labor rights as duties of justice: a cosmopolitan...
TRANSCRIPT
Labor Rights as Duties of Justice: A Cosmopolitan Approach
Yossi Dahan
Taub Center, New York University
Law School, Academic Center of Law and Business, Ramat Gan
Email: [email protected]
Hanna Lerner
Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University
Email: [email protected]
Faina Milman-Sivan
Faculty of Law, Haifa University
Email: [email protected]
Paper presented at the research workshop on Global Justice and International Labor,
January 3-5, 2011, University of Haifa.
This is a draft paper. Please do not cite/circulate.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
2
I. Introduction
In recent years, growing criticism has been voiced against the philosophical discussion of global
justice, arguing that by focusing on abstract normative argumentations most theories have failed
to provide useful insights into the moral evaluation of existing institutional arrangements and
social practices.1 The question of whether principles of justice should be extended beyond
political boundaries of a sovereign nation-state has been debated extensively by theorists.
However, practical problems that stem from increasing global economic, political,
environmental, or legal developments remained obscure in these debates.2
The aim of this article is to concretize economic and political global reality by focusing on
the field of labor as a particular sphere of global justice. While the dire conditions of sweatshop
workers, mainly in developing countries, have been described by many critics of the global
economic market, global labor has yet to be analyzed as a distinct sphere of justice. Our article
addresses this lacuna by asking whether duties of justice towards workers should extend beyond
state borders.
Issues of labor are central to questions of global justice for two main reasons. First,
contemporary debates within the field of labor touch upon core global justice concerns, such as
the nature of norm-generation, the level of decision making regarding labor rights – whether
1 Christian Barry and Thomas Pogge, ‗Introduction‘, Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global
Justice, ed. C. Barry and T. W. Pogge (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) pp. 1-2. See also: Chios C. Carmody, Frank J.
Garcia and John Linarelli, Introduction to 'Global Justice and International Economic Law: Opportunities and
Prospects', Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 246 (2011), Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934864. 2 Among the notable exceptions one may count Thomas Pogge, ‗Human Rights and Global Health: a Research
Program‘, Metaphilosophy 36:1 (2005). Simon Caney, ‗Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas
Emission‘, Journal of Global Ethics 5:2 (2009). Eszter Kollar, ‗Locating Injustice in Transnational Health-
worker Migration‘, paper presented at the conference on Global Ethics: 10 years into the millennium, Bristol,
2010.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
3
global, regional or national – and governance structures that should apply these rights. Second,
income redistribution – one of the main concerns of global justice – is considered the raison
d’être of labor law discourse.3 Earning income through labor is the only way to rise above
poverty line for many working poor throughout the world,4
We address the question of the scope of justice towards workers by applying the
methodological approach of practice-dependent interpretation. According to the practice-
dependent conception of justice, principles of justice should be derived from the practice they
presume to regulate. This methodology has been used by some advocates of the Anti-
cosmopolitan camp, who claim that a shared practice, understood in terms of national or political
affiliation (i.e. the state), is a necessary condition for applying principles of justice.5 In contrast,
our analysis of labor as a social practice leads us to support Cosmopolitan conclusions. Our main
argument is that guaranteeing a minimal level of labor standards to workers in global production
chains should be regarded as a duty of justice and requires the development of new legal and
institutional tools that would enforce such minimal standards.
We reached this conclusion by interpreting the social practice of labor, which refers to
the rules and regulations that govern labor relations between employers and employees, as they
developed over the past two centuries since the early days of the industrial revolution. The
interpretation of the practice of labor includes three separate stages: first, we delineate the
contours of the practice of labor. Second, we explore the practice‘s aims which are supposed to
guarantee working conditions that provide workers life in dignity. Here we analyze the
3 ILO, Constitution of the ILO (1919), Preamble. 4 The role of employment and decent labor standards in poverty reduction has been recognized as one of the
Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Development Goal Report (United Nations, 2010), pp. 8-11. 5 Andrea Sangiovanni, ‗Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality‘, The Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 2
(2008). See also Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
4
justifications for existing labor norms and regulations, with a focus on the state‘s attempt to
ameliorate the inherent power asymmetry between employers and employees. The third stage of
interpretation includes a critical analysis of the failure to realize the practice‘s aims in the current
global labor market. In this critical step of interpretation, we argue that global economic
developments have exacerbated the exploitive working conditions of workers. As we will
demonstrate below, exploitation in the context of global labor is understood in both substantive
and procedural terms and takes place on both the interactional level, namely in the interaction
between various actors within global chains of productions, and on the institutional level, namely
in regulations of global economy determined by global institutions such as the IMP, World Bank,
and WTO.
What are the normative implications of this interpretive analysis of the practice of labor?
We argue that the exploitive conditions in contemporary global labor market constitute what
John Rawls termed ―conditions of background injustice‖ and thus call for the establishment of
new institutions and regulations intended to correct this situation.6 The development of new legal
tools to regulate working conditions of workers within complex transnational chains of
productions is thus a matter of justice. In other words, assisting the working poor, who are
employed under dire conditions mostly in developing states, is not derived merely from a moral
duty of humanitarian assistance but rather should be considered a duty of justice.7
6 We follow here Miriam Ronzoni, ‗The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice Dependent
Account‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37:2 (2009). And Arash Abizadeh, ‗Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and
Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35:4 (2007). 7 Humanitarian duties (referred sometimes also as charity duties or duties of assistance) are less weighty than duties
of justice. Duties of justice are grounded in principles of justice that establish individuals' rights. In contrast,
humanitarian duties are not correlative to rights and no rights are violated when people do not fulfill their
humanitarian duties. In addition, by contrast to humanitarian duties, duties of justice are enforceable in the sense that
third parties may be justified in applying sanctions to those who default on them. The literature concerning the
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
5
Before presenting our interpretation of the practice of labor (Section III) and discussing
its normative implications (Section IV), the following section will first situate our argument
within the contemporary philosophical debate on global justice and the theoretical framework of
the practice-dependence approach.
II. The Global Justice Debate and Practice-Dependence Theories
Since its inception in the 1980s, the philosophical debate on global justice centered on the
question whether principles of justice should be extended beyond state borders or should they be
limited to the political boundaries of a sovereign nation-state. At the risk of oversimplification,
one can divide positions in this debate into two main competing approaches: Cosmopolitan
versus Anti-cosmopolitan approaches, which differ mainly in the weight they assign to
obligations for one's fellow citizens versus obligations for people in other nations.8 Cosmopolitan
theories rest either on institutional arguments, claiming that the emerging supranational
institutional structure provides a sufficient common political and economic framework required
for implementing principles of justice,9 or on moral inter-personal arguments, maintaining that
the overarching moral principle that should guide us in matters of distributive justice is the
concern for each person‘s welfare and dignity irrespective of her nationality, citizenship, and
differences between these two categories of duties is large. For recent discussion in the global context see: David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 248. 8 Thom Brooks, ‗introduction‘, The Global Justice Reader, ed. Thom Brooks (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 9 E.g. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2002).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
6
residence.10
In contrast, advocates of the Anti-cosmopolitan school claim either that a shared
national affiliation that underpins the political framework of a state is a necessary condition for
employing principles of justice, since national membership creates special moral obligations or
―common sympathies,‖ in Mill's words,11
towards our fellow countrymen,12
or, from an
institutional perspective, advocates of Anti-cosmopolitanism insist that principles of justice can
only be implemented under conditions of clear sovereignty capable of enforcing policies decided
democratically and that despite the growing reality of globalization, at present such conditions
exist only within the framework of the nation-state.13
One of the central points of controversy in the global justice discussion concerns the
concept of ―associative duties of justice‖. This concept usually refers to duties we owe to people
with whom we are associated in some way, such as family members, friends, neighbors or
compatriots.14
Advocates of the Anti-cosmopolitan position tend to rely on ―associative duties‖
arguments and restrict the scope of such duties to members in associations based on national
identity or state citizenship. Yet, interestingly, philosophical discussion of the concept of
associative duties neglects to acknowledge a different type of social association that has great
importance for individuals in the modern economy, namely associations that exist in the
workplace - among workers as well as between workers and their employers. This article‘s
10 Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Heave: Yale University Press, 2002). Darell
Molendorf, Global Inequality Matters, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 11 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1972) pp. 359-360. 12Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‗National Self-Determination‘, The Journal of Philosophy 9 (1990), 439-461.
David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). Michael Sandel, ‗The Procedural
Republic and the Unecumbered Self‘, Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-
Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 66-82. 13 Thomas Nagel, ‗The Problem of Social Justice‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2005) 113-147. Jon Mandle,
Global Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). 14
Jonathan Seglow, ‗Associative Duties and Distributive Justice‘, Journal of Moral Philosophy 7:1 (2010). Niko
Kolodny, ‗Do Associative Duties Matter?‘, The Journal of Political Philosophy 10:3 (2002), 250-266.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
7
contribution to the global justice debate may thus be made by means of associative duties
argument. Our main claim is that associations based on shared labor practice may imply
normative duties towards workers within the nation-state as well as beyond state borders. In
other words, in contrast to the Anti-cosmopolitan position, we aim to demonstrate that
associative duties may exist beyond the borders of nation-state on the basis of a shared practice
of labor.
Our analysis rests on a methodological approach that has been recently advanced mainly
by advocates of Anti-cosmopolitanism, namely the practice-dependent, or relational, approach to
distributive justice.15
This approach stands in opposition to the practice-independent, or non-
relational approach.16
Non-relational theories (practice independent theories) reject the idea that
principles of justice depend on practice mediated relations in which individuals stand.
Proponents argue that the existence of principles of justice are independent of shared practices,
and do not presuppose shared common institutions or involvement in certain unique cultural
interactions or participation in shared institutions. Furthermore, the non-relational approach
derives principles of justice from comprehensive moral theories that view human beings as the
source of moral concern, regarding them as subjects of justice relationships.17
These principles
apply to all human beings, per se, and are not dependent on any particular practice or institution.
15 Not all theorists who rely on practice-dependent approach hold anti-cosmopolitan views. Good examples are
Leura Valentini, ‗Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism‘, The
Journal of Political Philosophy 19:4 (2011). Charles, R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations.
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. 16 See Aron James, ‗Constructing Justice for existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33: 281-316 (2005). Andrea Sangiovanni, ‗Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State‘, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 35:1 (2007), 318-358. 17 Non relational approach is adopted by theorists who may hold different moral views. E.g. Peter Singer, ‗Famine,
Affluance and Morality‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:3 (1972). G. A. Cohen ‗On the currency of egalitarian
justice‘, Ethics 99 (1989), 906-944
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
8
In contrast, relational (practice-dependent) conceptions of justice maintain that principles
of justice cannot be articulated and justified independent of the practice they presume to
regulate.18
In Sangiovanni‘s words, "the practice mediated relations in which individuals stand
condition the content, scope, and justification of those principles. Relational accounts vary
regarding both in which relations condition the content, scope, and justification of those
principles as well as how they do so."19
Relational theories are not confined only to relationships
among people who participate in a common practice in the strict sense. Relationships between
individuals that give rise to duties of justice can also be based on other social, political, or
institutional relationships.20
All relational theories "share the idea that principles of distributed
justice cannot be formulated or justified independently of the practices that they are intended to
regulate."21
Ironically, despite the recent resurgence in writing on practice-dependent theories, social
practices themselves have been rarely analyzed. Most writings that adopt a relational or practice-
dependent approach tend to focus on relations that arise from sharing a common culture or
common identity, or participating in certain institutions. In contrast, our analysis, which concerns
the sphere of labor, centralizes the idea of social practice.22
Social practice is defined by Rawls
as a ―form of activity specified by a system of rules that defines offices, roles, moves, penalties,
defenses, and so on, and that gives the activity its structure.‖23
Our use of the term social practice
18 In Rawls words, ―the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing." John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 25. 19 Sangiovanni, ‗Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State‘, p. 5. 20 In the context of the present discussion on relational and non-relational theories of justice, we use the term "practice dependent" in a broad sense which includes all possible relationships that give rise to duties of justice. 21 Sangiovanni, Ibid. 22 An important exception is Iris Young, ‗Responsibility and Global Labor Justice‘, The Journal of Political
Philosophy 12:4 (2004), 365-388. 23 John Rawls, ‗Two Concepts of Rules‘, The Philosophical Review 64: 1 (1955), p. 3.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
9
in the sphere of labor refers to formal and informal rules and institutions that regulate labor
relations on national and supranational levels.24
According to the practice dependence approach, in order to justify a conception of justice
one needs an interpretation of the practices and institutions that the principles of justice govern
and to identify the role that the principles are intended to play within them.25
In the following
section we apply the practice-dependent methodology in the sphere of labor. We demonstrate
that an analysis of the social practice of labor leads to Cosmopolitan conclusions and extend the
scope of justice beyond state borders.
III. Interpreting Labor as a Social Practice
Our interpretation of the practice and institutions of labor draws on Dworkin‘s interpretational
framework.26
According to Dworkin, a constructive interpretation of a practice consists of three
stages. First, in the ―preinterpretive" stage the object of interpretation, ―the raw data of
interpretation‖, is identified in order to distinguish it from other practices. Note that the
delineation of the contours of a practice is often open to controversy and there could be
disagreements between different interpreters over the exact dimensions of the practice. At the
second stage the interpreter has to locate the aim, the general justification of the practice, and the
reasons why its participants believe it is worth pursuing. In this stage ―the interpreter assumes the
point of view of the participants in order to reconstruct what reason they might have for
24
See also Leura Valentini, ‗Global Justice and Practice-Dependence‘, p. 5. Our definition of social practice
resembles what Sangiovanni‘s calls ―regime.‖ Sangiovanni, ‗Justice and Priority of Politics‘, p. 142. 25
Sangiovanni, ibid, p. 141. 26 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), Ch. 2.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
10
affirming its basic rules, procedures, and standards. Why and how do the participants arrange
their affairs to achieve the goals and aims of the institutions."27
The interpretation in this stage
has to meet certain criteria of fit with practice details identified in the first stage. Moreover, the
interpretation of the practice should refer to the practice as an integrated whole. The third and
last stage, the "post-interpretive stage", is the critical and reforming stage, in which the
interpreter articulates what is required from the practice to fulfill the ends identified in the
previous stage.
Our interpretation of the practice of labor presented in the next sections, too, proceeds, as
in Dworkin‘s model, in three stages. First we identify the contours of the practice of labor,
which, from an institutional point of view, refers to the rules that govern labor relationship
between employees and their employers. Ambiguities and controversies over the definition of
categories such as ‗employee‘ or ‗employer‘ are inherent to the practice of labor. Moreover, as
we show in later stages of interpretation, such ambiguities had been exacerbated in the global era
and generated new dimensions of unjust labor conditions.
In the second stage of interpretation, we present the aim and the justifications of the
practice of labor from the point of view of those who take part in this practice, as well as their
expression in national and international moral and legal norms. In other words, we present what
are the commonly perceived goals of labor norms and regulations, as well as how, historically,
they evolved during the nation-state era, mainly in developed states.28
The third, post-interpretative stage is the critical stage. Here we analyze the growing
challenges to the realization of the practice‘s aims, as identified in the second interpretive stage.
27 Sangiovanni, ‗Justice and the Priority of Politics‘, p. 148. 28
The distinction between ―the nation-state era‖ and the ―global era‖ is clearly controversial and may in interpreted
in different ways. For operative purpose of this article, we roughly draw the line around the 1970s.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
11
Our critical interpretation of the practice of labor at this stage focuses on transformations in the
practice of labor resulting from recent globalization processes; in particular, expansion of labor
relations beyond the nation-state borders through global chains of production, outsourcing, and
other changes in the global labor market.
(1) Pre-Interpretive Stage: The Contours of Labor
The social practice of labor encompasses relations between employers and employees and the
rules governing these relations, rules that developed over the last two centuries. Since the age of
industrialization in the 18th century, employment contracts and aspirations for freedom of
employment replaced feudalism, guilds, and servanthood as the basis for the regulation of labor
market. Labor norms and regulations developed as industrialization expanded throughout the 19th
century and evolved into the establishment of the welfare state in the mid-20th
century. As a
result, today‘s labor relations at the state level are governed by legal rules stemming from
various legal sources (e. g., constitutional provisions, legislation, executive directives, court
decisions, customs, and rules established in collective agreements that result from collective
employer and employee negotiations or contractual agreements agreed upon by individual
employers and employees). On the supranational level, various types of organizations generate
and regulate the practice of labor; these include international organizations (e.g. UN and ILO),
and more recently regional supranational entities and agreements (e.g. EU), and non-
governmental organizations (e.g. FLA and WRC). In addition, labor relations are governed by
regional and international framework agreements, reached by global and regional workers unions
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
12
and TNCs, as well as, voluntary corporate social responsibility codes, and, multilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral arrangements linking trade and labor.29
The contours of the practice of labor are subject to various controversies among them the
historic and continuing question of who should be considered ‗employee‘ and/or ‗employer‘.30
This issue is essential as it determines who is protected by employment contract regulations. 31
As commonly defined in national labor law, typical labor relations entail subordinate contractual
relations and the exchange of a worker‘s labor in return to wages. Yet in recent decades, legal
definitions of employees/employers have become increasingly blurry due to various economic
developments such as decentralization of production, labor externalization, as well as, the growth
of new patterns of work (e.g. freelance workers) and labor intermediates (e.g. manpower
agencies, contractors and subcontractors). This ambiguity in the definition of labor relations was
tackled by labor law regulations which attempted to perfect objective classification/criteria for
ascertaining labor contracts.32
29 For an overview see, e.g., Arturo Bronstein, International and Comparative Labour Law: Current Challenges
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Ch. 4. 30 Bruno Veneziani, ‗The Evolution of the Contract of Employment‘, The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A
Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945 ed. Bob Hepple (Hart Publishing 2010). Other major controversies
regarding the contours of labor include for example the division between formal versus informal sectors, and the
controversy around house work as paid work. 31 We address here the main legal tools that are traditionally considered part of labor law. However, alternative
views of the scope of labor law suggest it includes additional fields of regulations, such as tariff protections and industrial policies. See for example, John Howe, ‗The Broad Idea of Labor Law: Industrial Policy, Labour Market
and Decent Work‘, The Idea of Labor Law, eds. Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011) pp. 295-313. 32
Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
13
We will return to this point at the third interpretive stage below, when we discuss the way
in which the growing ―defocusing of labor relations‖ in the global era has impeded the protection
of workers‘ rights through legal means.33
(2) The Interpretive Stage: Aims, Justifications, and Methods of the Practice of Labor
The second stage of interpretation explores the aims and the justifications of the practice of
labor, and the reasons that participants in this practice might have for affirming its basic rules,
procedures, and standards. We also discuss why and how these participants arrange their affairs
to achieve the aims of the labor practice.
Aims of Labor: Life in Dignity
Norms and regulations of labor have a variety of goals in the modern capitalist state.34
However,
if we look at the practice as a whole, at the highest level of generalization, a fundamental
aspiration of labor law is to reduce the commodity nature of labor relations in order to guarantee
life in dignity for all workers. According to Sinzheimer, ―labor law is a law on a mission,
intended to uphold human dignity is the special task of labor law[…] imprinting to be a ‗real
humanity‘ that is much more than some mere ideological humanism.‖35
This idea is also
expressed in the dictum ―labor is not a commodity and not a commerce clause‖ which was part 33 Arturo Bronstein, International and Comparative Labour Law, Ch.2. 34 Our analysis ignores the practice of labor as it has developed in non-market state-centralized economies in the
Soviet Block. For elaborated discussion on the plurality of ideas of labor law, see Davidov‘s and Langille‘s book. 35
Hugo Sinzheimer Cited in: Thomas C. Kohler, ‗The Disintegration of Labor Law: Some Notes for a Comparative
Study of Legal Transformation‘, Notre Dame Law Review 73 (2005) p. 1322.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
14
of post WWI Versailles Treaty and the 1946 ILO declaration.36
In contrast to other types of
economic exchanges, the exchange that characterizes the labor market is unique in that the object
sold (labor skills) cannot be separated from the subject selling her skills (the worker). If the body
and the personality of workers are inseparable from the skills she is selling in return for a wage
income, and if the idea that every person deserves dignity is commonly shared, then every
worker should be treated with dignity.
What constitutes life in dignity is a question intensely disputed by moral philosophers,37
and is controversial in the particular context of labor as well.38
Nevertheless, the 20th century
has witnessed the emergence of a world-wide consensus regarding a minimal standard of labor
rights intended to satisfy this aim. Despite great variety between the ways welfare and labor
regimes have developed in different modern industrial democracies,39
the majority of states in
the world today recognize the need to legally establish fundamental norms and rights in the area
of labor. This recognition is manifested in several key documents of international human rights
law (e.g. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Labor Organization Declaration of Fundamental Rights, the UN‘s Global
Compact), as well as, in growing similarities between normative commitments regulated on the
national level. One of the clear expressions of the global consensus on minimal labor standards
36 International Labor Organization’s Declaration Concerning The Aims And Purposes of the International Labour
Organisation (Philadelphia Declaration) (1946). 37 For recent analysis on the meaning of life with dignity see: George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2011). 38 Nien-he Hsieh, ‗Survey Article: Justice in Production‘, The Journal of Political Philosophy 16:1 (2008), 72-100. Russell Muirhead, Just Work (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). Jon Elster, ‗Self-Realization in Work
and Politics‘, Alternatives to Capitalism, eds. Jon Elster and Karl Moene (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1989). Richard Arneson, ‗Meaningful Work and Market Socialism‘, Ethics 97 (1987), 517-545. Michael Walzer,
Spheres of Justice. Adina Schwartz, ‗Meaningful Work‘, Ethics, 92 (1982), 634-646. 39 Gosta Esping-Anderson, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 1990).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
15
that guarantee workers life in dignity was the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights of Work, that defined four core basic labor rights, including elimination of all forms
of forced or compulsory labor, effective abolishment of child labor, elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, and ensuring freedom of association
and the right to collective bargaining. In 2008, the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for Fair
Globalization expanded this to include three additional strategic objectives to be adopted by the
states: promoting access for all to freely chosen employment; developing measures of social
security and labor protection such as basic healthcare (e.g. maternity leave), safety regulation at
work and minimum wage; and promoting social dialogue between workers, employers, and the
state.40
On the national level, such a consensus is reflected in that a significant majority of the
labor standards legislated in 190 countries in the world guarantee comparable basic norms, such
as for example, weekly day of rest, paid sick leave, paid annual leave, and wage premium for
mandatory overtime.41
Clearly not all states live up to their international legal commitments,
and do not always enforce existing national labor laws. Nevertheless, the overlap in basic labor
regulations represents a cross-cultural and cross-economic-developmental consensus regarding
the essential labor standards that constitute an acceptable floor for decent working conditions.
It is important to note that in spite of the international declarative consensus regarding
universal labor standards even in developed states existing labor laws often do not guarantee life
40 This Declaration introduces the ILO Decent Work agenda. The legal status of the Declaration is ambiguous and
States demonstrate varying degrees of commitment towards this consensus of labor rights. Some are of declaratory nature while others have stronger legal implications. See: Francis Maupain ―New Foundation or New Façade? The
ILO and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization‖ European Journal of International Law 20
(2009). 41
Jody Heymann and Alison Earle, Raising the Global Floor (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2010), pp.
89-120.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
16
in dignity. This is the case for a large number of workers who are defined as ―working poor,‖
namely those who are deprived of minimal income that would have allowed them life in
dignity.42
While we do not identify the international consensus of labor standards as sufficient
guarantee for life in dignity, for the purpose of this article we regard international labor norms
as a necessary condition for such a life.
Balancing Asymmetrical Power Relations and Preventing Exploitation
The labor market in a capitalist system, where scarcity of jobs is a common condition, is
characterized by asymmetry in bargaining power between employers and employees.43
Under
such conditions, an individual worker is often compelled to accept the terms of employment
contract dictated by the employer, since any objection may lead to his unemployment. From the
worker‘s perspective, unemployment means lack of means of subsistence. It also means a failure
to achieve other advantages usually associated with work, such as social status and a source of
identity and other psychological benefits. The power asymmetry between employers and
employees extends beyond the pre-contractual stage and is manifested throughout the period of
work relations. For example, workplaces are typically organized hierarchically, featuring
unequal distribution of knowledge, expertise, and power between employers and employees.
In an unregulated labor market, this structural asymmetry in bargaining power between
employers and employees generates labor contracts that are inherently exploitive. Exploitation in
42 David K. Shipler, The Working Poor: Invisible in America (Knop, 2004). Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America (Holt Paperbacks, 2008). ILO, Unemployment, Working Poor and Vulnerable
Employment to Increase Dramatically Due to Global Economic Crisis (2009), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/press-and-media-centre/news/WCMS_101462/lang--en/index.htm#1. 43
This asymmetry in bargaining power may be overcome if the worker has unique/rare capabilities that strengthen
his bargaining position vis-à-vis his employer. These cases, however, are not common.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
17
labor relations occurs on both a substantive and a procedural level. Thus, preventing the
emergence of exploitive labor relations requires both substantive and procedural regulatory
measures.
A substantive definition of exploitation usually addresses the gap between the return one
receives for the contribution of labor and the value the laborer adds to the end product or service.
In modern complex economies, such an outcome-based conception of exploitation is difficult to
measure, partly because the total output of labor is usually the result of various types of
contributions made by many members of society. National legal norms do not adopt a
comprehensive outcome-based conception of exploitation. Rather, the practice of labor rests on a
sufficientarian definition of exploitation. Namely, it institutes a threshold of employment
conditions, expressed in protective labor regulations. According to this minimal perspective,
employment relations that fail to achieve the protective threshold would be considered
exploitive.44
The state played a central role in undermining substantive exploitation and promoting
justice in the labor market by enacting and enforcing minimum standards of working conditions
that employers are required to satisfy (e.g., limits of working hours, safety standards, minimum
wages, holidays and sick leaves).45
By doing so the state in fact adopted a stance of legal
paternalism towards workers and recognized workers as a status, imposing limitations on their
44 We set aside for the moment the vast critical discussion regarding the inadequacy of such minimal standards to
secure human dignity and whether this sufficientarian minimalist approach is morally justified. 45 In the context of labor relations, the state is wearing two hats: first, it plays the role of a sovereign authority that
legislates and enforces labor rules. Second, the state also functions as an employer, usually the major employer in
every modern state.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
18
freedom of contract in order to guarantee them minimum of inalienable labor rights.46
This
process began with the first English Factory Act (1802) which set the workday of pauper
apprentices at twelve hours and forbid night work.47
Since then legislatures in industrialized
countries have gradually expanded the coverage and requirements of labor standards.
Another central legal tool developed in most western countries in order to tackle the
inherent problem of substantive exploitation in labor relations is the recognition of labor
contracts as belonging to a unique category termed ―relational contracts‖. In contrast to neo-
classical contracts whose aim is to advance the self-interests of the parties, relational contracts
seek to promote cooperative social behavior. Relational contracts regulate long-term relations
rather than insular interactions and are characterized by a heightened level of mutual
responsibility between employers and employees. Accordingly, labor contracts in most countries
delineate relations between employer and employee in a manner in which they are expected to
behave in good faith and to treat each other fairly. Moreover, the long term nature of labor
relations means that the full terms of labor contracts cannot be defined in advance, and therefore
it may well be the case that certain changes will be made in the contract without dissolving it all
together.
From a normative perspective, the legal category of ―relational contracts‖ acknowledges
a specific type of relations that exists between employers and employees beyond the
commitments that portray a one-time-interaction involving an exchange of goods and services
for money. Labor law thus recognizes labor relations as instituting a type of association which
46 An analogous group that is recognized as a status is the group of children, who enjoy protection of special rights
in return for limitations on their basic freedoms. S. Simitis, ―The Juridification of Labor Relations‖ Comparative
Labor Law Journal 7:2 (1986), 93-142. 47
Stanley L. Engerman, ‗The History and Political Economy of International Labor Standards‘, International Labor
Standards: History, Theory and Policy Options eds. K. Basu, H. Horn, L. Román, J. Shapiro (Blackwell, 2003).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
19
generates mutual commitments and normative duties between its participants. From this
perspective, associations based on shared practice of labor may imply ―associative duties‖
belonging to the same category of duties that are usually mentioned in the context of nation or
state membership. In other words, labor relations institute ―associative duties‖ between
participants in the labor practice. To clarify, we are not referring here necessarily to labor unions,
where membership in the association requires formal act of registration. Rather, by association
based on shared practice of labor we refer to those workers and employers who are associated
through a joint project that involves work.
From a procedural perspective, exploitive relations exist when one person takes
advantage of another person‘s bargaining weakness, due to the person‘s condition of desperate
neediness. Taking such an advantage is considered exploitation because the exploiter derives a
benefit from the weak person‘s ―difficulty in advancing her interests in interactions in which
both participate, in a process that shows inadequate regard for the equal moral importance of her
interests and her capacity for choice.‖48
According to this conception, exploitation may occur
even if the exploited person benefits as a result of interaction between the two parties.49
Thus,
employment contracts are considered to be exploitive if the worker‘s ability to bargain and
disagree with the terms of the contract was limited during the negotiation phase. This limitation
often stems from the asymmetry of power between workers and employees and is common in
48 Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.
60. In this article we do not distinguish between exploitation and wrongful exploitation, which was emphasized, for
example, by Allen W. Wood, ‗Exploitation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 12:2 (1995), 136-158. Joel Feinberg,
Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 49 A common example is that of a man lost in a desert, about to die of thirst, when another man on a camel appears and convinces the thirsty man to lead him to a well in return for life-long servitude in the camel rider‘s household.
Although the thirsty man benefited from the agreement, the camel rider has exploited the thirsty man since he took
advantage of the latter‘s needs, benefiting from his inferior capacity to pursue his interests. See for example Richard
Miller, Globalizing Justice, pp. 60-62. See also: Chris Meyers, ‗Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third
World Sweatshops‘, Journal of Social Philosophy 35:3 (2004), pp. 319-333.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
20
negotiations that occur on an individual rather than collective basis. From this procedural point
of view, employment contracts may be regarded exploitive even if they benefit the workers.
Regulations that guarantee freedom of association, freedom to collective agreements and
rights to strike are among the instruments that aim at correcting the unequal balance of power
between employers and workers, and in this sense attempt to constitute a protection from
exploitive relationship in the procedural sense.50
The presence of labor unions in the work place
is instrumental to enforcement of worker‘s rights, as empirical evidence supports the claim that
collective agreements tend to guarantee better working conditions than individual labor
contracts.51
In sum, in contrast to Marxist approach that perceives employer-employee relations as
structurally exploitive and seeks the total elimination of the capitalist system, modern labor law
attempts to balance the inherent asymmetry in employer and employee power relations as well as
guaranteeing a minimum standard of life in dignity. In doing so, the legal norms and regulations
within the practice of labor rest on the assumption that state intervention could balance this
asymmetry and avoid unacceptable conditions of work through various legal and political tools.52
The practice of labor described above evolved by and large during the nation-state era,
and addressed a labor market that generally functions within state boundaries. However,
economic globalization in the past three decades generated new conditions of exploitation that
cannot be addressed by the traditional practice of labor described above. In the next, third, stage
of interpretation we illustrate the effect of increasing economic globalization on the practice of
50 Janice R. Bellace, ‗The Role of the State in Industrial Relations‘, The Future of Industrial Relations: Global
Change and Challenges ed. J R Milend, R. D. Lansbury and C. Verevis (London: Sage 1994) pp. 19-40. 51 Roy. J. Adams, ‗Regulating Unions and Collective Bargaining: A Global Historical Analysis of Determinants and
Consequences‘, Comparative Labor Law Journal 14 (1992/93) pp. 272-301. 52 Paul Davies and Mark Freedman, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, (Stevens, 1983).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
21
labor. We argue that under the current global reality, the existing state-based institutional and
regulatory arrangements cannot achieve the aims and purposes of the practice of labor as defined
in the first and second stages of interpretation.
(3) Post-Interpretive Stage: Critical Analysis of Labor in the Global Era
Two of the global transformations that most significantly intensified the challenges faced by the
practice of labor are the emergence and growth of new actors in the global labor market – the
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) – and the increasing complexity of production chains. The
term ‗production chain‘ usually refers to a network of businesses collectively cooperating to
achieve the procurement, manufacturing, and distribution of a family of related products.53
It
encompasses all actors that participate in the endeavor to bring a product to the marketplace,
including manufacturers and distributors. Global production chains are most common in the
apparel and toys industries, but have become increasingly more prevalent in other industries,
such as electronics.
The growth of global trade and the increased global competition over capital and jobs that
has ensued in certain sectors had generated a reality of a ―race to the bottom‖ or a ―regulatory
chill‖ of labor standards in various sectors, mostly in developing countries. This reality provided
the background whereby workers that reside in developing countries sell their labor power very
cheaply in order to produce products and services for TNCs mostly located in developed states.
53Vincent A. Mabert, ‗Special Research Focus on Supply Chain Linkages: Challenges for Design and Management
in the 21st Century‘, Decision Sciences 29:3 (1998), 537-552. Jeffrey Henderson, ‗Global production networks and
the analysis of economic development‘, Review of International Political Economy 9:3 (2002) pp. 436 – 464, 446.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
22
While TNCs are the main benefactors of this type of labor practice,54
many production workers
are employed in sweatshops under devastating conditions, working unlimited hours, and lacking
minimum safety and health standards. The horrifying labor conditions of workers, particularly
women, in sweatshops in developing countries, have been described and acknowledged in the
literature.55
Legal protections of these workers are often minimal or nonexistent. In many cases,
even full compliance with the low labor standards prevailing in developing states does not
provide workers adequate living conditions. Moreover, it is common for local producers and
factory owners to disregard these inadequate legal protections provided by developing countries
as their enforcement mechanisms are often ineffective.
The exploitive nature inherent to labor relations re-emerges in the global era due to the
limited scope of national regulations which do not apply beyond state borders.56
As mentioned
above, in an unregulated labor market, labor relations may be exploitive because of the inherent
asymmetry in bargaining power between employers and employees. The power asymmetry
between employers and employees in the global labor market is exacerbated by the inability of
existing legal means to adequately capture and effectively regulate transnational production
chains. This deficiency of international and national labor law allows TNCs, based in developed
54 Gross profit margins earned by TNCs such as Nike and Reebok reach around 40%. At the same time, direct labor
costs typically range between 2 to 5 percent of all costs involved with manufacturing branded products in
developing countries. ‗Global Labor: A World of Sweatshops‘, Business Week (November 6, 2000). S. Pratash
Sethi, ‗Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Success of Globalization‘, Ethics and International Affairs 16:2 (2002)
p. 95. 55 Denis Arnold and Norman Bowie, ‗Sweatshops and Respect for Persons‘, Business Ethics Quarterly 13:2 (2003),
221-242. Pierta Rivoli, The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: an economist examines the markets, power
and politics of world trade (Hoboken NJ: Wiley, 2006) Ch. 6. Pamela Varley, ed, The Sweatshop Quandary:
Corporate Responsibility on the Global Frontier (Washington DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center 1998). Jill Esbenshade, Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers and the Global Apparel Industry (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2004). Denis G. Arnold ‗Working Conditions: Safety and Sweatshops‘, The Oxford
Handbook of Business Ethics eds. George G. Brenkert and Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford University Press, 2010). 56
This problem was termed the de-teritorialization of labor law. See: Guy Mundlak, ‗De-Territorializing Labor
Law‘, Journal of Law and Ethics of Human Rights 3:2 (2009).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
23
states, to utilize cheap labor force in developing countries without directly employing these
workers. From a legal point of view, TNCs are connected to workers that produce their products
through contractual obligations within the global production chains rather than thorough
employment contracts. Legally, TNCs are not considered these workers‘ ―employers‖, and are
thus not considered responsible, in the eyes of the law, for the workers‘ labor conditions or well
being. Locally, workers in global production chains are often employed indirectly by manpower
agencies or are legally considered to be self-employed despite their economic dependence on the
supplier. For example, in the apparel industry women are required to produce sections of future
assembled clothing in their homes and, thus, are regarded to be self-employed and not employees
of the sub-contractors who sell the products to the brands.
Nevertheless, although legally TNCs are not considered as formal ―employers‖ of the
production workers within the global production chains, they portray ―employer-like‖ features
that are often used to legally define ―employers‖ in national labor markets. For example, a
criterion commonly used in well regulated national labor market to determine employment
relations is the degree to which employer may exert substantial control in regulating the
production process. TNCs exerts control over the quality of products produced for their brand.
This suggests that TNCs have the capacity to regulate additional aspects of the terms under
which such workers operate. Moreover, by controlling the price paid for the products produced
by workers, they in fact exercise considerable control over the wages and much of the working
conditions of these workers and marginalized subcontractors.
Some supporters of the existing global labor arrangements recognize the severity of labor
conditions of many workers in developing countries but refrain from assigning actors outside
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
24
these countries any moral duty to relieve these dire conditions. Two common claims are usually
raised in defense of the lack of such actions: First, workers who work under sweatshop‘s
demeaning terms of employment have agreed to do so voluntarily; no one has forced them to
accept these conditions.57
Moreover, given the poor alternatives available to workers in their
countries, they do in fact benefit from the employment opportunities provided by the global
expansion of manufacturing. Second, many supporters of globalization argue that the dire
working conditions in developing countries are unfortunate yet unavoidable consequences of free
market economy and any attempt to control it would result in lower growth rates in the
developing world, reduced business investments, and greater unemployment in the these
countries.58
The problem with these two arguments is that they tell only part of the story. Most
importantly for our purposes, they ignore the fact that globalization processes exacerbated
potential exploitation of workers in both procedural and substantive senses, particularly in the
manufacturing sector in developing states. Exploitation in both senses occurs on two levels:
First, on the interactional level, global labor involves exploitive relationships between the
various actors of the transnational production chains.59
Second, on the institutional level,
globalization gave rise to exploitive relationships in which developing countries exploit
developed countries through an international institutional framework and inter-governmental
agreements regulated by the WTO, GATT, IMF, and others.
57 Ian Maitland, ‗The Great Non-Debate Over International Sweatshops‘, British Academy of Management Annual
Conference Proceedings (1997) 240-265. 58 Jadishe Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2004). 59
Some point to consumers as additional participants in such exploitation. See for example Young ‗Responsibility
and Global Labor Justice‘.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
25
On the interactional level, exploitation may occur despite what seems to be voluntary
consent of workers to terms of employment that fail to provide them with a life in dignity.60
As
discussed above, the fact that employees may benefit from their work arrangements, compared to
alternative options (e.g. unemployment or worse working conditions offered by local employers)
does not diminish the exploitive nature of the labor relations. This is because exploitation, in the
procedural sense, occurs when the employer takes advantage of the worker‘s bargaining
weakness, given the latter‘s desperate neediness under the existing economic conditions of
developing countries, regardless of the benefits the employee may obtain as a result of the
working agreement. As Richard Miller contends, ―to derive benefits from another‘s bargaining
weakness through an arrangement that is stultifying is only compatible with adequate respect for
her interests and capacity for choice on account of special, exclusionary reasons.‖61
These
reasons do not include ―voluntary consent by employees and her improvements as compared
with opportunities available to her.‖62
This procedural exploitation of workers in the global labor market is further exacerbated
when the asymmetry in negotiation power between employers and employees has a geographic
dimension. The disadvantage of workers in the developing world is structural. As economist
Prakash Sethi argued, standard trade theory requires that both capital and labor have maximum
mobility to allow equitable distribution of benefits from free trade, so that each side can
maximize the reward from its efforts. While TNCs currently enjoy all of the advantages of
moving capital between different sectors and nations in order to maximize their return on
60 One may argue that given the circumstances in developing countries and the existing alternatives (which are much
worse) employees‘ acceptance of sweatshop‘s demeaning labor conditions is not truly voluntary but rather forced
upon them. 61
Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice, p 66. 62 Ibid.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
26
investment, workers lack such mobility. Workers cannot migrate easily, if at all, to countries
with labor shortages and consequentially they are prevented from eliminating inefficiencies in
the labor market.63
According to Sethi, ―the imbalance between the mobility of capital and goods
and the immobility of labor are more characteristic of neo-mercantilism than of truly free
markets. TNCs use both the fact and threat of capital mobility to extract maximum productivity
gains from cheap and abundant labor. The control of overseas markets provides the TNCs with
monopoly - like power, which they use on local manufacturers to extract the lowest prices
possible and thus put extreme downward pressure on local wage rates. Local manufacturers, in
their turn, cooperate among themselves by not competing for workers on the basis of higher
wages—a situation that is easily maintained because of abundant labor.‖64
Sethi‘s focus on the international structure that prevents workers mobility suggests that a
complete picture of the exploitive nature of labor relations in the global era must take into
account not only exploitation of workers that occurs on the interactional level but also the
exploitive conditions of workers in developing countries that occurs on the institutional level;
namely the exploitation that stems from unequal global trade and investment framework
agreements shaped by inter-governmental negotiations between developing and developed
countries. The Uruguay Round administered by the World Trade Organization between 1981-
1994 is a prime example. During these negotiations, major developing countries took advantage
of developing states‘ urgent need for access to developed markets, and used threats of exclusion
63 S. Pratash Sethi, ‗Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Success of Globalization‘, Ethics and International Affairs
16:2 (2002) p. 90. 64
Sethi. Ibid. p. 90-91. MNCs, meaning Multinational Corporations, is a synonym to TNCs (Transnational
Corporations).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
27
and discrimination among other ―bullying‖ methods to achieve a trade regime that benefited the
developed states‘ markets.65
In sum, the three stages of interpretation discussed above reveal how various legal and
political means that helped balance the power asymmetry between employers and employee in
the nation state era have been eroded in the era of globalization. As the practice of labor
expanded beyond the borders of the state, labor norms and regulations that constituted the
practice of labor in the pre-globalization era failed to achieve its central aim; namely to secure
workers with life in dignity. In the next section we present the normative implications of this
failure to realize the aims of the practice of labor in the global economy and argue that advancing
worker‘s rights outside state borders should be regarded as a duty of justice.
IV. New Institutional Arrangements as a Duty of Justice
The failure to realize the aims of the practice of labor in the global era, on both interactional and
institutional levels, can be described as constituting conditions of ―background injustice,‖ which
is a term first coined by John Rawls, and has recently emerged in the discussion of global justice.
By background injustice Rawls meant the absence of just rules as well as political and social
institutions which constrain people's decisions and actions. In the absence of ―just background‖,
the accumulated results of many separate and fair agreements between individuals can over the
course of time lead to a situation whereby conditions of free and fair agreements no longer
65
For a more radical approach to structural exploitation towards workers in the capitalist system see: Lea Ypi, ‗On
the Confusion between Ideal and Non-ideal in Recent Debates on Global Justice‘, Political Studies 58 (2010).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
28
hold.66
This may be due to social trends and historical contingencies. Rawls limited the scope of
principles of justice only to the state level, namely to those people who live under the same basic
structure. However, in recent separate publications, Miriam Ronzoni and Arash Abizadeh relied
on Rawls‘ underlying assumptions to derive Cosmopolitan conclusions, and argued that the
existence of background injustice on the global level calls for the establishment of institutions
and rules that correct the unjust reality. According to Ronzoni, if problems of background
injustice arise at the global level, we have a duty to alter the global institutional structure in order
to end the conditions of injustice. Some of these institutions may be completely new and
different from institutional arrangements that characterized the basic structure of the nation-
state, yet they do not necessarily need to create a world-state.67
Similarly, Abizadeh reached a
concurring conclusion based on his analysis of Rawls‘ notion of ―fair terms of cooperation‖.
According to Abizadeh, when a group of individuals are engaged in a mutually advantageous
enterprise, the creation of a basic structure is required to realize just background conditions.68
The background injustice argument has particular relevance to problems of global labor.
In a brief comment, Rawls used the example of labor contracts to support his claim regarding the
role of sociopolitical institutions in preserving certain patterns and thus securing just background
conditions. He wrote: "whether wage agreements are fair rests, for example, on the nature of the
labor market: excess market power must be prevented and fair bargaining power should obtain
between employers and employees. But, in addition, fairness depends on the underlying social
66 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 265-66. 67
Ronzoni, ‗The Global Order‘, p. 230, 245. 68 Abizadeh, ‗Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion‘.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
29
conditions, such as fair opportunity, extending backward in time and well beyond any limited
view."69
As demonstrated in the previous section, the global labor market is characterized by
background injustice. This reality demands implementation of principles of justice on the global
sphere, since the unjustness of the practice of labor on the global level undermines the very aims
and justifications that characterize the practice of labor. In other words, the unjust conditions of
global labor require, as a matter of justice, the establishment of new institutions and rules or the
strengthening of the existing global institutions to correct such exiting injustices.
Outlining the particular rules and institutions that should govern the practice of labor on
the global level or practical details regarding the way they should be designed goes beyond the
purpose of this article. Yet, in the remaining of this section we present two general guidelines
that we deem to be crucial for designing just rules and institutions for a global practice of labor.
The first concerns the question of uniformity. In our view, the rules and institutions that
should govern the practice of labor on the global level may differ from those operating on the
national level as their nature depends on the kinds of problems they are supposed to ameliorate.
The extension of the practice of labor to the global sphere might require supranational
institutions or international rules different in their nature from the labor rules and institutions that
secure just background conditions for workers on the national level.70
Furthermore, the
regulation and enforcement of global labor standards does not necessitate a uniform content of
all labor norms, rules, and regulations across the world. For example, the norm of minimum
69 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 267. 70 Here we follow the main lines of Ronzoni's argument, although our argument differs from hers as we regard
chains of production as constituting a practice in need of a creation of new institutions and rules for achieving the
goals of the practice of labor, while in her terminology background injustice requires the establishment of new
practices.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
30
wage could vary across states depending on various factors such as productivity, standards of
living, and the welfare regime in the different states. However, some minimal level of labor
standards should be uniform (e. g., elimination of worst forms of child labor). The level of this
minimum is a subject for political and legal debate.
The second guideline concerns the question of responsibility. In recent years scholarly
attempts have been made to tackle the problem of background injustice in the area of global
labor by proposing new institutional arrangements for generating and enforcing labor standards
on the international level. For example, Archon Fung, Dara O‘Rourke and Charles Sabel
proposed to advance labor standards in sweatshops by incentivizing corporations through
coordinated actions of consumers, monitor agencies and nongovernmental organizations.71
Another leading example is Christian Barry and Sanjay G. Reddy, who call for world-wide
system of linkage between trade agreements and labor standards.72
These proposals assign
responsibility for the welfare of workers by either emphasizing the interactional perspective,
focusing on individual actors in global production chains (e.g. Fung et al) or underscoring the
institutional perspective by concentrating on reforms of global and international rules and
institutions (e.g. Barry and Reddy).
In contrast, we propose a multi-level approach.73
As demonstrated in this article,
problems of background injustice in the area of labor global exist on both interactional and
institutional levels. Therefore, proposed arrangements for guaranteeing workers‘ rights should
71 Archon Fang, Dara O‘Rourke and Charles Sabel, Can We Put and End to Sweatshops? (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). 72 Christian Barry and Sanjay G. Reddy, International Trade and Labor Standards: A Proposal for Linkage (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 73
For a good example of multi-level proposal to reform international labor law see: Mark Barenberg, ‗Sustaining
Workers‘ Bargaining Power in an Age of Globalization‘, EPI Briefing Paper 246 (2009).
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
31
address the exploitive conditions and assign responsibility to ameliorate them on both
interactional and institutional levels.74
A new legal and political concept of shared responsibility is thus required in order to
assign responsibility not only to individual actors and TNCs who participate in global labor, but
also to governance architectures of international institutions (i. e., WTO, ILO, World Bank,
IMF), and especially to those governments that have the greatest influence in the institutions that
affect the way labor is regulated on the global level.75
Such governance structure should satisfy
the conditions of background justice.
In order to prevent the exploitive nature of labor relations on the interactional level, such
arrangements should strengthen the right of freedom of association and bargaining power of
workers on the global level. One possible direction is to strengthen framework agreements
signed between supranational labor organizations and European based TNCs.76
Furthermore,
new legal tools should be developed in order to assign TNCs with responsibility towards
production workers at the end of their global production chains.
V. Conclusion
In this article, we drew on the empirical reality of global labor in order to contribute to the
normative discussion of global justice. Our analysis of the practice of labor has demonstrated
74 Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner and Faina,Milman-Sivan, ‗Global Justice, Labor Standards and Responsibility‘,
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 12:2 (2010), 117-142. 75 Iris Young has developed a new concept of social connection model of responsibility, which is similar in some ways yet we disagree with her emphasize on civil society and political activity as the only remedy to the unjust
conditions of labor around the world today. See: Young ‗Responsibility and Global Labor Justice‘. 76 Tonya A. Novitz, ‗Promoting Sustainable Development through Transnational Collective Bargaining: The Local
Implications of International Framework Agreements‘, Studies in Labour Law and Social Policy (2009), pp. 403-
416.
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
32
that moral obligations towards workers do not depend only on geographical location,
membership in a particular nation/culture, or participation in effective political institutions.
Rather, they depend on participation in the practice of labor itself, which in the past two
centuries have been increasingly regulated mainly on the national level. These regulations rested
on the normative perception of labor relations as constituting a type of association which implies
moral commitments among its participants. The fact that labor relations extend state-borders in
today's economy does not reduce the moral obligations among the parties in such relations. In
other words, if TNCs and other actors within the global production chain (e.g. sub-contractors
and vendors) demonstrate ―employer-like‖ characteristics such as influencing the working
conditions of all production workers within their chain and gaining benefit from their work, there
is no reason to exempt them from their duties towards workers who take part in their shared
practice of labor.
Our argument thus extends the meaning of ―associative duties of justice‖ beyond the
standard scope of this term. Obligations to ameliorate the dire conditions of workers outside the
state borders, we claim, should be regarded as ―associative duties.‖ Thus, normative obligations
towards exploited workers in developing countries should not be viewed as humanitarian
assistance to poor people, but rather as a matter of justice to guarantee these workers labor
standards that fulfill the aims of the practice.
By extending the concept of associative duties to labor relations, our argument
overcomes one of the main points of criticism usually raised against the Anti-cosmopolitan
camp. According to what is known as the voluntarist objection,77
being in a relationship with
others is insufficient to create associative duties towards them, since moral duties are acquired
77 Samuel Schefler Boundaries and Allegiances, Ch. 1
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
33
only by voluntary acts (e. g., by entering into contractual agreements). While the voluntarist
objection may be considered a persuasive argument against nationalist and statist conceptions of
associative duties, it is not applicable as an argument against associative duties of actors who
voluntarily enter into the labor practice since their duties towards workers are created
voluntarily.
A critical interpretation of the practice of labor in the global era leads not only to
normative conclusions regarding global justice theory but also has some practical implications.
First, our analysis reveals that the current legal framework that defines employers-employees
relationship is anachronistic and does not correspond to the actual exploitive conditions of such
relationships in contemporary global labor market. Thus, our argument call for development of
new legal framework that reallocates moral and legal responsibilities to actors in global labor
market and reflects just labor relations in the age of globalization. In doing so, international labor
law should redefine the terms ‗employees‘ and ‗employers‘ within global production chains. For
example, an employer should be considered as such legallyto the extent that such employer
controls the working conditions of workers in the chain of production, benefits from the product
of their work, participates with the workers in joint activities, or has the capacity to change
existing work conditions.
One possible counter-argument to our claim that may be offered is that it is restricted to
global chains of production and thus implies that the duties of justice to guarantee labor
standards do not extend to workers who work outside global production chains (e.g. those who
provide local services or work in local agriculture). This is, indeed, an important limitation of our
analysis of labor relations on the interactional level (i.e., between various actors in the global
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
34
labor market who take part in the practice of labor). However, this criticism does not apply to the
analysis of exploitation of workers on the institutional level, as such analysis refers to the
dominance and privileged positions that developed states enjoy in global economic institutions
such as IMF, World Bank and WTO. The second practical implication of this article is that new
institutional arrangements are needed in order to ameliorate the current conditions of background
injustice in the sphere of global labor. Since global economic institutions such as the IMF and
WTO shape the global economic reality and influence the way the global labor market is
regulated, their reform would potentially affect all workers in the developing and developed
world. Guaranteeing just working conditions for workers, within and beyond global production
chains, requires establishing new forms of global governance that will replace the existing unjust
institutional reality.78
Finally, by highlighting the need to address labor standards as a matter of justice, our
approach has significant practical implications in regards to the general global goal of poverty
reduction. By shifting the practical discussion of global justice from directly addressing
questions of poverty reduction to issues of labor rights and wages, our approach makes it
possible to overcome one of the main criticisms usually raised against proposals for direct
financial assistance to the world‘s poor; namely, that direct assistance requires intermediary
institutions which reduce the actual resources that eventually reach those people most in need of
assistance in the developing world. Such intermediary institutions include corrupt governments
or other forms of administrative expenses (many of which recycle resources back to the
developed world). In our view, focusing on normative duties towards workers rather than
Dahan, Lerner, Milman-Sivan DRAFT Haifa workshop
35
towards poor people in general and seeking a re-design of global institutions that enforce labor
standards by law would indirectly and perhaps more efficiently contribute to the general goal of
facilitating global justice and reducing economic inequality across the globe.