kuperman rwanda in retrospect

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Rwanda in Retrospect

Alan 7. Kuperman

A HARD LOOK AT INTERVENTION

SEVERAL YEARS after mass killings in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda,the United States is still searching for a comprehensive policy toaddress deadly communal conflicts. Among Washington policymakersand pundits, only two basic principles have achieved some consensus.First, U.S. ground troops generally should not be used in humanitarianinterventions during ongoing civil wars. Second, an exception shouldbe made for cases of genocide, especially where intervention can succeedat low cost. Support for intervention to stop genocide is voiced acrossmost of the political spectrum.

Despite this amorphous consensus that the United States canand should do more when the next genocide occurs, there has beenlittle hard thinking about just what that would entail or accomplish.A close examination of what a realistic U.S. military interventioncould have achieved in the last clear case of genocide this decade,Rwanda, finds insupportable the oft-repeated claim that 5,000troops deployed at the outset of the killing in April 1994 could haveprevented the genocide. This claim was originally made by theU.N.'s commanding general in Rwanda during the genocide andhas since been endorsed by members of Congress, human rightsgroups, and a distinguished panel of the Carnegie Commission onPreventing Deadly Conflict. Although some lives could have beensaved by intervention of any size at any point during the genocide,the hard truth is that even a large force deployed immediately upon

ALAN J. KUPERMAN is MacArthur Transnational Security Fellow atMIT'S Center for International Studies and Fellow of the Institute forthe Study of World Politics.

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reports of attempted genocide would not have been able to saveeven half the ultimate victims.

PRELUDE TO GENOCIDE

RWANDAN POLITICS were traditionally dominated by the Tutsi, agroup that once made up 17 percent of the population. Virtually allthe rest of the population was Hutu, and less than one percent wereaboriginal Twa. All three groups lived intermingled throughout thecountry. During the transition to independence starting in 1959,however, the Hutu seized control in a violent struggle that spurredthe exodus of about half the Tutsi population to neighboring states.

The Hutu themselves were divided into two regional groups. Themajority lived in the central and southern part of the country andsupported the PARMEHUTU (Parti du mouvement et de l'6mancipationdes Bahutu), which assumed power upon independence, while aminority lived in the northwest, historically a separate region. Duringthe first decade of independence, Tutsi refugees invaded Rwandarepeatedly, seeking a return to power. The ruling Hutu responded bymassacring domestic Tutsi. In 1973, a northwestern Hutu officer,Juvenal Habyarimana, led a coup that shifted political power to hisregion. Northwestern Hutu came to dominate Rwanda's political,military, and economic life, engendering resentment from other Hutuas well as from the Tutsi. But large-scale violence against domestic Tutsilargely disappeared for 1S years in the absence of any firther attemptedinvasions by refugees.

Stability began to unravel in October 199o, when an expatriate rebelforce composed mainly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, the RwandanPatriotic Army (RPA), invaded northern Rwanda. The RPA and itspolitical arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), were led by battle-tested soldiers who had fought with the Ugandan guerrilla YoweriMuseveni to overthrow Uganda's government in 1986 before turningtheir efforts toward home. By early 1993, the rebels had made substantialinroads against the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces (or FAR, inthe French acronym). This military advance, combined with diplomaticpressure from the international community, compelled Habyarimana toagree to share power in the Arusha accords of August 1993.

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The peacekeepers of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda(UNAMIR) then arrived, but for eight months the Rwandan leaderobstructed and tried to modify the power-sharing provisions. Theextremist wing of his northwestern Hum clique viewed the accordsas abject surrender to the Tutsi, who they feared would seize the spoilsof rule and seek retribution. Habyarimana attempted to retain powerby co-opting the opposition Hum through bribery and appeals to

solidarity against the Tutsi, and he succeeded

The most remarkable in splitting off radical factions from the main

of the genocide opposition parties. But he and the extremistsaspect oalso developed a forceful option-trainingwas its speed. militias, broadcasting anti-Tutsi hate radio,

and plotting to kill moderate Hum leadersand Tutsi civilians. On April 6, 1994, as

Habyarimana appeared to be acquiescing to international pressure toimplement the accords, his plane was mysteriously shot down. Thegenocide plan was put in motion.

In most areas of Rwanda, violence began on the following day.The government radio station and the extremists' counterpart-Radio-T616vision Libre des Mille Collines-urged the Hutu totake vengeance against the Tutsi for their alleged murder of thepresident. Led by militias, Hutu began to attack the homes ofneighboring Tutsi, attempting to rob, rape, and murder them, andoften setting fire to their homes. This initial step did not elimi-nate a high proportion of Tutsi, however, because their attackerswere generally poorly armed. The vast majority of Tutsi fled theirhomes and sought refuge in central gathering places-churches,schools, hospitals, athletic fields, stadiums, and other accessiblespaces. Tutsi often passed through more than one such site togather in larger concentrations, either voluntarily or at govern-ment direction. Within a few days, most of Rwanda's Tutsi hadcongregated at such centralized sites throughout the country, ingroups ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands.

At first, the assembled Tutsi gained a defensive advantage. Thesurrounding crowds of militia-led Hutu were generally armed onlywith swords, spears, and machetes-or with the traditional masu, alarge club studded with nails. By using walls and buildings for defense,

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Tutsi groups could often fend off , 9Most Tutsiattacks merely by throwing rocks. flyedp*toBy contrast, individual Tutsi who Apl1994attempted to flee were often killed Many Tutsiimmediately by the surrounding saved byRPFHutu masses or caught and killed occupat onat roadblocks. For several days,this produced a standoff. Tutsiliving conditions were deteriorating and supplies were dwindling,but most Hutu were unwilling to risk casualties by attacking.

This situation changed in most of Rwanda within a week, by aboutApril 13, when better-armed Hutu reinforcements-composed ofmembers of the regular army, the reserves, the Presidential Guard(PG), or the national police-began arriving at the Tutsi gatheringsites. Although these forces were few in number at each site, theywere armed with rifles, grenades, or machine guns, which tilted the

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balance of force. They would typically toss a few grenades on theTutsi and follow with light-arms fire. Survivors who attempted to fleewere usually mowed down by gunfire or caught and killed by thesurrounding mob. Militia-led Hutu would then enter the site, hackingto death those still alive. Some Tutsi escaped in the initial mayhemor avoided death by hiding beneath their dead compatriots, but manywere later caught at roadblocks and killed on the spot or taken toother central sites to face a similar ordeal. A few lucky Tutsi survivedby hiding in places such as pit latrines or the homes of sympatheticHutu, living to tell their harrowing tales.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the genocide was its speed.According to survivor testimonies gathered by African Rights andHuman Rights Watch, the majority of Tutsi gathering sites wereattacked and destroyed before April 21, only 14 days into the genocide.Given that half or more of the ultimate Tutsi victims died at thesesites, the unavoidable conclusion is that a large portion of Rwanda'sTutsi had been killed by April 21--perhaps 250,000 in just over twoweeks. That would be the fastest genocide rate in recorded history.

Despite this generally rapid pace, two factors constrained the speedand extent of the killing in Rwanda. First, Hutu extremists generallyavoided large-scale massacres when international observers werepresent-as part of a comprehensive strategy to hide the genocide fromboth the outside world and Rwanda's remaining Tutsi until it could becompleted. Wherever Tutsi were congregated under the watch ofoutside observers, the extremists favored an alternate strategy of slow,stealthy annihilation: Hutu leaders would arrive each day at such siteswith a list of up to several dozen names, usually starting with the Tutsipolitical elite. These Tutsi would be removed under a false pretense suchas interrogation before being taken to a remote location and executed.This occurred at several places across Rwanda: Kamarampaka Stadiumand the Nyarushishi camp in Cyangugu prefecture, where Red Cross aidworkers were present; the Kabgayi Archbishopric in Gitarama, underthe watchful eyes of the pope's subordinates; Amahoro stadium inKigali, where U.N. troops stood guard; and smaller sites in Kigali suchas the St. Famille and St. Paul's churches. At such sites, the slower paceof killing meant that the vast majority of Tutsi there were still alive atthe end of April, and a good number survived the entire ordeal.

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Second, the killing varied among Rwanda's ten original prefec-tures. Byumba prefecture in the north was the base of the Tutsi-ledrebels, who generally prevented large-scale massacres of Tutsi there.The two prefectures most dominated by Hutu extremists, Gisenyiand Ruhengeri in the northwest, also suffered relatively little killingbecause much of their Tutsi populations had fled prior to the genocidein response to earlier threats and harassment.

Two prefectures with high Tutsi populations and strong Hutuopposition movements also initially managed to avoid the genocide.Butare prefecture in the south was governed by a Tutsi prefect whomanaged to keep matters relatively calm until he was removed fromoffice on April 18. Widespread killing then began with a vengeance,and tens of thousands of Tutsi perished in the next few days. Similarly,Gitarama prefecture, the heart of central Rwandan Hutu oppositionto the northwestern Hutu regime, generally resisted implementingthe genocide until government forces arrived to spur them on. Large-scale killing commenced there about April 21. Finally, the nature ofkilling in the capital, Kigali, also differed significantly from that inthe rest of the country. During the first two days, a highly organizedand thorough assassination campaign was carried out there againstopposition politicians and prominent liberals such as human rightsadvocates. Unlike elsewhere, many of Kigali's initial victims of Hutuextremism were fellow Hutu.

Civil war also erupted in Kigali almost immediately. On April 7,an RPA battalion that had been stationed in the capital since De-cember 1993 under the Arusha accords demanded a halt to atrocitiesagainst civilians-and then clashed with government forces whenits demand was ignored. With the president and the moderateopposition dead, war breaking out in Kigali, and radio broadcastsurging Hutu to kill their neighbors, the capital descended intochaos. Corpses began to pile up, totaling as many as 20,ooo duringthe first week. Unlike in the countryside, however, Tutsi had a decentchance of gaining some refuge by reaching a central gathering sitewhere foreigners stood guard. Although the extremists could nothide the chaos and violence in the capital, they generally avoidedwholesale massacres before such witnesses in hopes of avertingforeign military intervention.

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ESTIMATED PACE OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDAAPRIL - JULY 1994

Surviving Tutsi in thousands

650

550

450

350

250

150

50

7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 7 14 21

1 April May June I July

Genocide First Genocide could have French Operationbegins reports of been stopped Turquoise

nationwide if intervention enters Rwandagenocide ordered April 20

By late April, only three weeks after the president's plane crash,almost all the large massacres were finished. The rebels themselvesacknowledged on April 29 that "the genocide is almost completed."Human Rights Watch concurs that "in general, the worst massacreshad finished by the end of April." By that time, it notes, "perhapshalf of the Tutsi population of Rwanda"-some two-thirds of theultimate Tutsi victims-already had been exterminated. Killing ofthe remaining Tutsi continued at a slower pace for another two anda half months until halted by the rebels' military victory and a belatedFrench-led intervention.

Precise Tutsi death totals are difficult to determine because ofseveral factors, including the inability to distinguish Tutsi from Hutucorpses. But estimates can be made by subtracting the number ofTutsi survivors from the number living in Rwanda immediatelyprior to the genocide. Estimated 1994 population figures, which areextrapolated from the 1991 census and account for annual popula-tion growth of three percent, indicate that Rwanda's pre-genocide

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population included approximately 650,000 Tutsi. There is no evidencefor other, higher claims.' After the genocide and civil war, some15o,ooo Tutsi survivors were identified by aid organizations. Thus anestimated 500,ooo Rwandan Tutsi were killed, more than three-quarters of their population. The number of Hutu killed during thegenocide and civil war is even less certain, with estimates rangingfrom io,ooo to well over lOO,OOO.

THE KNOWLEDGE GAP

ALT HO U GH U.S. intelligence reports from the period of the genocideremain classified, they probably mirrored those of the internationalnews media, human rights organizations, and the U.N.-becauseU.S. intelligence agencies committed virtually no in-country resourcesto what was considered a tiny state in a region of little strategic value.During the genocide's early phases, the U.S. government actuallyreceived most of its information from nongovernmental organizations.A comprehensive review of such international reporting-by American,British, French, Belgian, and Rwandan media, leading human rightsgroups, and U.N. officials-strongly suggests that President Clintoncould not have known that a nationwide genocide was under way inRwanda until about April 20.

This conclusion is based on five aspects of the reporting during thefirst two weeks. First, violence was initially depicted in the context ofa two-sided civil war-one that the Tutsi were winning-rather thana one-sided genocide against the Tutsi. On April 13, the Westernpress accurately reported that Rwanda's Hutu interim governmenthad fled the capital for refuge in Gitarama and that "the fall of Kigaliseems imminent" (Paris Radio France International). When Westerntroops arrived to evacuate foreign nationals, the Tutsi rebels did not

I Some accounts claim that one million Tutsi lived in Rwanda before the genocide,

making up 12 percent of the population, which would correspond with the estimate of850,ooo killed. But historical demographic data suggest otherwise. In 1956, a Belgiancensus counted almost 17 percent of the population as Tutsi, but half of those fled or diedin the violence that accompanied independence. The remaining 9 percent subsequentlyhad a lower fertility rate than the Hutu, reducing the Tutsi population to the 8 percentreported in the 1991 census.

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seek assistance but rather demanded that the troops depart immediatelyso as not to interfere with their imminent victory. The Canadiancommander of the U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda, General RomeoDallaire, also identified the problem as mutual violence, stating onApril 15 that "if we see another three weeks of being cooped up andseeing them pound each other" (The Guardian), the U.N. presencewould be reassessed. In addition, until April 18 both the governmentand the rebels stated publicly that the FAR was not participating inmassacres. (The government was engaged in a cover-up, and therebels initially avoided implicating the FAR in the vain hope of winningits allegiance against the extremist Hutu.)

Second, the violence was reported to be waning when it actuallywas accelerating. Just four days in, on April n, The New York Timesreported that fighting had "diminished in intensity" and Le Mondewrote three days later that "a strange calm reigns in downtown" Kigali.The commander of Belgian peacekeepers stated that "the fighting hasdied down somewhat, one could say that it has all but stopped" (ParisRadio France International). On April 17, Dallaire told the BBC thatexcept for an isolated pocket in the north, "the rest of the line isessentially quite quiet." Only on April 18 did a Belgian radio stationquestion this consensus, explaining that the decline in reports ofviolence was because "most foreigners have left, including journalists."

Third, most early death counts were gross underestimates andnever suggested genocidal proportions. Three days into the killing,on April lo, The New York Times quoted varying estimates of 8,oooor "tens of thousands" dead. But during the second week, mediaestimates did not rise at all. On April 18, the Times still reported only20,ooo deaths, underestimating the actual carnage at that point byabout tenfold. The true scope of the killing emerged only on April20, when Human Rights Watch estimated that "as many as loo,ooopeople may have died to date," followed the next day by a Red Crossestimate of perhaps "hundreds of thousands."

Fourth, the initial focus of international reporting was almost exclu-sively on Kigali, a relatively small city, and thus failed to indicate thebroader scope ofviolence-a consequence both of Hutu concealmentefforts and of the Western evacuation of expatriates and reportersfrom the countryside. Although a few early reports of rural violence

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did trickle out to the West, these indicated military combat, mutualethnic violence, or criminal looting rather than an exterminationcampaign. An RPF official told the BBC on April 12 only that "we wantto stop the senseless killing that is going on in Kigali." The first inter-national report of a large-scale massacre outside the capital did notemerge until April 16. As late as April 20, U.N. Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali still described the killings as "mainly in Kigali."This initial obsession with the capital, which contained only fourpercent of Rwanda's population, obscured the national scope ofviolenceand thus its genocidal intent.

The rebels' own radio station did not report the nationwide scopeof the violence until April 19. American newspapers failed to give anysuch indication until April 22, when they belatedly reported thatfighting bands had reduced "much of the country to chaos" (The NewYork Times). Many foreign observers still could not conceive that agenocide was under way. On April 23, The Washington Post ponderedwhy only 20,ooo refugees had crossed the border-even though halfa million Tutsi had fled their homes-and reported that aid workershad concluded that "most of the borders have been sealed by theRwandan Army." Only on April 25 did The New York Times solve theriddle, reporting that violence had "widened into what appears to bea methodical killing of Tutsi across the countryside." The missingrefugees "either have been killed or are trying to hide."

Fifth, no credible and knowledgeable observers, includinghuman rights groups, raised the prospect that genocide was occur-ring until the end of the second week. In opinion articles publishedon April 14 and 17, Human Rights Watch gave no hint of an attemptednationwide genocide. The rebels did not use the term until April 17.Human Rights Watch finally raised the prospect in an April 19letter to the U.N. Security Council. Other international observersremained considerably more cautious. The pope first used the word"genocide" on April 27. The U.S. Committee for Refugees waiteduntil May 2 to urge the Clinton administration to make such a deter-mination. Only on May 4 did Boutros-Ghali finally declare a "realgenocide." Thus the earliest President Clinton credibly could havemade a determination of attempted genocide was about April 20,

1994-two weeks into the violence.

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THE MILITARY SCENE

AT THE TIME of Habyarimana's death, Rwanda hosted three militaryforces-those of the government, the rebels, and the United Nations.Government forces totaled about 40,000, including the army, thenational police, and 1,500 PG troops. But except for the PG and a fewother elite battalions, this force was largely hollow, having expandedsixfold in three years responding to the rebel threat. Another 15,oooto 3o,ooo Hutu were scattered around the country in militias, butmany apparently did not possess firearms or ammunition. Rebel armswere more primitive than the FAR'S and included few motorizedvehicles and no aircraft.

UNAMIR had about 2,500 peacekeepers, most either in Kigali orin the north near the demilitarized zone. Their presence was subjectto the consent of the Rwandan government. Rules of engagementwere somewhat ambiguous but were generally interpreted to bar theuse of force except in self-defense or in joint operations with Rwandannational police.

On the first day of violence, the PG executed ten Belgian peace-keepers who were attempting to protect Rwanda's opposition primeminister. These deaths and the emerging chaos in Kigali promptedWestern governments to evacuate their nationals. European troopsbegan arriving on April 9 and evacuated several thousand Westernersbefore departing on April 13. On April io, Dallaire also requested5,ooo more U.N. troops to halt what he perceived to be mutual killingconfined to the capital. Instead, Belgium announced on April 14 thatit would be withdrawing its UNAMIR battalion, which triggered uneaseamong the other troop-contributors and led the U.N. Security Councila week later to cut authorized troop levels to a skeleton crew of 270.

Rebel forces, estimated at 20,000, had been constrained by theArusha accords to a small area of northern Rwanda; the exceptionwas one authorized Kigali battalion, which the RPF had reinforcedclandestinely to about 1,ooo troops. When the civil war was renewedon April 7, the northern-based rebels set out to help the strandedbattalion in the capital and engage FAR troops elsewhere, makingquick progress down Rwanda's entire eastern flank by late April.Thereafter, the war had two stationary fronts, in Kigali and Ruhengeri,

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until the end ofJune, as well as a broad mobile front moving westwardthrough southern Rwanda. In just three months, the rebels capturedmost of the country-Gitarama on June 9, Kigali on July 4, ButareonJuly 5, Ruhengeri on July 14, and Gisenyi on July 17-before finallydeclaring a cease-fire on July 18.

As reports of genocide reached the outside world starting in lateApril, public outcry spurred the United Nations to reauthorize abeefed-up "UNAMIR II" on May 17. During the following month,however, the U.N. was unable to obtain any substantial contributionsof troops and equipment. As a result, on June 22 the Security Councilauthorized France to lead its own intervention, Operation Turquoise,by which time most Tutsi were already long dead.

POTENTIAL U.S. INTERVENTIONS

IN RETROSPECT, three levels of potential U.S. military interventionwarrant analysis: maximum, moderate, and minimal. None wouldhave entailed full-blown nationwide policing or long-term nation-building by American troops. Based on historical experience, fill-blownpolicing would have required some 8o,ooo to 16o,ooo personnel-that is, ten to twenty troops per thousand of population-an amountfar more than logistically or politically feasible. Nation-buildingwould have been left to a follow-on multinational force, presumablyunder U.N. authorization.

Maximum intervention would have used all feasible force to haltlarge-scale killing and military conflict throughout Rwanda. Moderateintervention would have sought to halt some large-scale killing withoutdeploying troops to areas of ongoing civil war, in order to reduce U.S.casualties. Minimal intervention would have relied on air power alone.

A maximum intervention would have required deployment of aforce roughly the size of one U.S. division-three brigades andsupporting units, comprising about 15,ooo troops and their equipment-with rules of engagement permitting the use of deadly force to protectendangered Rwandans. After establishing a base of operations atKigali airport, the force would have focused on three primary goals:halting armed combat and interposing itself between FAR and RPF

forces on the two stationary fronts of the civil war; establishing order

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THREE POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

Force Tutsi Percentagesize i n days saved ofdeath, l

xiu Division -40 125,000 25

13,500 troops; 27,ooo tons

Moderate Reinforced Brigade 21 100,000 20

6,ooo troops; io,ooo tons

Mnimum Air Assault Brigade 14 75,000 152,5o troops (outside Rwanda);

4,500 tons

in the capital; and finally fanning out to halt large-scale genocidalkilling in the countryside. None of these tasks would have been especiallydifficult or dangerous for properly configured and supported Americantroops once they were in Rwanda. But transporting such a force io,ooomiles to a landlocked country with limited airfields would have beenconsiderably slower than some retrospective appraisals have suggested.

The first brigade to arrive would have been responsible for Kigali:coercing the FAR and RPF to halt hostilities, interposing itself betweenthem, and policing the capital. The second brigade would have deployedone battalion in the north to halt the civil war in Ruhengeri andanother as a rapid-reaction force in case American troops drew fire.The third brigade, supplemented by a battalion of the second brigade,would have been devoted to halting the killing in the countryside. Suchan effort would have required roughly 2,000 troops to halt the war inKigali, 3,000 to police Kigali, 1,ooo to stop the fighting in the north,1,5oo for a rapid-reaction force, and 6,ooo to stop the genocide outsideKigali-a total of about 13,500 troops, in addition to support personnel.

The time required to deploy such a force would have dependedmainly on its weight. A division-size task force built around onebrigade each from the l1st Air Assault, 82nd Airborne, and a lightarmy division can be approximated as the average of those divisions-26,550 tons, including 20o helicopters and 13,500 personnel. (TheMarines could also have substituted for the one of the brigades.)

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Because Rwanda is a landlocked country in Central Africa, and becausespeed is critical in stopping a genocide, the entire force would havebeen airlifted. The rate of airlift would have been constrained byfactors such as the delay in loading planes at U.S. bases, excessivedemand for air refueling, fuel shortages in Central Africa, and thelimited airfield capacity in Kigali and at the potential staging base atEntebbe in neighboring Uganda. At an optimistic rate of 8oo tonsdaily, the task force would have required 33 days to airlift. Personnel,which are much quicker to transport thantheir cargo, could have been sent first-but Hum ringleaders spreadit would have been imprudent to deploythem into the field without sufficient equip- false reports of anment and logistics. Several additional days impending Westernwould also have been required for the delaybetween the deployment order and start of intervention to helpairlift, for the gradual increase in the capacity speed the killings.of theater airfields unaccustomed to suchtraffic, and for travel to and unloading at the theater. In addition, therate of force deployment might have been slowed by the need to uselimited airlift capacity for food, medicine, and spare parts to sustainthe first troops to arrive. Thus the entire force could not have closedin the theater until about 4o days after the president's order.

Advance units, however, could have begun operations muchsooner. Approximately four days after the order, a battalion or two ofArmy Rangers could have parachuted in and seized Kigali airport atnight. Follow-on troops could have expanded outward from theairfield to establish a secure operating base. Within about two weeks,sufficient troops and equipment could have arrived to halt the fighting,form a buffer between the FAR and the RPF in Kigali and northwestRwanda, and fully police the capital. Only later, however, could theintervention force have turned in earnest to stopping the genocide inthe countryside as helicopters, vehicles, and troops arrived.

Some observers have suggested that the genocide would have ceasedspontaneously throughout Rwanda upon the arrival of Westernenforcement troops in Kigali-or possibly even earlier, upon themere announcement of a deployment. They claim that the extremistswould have halted killing in hopes of avoiding punishment. But these

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Hutu were already guilty of genocide and could not have imaginedthat stopping midway would gain them absolution. More likely, theannouncement of Western intervention would have accelerated thekilling as extremists tried to finish the job and eliminate witnesseswhile they had a chance. Such was the trend ahead of the RPA advance,as Hutu militias attempted to wipe out remaining Tutsi before the

rebels arrived. During the genocide, the

A major intervention ringleaders even trumpeted false reports ofan impending Western intervention to help

would have saved motivate Hutu to complete the killings.

275,ooo Tutsi, Although the Hutu generally held back frommass killing at sites guarded by foreigners toavoid provoking Western intervention, they

i50,ooo who would have lost this incentive for restraint

actually survived, had such an intervention been announced.The 6,ooo U.S. troops deployed to the

countryside would have been insufficient toestablish a full police presence, but they could have found and pro-tected significant concentrations of threatened Rwandans. Ideally,helicopter reconnaissance could have identified vulnerable or hostilegroups from the air and then directed rapid response forces to dispersehostile factions and secure the sites. Alternately, ground troops couldhave radiated out from Kigali in a methodical occupation of thecountryside. Displaced Rwandans could have been gathered graduallyinto perhaps 20 large camps for their protection.

Depending on the search method, large-scale genocide could havebeen stopped during the fourth or fifth week after the deploymentorder, by May 15 to May 25. Interestingly enough, this would havebeen before the task force's airlift had been completed. Based on thegenocide's progression, such an intervention would have saved about275,ooo Tutsi, instead of the 15o,ooo who actually survived. Maximumcredible intervention thus could not have prevented the genocide, asis sometimes claimed, but it could have spared about 125,ooo Tutsifrom death, some 25 percent of the ultimate toll.

A more modest intervention would have refrained from deployingU.S. troops to any area in Rwanda in which FAR and RPA troops wereactively fighting. In late April, this would have limited U.S. troops to

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a zone consisting of six prefectures in the south and west of Rwanda.A single reinforced brigade would have sufficed given the reducedterritory, population, and threat ofpotential adversaries. Ideally, the readybrigade of the iOlst Air Assault Division would have been designated andsupplemented by two additional light-infantry battalions, supportingunits for peace operations, and additional helicopters and motorizedvehicles: a force of 6,ooo personnel, weighing about lo,ooo tons.

For such an action, three main objectives would have been set:first, to deter and prevent entry of organized military forces into theabove-mentioned zone; second, to halt large-scale genocide there;and third, to prepare for a handoff to a U.N. force. Strategic airliftwould not have relied on Kigali airport, which was still a battlegroundin the civil war, but rather on neighboring Bujumbura in Burundi andEntebbe in Uganda -which would have ftirther constrained the deploy-ment rates. Still, facing little military threat in the zone, these troopsprobably could have stopped large-scale genocide there within threeweeks after the deployment order, by May 11, 1994. About 200,000

Tutsi from the zone could have survived, as opposed to about loo,ooofrom this part of Rwanda who actually did. Elsewhere in Rwanda,genocide would have continued until stopped by the RPA, as occurred,leaving only 50,000 survivors outside the zone of intervention.Moderate intervention thus could have spared about loo,ooo Tutsifrom death, or 20 percent of the ultimate toll. Surprisingly, moderateintervention in this case would have saved almost as many lives as themaximum alternative, because by avoiding combat areas the intervenerscould have turned sooner to counter genocide in the zone wheremost Tutsi lived.

The third alternative, a minimal intervention, would have attemptedto mitigate the genocide without introducing U.S. ground troops intoRwanda, relying on airpower alone from bases in neighboring countries.For example, the United States could have threatened to bomb theextremist ringleaders and the FAR's military assets unless the killingwas halted-and then followed through if necessary. But if the threatalone failed to coerce, U.S. pilots would have had difficulty locatingthe ringleaders or hitting FAR positions without killing rebels as well.Even if air coercion had succeeded in Rwanda, a follow-on groundforce would have been needed to keep the peace. Alternatively, the

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United States could have pursued airborne policing, which would haveattempted to interdict physically and intimidate psychologically theperpetrators of the genocide throughout Rwanda. Significant numbersof U.S. attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft could have patrolledRwanda daily from bases in neighboring countries. If armed factionsthreatening large groups of civilians were spotted, air-to-ground firecould have dispersed the assailants, at least temporarily. Such air patrolswould have continued until deployment of non-American groundtroops or until the RPF won the civil war. But airborne policing couldnot have prevented smaller acts of violence in the meantime.

Another minimal approach would have been to help the RwandanTutsi escape to refugee camps in bordering states-Burundi, Tanzania,Uganda, or Zaire-by using helicopter patrols to ensure safe passage.Rwanda has only about 6oo miles of paved roads. Assuming a team of2o helicopters with standard maintenance needs, five helicopters couldhave been kept aloft at a time, with each responsible for 120 miles ofroadway. If these helicopters flew at a ground speed of 120 miles perhour, each section of roadway could have been patrolled approxi-mately every hour. Airborne broadcasts and leaflets would havedirected the Tutsi to the exit routes. Air-to-ground fire wouldhave broken up roadblocks and dispersed armed gangs to ensurethe free flow of refugees. But this strategy could not have savedthose Tutsi unable to reach major roads and would have caused amajor refugee crisis.

Each of the airpower options would have had drawbacks, includingthe risk of losing airborne personnel to anti-aircraft fire, but each alsohad the potential to save tens of thousands of Tutsi. Coercion mighthave stopped the genocide quickly, potentially facilitating a cease-firein the civil war. Airborne policing could have allowed more Tutsito be saved by France's Operation Turquoise or a similar follow-updeployment. Free passage also would have kept more Tutsi alive,albeit as refugees, and they might have returned home quickly afterthe RPF'S victory. About 3oo,ooo Tutsi still were alive in late April1994, of whom about 15o,ooo subsequently perished. If minimumintervention had been able to avert half these later killings, it couldhave spared about 75,ooo Tutsi from death, or 15 percent of thegenocide's ultimate toll.

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A WESTERN FAILURE OF WILL?

MANY OBSERVERS have claimed that timely intervention would haveprevented the genocide. Some even asserted at first that UNAMIR itselfcould have done so, although most now acknowledge that the peace-keepers lacked sufficient arms, equipment, and supplies. Conventionalwisdom still holds that 5,000 well-armed reinforcements could haveprevented the genocide had they been deployed promptly when thekilling began-and that the West's failure to stop the slaughter resultedexclusively from a lack of will. Rigorous scrutiny of six prominentvariations of this assertion, however, finds all but one dubious.

Human Rights Watch makes the boldest claim: Diplomatic inter-vention could have averted the genocide without additional militarydeployment. These advocates contend that a threat from the interna-tional community to halt aid to any Rwandan government thatcommitted genocide would have emboldened Hutu moderates to facedown the extremists and extinguish violence. As proof, they note thatmoderate FAR officers appealed for support from Western embassiesduring the first days of violence, and that the intensity of massacreswaned after the West intensified its condemnations in late April.

However, this argument ignores the fact that virtually all ofRwanda's elite military units were controlled by extremist Hutu, ledby Colonel Theoneste Bagosora. These forces demonstrated theirpower and ruthlessness by killing Rwanda's top political moderatesduring the first two days of violence. By contrast, moderate Hutuofficers had virtually no troops at their disposal. The moderatesavoided challenging the extremists not because of a lack of Westernrhetorical support but because of mortal fear for themselves and theirfamilies. This fear was justified given that the extremists stamped outany nascent opposition throughout the genocide-coercing and bribingmoderate politicians, removing them from office or killing them ifthey did not yield, shipping moderate soldiers to the battlefront, andexecuting civilian opponents of genocide as "accomplices" of therebels. The decline in massacres in late April is explained simply bythe dwindling number of Tutsi still alive. International condemnationdid little except compel extremists to try harder to hide the killing anddisguise their rhetoric. Even these superficial gestures were directed

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mainly at persuading France to renew its military support for theanti-Tutsi war--hardly an indication of moderation.

The only way that the army's Hutu moderates could have reducedthe killing of Tutsi civilians would have been to join forces with theTutsi rebels to defeat the Hutu extremists. This was militarily feasible,given that the Tutsi rebels alone defeated both the FAR and the Hutumilitias in just three months-but it was politically implausible. ByApril, Rwanda had already been severely polarized along ethnic linesby four years of civil war, the calculated efforts of propagandists, andthe October 1993 massacre of Hutu by Tutsi in neighboring Burundi.Even moderate Hutu politicians once allied with the rebels had cometo fear Tutsi hegemony. Although the moderate Hutu officers sincerelyfavored a cease-fire and a halt to the genocide, they could not realisti-

cally have defected to the Tutsi rebels-atU.N. peacekeepers least until the FAR'S defeat became imminent.UwN.ee keperse tThe second claim is that 5,000 U.N.

troops deployed immediately upon the out-

violent retaliation, break of violence could have prevented thegenocide. But this assertion is problematicon three grounds. It assumes such troops

could have been deployed virtually overnight. In reality, even a U.S.light-infantry ready brigade would have required about a week afterreceiving orders to begin significant operations in the theater and sev-eral more days for all its equipment to arrive. Further delays would haveresulted from reinforcing the brigade with heavy armor or helicopters,or from assembling a multinational force. Even if ordered on April io,as requested at the time by Dallaire, reinforcements probably could nothave begun major operations to stop genocide much before April 20.

Moreover, it is unrealistic to argue that urgent intervention should havebeen launched on April lo-given that the international community didnot realize genocide was under way until at least ten days later.

Intervention advocates, such as the Carnegie Commission, alsoerroneously characterize the progression of the genocide. The com-mission claims that there was a "window of opportunity ... fromabout April 7 to April 21" when intervention "could have stemmed theviolence in and around the capital [and] prevented its spread to thecountryside." In reality, killing started almost immediately in most of

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Rwanda, and by April 21, the last day of this purported "window," halfthe ultimate Tutsi victims already were dead. Even if reinforcementshad arrived overnight in Kigali, Dallaire was unaware of genocideoutside the capital and thus would not have deployed troops to thecountryside in time to prevent the massacres.

Furthermore, 5,000 troops would have been insufficient to stopgenocide without running risks of failure or high casualties. Only 1,oootroops would have been available for policing Kigali--some three troopsper thousand residents, which is grossly inadequate for a city in thethroes of genocide. In the countryside, U.S. commanders would havefaced a stark choice: either concentrate forces for effective action, leav-ing most of the country engulfed in killing; or spread forces thin,leaving troops vulnerable to attack. To avoid such painftd choices in thepast, U.S. military planners have insisted on deploying more than20,ooo troops for interventions in the Dominican Republic, Panama,and Haiti-all countries with populations smaller than Rwanda's.

A third claim is that U.N. headquarters had three months' advancenotice of genocide and could have averted the killing simply by au-thorizing raids on weapons caches. Critics cite the so-called genocidefax-a January 11, 1994, cable from Dallaire to U.N. headquarters inNew York that conveyed a Hutu informant's warning that extremistswere planning to provoke civil war, kill Belgian peacekeepers to spurtheir withdrawal, and slaughter the Tutsi with an Interahamwe militiaofl,7OO troops that the informant was training. The cable also reportedan arms cache containing at least 135 weapons, which Dallaire wantedto seize within 36 hours.

Dallaire, however, raised doubts about the informant's credibilityin this cable, stating that he had "certain reservations on the suddennessof the change of heart of the informant.... Possibility of a trap notfully excluded, as this may be a set-up." Raising further doubt, thecable was the first and last from Dallaire containing such accusations,according to U.N. officials. Erroneous warnings of coups and assas-sinations are not uncommon during civil wars. U.N. officials wereprudent to direct Dallaire to confirm the allegations with Habyarimanahimself, based on the informant's belief that "the president does nothave full control over all elements of his old party/faction." Dallairenever reported any confirmation of the plot.

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Even if the U.N. had acquiesced to Dallaire in January 1994, it isunlikely the weapons cache could have been seized or that doing sowould have prevented the genocide. The U.N. actually did reverseitself barely three weeks later, on February 4, 1994, granting Dallaireauthorization to raid weapons depots. But his forces failed in everyattempt, even after an informant identified three new caches onFebruary 7. By mid-March, six weeks after receiving authorization,the peacekeepers had captured only a paltry total of 16 weapons andloo grenades; their rules required cooperating with Rwandan police,who tipped off the extremists. If the U.N. had permitted Dallaire toact without consulting local authorities, Kigali could have respondedunder Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (which governs consensualpeacekeeping operations) by simply expelling the force. The peace-keepers also were vulnerable to violent retaliation, as they were dispersedand still lacked armored personnel carriers at the time. In addition,Dallaire's cable identified a cache of only 135 weapons-a tiny fractionof the 20,ooo rifles and 500,000 machetes imported by the governmentover the preceding two years. Even had Dallaire managed to seize thiscache without prompting expulsion or retaliation, he could not havederailed the wider genocide plot without significant reinforcements.

A fourth claim holds that quicklyjamming or destroying Hutu radiotransmitters when the violence broke out could have prevented thegenocide. A Belgian peacekeeper who monitored broadcasts testified,"I am convinced that, if we had managed to liquidate [Radio MilleCollines], we could perhaps have avoided, or in any case limited, thegenocide." A human rights advocate characterized the jamming as "theone action that, in retrospect, might have done the most to save Rwan-dan lives." But radio broadcasts were not essential to perpetuating ordirecting the killing. By April, Rwandans had been sharply polarizedalong ethnic lines by civil war, propaganda, and recent massacres inBurundi. Habyarimana's assassination was a sufficient trigger formany extremist Hutu to begin killing. Moderate Hutu were usuallyswayed not by radio broadcasts but by threats and physical intimidationfrom extremist authorities. Furthermore, orchestration of the genociderelied not merely on radio broadcasts but on the government's separatemilitary communications network. Silencing the radio might have hadmost impact prior to the genocide, when broadcasts were fostering

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polarization, but such action would have been rejected at the time as aviolation of sovereignty. Even if hate radio had been preventively extin-guished, the extremists possessed and used other means to foster hatred.

The fifth variant of the intervention argument is that the Westernforces sent to evacuate foreign nationals during the first week couldhave restored order in Kigali-and thereby prevented the genocide hadthey merely been given the orders to do so. Just four days afterHabyarimana's assassination, some i,ooo lightly armed Western evac-uation troops, mainly French and Belgian soldiers, had arrived inKigali, where Belgium's 40o-troop UNAMIR contingent was alreadystationed. Another 1,ioo reserves were less than two hours away by air.But it is doubtful that this small force, lack-ing the right equipment or logistical support, More U.N. forcescould have quickly quashed violence in thecapital-or that doing so would have stopped deployed prior to thethe genocide elsewhere. The Western evacua- genocide with a robusttors had to commit half their force to guardingthe airport at the town's outskirts and a few mandate could havekey assembly points, leaving few available for deterred the killing.combat. In addition, coordinated actionwould have been inhibited by the widespreadperception that France and Belgium sympathized with opposite sides inthe civil war. Moreover, Kigali was defended by 2,ooo elite Rwandanarmy troops and several thousand regulars equipped with heavyweapons, another 2,ooo armed fighters of the Hutu militia, and 1,ooonational police. Also located there were more than i,ooo Tutsi rebelswho had access to surface-to-air missiles and had explicitly threatenedto attack the evacuators if they extended their mission. Even if the smallWestern force had somehow halted the violence in Kigali, it lacked theequipment and logistics to deploy troops quickly to the countryside.Rural killing probably would have continued unless the ringleaders werecaptured and coerced to call off the slaughter. Such a search would nothave been a quick or simple matter for any force, as demonstrated by thefailed search for the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid by U.S.troops in 1993. Ill-equipped evacuation troops could have wasted weekslooking for the ringleaders while genocide continued at a torrid pace inthe countryside, where 95 percent of Rwandans lived.

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The sixth claim is most realistic: Had UNAMIR been reinforcedseveral months prior to the outbreak of violence, as Belgium urged atthe time, genocide might have been averted. More troops with theproper equipment, a broad mandate, and robust rules of engagementcould have deterred the outbreak of killing or at least snuffed it outearly. Such reinforcement would have required about 3,5 o additionalhigh-quality troops in Kigali, armored personnel carriers, helicopters,adequate logistics, and the authorization to use force to seize weaponsand ensure security without consulting Rwandan police. This wouldhave been the 5,ooo-troop force that Dallaire envisioned-but onedeployed prior to the genocide.

Under the U.N.'s peacekeeping rules, Rwanda's governmentwould have had to consent to such a change-and probably wouldhave. Prior to the genocide, its cabinet still was dominated by theHutu opposition moderates who had negotiated the Arusha accords,which called for a neutral international force to "guarantee [the]overall security of the country." The U.N. Security Council hadwatered down implementation of this provision, authorizing UNAMIRonly to "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali." As tensionsmounted in early 1994, the Rwandan government again asked theU.N. to dismantle armed groups, but the peacekeepers were tooweak. Belgium pleaded for reinforcements and a new mandatefrom the Security Council in January and February 1994 on thegrounds that UNAMIR could not maintain order. But the UnitedStates and Britain blocked this initiative before it could even reacha vote, citing the costs of more troops and the danger that expandingthe mission could endanger peacekeepers-as had occurred inSomalia the previous October.

The Rwandan government, however, almost certainly wouldhave welcomed a reinforcement Of UNAMIR prior to the genocide.Five thousand troops in the capital would have meant 16 troops forevery thousand Rwandans, a ratio historically sufficient to quell severecivil disorders. Such a force might well have deterred the genocideplot. Failing that, well-equipped peacekeepers could have pro-tected moderate Hutu leaders and Tutsi in the capital and capturedsome of the extremists during the first days of violence, therebydiminishing the chance of large-scale massacres in the countryside.

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Indeed, such early reinforcement of UNAMIR is the only proposedaction that would have had a good chance of averting the genocide.

LESSONS

THE M O S T O B VI O U S L E S S O N of Rwanda's tragedy is that interventionis no substitute for prevention. Although the 1994 genocide represents aparticularly tough case for intervention in some respects---such as itsrapid killing and inaccessible location-it would have been a relativelyeasy mission in other respects, including the limited strength of potentialopponents. Yet even an ideal intervention in Rwanda would have lefthundreds of thousands ofTutsi dead. To avert such violence over the longterm, there is no alternative to the time-consuming business of diplomacyand negotiation. Tragically, international diplomatic efforts in Rwandaprior to the genocide were ill conceived and counterproductive.

Whether pursuing prevention or intervention, policymakers mustuse their imagination to better anticipate the behavior of foreign actors.In Rwanda, Western officials failed to foresee the genocide, despitenumerous warning signs, in part because the act was so immoral that itwas difficult to picture. Increased awareness of such risks demands thatany peacekeeping force deployed preventively to a fragile area beadequately sized and equipped to stop incipient violence-rather thanbe sent as a lightly armed tripwire that serves mainly to foster a falsesense of security. If the West is unwilling to deploy such robust forces inadvance, it must refrain from coercive diplomacy aimed at compellingrulers to surrender power overnight. Otherwise, such rulers may feel sothreatened by the prospect of losing power that they opt for genocide orethnic cleansing instead. Western diplomacy that relies mainly on thethreat of economic sanctions or bombing has provoked a tragic backlashnot just in Rwanda, but also in Kosovo and East Timor over the last fewyears as local rulers opted to inflict massive violence rather than handover power or territory to lifelong enemies. In each case, Western mili-tary intervention arrived too late to prevent the widespread atrocities.

Obviously, time is of the essence once large-scale attacks against civil-ians begin. Most such violence can be perpetrated in a matter of weeks,as was demonstrated in Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. Despite thisreality, domestic politics often prevents an American president from

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quickly launching a major intervention. Thus U.S. defense plannersshould be more creative in developing limited alternatives. The case ofRwanda underscores that lighter intervention options that avoid com-bat areas and focus mainly on stopping violence against civilians couldsave almost as many lives if pursued seriously and expeditiously. Rapidresponses would be facilitated by the development ofpre-prepared plansfor known trouble spots and by better coordinating intelligence fromavailable sources, including nongovernmental organizations.

That said, tradeoffs are inevitable if the United States hopes to increaseits effectiveness in humanitarian military intervention. To deploy troopsfaster, additional "ultra-light" units (like the Tenth Mountain Division)would have to be created, either by converting existing heavier unitsintended for major contingencies or by increasing defense spending. ThePentagon's recent proposal to trim some heavy mechanized forces downto medium-weight units would not solve the problem, because theywouldstill be too heavy for a quick airlift. Lighter units probably could save morelives abroad but would also be subject to more casualties and potentialfailure. Such tradeoffs should be made only after rigorous debate, whichto date has been virtually absent in the United States.

Finally, no policy of humanitarian military intervention should beimplemented without a sober consideration of its unintended conse-quences. Recent interventions, whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or EastTimor, have been motivated by the impulse to provide humanitarianaid to a party visibly suffering in an internal conflict. But interventionin those cases also resulted in the weaker sides being bolstered militarily.This pattern creates perverse incentives for weaker parties in suchconflicts to reject compromise and escalate fighting because they expectforeign intervention or hope to attract it. The result is often tragedy,as intervention arrives too little or too late to protect civilians. Thus apolicy of intervening to relieve humanitarian emergencies that stemfrom internal conflicts may actually increase the number and extent ofsuch emergencies-a classic instance of moral hazard.

Inevitably, decisions on whether and how to intervene in specificcases will be caught up in politics. But this challenge should not deterhard thinking on when and how such intervention can be mostbeneficial-or detrimental. If Rwanda demonstrates nothing else, itis that thousands of lives are at stake in such decisions.0

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