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Gr 90501Aug 5, 1991G.R. No. 90501 August 5, 1991ARIS (PHIL.) INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA,respondents.Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for petitioner.Zosimo Morillo for respondent Rayos del Sol.Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy & Associates for private respondents.DAVIDE, JR.,J.:pPetitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows:SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:ART. 223.Appeal.xxx xxx xxxIn any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as follows:Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the payroll.The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.xxx xxx xxxSection 17. Transitory provision. Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the Commission.The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are not disputed:On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which reads:ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Besmonte, Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman.All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution2pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal.4On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal.5On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition6to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect7and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply8filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.9On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution10as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof.In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March 21,1989. With more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter.11Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 198912raising the issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision under the following assignment of errors:A. THE LABOR ARBITER AQUOAND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.B. GRANTINGARGUENDOTHAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES.In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the petition.Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989.13Meeting squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision "is then a police legislation."As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional provision on protection to labor.On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation14informing the Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder15to the Comment of the Solicitor General.In the resolution of 11 January 1990,16We considered the Comments as respondents' Answers, gave due course to the petition, and directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits that said portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or misplaced antipathy against any group, but even-handedly and fairly.17To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply to have someone watch over the reinstated employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b) reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to commit similar, if not graver infractions.These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin18and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.19Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution,20which principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations readily reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health, working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muoz-Palma, aptly describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter."21These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms With equal intensity.22Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits.23Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family.The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.24To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.25InParades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary26We stated:2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism isapropos: To doubt is to sustain.27The reason for this:... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds.28The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect.29There are no vested rights in rules of procedure.30A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.31WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

GR L-15045 Jan 29, 1961G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA,petitioner-appellant,vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,respondent-appellee.Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.GUTIERREZ DAVID,J.:On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle ofejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The ruleejusdem generisapplies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in the case ofBoy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos(G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.

GR 120095 Aug 5, 1996FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 120095.August 5, 1996]JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy.Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.The factual antecedents are undisputed.Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations.The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment.In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1]the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former.Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system.Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:1.Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.2.Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.3.Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.4.Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law.FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same.Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.We agree.The latin maximsalus populi est suprema lexembodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power.As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"[2]this "least limitable"[3]of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, asparens patriaegives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro[4]wrote:"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."[5]Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China.According to the National Statistics Office, thisdiasporawas augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,[6]the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse."[7]Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."[8]Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists.In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts.Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.[9]Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders.These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists.Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,[10]which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad.It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste.The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists.As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills.The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to acceptany available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers.The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's.They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines.Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations.On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers.The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:Sec. 18.The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.As this Court explained inPhilippine Association of Service Exporters(PASEI) v. Drilon,[11]in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process clause.We find this contention untenable.A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.[12]Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.According to the maxim,sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.[13]In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.[14]To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship.Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses.It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause.So long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.InPhilippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."[15]Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.A last point.Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.We do not agree.The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege.It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[16]We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.[17]If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad.These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies.The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.

GR 61594 Sep 28, 1990G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION,petitioner,vsHON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG,respondents.Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents.FELICIANO,J.:On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig.1The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTYThis agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.xxx xxx xxx6. TERMINATIONxxx xxx xxxNotwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary.xxx xxx xxx10. APPLICABLE LAW:This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]."2On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted its position paper,3but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month salary.4The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .".5In the instant Petition forCertiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and the Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been rendered without support in the evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts with private respondents.1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment:Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . .(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied)Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination cases:Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of employment cases:Under PD 850, termination cases with or without CBA are now placed under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first time, are also placed under the Regional Director. Before PD 850, termination cases where there was a CBA were under the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while termination cases where there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section.In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its implementing rules and regulations with respect to termination and preventive suspension cases are:1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for clearance, whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from receipt thereof.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction, still his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process .6This claim, however, cannot be given serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and Employment.7There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the time the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusivelypresumed to be terminationof employmentwithout a cause", and the Regional Director was required in such case to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in view of the conclusive(juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law and regulation. InCebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and Employment,8the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however strong."3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.9Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible by agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any time by giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-months salary.A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties.10The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient,"providedthey are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract.11Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held that paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was entered into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph 5. These Articles read as follows:Art. 280. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement.Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that,any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employeewith respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)InBrent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al.,12the Court had occasion to examine in detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the above quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive examination of the history and development of Articles 280 and 281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing for employment with a fixed period was not necessarily unlawful:There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition thatwhere from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist e.g. where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination is asine qua nonwould an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"As it is evident from even only the three examples already given thatArticle 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.xxx xxx xxxAccordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. (emphasis supplied)It is apparent fromBrent Schoolthat the critical consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement, or upon evidencealiundeof the intent to evade.Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondentseven during the limited period of three (3) years,13and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only[in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case,i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.14We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered.ACCORDINGLY, the Petition forcertiorariis hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Order dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or qualification; and (2) should reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to one (1)-month's salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years putative service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13 September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Gr 90634-5 June 6, 1990G.R. No. 90634-35 June 6, 1990CARMELCRAFT CORPORATION &/OR CARMEN V. YULO, President and General Manager,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CARMELCRAFT EMPLOYEES UNION, PROGRESSIVE FEDERATION OF LABOR, represented by its Local President GEORGE OBANA,respondents.Tee, Tomas & Associates for petitioners.Raul E. Espinosa for private respondents.CRUZ,J.:The Court is appalled by the degree of bad faith that has characterized the petitioners' treatment of their employees. It borders on puredisdain. And on top of this, they now have the temerity to seek from us a relief to which they are clearly not entitled. The petition must be dismissed.The record shows that after its registration as a labor union, the Camelcraft Employees Union sought but did not get recognition from the petitioners. Consequently, it filed a petition for certification election in June 1987. On July 13, 1987, Camelcraft Corporation, through its president and general manager, Carmen Yulo, announced in a meeting with the employees that it would cease operations on August 13, 1987, due to serious financial losses. Operations did cease as announced. On August 17, 1987, the union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor against the petitioners for illegal lockout, unfair labor practice and damages, followed the next day with another complaint for payment of unpaid wages, emergency cost of living allowances, holiday pay, and other benefits. On November 29, 1988, the Labor Arbiter declared the shutdown illegal and violative of the employees' right to self-organization. The claim for unpaid benefits was also granted.1After reviewing the decision on appeal, the respondent NLRC declared:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is modified. In addition to the underpayment in their wages, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay, legal holiday pay and premium pay for holidays for a period of three years, the respondents are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for every year of service, a fraction of six months or more shall be considered as one (1) whole year.The rest of the disposition stand.2We do not find that the above decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, it is comformable to the pertinent laws and the facts clearly established at the hearing.The reason invoked by the petitioner company to justify the cessation of its operations is hardly credible; in fact, it is preposterous when viewed in the light of the other relevent circumstances. Its justification is that it sustained losses in the amount of P 1,603.88 as of December 31, 1986 .3There is no report, however, of its operations during the period after that date, that is, during the succeeding seven and a half months before it decided to close its business. Significantly, the company is capitalized at P 3 million .4Considering such a substantial investment, we hardly think that a loss of the paltry sum of less than P 2,000.00 could be considered serious enough to call for the closure of the company.We agree with the public respondent that the real reason for the decision of the petitioners to cease operations was the establishment of respondent Carmelcraft Employees Union. It was apparently unwelcome to the corporation, which would rather shut down than deal with the union. There is the allegation from the private respondent that the company had suggested that it might decide not to close the business if the employees were to affiliate with another union which the management preferred.5This allegation has not been satisfactorily disproved. At any rate, the finding of the NLRC is more believable than the ground invoked by the petitioners. Notably, this justification was made only eight months after the alleged year-end loss and shortly after the respondent union filed a petition for certification election.The act of the petitioners was an unfair labor practice prohibited by Article 248 of the Labor Code, to wit:ART. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers.-It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;More importantly, it was a defiance of the constitutional provision guaranteeing to workers the right to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining with management through the labor union of their own choice and confidence.6The determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management that is usually not interfered with by the State as no business can be required to continue operating at a loss simply to maintain the workers in employment.7That would be a taking of property without due process of law which the employer has a right to resist. But where it is manifest that the closure is motivated not by a desire to avoid further losses but to discourage the workers from organizing themselves into a union for more effective negotiations with the management, the State is bound to intervene.And, indeed, even without such motivation, the closure cannot be justified because the claimed losses are obviously not serious. In this situation, the employees are entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-half month for every year of service under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.The contention of the petitioners that the employees are estopped from claiming the alleged unpaid wages and other compensation must also be rejected. This claim is based on the waivers supposedly made by the complainants on the understanding that "the management will implement prospectively all benefits under existing labor standard laws." The petitioners argue that this assurance provided the consideration that made the quitclaims executed by the employees valid. They add that the waivers were made voluntarily and contend that the contract should be respected as the law between the parties.Even if voluntarily executed, agreements are invalid if they are contrary to public policy. This is elementary. The protection of labor is one of the policies laid down by the Constitution not only by specific provision but also as part of social justice. The Civil Code itself provides:ART. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.ART. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.The subordinate position of the individual employeevis-a-vismanagement renders him especially vulnerable to its blandishments and importunings, and even intimidations, that may result in his improvidently if reluctantly signing over benefits to which he is clearly entitled. Recognizing this danger, we have consistently held that quitclaims of the workers' benefits win not estop them from asserting them just the same on the ground that public policy prohibits such waivers.That the employee has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in a waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.8Release and quitclaim is inequitable and incongruous to the declared public policy of the State to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to security of tenure.9We find also untenable the contention of Carmen Yulo that she is not liable for the acts of the petitioner company, assuming it had acted illegally, because the Carmelcraft Corporation is a distinct and separate entity with a legal personality of its own. Yulo claims she is only an agent of the company carrying out the decisions of its board of directors. We do not agree. Our finding is that she is in fact and legal effect the corporation, being not only its president and general manager but also its owner.10Moreover, and this is a no less important consideration, she is raising this issue only at this tardy hour, when she should have invoked this argument earlier, when the case was being heard before the labor arbiter and later m the NLRC. It is too late now to shunt these responsibilities to the company after she herself had been found liable.All told, the conduct of the petitioners toward the employees has been less than commendable. Indeed, it is reprehensible. First, the company inveigled them to waive their claims to compensation due them on the promise that future benefits would be paid (and to make matters worse, there is no showing that they were indeed paid). Second, it refused to recognize the respondent union, suggesting to the employees that they join another union acceptable to management. Third, it threatened the employees with the closure of the company and then actually did so when the employees insisted on their demands. All these acts reflect on thebona fidesof the petitioners and unmistakably indicate their ill will toward the employees.The petitioners obviously regard the private respondents as mere servants simply because they are paid employees. That is a mistake. Laborers are not just hired help to be exploited, without the right to defend and improve their interest . The working class is an equal partner of management and should always be treated as such.The more labor is prevented from pursuing its legitimate demands for its protection and enhancement, the more it is likely to lose faith in our free institutions and to incline toward Ideologies offering a more if deceptive regime. One way of disabusing our working men and women of this delusion is to assure them that under our form of government, the interests of labor deserve and will get proper recognition from an enlightened and compassionate management, no less than the total sympathy of a solicitous State.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

GR 43633 Sept 14 1990G.R. Nos. 43633-34 September 14, 1990PABLO ARIZALA, SERGIO MARIBAO, LEONARDO JOVEN, and FELINO BULANDUS,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Januario T. Seno for petitioners.NARVASA,J.:Under the Industrial Peace Act,1government-owned or controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private sector.2The Act also prohibited supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees,3and prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition.4It was under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short) became bound by a collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause,5i.e., that all employees who, at the time of the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or became members thereafter, were obliged to maintain their union membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued employment in the GSIS.There appears to be no dispute that at that time, the petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their supervisory positions. They refused to do so. Consequently, two (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribao6and the other, Joven and Bulandus.7Both criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the accused in separate decisions.8They were each sentenced "to pay a fine of P 500.00 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." They appealed to the Court of Appeals.9Arizala's and Maribao's appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14724-CR; that of Joven and Bulandus, as CA-G.R. No. 14856-CR.The appeals were consolidated on motion of the appellants, and eventuated in a judgment promulgated on January 29, 1976 affirming the convictions of all four appellants. The appellants moved for reconsideration. They argued that when the so called "1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1104, the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated (eff., November 1, 1974), repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation thereof. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code. The Appellate Court denied their plea for reconsideration.Hence, the present petition for review oncertiorari.The crucial issue obviously is whether or not the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial Peace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.The petitioners' contention that their liability had been erased is made to rest upon the following premises:1. Section 1, Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution does indeed provide that the "Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, .. administered by an independent Civil Service Commission.2. Article 292 of the Labor Code repealed such parts and provisions of the Industrial Peace Act as were "not adopted as part" of said Code "either directly or by reference." The Code did not adopt the provision of the Industrial Peace Act conferring on employees of government-owned or controlled corporations the right of self-organization and collective bargaining; in fact it made known that the "terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations," would thenceforth no longer be fixed by collective bargaining but "be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations."103. The specific penalty for violation of the prohibition on supervisors being members in a labor organization of employees under their supervision has disappeared.4. The Code also modified the concept of unfair labor practice, decreeing that thenceforth, "it shall be considered merely as an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense (and that) (u)nfair labor practice complaints shall x x be processed like any ordinary labor disputes."11On the other hand, in justification of the Appellate Tribunal's affirmance of the petitioners' convictions of violations of the Industrial Peace Act, the People-1) advert to the fact that said Labor Code also states that "all actions or claims accruing prior to ... (its) effectivity ... shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual;" and2) argue that the legislature cannot generally intervene and vacate the judgment of the courts, either directly or indirectly, by the repeal of the statute under which said judgment has been rendered.The legal principles governing the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining of rank-and-file employees in the government- particularly as regards supervisory, and high level or managerial employees have undergone alterations through the years.Republic Act No. 875As already intimated, under RA 875 (the Industry Peace Act),12persons "employedin proprietary functionsof the Government, including but not limited to governmental corporations," had the right of self-organization and collective bargaining, including the right to engage in concerted activities to attain their objectives, e.g. strikes.But those "employed in governmental functions" were forbidden to "strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment" or join labor organizations which imposed on their members the duty to strike. The reason obviously was that the terms and conditions of their employment were "governed by law" and hence could not be fixed, altered or otherwise modified by collective bargaining.Supervisory employeeswere forbidden to join labor organizations composed of employees under them, but could form their own unions. Considered "supervisors' were those 'having authority in the interest of an employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign, recommend, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, and to adjust their grievance or effectively to recommend such acts if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment."13Republic Act No. 2260Similar provisions were found in R.A. No. 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959. This Act declared that the "Philippine Civil Service ... (embraced) all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the governmentincluding government-owned andcontrolled corporations."14It prohibited such civil service employees who were "employed in governmental functions" to belong to any labor organization which imposed on their members "the obligation to strike or to join strikes." And