. What’s more, Kosovo’s non-inclusion risks undermining one of the main goals of the Programme which is to create a regional partnership of military cooperation. An invitation for Kosovo to sign the PfP would contribute

17 Based on KCSS’ discussion with Slovak officials and civil society, the Slovak contingent withdrawal took place due to the Slovakian role in Afghanistan as well as other post-conflict countries as well as due to the budgetary constraints. Also see article: http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/40317/2/slovak_troops_will_leave_kosovo.html

18 Larry Wentz, Lesson Learned for Kosovo: The KFOR experience, Command And control Research Programme, p.25 http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf,

19 See the article: http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2009/chronicle_08/chronicle_08.pdf

20 Even though Slovakia did not participate in the preparation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy Mission in Kosovo, as soon as EULEX declared itself operational (by the end of 2008) Slovakia redeployed a contribution dedicated to Kosovo by sending a limited number of police officers, number between 6 and 8 depending on the lengths of their opera-tions tours. http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/StaffInfo.php

21 See the article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17156905

22 Hashim Thaçi, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Press Release, 24th February 2012, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/index.php?page=1,9,2689,



positively towards improving the security situation in Kosovo and the whole of the Western Balkans region. Further to this, the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force has, since its inception in 2008, been provided with substantial advice on daily basis by the nATO Advisory Team deployed by the Defence Policy and Planning Division. Consequently, through this direct support, despite its status neutral approach, nATO adopted a modus-vivendi in coexistence with post-independent and sovereign centric institutions in Kosovo.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT AnD STRATEgIC VISIOn

From the political perspective, it is very important to mention the willingness, trust and support of Kosovo citizens towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Indeed, surveys conducted with Kosovo’s citizens indicated that nATO and its KFOR mission is one of the most trusted security mechanisms in the country.23 Despite the high level of trust and support demonstrated by Kosovo citizens and institutional leaders, the aforementioned political challenges are predominantly holding Kosovo back from entering the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

From the institutional point of view, virtually all the aspirations of Kosovo for joining nATO and corollary PfP could be traced throughout national strategic documents and legislation pertaining to the security sector. The vision for nATO membership is explicitly mentioned in almost every document alongside EU integration. As such, the political discourse considers Euro-Atlantic integration as one of the main midterm and long-term goals.

Bearing in mind the interest expressed by Kosovo’s institutions to move in statehood issues forward, the necessity for gradually revising the international approach towards Kosovo is emerging as an important issue. It is very clear that the revision of nATO’s approach towards Kosovo should take into account the needs for gradual substitution of its current influential role, exercised through its direct physical presence24. in favour of strongly emphasised support towards Kosovo institutions in

23 Early Warning Report, UnDP Kosovo, 2010, P. 9 http://www.kosovo.undp.org/reposi-tory/docs/EWR_eng_web-opt.pdf

24 Exercised through KFOR presence in Kosovo



developing local ownership in the defence sector. The PfP Programme has been proven to be an important tool used by nATO in order to support emerging countries in building their respective security sectors, underpinned by democratic practice. Therefore, the prospect of Kosovo signing the PfP Agreement with nATO will be ultimate necessity, the former must moves towards, not only to maintain mutual trust on the positive development of regional processes, but it will also effectively grant long-term peace and stability to Kosovo, as well as the wider area. Supporting transformational tools through PfP will also serve to strengthen civil society capacities in educational and training components, such as the nATO School in Oberammergau, germany; the nATO Defence College in Rome, Italy and some 20 national Partnership Training and Educating Centres.25

25 See the Partnership Tools http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E87CB788-E5249D64/natol-ive/topics_80925.htm



InSTITUTIOnAL CHALLEngES

InTERnATIOnAL MILITARY PRESEnCE - KFOR

Up until independence, 17th February 2008, defence policies and military tasks were entirely the responsibility of KFOR. Indeed, there are some of these competences that have been exclusively exercised by KFOR since 1999 to present day. However, throughout the years, the degree of KFOR’s involvement in Kosovo has been considerably transformed and rather reduced.26 In other words, when KFOR initially entered Kosovo, it numbered in excess of 50,000 military troops27, whereas currently there are only 6, 226 KFOR personnel28 on the ground and the plans for further downsizing of the KFOR’s personnel ranks highly on nATO’s priority agenda. This reflects the improvement of the security situation on the overall territory of Kosovo, with the exception of the northern part of Kosovo. In other words, the need for the KFOR’s presence and its role should be exclusively focused on the northern part of the country; whereas, in other parts of Kosovo security related issues, especially those of public security, should be under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo Police. The downsizing is also substantiated in discourse between actors and corresponding documentation, emphasizing that the KFOR mission is provisional and its presence in Kosovo should be reconsidered in proportion with the security situation and the possibility of handover of responsibilities to the local security institutions. 29

Moreover, KFOR’s structural review and upcoming developments should be

26 Qehaja, F. & Vrajolli, M. “Context analyses of the Security Sector Reform in Kosovo”, Anexx on “Chronology of Security Sector Reforms in Kosovo”, published by KCSS, p. 36 http://qkss.org/new/images/content/PDF/KOS%20-%20KCSS_eng.pdf

27 See Article “nATO in the Balkans – Briefing”, p.6 http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf

28 For more KFOR details see link: http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf

29 United nations, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, Annex, Provision of the Settlement, Marti Ahtisaari, Untitled nation Special Envoy of Secretary general, P. 6, http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf



fully coordinated with their local-counterparts, a set of circumstances which have not prevailed so far. Until this happens, the role of KFOR is expected to be essential in supporting the capacity building process of the local institutions, particularly the Kosovo Security Force both before and after its anticipated mandate review in 2013.30

KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) represents a newly established security force with a civilian mission, mandated “to fulfil security functions not appropriate for the police or other law enforcement organisations”. It has been widely considered to be the successor of the international military presence in Kosovo. From a structural point of view, KSF represents a relatively modest force. Its active force numbers 2,500, with a reserve component with up to 800. The KSF members are volunteers, wear a uniform and are lightly arme.31 Their hierarchy and structure is entirely based on the nATO military ranking system. At the moment, the process of recruitment and institutional consolidation for the active component has almost been completed and is expected to be finished soon, these calculations also including the reserve component. The entire process of recruitment, training and capacity building of KSF members has been led by nATO and was based upon the standards which are applied equally across the military armed forces of democratic countries. Apart from consolidating the uniformed component of KSF, there has been considerable progress reached in developing the civilian chain of command as well as command and control. The Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) represents an integrated structure of civilian (60%) and uniformed (40%) personnel, similar to standards applied by defence ministries of nATO member

30 Although the role of the KFOR mission is of significant importance, not only for main-taining the security of the country, but also in developing the Kosovo Security Force which is expected soon to inherit KFOR’s military tasks, either partially or completely. This research could not provide any direct contribution or input from the nATO’s KFOR personnel. Despite initially accepting an offer for an interview, and after postponing twice the date of interview, it was with regret the KFOR Headquarters official informed the KCSS research team that he was ‘disallowed’ to respond to questions raised by this policy brief. This lack of transparency is a serious issue of concern for all international missions that operate in Kosovo.

31 Ibid, Art 9 & Art 10



state.32 The commander of KSF is directly accountable to the Minister of MKSF33, to whom he reports. The budget allocated for KSF and MKSF varied from 2% to 4% of the total Annual Kosovo Budget across the period of 2009-2011. The budget allocated for the MKSF and KSF by Kosovo government for the year 2012 is around 35.8 million Euros or expressed as a percentage: about 2.8% of the Annual Budget of Kosovo. Despite this, the percentage is significant compared to the limited Kosovo budge.34 However, the current funds are not sufficient to purchase the weapons and vehicles foreseen as necessary in the scope of the KSF mandate.

There has been significant progress with regard to the consolidation of KSF and MKSF. According to MKSF officials, only 5 benchmarks out of 132 benchmarks set for KSF have not been fulfille. 35 So far, only the squadron aircraft unit still needs to be established. 36 However, good governance practices still need to be further advanced,37 despite the high degree of willingness demonstrated in embracing democratic standards applicable to the armed forces. In attempts to build the trust of all communities in Kosovo, the KSF exercised particular dedication to ensure substantial inclusion of ethnic minorities and women within its ranks. 38

Thus far, the KSF has been involved in different projects with the purpose of directly supporting Kosovo’s minority communities. Aside from this, the KSF has successfully involved itself in different rescue missions. The most recent example of this was the involvement of KSF in a rescue mission following an avalanche in the municipality of Dragash, southeaster Kosovo, remarkably

32 Indeed, many consider Ministry of Kosovo Security Force the future Kosovo Defense Ministry.

33 Ibid, Art 16

34 Law on Budget of the Republic of Kosovo for 2012, Kosovo Assembly, 2012, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Budget%202012.pdf

35 Interview with gen. Kadri Kastrati, Commander of KSF, 24 January 2012 Interview with Bejtush gashi, Deputy-Minister of MKSF, January 2012

36 QKSS, Monitorimi dhe Vlerësimi I Qeverisjes së Mirë në Forcën e Sigurisë së Kosovë p. 77

37 Qehaja, F. & Vrajolli, M. “Monitoring and Evaluating the good governance in the Kosovo Security Sector”, Prishtina, Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, February 2012, www.qkss.org

38 KCSS, Monitoring and Evaluating good governance in the Kosovo Security Force, p. 77



resulting in the rescue a 5-year-old girl after 24 hours searching. 39

This was not the first instance in which the KSF have performed admirably, rescuing citizens at risk in emergency situations. Another area in which KSF has developed both a considerable level of expertise and a reputation for professionalism is the demining of landmine zones as well as the destruction of unexploded ordnance.40 In general, the KSF is still developing and its role and mandate have yet to be properly redefined. According to the pertinent legislation, the initial operational scope of KSF would mainly be focused on humanitarian and emergency reaction missions. On the other hand, the legislation does not provide any territorial limitations, allowing the KSF to participate in humanitarian and emergency rescue missions not only within the territory of Kosovo, but also regionally and internationally, in the even of an invitation to participate in such missions.41

Aside from this defined role, there is no concrete reference to defence responsibility attributed to this security force. These competences are supposed to become part of the KSF mission after the final revision of its mandate. Despite this, the current mandate of the KSF does not differ substantially from the mandates and tasks of the armies in the region. The primary tasking of the armies in the region is participating in peacekeeping missions, wherein the KSF is also allowed to participate. Civil emergency tasks are also embedded in the principles and mandates of the armies in the region, showing similarities to the KSF’s role. In fact, the main security risks and challenges that would require the involvement of the armies in the region are those related to civil emergencies and disaster relief, as other types of security challenges such as organised crime and corruption fall under the responsibility of respective police forces, be they civilian police or gendarmerie- type, paramilitary organisations. Overall, the current mandate of the KSF should not be used by critics as an excuse to argue that only countries with armies can join the PfP. In terms of size and capability, Montenegro does not have a larger army than Kosovo, but it is still part of the PfP and progressing towards nATO integration.

nevertheless, the current mandate of KSF will be subject to revision as

39 See the Article: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/12/kosovo-avalanche-rescue_n_1271286.html

40 “Achievements of the Ministry for Security Force for 2011”, MFSK, 28th December 2011, http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Raporti_-_Reviste_2011_-_shqip.pdf

41 See “Law on Kosovo Security Force”, Art 2 & Art 10 http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L046_en.pdf



provided for by the Ahtisaari Plan, the Constitution of Republic of Kosovo and the Law on KSF. The Article 10.2 of the Law on KSF explicitly states that future changes of the KSF mission will be determined by the International Military Presence, in coordination with the International Civilian Representative. It also states that a full review of the implied limitations for the KSF mission should be conducted not earlier than 5 years from the date when this Law enters into force.42 Having this provision in mind, there are clear indications that the KSF may revise its mission in the very near future, starting from 2012. The meeting of the Kosovo Security Council (KSC) in February 201243 confirmed the launch of the Strategic Review of the Security Sector in Kosovo which will also consider a review of the KSF mandate. These recommendations have been transformed into government Decisions that were issued on 29th of February 2012.44 Changes regarding some issues related to the KSF are expected to take place alongside the upcoming constitutional modification, vis-à-vis the role of the President of the Republic of Kosovo. Holding the command of the KSF, which is a common practice for all states when it comes to military forces, is also among the demands that are raised by Kosovo’s political elites regarding the role of President. 45

The new mandate of the KSF is expected to reflect in its current structure where the current position of the KSF Commander will cease to exist,46 and the Chief of Staff will become the highest military position. Despite the proclamation of these changes, it is also very important to clarify that there are no significant expectations that the future military mandate of this force will undergo any tremendous transformations when compared to the existing regulations. The primary purpose of these changes is to remove the political constraints and limitations of Kosovo institutions in the defence area. Considering the risks and threat analyses, limited procurement capabilities and budgetary constraints, it is clear that the Kosovo authorities have no ambition to build a large military force, either in terms of size or scope. To be more precise, all these indicators show that the efforts of Kosovo’s institutions to develop the KSF into -a future Kosovo Military Force - are entirely based on defensive and

42 Ibid, Art. 10.2

43 See the Article http://www.koha.net/index.php?page=1,13,88790

44 governmental “Decision for Launching the Strategic Security Sector Revision”, Prime Minister of Republic of Kosovo, 29the March 2012 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/vendimet_e_mbl_63.pdf

45 Rubikon, KTV interview with Minister of KSF, Agim Çeku, 2nd March 2012

46 Ibid



humanitarian agendas. Furthermore, arguments coming from international circles that the current KSF and the upcoming Kosovo military force may posea threat to the other neighbouring countries, in particular Serbia, are illogical and do not correspond with the military balance of the region.

BILATERAL AnD MULTILATERAL COOPERATIOn OF KSF

The KSF has a marked level of cooperation on both bilateral and multilateral levels, demonstrating signs of sufficient maturity for Kosovo to join important programmes such as PfP. This cooperation takes place at the regional level and far beyond. The KSF signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United State which arguably represents one of the greatest long term steps achieved by KSF. With regard to US, the KSF has close cooperation with the national guard of Iowa. 47 The KSF has built cooperation also with other established states and is now planning to send military or defence attachés to the Kosovo embassies in Brussels, London and Ankara; following the dispatch by the Kosovo government of a military attaché to their Embassy in Washington D.C. 48 Of late, there have been concrete efforts to draft the Law on Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).There are high expectations that this law will be soon adopted, further complementing the legal framework of the KSF.

So far, the KSF’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation with nATO and non-nATO states has mainly been exercised in the context of experience exchange and, more specifically, some countries have provided training and support for the consolidation of the KSF. This research showed close cooperation and capacity building platforms have been established with Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, The United Kingdom, Slovenia, germany, Denmark, and Sweden amongst others. 49

The existing cooperation between the KSF and their partners are usually not limited to joint exercises. There are also many cases of the KSF supporting these

47 Interview with gen. Kadri Kastrati, Commander of KSF, 24 January 2012

48 Ibid,

49 Based on the KCSS non-participatory observation and discussion with stakeholders



partner countries during emergencies. In this regard, one of the most successful examples was the support provided by KSF in the northern Albania during the 2010/2011 floods, which resulted in the successful rescue of many Albanian citizens who were trapped by immense floods.50 Even more promising than these examples is the fact that there are clear indications that the KSF has recently been invited by the United Kingdom to be part of their contingent that trains the new Libyan army, which indeed will give additional weight to the international profile of the KSF compared to how they are currently viewed.51

As mentioned in the political challenges section, the main obstacle when it comes to multilateral cooperation and particularly when it comes to operating on regional or international platforms was the objection from Serbia and other non-recognizing countries. These problems are especially emphasised when it comes to the participation of Kosovo in the Western Balkans agreements. The research team found at least two important initiatives in which Kosovo, to date, has not invited participate: Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) initiative - based in Croatia, and the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) - based in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are several initiatives in which the KSF participated, most notably those involving more than two countries. Worth noticing that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, Enver Hoxhaj, attended a meeting between the United States of America and the other countries of the “US-Adriatic Charter (A5)” in June 2011 in Montenegro52. Consequently, aside from the United States, the respective regional member countries such as Albania, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia showed their commitment towards Kosovo. On a final note, regarding operational contexts, the KSF participated in military trainings in Krivollak53 alongside Macedonia which took place from 02-12 July 2012. However, this attendance is rather small considering the number of initiatives in the region and beyond. Considerations for progress on the immediate participation of Kosovo in regional agreements should also encompass the KSF’s inclusion in defence related initiatives, which are important and in line with the PfP agreement.

50 See the Article: http://kosovain.eu/?cid=1,40,1572

51 Shemsi Veseli, Deputy Minister of KSF, Media Release, Telegrafi, 19 March 2012, http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/fsk-se-i-kerkohet-ta-trajnoje-ushtrine-e-libise-2-21039.html

52 See the news report:”The Adriatic Charter – a good opportunity in moving Kosovo’s nATO integration process forward” available at http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,832

53 See the news report: http://www.koha.net/?page=1,13,62355



RECOMMEnDATIOnS TO KOSOVO gOVERnMEnT:

1. To increase its efforts for achieving the goal of inclusion in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the Chicago Summit in 2012;

2. To finalise the Strategic Security Sector Review by 2013 at the latest and provide tangible recommendations for the new name and mandate of KSF;

3. o actively engage civil society and other community actors during the upcoming process of the Strategic Security Sector Review as a precondition for establishing a democratic and accountable security sector in the country.

TO THE MInISTRY OF KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE:

4. To fulfil the current mandate and objectives within the envisaged time frame in order to justify the upcoming responsibilities of the new force;

5. To reconsolidate its structures based on professionalism and accountability and avoid the shortcomings in crucial areas such as good governance of the KSF;

6. To immediately consider the inclusion of Kosovo in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme. nATO shall put this issue on the agenda of the forthcoming Chicago Summit to be held in May 2012;

TO nATO:



7. To support the efforts of the Kosovo government for the Strategic Security Sector Review and, in particular, the revision of the KSF’s mandate in accordance with up-to-date regional circumstances and corresponding to the mandates of small armies in the Western Balkans;

8. To use the Partnership for Peace as a tool for strengthening regional cooperation and peace-building based on the principles of equality, common goals and mutual understanding.

9. To support civil society activism through mechanisms deriving from the Partnership for Peace in the context of democratic civilian oversight;

TO THE FOUR nOn-RECOgnIZIng COUnTRIES (SPAIn, SLOVAKIA, RUMAnIA AnD gREECE):

10. o refrain from the potential blocking of Kosovo’s path towards nATO membership and to consider the new developments and results in the context of Kosovo’s contractual agreement with nATO (including the PfP);

11. To reconsider their actual approach with respect to the of opening doors to nATO programmes for non-political actors from Kosovo, such as civil society projects and academia;



BIBLIOgRAPHY LEgISLATIOn AnD STRATEgIES

1. ICJ final decision for Kosovo Status link: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf>Kuvendi i Kosovës- Ligji për Forcën e Sigurisë së Kosovës Force”, Art 2 & Art 10 <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L046_en.pdf>

2. Kosovo Assembly Law on Kosovo Security Force”, Art 2 & Art 10 <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L046_en.pdf>

3. Law on Budget of the Republic of Kosovo for 2012, Kosovo Assembly, 2012, <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Budget%202012.pdf>

4. Marti Ahtisaari. The “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, United nation Special Envoy of Secretary general, <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>

5. Interview with gen. Kadri Kastrati, Commander of KSF, 24th January 2012

6. Interview with Bejtush gashi, Deputy-Minister of MKSF, 7th February 2012

7. Interview with Mr. Ibrahim gashi Deputy Minister of MoFA, 18th February 2012

REPORTS AnD ARTICLES

8. nATO, “nATO in the Balkans – Briefing”, nATO Report, p.6 http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf>

9. UnDP, “Early Warning Report”, UnDP Kosovo, April-June 2010, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR_eng_web-opt.pdf

InTERVIEWS



10. nATO, Larry Wentz, Lesson Learned for Kosovo: The KFOR experience, Command And control Research Programme, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf, July 2002

11. Kohavision, Minister of Kosovo Security Force, “RUBIKOn” hosted by Adriatik Kelemendi, Live Interview, Private national Television “Kohavision” 2nd March 2012”

12. Qehaja, F. &Vrajolli, M. “Chronology of Security Sector Reforms in Kosovo” Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), http://qkss.org/new/images/content/PDF/KOS%20-%20KCSS_eng.pdf KCSS 2010MoFA, “Vendet të cilat nuk e njohin Republikën e Kosovës” Burime nga Ministria e Punëve të Jashtme, 17th Shkurt 2012<http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>

13. Qehaja, F. &Vrajolli, M. “Monitoring and Evaluating the good governance in the Kosovo Security Sector”, Prishtina, Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), February 2012, http://qkss.org/new/index.php?section=news&cmd=details&newsid=316&teaserId=5nATO, “Deklarata nga Këshilli i Atlantikut të Veriut, pas shpalljes së pavarësisë së Kosovës “, njoftim për Shtyp I nATO-s, 2008-02-18 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-025e.html

14. gAO, “DoD needs to Assess U.S. Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program”, Report to the Chairman, Committee for Foreign Relation US Senate nATO Partnerships, US governmental Office, September 2010 http://books.google.com/books?id=7kdp1AIozMMCnATO, “Roli i nATO-s në Kosovë”Burime nga nATO nATO: 6th Mars 2012 <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm>

15. nATO, “Statement by the north Atlantic Council after Kosovo’s declaration of independence”, nATO Press Release, 2008-02-18 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-025e.htmlATO, Larry Ëentz, Mësimet e nxjerra për Kosovën: Eksperienca e KFOR, Komanda dhe Kontrolli Programi Hulumtues, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ëentz_Kosovo.pdf, Korrik 2002

16. nATO, Les Aspin, Former US Secretary of Defence “new Europe, new nATO”, nATO, February 1994 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9401-3.htm>

17. BBC, “Profile: nATO”, BBC Article February 2012 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1549072.stm>

18. Tanjug, “Uganda Recognises Kosovo” Source from TAnJUg, Econom:east



Media group, 18 February 2012<http://www.emg.rs/en/news/serbia/174904.html>

19. MoFA, “Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sources, 17th February 2012<http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>

20. nATO, “nATO’s role in Kosovo”, nATO Sources: 6th March 2012 <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm>

21. nATO, Key Facts and Figures”, KFOR Report, 1st February 2012 http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf

22. Spectator, “Slovak Troupes will Leave Kosovo”, Spectator’s online news report, 4th October 2010, http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/40317/2/slovak_troops_will_leave_kosovo.html>

23. nATO, “KFOR Chronicle: 8th Edition”, KFOR Report, Kosovo, 31st August 2009, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2009/chronicle_08/chronicle_08.pdf>

24. EULEX, “EULEX Staff Info”, European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), Kosovo, 27th July 2011 <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/StaffInfo.php>

25. Associated Press, “Kosovo Avalanche: Child, Asmira Reka, Rescued Alive, 9 Dead”, Source from Associated Press, Hufington Press, 12th February 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/12/kosovo-avalanche-rescue_n_1271286.html

26. RTV21, “FSK vetëdijeson nxënësit për rrezikun nga minat” (“The KSF Raise Children’s Awareness about Threats Caused by Landmines”) news Article, Radio-Television Twenty One (RTV 21), 26 December 2011 http://rtv21.tv/home/?p=50548

27. Kosova-in-EU, “Skuadrat e FSK-së ndihmojnë Shkodrën (KSF Squadron in Shkodër for Support)”, news Article, Media Online, Kosova in EU, http://kosovain.eu/?cid=1,40,1572 3 December 2010

kosovo's path towards the nato partnership for peace (pfp) programme

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