kreidie and monroe -- psychological boundaries and ethnic conflict
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Psychological Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict: How Identity Constrained Choice and Workedto Turn Ordinary People into Perpetrators of Ethnic Violence during the Lebanese Civil WarAuthor(s): Lina Haddad Kreidie and Kristen Renwick MonroeSource: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall, 2002), pp.5-36Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020146.
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Kreidie and Monroe
my
father.
They
cursed
me
and said. 'Look what
we
are
going
to
do
to
you
in
front
of
your
father.
'
They raped
me,
one
after
the other.
Then
they
shot
me
in
my
left
hand and
left
leg.
I
became
paralyzed.
My
father
then said
to
me,
"May
God be with
you,
"
and he
died. I will
never
forget
this....
Help
me
I
am
desperate,
and
I
am
ready
to
fight.
I
pray
that
war
happens again_If
I
see
them,
I
will kill them with
my
bare hands
Oh,
my
God,
their
voices
are
in
my
ears
I
hate
this.
I
do
not want
to
talk about this
anymore.
I
am
tired
of living
like this.
Saud,
Witness
to
Sharon's
participation
in the Sabra Shatila massacres of 1982
An
important
but
unanswered
question
in
discussions
of
genocide
and
ethnic conflict
concerns
the
psychology
of the combatants and the
perpe
trators.
What is
it
that
has
to
happen
to
ordinary people1?someone
like
Saud?to
turn
them into
individuals
capable
of
committing
atrocities,
often
against people
they
have lived with in
peace
for centuries?
A
vast
literature
exists
on
the sudden
eruption
of
identity-based
conflicts,
and
deciphering
the
causes
precipitating
such
conflicts
has become
a
primary
concern
among
both social
scientists
and
policy
makers. Saud
reminds
us
of the human di
mension
to
our
intellectual
analyses.
She
illustrates
a
point
made
by
Gross
(2000)
in
discussing
the Poles and the Holocaust:
it
was
neighbors
who
did
the
dirty job.
Human
beings
are
not
born into
categories
of
perpetrators,
bystanders
or
victims.
They
are
made that
way
by
events,
and
today's
victim
can
become
tomorrow's
perpetrator
in
a
vicious
cycle
of
retaliation.
Un
derstanding
the
psychological
aspect
of this
problem?why
some
ordinary
people
nonetheless
perform
deeds
we
usually
associate
with madmen
or
sadists?is what
drives
our
research
on
the
ethnic
violence in
Lebanon.2
The
paper
presents
the
results
of
a
narrative
analysis
of
interviews
with
five
ordinary people
who
participated
in
acts
of
ethnic
violence
during
the
Lebanese Civil
War.
Our
results
come
from
a
pilot
project
and,
as
has
been
noted with
oral interviews
concerning
other traumatic
events
(Langer
1991,
Monroe
2001), speakers
are
often
confused
and
ambivalent
in
describing
their
experiences.
Despite
these
limitations,
however,
the
interviews
present
striking
evidence
that
identity
constrains
choice
for
all
individuals,
regardless
of
their
particular
ideological
or
socioeconomic
demographic
background.
This
finding
is
significant,
given
the
hegemonic
influence
of rational choice
theory
in social
science
(Monroe
1991,
1996;
Green
and
Shapiro
1994).
Once
the
importance
of
identity
is
established,
the
next
step
is
for
scholars
to determine how identity exerts its psychological influence. As
a
first step
in this
direction,
we
situate
our
analysis
in
a
social
psychological
framework
and
ask what
insight
the
major
theories
concerning identity
reveal
about the
people
we
interviewed.3
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Psychological
Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict
7
Part
1
summarizes
the
social
psychological
literature
we
might
expect
to
find
most
relevant for ethnic
conflict. Our
questioning
of
subjects
was
in
formed
by
this
literature,
and
tried
to
address
some
of the
subtle
differences
in
the
approaches
we
found. We
appreciate
the
limitations of
an
examination
constructed
on
the
basis
of
a
few
interviews,
and
hope
future
analysts
can
build
on
our
initial
attempts
as
they
craft
questions
to
analyze
a
wide
range
of
approaches
to
ethnic violence. Part
2
describes
our
research methodol
ogy
and
gives
the
particulars
of
our case
study,
a
narrative
analysis
of
five
perpetrators
of violence
during
the
Lebanese
civil
war
from
1975
to
1989.
Part 3 presents our empirical findings, which suggest the tremendous power
of
identity
and
perceptions
of self
in
relation
to
others
to
determine
political
action.
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INFLUENCES
ON ETHNIC
VIOLENCE
In
general, analyses
of
ethnic
violence and
genocide
fall
into three
cat
egories.
(1)
Societal
or
structural
analyses,
widely
utilized
by sociologists,
economists
and
political
scientists,
emphasize
the
association
of
particular
behaviors with certain
cultures,
classes
or
ethnic
groups.
Such
analyses
stress
the
importance
of
economic hard
times,
governmental
policies
or
technolog
ical
changes
on
individual
patterns
of behavior.
(2)
Individual level
analysis,
frequently
used
by
clinical
or
personality
psychologists, explain
behavior
in terms
of
a
person's
unique
life
history
and
psychological
characteristics.
Such works
assume
that
personality
traits?such
as
Adorno's authoritarian
personality?explain why
individuals behave
as
they
do.
Highlighting
per
sonality
differences also
helps explain why
two
dissimilar
people
thus would
react
quite differently
to
the
same
situation. The
emphasis
in
this
approach
is
on
individual differences
in
childhood
experiences
and
in
personality
or
psychological adjustment.
(3)
Falling
somewhere between
the
macro
and
the
microlevel
explanations,
social
psychological analysis
is
more
interper
sonal than
societal
or
individual.
It
focuses
more
on
how
immediate
social
influences?other
people
in
the
environment,
their
attitudes
and
behaviors,
and their
relationship
to
the
individual
actor?explain
whether
the
actor
will
engage
in-group
conflict.
Explanations
of
genocide
and
ethnic
violence
utilizing
this
approach
tend
to
focus
not
on
the individual
pathology
of
geno
cide
(such
as
a
childhood
of
abuse)
or
the
psychological
dislocation
resulting
from
macropolitical phenomena
(such
as
wars
or
political
disintegration
of
empires). Instead, the social psychologist asks what kinds of interpersonal
situations
might
create
the
feelings
necessary
to
trigger
or
increase violent
behavior
that then
turns
into
genocide
or
ethnic
violence.4 This is
the
ap
proach
followed here.5
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Kreidie
and
Monroe
This
study
takes
advantage
of
an
unusual
access
to
Lebanese
fighters
who
deliberately
killed
civilians.
Analysis
of
such individuals
is
usually
con
ducted
through legal
testimony
in
which the
person
who
committed
the
violence is
defending
himself
against
possible
legal
punishment
(Browning
1992,
Goldhagen 1996),
through journalistic
interviews in
which
there is
a
heavy component
of
ideological
and
political ground
to
be
gained,
or
through
biographies
in
which
there is
a
pronounced
stress
on
self-evaluation
and self
justification
(Speer
1970,
Serany
1995).6
Our research
focused
on
two
kinds
of
influences.
The first
concerned
the situational factors the
perpetrators
of ethnic violence felt were critical
in
their
actions. These
included
the
standard
social
psychological
variables,
of
the
kind
found
significant
in
Browning's
work
on
the
ordinary
men
who
engaged
in
killing
Jews
in
Poland
and
reviewed in
the
social
psychological
literature
summarized below
(section
2).
But
we
also
considered
questions
about
basic
identity
factors,
of
the
kind made
central
by
virtue
ethicists
(Kupperman
1991;
Trianosky 1986)
in
an
attempt
to
link
the
social
psycho
logical
to
work
on
moral
psychology (Monroe
2001).
Our
particular
goal
is
to
discover
how
personal identity
becomes
reconceptualized
in
a
manner
that
enables
an
individual
to kill
fellow
citizens
and to
inquire
about
how
these
actions,
in
turn,
feed back
into
and
modify
the
person's
sense
of
self. Our
work thus
focuses
on
the
inter-related
role
of
personal
and
group
identity
as
played
out
in
ethnic
conflict.
This
paper
builds
on
earlier
work
on
the
constraints of
identity
on
choice
(Monroe
1996,
2001)
and
on
work
on
the
importance
of
identity
for
Islamic
political
movements
in
particular
(Euban
1995,
Kreidie
and
Monroe
1997).
The
specific
instance of
ethnic
violence
in which
we
test
our
ideas is
the Lebanese Civil
War.
We
adopt
a
narrative
analysis
(Patterson
and
Monroe
1998)
of
interviews with
men
who killed
civilians in different
villages
and
refugee
camps
between
1975-1982.
Questions
and Controversies Addressed:
The Relevant
Literature
There
is
a
small
but
important body
of work
suggesting identity
con
strains choice
(Monroe
1994,1996;
Ringma 1996),
and
one
of
our concerns
was
to
determine whether the moral
constraints Monroe found
operative
during
the Holocaust
were
also
present
in
other instances of ethnic
violence.
There
is
a
further
body
of
literature
on
the social
psychological
aspect
of
iden
tity;
while this literature
does
not
explicitly
make
the
connection between
identity and choice, we drew heavily from this material in constructing our
interviews.
One
of
our
goals
is
to
encourage
future discussions
to
ask
which
social-psychological
process
most
fully
captures
the
empirical reality
for
our
subjects.
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Psychological
Boundaries
and Ethnic
Conflict
9
Rational
Choice
and Realistic
Conflict Theory
The rational
choice
approach
suggests
there
are
tangible
costs
and ben
efits
to
be
gained
from
conflict and that
participants
act
in
accordance
with
a
rational
calculus.
Realistic
conflict
theory (Campbell
1965,
Insko
et
al
1991)
adopts
the
basic
premises
of rational
choice
theory
in
assuming intergroup
conflict
originates
in the
perceptions
of
group
members with
regard
to
the
real
competition
between
groups
for
scarce resources.
From this
perspec
tive,
it is
rational
for
group
members
to
maximize
their
own
resources
at
the
expense of competing groups. This focus on the rational basis of intergroup
competition
is
important,
especially
when
complemented by
psychological
models that
can
account
for the
generation
of
discriminatory
stereotypes
about
the
out-group,
which
we
argue
is
a
less than
rational
process
as
tradi
tionally
defined
(Monroe
1991;
Green
and
Shapiro
1994).
To
test
for this kind
of
influence,
we
asked
the
perpetrators
about the kind of threat
they
felt
and
the benefit
they expected
from
taking
a
role
in the
battles in Lebanon. As
Saud's remark
illustrates,
concrete
events
do have
important
psychological
effects.
We
tried
in
our
analysis
to
determine
whether these
objective
events
were as
important
as
the shifts
in
social
identity
they
often
precipitated;
we
then
tried
to
calculate the relative
significance
of each.
In
contrast
to
this
approach
is the
view
that
behavior
might
be influenced
less
by
actual realities
and
more
by
cognitive
factors,
e.g.,
the
thoughts,
feel
ings,
beliefs,
or
pieces
of
knowledge
held
by participants
in
conflict.
Lewis
(2002)
has
suggested
the
perceptions
of "the other"
are
particularly
im
portant
in
the Islamic world's
response
to
the West.We thus
focused
on
understanding
how the mental
structures
our
respondents
used
to
organize
knowledge
of
the
socio-political
world
might
influence
the
information
they
noticed
and remembered.
Here,
we
found twelve theories
that focused
on
identity
but which
differed
slightly
in
suggesting
how
identity
worked
to
influence
political
behavior.
Social
Identity Theory
That
part
of
an
individual's
self-concept
which
originates
in
his/her
membership
in
a
social
group(s),
along
with
the
importance
and
the
emo
tional
import
attached
to
that
group
membership,
is
referred
to
as
social
identity.
Associated with the Bristol
school,
social
identity theory suggests
identities are produced from social comparisons. It situates the drive for so
cial
identity
in the
need for social
value and
personal
esteem
in
group
bias.
Because
people
have
cognitive
limitations in
processing
information,
they
develop
sch?mas and
stereotypes
of
social
groups.
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10
Kreidie
and
Monroe
Originating
in
Festinger's
work
on
social
comparisons
(1954),
social
identity theory
argues
that individuals have
a
tendency
to
compare
them
selves with others
who
are
similar
to
or
slightly
better
on
relevant dimen
sions. Self-evaluations and
opinions
grow
from such
experiences.
Bruner's
(1957) finding
that
people
overestimate the size
of
objects
they perceive
to
be
valuable,
such
as
a
coin,
was
enlarged
upon
by
Tajfel (1959)
to
theorize
that overestimation is
a
process
whereby
individuals
accentuate
differences
in order
to
make
categorizations.
These theoretical
developments
suggested
that individuals
indeed do
compare
themselves
to
others,
but
usually
do
so
as members of groups.
The
consideration
of the self in relation
to
groups
orients the research
on
social
identity.
Individuals
are
motivated
to
maintain
high
self-esteem,
and identification
with
a
group
will lead
to
social
comparisons
that allow the
individuals
to
continually
evaluate themselves in
a
positive light.
As
individ
uals
identify
themselves with
others
on
the
basis
of
characteristics
such
as
gender,
race
or
socioeconomic
status,
they
also
form
negative feelings
about
the
groups
that
are
excluded
from
their self-definition.
This
leads
to
devalu
ation of
out-groups.
Thus,
social
comparisons
in
intergroup settings
seem
to
attain
a
positively
valued
distinctiveness from other
groups
(Tajfel 1971).
Tajfel's
conclusions
were
derived from
experimental
work.
To
test
these
ideas
in
nonlaboratory
settings,
we
asked
about social
identity
as
a
result of
social
comparisons.
How did
our
subjects
view
the
enemy?
Why
did
they
have
negative
feelings
about
the members
of
the
out-group?
If
they
held
such
feelings,
why
did these
feeling emerge?
What
encouraged
the
growth
of
these
feelings?
Did social
comparisons
with
out-group
members
affect
the
way
the
subjects
felt
about themselves?
Why
did
they
kill these
people?
Was it
because
of
group
memberships?
Group
Identification
and
Self-Esteem
What
motivations
underlie
individual identification
with
groups?
Both
Tajfel
and
Turner
(1979)
and Oakes
and
Turner
(1980) hypothesize
that
the
need for
self-esteem
is
a
prime
motivator
of
intergroup
behavior,
and
therefore
individual
action.
Turner
(1982,
1987)
argues
that since
the need
for
positive
self-esteem
drives
individuals,
group
members will
categorize
themselves
into
groups
and
then
negatively
evaluate
out-groups.
This
pro
cess
frequently
takes
the
form of
negative
stereotyping
or
discrimination.
Successful intergroup discrimination thus enhances social identity and ele
vates
self-esteem.
But
self-esteem
also
can
motivate
a
person
to
overcome
threats
to
self-esteem
by
promoting
intergroup
discrimination
(Abrams
and
Hogg
1990:
33).
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Psychological
Boundaries and Ethnic
Conflict
11
Turner's work has
not
always
been
supported
by empirical
research,
and
some
researchers
conclude
that self-esteem
is
one
of
many
motivating
forces that
surfaces
in
varying
degrees,
depending
on
the
situation.
While
it is
generally
believed
that
self-esteem
does motivate individuals
to
par
ticipate
in
groups,
and
to
discriminate
against
out-group
members,
other
evidence
suggests
the
need
to
modify
this conclusion. Some
groups
do
not
always
negatively
evaluate
out-groups
of
comparable
status,
at
times
evalu
ating
them
more
highly
on
relevant
dimensions,
and
at
other
times
evaluating
them
more
highly
than
some
in-group
members. We
find
one
stark
example
of this in the Middle East conflict. Despite the intensity of the Arab-Israeli
conflict,
Arab-Americans view
Jewish-Americans
living
in
the United
States
as a
more
coherent
and
powerful
group
than
any
Arab-American
organi
zation.
They
even
view
Israeli
leaders
as more
competent
than
the
Arab
leaders
(Kreidie
1988).
On
the other
hand,
a
kind
of "black
sheep"
effect
(Levine
1980)
suggests
consistently
deviant
group
members
are
rejected by
conforming
group
members in order
to
maintain
group
cohesion
and
con
sistency.
We asked
our
respondents
about this
phenomenon
in
a
variety
of
ways.
We
also
asked,
what made
subjects
different from
the other
group?
Why
did
they
choose
to
identify
with
one
certain
group
and
not
the other?
What
happened
that made
them
join
the
group?
The
political/military fight
ing?
Was
group
identity
a
factor
in
their discrimination
against
members of
the
out-group?
How effective did
they
view the
Lebanese leaders of their
own
group?
And
how
do
they
view
them
in
comparison
with
leaders
of
the
other
group(s)?
Do
Cognitive
Limitations Result
in
Reliance
on
Schema and
Stereotypes?
One
reason
people rely
on
group
biases
may
be
cognitive
limitations
in
processing complex
information
(Lakoff
and
Johnson
1999).
Schema
the
ory
offers
an
important
approach
for
understanding
social
identity.
It
argues
(Kihlstrom
and
Cantor
1984)
that the self is
represented mentally
in
a
hierar
chically
ordered series
of
"context-specific
self-concepts,"
each
representing
beliefs
about
the
self
in
various
social
situations.
Thus,
people
have
cate
gories
for
themselves,
just
as
they
have sch?mas for
others.
Having
multiple
sch?mas leads
to
"self-complexity"
which
may
act
as a
buffer
against
threats
to
identity.
To
test
this
view,
we
asked whether
our
interviewees
felt threat
ened
in
one
sphere
and then
cognitively compensated
for
the
attack
on
this
identity by
conceptualizing
of
themselves
as
superior
or
powerful
in other
ar
eas (Linville 1987). Alternatively, a person may have negative self-schemas
that
would
consist of
categories
of
negative
traits
that do
not
characterize
the
individual,
and
may
be
more
easily
accessed than
positive
self-schemas.
To
test
this
position,
we
inquired
about
self-image.
How did
subjects
describe
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Kreidie and Monroe
their
self-images?
Where and how did these
images
develop?
How did these
images
shift
over
time,
and
in
response
to
what
situations
or
framing?
Is
self-image
affected
by
participation
in
acts
of
ethnic
violence?
Self-Identity
as an
Outgrowth
of
Role
Theory
Self-categorization
is
not
the
only approach
to
social
identity.
Sarbin
and
Scheibe
(1983)
suggest
social
identity
emanates
from roles and
that
roles
are
the natural
starting point
for
understanding
social
identity.
Their
model
emphasizes
three factors:
(1)
status
or
position
in
a
social
structure
that conforms
to
a
set
of
expectations
held
by
members
of
a
relevant
society,
a
notion
qualitatively
different from
role;
(2)
involvement,
or
the
intensity
with which
a
role is
enacted;
and
(3)
positive
or
negative
valuation
of
these
two
dimensions.
To
test
this
model,
we
inquired
about
the social
status
of
the
perpetrators
in
their
family
and social
surroundings
and
what role
they
took
in
the
fighting.
Were
subjects
in
roles
or
positions
that led
to
certain
expectations
about
their behavior? If
so,
were
these
expectations
relevant
for
their acts?
If
so,
how?
Categorization
We
next
explored
one
especially
troubling
implication
of
social
identity
theory:
the
suggestion
that
although perceptions
of
competition
for
scarce
re
sources
reinforce
in-group/out-group
distinctions,
genocide
and
racism
may,
in
fact,
simply
be extreme manifestations
of
normal
group
identification and
behavior.
The
social
identity approach
leaves
undefined
the
kinds
of
situ
ational
factors
and
processes
that affect
(1)
which
group
categories
form,
(2)
which
group
identifications
become
most
salient
in
particular
contexts
and
(3)
how these
identifications
escalate
into
violence.
Not
all differences
become
politicized
or
violent;
in
fact,
a
wide
range
of
group
identities
coexists
peacefully
in
most
times and
places.
We
posed
many
questions
for intervie
wees
about
group
categories,
how these
categories
shift
over
time,
and
what
function
these
categories
serve
for
our
perpetrators.
We also considered
several
other literatures that
rely
on
different
psychological
mechanisms
to
understand
ethnic
violence.
These
literatures
include
models
of
symbolic
racism,
social
representations
and
poststructuralist
theories
of conflict.
Models of Symbolic Racism
Models of
symbolic
racism
(Sears
1993, 1988;
Kinder
and
Sears
1981)
argue
that
racism is
based
on
symbolic
dispositions
learned
early
in life.
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Psychological
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13
These
dispositions,
though
latent
for the
most
part,
can
be elicited
in
certain
contexts to
produce
racist
attitudes
and behavior. Because of its
ability
to
account
for the
contexts
in
which
symbolic
dispositions
become
"activated,"
the
symbolic
racism
approach
offers
interesting insights
and
methodologies
for
the
analysis
of
the
critical
shift
of
perception
that
occurs
between self
and
other
in
cases
of
genocide
and racism.
To test
this
approach,
we
asked
the
people
in
our
sample
about
symbolic dispositions
toward Muslims/
Maronites/etc. learned
early
in life and how
socialization
by
schools,
par
ents,
media,
and
religious
groups
affected the
subjects
(Kreidie 1988).
Social
Representations
Moscovici
(1988)
and
Doise
(1988)
suggest
collective
meanings
are
gen
erated
through
the
act
of
communication
between
individuals. This
approach
accepts
the
validity
of
realistic
conflict
theory
by
agreeing
that there is often
a
real material
or
political
interest involved
in
intergroup
conflict;
but
it
ar
gues
that the "real"
situation
is less determinative of
how
people
will behave
than what
people
believe
or
perceive
about the
scarcity
of
resources.
We thus
must
consider the
production
of beliefs
in
a
particular
society
through
sym
bols and
systems
of
meaning
since the critical
beliefs
and
social actions of
a
society
may
emanate
not from
objective phenomena
but
rather
from
the
shared
representation
of these
objective
phenomena
(Moscovici
1988).
Social
representations
concern
the
contents
of
everyday
thinking
and
the stock of
ideas that
gives
coherence
to
our
religious
beliefs,
political
ideas
and the
connections
we
create
as
spontaneously
as
we
breathe.
They
make
it
possible
for
us
to
classify
persons
and
objects,
to
compare
and
explain
behaviors,
and
to
objectify
them
as
parts
of
our
social
setting.
While
repre
sentations
are
often
located
in
the minds
of
participants, they
can
just
as
often
be
found
"in
the
world,"
and
as
such
examined
apart
from
any
particular
in
dividuals
(Moscovici 1988:114).
This
suggests
that
when
we
"represent"
the
character
and
relation
of
identity
groups
in
language
and
images,
we
actually
help
construct
beliefs
about
them.
Social
representations
might
be
identi
fied
in
everyday
language,
in
media
images,
in
popular
culture,
or
any
other
place
where
communication
occurs
(Moscovici
1988:115).
Because there
are
so
many
people
talking
and
so
many
images
around
us,
representations
of
identity
groups
will
necessarily
be
multiple,
and
might
not
be shared
by
an
entire
society
(Moscovici
1988:119).
At
the
same
time,
many
representations
become so common in a particular context that they have profound effects
on
popular
perceptions
and
beliefs.7
To test
this
theory,
we
asked
what
factors
made
our
subjects
draw
an
image
of
himself
and
of
the
enemy.
Where
did
the
subject
situate
himself in
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Kreidie and
Monroe
society?
What role had
he
attained
during
the war? What
were
his definitions
of
enemies and
what
role did different
agents?such
as
the
family,
school
and
media?play
in
shaping
both
his
self-image
and that of his
enemy?
How did
certain
acts,
such
as
killing
civilians,
affect the
subject's
sense
of
self?
Social Dominance
Theory
Sidanius
(1994;
Sidanius
et
al
1993)
explains
racism in
terms
of socio
biology
and
evolutionary theory, arguing
that
the needs
of
certain
groups
to
maintain the
integrity
of their
gene
pools
causes
racist
attitudes
and
be
havior. This
approach
may
have
particular
relevance
in
the
Mideast,
where
birthrates take
on
political significance,
with
people
often
fearing
that "the
other is
populating
and
taking
over."
To
inquire
about social dominance the
ory,
we
asked about the
kind
of
threat
subjects
felt and how
poignant
these
threats
were
to
their existence. We also asked what alternatives the
perpe
trators
thought
they
had in
dealing
with the
enemy
and how
they
thought
eradicating
the
enemy
would
help
solve the
underlying problem
for them.
Poststructural
Approach
to
Identity
What
we
might
characterize
as
a
post-structural approach
to
identity
overlaps
with each
of the above-mentioned
literatures;
as
such,
it
provides
a
useful
synthesis.
Poststructural
theory
(not
to
be confused with
postmodern
theory)
owes
its intellectual
origin
to
the Marxist tradition insofar
as
it
pre
sumes
that
society
is
structured
into classes
which
are
in
conflict
for
power
and
resources.
But
while Marx
considered
only
a
single
identity
division?
property
ownership?poststructural
theory
incorporates
the
study
of mul
tiple
kinds
of
identities,
such
as
race,
ethnicity,
nation,
and
gender,
or
any
identity
category
in
which there
is either
an
active
contest for
dominance
or
a
history
in which
one
group
has been dominant
over
another. Like
social
identity
theory,
poststructural
theory
presumes
that identities
are
produced
through
social
comparisons,
and that
group
value is
assigned
through
such
comparisons.
Like realistic
conflict
theory,
it
incorporates
the
belief
that
re
sources
are
usually
scarce
and that
people
are
motivated
by
"rational" desires
to
promote
their
interests. And
like the literature
on
social
representations,
it focuses
on
the
ways
that
beliefs
about
identity
groups
are
constructed
through
discourse
and
symbols.
To explain the transformation of mere difference into intergroup con
flict
or
violence,
utilizing
this
approach,
we
tried
to
consider
intergroup
rela
tions
in
highly
contextual
ways.
That
is,
we assume
group
identities
form
in
historically specific
ways.
We
then
asked whether the social
representations
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Psychological
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15
which foment
conflict
are
also
specific
to
a
particular society.
In
the
case
of
Lebanon,
we
asked
perpetrators
about
feelings
and views
on
the
political,
economic and social situation
in
Lebanon. We also asked how
the sectarian
political
system
affected their actions either
in
joining
their
party
or
move
ment
or
the
way
they
viewed the
others.
We
asked
the
Druze
(the
Socialist
Progressive
Party
members)
why
they
considered themselves
subordinates
while the
Christians
(specifically
the
Maronites)
were
deemed the
dominant
group.
Why
did the Druze
ally
with the Palestinian
refugees
against
other
Lebanese? At
the
same
time,
we
asked Christian
fighters
about their
views
on
Palestinian refugees and the other Lebanese Muslim fighters. What factors
made the Maronites
join
the
Phalengist
party?
Why
did the
Maronites
ally
with the Israelis
against
other
Lebanese?
Why
would Maronites
resort to
violence when
they
had the
largest
share in
government
representation?
We asked
perpetrators
of
all
groups
about the
importance
of
their reli
gious/ideological
and
political
identification.
What kind of
relationship
did
they
have
with other
groups
before
the
eruption
of
violence? What
caused
the
violence? How
strong
and
certain
was
the threat of the
other
group
to
compel
them
to
commit
violent
acts? Did
they
believe
they
had
any
other
alternative
ways
to
deal
with
the threat?
In some
poststructural
studies of
group
conflict,
the
metaphors
of
rep
resentation
play
an
important
part
in the
psychology
of
violence. For in
stance,
the
popular representation
of
the "dehumanized other"
as
vermin
or
bestial
suggests
that
a
group
does
not
deserve human
rights (Lerner
1992,
Glass
1997). Similarly,
there
might
be
a
drive
to
eradicate the
"morally
bankrupt
others,"
lest
they
infest, defile,
or
pollute
the
healthy
social
body.
This
metaphor
represents
the
in-group
as
organic,
and
the
out-group
as
a source
of
impurity.
Or,
there
is
the
specter
of the
"threatening
others,"
who
will
perhaps
undermine the
economy
if
left
unchecked,
who
will kill
us
if
we
don't
kill
them first.
We
raised
all
these issues in
our
interviews,
since
Monroe
(2001)
found classification and
categorization
critical for
un
derstanding
genocide
during
the
Holocaust.
In
each
of these
situations,
our
underlying hypothesis
was
that
popular
representations
of
the
out-group
would
reinforce the coherence
and
superiority
of
the
in-group
as
well
as
justify
violent
means
to
gain
or
maintain
domination.
LEBANON: A
CASE STUDY OF
IDENTITY
POLITICS
The
Complex Variety
of
the
Lebanese
Identity
All
the
people
we
interviewed
described
themselves
as
Lebanese.
But
being
Lebanese differs
depending
on
whether
one
is
Maronite,
Sunni,
Shiite,
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16
Kreidie
and
Monroe
Druze,
Muslim
fundamentalist,
Lebanese
communist,
or
Lebanese Arab
na
tionalist.
Strong
competing
identities undercut the
Lebanese
national
iden
tity
and,
at
least
in the
case
of
modern
Lebanon,
separate
identities often
produce
inner
psychological
conflicts
concerning
who
one
is and
to
which
groups
that
most
basic
sense
of
identity
can
allow
one
to
belong.
Perhaps
because
of the
political
violence
itself,
group
membership
takes
on
an aura
of
being
necessary
for survival and
group
loyalty
becomes
a
premium
since
other
group
members
are
necessary
for
protection.
Whatever the
causes?
and these
are
the focus of
our
analysis?it
seems
fair
to
say
that
in contem
porary Lebanon, conflicting identities tend to promote mistrust, intolerance
and
intergroup
antipathies,
and
not
the
consociational
democracy
of the
immediate
post-World
War
II
period
lauded
by
many
(Lijphart
1984).
This
has
long
been
true,
as
is
evident
from
even
the
most
cursory
of
historical
backgrounds.
During
various historical
periods,
the
political
struc
ture
in Lebanon
reflected
a
pluralistic political
system
in
which
subordination
among
the
actors
was
conjoined
with
political
supremacy
of
each in his do
main. Even
a
brief historical
survey
lies
beyond
the
scope
of this
manuscript
(see
Kreidie and Monroe
2001 for
a
review);
however,
most
experts
agree
that social
identity
is critical
for
understanding
Lebanese
political
instability
and
Lebanon's
seemingly
unending political
conflicts. Sectarian
and social
cleavages
have
widened
over
time
as
the
apparently
conflict-ridden
political
system
has failed
to
assimilate
diverse
groups
into
one
political
commu
nity.
Each tended
to
impose
its
own mores
on
all
segments
of
the
society.
This
process
created
domineering
and subordinate
groups,
or
"us
versus
them"
communities,
which
were
exacerbated
by
the
fact that communal
differences
correspond
with
politico-economic
inequities
and
a
have-and
have-not
group
mentality.8
Prior
to
the 1975-1990
civil
war,
there
was
widespread
discontent
among
Lebanese
Muslims,
especially
the
Shiites,
who
blamed
official
authorities
for
the
negligence
in their
areas
and for
not
preventing
the
Israeli
attacks
on
southern
Lebanon.
The
Shiites
thus
formed
the movement
of
the under
privileged
in
Lebanon
(AMAL)
headed
by
Moussa
El
Sadr.9
The Sunnis
never
relinquished
hope
of
drawing
Lebanon
closer
to
the Arab
world and
achieving
more
equitable
shares
in
the
government.
But
because
they
are
scattered
geographically,
the Sunnis
were
unable
to
cohere
politically.
The
general
Muslim
discontent
and
feeling
of
deprivation
were
countered
by
an
equal
if
not
stronger
Christian
paranoia
and
fear
of
being
lost
in the
sea
of
Muslim
Arabs.
This
fear
was
institutionalized in
the
Phalengist
party,
founded by the Maronite Pierre Gemayel.10 At the
same
time, the
Druze
had the
same
feelings
as
the
Christians
and also
struggled
to
keep
their
land
and
unity.
The
Popular
Socialist
party
was
founded
by
Kamal Junbulat
to
fulfill
the
Druze's dream
of survival.
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Psychological
Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict
17
Since
independence,
Lebanon
has been the
scene
of
two
nationalis
tic
trends that exacerbate
identity
differences:
Arab
nationalism
(majority
Muslim)
with Lebanon
part
of
a
united Arab
world,
and
(2)
Lebanese
na
tionalism in
an
independent
Christian
state.
As Arab
nationalism
prospered
in
the
early
fifties under
Nasser,
the Lebanese Maronite
president
rushed
to
sign
the Eisenhower doctrine
(1957),
which
pledged
the United State
to
use
its
armed forces when asked
to
do
so
by
any
state
threatened
by
direct
or
indirect communist
aggression.
This
governmental
decision intensified
Muslim
discontent,
which climaxed
in
the
1958
crisis.
However, Arab nationalists were divided among themselves in their
perception
of Arab nationalism.
In
the
sixties,
the Arab
nationalist
move
ment
gave
rise
to
many
prosocialist organizations.11
Most Muslim
Sunnis who
wanted
an
independent
Lebanon with
an
Arab face
were
not
comfortable
with the socialist character of the nationalists. On the other
hand,
the Shiites
split
into the fundamentalist Hizbullah
or more
moderate
AMAL
move
ment.
At the
same
time,
Christians divided
to
form different
parties,
each
with
a
different
perspective
on
Lebanon. Sectarian
differences
in
Lebanon
supercede
parochial loyalties.
Parochial,
sectarian,
ideological
differences,
exacerbated
by
the
internal and
external
factors,
were
evident in
the
out
bursts
of
1840,
1860, 1918,
1958,
and 1975-1990. Violence
ended after the
Syrian
government
and Lebanon's
warring
factions reached
an
agreement
under the
premiership
of Rafik El Hariria and
at
the directive of
King
Fahd.
Thanks
to
superpower
and
regional
endorsement,
the 1989
signing
of the
Ta'if
Agreement
ended?at least
technically?the
Lebanese civil
war.
The
Ta'if
agreement
set
new
rules
for
more
equitable
representation
between the
different
sects
and for the
preservation
of Lebanon
as an
independent
and
sovereign
nation. The
Ta'if
is
not
yet
fully
implemented,
however,
and
one
of the most
pressing
issues is
the
Syrian
withdrawal
from
Lebanon,
an
issue
that exacerbates
already-polarized
sectarian
identifications within
Lebanon.
Profiles:
Sample
and
Methodology
For
our
pilot project,
we
chose
subjects
from
each of
the most
impor
tant
fighting
factions: 2 Christian
Phalengists;
1Muslim
Murabetoun;
and
2
Druze
Progressive
Socialist
Party
members. Because of the
sensitive
as
pect
of
the
interviews,
subjects
were
reached
through
personal
contacts,
in
part
to
assure
anonymity.
Interviews
were
conducted in
Arabic
during
the
summers
of
2000-1,
at
places
in
Lebanon chosen
by
the
interviewee.12
Inter
views ranged from 90 minutes to five hours and were taped, transcribed and
integrated
with
notes
taken
during
the
interview. Several
other
interviews
were
scheduled but
dropped,
because the
subject
seemed
skittish and
ner
vous
about
anonymity,
or
because
we
felt the
demands
made
on
us
would
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18
Kreidie and Monroe
have
jeopardized
our own
safety.
(We
were
asked
to
ride
in
several
cars
blind
folded for several
hours and
change
cars
frequently.)
We
use
only
first
names
and identities
have been modified
slightly
to
protect
subjects'
anonymity.
All
subjects
admitted
they
had
engaged
in
ethnic violence and
killing.
To
have
a
check
on
the
veracity
of
facts
described,
we
also interviewed
some
vic
tims
and
victims'
families. But since
our
interest
here
is in the
perceptions
of
perpetrators,
in
understanding
how
they
process
information
and
how
their
cognitive
frameworks
affect their
behavior,
we
focus less
on
historical
details
and
more
on
capturing
the mindset that leads
to
violence.
Dealing
with memories involved interesting methodological problems, not the least
of
which is the distinction
between
post
hoc
justifications
for
decisions
as
opposed
to
the actual
decision
making
process
itself.
For
our
purposes,
how
ever,
it is
important
to
understand what
particular
post
hoc
justifications
are
given,
since that
yields
insight
into the mindset of the
speaker.
All
subjects
were
between
36 and 50
when
interviewed. At the
time of
their
involvement
in
the
war,
they
were
between 15 and
22.13
Assa'd,
Abdo,
Talal and
Toni
were
involved
in
the
war
at
all
stages,
until its
closing
around
1989.
Marwan
was
involved between 1975-76
and
again
from 1981-1984.
Interviews
were
analyzed using
a
narrative
technique
commonly
utilized in
political
science
(Patterson
andMonroe
1998)
and were
analyzed by
separate
coders.
Each of
our
five
perpetrators
was
involved in
an
ethnic
massacre.
Each
admitted
killing
members
of the other
ethnic
groups.
The
particular
incidents
range
from
fighting
on
a
one-to-one
basis,
bombing
civilian
areas,
and/or
killing
with
the
purpose
of
cleansing/eradicating
certain
areas
from the
en
emies.
These included
(1)
the
1975
Tall
Za'atar,
(2)
Nabaa
and Karantina
massacre,
(3)
the
Sabra
and
Shatila
massacres
of 15-18
September
1982,
massacres
in which
Ariel
Sharon
played
a
role,
(4)
the Salima
village
in
cident
and
Bmaryem
village
massacres
of
1975-6,
and
(5)
the
Green
Line
kidnappings
of
1975-1976.
We
were
careful
to
choose
incidents which
in
volved
perpetrators
from
different sectarian
groups
since
ethnic
violence is
not
limited
to
one
group.14
ANALYSIS
Although
interviews
are on
going,
even
this
preliminary
analysis
sug
gests
the
tremendous
power
of
identity
and,
more
particularly,
our
view
of ourselves
in relation
to
others.
These
two
psychological
factors
seem
to
constrain choice for
all
these
individuals.
Beyond
this
finding,
the results
summarized
in Table
1
focus
on
the
critical
psychological
factor(s)
that
turns
ordinary
citizens
into
perpetrators
of ethnic
violence,
and
on
the
psycholog
ical
steps
in
this
transformational
process.
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Psychological
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and Ethnic
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19
Table
1.
Major
Social
Psychological Approaches
to
Ethnic Conflict
Theoretical
explanations
Mentioned:
Yes
Mentioned: No
Social
identity
Group
identification
Social
comparison
Self-esteem
Schema and
stereotypes
Self
identity
as
roles
Cognitive representations,
socio/cultural effects
Models
of
symbolic
racism
Realistic
conflict
theory
Social
representation
Social dominance
Post-structural
approach
All
subjects
All
subjects
All but
more as
background
All
subjects
All
subjects
All
subjects
All
subjects
All
but
more as
background
Yes
but
secondary.
Toni,
Assa'd, Talal,
and Marwan
All
Marwan,
Talal,
Assa'd
All
All
but Talal and
Assa'd broke
with
parental
models
Abdo
Toni and
Abdol-secondary
Identity
Constrains Choice
We
were
struck
by
the
extent to
which
identity
constrained
choice for
all these
people.
Regardless
of
their
political
and
ideological position,
and
irrespective
of their
particular
social/group
identities,
no
one
felt
they
had
a
choice.
Each insisted
they
were
pushed
into action
by
"the
other."
No
one
seemed
to want
the
conflict
to
continue;
yet
all seemed
pulled
toward
its
continuation
by
a
feeling
that
they
would be
destroyed
if
they
did
not
turn
to
violence.
Moreover,
even
the
few
narratives
we
have
collected
so
far
suggest
the
important
role
of
social
comparisons
in
forming
group
boundaries and
social
identities.
We also
can see
the
fighters'
motivations that
made
perpe
trators
biased
against
other
groups;
we
can
form
a
picture
of
the
factors that
might
have
produced
certain
cognitive
sch?mas
of
the
"others."
Stereotypes
shaped
the
inter-group
relationships.
Many
researchers
suggest
the
location
and
historical
role
of
Lebanon
as a
refuge
of
different
ethnic and
religious
groups
have
shaped
its
destiny
as a
divided multiethnic
country.
Our
findings
do
not
support
theories
of
consociational
democracy
(Lijphart 1975)
which
argue
that the
institutional
recognition
of
multiethnic
groupings
can
provide
political
stability.
Instead,
our
analysis
reinforces
the
conclusions of
scholars
who
claim
ethnic divi
sions
deepened
because the
Lebanese
constitution
entrenched
ethnicity
in
a
sectarian-based
political
system
(Hitti
1957;
Kirk
1964;
Salibi
1965;
Barakat
1977). At least for the people in our sample, sectarian arrangements ag
gravated
disparities
between
the "haves
and
the
have-nots" in
Lebanon.
Further,
we
find
that
although
this structural
explanation
provides
fertile
intellectual
ground
for
explaining
how
ethnic
divisions and
differences led
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Kreidie and Monroe
to
violence,
this structural
explanation
alone
cannot
fully clarify
why
the
Lebanese
resorted
to
political
violence.
For
a
fuller
explanation,
we
need
the
psychological
component.
Social
Comparisons
The
members of the Lebanese National
Movement?Talal,
Assa'd and
Marwan?were
very
dissatisfied with
the
unequal
distribution of
political
power and its effect on their group's accessibility to better employment.
This
social,
economic and
political
dissatisfaction,
which
rationalists
might
focus
on as a
major
cause
of frustration and
eruption
of
violence,
was
set
in
a
historical
background
of mistrust
that
was
entrenched
in
the
fighters'
minds
through
socialization.
The
distrust
from
past
injustices
seemed
to
place
a
lens
on
people's
abilities
to
view the
present
situation,
and
spread
a
cloud
of
suspicion
over
current
interactions with
people
of
the
other
group
that
was
more
important
than
existing political
realities
in
determining
re
sponses
and
future
behavior.
All
subjects
depicted
the role
of their
family,
school and
media in
accentuating
their
status
in
Lebanon
as
either
being
Sunnite,
Shiite,
Druze
or
Maronite.
Each views his
group
and himself
as
different
from others in
terms
of
status
in
society,
rights
in
government
and
employment
privileges.
This
social
comparison
was
clear
in
the
stories of
all
subjects.
According
to
Marwan,
his
parents
often talked about their disadvan
tages
and
how
unfair their
situation
has
been
over
years,
but
they
never
thought
that
war
would
help.
Even when
the
war
erupted
and their lives
were
endangered,
Marwan's
parents
chose
not
to
get
involved
and discour
aged
their
son
from
taking
part.
Unlike
his
parents,
however,
Marwan could
not
take
a
passive
role. "How
can
I
see
this
happening
to
my
people?
They
[Christian
Lebanese
Forces]
allied with the
enemy
[Israel]
and
they
were
implementing
their
plan
of
eradicating
not
only
the Palestinians
but also
us
Lebanese
Muslims."
What turned
Marwan,
Toni,
Abdo,
Assa'd
and Talal toward violence
was
perceptions,
especially
the
perceived
threat
to
their
group's identity.
The
social
representations
with which
they
had been socialized
made each
of
these
men
see
themselves
as
part
of their ethnic and
religious
group
and
view
the other
group
members
as
traitors
or as
a
direct threat
to
their
group's
identity.
The Lebanese Forces members (Toni and Abdo) felt theMuslims
were
traitors
because
the
Muslims
supported
the
Palestinians
who
are
planning
to
have their
own
state
within
the state of
Lebanon.
Social
representations
worked
as a
background
variable
on
social
identity.
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Abdo: "The
Muslims,
whom
we
lived and worked
with
[for]
years,
dared
to
support
the
Palestinians,
who
were
becoming
too
strong
and
were
planning
on
taking
over
our
country
How
can we
accept
that?"
When asked
if
there
was
any
alternative
to
force
in
order
to
stop
this
in
cursion
on
Lebanese
sovereignty,
both Abdo and
Toni
said
no.
Both
men
felt
the
Muslims and
all Arab
countries
were
planning
on
having
the
Palestinian
plan
implemented
in
Lebanon.
Toni: "No. No other
way
[than
force].
We had
to
act
swiftly,
or we
would
have
been thrown
in
the sea."
Abdo
seconded this sentiment.
"All
Arab countries saw what was happening and they did not do anything to
stop
it.
We
had
to
do
it,
and
by
force.
They
[Palestinians]
were
moving
into
our
[Christian] villages."
The
perception
of this threat became
more
imminent when
members
of another sectarian
group
were
approaching
the
Christian
villages,
the
Christian
refuge.
Abdo
said,
"I
was
born in this
village.
My
school,
my
her
itage,
my
people...
[He
fell
silent.]
I had
no
other
option
[than
fighting]."
Talal and
Assa'd,
members of the Lebanese National
movement,
felt the
same
way.
"It is
my
home.
My
family
lived here for
many
generations.
I
had
to
protect
our
honor." Talal
explained,
"If
they
take
over,
where
would
we
go?
This is our home. As
Druze,
we can't let
anyone
step
on our
honor,
and
only
by
blood and
soul
we can
protect
it."
Marwan continued
in
this
vein,
capturing
what
was a
feeling
of
being
encircled.
"We
Sunnis
cannot
continue
to
be
passive
and let
them
take
over.
They
[Christians]
have
done
it
over
and
over
through
out
history."
Q.
Done
what?
Marwan:
They
took
the
biggest
share.
They
allied
with Israel
and France
and
did
their
best to
put
us
down.
Assa'd
also
saw
himself
as
a
liberator.
Q.
Was
itLiberation
war
from
the
other Lebanese militias?
And where
would
they
go?
Assa'd: Which
Lebanon?
They
claim that
they
are
Lebanese.
They
are
traitors. If
they really
want
a
Lebanon
for
all,
then
they
would
give
us
rights.
[Let
us]
have
more
representation
in
politics,
government,
employment.
They
allied with Israel
to
keep
Lebanon for them. If
this
is
what
they
want,
we
will
protect
our
homes,
fight
till the
last
drop
of
blood and
not
give
up
our
right.
We will
not
submit
to
their
conspiracy
and
we
will
not
let
our
children be the
victims of
oppression
Abdo felt the
same
way,
justifying
his
party's
alliance with
Israel.
Q:
Do
you
think
that
your
freedom
and
equality
can
be achieved
through
violence?
Abdo:
I
said
many
times;
we
had
no
option.
Anyone
would
do
what
we
did
with
these
people
who lost their
conscience
and allied with
the
worst
enemy....
They
claim
they
are
Lebanese
They
have
nothing
to
do
with this Our
alliance with
Israel
was
a
de
facto
situation. We had
no
choice.
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Kreidie
and Monroe
Self-Esteem
as
a
Background
for
Social
Identity
We asked about the need
for
social value and
personal
esteem
as a
motive
toward
in-group
bias. We found that the
subjects
associated with
their
own
sectarian
group,
even
if
they
had
to
ignore
some
of their
long
held values
or
deviate
from
family
standards.
Consider
Assa'd,
who
fought
in battles
defending
his
own
Druze dominant
village.
Assa'd
explains
his
shift from
being
a
member
of the
Communist
Party
to
being
a
member
of the Socialist
Progressive
Party
by
reference
to
the need
to
help
pro
mote his sect's status and, more specifically, his family's honor. Even though
Assa'd claims
to
be
ideologically
closer
to
the
Communists,
he felt his iden
tity
as a
Druze
was more
important.
His
fighting
as a
Druze
was con
nected
in his mind with his self-esteem.
"If
my
family
is
in
direct
threat,
I would
kill them
[my
family]
myself
before
I
let
them
be touched
by
the
bastards."15
Social
esteem
was
evident
as
a
background
factor
for
all
our
subjects.
While
Marwan decided
to
join
the Sunni
Murabetoun
movement,
disre
garding
his
parent's
requests
to
stay
out
of
any
political
involvement,
he
reported:
"I
joined
the Murabetoun
wholeheartedly hoping
that
we
would
fight
to have more
rights
and better status." When asked
why they supported
the Palestinians
against
other
Lebanese, Marwan,
Assa'd
and Talal said that
they
had
to
defend
the
Palestinians
from "those
Israeli
puppets
who
are
im
plementing
the Israeli
plan
of
weakening
if
not
eradicating
the Palestinian
Liberation
movement. We
can
not
stop
there
and
watch
them
being
per
secuted
again."
Assa'd
added:
"We
Arabs
have
to
put
our
hands
together
to
stop
any
Israeli
aggression,
whether
directly
or
through
their
agents
[the
Lebanese
Forces]."
Talal
repeatedly
told
us
how his
party
works
to
improve
the
general
welfare,
social
equality
and social
status
of
the
Druze,
Talal: Our leader's main goal is improving and spreading education. As parliamen
tarian,
he
always
worked
on
bringing
better education