CASE 1: PHIL. ASSOC. of SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI) vs. DRILON

TOPIC: Police power of the State

PARTIES1. PASEI – firm engaged principally in the

recruitment of Fil workers, male and female, for overseas placement”

FACTS: 1. PASEI challenges the Constitutional

validity of Dept. Order No. 1 S1998 of DOLE in the “Guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Fil domestic and household workers”

2. Specifically, the guidelines is assailed for

a. “discrimination against males or females”

b. that it “does not apply to all Fil workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills” and that

c.it is violative of the right to travel.d. It is also an invalid exercise of the

lawmaking power, police power being legislative, not executive in character

3. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of A13 of PH Consti providing for worker parcitipation

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“in policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and beenfits as may be provided by law”

4. SOLGEN filed a Comment informing the court that respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states1. SOLGEN invokes the police power in submitting the validity of the challenged “guidelines”

ISSUES: 1. WON Dept Order No. 1 is a police power measure? YES2. WON it is valid under the PH Consti?

DOCTRINES ON POLICE POWER

POLICE POWER – state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. It consists of 1. imposition of restraint upon liberty or property2. in order to foster the common good.

Its all-comprehensive embrance provides enough room for an efficient and flexible

1 Iraq, Jordon, Qatar, Canada, HK, US, Italy, Norway, Austria and Switzerland

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response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring greatest benefits.

Plenary power of the state “to govern its citizens” – enables to prohibit all things harmful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

Limitations on police power: it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.

RULING: Based from the above doctrines, the case must be dismissed. It follows the general rule that:

“Official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands”PASEI did not satisfactorily show the reason why contested measure should be nullified.

Dept Order 1 applied only to :female contract workers” but it does not make an undue discrimination between the sexes.

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Equality before the law, under the Constiution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits classification provided that1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions2. they are germane to the purpose of the law3. they are not confined to existing conditions4. they apply equally to all members of the same class

1ST CONDITION: Such classification rests on substantial distinctionsTHE CLASSIFICATION MADE SATISFIED the preference for female workers – rests on substantial distinctions.

Further reason of granting it: Sad plight of female workers, to protect them as victims of exploitation.

It is not the same case of our make workers. First, there is no evidence that except for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament.

What the court is saying that it was largerly a matter of evidence (That women domestic workers are being ill treated abroad in

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massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the government acted in this case. Discrimination in this case is justified.

2ND CONDITION: germane to the purpose of the law

It is germane because of the purpose: to enhance protection of Filipino female overseas workers

3RD CONDITION: not confined to existing conditionsIt does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. It is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. Should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.

4TH CONDITION: apply equally to all members of the same class

The impugned guidelines is applicable to all female domestic overseas workers.

What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons

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within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

On the right to travelThe deployment ban did not impair this right. Dept. Ord 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, its basic policy – to afford protection to labor.

Does Dept Ord 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power? No.It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rule-making powers in the enforcement

The right granted by Sec 32 must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power regulation.

“Protection to labor” does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly

2 Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all

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is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.

DISPOSITIVE: The deployment ban is valid exercise of police power.

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CASE 2: ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE’S ASSOC.-AFW v. NLRC

TOPIC: POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

FACTS1. Maribel Santos was hired as XRay

Technician by St. Luke’s.2. Congress passed RA7431 known as

“Radiologic Tech. Act of 1992” it requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or xray technologists in the PH without having obtained the proper certification of registration from the Board of Rediologic Technology.

3. The HR director of St. Luke’s issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement of RA 7421 by Dec 31, 1995

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otherwise the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available.

4. The Director issued a final notice to Maribel requiring her to comply by passing the exam otherwise she may be complled to retire from her employment should there be no position available for her to be abosorbed.

5. On May 14, 1997, the Dir ector of Institute of Radiology two memos to Maribel advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment and that she is being given the last chance to take and pass the board exams.

6. On Nov 23, 1998, the Director issued a notice to Maribel informing her that the St. Lukes approved her retirement in liue of separation pay.

7. St Lukes issued a “Notice of Separation from the Company” to Maribel effective Dec 30, 1998 since Maribel refused to accept St. Luke’s offer for early retirement

a. The notice also states that SLMC exerted efforts to transfer Maribel to other position/s, her qualifications do

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not fit with any of the present vacant positions in the hospital

8. The President of PH Assoc of Radiologic Technologists wrote SLMC requesting to give consideration to Maribel for not passing passing yet the board by giving them an assignment in any department awaiting their chance to pass the exam

9. SLMC issued again a notice of separation from the company to Maribel because this time she failed the exam.

10. Thus, Maribel filed a COMPLAINT against SLMC for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits.

11. In the meantime petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers addressed to Ms Rita Marasigan, HR Director to accommodate Maribel and assign her in vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital.

12. Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of SLMC also wrote Mr. Calderon the President of Petitioner, AFW group.

PROCEDURAL:1. LABOR ARBITER’s decision: Ordered

SLMC to pay Maribel 115,500 representing her separation pay.

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2. Maribel filed an appeal with NLRC.3. NLRC affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision.4. Maribel filed petition for certiorari with

CA which affirmed NLRC’s decision5. Hence this petition

ISSUES1. WON Maribel Santos was illegally

dismissed by SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a certification of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology

RULINGThe requirement for a certification of registration is under Sec 15 RA 7431

Petitioners asserts that: the main reason for Santos’ separation from her work is because she dialed to pass the board exam.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people.

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Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers

It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine

The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and xray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this field is embodied in Section 23

“The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State’s inherent police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, 3 Statement of policy - upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines for the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of machines and/or equipment using radiation

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morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for xray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens.

No malice or illwill can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate.

To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control

DISPOSITIVE: SLMC WON! SLMC not guilty of illegal dismissal. RA 7432 is a valid exercise of police power.

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CASE 3: MAGANA v MEDICARD

TOPIC: POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

FACTS1. Medicard hired Myrna Magana as

company nurse whom Medicard detailed to its corporate client – Manila Hotel.

2. Although Medicard initially hired Magana on probation, Medicard converted her employment to permanent.

3. The following year, Magana was replaced with another nurse.

4. In lieu of a nursingrelated position, Medicard offered Magana the position of liaison officer.

5. Finding the offer unacceptable and with her continued non assignment, Magana sued Medicard and the Hotel in the (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and payment of benefits and damages.

PROCEDURAL1. Labor Arbiter: ruled for Magana.

Arbiter found Medicard to be a mere labor contractor for the Hotel which exercised control and termination powers over petitioner. Arbiter ordered

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the Hotel to reinstate Magana and pay her backwages.

2. NLRC: Affirmed LA’s rulinga. Found that Medicard not the

Hotel as Magana’s employer and held Medicard responsible for her dismissal.

3. Medicard appealed to the CA4. CA granted the appeal by deleting

the award of reinstatement wages.a. Found that Magana’s dismissal

with cause, noting that Medicard’s failure to assign Magana to a suitable position within 6 mos after her replacement is analogous to a suspension of operations of an enterprise, entitling the employee to payment only of separation pay

ISSUE:

1. WON Magana is an employee entitled to draw wages under LA’s ruling ordering her reinstatement even though that order was later on reversed.

RULING: YES.LB: A23 Paragraph 2 of Labor Code – A police power measure is mandatory and immediately executory: The requirement for

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employers to pay wages to employees obtaining, favorable rulings in illegal dismissal suits pending appeal is statutorily mandated under the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code

Article 223 gives employers two options, namely, to (1) actually reinstate the dismissed employees or, (2) constructively reinstate them in the payroll. Either way, this must be done immediately upon the filing of their appeal, without need of any executory writ.

This is immediately executory and the employer has to either readmit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries.

This unusual, mandatory order by law to execute reinstatement orders pending appeal,

unheard of in ordinary civil proceedings, is a POLICE POWER MEASURE, grounded on the theory –

“[t]hat the preservation of the lives of the

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citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family.”

2. if the arbiter’s order of reinstatement remains unexecuted, should its subsequent reversal on appeal preclude execution?

“[t]echnicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the

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period.

Roquero ruling:

“If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries [he/she] received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.”

DISPOSITIVE: MEDICARD is bound to pay Magana her reinstatement wages computed from the filing of Medicard’s appeal of the LA’s decision until its receipt of the CA’s decision.

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CASE 4: CALALANG v. WILLIAMS

TOPIC: SOCIAL JUSTICE, DEFINED.

FACTS1. Calalang as private citizen and

taxpayer of Manila filed this petition for writ of prohibition against Williams, the Chairman of National Traffic Commission.

2. It is alleged that National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend to

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the Director of Public Works and to Secretary of Public Works and Comm that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited form passing Rosario St. to Dasma Street from 730am to 1230pm and from 130pm to 530pm and along Antipolo St to Echague St from 7am to 11pm for 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic

3. The Chariman of the NTC recommended to the Dir. Of Public Works the adoption of proposed resolution which authorizes the Director of Pub Works with approval of Sec. of Pub Work to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control use o and traffic on national roads

4. The Mayor of Manila enforced the rules and regulations such that all animal drawn vehicles are not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the above places for the benefit of the riding public.

5. Calalang alleges that Commonwealth Act 548 (rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power)

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1. ISSUE: WON it is constitutional? Yes

The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads

The proper distinction the court said was this: “The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.

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2. ISSUE: WON the rules and regulations constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? NO

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.

By virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.

Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.

3. ISSUE: WON rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social

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justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people?

The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle of salus populi est supremo, lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of

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the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

DISPOSITIVE: CA 548 promotes social justice.

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CASE 5: HFS PHIL INC v PILARTOPIC: Social justice applied

FACTS:1. Pilar was engaged by IUM

Shipmanagement AS and its PH manning agent, HFS as a crew member of the Norweigan vessel

2. Pilar boarded the vessel on Oct 27, 2001

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3. 4 mos after he boarded, Pilar complained of loss of apetite.. servere nervousness. Despite treatment, he did not improve.

4. When the vessel reached Japan he was brought to a hospital – depression and gastric ulver.

5. Physician declared him unfit for work and recommended hospitalization and repatriation so he retuened to manila.

6. Upon reaching manila, he was met by reps of HFS who brought him to Medical Center Manila. It was confirmed that he was suffering from major depression. He was declared unfit for work.

7. Pilar filed COMPLAINT for underpayment of disability and medical benefits.

8. Pilar claimed that while sleeping during rest hours he was suddenly awakened by his officer who hit him on the head. He was traumatized by the incident.

9. He claimed to be entitled to disability compensation

10. HFS asserted that in the absence of proof of his depression was caused by accident, he was not entitled to disability and medical benefits.

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11. The National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) held that the nature of his occupation significantly contributed to the deterioration of his physcological condition. In view of the principle of SOCIAL JUSTICE (that those who have less in life should have more in law), it awarded the compensatio to him

12. HFS questioned this.

ISSUE: WON Pilar is entitled to sickpay under the social justice principle?

RULING: YES. Pilar is clearly entitled to sickpay.

It is undisputed that respondent fell ill while he was onboard M/V Hual Triumph. This fact was confirmed not only by petitioner’s accredited physicians but also by respondent’s own independent physicians.

The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the principle of social justice.

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CASE 6: PLDT v NLRCTOPIC: Social justice appliedFACT:

1. Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of PLDT was accused by 2 complainants of having demanded and received from them P3,800 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. She was found guilty and was separated from service.

a. She was awarded financial assistance = to 10 mos pay for her 10 years of service

b. She is in effect rewarded rather than punished for her dishonesty and without legal authorization or justification.

2. Marilyn’s petition: an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law.

3. PLDT claims: employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment.

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ISSUE: Legality of the award of financial assistance to an employee who had been dismissed for causes.

DOCTRINES:

The rule in the LC is that a person dismissed for cause is not entitled to separation pay, exception: equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law being ethical than jural and belonging to the spehere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law.

It is not correct to say that there is no express justification for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other than consideration of equity.

The reason is that our constitution is replete with positive commands for the PROMOTION of social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers.

The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present charter.

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The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrong doing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may litigate the penalty but certainly it will not condone the offense.

Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.

RULING:

Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified.

The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has

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worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.

CASE 7: TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP WORKERS ASSOC. v NLRCTOPIC: Social justice applied

FACTS1. Toyota Union questions their dismissal

from the illegal strikes they conducted2. Toyota Union is the sole and exclusive

bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees

3. Union filed a petition for certification election among Toyota rank and file employees with the NCMB. The Union was declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.

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4. Union submitted its CBA but Toyota refused to negotiate so the Union filed a notice of strike based on Toyota’s refusal to bargain.

5. the NCMBNCR converted the notice of strike into a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue of whether or not the Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary.

6. The Union in a letter requested that its members be allowed to be absent to attend the hearing which was denied. But despite denial, more than 200 employees staged mass actions to protest.

7. Toyota sent letters to 360 employees requiring them to explain why they should not be dismissed

8. Manifesto was circulated by the union which urged its members to participate in a strike

9. Later on Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees for participation for violations of its code of conduct for misconduct under A282

10. In reaction to the dismissal Union when on strick.

11. Toyota filed petition for injuction.

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12. Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal w

ISSUE:RULING:

In the case at bench, the Union failed to convince us that the NLRC findings that the Union officials instigated, led, and knowingly participated in the series of illegal strikes are not reinforced by substantial evidence. Verily, said findings have to be maintained and upheld.

SOCIAL JUSTICE:The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to “whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or practice”65 or under the Labor Code and other existing laws.

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This means that the employee, despite the dismissal for a valid cause, retains the right to receive from the employer benefits provided by law, like accrued service incentive leaves. With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and voluntary management policy or practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations of the CBA or the company rules and policies.

As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution

REASON:The reason is that our Constitution is replete with positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the

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new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate subtopic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause.

Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justiceserious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee. What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than serious misconduct.

In analogous causes for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant separation pay

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anchored on social justice in consideration of the length of service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the employee and the like, using the guideposts enunciated in PLDT on the propriety of the award of separation pay.

MAIN ISSUE: In the case at bench, are the 227 striking employees entitled to separation pay?

CASE 8: YRASUEQUI v. PALTopic: Social Justice applied, Page 4

This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

DOCTRINE: The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. Validity of PAL’s weight standards.Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply

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with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier. The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay because of “social justice”Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay (Article 279) but this rule can be relaxed. Separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or based on “equity”. In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral

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character of the employee. Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service because we was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act that would reflect on his moral character.

DISPOSITIVE: His dismissal is valid. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

CASE 9: CEBU ROYAL PLANT v HON DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and PilonesTOPIC: Social justice – protection of labor, page 4FACTS:

1. Respondents was removed by Cebu Royal Plant.

2. Ministry of Labor held that Ramon Pilones was already a permanent employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure.

3. Alleged ground of removal – pulmonary tuberculosis minimal was not

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certified as incurable within 6 mos to justify his separation.

4. Cebu claims that Pilones was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. Saying that his dismissal was not only in conformity with company policy but also necessary for the protection of the public health as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.

5. Original findings: employed for 6 mos probation, after that he went medical exam for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minima. He was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent.

6. Employed on probation on Feb 16, 1978 but it is not shown that Pilones’ employment ended after the 6 mos period on the contrary he continued working as usual. Under the Labor Code, A282: an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee” He was dismissed on August 21, 1978/ 4 dys after he ceased to be a probationer.

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7. Cebu: he could not have been dismissed earlier because the xray was on Aug 17

a. Court: this is untenable. Cebu had 6 mos to conduct the exam and it chose to wait until exactly the last day of probation period.

b. In the light of such delay, its protestation that reinstatement would prejudice public health CANNOT BE SOUND.

c.8.

ISSUE: WON Pilones was a regular/probationary employee? Is the dismissal justified?

RULING: He is already presumed to be a regular because (6)Cebu cannot say that he was dismissed for public health because (7a)

We are satisfied that whether his employment began on February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he claims, the private respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure

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guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code.

ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: We agree that there was here an ATTEMPT to circumvent the law by separating the employee after 5 months’ service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then rehiring him on probation.

We cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other hand, we have also the health of the public and of the dismissed employee himself to consider. Hence, although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent authority.

DISPOSITIVE: private respondent shall be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return to work

CONCERN FOR THE LOWLY WORKER REAFFIRMEDWe take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the

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mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.

CASE 10: GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSOTY FOUNDATION v. NLRCTopic: Social justice – protection to labor, page 4FACTS

1. The president of GA University Foundation, Mijares wrote Minister of Labor Blas Ople soliciting his opinion on a proposed retrenchment and reorganization program necessary because of financial difficulties

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2. Ople reply: no serious objection to the program but advised him that it should be implemented without prejudice to whatever benefits that might have accrued to the employees concerned at the effective date of reorganization.

3. The Uni started implementation of its retrenchment program

a. All ad hoc, ad interim and tempo appointents will be considered TERMINATED as of the date indicated in their respective appointments

4. The private resps (6) did not submit their courtesy resignations.

5. Menesis, acting president of the uni served notices of the termination to the 6 on No 10, effective Nov. 11

6. The priv resp responded to M’s action by filing case for ILLEGAL DISMISSAL before NLRC.

7. Complainants alleged that they were dismissed without prior notice, that the implementation of the retrenchment program was without any established criteria for selecting the faculty members to be dismissed

8. Uni denied the allegations and stated that sufficient notice was gicen prior dismissal as early as May 1983

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a. That complainants’ dismissal was due to the nonsubmission of their resignation letters as directed and their failure to conform to the new terms and conditions of the reorganized setup and not as a retaliation move against the complainant

b. and that the complainants’ appointments as institute deans and department heads were merely ad hoc or temporary and had expired on October 15,1983 as indicated in their appointment papers which they signed resulting in their termination even without the retrenchment program.

ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents were dismissed within the context and spirit of the retrenchment program adopted by the university.

The basic and salient features of the reorganization plan are couched in clear terms which leave no room for interpretation. Specifically, the plan calls for the ‘separation or retirement of all per sonnel with

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corresponding grant of termination pay or retirement benefits, whichever is higher . ’

This phrase connotes authority to effect dismissal of personnel in the implementation of a ‘topto bottom, Universitywide reorganization,’ subject, however, to the condition of ‘rehiring of ALL personnel so separated or retired.’

RULING: The rehiring of “ALL personnel so separated or retired” was, however, subject to the exception “of those whose present positions will be affected by the proposed. reorganizational changes.” The NLRC took this into consideration when it ruled that the private respondents were illegally dismissed by the petitioners

Dismissal because of failure to give letters? It did not result in dismissal

The failure of the private respondents to file their courtesy resignations cannot automatically result in dismissal or inclusion in the retrenchment. We agree with the NLRC that such courtesy letters of resignations were merely administrative requirements that

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could be dispensed with in the implementation of the retrenchment program.

In this guidelines: - 1st para of RULINGAll the employees were therefore, considered resigned under the reorganizational set up without any need for the courtesy resignations demanded by the petitioner university in its memorandum circular. The resignations or “retirement” of the employees are, of course, subject to the proviso that their positions have been abolished by the reorganizational set up envisioned in the retrenchment program. In the case of the private respondents, their positions were not abolished. Hence, there is no basis for their being considered “retired” or “separated” from the university.

Are they holding ad hoc positions? NOA person who has served the University for 28 years and who occupies a high administrative position in addition to teaching duties could not possibly be a temporary employee or a casual.

MOST IMPORTANT: Are they estopped from questioning their dismissal becase they accepted their termination fee? NO

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Section 18, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.” This constitutional protection to labor has been carried through all our three (3) constitutions since 1935.

CASE 11: QUITORIANO v JEBSENSTopic: Social justice – protection to laborFACTS:

1. Jebsens hired Quitoriano as 2nd officer aboard the vessel for a 6 mos for US$936

2. Q, assigned as navigating officer from 12mn to 4am and port watcher from 12mn to 6am complained of dizziness with severe headache.

3. When the vessel landed in Spain, Q was brought a hospital where he was diagnoses as suffering from hypertension arterial or mild stroke. He was repatriated to the PH to undergo further med exam.

4. 169 days after his repatriation, a med report was issued declaring him fit to work by the doctor of the company

5. He asked an independent doctor he was sffering from hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia

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6. So he repeatedly asked Jebsens for FULL permanent disability compensation but was unsuccessful.

7. So he FILED a COMPLAINT to recover permanent total disability of US$80,000 as provided under the CBA

8. J disclaimed Q;s entitlement to any disability benefits in view of the company designated physician certification that he is fit to work.

9. Q: t hat the “fit to work” assessment did not reflect his real health condition; and that his illness, given its delicate nature, could recur anytime once he resumes sea duties

ISSUE: WON he is entitled to 100% compensation? YES!

RULING: His disability is considered permanent and totalIn accordance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to Filipino seafarerers it holding that the notion of DISABILITY is intimately related to the worker’s capacity to earn, what is compensated being not his injury or illness

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but his inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity; hence, disability should be understood less on its medical significance but more on the loss of earning capacity

Applying the standards reflected in the immediately quoted ruling of the Court visàvis the fact that it was only on November 16, 2001 that the “fit to work” certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from the time petitioner was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001, petitioner’s disability is considered permanent and total.

*Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

*Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do

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DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner’s disability being then permanent and total, he is “entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$80,000 for officers,” as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the parties’ CBA

CASE 12: JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC v CATopic: Right to due process and right to labor as property, page 5

FACTS:1. Gruesome death of Fil entertainer –

Maricris Sison2. Pres. Aquino ordered a total ban

against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries.

3. The ban was rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment.

4. Government through DOLE, issued DO 28 creating Enterntainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC) which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.

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5. Puruant to EIAC’S recomm, the Sec of Labor issued DO 3 establishing various procedures and req for screening performing artists under a new system of training. They were (Artists) be issued Artist’s Record Book (ARB)

6. DOLE implemented it7. In a civil case, Federation

Enterntainment Talent Managers of the PH filed a class suit assailing the DO’s contending that

a. It violated the consi right to travelb. Abridged existing contracts for

employmentc.Deprived individuals artists of their

licenses without due process of lawd. The issuance of ARB was

discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the consti right to life liberty and property

8. JMM filed a Motion for Internvention which was granted

9. TC ruled that the issuances of the DO’s constituted a VALID EXERCISE BY THE STATE OF THE POLICE POWER

ISSUE: WON it is a valid exercise of police power? Yes

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RULING: Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “highrisk” destinations, In any event, apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained in

MAIN ISSUE: petitioners’ assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return

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to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a “property right,” protected by the due process clause.

RULING: NO MERIT:

A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions

It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property

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right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

ISSUE: it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

RULING: Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

DISPOSITIVE: The ban is valid

CASE 13: CALLANTA v CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC

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Topic: Right to due process and right to labor as property, page 5

FACTS1. Callanta was employed by Carnation in

January 1974 as a salesman in Agusan del sur. 5 years later, Carnation filed an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12K

2. Upon approval by MOLE (Min of Labor and Emp) of said clearance application, Callanta’s employment with Carnation was terminated effective June 1 1979

3. Callanta filed with MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal

ISSUERULING:

there is, merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, applies by way of supplement,

As this Court stated in Bondoc vs. People’s Bank and Trust Co., when a person has no

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property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood, hence, he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job.

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is wellrecognized in this jurisdiction that one’s employrnent, profession, trade or calling is a “property right,” and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.

The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which mast be brought within four [4] years.

APPLICATION: In the instant case, the action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5,1982, or three [3] years, one [1] month

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and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on June 1,1979 which is well within the four [4]year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code

Even on the assumption that an action for illegal dismissal falls under the category of “offenses” or “money claims” under Articles 291 and 292, Labor Code, which provide for a threeyear prescriptive period, still, a strict application of said provisions will not destroy the enforcement of fundamental rights of the employees

BASICALLY: Di daw pasok sa 3 year period ang kaso kasi naifile ng lagpas na but petitioner used the Civil Code, kung saan ang prescription ay 4 years.

DISPOSTIVE: We find that petitioner, who has continuously served respondent Carnation for five [5] years was, under the attendant circumstances, arbitrarily dismissed from his employment. The alleged shortage in his accountabilities should have been impartially investigated with all due regard for due process.

Carnation Philippines, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay

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petitioner Virgilio Callanta backwages for three [3] years without qualification and deduction.

CASE 14: PHIL. MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS’ ASSO. v PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS INC.Topic: Right to due process and right to labor as property, page 5

FACTS:1. Court gave authority to Premiere

Prods. To lay off 44 employees on the condition that in the event work is avaialable in the future where their ability may be required, the same workers should be reemployed and that if after the termination of the case, the court would find that at the time of their layoff work was available, Premier shall pay them backwages.

a. Ground of layoff – financial losses

ISSUE: May the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such layoff?

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And on the strength of the findings' made by Judge Roldan in this ocular inspection he reached the conclusion that the petition for layoff was justified because there was no more work for the laborers to do in connection with the different jobs given to them.

it is now contended that such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it deprived the workers affected of the opportunity to disprove what apparently was represented to the court during the ocular inspection. In other words, the petitioning labor union claims that with the procedure adopted by the court the workers were deprived of their employment without due process of law.

DOCTRINE: The right to labor is a constitutional as well as a statutory right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law

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DOCTRINE: Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any question or controversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence his broad grant of power should not be interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in the trials and investigations of cases brought before it for determination.

APPLICATION: An ocular inspection of the establishment or premises involved is proper if the court finds it necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened. determination of the case

DISPOSITIVE: required due process has not been followed. The petition for layoff was predicated on the lack of work and of the

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further fact that the company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested party.

CASE 15: PH ASSOC OF SERVICE EXPORTERS INC v DRILONTopic: Full employment, page 5

PARTIES1. PASEI – firm engaged principally in the

recruitment of Fil workers, male and female, for overseas placement”

FACTS: 1. PASEI challenges the Constitutional

validity of Dept. Order No. 1 S1998 of DOLE in the “Guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Fil domestic and household workers”

2. Specifically, the guidelines is assailed for

a. “discrimination against males or females”

b. that it “does not apply to all Fil workers but only to domestic helpers

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and females with similar skills” and that

c.it is violative of the right to travel.d. It is also an invalid exercise of the

lawmaking power, police power being legislative, not executive in character

3. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of A13 of PH Consti providing for worker parcitipation “in policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and beenfits as may be provided by law”

4. SOLGEN filed a Comment informing the court that respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states4. SOLGEN invokes the police power in submitting the validity of the challenged “guidelines”

ISSUES: 1. WON Dept Order No. 1 is a police power measure? YES2. WON it is valid under the PH Consti?

DOCTRINES ON POLICE POWER

POLICE POWER – state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal

4 Iraq, Jordon, Qatar, Canada, HK, US, Italy, Norway, Austria and Switzerland

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liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. It consists of 1. imposition of restraint upon liberty or property2. in order to foster the common good.

Its all-comprehensive embrance provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring greatest benefits.

Plenary power of the state “to govern its citizens” – enables to prohibit all things harmful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

Limitations on police power: it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.

RULING: Based from the above doctrines, the case must be dismissed. It follows the general rule that:

“Official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to

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the contrary, the presumption logically stands”PASEI did not satisfactorily show the reason why contested measure should be nullified.

Dept Order 1 applied only to :female contract workers” but it does not make an undue discrimination between the sexes.

Equality before the law, under the Constiution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits classification provided that1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions2. they are germane to the purpose of the law3. they are not confined to existing conditions4. they apply equally to all members of the same class

On the right to travelThe deployment ban did not impair this right. Dept. Ord 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, its basic policy – to afford protection to labor.

Does Dept Ord 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power? No.

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It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rule-making powers in the enforcement

The right granted by Sec 35 must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power regulation.

“Protection to labor” does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.

On Full Employmenthe Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The nonimpairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 5 Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all

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Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

DISPOSITIVE: The deployment ban is valid exercise of police power.

CASE 16: INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v QUISIMBINGTopic: International law, page 5

FACTSReceiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the localhires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination.

1. School pursuant to PD 72 is a domesic educ. Institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.

2. To enable the school to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instructions the school was authorized to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected either locally or form abroad

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3. The school hired both foreign and local teachers 1) local hires 2) foreign hires

4. The school grants foreign hires certain benefits not accorded local hires

5. They were also paid 25% more than local hires. The school justified it

a. Dislocation factorb. Limited tenurec.The compensation scheme is simply

the school’s measure to remain competitive on an international level

6. When negotiations on cba were held, the petitioner (the union) contested the differences in salary rates

7. The union filed a notice of strick8. The union claims that the point of hire

classification employed by the school is DISCRIMINATORY to Filipinos.

RULING: The Consti in the Article on Social Justice exhorts Congress to “give higest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities”

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law

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include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.

The UDHR, the ICESCR AND Int Conv on the Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination – all embody the general principles against discrimination, the very antithesis of faireness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace but include as well as the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,”25 “to afford labor full protection.”26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to

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regulate the relations between labor and capital.27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

DISPOSITIVE: That the localhires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

CASE 17: CHU v NLRC and VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY (VMC)Topic Definition and scope of management prerogatives

FACTS1.Chu retired from VMC upon reaching 60.2.He was granted an extension of service under a

Special Contract Employment (SCE) for a period of 1 year (Aug 1, 1988)

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3.VMC issued memos both providing for a rotation of the personnel. Pursuant to that, Chu was transferred to the Sugar Sales Dept.

4.Chu protested his transfer asked for reconsideration but was denied so he filed a COMPLAINT for illegal dismissal contending that he was constructively dismissed from his employment.

5.VMC used MP as a defense6.Chu said there is no valid exercise of MP

becausea. His transfer violated the SCE which was the

law between the partiesb.transfer was unreasonable and caused

inconvenience to him

ISSUE: WON there was valid exercise of MP?

RULING: YES. An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in managing his business because it is deemed important to society as a whole that he should succeed. Our law, therefore, recognizes certain rights as inherent in the management of business enterprises.

MP - acts by which one directing a business is able to control the variables thereof so as to enhance the chances of making a profit.

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APPLICATION: One of the prerogatives of management, and a very important one at that, is the right to transfer employees in their work station.

EXCEPTION: Of course, like other prerogatives, the right to transfer or reassign is subject to limitations arising under the law, contract or general principles of fair play and justice.

Jurisprudence proscribes transfers or reassignments of employees when such acts are unreasonable and cause inconvenience or prejudice to them.

There is NOTHING in the SCE where VMC HAD waived its right to transfer or re-assign Chu to any other position in the company. Before such right can be deemed to have been waived or contracted away, the stipulation to that effect must be clearly stated so as to leave no room to doubt the intentions of the parties.

ISSUE: WON it was inconvenient to him?

RULING: Rotation was made in good faith and was not discriminatory, and that there was no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary, benefits and privileges.

DISPOSITIVE: Chu lost!

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CASE 18: SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION v OPLETopic Definition and scope of management prerogatives

FACTS

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1. A CBA was entered by San Miguel Corp Sales Force Union and San Miguel Corp

a.Employees within the bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on respective sales

2.SMC introduced Complementary Distribution System (CDS) where its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through SM’s sales offices.

3.The Union filed a COMPLAINT for unfair labor practices

a.Ground: that the CDS was contrary to existing marketing scheme – the route salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company

b. The new scheme would CBA because it would reduce the take home pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them

ISSUE: WON there is a valid exercise of MP?

RULING: YES! MP was exercised in good faith. San Miguel Corporation’s offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS, by

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paying them a socalled “back adjustment commission” to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS, proves the company’s good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.

DOCTRINE:“Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work.

So long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them

DISPOSITIVE: SMC won!

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CASE 19: PAL v NLRC and PALEATopic Definition and scope of management prerogatives

FACTS1.PAL revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. 2.PALEA filed a COMPLAINT for unfair labor

practice “ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL’s Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by Management”

3. PALEA contended that the code was penal in nature oppressive and prejudicial to the rights of the employees.

4.PAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules and regulations

ISSUE: WON PAL may be compelled to share with the union or its employees its prerogative of formulating a code of discipline?

RULING: The provisions of the Code CLEARLY have repercussions on the employees’ right to security of tenure. The implementation of the provisions may result in the deprivation of an employee’s means of livelihood which, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, is a property right

Uphold constitutional requirements: the protection of labor and the promotion of social justice, for these

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factors, according to Justice Isagani Cruz, tilt “the scales of justice when there is doubt, in favor of the worker”

DIFFERENCE with SMC case: A close scrutiny of the objectionable provisions of the Code reveals that they are not purely businessoriented nor do they concern the management aspect of the business of the company as in the San Miguel case.

DOCTRINE: All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play and justice it must be duly established that the prerogative being invoked is clearly a managerial one.

Rule: MP regarding business operations v MP affecting rights of employees

In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of action.

ISSUE: PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the Code. Public respondents found to the contrary, which finding, to

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say the least is entitled to great respect.

Basis of PAL: PALEA signed the CBA which recognized PAL’s exclusive right to make and enforce company rules without having to discuss it with PALEA and much less obtain its conformity.

APPLICATION: Such provision in the collective bargaining agreement may not be interpreted as cession of employees’ rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto. And one such matter is the formulation of a code of discipline.

RULING: Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account of their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment.

DISPOSITIVE: PALEA WON! PAL to give the Code to all employees, reconsider the employees prejudiced by the code, discuss with PALEA the objectionable provisions.

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CASE 20: ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION v COCA COLA BOTTLERS PH – CEBU PLANTTopic Definition and scope of management prerogatives

FACTS1.Coca-Cola Cebu Plant: Under the employ of

each bottling plant there are 20 bottling operators:

a.1st shift: 8-5pmb.2nd shift: 5pm until production operations is

finished.c.However, bottling operators are

compensated with overtime pay if the shift extends beyond 8 hours.

d. Rotations of break: before 2 ½ = 30 mins break, now: 1 ½ = 30 mins break

e.Chairs were requested and granted so Coke removed the break and so that they will

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avoid sleeping which would prevent injuries to their persons

f. The operators initiated grievance machinery of the CBA

g.SMC invokes MPh.Bottlers – they were performing their works

satisfactorily with the help of the chairs and the removal is a violation of the occupational health and safety standards – policy of state to assure just and humane conditions

2.The Union further claims that management prerogatives are not absolute but subject to certain limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice. The operators have been performing their assigned duties and responsibilities satisfactorily for thirty (30) years using chairs. There is no record of poor performance because the operators are sitting all the time. There is no single incident when the attention of an operator was called for failure to carry out his assigned tasks. CCBPI has not submitted any evidence to prove that the performance of the operators was poor before the removal of the chairs and that it has improved after the chairs were removed. The presence of chairs for more than 30 years made the operators awake and alert as they could relax from time to time.

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3.Respondent: The management decision to remove the subject chairs was made in good faith and did not intend to defeat or circumvent the rights of the Union under the special laws, the CBA and the general principles of justice and fair play.

ISSUE: was the removal of the bottling operators’ chairs from CCBPI’s production/manufacturing lines a valid exercise of a management prerogative?

RULING: YES. In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators’ chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its “I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean” program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were not removed indiscriminately.

They were carefully studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling operators from a twoandonehalf (2 1⁄2)hour rotation period to a one-andahalf (1 1⁄2) hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations.

he decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances

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of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary considering that the operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPI’s exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers’ rights.

the removal of the chairs did not violate the general principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators’ working time was considerably reduced from two and a half (2 1⁄2) hours to just one and a half (1 1⁄2) hours and the break period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The bottling operators’ new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases their working time. A break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a half (1 1⁄2) hours is a just and fair work schedule.

DOCTRINE: Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer

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of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.

DISPOSITIVE: CCBPI WON!

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CASE 21: SHS PERFORATED MATERIALS INC and SCHUMACHER v DIAZTopic Limits of MP

FACTS: 1.Schumacher is a german national is SHS’

president and is in charge of day to day affairs. (the other Schumacher is the treasurer)

2.Shumacher is also the executive vice pres of European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines (ECCP) a separate entity from SHS

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3.Both entities have an arrangement where ECCP handles the payroll requirements of SHS to simplify business operataions and minimize operational expenses.

4.Thus the wages of SHS employees are paid out by ECCP

5.Diaz was hired by SHS as Manager for Business Devt on probationary status his work was described in Contract

6.In addition to his work he was instructed to report to SHS office and plant at least 2 days every work week to observe technical processes involved in manufacturing

7. During respondent’s employment, Hartmannshenn was often abroad and, because of business exigencies, his instructions to respondent were either sent by electronic mail or relayed through telephone or mobile phone. When he would be in the Philippines, he and the respondent held meetings. As to respondent’s work, there was no close supervision by him.

8. During meetings with the Diaz, Hartmannshenn expressed his dissatisfaction over respondent’s poor perfor mance – failed to make concrete business proposals. In numerous electronic mail messages, Diaz acknowledged his poor performance and offered to resign from the company.

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9. Diaz claimed not to receive messages from H so he instructed that his salary wont be released

10. Diaz wrote a demand letter and a resignation letter: illegal and unfair labor practice daw yung hindi pagbigay ng sweldo nya

11. They met, H accepted the resignation letter and informed him that his salary would be released upon explanation of his failure to report to work and proof that he did in fact work for the period in question. D agreed to these exit conditions via email

12. Diaz filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non payment of salaries

13. The NLRC explained that the withholding of respondent’s salary was a valid exercise of management prerogative. The act was deemed justified as it was reasonable to demand an explanation for failure to report to work and to account for his work accomplishments

14. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the CA held that withholding respondent’s salary was not a valid exercise of management prerogative as there is no such thing as a management prerogative to withhold wages temporarily.

15. SHS contend that withholding respondent’s salary from November 16 to November 30, 2005, was justified because respondent was absent and did not show up for work during that

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period. He also failed to account for his whereabouts and work accomplishments during said period.

a.It claims: When there is an issue as to whether an employee has, in fact, worked and is entitled to his salary, it is within management prerogative to temporarily withhold an employee’s salary/wages pending determination of whether or not such employee did indeed work.

ISSUE: whether or not the temporary withholding of respondent’s salary/wages by petitioners was a valid exercise of management prerogative

RULING: NO!

DOCTRINE: Management prerogative refers “to the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, layoff and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work.” Although management prerogative refers to “the right to regulate all aspects of employment,” it cannot be understood to include the right to temporarily withhold salary/wages without the consent of the employee. To sanction such an interpretation would be contrary to Article 116 of the

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Labor Code (Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited)

Any withholding of an employee’s wages by an employer may only be allowed in the form of wage deductions under the circumstances provided in Article 113 (Wage deductions)

On Evidence:

The Court finds petitioners’ evidence insufficient to prove that respondent did not work from November 16 to November 30, 2005. Such duties called for meetings with prospective clients outside the office rather than reporting for work on a regular schedule. In other words, the nature of respondent’s job did not allow close supervision and monitoring by petitioners. Neither was there any prescribed daily monitoring procedure established by petitioners to ensure that respondent was doing his job.

Although it cannot be determined with certainty whether respondent worked for the entire period from November 16 to November 30, 2005, the consistent rule is that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in

favor of the latter24 in line with the policy mandated by Articles 2 and 3 of the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor.

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DISPOSITIVE: DIAZ WON!

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CASE 22: SUPREME STEEL CORP v NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNIONTopic Limits of MP

FACTS

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1.Resp (Union) is the certified bargaining agent of Supreme’s rank and file employees.

2.The Union filed a notice of strike on the ground that Supreme violated CBA

3.Issue on contracting out labora.Sec 6 of CBA: Prohibition of Contracting out

of work of members of CBAb.Supreme hired temporary workers for 5

months based on uniformly worded employment contracts, renewable for 5 months, and assigned them to almost all of the departments in the company.

c.Under the CBA, tempo workers are allowed only in the warehouse and packing section; consequently, employment of contractual employees outside this section, whether direct or agency hired was absolutely prohibited.

d.Worse, Supreme never regularized them even if the position were necessary.

RULING: Petitioner, in effect, admits having hired “temporary” employees, but it maintains that it was an exercise of management prerogative, necessitated by the increase in demand for its product. ndeed, jurisprudence recognizes the right to exercise management prerogative. Labor laws also discourage interference with an employer’s

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judgment in the conduct of its business. For this reason, the Court often declines to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but

also the right of employers.

However, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice.The CBA is the norm of conduct between the parties and, as previously stated, compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

APPLICATION: The CBA is clear in providing that temporary employees will no longer be allowed in the company except in the Warehouse and Packing Section. Petitioner is bound by this provision. It cannot exempt itself from compliance by invoking management prerogative. anagement prerogative must take a backseat when faced with a CBA provision.

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CASE 23: PLDT v PAGUIOTopic Limits of MP

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FACTS1.PLDT has 27 exchanges in its greater manila

(GMM) network. Paguio was the head of the Garnet Exchange.

2.PLDT assessed the performance of GMM. Upon receipt Paguio sent a letter criticizing PLDT’s criteria for performance rating as unfair because they depended on manpower.

3. He also suggested that the criteria failed to recognize that exchanges with new plants could easily meet the objectives of GMM compared to those with old plants.

4. Despite Paguio’s criticism, Garnet Exchange, the oldest plant in GMM, obtained the top rating in the GMM

5. PLDT rebalanced the manpower of the East Center. Paguio requested reconsideration of the manpower rebalancing, claiming it was unfair to Garnet Exchange because as the oldest exchange in the East Center, it was disallowed to use contractors for new installations and was not made beneficiary of the cutover bonus.

6.Paguio was reassigned. He complained but he was informed that his reassignment was in order as it was based on the finding that Paguio was not a team player and cannot accept decisions of management which is short of insubordination.

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7.Aggrieved, P filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

8.PLDT asserts that the reassignment of Paguio was not a demotion because it was merely a transfer to a position of equivalent rank and salary. According to PLDT, transfer, as a rule is allowed by law unless it is vitiated by improper motive or is used as a disguise to remove or punish the employee

9.Paguio argues that his transfer was a demotion since he was assigned to a functionless position with neither office nor staff and deprived of the opportunity to be promoted as he would have no performance to speak of in his new post.

DOCTRINE: an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the transfer of employees.

It is the employer’s prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees’ qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to deploy its employees in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.

An employee’s right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his

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assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful.

LIMIT: the exercise of management prerogative cannot be utilized to circumvent the law and public policy on labor and social justice. That prerogative accorded management should not defeat the very purpose for which our labor laws exist: to balance the conflicting interests of labor and management. By its very nature, management prerogative must be exercised always with the principles of fair play and justice.

In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,

privileges and other benefits.1

The employer bears the burden of proving that the transfer of the employee has complied with the foregoing test.

APPLICATION: His transfer was VALID

e see no credible reason for Paguio’s transfer except his criticisms of the company’s performance evaluation methods. Based on the undisputed facts, Garnet Exchange was doing well and excelled in the performance rating. In the same way, Paguio’s performance was consistently rated as outstanding.

There was also no proof that Paguio refused to

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comply with any management policy.

Paguio’s transfer could only be caused by the management’s negative reception of his comments.

CASE 24: BUSINESSDAY INFORMATION SYSTEMS v NLRCTopic Limits of MP

BSSI gave more separation benefits to its 2nd and 3rd

batches of employees on the ground that it was their expression of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees who have tried to save and make the company viable in the remaining days of operations. Hence, the 1st batch of employees complained.

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court ruled that clearly, there was impermissible discrimination against the private respondents in the payment of their separation benefits. The law requires an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the guise of exercising management prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some and less to others. Management prerogatives are not absolute prerogatives but are subject to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements, or general principles of fair play and justice

With regard to the private respondent’s claim for the

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mid-year bonus, it is settled doctrine that the grant of a bonus is a prerogative, not an obligation, of the employer .The matter of giving a bonus over and above the worker’s lawful salaries and allowances is entirely dependent on the financial capability of the employer to give it. In this case, the mid-year bonus cannot be claimed because BSSI was no longer profitable.

DISPOSITIVE: BSSI cannot use Management Prerogatives as a defense to grant higher separation pay to 2nd and 3rd batches. However, private respondent’s claim for mid-year bonus is not valid because BSSI was no longer profitable.

CASE 25: BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL v NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION (NAFLU), ANTONIO ESTRADA and NLRC

Topic: Civil Code

FACTS

1.NAFLU is a labor union of which Estrada is a member of. Estrada was first employed on Sept 16, 1990 as a route helper with daily wage of P119. For 1 month, Estrada was absent without permission (Awol).

2.So NAFLU thru Valentin sent a MEMO to Estrada, for which he was asked to explain in writing within 24 hours his absence and why no

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disciplinary action must be taken against him.

3.Estrada answer: inuwi ang mga anak sa Samar dahil ang asawa ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak. Walang pera kaya di naka long distance.

4.NAFLU found it unsatisfactorily so it issued a Notice of Termination since he was very well aware of the rules that absence of 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.

5.Estrada and the Union contends that Estrada’s dismissal was without just cause, that the penalty was too severe, that in imposing the penalty, the company should have taken into consideration the length of service as a first offender

6.Brew Master justified that it was with cause allowed by the company’s rules and regulations and the labor code.

7.LA dismissed the complaint citing principle of managerial control which recognizes the employer’s prerogative to prescribe rules and regulations

8.NLRC modified the decision because according to the NLRC prolonged absence does not necessarily mean abandonment. Stating that dismissal is too severe for a penalty. It directed

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the reinstatement to former position but without backwages

ISSUE: WON Estrada should be reinstated?

RULING: Yes, without backwages (follow NLRC ruling).

Recalling the facts: He was then under emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner’s approval was an omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.

Estrada is not guilty of abandonment! (The elements are not present)

Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Two elements must then be satisfied:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and

(2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship

Moreover, Brew Master failed to discharge the burden of proof that Estrada was guilty of

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abandonment. No evidence other than complainant’s letter explaining his absence was presented.

DOCTRINE: While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.

It must be underscored that no less than our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards.

Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good

RELATED PROVISIONS:

Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,

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closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

DISPOSITIVE: We then conclude that Estrada’s “prolonged” absence without approval does not fall within the definition of abandonment and that his dismissal was unjustified.

CASE 26: PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION v PNCC SKYWAY CORP

FACTS:

1.PNCC Union is a labor union in PNCC Skyway Corp. They entered into a CBA incorporating terms and conditions of their agreement which included vacation leave and expenses for security license provisions. Relevant provisions

a. Employee, at least 1 year of continuous service shall be entitled to vacation leave with pay on the length of service

b.Company shall schedule vacation leave during the year taking into consideration the request of preference of the employees.

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2.In a MEMO, PNCC published a scheduled vacation leave of its personnel and issued a memo to its personnel, it included

a. Swapping of SVL schedule is allowed on a oneon-one basis by submitting a written request at least 30 days before the actual schedule of SVL duly signed by the concerned parties.

3.The Union objected to the implementation. It insisted that the individual members have the RIGHT to schedule their vacation leave. Saying further that the unilateral schedule was done to avoid the monetization of their vacation leave.

4.The Union also demanded that the expenses for the required in-service training of its member security guards as a requirement for the renewal of their license be shouldered by the company.

5.PNCC did not accede to both.

a.For the 1st: PNCC argues that Art 8 Sec 1B gives the management the final say regarding the vacation leave of its employees. The Union may take into consideration the employees’ preferred schedule but it is not controlling.

b.For the 2nd: PNCC invokes that the CBA provision which states that all expenses of security guards in securing /renewing their license shall be for their personal account.

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ISSUE: What is the true meaning of the contract between the parties?

RULING: The contested provision of the CBA is clear and unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1 (b) of the CBA categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of the employer. The preference requested by the employees is not controlling because respondent retains its power and prerogative to consider or to ignore said request.

Thus, if the terms of a CBA are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail

Indeed, the multitude or scarcity of personnel manning the tollways should not rest upon the option of the employees, as the public using the skyway system should be assured of its safety, security and convenience.

Although the preferred vacation leave schedule of petitioner’s members should be given priority, they cannot demand, as a matter of right, that their request be automatically granted by the respondent. If the petitioners were given the exclusive right to schedule their vacation leave then said right should have been incorporated in the CBA. In the absence of such right and in view

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of the mandatory provision in the CBA giving respondent the right to schedule the vacation leave of its employees, compliance therewith is mandated by law.

UNION’s argument: Labor contracts should be construed in favor of the laborer. With basis or not?

RULING: Without bassis! This rule of construction does not benefit petitioners because, as stated, there is here no room for interpretation. Since the CBA is clear and unambiguous, its terms should be implemented as they are written.

ISSUE: Who is accountable for the in-service training of the security guards?

RULING: Although it is a rule that a contract freely entered into between the parties should be respected, since a contract is the law between the parties, there are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 13066 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. “They are so

6 “The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.”

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impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. labor contracts are not ordinary contracts; they are imbued with public interest and therefore are subject to the police power of the state

In the present case, Article XXI, Section 6 of the CBA provides that “All expenses of security guards in securing/renewing their licenses shall be for their personal account.” A reading of the provision would reveal that it encompasses all possible expenses a security guard would pay or incur in order to secure or renew his license.

Since it is the primary responsibility of operators of company security forces to maintain and upgrade the standards of efficiency, discipline, performance and competence of their personnel, it follows that the expenses to be incurred therein shall be for the personal account of the company.

CASE 27: REYES v CA and LEUNG HUP

Topic: Construction in favor of Labor

FACTS

1. Leung Hup of Malaysia appointed Reyes as a 108

Technical/Sales Manager with net salary of US$4,500/month. His duties consist of selling parent stock day-old chicks and providing technical assistance to clients of the company.

2.The company formed PH Malay Poultry Breeders (Philmalay) where Reyes was appointed General Manager with US$5,500/month

3.The Company suffered losses which caused them to retrench employees in Phimalay. On June 30, 1997, Reyes gave verbal notice that he will serve as General Manager until Dec 31, 1997 only. The company confirmed this.

4.Reyes requested that he be given the same benefits granted to retrenched and resigned employees of the company, consisting of separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service and the monetary equivalent of his sick leave and vacation leave.

a.He requested: payment of underpaid salaray, brand new car (gallant super saloon) or its equivalent, life insurance policy US$100k, office rentals, retention of the law firm services

5. Philmalay retrenched petitioner effective January 20, 1998 and promised to pay him

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separation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code.He was, however, offered a separation pay equivalent to four months only, or the total amount of P578,600.00 (P144,650 x 4). The offer was not accepted by petitioner and efforts to settle the impasse proved futile.

6. Reyes now filed a complaint for underpayment of wages and non payment of separation pay and other benefits

ISSUE: WON the Reyes’ termination was caused by retrenchment or by voluntary resignation?

RULING: Retrenchment evident by the termination letter sent by Philmalay.

While it is true that petitioner tendered his resignation letter to respondents requesting that he be given the same benefits granted by the company to resigned/retrenched employees, there is no showing that respondents accepted his resignation.

Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective. No such acceptanCe was shown in the case.

What appears in the record is a letter terminating the services of petitioner due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. Verily, said letter should be interpreted as a nonacceptance of petitioner’s resignation effective December 31, 1997. As

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correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, if respondents considered petitioner resigned as of December 31, 1997, then there would be no need to retrench him.

The length of service of petitioner, which the NLRC correctly reduced to 8 years, as well as the solidary liability of respondent corporations are no longer assailed here. Whether petitioner is considered resigned on December 31, 1997 or retrenched on January 20, 1998, his length of employment reckoned from August 24, 1989 would still be 8 years.

Moreover, respondents did not appeal from the decision of the NLRC and in fact sought its affirmance in their Opposition to the motion for reconsideration and Comment to the motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, respectively.

So also, petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed and that his retrenchment was without basis. His request for benefits granted to retrenched employees during such time when respondent was in the process of retrenching its employees is tantamount to a recognition of the existence of a valid cause for retrenchment

On Construction in favor of labor:

In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code’s 111

provisions and its implementing regulations, the employee’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that “[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor”, and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that “[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE: In the case at bar, what was withheld from Reyes was not only his salary, vacation and sick leave pay, and 13th month pay differential, but also his separation pay. Hence, pursuant to current jurisprudence, separation pay must be included in the basis for the computation of attorney’s fees.

DISPOSITIVE: the awards of underpayment of salary, 13th month pay differential, sick leave pay and separation pay, respondents are ordered to pay Reyes vacation leave pay and 10% attorney’s fees, the basis of which shall be the total monetary award. Petitioner’s vacation leave and sick leave pay shall be computed on the basis of his 8 years of service

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with respondents. For this purpose, the case is ordered REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the amounts due petitioner

CASE 28: J.K. MERCADO & SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC. V. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMASTopic: Construction in favor of LaborFACTS

1. The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board issued Wage Order No. XI-03 granting a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to covered workers

2. J.K Mercado filed an application for exemption from coverage which was denied by the board for lack of merit and was ordered to pay its covered workers plus 1% interest per month retroactive.

3.But despite this, respondents (Workers) were not given the benefits so they filed a Writ of Execution and Garnishment against J.K seeking the enforcement of subject wage (filed on July 10, 1998)

4.J.K. argued that the right of the workers had already prescribed due tot heir failure to move for the execution of the order within the period provided under A291(within 3 years from finality)

5.The lower court ruled that the denying of the benefits has nothing to do with Article 291 (money claims) because what was being

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enforced is the application of the exemption of the wage order.

ISSUE: WON the workers are already barred by prescription (beyond 3 years as provided by the Labor Code, A291)

RULING: NO! Because the order was already final, thus it can be the subject of execution motu proprio or upon motion by any of the parties concerned.

The law is equivocal that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Hence, we see no basis for petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Article 291 of the Labor Code in the instant case.

Further, J.K. did not appeal the order, thus it had long become final and executory.

DOCTRINE: a claimant has three years to press a money claim. Once judgment is rendered in her favor, she has five years to ask for execution of the judgment, counted from its finality. This is consistent with the rule on statutory construction that a general provision should yield to a specific one and with the mandate of social justice that doubts should be resolved in favor of labor.

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CASE 29: PNCC v PNCC SKYWAY CORPTopic: Construction in favor of Labor

CASE 30: RACELIS v UNITED PHILIPPINE LINESTopic: Construction in favor of LaborFACTS

1.Racelis was recruited by United PH Lines (UPL) for its principal, Holland America Lines (HAL) to serve as “Demi Chef de Partie) onboard MS Prinsendam with US$799.55 salaray.

2.Prior thereto, Rodolfo was repeatedly contracted by said respondents and was deployed under various contracts since December 17, 1985

3. In the course of his last employment contract, Rodolfo experienced severe pain in his ears and high blood pressure causing him to collapse while in the performance of his duties. He consulted a doctor in Argentina and was medically repatriated for further treatment. He was suffering from Brainstem Cavernous Malformation. He had surgery but he died

4.Through an email, Toby informed Atty. Aquino (counsel for UPL, HAL) that Raceli’s illness was congenital and that there may be familial strains in his case, hence, his death was not workrelated.

5.Racelis’ wife (Respondent) sought to claim death benefits but to no avail. Thus she filed a COMPLAINT for death benefits etc against UPL

6.UPL’s defense: Racelis is not entitled to death

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benefits because illness was not work related and that his death did not occur during the term of his employment contract.

7.LA – ruled in favor of Racelis, NLRC affirmed holding that Rodolfo’s illness is disputably presumed to be workrelated and that since it supervened in the course of his employment, the burden is on the respondents to prove otherwise

8.CA- reversed NLRC

ISSUE: WON Racelis can get death benefits?RULING: Yes!

Under the POEASEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment AdministrationStandard Employment Contract, beneficiaries of a deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the seafarer’s death is workrelated, and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract.

1. Racelis’ death is work-related.

Definition:

11. WorkRelated Injury – injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment.

12. WorkRelated Illness – any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied

While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous

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Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32A of the 2000 POEASEC, Section 20(B)(4) of the same explicitly provides that “[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers workrelated injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as workrelated.”

In other words, the 2000 POEASEC “has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related.

This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32A of the POEASEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption.”

Records show that respondents’ sole evidence to disprove that Rodolfo’s illness is workrelated was the medical opinion of Dr. Abaya, wherein it was explained that Rodolfo’s ailment is a congenital malformation of blood vessels in the brain that may be due to familial strains.60 However, as correctly observed by the LA, the document presented cannot be given probative value as it was a mere print out of an email that was not signed or certified to by the doctor.

2.Racelis’ death occurred during the term of his employment

While it is true that a medical repatriation has the

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effect of terminating the seafarer’s contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had. A further exposition is apropos.

Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,64 the POEASEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment onboard oceangoing vessels. As such, it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.

Employing the same spirit of liberality as fleshed out in Canuel, the Court finds that it would be highly inequitable and even repugnant to the State’s policy on labor to deny petitioner’s claim for death benefits for the mere technicality triggered by Rodolfo’s prior medical repatriation. As it has been clearly established that Rodolfo had been suffering from a workrelated illness during the term of his employment that caused his medical repatriation and, ultimately, his death on March 2, 2008, it is but proper to consider the same as a compensable work related death despite it having occurred after his repatriation.

To echo Canuel, “it is enough that the seafarer’s workrelated injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.

Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that

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it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated.

CASE 31: TAMAYO v MANILA HOTELTopic: Construction in favor of LaborFACTS

1. 265 employees of Manila Hotel had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under 286 of the Admin Code when the hotel was leased to a private concern.

2.This action was brought to recover from Manila Hotel an adiditional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due to them under the Admin Code but was amended by RA 1081, approved 15 days before they were separated from service

3.Lower court dismissed the compliant on the ground that it did not state a cause of action saying that RA 1081 did not have a retroactive effect.

4.Employees claim that they were entitled to 10 months' accrued leave because the aforementioned section of the Administrative Code was, several days before their dismissal, amended by Republic Act No. 1081

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ISSUE: WON the employees can still be paid their additional accrued leave? (WON the latter amendment applies retroactively to employees whose length of service prior to its approval would give them an accumulated leave in excess of five months, the limit fixed by law before the last amendment.)

RULING: NO. Employees have already been paid the value of their accrued leave under Sec 186 of the Revised Admin Code

Article 4 of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. As Republic Act No. 1081 does not provide that it is to have retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval.

“the accumulation of the additional five months' total vacation and sick leave (to the original five months allowed under Republic Act No. 611) should begin only from June 15, 1954" " Confirmatory of that ruling is the opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice, Hon. Pedro Tuason, at the request of the Executive Secretary,

Confirmation: This is with reference to your request for opinion on whether or not Republic Act No. 1081, which has increased the maximum accumulable leave

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of a government officer or employee from 5 months to 10 months, applies retroactively to those whose length of service prior to its approval would have entitled them to an accumulated leave in excess of five months.

We are informed that the Bureau of Civil Service had construed and enforced the abovequoted provision in the sense that after an officer or employee had accumulated more than five months' vacation and sick leave, any leave accruing during the calendar year but not taken within that year was automatically forfeited.

Lastly, plaintiffsappellants cite article 1702 of the new Civil Code, which provides that in case of doubt, labor legislation shall be construed in favor of the laborer. As the article is expressly intended to apply in case of doubt, it can have no application where, as in the present case, no doubt exists.

CASE 32: INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES’ UNION v INCIONGTopic: Rule-making power, limitationsFACTS

1. The Union filed a complaint against Insular for the payment of holiday pay.

2.Labor Arbiter granted the complaint for payment of holiday pay. Bank complied.

3.PD 850 was promulgated amending the right to holiday pay. Controversial section

a.“Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month.

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—Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

b.“For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve”

4.Policy instruction, explaining the law:

“The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.

“Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pray is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.

5. Insular because of the said rules stopped paying holiday pay to its employees

6.So employees filed a writ asking that the former decision be enforced where Insular was ordered to pay holiday pay.

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7. Insular argued that the said award is already repealed by PD 850 considering that its monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240 and their monthly pay is uniform, and that no deductions are made from the monthly salaries of its employees.

8.LA ordered Insular to continue paying becausea.Judgment is already final – res judicatab.Since decision had already been partially

implemented by Insular, appeal from the decision is no longer available.

9.Insular appealed

ISSUE: WON Insular should continue paying holiday pay?

RULING1. Union is correct in saying that Policy ARE

It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, had already become final, and was, in fact, partially executed by the respondent bank.

However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49, November 13, 1974, he can annul the final decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing rules of the Labor Code pursuant to P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and

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the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April 23, 1976 by the then Secretary of Labor are facts and circumstances that transpired subsequent to the promulgation of the decision of the labor arbiter, which renders the execution of the said decision impossible and unjust on the part of herein respondent bank

This argument has no merit.

Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that, “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor”; and Article 1702 of the Civil Code provides that, “In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.”

Consequently, contrary to public respondent’s allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the members of petitioner union of their vested right acquired by virtue of a final judgment on the basis of a labor statute promulgated following the acquisition of the “right”.

ISSUE: whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued prior to its promulgation,

RULING: Said order, being unappealable, became final on the date of its issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be deprived thereof by a constitutional provision enacted or promulgated subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal laws favorable to the accused,

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have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or modifying vested rights, or altering contractual obligations”

When a court renders a decision or promulgates a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.”

CASE 33: BARTOLOME v SSS and SCANMAR MARITIEM SERVICESTopic: Rule-making power

FACTS1.John Colcol was an electricial at Scanmar

onboard Maersk Danville since Feb 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the govt’s employees’ compensation program (ECP). Sadly John died (steel plates fell on him)

2.John was childless and unmarried. Thus petitioner, mother filed a claim for death benefits under PD 636 with SSS. However it denied the claim “you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL(grandfather) based on documents you submitted to us”

3.She cannot also pass as a secondary beneficiary: n their absence, the dependent

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parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries.

a.Dependent parent is referred as the legitimate parent

ISSUE: WON Bernardina Bartolome can get anything? Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

RULING: YES!

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ 126

Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation.

Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”

In the same vein, the term “parents” in the phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to “legitimate parents” as what the ECC did.

Moreover, the same Article 167(j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “dependent parents” to solely legitimate parents.

Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be

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countenanced.

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive

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parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption visàvis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.

CASE 34: SIM v NLRCTopic: Overseas WorkersFACTS

1. Corazon filed a case for illegal dismissal alleging that she was initially employed by PCI Bank.

2. Eventually she was promoted to a Manager position until she received a letter informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.

3. PCI denied any EER between them and sought the dismissal of the complaint.

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4.LA dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.a. It is limited to the relationship between labor

and capital within the Philippines. Since complainant was hired and assigned in a foreign land, although by a Philippine Corporation, it follows that the law that govern their relationship is the law of the place where the employment was executed and her place of work or assignment. On this premise, the Italian law allegedly provides severance pay which was applied and extended to herein complainant

b.5.Relevant facts as to her dismissal

a. Petitioner does not deny having withdrawn the amount of P3,000,000.00 lire from the bank’s account. What petitioner submits is that she used said amount for the Radio Pilipinas sa Roma radio program of the company. Respondent, however, countered that at the time she withdrew said amount, the radio program was already off the air. Respondent is a managerial employee. Thus, loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground

for her dismissal.14

The mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has breached the

15 trust of the

employer would suffice for his/her dismissal

ISSUE: WON it was correct for the LA to dispose the case because it has no jurisdiction?

RULING: NO. It was wrong for the Labor Arbiter to rule that “labor relations system in the Philippines

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has no extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.— (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employeremployee relations,

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including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos

“SECTION 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.”

Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and

Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 804219

provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC.

APPLICATION: Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction

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over claims arising from employeremployee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers

DOCTRINE: Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. his pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor,

CASE 35: SANTIAGO v CF SHARP CREWTopic: Overseas Workers

INTRO: At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the manning agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid reason but whose POEAapproved employment contract provides that the employeremployee relationship shall commence only upon the seafarer’s actual departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to relief?

FACTS:1. Santiago was a seafarer for Smith Bell Mgmt for

5 years. Santiago signed a new contract for another 9 months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515 overtime pay and benefits. The following day the contract was approved by

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PH Overseas Employment Admin (POEA). He was to be deployed on board MSV Seaspread.

2.A week before the scheduled departure the wife of Santos wrote (gave the captain a call) the captain asking not to send her husband to MSV Seaspread, because if he did he will jump in Canada like his brother. So the captain did not send him to MSV anymore.

3.Santiago was told that he would not be leaving anymore but was reassured that he might be considered for deployment.

4.Santiago now filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not commenced since Santiago was not deployed. Smith Bell violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy Santiago causing him to suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for 9 mos and fixed overtime fee. So Smith Bell was ordered to pay Santiago actual damages.

5. NLRC ruled that there is no EER because under the Standard Terms and Conditions governing employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, the employment shall commence upon ACTUAL departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with POEA approved contract. That in the absence of the EER, the claims for illegal

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dismissal and actual damages should be dismissed. Smith’s decision not to deploy Santiago is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

6. CA – Santiago is not entitled to actual damages because damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period described in the POEA Rules. CA agreed with NLRC

7. Santiago’s claima. Smith violated the Migrant’s Work Act and

POEA when it failed to deploy him within 30 days without a valid reason. And s, it arbitrarily prevented the consummation of the POEA approved contract.

b.Since prevention was without basis, the deployment being a condition to the consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed consummated and therefore should be awarded actual damages consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay.

A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employeremployee relationship.

The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and

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conditions therein.

The commencement of the employeremployee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire.

Thus, even before the start of any employeremployee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party

Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason.

ISSUE: WON Smith breached the EER when it did not deploy Santiago?RULING: YES!Smith’s act of preventing Santiago from departing the port of Manila and boarding “MSV Seaspread” constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

We take exception to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules are silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the

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seafarer is precluded from claiming the same.

The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can impose on erring agencies. It does not provide for damages and money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees because it is not the POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such matters.

Despite the absence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employeremployee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042

Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

ANSWER: Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay.

While the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered overtime

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work. Even though petitioner was “prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much less overtime service,”the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel.

The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation.

We note that respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed.

Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorney’s fees is thus warranted.

moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we cannot qualify such action as being tainted with bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioner’s rights, as to justify the award of moral damages. At most, respondent was being overzealous protecting its itnerest

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CASE 36: NASECO v NLRCTopic: Government Employees

CASE 37: PNOC-Energy Devt Corp v NLRCTopic: Government Employees

CASE 38: INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION v CALLEJATopic: Employees of international organizations and specialized agencies

CASE 39: CALLANTA v CARNATION PHIL. INCTopic: Decisions of the courts and quasi-judicial bodies

CASE 40: SUPREME STEEL CORP v NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNIONTopic: Labor Contracts

CASE 41: MARIVELES SHIPYARD v CATopic: Labor Contracts

CASE 42: CENTRAL AZUCERA DE TARLAC v CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNIONTopic: Company Practice

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CASE 43: METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST v NLRCTopic: Company Practice

CASE 44: PAG-ASA STEEL v CATopic: Company Practice

CASE 45: KIMBERLY CLARK PHIL v DIMAYUGATopic: Company Practice

CASE 46: CHINA BANKING CORP v BORROMEOTopic: Company Practice

CASE 47: GTE DIRECTORIES CORP v SANCHEZTopic: Company Practice

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