land titles deed cases

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 64818. May 13, 1991.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Respondents.

Pedro M. Surdilla for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; NO PERSON IS ENTITLED TO HAVE LAND REGISTERED UNDER THE

CADASTRAL OR TORRENS SYSTEM UNLESS HE IS THE OWNER IN FEE SIMPLE OF THE SAME. The most basic rule inland registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system

unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such

registration by third persons . . . In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have

the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally issued, the burden is upon

him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRIVATE PERSONS WITHOUT ANY GRANT, EXPRESS OR

IMPLIED, FROM GOVERNMENT; WHEN GRANT CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED BY LAW; FOREGOING RULES BASED ON

DOCTRINE THAT ALL LANDS NOT ACQUIRED FROM THE GOVERNMENT, EITHER BY PURCHASE OR BY GRANT, BELONG

TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons withoutany grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by

himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a

claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior thereto. The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that

were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.

D E C I S I O N

FERNAN, J.:

In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the

possession of her predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and

"conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the issue to be resolved in the instant petition for

review.cralawnad

On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of

Pangasinan, an application 1 for registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more

or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.

The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that neither the

applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other

recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty (30) years immediately

preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of

the Philippines. 2

After trial, the Court of First Instance 3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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"WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236,

the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby

adjudicates the same in the name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age,

Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal property.

"Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.

"SO ORDERED." 4

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), whichhowever affirmed the lower courts decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: 6

"The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER

ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO. 141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC

LAND ACT);

"B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVETESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN

POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, LEADING TO REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVINGTHE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;

"C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT

RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF WHICH MUST BE CONCLUSIVE REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;

"D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE

LAND IS PUBLIC LAND BELONGING TO THE STATE."cralaw virtua1aw library

Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question throughdocumentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her testimony that her

predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question for more than 20 years; that said testimony,

which petitioner characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight and credence considering its

spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her

credibility; and that, the reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that

the land being applied for is a private land. 7

We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses Urbano Diaz and

Bernarda Vinluan, who on August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr.

Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their halfportions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the property recorded for taxation purposes in her

name and that of her husband Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same

years.chanrobles law library : red

At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had been in

possession of the subject area for about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to her possession that of

her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,

as amended, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of


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acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for

confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to haveperformed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the

provisions of this Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library

Private respondents testimony on her predecessors-in-interests possession is contained in a one-page declarationgiven before a commissioner on December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows: 8

"Commissioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.

"Atty. Surdilla:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.

Commissioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Swearing under oath the applicant.

Atty. Surdilla:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

"A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.

"Q Are you the applicant in this case now?

"A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.

"Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration now?

"A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.

"Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of

Absolute Sale dated July 30, 1963, what can you say to them?

"A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2

portion of the property and the deed of sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2 portion of the

property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.


At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J",

your Honor.


Please mark them accordingly.

"Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise

the property sought by you to be registered?


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"A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for

more than 20 years.

Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale

adverted or referred by you?

"A Yes, sir.


At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your Honor.


Please mark it.

"Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?

"A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession tacked to that of our predecessors-in-

interest is adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your Honor.

"Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?

"A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.


At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24128, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1",

respectively.



"Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?

"A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.


At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March

25, 1975 be marked as Exhibits "L" and "L-1" respectively.



"Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?

A No, sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.

"Thats all, your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library

The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral

or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented

against such registration by third persons . . . In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be


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permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued,

the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple." 9

Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,

from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his

predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July

26, 1894 10 or prior thereto. 11

The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by

purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As enunciated in the case of Santiago v. de los Santos: 12

". . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural

resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care

applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible

evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim

with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless

alienated in accordance with law, It retains its rights over the same as dominus . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more

possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year

period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This

burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spousesUrbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in

private respondents declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The

phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by which she described her own

possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require factual support

and substantiation.

That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is

upon her to prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors possession was indeed adverse,continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner. Her bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such

preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.cralawnad

Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for is private land

helpful to private Respondent. Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which should be convinced, by

competent proof, of private respondents registerable light over the subject parcel of land.

Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the requirements of

the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the part of the lower court to have

granted her application.cralawnad

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as

to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 147359 : March 28, 2008]

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF TITLE FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION,

represented by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals by certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366,

and the March 7, 2001 Resolution2 denying its reconsideration.

On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for confirmation of

title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,3 with an aggregate area of 8,463 square

meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.

FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it openly, exclusively and

notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership, tacking its

possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It allegedly acquired these lots in the following manner:

a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed of Exchange executed by and between

the Brgy. Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid and Brgy. Sec.

Teofilo Descargar, and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 415,

Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered

with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;

b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20305 was acquired by a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed

of Absolute Sale executed by and between Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago, Felomina B. Higoy,

Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Reinerio P. Dacanay and the applicant at San Fernando, La

Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial

register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for the province of La Unionon November 16, 1988;

c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and

between Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino Adman, and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990

appearing as Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman

R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union on September 25, 1990.4

FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.

On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel for the Republic of

the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.5

On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on February 28,

1995.rbl r l l lbrr

The Order was published in the January 23, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette,6 and the February 18-24, 1995 issue of

the Guardian.7 The notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a conspicuous place in each parcel of land included in

the application, and on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Bacnotan, La Union.8 The Provincial Prosecutor

of La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of hearing on November 18, 1994.9

At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita Balloguing entered her appearance as collaborating

counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits.10 The RTC granted the request and issued

an Order resetting the hearing to April 19, 1995, viz.:


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As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance in collaboration with Atty. Ungria as counsel for the

applicant, this case is reset to April 19, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts.

SO ORDERED.11

The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the resetting.12

On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and once more deputized the

Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.13 On the same date, the Republic filed itsOpposition to FATCO's application for registration on the following grounds: (1) neither FATCO nor its predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question

since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations of the applicant (and its

predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land

applied for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3) applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim

ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant, since they failed to file the appropriate application for

registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

892; (4) the parcels of land applied for forms part of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation;

and (5) the application was belatedly filed as it was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec.

2, P.D. No. 1073.14

During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the Republic. FATCO, throughcounsel, offered in evidence the following documents to establish jurisdictional facts:

Exhibit "A" - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030

Exhibit "B" - Technical Description

Exhibit "B-1" - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate

Exhibit "C" - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA

Exhibit "D" - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The Guardian

Exhibit "D-1" - Clipping of Publication

Exhibit "E" - Whole issue of The Guardian for February 18 to 24, 1995;

Exhibit "E-1" - Section A of publication of said issue;

Exhibit "F" - Certificate of Publication from the Official Gazette/ National Printing Office;

Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining Owners (Reserved);

Exhibit "H" - Certificate of Publication from LRA

Exhibit "I" - Sheriff's Certificate of Posting

Exhibit "J" - Certificate of Assessment15

The RTC then issued an Order16 setting the case for the reception of evidence on May 25, 1995 at 8:30 in the

morning.

In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial evidence to prove its title to the parcels of land

applied for. The Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCO's assertion.


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In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently established its ownership of

the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the application and orders that the parcels of

land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of EIGHT

THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less, located at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La

Union, covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 (Exh. "A"), and more particularly described in the technical

description, Exh. "B" shall be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation, with

address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.

The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, San Fernando, La Union Branch

in the amount of Seventeen Million (P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be annotated at the back of the title to

be issued in the name of the applicant.

Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of registration be issued.17

From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course to FATCO's

application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view of the non-publication of the notice of

actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open, continuous and notorious possession of the

subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as required by law.

On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic that the RTC did notacquire jurisdiction over FATCO's application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. The notice

that was published in the Official Gazette and in the Guardian was the hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no

hearing was conducted on the said date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from

what was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the publication requirement.

The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated February 5, 1996 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.18

FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.

Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.19

In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that:

I

No actual hearing was held by the trial court on February 28, 1995 which was THE published date of initial hearing;

II

The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear petitioner's application for registration due to petitioner's failure to

publish the notice of actual hearing set on April 19, 1995 and to post said notice in conspicuous places and to serve

the same to adjoining owners.

III

NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE IN THE COURT A QUO.


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IV

petitioner failed to prove its open, continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the subject properties in the

concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.20

We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.

Section 2321 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitly provides that before the court can act

on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of

publication, mailing, and posting.

FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, specifically the publication of the notice of initial

hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for reversing the RTC and, accordingly, dismissing its application for registration.

The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over FATCO's application because

the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. It points out that the initial hearing set on February 28, 1995

was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial hearing, therefore, took place on a date different from what was stated

in the published notice of initial hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new notice of hearing was necessary, but FATCO

failed to publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995, thus, preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over

the application.

The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the notice of initial hearing is a jurisdictionalrequirement and non-compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The purpose of publication of the

notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for, to appear

in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application should not be granted.22

It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the notice of the initial hearing set on February

28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the

registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over FATCO's application.

Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCO's counsel requested a resetting, and the RTC granted said request,

the Republic and all interested parties were already fully apprised of the pendency of the application. When the

hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the Republic included, may be deemed to have been given

notice thereof.23 There was, thus, no need for the re-publication of notice of hearing, for clearly, the avowed purposeof Section 23 had already been accomplished. We, therefore, find that the application for registration was rightfully

given due course by the RTC. The CA, thus, committed reversible error in holding otherwise.

Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCO's plea for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision granting its application for

registration or confirmation of its imperfect title.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for

registration of title to the land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives.

(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945.

Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by himself or through his

predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land subject of the application is alienable and

disposable land of the public domain.24

To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its division manager, Emilio Paz,

owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its predecessors-in-interest. It also presented

deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations covering the lands in question.


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Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the validity of its cause. Antonio

Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had taken possession of the same in

1988 or 1989.25 FATCO's predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other hand, testified that he acquired

ownership and possession of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No. 1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or

1984.26 Similarly, Cifirino Bucago's testimony27 did not establish the period of possession required by law over Lot

No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of general statements with no specifics as to when he began occupying the

land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the

length of time prescribed by law.

Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCO's assertion. The earliest tax declarations presented for Lot No. 1505 and

Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948,28 while the earliest tax declaration for Lot No. 1234 was issued in 1970.29

We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient

basis for inferring possession.30

Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing the

alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof

of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.31

In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and

adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can only prove possession of Lots No.

1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing ofpossession for thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and occupation had

started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not only as required by Section 14(1)

of the Property Registration Decree but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which states:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own

any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court

of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a

certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition

of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of

title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this

chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, even if FATCO's case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No.

141), as amended, it would still meet the same fate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by Fieldman Agricultural TradingCorporation is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3637. August 31, 1907. ]

PEDRO P. ROXAS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ANASTASIO CUEVAS, ET AL., Respondents-Appellants.

Jose Santiago, for Appellants.

Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS IN LAND ADJUDICATION CASES. If it is the opinion of the appellants that the landawarded to the petitioners does not belong to private individuals but to the Government, it follows that they can have

no interest in such land since they do not represent the Government, being private citizens only. Since the property

belongs to the Government, being private citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, although the

lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the prejudiced party would be the Government, not a private individual,

and the right to appeal rests with the Government, not with the respondents nor any other private individual to whom

the representation of the State or Government has not been intrusted.

2. SCOPE OF THE RESPONDENTS APPEAL. In order that an application for registration of the title in the Court of

Land Registration may be objected to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition have been injured thelatter can have no right to appeal from the judgment, whatever it may have been; neither the said act nor any other

law grants to anyone the right to appeal on behalf of another party, and not in his own name and by reason of his

own interest. It is only the legal personal right of the respondent prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court that

can be considered by this court upon appeal. As no claim was made by the respondents in their own name, and as the

decision which they seek from this court is that it be held that the land adjudicated by the judgment appealed from is

the property of the Government, there is no possible way for this court to consider and decide as to a right which has

not been claimed on appeal by the party really prejudiced. In the present case the proper party would be the Insular

Government, represented by the Attorney-General, and the latter has not appealed from the judgment.

3. HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATE TO RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. An application for the grant of ahomestead can only be considered when it refers to public lands, not when private property is concerned. Wile it

remained doubtful, in the course of a litigation, whether a portion of land claimed to be private property does or doesnot belong to the Government, the applicants for homesteads might be allowed to appear in the suit as coadjuvants,

though it may have been the initial right that induced them to defend the public rights of the Government, although

subordinate to this public interest; but from the moment when such public interest has disappeared, by reason of

proof of private ownership, cooperation in such an action can no longer be insisted upon, nor can the coadjuvant claim

to have better rights than the principal plaintiff himself.

D E C I S I O N

ARELLANO, C.J. :

The judgment appealed from contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on the 22d of December, 1904, application was filed with the Court of Land Registration, whereby the applicants

asked for the registration in their name of certain land situated in the Province of La Laguna, known as Hacienda of

Calauang, having an area of 7,813 hectares and 87 ares, valued according to the last assessment at $525,000 in

money of the United States; that the following parties opposed the application: The Government of the Philippine

Islands through the Attorney-General; 367 residents of the town of Calauang, Province of La Laguna, represented by

Jose Santiago; 136 residents of the ancient town of Alaminos, now a barrio of the municipality of San Pablo, Province

of La Laguna, and three residents of Santo Tomas, in the Province of Batangas, represented by Juan Alvarez; and 80

residents of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of La Laguna, represented by Julian Gerona and Gregorio Pineda.


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"That the lands in question were originally Crown lands of the Kingdom of Spain, and were conveyed to one Francisco

Xavier Salgado by royal grant dated February 2, 1777, Salgado being already in possession on the 5th day of March,

1776. That after the death of Salgado his estate was taken in administration by the Auditoria de Guerra, and on the7th day of February, 1829, the Hacienda of Calauang was sold at auction, one Benito Machado becoming the

purchaser for the sum of 16,000 pesos, one-half of which was paid in cash, the purchaser agreeing to pay the balance

in three years, giving a mortgage upon the hacienda to secure the satisfaction of the deferred payment. That the

purchase by said Machado was made with the funds, in the name, and for the use of one Domingo Roxas; that the

latter performed the conditions as to the payment of the remaining one-half of the purchase price and thereupon

became the owner in fee of the hacienda, free and clear of any incumbrance; that by various mesne conveyances andin regular order of succession the title to the Hacienda of Calauang became vested in the applicants in this case, who

are now the owners of the same in fee, free and clear of all incumbrance, except the lien of a "censo" in favor of "Las

Cajas de Comunidad," dated February 26, 1834, for the sum of twelve thousand pesos, bearing interest at the rate of

6 per cent per annum. That in certain proceedings held in the years 1847, 1848, 1878, and 1880, before the courts of

the Spanish sovereignty, with the assistance of the inspector general de montes in representation of the Government,

various questions disputes concerning the boundaries and limits of the hacienda with adjoining lands and towns were

heard and determined. That pursuant to these proceedings surveys were made by the said inspector general de

montes and a plan was prepared by him showing the true boundaries of the hacienda as established by the decision of

the court and recognized by the Government. The said plan was introduced in evidence and forms part of the record

herein, marked Exhibit U."

In reviewing the case, the court stated the following conclusions of facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) That at the time of the entry by respondents upon the lands in question the same were lawfully possessed by

another under a good and sufficient title;

"(2) That contained and uninterrupted possession has been maintained by the original owner of the lands and his

successors down to the present date; and

"(3) That both prior and subsequent to the entry aforesaid, by respondents and their predecessors, knowledge of

the title and legal possession of the true owner was repeatedly brought home to them by means of judicial decrees

and official surveys of the land in questions."cralaw virtua1aw library

And further on:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The testimony shows that Francisco Xavier Salgado, the original owner of the lands in question, entered into

immediate possession of the same under his grant from the Spanish Crown in 1777; that he contained in such

possession in during his lifetime and that after his death the possession was continued by his legal successors, and

has been continued by them without interruption down to the present day, for a period of one hundred and thirty

years. This possession was not a purely constructive but a very active one, exercised by Salgado and his successors

by means of actual occupancy, construction of valuable buildings, cultivation, appointment of administrators,

collection of rents, measurements, surveys, placing of boundary monuments, and the employment of persons whose

duty it was to, and who actually did at stated intervals, inspect the said monuments and attend to their proper

maintenance. It further appears that upon two occasions, when infringements upon the rights of the owners were

attempted, the aggressors were met by legal proceedings in the courts, resulting in judgments confirming the ancient

title and possession. In contemplation of law, applicants have never been out of possession.

"Respondents allege in their answers possession by themselves and their predecessors for periods of from thirty to

one hundred years, but their testimony was limited, in most cases, to showing possession by themselves alone. Some

went a little further and introduced testimony tending to show possession by their immediate grantors; but that this

possession was at best a precarious and doubtful one is clear from the testimony, which shows that in most cases the

respondents resided at considerable distances from the lands claimed, having merely made use of the same for

agricultural purposes from time to time, under circumstances from which it is fair to infer that their possession was

nothing more than a permissive one."cralaw virtua1aw library

And, lastly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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"There is evidence in the record tending strongly to show that many of the persons occupying lands within the limits

of the Hacienda of Calauang were carried upon the books, kept by the administratory of the hacienda, as tenants, and

recognized the title of its proprietors . . .

"For the reason given (so ends the judgment) the oppositions herein must be overruled; and it is ordered that the

record of the above-mentioned documents in the registry of property of the Province of La Laguna be canceled."cralaw

virtua1aw library

And the findings in said judgment are of this tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The court finds that the appellants have legally acquired title to and are the owners in fee of the lands hereinafter

described, and that they are entitled to a decree of registration for the same as provided by law.

"The court surveyor will prepare a new plan in accordance with this decision, showing therein the following described

land, title to which is hereby confirmed to and ordered registered in the name of the applicants in the manner in which

the interest of such of the applicants is set forth in the petition."cralaw virtua1aw library

This judgment was rendered on the 17th of February, 1906. On the 26th of the same month the respondents residing

in the town of Calauang, by their attorney, Jose Santiago, duly excepted to said judgment, and announced their

intention to present a bill of exceptions. On the same date they also filed an application for a new trial to be held on

March 1, alleging as reason "that the exceptions submitted to this court the appellants state that "on the first instant

(March, 1906) the new trial was denied."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record does not show that the motion was considered or that the petition for new trial was denied, nor that

exception was taken in consequence of such denial.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, if the excepting partly filed a

motion in the Court of First Instance for a new trial, and the judge overruled the motion, and due exception was

taken, the Supreme Court may "review the evidence and make such findings upon the facts, and render such final

judgment, as justice and equity require."cralaw virtua1aw library

Therefore, in this case, there is no basis provided for a review of the evidence, and the findings upon the facts, as set

down by the trial court in its decision, must stand.

Under the bill of exceptions presented, this court, in accordance with the said section 497, can only decide the

questions of law therein contained.

The questions of law presented in the statements of errors, in which, according to the appellants, the trial court has

incurred, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. For having admitted "Exhibits C" and "D" as evidence from the applicants, the first of which is the instrument

whereby the Hacienda of Calauang was acquired by Benito Machado, at public auction, in February, 1829, and the

second a statement made by the same party interested in the hacienda, which does not invalidate the deed of sale in

favor of Machado. (I and II.)

2. For having admitted from the applicants, as counter- proofs and additional evidence, the exhibits stated above,which do not justify the right or dominion of the petitioners on the Hacienda of Calauang, and for having accepted as

sufficient proof of dominion the documents offered by the petitioners when the same are not deeds of successive

conveyances from the first holder to the petitioners. (III, IV, V, and VI.)

3. For not having considered that the land in question belongs to the Government when, as a matter of fact, the

exclusion of a parcel thereof, as such Government land, had been ordered; for having included in the judgment land

the title to which is recorded in the Court of Land Registration in favor of persons other than the petitioners, said title

having been issued by the Government; in view of the fact that the chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had approved

several applications for homesteads; according to "Exhibits 1" to "10" of the respondents; since one of the very same

petitioners had himself applied for a permit to cut timber within the land in question. (VII, VIII and IX.)


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4. For not having considered that the petitioner have exhibited only a title by mere possession, a right which was

forfeited for having failed to possess the property during more than eight years; and for having failed to consider the

preferential rights of the respondents to the land occupied by them, when the evidence of the latter had not been

objected to by the petitioners, in accordance with the agreement entered into by both parties on page 8 of the bill of

exceptions. (X and XI.)

This last point touched by the appellants, and by the appellees as well, is extremely important on account of its

significance and decisiveness. In fact, it has been agreed between the parties herein that the contents of the answers

filed by the respondents may be taken as confirmed.

And it is because the respondents of Calauang have maintained in all their pleadings "that the land claimed and a

portion thereof is occupied by the respondents." (Bill of exceptions, 6.) And in the brief filed before this court they

maintain "that the Roxas people have alleged, as applicants, that they were the owners of the land in question, and

that the respondents residing in the town of Calauang said that the land belonged to the Government . . ." And they

reproduce the essential parts of their answer in opposition, wherein the first thing that they state is that the land in

question is the property of the Government. And when referring to the documents offered by them as evidence, they

said "that the same clearly established that the land in question is owned by the Government and not by private

individuals." This statement is repeated in several parts of the brief.

If it is the opinion of the appellant that the land awarded by the judgment to the petitioners does not belong to private

individuals but to the Government, it follows that the appellants, as respondents residing in Calauang, can have no

interest in said land, as they are not the Government but mere citizens.

Since the land belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the aggrieved party

would be the State and not a mere citizen, and it is the State that would have been entitled to appeal from the

judgment and not the respondents of Calauang or any other private individual to whom the representation of the

State or the Insular Government has not been entrusted.

The Insular Government, duly represented at the trial by the Attorney-General, has not appealed before us, nor have

we to decide any question connected with the rights of the State or of the Insular Government.

In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in the Court of Land Registration may be objected

to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other

real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited orabsolute; and if none such rights of the respondent have been injured by the judgment, he can not have, on his part,

the right to appeal from the said judgment, whatever it may be, as neither the said act nor any other law on this

matter grants any one the right to appeal on behalf of another party and not in his own name and by reason of his

own interest.

It is only the legal personal right of the respondent, prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court, that can be

considered by this court upon appeal. No right of their own being claimed by the respondent, and inasmuch as the

decision they seek from this court is one declaring that the land adjudicated by the lower court is the property of the

Government, there is no way for his court to consider and decide as to a right which has not been claimed in the

appeal by the party prejudiced, which in the present case would be the Insular Government, represented by the

Attorney-General, who has not appealed from the said judgment.

Therefore the assignment of errors filed by the appellants is overruled as being absolutely contrary to law and

worthless, and the appeal filed by the respondents of Calauang, from the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, of

the Court of Land Registration, is dismissed, with the cost of this instance.

But there is yet another judgment by the same court in this same action, bearing date of the 20th of July, 1906,

rendered upon the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. On account of the opposition to the application in question, filed by the Attorney-General, with regard to a certain

tract of land in the Hacienda of Calauang, the Court of Land Registration, in its judgment above referred to, of

February 17, 1906, made also this statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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"That portion of the application which refers to lands not included in the above description is hereby denied, reserving,

nevertheless, the right of the petitioners to file an amended application asking for the registration of the land thus

excluded, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Act and in the manner therein provided."cralaw virtua1aw

library

2. Although the applicants excepted to this part of the decision, they, however, subsequently availed themselves of

the benefits of the said act, and the action was reopened in view of the amended application.

3. In his opposition the Attorney-General asked that certain persons who had applied for homesteads be notified in

order that their rights might be protected; these persons appeared with Santiago and ratified their former answers inthis case. (Minutes of proceedings.)

The court rendered its aforementioned judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, whereby, with the exception of about 213

hectares held to be public forest, it adjudged to the applicants the remainder of the lands which had been excluded by

the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, announced his appeal.

On the same date a petition for new trial was filed on the ground that the decision was contrary to law, and on the

28th of September of the same year he stated who were the respondents to the amended application, on account of

their respective homesteads, to wit: Jose Antillon, Maria Salvador, Mariano Marfori, Gabino Quincaco, Juan Palejon,

Domingo Ramos, Brigido Pascual, Leopoldo Atienza, Regino Martinez, Vicenta Jazmin, Magdalena Avapo, Mariano

Medel, and Catalino Marfori, on whose behalf the defense excepted to the decision rendered in connection with the

amended application. (Petition on p. 188, part 12.)

In the aforesaid petition, as well as in their previous one, the petitioner asked that the last proofs produced by both

parties in support of and against the amended application, in connection with the tract of land excluded by the first

decision, be included in the bill of exceptions. And upon this basis the appeal was heard together with the former one.

Out of the 1,000 hectares, more or less, excluded from the adjudication, under the judgment of the 17th of February,

1906, the court in its last decision, rendered on the 20th of July of the same year, finally excluded but 213 hectares,

and adjudicated to the petitioners the remaining 787 hectares, more or less.

If the land claimed by the respondents of Calauang is included within the 213 hectares which have been excluded, and

are not adjudged to the petitioners, their is no object in the appeal and the same should be dismissed. If, on the other

hand, the same is included in the 787 hectares, more or less, transferred by the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906,the appeal can not prosper because in the last decision the court found as a fact that the petitioners, and not the

respondents, have been and are not in possession of the 787 hectares. The thirteen respondents are not, therefore,

entitled to the homestead for the reason that they have not been, nor are they at the present time, in possession of

the land included therein.

Be that as it may, the fact is that in connection with the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, although the aforesaid

thirteen respondents excepted thereto, the bill of exceptions announced by them at the time has not been brought

before us. Consequently the evidence expressly stated as forming part of the bill of exception can not be reviewed, for

the reason that the bill has not been submitted with or without the evidence.

And even if submitted, they could not have been reviewed by this court, in view of the fact that the motion for a new

trial was made on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the law, a basis which does not authorize thereviewing of evidence taken before a lower court. The motion for a new trial was neither heard nor denied, and no

exception was taken as to any ruling denying the same.

The jurisdiction of this court being thus limited to deciding mere question of law, none of which, except those already

set forth in the bill of exceptions to the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, have been offered in connection with

the judgment of the 20th of July following, yet, and in order to avoid confusion, the foregoing remarks are made on

points of law that might have arisen on the second appeal.

For the reasons above set forth, the judgments of the 17th of February and 20th of July, 1906, appealed from, are

affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G. R. No. 162322 : March 14, 2012]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of

municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of

the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point

Development Corporations (Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questionsof law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before

filing this Petition for Review.cralaw

The Facts

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value ofP4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described

as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at

Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.[4] On 7 August

1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.[5]

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still

with the RTC.[6]

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan,

because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than P100,000.[7]

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8] and commenced with the reception of evidence.[9]

Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations,[10] a Deed of

Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the

alienable and disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the

proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby

estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.[15] The CA further found that respondent

Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject property after having proven

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and itspredecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.[16]

Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the followingarguments in support of its appeal:

I.

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

II.


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THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL

REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]

The Courts Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order to

determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

IThe Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court,

even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred

only by the Constitution or the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the

parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.[20] Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable

even if raised for the first time on appeal.[21]

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he hasactively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the

event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppelby laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the

party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years

thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant

question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches hadalready precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v.

People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the

most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic

filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point,

petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with

that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmativerelief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the

exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do thatwhich, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a

right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or

declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect thatwould lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's

jurisdiction.

II

The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period for

setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC set the

date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.[28]

We disagree.

The Property Registration Decree provides:


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Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue

an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than

ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.

In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day after the

filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997,

which was 96 days from the Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in

Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31]

petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original

registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initialhearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and

the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has

no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene

in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on

matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has

neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.[32]

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for

registration on account of events beyond its control.

Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,[33]

within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured,

as the second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed

period under the Property Registration Decree.[34]

Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing ofthe application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts itsjurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period

did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory

would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter isconferred only by the Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law

deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, therecords of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for

initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration,[37] except that it had to issue a second Order

because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.

Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to

respondents application for original registration was P160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try

cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed ?100,000.

We are not persuaded.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary

Reorganization Act, which provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or

land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of

which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of

the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax


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declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of

the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is

no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations applicationfor registration on 8 January 1998.[41]

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does notexceed P100,000.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price.Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to be registered

may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective

claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.[42]

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are bereft of

any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the

second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on and

make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development

Corporation claims the property.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations

submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find that the

assessed value of the property is P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the entire

property.[43] Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does not

exceed P100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as

amended.

III

A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of

the public domain.

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred ingranting respondent Corporations application for original registration in the absence of sufficient proof that theproperty in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.[44] The applicant for land

registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through

incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the

government.[45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the

alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered.[46] The applicant must also show sufficient

proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and

disposable.[47]

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or

PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as

a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[49]

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.[50] Clearly, this falls

short of the requirements for original registration.

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the property in

question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point

Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary,


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the application for original registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question

is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should be denied.cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the

Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the property sought to be

registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.


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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF

RESPONDENT COURT THAT SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY SAID

DECREE, TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals thatSection 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There

is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend

said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D.

No. 1529 reading as follows: ". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction

upon the court." Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied

amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of theprincipal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens

System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and

irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial

notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out

in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be

sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday

painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had caused their

registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE

OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice bymailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient

compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in

the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the

latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. That such proviso was never meant

to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section

23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of

mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining

properties, and occupants of the land.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; FUNCTION; LAPSES ON THE PART OF COURTS OR THEIR PERSONNEL, NOT A

REASON OR JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. The belabored argument of respondent Court of

Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement ofservice of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost

is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous

proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the

required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately,

and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to

comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and

efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here

that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of

laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws.


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D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August 1988 1 of the

Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which, respectively, affirmed

the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4

granting the petition of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owners duplicate copies of atransfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land,

and denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5

The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory

and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.

On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a

parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a

petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the

basis of the owners duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of the

petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.

In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official

Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were

given.

Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondents evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerkof Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made the following findings of

facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land

situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by adocument of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title which was usually kept in

the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the

entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12,1977 (Exh. "C"). It appears further that there are no co-

owners, mortgagees, lessees duplicate copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by theRegister of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters

which was sold to her and that she is benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area

belonging to her."cralaw virtua1aw library

and disquisition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval, same is

hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the ownersduplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days afterreceipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration

Commission, on the basis of the existing owners duplicate copy thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals and

made the following assignment of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR

RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNERS DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THEREQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND

AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.


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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION." 8

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not

only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS v. Sison, Et Al., 124 SCRA 394.

In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held

that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and actual

occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529"

because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original registration cases publication

of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said

Decree provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates of title lostor destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be

reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent

with this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)

2) The MWSS v. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original and the

owners duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where theduplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the Register of Deeds was

destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the names of other persons;

and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in

the instant case.

3) The duty to send notices to adjoinin

land titles deed cases

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