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Labor Law 2 A2010 - 165- Disini

- Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of alabor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of theother. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity toschemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures.

DISPOSITIONPetition is dismissed.

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN VASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OFLETRAN (AMBAS)

340 SCRA 587K APUNAN,J .; September 18, 2000

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA dismissing thepetition of petitioner and affirming the order of the Sec of Labor

FACTS- Respondent union initiated the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner for the last 2 years of the CBAs 5 year lifetime. In the same year, theunion elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent Eleanor

Ambas was elected President. Ambas wanted to continue therenegotiation of the CBA but petitioner claimed that the CBA wasalready prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted thedisputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who eventuallyrejected the said CBA. Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided infavor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiters decision was reversedon appeal before the NLRC. The union gave notice to the NationalConciliation & Mediation Board of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioners non-compliance with the NLRCs orders and refusal tobargain.- The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to startnegotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union submitted its proposalsto petitioner, which notified the union that the same had been submittedto its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed througha letter from her superior that her work schedule was being changedfrom Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested andrequested management to submit the issue to grievance machinery

under the old CBA. Due to petitioners inaction, the union filed a noticeof strike. The parties met before the NCMB to discuss the ground rulesfor the negotiation. The union received petitioners letter dismissing

Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its noticeof strike to include Ambas dismissal. Both parties again discussed theground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped thenegotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition for certification election.

- The union finally struck. Public respondent Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the unionpresident to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas. Public respondentissued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on twocounts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas withbackwages. Petitioner filed an MFR which was denied. Petitioner sought

a review of the order of the Sec of Labor before the CA. The appellatecourt dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of publicrespondent.

ISSUE/S1. WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargainwith the union when unilaterally suspended negotiations2. WON termination of the union president amounts to interference withthe right to self-organization

HELD1. YESRatio Petitioners utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union isobvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented

by the latter. Where the employer did not even bother to submitan answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is aclear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.Reasoning In order to allow the employer to validly suspend thebargaining process there must be a valid petition for certificationelection raising a legitimate representation issue. The mere filingof a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justifythe suspension of negotiation. The petition must first comply withthe Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Significantly, thesame petition was dismissed by the Sec of Labor. The dismissalwas upheld by this Court.

2. YESRatio Management has the prerogative to discipline itsemployees for insubordination. But when the exercise of suchmanagement right tends to interfere with the employees right toself-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore aprohibited act.Reasoning The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed tofrustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with theCollege that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of theUnion members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to getrid of her. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of itsstrong-willed leadership. When management refused to treat thecharge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the

Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finallydismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious andwhimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas right to dueprocess.On Duty to Bargain Collectively

Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase"duty to bargain collectively," as follows: The duty to bargaincollectively means the performance of a mutual obligation tomeet and convene p r omptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect towages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing acontract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to aproposal or to make any concession.D isposition Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

K IOK LOY (SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT) VNLRC, K ILUSAN G.R. No. L-54334

CUEVAS; JAN 22 1986

NATUREPetition for CERTIORARI to annul the decision ofNLRC (w/cfound petitioner guilty of ULP for unjustified refusal to bargain, inviolation of par. (g) of Article 249 Labor Code, and declared thedraft proposal of the KILUSAN for a collective bargainingagreement as the governing CBA bet the EEs and the mgt.

FACTS- Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (Kilusan), a legitimate labor

federation, won cert election and was certified by the BLR as thesole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-fileemployees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company).

- Kilusan then gave the Company two copies of its proposedCBA. It requested the Company for its counter proposals. Therewas no response from Company. Kilusan again requested theCompany for collective bargaining negotiations and for theCompany to furnish them with its counter proposals. Bothrequests were ignored and remained unacted upon by theCompany.

-Kilusan on Feb 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the BLRon ground of unresolved economic issues in collective


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bargaining.

-Conciliation proceedings followed but all attempts towards an amicablesettlement failed. BLR certified the case to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration. The case was reset/postponed several times (mostlyCompanys request).

-Then in the scheduled hearing on June 4, 1979, the Company'srepresentative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined, failed toappear. The Companys counsel requested for another postponement.The labor arbiter denied. He ruled that the Company has waived its rightto present further evidence and, therefore, considered the casesubmitted for resolution.

- NLRC held: Sweden Ice Cream guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain.The draft proposal for a CBA was found to be reasonable under thepremises, and declared to be the collective agreement w/c shouldgovern the relationship between the parties.

-Petitioner: its right to procedural due process has been violatedwhen it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of itsstand and when its request for further postponement was denied.that the NLRCs finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain isnot supported by law and the evidence considering that it was only onMay 24. 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the

proposed CBA and it was only then that they came to know of theUnion's demands; that CBA approved and adopted by the NLRC isunreasonable and lacks legal basis.

ISSUE/S4) WON companys right to due process has been violated5) WON company is guilty of ULP6) WON CBA is reasonable

HELD1) NO-Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, theclaimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal andfactual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had not even honoredrespondent union with any reply to the latter's successive letters, allgeared towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table.. Certainly,the moves and overall behavior of company were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the Labor Code which is aimed towardsexpediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, the Court is notprepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubiousmaneuvers.

2) YES

- Article 249, par. (g) LC makes it an unfair labor practice for anemployer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously ingood faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect towages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employmentincluding proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating suchagreement, if requested by either party."

-Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a

collective agreement, is designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrialpeace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and ischaracterized as a legal obligation.

- While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer,however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation.

-The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the ff. jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of thestatus of majority representation of the employees' representative inaccordance with any of the means of selection or designation providedfor by the LC; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand tobargain under Art 251, par. (a) of the Labor Code . . . all of which

preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.

-From the over-all conduct of petitioner company, Kilusan has avalid cause to complain against Company's attitude, the totalityof which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to liveup to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code ---- to bargain in goodfaith.

-Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. (1) respondentUnion was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definiterequest to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposedCBA, to the Company not only once but twice which were leftunanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made nocounter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicatelack of a sincere desire to negotiate. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, Company's stalled thenegotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance atthe hearing conducted

-Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald Publications:"unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that therespondent employer, after having been served with a writtenbargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal. This doctrinewas reiterated in Bradman vs. CIR: "while the law does not

compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplatethat both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mindand make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement".

3) YES

- The instant case being a certified one, it must be resolved bythe NLRC pursuant to the mandate of P.D. 873, as amended,which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonablenessof the terms and conditions of employment embodied in any CBA.To that extent, utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement as thegoverning agreement by the employees and management mustbe accorded due respect by this Court.

D isposition Petition dismissed.

REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR21 SCRA 226

CASTRO; September 27, 1967

NATURE Appeal of CIR decision

FACTS- Republic Savings Bank (now Republic Bank or RB)discharged/terminated private respondents Resuello, Jola et al,for having written and published "a patently libelous letter,tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of your employer,

the bank itself." Respondents had written to the bank president,Ramon Racelis, a letter-charge, demanding his resignation onthe grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment andfavoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of RBemployees.- CIR ruled that RBs act of dismissing the 8 respondentemployees constituted an unfair labor practice within themeaning and intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (RA 875).RB appealed. It still maintains that the discharge was for cause.- RBs defense : CIR should have dismissed the complaintbecause the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do withtheir union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the hearingthat the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" butmerely their "individual" act.


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ISSUEWON the dismissal of the 8 employees by RB constituted unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of the Industrial Peace Act

HELDYES.- Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacitieswhen they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid andprotection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice.The joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests, is a concerted activityprotected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that unionactivity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.- NLRC v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co is case in point. Held: Aninsurance company was guilty of an unfair labor practice in interferingwith this right of concerted activity by discharging two agents employedin a branch office. The agents acts of meeting and joining in a letter tothe home office objecting to the transfer to their branch office of acashier from another branch, for further discussion, approval andsignature, is a concerted activity that is protected.Re Meaning of Duty to Bargain- What the RB should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the

grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed anunfair labor practice RA 875 which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for havinggiven or being about to give testimony under this Act."- Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement.It is a continuous process. T he duty to bargain imposes on the partiesduring the term of their agreement the mutual obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement and a violation of this obligation is an unfair labor practice.- Instead of stifling criticism, RB should have allowed the respondents toair their grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an openmind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievances. The grievancecommittee, created in the CBA, would have been an appropriate forumfor such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of thecontinuous process of collective bargaining. It is intended to promote afriendly dialogue between labor and management as a means of maintaining industrial peace.Disposition Appealed decision is AFFIRMED

FERNANDO, CONCURRING- Collective bargaining presupposes the give-and-take of discussion. Noparty adopts, at least in its initial stages, a hard-line position, from whichthere can be no retreat. That was not the situation here. Respondents aslabor leaders were quite certain that the President of RB had offendedmost grievously. They wanted him out. There was no room for discussion.- That for me is not bargaining as traditionally and commonlyunderstood. It is for that reason that I find it difficult to agree fully with theview that their dismissal could be construed as a refusal to bargaincollectively. Moreover, they did not as adverted to in the opinion of theCourt, follow the procedure set forth for adjusting grievances. It is my

view therefore that the dismissal amounted to "interference, restraint or coercion" as prohibited in the Industrial Peace Act, and not refusal tobargain collectively.

DEADLOCK

SAN MIGUEL CORP. V NLRC304 SCRA 1

PURISIMA; March 23, 1999

NATUREPetition for Certiorari

FACTS- In July 1990, San Miguel Cooperation shut down some of itsplants and declared 55 positions as redundant. Consequently,the private respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company.- Grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5and 8, Article VIII of the parties 1990 Collective Bargaining

Agreement. During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted earlyretirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when theparties proceeded to the third level of the grievance procedure.In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed privaterespondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17employees could not yet be redeployed, their services would beterminated on November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjournedwhen Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union,declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of thedeadlock.- On November 7, 1990, the private respondent filed with theNational Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of strikeon the following grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b) unionbusting; c) gross violation of the CBA such as non-compliancewith the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide privaterespondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the partiesside agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e)defiance of voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failedto act on the motion.- On December 21, 1990, petitioner SMC filed a complaint withthe respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent union to submit togrievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike; (3)the recovery of the expenses of litigation. Respondent NLRCcame out with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint.

ISSUEWON NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissingSMCs complaint

HELDYES- Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing Book V the Labor Code,10 [As amended by D.O.No. 09 which took effect on June 21, 1997.] reads:

"Section 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. -- A strike or lockoutmay be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargainingagreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to complywith its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may bedeclared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union

disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or compulsoryarbitration."

- In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by theprivate respondent union are non-strikeable. The issues whichmay lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the privaterespondent union are: collective bargaining deadlock andpetitioners alleged violation of the collective bargainingagreement. These grounds, however, appear more illusory thanreal.- Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situationbetween the labor and the management of the company wherethere is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resultingin a stalemate". This situation, is non-existent in the present case


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since there is a Board assigned on the third level of the grievancemachinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives eachfrom the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing toexhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitrationproceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the noticeof strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and privaterespondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitrationproceedings. In the case of Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., thecourt declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for not complyingwith the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargainingagreement, ruling that:

"x x x the main purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in thesettlement of their disputes is to prevent a strike. This procedure mustbe followed in its entirety if it is to achieve its objective. x x x strikes heldin violation of the terms contained in the collective bargaining agreementare illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses.These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. x x x"

As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that such aviolation is chargeable against the private respondent union. Inabandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail

of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent violated themandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

D isposition Petition is granted.

MINUTES OF NEGOTIATION

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM V. NLRC295 SCRA 171

ROMERO : September 7, 1998

FACTS:- The charge arose from the employer's refusal to grant across-the-board increases to its employees in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01

and 02 of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of theNational Capital Region (RTWPB-NCR). Such refusal was aggravatedby the fact that prior to the issuance of said wage orders, the employer allegedly promised at the collective bargaining conferences toimplement any government-mandated wage increases on an across-the-board basis.- Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form ManufacturingUnited Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collectivebargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc.- At the collective bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed to discussunresolved economic issues. According to the minutes of the meetingthe Union proposed that any future wage increase given by thegovernment should be implemented by the company across-the-boardor non-conditional.- Management requested the union to retain this provision since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00 wage increase wasgranted across-the-board. The union acknowledges management'ssincerity but they are worried that in case there is a new set of management, they can just show their CBA. The union decided to defer this provision.- In their joint affidavit dated January 30, 1992, union members Salve L.Barnes, Eulisa Mendoza, Lourdes Barbero and Concesa Ibaezaffirmed that at the subsequent collective bargaining negotiations, theunion insisted on the incorporation in the collective bargainingagreement (CBA) of the union proposal on "automatic across-the-boardwage increase."- On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This

was followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary.- As expected, the union requested the implementation of saidwage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be onan across-the-board basis. Private respondent refused to accedeto that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increasespurportedly to avoid wage distortion.- On October 24, 1991, the union, through its legal counsel,wrote private respondent a letter demanding that it should "fulfillits pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board wage increase to all employees under the wage orders."- Several conferences between the parties notwithstanding,private respondent adamantly maintained its position on thesalary increases it had granted that were purportedly designed toavoid wage distortion.- Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRCalleging that private respondent's act of "reneging on itsundertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith." It charged privaterespondent with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of

Article 247 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically"bargaining in bad faith," and prayed that it be awarded actual,moral and exemplary damages.- Private respondent, on the other hand, contended that inimplementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the

existence of a wage distortion" that would arise from suchimplementation. It emphasized that only "after a reasonablelength of time from the implementation" of the wage orders "thatthe union surprisingly raised the question that the companyshould have implemented said wage orders on an across-the-board basis." It asserted that there was no agreement to theeffect that future wage increases mandated by the governmentshould be implemented on an across-the-board basis.Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated andexpressly stipulated in the CBA.- On March 11, 1992, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera rendered adecision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.- Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the NLRC that, in turn,promulgated the assailed Resolution of April 29, 1993dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Still dissatisfied, petitioner sought reconsideration which, however, was denied by theNLRC in the Resolution dated January 17, 1994.

ISSUE: WON private respondent committed an unfair labor practice

HELD: NOReasoning:- If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of private respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union should have requestedor demanded that such "promise or undertaking" be incorporatedin the CBA. After all, petitioner union has the means under thelaw to compel private respondent to incorporate this specificeconomic proposal in the CBA. It could have invoked Article 252of the Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the dutyincludes "executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party."

- The CBA is the law between the contracting parties, thecollective bargaining representative and the employer-company.Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy togive protection to labor. In the same vein, CBA provisions shouldbe "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, andthe courts must place a practical and realistic construction uponit, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiatedand purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded onthe dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but oneimpressed with public interest. It goes without saying, however,that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be sointerpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by acontracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a partthereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its


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implementation. Because the proposal was never embodied in the CBA,the promise has remained just that, a promise, the implementation of which cannot be validly demanded under the law.

DISPOSITIVE:NLRC decision affirmed.

SUSPENSION OF BARGAINING

COLEGIO de SAN JUAN de LETRAN v ASSOCIATIONOF EMPLOYEES

340 SCRA 587K APUNAN; September 18, 2000

FACTS:-Newly elected union president Ambas wanted to continue therenegotiation of the CBA with said school but petitioner claimed that theCBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. Union membersrejected CBA-union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the ground of petitioner's refusal to bargain.January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to start negotiation on a new five-

year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submittedits proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six days later or onFebruary 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees.-In the meantime, Ambas was informed that her work schedule wasbeing changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambasprotested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievancemachinery under the old CBA-Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike. The partiesmet on March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination- On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped the negotiationsafter it purportedly received information that a new group of employeeshad filed a petition for certification election-union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to workorder - On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order declaringpetitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts and directing thereinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages

ISSUE:WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargainwith the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiationsfor a new CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification hasbeen filed by another legitimate labor organization?

HELD: yes-Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase "dutyto bargain collectively. Noteworthy in the above definition is therequirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligationto meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for thepurpose of negotiating an agreement-union lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for theCBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation-Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obviousin its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by thelatter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by theunion, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals which is aclear violation of Art.250 which in part states: When a party desires tonegotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make areply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such

notice. the company's refusal to make counter-proposal to theunion's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith-Moreover, the series of events (changing of Ambas work schedand her subsequent dismissal for insubordination) that transpiredafter the filing of the first notice of strike in January 1996 showpetitioner's resort to delaying tactics to ensure that negotiationwould not push through.

7.0 4 BARGAINABLE ISSUES- 252

ISSUES

MANILA FASHIONS, INC. V NLRC (ZAMORAAND NAGK AK AISANG MANGGAGAWA NG

MANILA FASHIONS, INC.)G.R. No. 117878

BELLOSILLO; November 13, 1996

FACTS- respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila Fashions,Inc., through its president, respondent Nonito Zamora, filed a

complaint before the Labor Arbiter on behalf of its one hundredand fifty (150) members who were regular employees of petitioner Manila Fashions, Inc. The complaint charged petitioner with non-compliance, with Wage Order No NCR-02 and 02-Amandating a P12- increase in wages effective 8 January 1991.

As a result, complainants' basic pay, 13th month pay, serviceincentive leave pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential andovertime pay were all underpaid- Petitioner countered that the failure to comply with the pertinentWage Order was brought about by the tremendous lossessuffered by it which were aggravated when the workers staged astrike on account of the non-adjustment of their basic pay. Toforestall continuous suspension/closure of business operations,which petitioner did for three (3) months, the strikers sent anotice that they were willing to condone the implementation of the increase. The condonation was distinctly stated in Sec. 3, Art.VIII, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dated 4February 1992, which was voluntarily entered into by the partiesand represents a reasonable settlement The Union realizes thecompanys closeness to insolvency and, as such , sympathizeswith the companys condition. Therefore, the Union has agreed,as it hereby agrees, to condone the implementation of WageOrder o. NCR-02 and 02-A.- The complainants admitted the existence of the aforementionedprovision in the CBA; however they denied the validity thereof inasmuch as it was not reached after due consultation with themembers.- The Labor Arbiter sustained the claim that the subject provisionof the CBA was void but based its conclusion on a differentground :

ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. -The duty to bargain collectively means theperformance of a mutual obligation to meet andconvene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respectto wages, hours of work and all other terms andconditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contractincorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party toagree to a proposal or to make any concession.


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. . . While it is true that both union officers/members and(petitioner) signed the agreement, however, the same is notenforceable since said agreement is null and void, it beingcontrary to law. It is only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Boardof (the) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) that couldapprove exemption (of) an establishment from coverage of (a)Wage Order . . .

ISSUES1. WON the condonation of the implementation of Wage Order No.NCR-02 and 02-A contained in Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the CBA was valid

HELD1. NOReasoning A Collective Bargaining Agreement refers to the negotiatedcontract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other contracts, theparties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms andconditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contraryto law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Section 3,

Art. VIII, of the CBA is a void provision because by agreeing to condonethe implementation of the Wage Order the parties thereby contravenedits mandate on wage increase of P12.00 effective 8 January 1991. Also,as stated by the Labor Arbiter, it is only the Tripartite Wage ProductivityBoard of the DOLE that could approve exemption of an establishmentfrom coverage of a Wage Order. If petitioner is a financially distressed company then it should haveapplied for a wage exemption so that it could meet its labor costs withoutendangering its viability or its very existence upon which bothmanagement and labor depend for a living. The Office of the Solicitor General emphasizes the point that parties to a CBA may not by themselves, set a wage lower than the minimum wage. T o do so would render nugatory the purpose of a wage exemption, not to mention the

possibility that employees may be unwittingly put in a position to accept a lower wage .The cases that petitioner relies on are simply inapplicable because,unlike the present case which involves a stipulation in the CBA incontravention of law, they are concerned with compromise settlementsas a means to end labor disputes recognized by Art. 227 of the Labor

Code and considered not against public policy by doctrinal rulesestablished by this Court.

D isposition Petition is dismissed.

NESTLE PHIL V NLRC (Union of FIL-IPRO Employees)193 SCRA 504

GRINO-AQUINO; February 4, 1999

NATUREPetition for certiorari

FACTS- Four CBAs with Nestle Philippines (Nestle) expired on June 30, 1987.While the parties were negotiating, the employees resorted to a"slowdown" and walk-outs prompting Nestle to shut down the factory.Marathon collective bargaining negotiations between the parties ensued.- The UFE declared a bargaining deadlock. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to work order. In spite of thatorder, the union struck, without notice. Nestle retaliated by dismissingthe union officers and members of the negotiating panel whoparticipated in the illegal strike. The NLRC affirmed the dismissals. UFEfiled a notice of strike on the same ground of CBA deadlock and ULP.- After conciliation efforts of the NCMB yielded negative results, thedispute was certified to the NLRC by the Secretary of Labor. The NLRCissued a resolution regarding the union's demand for liberalization of thecompany's retirement plan for its workers. Both the parties MFR weredenied.

- Nestle filed this petition for certiorari alleging that since itsretirement plan is non-contributory, it has the sole and exclusiveprerogative to define the terms of the plan because the workershave no vested and demandable rights there under, the grantbeing not a contractual obligation but merely gratuitous. At mostthe company can only be directed to maintain the same but notto change its terms. It should be left to the discretion of thecompany on how to improve or modify the same.

ISSUEWON the Retirement Plan is a collective bargaining issue

HELDYES.Ratio The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e.,that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of theplan, does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations.Reasoning Almost all of the benefits granted to its employeesunder the CBA (salary increases, rice allowances, midyear bonuses, 13th & 14th month pay, seniority pay, medical andhospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick &other leaves with pay) are non-contributory benefits. Since theretirement plan has been an integral part of the CBA since 1972,the Union's demand to increase the benefits due the employeesunder said plan is a valid CBA issue.

- The improvement of the existing Retirement Plan was one of the original CBA proposals submitted by the UFE to Nestle. Theunion's original proposal was to modify the existing plan byincluding a provision for early retirement. The company did notquestion the validity of that proposal as a collective bargainingissue but merely offered to maintain the existing noncontributoryretirement plan which it believed to be still adequate for theneeds of its employees and competitive with those existing in theindustry. The union thereafter modified its proposal, but thecompany was adamant. Consequently, the impasse on theretirement plan became one of the issues certified to the NLRCfor compulsory arbitration.- The inclusion of the retirement plan in the CBA as part of thepackage of economic benefits extended by the company to itsemployees gives it "a consensual character" so that it may notbe terminated or modified at will by either party. Employees havea vested and demandable right over existing benefits voluntarilygranted to them by their employer. The latter may not unilaterallywithdraw, eliminate or diminish such benefits.

D isposition Petition is DISMISSED.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORMMANUFACTURING UNITED WORK ERS OF THE

PHILIPPINES V NLRC (DE VERA).295 SCRA 171

ROMERO; September 7, 1998

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS. At the collective bargaining negotiation between SMTFM-UWPand its employer, the Union proposed that any future wageincrease given by the government should be implemented by thecompany across-the-board or non-conditional. The managementpromised to implement this but requested the union to drop theprovision since their sincerity was already proven when theP25.00 wage increase was granted across-the-board. Anundertaking to this effect was taken by the officials of thecompany.- RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01 and Wage Order No.02 providing for a P17 and P12 daily increase in salary,respectively.


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- Union requested the implementation of said wage orders on an across-the-board basis. Employer refused. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.- Several conferences were held but they were not able to settle.- Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practices or violation of Article247 of the Labor Code, specifically "bargaining in bad faith," and prayedthat it be awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages. Union addedthat it was also charging private respondent with violation of Article 100. - Labor arbiter De Vera, and subsequently, the NLRC, dismissed thecomplaint for lack of merit.

ISSUES1. WON the employer committed an unfair labor practice

HELD1. NORatio The CBA is the law between the contracting parties. Compliancewith a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection tolabor. In the same vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberallyrather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place apractical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration tothe context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended toserve." This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinarycontract but one impressed with public interest. It goes without saying,however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so

interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contractingparty does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and theproponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation Reasoning - If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of themanagement to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-boardwage increase, union should have requested or demanded that such beincorporated in the CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing acontract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party."However, Article 252 also states that the duty to bargain "does notcompel any party to agree to a proposal or make any concession." Thus,union may not validly claim that the proposal embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally entered into withprivate respondent.- Union asserts that management committed "acts of unfair labor practices by virtue of its contractual commitment made during thecollective bargaining process ." The mere fact, however, that theproposal in question was not included in the CBA indicates that nocontractual commitment thereon was ever made as no agreement hadbeen arrived at by the parties.- The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreementresulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach anagreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does notestablish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate acollective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty tobargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.- The question as to what are mandatory and what are merelypermissive subjects of collective bargaining is of significance on the rightof a party to insist on his position to the point of stalemate. A party mayrefuse to enter into a collective bargaining contract unless it includes adesired provision as to a matter which is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; but a refusal to contract unless the agreement

covers a matter which is not a mandatory subject is in substance arefusal to bargain about matters which are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and it is no answer to the charge of refusal tobargain in good faith that the insistence on the disputed clause was notthe sole cause of the failure to agree or that agreement was not reachedwith respect to other disputed clauses. - No benefits or privileges previously enjoyed by union and the other employees were withdrawn as a result of the manner by which privaterespondent implemented the wage orders. Granted that privaterespondent had granted an across-the-board increase pursuant to RA6727, that single instance may not be considered an establishedcompany practice. Union's argument in this regard is actually tied upwith its claim that the implementation of Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 byprivate respondent resulted in wage distortion.

D ispositive Petition DISMISSED.

THE SUBJECTS OF MANDATORYBARGAINING

BERNARD D. MELTZER

- Collective bargaining alternative to individual bargaining; alsoa process for joing determination of web of private rules thatgovern and impinge on employment- Uncertainty exists regarding unions right to participate indecisions on matters that affect EXISTENCE of jobs rather thantheir TERMS and conditions.- New conditions include the progressive expansion of collectiveagreements into new areas. Areas included in the subjects of mandatory bargaining expanded.- Issues involved:

- Is a subject within or beyond mandatory bargaining?- How to balance management interest in innovation andemployee interest in decisions that may affect their economic lives- Role of law and economic power in determining area of negotiation- Sphere of NLRB, courts, Congress

- Outside US, there are other forms of participation, includingsystems of codetermination under w/c workers representatives

join stockholders representatives on directorial boards.

NLRB V. WOOSTER DIV. OF BORG-WARNER CORP.- Here, employer insisted that collective bargaining contractinclude

1. ballot clause calling for prestrike secret vote as to theemployers last offer 2. recognition clause w/c excluded, as party to the contract,the International Union

- Board held that the employers insistence on the clausesamounted to refusal to bargain.- Board held that the clauses do not come within scope of mandatory collective bargaining.

- SC sustained the Boards order directing employer to ceaseinsisting upon either clause.- International was certified by the Board to the Wooster Divisionof the Borg-Warner Corp as the elected representative.International chartered a local. Together the unions presented acomprehensive CBA.- Company submitted counterproposal. Unions negotiatorsobjected because a clause disregarded the certification of International as the employees representative. Thecounterproposal also contained the ballot clause.- Unions did not accept the clause. They struck, but negotiationscontinued. Finally, the local, upon recommendation of International, gave in and entered into agreement with bothclauses.- The obligation to bargain in good faith is limited to subjectswithin wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment As to other matters, each party is free to bargainor not.- Companys good faith met the requirements as to subjects of mandatory bargaining. But that doesnt license employer torefuse to enter into agreements on ground that they dont includesome proposal w/c is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.Such conduct is a refusal to bargain.- The two clauses are lawful. But it doesnt follow that becausethe company may propose these, it can lawfully insist upon them.- The issue now becomes WON the two clauses come within thephrase wages, hours, and other terms

- The ballot clause does not. It relates only to procedurebefore strike.


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- The recognition clause also does not come within the definition of mandatory bargaining. The Act doesnt prohibit voluntary additionof a party, but that doesnt authorize employer to exclude a certifiedrepresentative.

Harlan, J., whom Clark and Whittaker, JJ., join, concurring in partand dissenting in part- I must state that I am unable to grasp a concept of bargaining whichenables one to propose a particular point, but not to insist on it as acondition to agreement.- The ballot clause should come within other terms and conditions Itaffects employer-employee relationship, determines timing of strikes or even whether a strike will occur.- Nonetheless, I accept Courts holding that this clause is not a conditionof employment.- Bargaining process should be fluid.- WON party bargained in good faith depends upon evaluation of totalcircumstances.

RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS V. CHICAGO & NW. RY.- Norris-LaGuardia Act barred a permanent injunction against athreatened strike in support of a demand that the railroad should notabolish preexisting jobs without incumbent unions consent.- Majority found that the demand fell within bargainable subjects.- There is nothing strange about agreements that affect permanency of employment.

FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS CORP. V. NLRB- Issue is WON contracting out of work being performed by employeesis a statutory subject of collective bargaining.- Board adhered to Trial Examiners finding that companys motive incontracting out was economic rather than antiunion but foundnonetheless that failure to negotiate with union concerning its decision tosubcontract constituted a violation.- Contracting out work is a matter within phrase other terms andconditions and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.- In this case, the maintenance work still had to be performed. Nocapital investment was contemplated. Company merely replacedexisting employees with those of an independent contractor. To requireemployer to bargain on this would not significantly abridge its freedom tomanage the business.- Another issue is WON upon finding that the company refused tobargain on a statutory subject of collective bargaining, Board wasempowered to order resumption of maintenance operations andreinstatement with back pay. Held: It is so empowered.Stewart, J., with whom Douglas and Harlan, JJ., join, concurring.- Court doesnt decide that every managerial decision which terminatesemployment is subject to duty to bargain. Nor does Court decide thatsubcontracting is as a general matter subject to that duty.- Industrial experience may be useful in determining proper scope of duty to bargain.- Only a narrow concept of conditions of employment will servepurpose of delineating a limited category of issues w/c are subject toduty to bargain collectively.

GOLDBERG, MANAGEMENTS RESERVED RIGHTS: A LABORVIEW- Mature bargaining relationships require reliance on acceptance of rights of each party by the other.

- Business is often conservative on social questions but radical when itcomes to production. Trade unionists and trade unions are radicals inchanging social institutions but they are conservative in approach tochanges in methods of production.- Employer has right to innovation and change. Employee and unionseek to protect right to certainty / security.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.- Contracting out has been a practice of respondent. Before doing so,respondent considers economic feasibility of doing the work with unitemployees. It doesnt advise Union each time it awards work to anoutside contractor - In Fibreboard cases, contracting out is a departure from establishedpractice. Here, contracting out is motivated solely by economic

considerations and that it comported with traditional methods.The respondent did not violate its statutory bargaining obligation.

ALLIED CHEMICAL & ALK ALI WORK ERS V. PITTSBURGHPLATE GLASS CO.- NLRB held that changes in retired employees retirementbenefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation and thatemployers unilateral modification of them is an unfair labor practice. CA disagreed. SC affirmed order of CA.- Board held that pensioners are employees and members of the bargaining unit.- Boards decision is not supported by law. The Act is concernedwith rights of workers, not those who have retired from the workforce. Employee is not to be stretched beyond its plainmeaning.- Active and retired employees do not share a community of interests. Pensioners interests extend only to retirementbenefits. Inclusion of such limited purpose constituency in thebargaining unit would create potential for severe internal conflicts.

Also, representatives may bargain at the expense of retireesbenefits.

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. V. NLRB- GE walked out of meeting with IUE because company objectedto presence on IUE bargaining committee of representatives of

other unions. It feared that IUE was using its request for preliminary discussion as device to further IUEs desire for jointcompany-wide bargaining.- There have been exceptions to general rule that either side canchoose its bargaining representatives freely, but they have beenrare and confined to situations infected with ill will.- A union has an interest in using experts to bargain. No goodreason why it may not look to outsiders just as an employer isfree to do so. The IUE technique is in response to companyspast bargaining practices.

7.0 5 THE COLLECTIVEBARGAINING AGREEMENT

1. DEFINITION

UNIVERSITY OF THE IMMACULATECONCEPCION, INC v. THE HON. SECRETARYOF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, UNIVERSITY

OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPCIONTEACHING AND NON-TEACHING EMPLOYEES

UNION-FFW374 SCRA 471

PARDO; January 23, 2002

Nature : Appeal via CertiorariFacts- University of the Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. is a non-stock,non-profit educational institution, who, on 2 occasions, met with

the ICTNE Union-FFW, through the auspices of the NationalConciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), to negotiate a CBA.- The Union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike, the first in aseries of 3 notices of strike, alleging deadlock in the CBAnegotiations and unfair labor practices on the part of the petitionin the form of " mass termination of teaching and non-teaching employees, interference with union activities, discrimination, and harassments ."- The Univ. of IC denied the allegations in its Motion to Strike OutNotice of Strike.- During the parties' conciliation conference before the NCMB,petitioner and the Union reached an agreement on some issues(ie. ECONOMIC ISSUE~ pertaining to increase in amt of salary


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per increase in tuition fees; NON-ECONOMIC ISSUES~ unionrecognition and security, working schedule) - The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision excluding thesecretaries, registrars, cashiers, guidance counselors and the chief of the accounting department of the petitioner from the coverage of thebargaining unit.- The University presented to the Union a draft of the CBA. After a studythereof, the Union rejected the draft on the ground that the manner of computing the net incremental proceeds has yet to be agreed upon bythe parties.- The University wrote the Union insisting that the Union was bound tocomply with the terms contained in the draft-CBA since said draftallegedly embodies all the items agreed upon by the parties during theconciliation sessions held by the NCMB.- the Union filed its Second Notice of Strike with the NCMB, thereinalleging bargaining deadlock on "allocation of 5% (CBA) anddistribution/computation of 70% incremental proceeds (RA6728)", andunfair labor practice by the petitioner in the form of "harassments, unionbusting and correct implementation of COLA,"- After the Union's filing of its Second Notice of Strike, the Universityterminated the employment of 2 union members who later filed their complaints for illegal dismissal before the Regional Arbitration BranchNo. XI of the NLRC in Davao City.- In the same venue, the University filed a complaint against the Unionand its officers for unfair labor practices based (ie refusing to answer in

writing, and within 10 days required by law, the cba proposals, refusing to bargain in good faith, by declaring a deadlock in the cba negotiationsafter just two days of negotiations, even if there were so many issuesunresolved and still to be discussed at the bargaining table, etc) - The case was elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The Union alsopushed through with the strike.- The Secretary of Labor issued an order assuming jurisdiction over thelabor dispute and directed all workers to return to work within 24 hoursupon receipt of the Order and for management to accept them backunder the same terms and conditions prior to the strike The parties werefurther directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts thatmight exacerbate the situation.- Eventually, the Sec of Labor found that the strike undertaken by theUnion was a valid exercise of the workers' rights under the Labor Code.The Union observed the mandatory requirements/procedures for a validstrike and the issues raised in the Notice of Strike i.e., bargainingdeadlock and ULP are strikeable issues specifically provided under

Article 263 (c) of the Labor Code and then directed the University andthe Union to execute a CBA embodying the dispositions containedherein as well as all items agreed upon by the parties. The CBA shall beeffective for five (5) years starting SY 1995-96, subject to renegotiationof the economic provisions for the last two (2) years.- CA affirmed the decision of the Sec of Labor. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:WON the CA erred in affirming the orders of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment.

HELD: NO.REASONING:- CA did not err in finding that there was still no new collectivebargaining agreement because the parties had not reached a meeting of the minds.

- A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) refers to the negotiatedcontract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms andconditions of employment in a bargaining unit, includingmandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. (M anila Fashions v. NLRC) As in all other contracts, there must beclear indications that the parties reached a meeting of the minds.- In this case, no CBA could be concluded because of what the unionperceived as illegal deductions from the 70% employees' share in thetuition fee increase from which the salary increases shall be charged.

Also, the manner of computing the net incremental proceeds was yet tobe agreed upon by the parties.- Petitioner insisted that a new collective bargaining agreement wasconcluded through the conciliation proceeding before the NCMB on all

issues specified in the notice of strike. Although it is true that theuniversity and the union may have reached an agreement on theissues raised during the collective bargaining negotiations, stillno agreement was concluded by them because, among other reasons, the DOLE Secretary, who assumed jurisdiction onJanuary 23, 1995 only was set to resolve the distribution of thesalary increase of the covered employees. The Court of Appealsfound that "there are many items in the draft-CBA that were noteven mentioned in the minutes of the July 20, 1994 conference."- Considering the parties failed to reach an agreement regardingcertain items of the CBA, they still have the duty to negotiate anew collective bargaining agreement in good faith, pursuant tothe applicable provisions of the Labor Code.

DISPOSITIVE : Petition Denied. The parties are enjoined tocomply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement ingood faith.

DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORINGSERVICES v ABARQUEZ (THE ASSOCIATION

OF TRADE UNIONS)220 SCRA 197

ROMERO; March 19, 1993NATURE Petition for certiorari

FACTSPetitioner Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services(petitioner-company) and private respondent ATU-TUCP (Union),the exclusive collective bargaining agent of the rank and fileworkers of petitioner-company, entered into a collectivebargaining agreement (CBA) which, under Sections 1 and 3,

Article VIII thereof, provide for sick leave with pay benefits eachyear to its employees who have rendered at least one year of service with the company.

Upon its renewal, the provisions for sick leave with pay benefitswere reproduced under Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the newCBA, but the coverage of the said benefits was expanded toinclude the "present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signingof this Agreement."

During the effectivity of the CBA (a total of three years and ninemonths), all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor poolwho had rendered at least 750 hours up to 1,500 hours wereextended sick leave with pay benefits. Any unenjoyed portionthereof at the end of the current year was converted to cash andpaid at the end of the said one-year period pursuant to Sections1 and 3, Article VIII of the CBA. The number of days of their sickleave per year depends on the number of hours of service per calendar year in accordance with the schedule provided inSection 3, Article VIII of the CBA.

The commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave withpay benefits of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cashwas, however, discontinued or withdrawn when petitioner-company under a new assistant manager, Mr. Marzo (whoreplaced Beltran, Jr. upon the latter's resignation in June 1989,stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground thatthey are not entitled to the said benefits under Sections 1 and 3of the 1989 CBA.

The Union objected to the said discontinuance of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefitsof petitioner's intermittent workers contending that it is a


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deviation from the true intent of the parties that negotiated the CBA; thatit would violate the principle in labor laws that benefits already extendedshall not be taken away and that it would result in discriminationbetween the non-intermittent and the intermittent workers of thepetitioner-company.

Upon failure of the parties to amicably settle the issue on theinterpretation of Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, the

Union brought the matter for voluntary arbitration before the NationalConciliation and Mediation Board, Regional Arbitration Branch XI atDavao City by way of complaint for enforcement of the CBA. The partiesmutually designated public respondent Abarquez, Jr. to act as voluntaryarbitrator.

After the parties had filed their respective position papers, publicrespondent Abarquez, Jr. issued an Award in favor of the Union rulingthat the regular intermittent workers are entitled to commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits under Sections 1 and 3 of the1989 CBA. Petitioner-company disagreed with the aforementioned rulingof public respondent, hence, the instant petition.Petitioner-company argued that it is clear from the language and intentof the last sentence of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA that onlythe regular workers whose work are not intermittent are entitled to thebenefit of conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of sick leave, thus:". . . And provided, however, that only those regular workers of theCompany whose work are not intermittent are entitled to the herein sickleave privilege."ISSUEWON public respondents interpretation of Sections 1 and 3, Article VIIIof the 1989 CBA is correct

HELD YES. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as used in Article 252 of theLabor Code, refers to a contract executed upon request of either theemployer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating theagreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, includingproposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under suchagreement. While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between theparties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied theprinciples of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor

contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is notmerely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, itmust yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberallyrather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place apractical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration tothe context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended toserve.

It is thus erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the1989 CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits,specifically Section 3 thereof, in its attempt to justify the discontinuanceor withdrawal of the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefit to regular intermittentworkers. The manner they were deprived of the privilege previouslyrecognized and extended to them by petitioner-company during thelifetime of the CBA of October 16, 1985 until three months from itsrenewal on April 15, 1989, or a period of three years and nine months, isnot only tainted with arbitrariness but likewise discriminatory in nature.

D ispositive Petition dismissed

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR v. CA (SIMEDARBY PILIPINAS INC)

440 SCRA 604CALLEJO, SR.; October 19, 2004

NATUREPetition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS - American Rubber Company, Inc. (ARCI) is a domesticcorporation existing in and incorporated under the laws of thePhilippines. It owns a rubber plantation in Latuan, Isabella. Itentered into a Farm Management Agreement (FMA) with SimeDarby Pilipinas, Inc. (SDPI), where SDPI was given the right tomanage, administer, develop, cultivate, and improve the rubber plantations as an agro-industrial development project,specifically for planting rubber trees, processing of andmarketing of its products and providing technical expertise for aperiod of twenty-five years, or up to the year 2011.- National Federation of Labor (NFL) was the duly registeredbargaining agent of the daily-and-monthly-paid rank-and-fileemployees of SDPI in the Latuan rubber plantation. SDPI andNFL executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in whichthey agreed that in case of permanent or temporary lay-off,workers affected would be entitled to termination pay asprovided by the Labor Code . The 150 petitioners were daily-and-monthly-paid employees of SDPI in the Latuan plantationand were, likewise, members of NFL.- In 1988, RA 6657, aka Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Lawtook effect.- SDPI decided to cease its operations in certain plants, includingthe one in Latuan.

- The employees were given month pay for every year of service as separation pay, pursuant to the CBA. They weremade to sign quitclaim, which they said they entered intovoluntarily.- A few months later, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissaland insufficiency of separation pay.- Labor arbiter, NLRC, and CA all found that there was no illegaldismissal and that the employees were properly paid their separation pay.

ISSUE WON the employees separation pay was insufficient.

HELD NO.- The employees argue that they should have gotten 1 month per year of service, pursuant to company policy. The precedentsthey site are not applicable.- A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiatedcontract between the legitimate labor organization and theemployer concerning wages, hours of work and all other termsand conditions of employment in the bargaining unit. During thenegotiations, the parties, management and union meet andconvene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purposeof negotiating an agreement. Had the daily-paid rank-and-fileemployees deemed the same to be a diminution of their benefits,they should have rejected the CBA. The petitioners never assailed the CBA as prejudicial to them or for having been inviolation of Article 100 of the Labor Code. Unless annulled, theCBA, as a contract governing the employer and the employeesrespecting the terms of employment, should prevail.- If the separation pay was supposed to be 1 month per year of service, why wasnt it specified in the CBA? Instead, the CBA

says as pr ovided by the LC. Art. 283 provides that in case of closure or cessation of operations, the separation pay shall be

equivalent to 1 month pay or to at least month per year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the latter is higher, sothats what the company gave them.

Disposition Petition DENIED.RIVERA v ESPIRITU

374 SCRA 351QUISUMBING; January 23, 2002

NATURESpecial civil action for certiorari and prohibition


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FACTS -PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines(ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to thefinancially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL's financial situationwent from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted arehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.-PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adoptedby the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The strike endedfour days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematicreduction in PAL's work force and the payment of separation benefits toall retrenched employees.-then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address theproblems of the ailing flag carrier -PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by privaterespondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees-PALEA informed the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tan's offer. 2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA members cast their votes in the referendum under DOLEsupervision held on September 21-22, 1998. Of the votes cast, 1,055voted in favor of Tan's offer while 1,371 rejected it-PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to itsemployees.

Two days later, the PALEA board wrote President Estrada anew,seeking his intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikesand similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in theexisting CBA. Tan, however, rejected this counter-offer -PALEA board again wrote the President. Among the signatories to theletter were herein petitioners Rivera, Ramiso, and Aranas, as officersand/or members of the PALEA Board of Directors. PAL managementaccepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum wasscheduled.-PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEAagreement, while 34% rejected it.-seven officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annulthe September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL andPALEA

ISSUE WON the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998, stipulating thesuspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary topublic policy?

HELD NO. petitioners contend that the controverted PAL-PALEA agreement isvoid because it abrogated the right of workers to self-organization andtheir right to collective bargaining. Petitioners claim that the agreementwas not meant merely to suspend the existing PAL-PALEA CBA, whichexpires on September 30, 2000, but also to foreclose any renegotiationor any possibility to forge a new CBA for a decade or up to 2008. Itviolates the "protection to labor" policy laid down by the Constitution.Under Article 253-A of the Labor Code, insofar as representation isconcerned, a CBA has a term of five years, while the other provisions,except for representation, may be negotiated not later than three yearsafter the execution. Petitioners submit that a 10-year CBA suspension is

inordinately long, way beyond the maximum statutory life of a CBA,provided for in Article 253-A. By agreeing to a 10-year suspension,PALEA, in effect, abdicated the workers' constitutional right to bargainfor another CBA at the mandated time.-HOWEVER, A CBA is "a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representativeincorporating the agreement reached after negotiations withrespect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditionsof employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievancesor questions arising under such agreement.'' The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order tocreate a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. In construing aCBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give dueconsideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose

which it is intended to serve. The assailed PAL-PALEAagreement was the result of voluntary collective bargainingnegotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financialsituation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and uniqueintention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, butpreventing the latter's closure. We find no conflict between saidagreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-Ahas a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability andpredictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promoteindustrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreementsatisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assignspecific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of rightand requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the partiesfrom waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables andagreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargainingagent of PAL's ground employees, that voluntarily entered intothe CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the union'sexercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to freecollective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.

Disposition Petition DISMISSED

2 . CONTENTSSEE SAMPLE CBAEFFECT SUBSTANDARD CONTRACT

DURATION AND RE-NEGOTIATIONGRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK V ASSOCIATIONOF DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES

249 SCRA 162

ART. 239. G rounds for cancellation of union registration. -The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:(f) Entering into collective bargaining agreements which

provide terms and conditions of employment below minimumstandards established by law;

* remember! A239 has been amended by RA 8491

ART. 253-A. T erms of a collective bargaining agreement. - Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties mayenter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect isconcerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petitionquestioning the majority status of the incumbent bargainingagent shall be entertained and no certification election shallbe conducted by the Department of Labor and Employmentoutside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3)years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement enteredinto within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the termof such other provisions as fixed in such CollectiveBargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately

following such date. If any such agreement is entered intobeyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiationof the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties mayexercise their rights under this Code. (As amended bySection 21, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).


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ROMERO; October 6, 1995

NATUREPetition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same

FACTS-Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of LuzonDevelopment Bank Employees (ALDBE) submitted to arbitration toresolve WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining

Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion-The parties agreed to submit their respective Position Papers onDecember 1-15, 1994.-Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received

ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995.-LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper -On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary

Arbitrator rendered a decision finding that the Bank has not adhered tothe Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of

Agreement on promotion.-Hence, this petition

ISSUEWON the Voluntary Arbitrator erred in finding that the Bank hasnot adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion(the Court referred the case to the CA so the issue wasntresolvedit said that elevating a decision or award of a voluntaryarbitrator to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari is ineffect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Courtof Appeals, which in its view is illogical and imposes anunnecessary burden upon it)

HELD(only obiter pertaining to topic )-In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to animpartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence andarguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves toaccept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

-Arbitration may either be compulsory or voluntary.-Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to adispute are compelled by the government to forego their right tostrike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their disputethrough arbitration by a third party.

-Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of adispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntaryarbitration clause in their collective agreement, to animpartial third person for a final and binding resolution . -Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with byboth parties without delay, such that once an award has beenrendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by bothparties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumedto have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen amutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by saidarbitrator's decision.-In the Philippine context, the parties to a CollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include thereinprovisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievancesarising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBAor company personnel policies . -For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designatetherein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include

a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accreditedby the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

D ispositionThe Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals

NAVARRO V DAMASCO, BUSCO SUGARMILLING

246 SCRA 260QUIASON; June 16, 1969

NATUREPetition for certiorari to reverse the Decision of the Voluntary

Arbitrator Damasco, declaring as valid the separation fromemployment of petitioner

FACTS- Navarro III was employed as typist of BUSCO Sugar Milling atits plant in Quezon, Bukidnon.- One time, he went to visit Mercy Baylas, a co-employee he wascourting, at the ladies' dormitory inside the compound of thecompany. Upon seeing him, Baylas hid behind the divider at thereception room. He still saw her, followed her, and after takinghold of her left hand, pulled her towards him. The force causedher to fall on the floor. He then placed himself on top of her. Thedormitory housekeeper, responded to Baylas' shouts for help.- According to the medical report issued by Dr. Maraat, Baylascomplained of pains on her shoulder and left foot.- Navarro was then informed of the complaint against him andwas placed under preventive suspension. He was dismissedfrom the service for having violated paragraph 3.B (Conduct andBehavior) of the Code of Employee Discipline. This includes:

inflicting bodily injury, immoral conduct within company premises,improper conduct and acts of gross discourtesy or disrespect.- President of the Mindanao Sugar Workers Union, for and inbehalf of petitioner, and Jaime J. Javier, Personnel Officer of thecompany, agreed to submit the case of petitioner to voluntaryarbitration.- Navarro contends that the grievance procedure was notfollowed hence the Voluntary Arbitrator should not have takencognizance of the case.

ISSUE

ART. 260. G rievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. - The parties to a Collective Bargaining

Agreement shall include therein provisions that willensure the mutual observance of its terms andconditions. They shall establish a machinery for theadjustment and resolution of grievances arising fromthe interpretation or implementation of their CollectiveBargaining Agreement and those arising from theinterpretation or enforcement of company personnelpolicies.

All grievances submitted to the grievance machinerywhich are not settled within seven (7) calendar daysfrom the date of its submission shall automatically bereferred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in theCollective Bargaining Agreement.For this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining

Agreement shall name and designate in advance aVoluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,or include in the agreement a procedure for theselection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by theBoard. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary

Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Boardshall designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant

to the selection procedure agreed upon in theCollective Bargaining Agreement, which shall act withthe same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panelof Arbitrators has been selected by the parties asdescribed above.


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WON grievance machinery provisions 3 should have been invoked

HELDNOReasoning The instant case is not a grievance that must be submittedto the grievance machinery. What are subject of the grievanceprocedure for adjustment and resolution are grievances arising from theinterpretation or implementation of the collective bargainingagreement. - The acts of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of EmployeeDiscipline, particularly the provision penalizing the immoral conduct of employees. There was no justification for petitioner to invoke thegrievance machinery provisions.D isposition Decision of Voluntary Arbitrator is AFFIRMED.

SMC v. CONFESSOR(cha Mendoza)

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v CA (GMCINDEPENDENT LABOR UNION)

422 SCRA 514

QUISUMBING; February 11, 2004FACTS-GMC employed 190 workers in its two plants, all of whom weremembers of GMC-ILO (duly certified bargaining agent). GMC and theunion concluded a CBA) which included the issue of representationeffective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for threeyears, to expire on November 30, 1991.-A day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposedCBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within 10days. As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collectiveand individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawnfrom their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation andpersonal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing tonegotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal, believing thatthere was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed.-The union officers disclaimed any massive disaffiliation or resignationfrom the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members,

stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.-GMC dismissed Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit thematter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC denied theunions request. Thus, the union filed a complaint against GMC with theLabor Arbiter alleging ULP for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2)interference with the right to self-organization; and (3) discrimination.The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that apetition for certification election be held to determine if the union stillenjoyed the support of the workers.- Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision. But NLRC later reversed its own decision. The CA reinstated NLRCs first decision,ruling in favor of the union.ISSUE1. WON GMC is guilty of ULP for violating the duty to bargaincollectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization2. WON the CA erred in imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed bythe union for two years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.HELD1. YES

3 Section 2 , Article X of the Collective Bargaining Agreement specifies the instances when thegrievance machinery may be availed of, thus: "Any protest or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice or working conditions in the Company, or any dispute arising as to the meaning,application or claim of violation of any provision of this Agreement or any complaint that any employee may have against the COMPANY shall constitute a grievance."

ART. 253-A of the LC mandates that the representation provisionof a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence

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