PNB vs CabansagCASE: PNB vs. CabansagDate: June 21, 2005Ponente: J. PanganibanFacts:Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refused but was informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.Issues:1 W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction2 W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue3 W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissedRuling:1 Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment certificate.2 Amigrant workerrefers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker. Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.

OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. NLRC[footnoteRef:1] [1: Farina Salvador]

(Panganiban, 2003)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions of the CA

Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay was filed by Fermin Guerrero against OSM Shipping Phils. Guerrero was hired by petitioner, in behalf of its principal Phil. Carrier Shipping Agency (PS-SLC) to board its vessel MV Princess Hoa as Master Mariner for a contract of 10 months. He boarded the ship on July 21, 1994. Almost 7 months later, he was forced to disembark the ship because he was never paid any compensation for his work since he boarded the ship and as such, he could not even buy his basic necessities. OSM story: Concorde Pacific, the American company which owns the MV Princess Hoa, appointed Phil. Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager, one of whose responsibilities was the selection or determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with PC -SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents of crew members of the vessel. The initial plan was to use the vessel for overseas trade. But Concorde changed its plans for the vessel and decided to use it instead for coastwide trade, thus the vessel never left the Philippines. It had the vessel converted to Philippine registry by way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity named PS-SLC. To do this, Concorde, through its representative had to terminate is crew agreement with PS-SASCO. Consequently, the latter terminated its crew agreement with OSM. PS-SLC, the bareboat charterer, is now the disponent owner/employer of the crew and is thus responsible for the payment of the complainants wages. Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in favor of Guerrero, ordering OSM and PS-SASCO to jointly and severally pay Guerreros claims. NLRC affirmed with modification. OSM filed with the CA a petition to set aside the NLRC judgment. This was dismissed because petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 3 Rule 46 of the ROC by failing to attach a duplicate original or certified true copy of the LAs decision. They only attached a mere machine copy. Hence this petition.

Issue:1) Procedural WON CA was correct in dismissing the petition for failure to comply with the said requirement? NO2) Substantive WON OSM is jointly liable with PC-SASCO, as its agent. - YESHeld:1) Sec. 3 rule 46 of the ROC requires that a duplicate original or certified true copy of only the questioned decision should be attached to the petition and not all supporting papers. Since the LAs decision was not questioned ruling, a machine copy of it would suffice. The duplicate original of the questioned decision of the NLRC should be attached, and this was complied with. However, even if petitioners procedural contention was correct, this Court still ruled for Guerrero on the merits. To remand this case to the CA would further delay the recovery of wages.2) On behalf of its principal, OSM does not deny hiring Guerrero as master mariner. Petitioner was the legitimate manning agent of PS-SASCO and it was allowed to recruit, hire and deploy seamen on board the vessel.a. It argues that since Guerrero was never deployed overseas, his employment contract became ineffective because its object was allegedly absent. Employment contract like any contract is perfected upon the concurrence of essential elements such as consent of the parties, object certain (subject matter of the contract) and the cause of the obligation. Contrary to petitioners contention, the object of the contract was the rendition of service by Guerrero on board the vessel. The non-deployment overseas of the ship did not affect the validity of the perfected employment contract. b. OSM also contends that there was a novation of the contract when Concorde decided to use the ship for coastwide trade. A contract cannot be novated solely by the will of one party. 3) Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.

Decision of NLRC affirmed.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other relatedissuance, principally contending that the saidorders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminaryinjunctionand dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the saidissuanceconstituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Laborpursuantto a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimategovernmentalfunctions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maximsic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas(use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailedaffectsat most the right ofproperty, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and otherworkersmeet reasonable regulatory standards no suchdeprivation exists.

Case: Executive Secretary vs CADate of Promulgation: May 25, 2004Ponente: Callejo Sr., J.Facts:Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995.Before the law took effect, ARCO-Phil filed a petition asking the court to declare some provisions of the law unconstitutional. The law required that only skilled workers were to be deployed for employed abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

Detailed facts:

The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional: SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 is validHeld:Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid. It provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment.Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

G.R. No. 154213 August 23, 2012EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., Petitioners,vs.ESTANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA,ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES,SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, .JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEOMANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.FACTS:Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner EasternMediterranean Maritime Ltd., and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar ManningAgency, Inc.While on board the vessel, the respondents had experienced delays in payment of their wages and in the remittance of their allotments and they were not paid for extra work or extra overtime; they also complained of inadequate equipment and poor working conditions

When the vessel came to dock in Switzerland, authorities from the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded and found out that indeed the respondents were receiving less than the prevailing wage rates negotiations followed between ITF and the vessel owner which resulted in payment of differentials to the respondents and their subsequent repatriation to the PhilippinesA few days after, however, Eastern Mediterranean filed at the POEA a complaint for disciplinary action against the newly-repatriated respondents based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of wage increases

During pendency of the action, R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995, vesting with the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers (jurisdiction was formerly exercised by POEA)

POEA dismissed the complaint Appeal made with NLRC, which also dismissed, saying they had no jurisdiction Petitioners filed pet. For certiorari and mandamus with SC which referred the same to CA

CA dismissed ruling that jurisdiction lay with POEA, to the exclusion of NLRC

ISSUE:WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actionsHELD/RATIO:

Perusal of the POEA rules and the IRR of R.A. 8042 show that NLRC has no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA; the matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of NLRCAlthough the passage of the new law transferred jurisdiction over money claims from POEA to the Labor Arbiter, POEA retained jurisdiction over disciplinary/administrative cases involving overseas workersPetitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC [When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1),Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987]

SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and forpayment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National LaborRelations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.

Petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:Sec. 10.Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:1.)Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?

2.)Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:1.)Yes.Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to theirsalaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts.

But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiardisadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No.

The wordsalaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation forall work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on designated rest days and holidays.By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can beemployed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.

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As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.

Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan, and signed with a oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.

The agency required her to pay a placement fee of 70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.

She was deployed to work in Taiwan for Wacoal, but was given a position as a cutter.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation.

Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

She filed a filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal for illegal dismissal.

Sameers Defense: oRespondents termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer];

o The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of NT$70,000.00 (evidenced by an OR bearing NT% 20,360.00); o Petitioner added that Wacoals accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Aug. 06, 1997) thus, obligation is substituted with Pacific, which the latter denied

Labor Arbiter Ruling: o Case is dismissed Rationale: Complaint is based on mere allegations.

o No excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner o Transfer of obligation to Pacific is immaterial

NLRC Ruling: o Joy is illegally dismissed

o Reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer

o It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.

o There was no sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent.

o Did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction

o It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.

o It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters decision not to rule on the matter.

Sameer filed for MR but NLRC dismissed; filed for petition for certiorari at CA

CA Ruling: o Affirmed NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorneys fees.

o Remanded case to NLRC to address the validity of petitioners allegations against Pacific.

ISSUE OF THE CASE: o WON the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination;

o WON there was a just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work;

o WON Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoals contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner

SC RULING/RATIONALE: 1.) JUST CAUSE: o Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys petition is without merit. SC find for respondent.o Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joys dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

o Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not authorize the oppression or selfdestruction of the employer. Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is tempered with the employees right to security of tenure. Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution

o With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, follow the principle of lex loci contractus.

o Pinned Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC

o Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus: o Art. 282. Termination by employer.

o An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

o Petitioners allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.

o The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. o To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:

o 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged;

o 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and

o 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employees performance assessment.

o The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for employment. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employers failure to communicate work standards that would govern ones employment if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate.

2.) DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT o Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirement

o A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination.

o One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must [inform] the employee of the employers decision. Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard.

3.) Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 o Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

o Sec 10 of RA 1082 MONEY CLAIMS

o SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND

o The reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondents termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

o Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. willful

o SC reiterate their finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

o Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the threemonth equivalence of respondents salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

o Respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this judgment.

4.) LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYER o SC clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated respondents overseas employment.

o Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of an employer employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.

o This provision is in line with the states policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers plight.

o The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be enforced to the full extent against the local agent, the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.

o Pinned Prieto vs NLRC

o The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, subhuman lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorneys fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD:There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.

People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis 142 SCRA 664G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.

ISSUE: Determination of the proper interpretation of Art 13(b) of PD 442/ Labor Code:

b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising oradvertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That anyperson or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

HELD: The specification of two or more persons is not to create a condition prior to filing but rather it states a presumption that the individual is engaged in recruitment in consideration of a fee, however the number of persons is not an essential ingredient to the act of recruitment or placement, and it will still qualify even if only one person has been involved

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellantG.R. No. 121777(350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.

They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken.

Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter.A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.

First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.(b)Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES: (1)Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.

(2)Whether or not accused was denied equal protection andtherefore should be exculpated

HELD:(1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.

In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement.

The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence ofsuch records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad.

Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2)Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free.

From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection ofthe laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officialsFurthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption.

The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused, NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.G.R. No. 113161August 29, 1995Facts:

On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, allegingThat in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.

Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987 he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Paraaque, Metro Manila.

Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt.

Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee.Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad.Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00.

Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00.

Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to leave for abroad.

Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Paraaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted several pertinent documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials.

In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to leave for abroad as promised.

Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments. As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Paraaque. She informed him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00.On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but to no avail.

Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her.

Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at Tambo, Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her tointroduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she acceded.

Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses.

On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment.

Issue:Whether or not Agustins act of introducing couple Goce falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Art 13(b) in relation to Art 34 of the Labor Code.

Held:Yes Under the Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment or two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.

The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.

As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity.There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.

It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V. ORTIZ-MIYAKE

FACTS:Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, following a complaint filed by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan had also charged her with estafa by means of false pretenses.Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as the other two complainants were abroad. Marasigan said Ortiz-Miyake promised her a job as factory worker in Taiwan. The former gave her P5,000 initially as placement fee, which amount subsequently became P23,000 paid in installments upon the demands of the accused. Accused gave assurances that Marasigan would have no problem getting a visa and a plane ticket. She was unable to go to Taiwan, as there was no ticket booked for her and, in fact, the supposed agency did not even know Miyake.On the other hand, Generillo was represented by her mother, while del Rosarios sister testified in court on the latters behalf. As they were not personally present, however, during the transactions with Miyake, they could only claim they gave certain amounts that were supposed to go to Miyake, and concluded that since their relatives had not been able to leave as promised by Miyake, then they were necessarily victims of illegal recruitment by the accused. A POEA representative also testified that Miyake had no authorization to recruit workers for overseas employment. [Miyake claiming she only offered discounted plane tickets to the supposed victims]

TC convicted the accused, largely basing their decision on the previous decision rendered by Paranaque MeTC, where the two complainants now absent had filed charges of estafa against Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.

ISSUE: won Miyake can be held liable for illegal recruitment on a large scale

HELD/RATIO: Ortiz-Miyake guilty only of simple illegal recruitment (and estafa).

LC:RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT IS ANY ACT OF CANVASSING, ENLISTING, CONTRACTING TRANSPORTING, UTILIZING, HIRING OR PROCURING WORKERS AND INCLUDES REFERRALS, CONTRACT SERVICES, PROMISING OR ADVERTISING FOR EMPLOYMENT, LOCALLY OR ABROAD, WHETHER FOR PROFIT OR NOT;BECOMES ILLEGAL IF ONE HAS NO AUTHORIZATION FOR PERFORMING SUCH ACTS; BECOMES LARGE SCALE IF DONE AGAINST THREE OR MORE PERSONS WHETHER INDIVIDUALLY OR AS A GROUP

Right of accused to confront del Rosario and Generillo was not afforded her. Testimonies of sister and mother, respectively, mere hearsay. Although testimonies from the previous case could have been used, the decision convicting the accused of another crime (in that previous case, estafa) cannot be sustained for being violative of the accuseds right to confront witnesses.Conviction of illegal recruitment does not preclude conviction for estafa. Burden of proof was only successfully established as to victim Marasigan. Since large scale not established, conviction is only for simple illegal recruitment (and estafa).

Stolt Nielsen Transportation Group & Chung Gai v. Sulpecio MedequilloActual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. We agree with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners.

FACTS.On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before theAdjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against Stolt Nielsen et al for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract. Sulpecio alleged that :

1. On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen MarineServices, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management ofPanama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel Stolt Aspiration fora period of nine (9) months;

2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime payof $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment periodcommencing on 6 November 1991;

3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV Stolt Aspiration;4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ships master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation;

5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioners office where he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV StoltPride under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract;

6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA;

7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certifiedthe Second Employment Contract on 18 September 1992.

8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV Stolt Pride;9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with theSecond Employment Contract.

10. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seamans book andother employment documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the saiddocuments in exchange of his signing a document;11. He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without these documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies. He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not complying with the Second Contract.The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Labor Arbiter: respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The petitioners appealed.

NLRC affirmed with modifications. The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustifiedtermination of contract for failure on the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their non-deployment of the respondent. It denied the claim of the petitioners that the monetary award should be limited only to three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term of the contract. It ruled that the factual incidents material to the case transpired within 1991-1992 or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 which provides for such limitation.

However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award with respect to the deletion of the overtime pay due to the non-deployment of the respondent.Stolts main defense: the first employment contract between them and the private respondent is different from and independent of the second contract subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila.

Issue: WONHeld/ Ratio:

(1)The second contract novated the first. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:1. There must be a previous valid obligation,2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and4. There must be the validity of the new contract.On the issue on novation, the SC adopted the findings of the LA and the CA:It is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila

The records also reveal that the 2nd contract extinguished the first contract by changing its object or principal. These contracts were for overseas employment aboard different vessels. The first contract was for employment aboard the MV Stolt Aspiration while the second contract involved working in another vessel, the MV Stolt Pride.

Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr. accepted the terms and conditions of the second contract. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the first contract was aprevious valid contract since it had not yet been terminated at the time ofMedequillo, Jr.s repatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract when he