land titles jason digests

7/24/2019 Land Titles Jason Digests

1/68

Land Titles for Atty. Abano by Jason Arteche

Feel free to use and share this digest with anyone who needs it

1

Traders Royal Bank vs CA

Facts

Sps. Capay (respondents) took out a loan from Traders Royal Bank (TRB) that was secured by the

Capays Property X. The Capays defaulted and TRB extrajudicially foreclosed Property X. The

Capays challenged the foreclosure in court and caused to be annotated in the Property Xs title the

notice of lis pendens. The foreclosure still proceeded and TRB acquired Property X in the auction. A

new title to Property X was issued in TRBs favor but without the notice of lis pendens.The Capays

filed a case to recover Property X.

While the case was still pending TRB sold Property X to a 3rd

person. The 3rd

person sold Property X

to a 4th person and so on. All the subsequent titles issued in favor of the non-bank buyers had no

notice of lis pendens.The lower courts ruled in the Capays favor and ordered Property X returned to

the Capays. However, Property X couldnt be returned because of its subsequent transfers. The

Capays filed another case to recover Property X but the lower court ruled in favor of the non-bank

respondents.

Issue

Who has the better right to Property X? Capays or the 3

rd

person, 4

th

person, and so on?

Held

The 3rd person, 4th person, and so on.

The certificate of title issued in TRBs favor contained no notice of lis pendens.The subsequent titles

issued in the non-bank buyers favor also didnt contain such notice. The non-bank buyers had the

right to rely on the title of their predecessors and werent bound to go beyond the same. There was

nothing to arouse their suspicion that said property was under litigation.

Next, the non-bank buyers exercised extraordinary diligence when they physically inspected Property

X and inquired from the Register of Deeds for any defect in title.

Further, between 2 innocents persons the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done will bear

the loss. Here, the Capays slept on their right when they could have easily inspected the title issued in

TRBs favor to determine if their claim was annotated on it.


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2

Tan vs Phil. Banking

Facts

The Sps. Aguinaldo took out a loan from Phil. Banking secured by the formers Property X. The Sps.

Aguinaldo failed to pay back the loan and the Bank moved to foreclose Property X. The Bank

acquired Property X in the subsequent auction.

The Sps. Aguinaldo filed a case to nullify the foreclosure proceedings that they won in the RTC. The

Sps. Aguinaldo then sold Property X to Tan. The Sps. Aguinaldos title indicated no claims,

encumbrances, or mortgages.

The Bank appealed the case to the CA and impleaded Tan as a nominal party and eventually won a

decision to reclaim Property X. The Register of Deeds was ordered to cancel Tans title and issue one

in the Banks favor.

Issue

Who has the better right to Property X? Tan or the Bank?

HeldTan.

Tan wasnt even a party to the action between the Sps. Aguinaldo and the Bank in the CA case. Tan

was merely impleaded in his nominal capacity as the newly registered owner of Property X.

Next, Tans title over Property X was regularly issued after buying it from the Sps. Aguinaldo. Tan

relied on the Sps. Aguinaldos title that was free from any claims, encumbrances, or mortgages. Tans

title can only be challenged in a direct action and cant be the subject of a collateral attack.


3/68



3

Republic vs Guzman 2/23/2000

Facts

After a public bidding the Board of Liquidators awarded Property X to Eusebio. Eusebio transferred

her rights to Property X to Guzman. Guzman afterwards sold Property X to his daughter and her

husband. The daughter and husband eventually mortgaged Property X in favor of Hoescht Phil

(Hoescht).

The daughter and her husband failed to settle their obligation and Hoescht foreclosed Property X.

Hoescht acquired it in the ensuing sale. The Government filed a case against Guzman to reclaim

Property X alleging Guzman acquired it through fraudulent means. The Government also further

alleged the daughter and husband werent innocent purchasers for value.

Issue

Does the Director of Lands still have authority over Property X?

Held

Yes.

The Director of Lands doesnt lose authority over land the moment an original certificate of title is

issued covering the same. The Director of Lands has the duty to investigate patents and titles

allegedly secured fraudulently. An indefeasible title is no bar to the Director of Lands from

investigating how title was acquired if the investigations purpose is to determine the existence of

fraud, even after 1 year from the time the title was issued.

Next, Guzman fraudulently acquired Property X because he failed the requirement to take possession

of and improve the land. Further, his daughter and husband arent innocent purchasers for value

because they knew of Guzmans fraud and the fact another person was occupying Property X.


4/68



4

Sherwill Corp. vs Sitio Sto. Nino Inc.

Facts

Sherwill Corp. owns Land X as evidenced by a certificate of title in its name. Sherwill filed a case

against Sitio Inc. to quiet title and prevent the Land Management Bureau from hearing the case Sitio

Inc. filed with the Bureau challenging Sherwill Corp.s titles.

Issue

Can Sherwill Corp. petition the court to prevent the LMB from hearing the case Sitio Inc. filed before

it?

Held

No.

The courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters falling in the Land Management Bureauss

powers and should defer jurisdiction on the matter to the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands is

the officer charged with carrying out the Public Land Acts provisions and has control over the

concession, disposition and management of public lands. The case should remain with him for final

adjudication.

Next, the Director of Land doesnt lose authority over the land even if an original certificate of title

over the same is issued. It is the Director of Lands duty to investigate alleged fraud in securing titles.

A titles indefeasibility doesnt bar the Director of Lands from investigating how such title was

acquired if the purpose is to determine if there has been fraud.


5/68



5

Republic vs Rosenoor Mining

Facts

Rosenoor Mining found a huge cache of marble deposits in a mountain in the province. Rosenoor

Mining then applied with the Bureau of Mines for a mining license to exploit the marble deposits.

After some time, Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed the new DENR minister. Maceda cancelled

Rosenoor Minings license.

Issue

Is the mining license's revocation valid?

Held

Yes.

The mining license violated the law under which it was granted by exceeding the 100 hectare limit.

Further a mining license, any license to exploit natural resources for that matter, is a privilege granted

by the State that can be revoked at any time in the interest of public welfare.

All natural resources belong to the State and the Constitution states such resources are under theState's full control and supervision.


6/68



6

Republic vs Guzman

Facts

Norma Almanzor and Guzman filed conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title over

Land X. Almanzor occupied Land X since 1928 and she applied for confirmation of title in 1991.

Before 1965, Land X was classified as forestland. After 1965, Land X was classified as agricultural

land.

Issue

Who should own Land X?

Held

Guzman.

Prior to Land Xs declaration as alienable land, any occupation cant be considered in counting the

30-year prescriptive period. As such, the counting should start only from the time the land was

classified as agricultural land.

In this case, even starting from 1965 Norma Almanzor would still be short 4 years of the required 30-year prescriptive period.


7/68



7

Pagkatipunan vs CA

Facts

Pagkatipunan filed an application for judicial confirmation and registration of title to Land X. The

court granted the application. Afterwards, the Government challenged Land Xs registration arguing

Land X was classified as forestland at the time Land X was registered. Therefore, said land was

inalienable and cant be registered.

Issue

Does Pagkatipunan have a better right to Land X against the Government?

Held

No.

Unless its shown the State has reclassified or alienated public land to a private person it remains part

of the inalienable public domain. Occupation, no matter how long, cant ripen into ownership.

The Regalian doctrine states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not

appearing to be privately owned are presumed to belong to the State. The classifications of landsdescribe not its physical status but rather its legal status.

In this case, Pagkatipunan applied for title while Land X was classified as forestland. No evidence

shows Land X has been reclassified as alienable land by any positive act of Government.


8/68



8

Collado vs CA

Facts

Collado filed an application to register Land X. Land Xs technical description states its inside the

Mariquina Watershed. Collado and co-petitioners alleges their private rights have vested in Land X in

1902, 2 years before Land X was made part of the Mariquina Watershed.

Issue

Does Collado have registrable title over the lot?

Held

No.

A Watershed is a natural resource because it helps provide one of the most basic human needs, water.

Land X became inalienable public land after being made part of the Mariquina Watershed. A land

once classified is presumed to continue as so until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent

declassification is shown.

In asserting ownership over land, the applicant bears the burden of proving he meets all therequirements to register such land. In this case, Collado failed to prove he acquired ownership over

Land X before 1904, the time when Land X became part of the Watershed. Further, the time of

occupancy after 1904 can no longer be counted in Collados favor because the Public Land Act

applies only to alienable land.

An exception to this case is if Collado acquired private rights over Land X before it was declared part

of the Watershed. Private rights here meaning ownership that can ripen into title.


9/68



9

Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Facts

The Sps. Laburada applied to register Land X that the RTC granted. The decision became final and

the RTC issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.

However, the LRA refused the order because Land X was already covered by another Torrens title.

The Sps. Laburada then filed this action for mandamus to compel the LRA to issue the decree.

Issue

Can the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue the corresponding decree?

Held

No.

First, the judgment isnt executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.

Consequently, the Sps. Laburada dont have any clear legal right to implement it. A judgement of

registration doesnt become executory until after the expiration of 1 year after entry of the final decree

of registration.

Second, its possible the RTCs judgment is void and the LRAs refusal to issue the corresponding

decree is reasonable. The RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a Torrens title over registered land. The

LRA is mandated to refer to the RTC any doubt it may have in issuing the corresponding decree. In

this sense, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as court officers, and their act is the

courts act. The LRA is specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and

cadastral land registration proceedings.

Third, issuing the corresponding decree is part of the courts judicial function and isnt a mere

ministerial act which can be compelled through mandamus. Such act involves exercising discretion.

Fourth, the instant action takes the form of a prohibited collateral attack against the 1st Torrens title.

A Torrens title must be attacked in a proceeding for that purpose.


10/68



10

Heirs of Tan Buto vs Luy

Facts

In 1953, Luy bought Land X from Leyva and had a Torrens title issued in Luy's name. In 1954, Buto

also applied to register Land X. Buto claims his family has possessed Land X in the concept of an

owner long before the end of the Spanish regime. Luy opposes on the ground he's the true owner. The

Government opposes on the ground Land X is part of the public domain.

Issue

Who has the better right to Land X?

Held

Luy.

After 1 year from issuing the decree of registration, the certificate of title serves as an indefeasible

title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. A Land Registration Court

has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in an earlier Land Registration

Case. Such second decree is null and void.

The 1st registration is indefeasible because it's binding on the whole world. Further, it promotes the

Torrens system's purpose that is to quiet title and guarantees its indefeasibility.


11/68



11

Bracewell vs CA

Facts

Bracewell owns Land X. In 1963, Bracewell filed an action for confirmation of imperfect title under

the Public Land Act. Bracewell argues he has a right to Land X because he and his predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Land X

under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1908. The Government argues Land X was classified as

alienable land only in 1972 and the 30-year possession wasnt met.

Issue

Does Bracewell have a right to Land X under the Public Land Act?

Held

No.

The Public Land Act requires the applicant to prove:

1. The land applied for is alienable public land

2. His open, continues, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be

since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.

Once these conditions are complied with, the applicant acquires by operation of law a governmental

grant without necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

In this case, the Government proved Land X was classified as alienable land only in 1972; 9 years

after Bracewell filed his application. Under the Public Land Act, there can be no imperfect title to be

confirmed over lands not yet classified as alienable. At the time Bracewell filed for confirmation of

title under the Public Land Act, Land X wasnt alienable land.


12/68



12

Calecdan vs Cendana

Facts

In 1947, Calecdans mother executed a deed of donation over Land X in favor of Calecdans brother,

Cendana. Cendana took possession of Land X and lived there until 1998. In 1992, Calecdan filed a

complaint to recover Land X alleging the donation is void. Cendana argues he has already possessed

the land for 45 years.

Issue

Who has the better right to Land X?

Held

Cendana.

Cendana acquired Land X through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another

mode for acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It involves the lapse of

time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription

over real property requires possession and lapse of time of 30 years. Possession must be in the

concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.

In this case, the disputed land was unregistered land. Candena has possessed Land X for 45 years,

satisfying the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. The following proves

Candenas possession of Land X:

1. He built his house and lived on Land X

2. He paid taxes on Land X

3. He acquired Land X under the claim of donation, even if the donation is void.


13/68



13

Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic of the Philippines

Facts

In 1998, Del Rosario-Igtiben filed an application to register Land X under the Property Registration

Decree. Del Rosario-Igtiben alleges he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,

continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of Land X in the concept of an owner

for more than 30 years. Tracing Land Xs history, Del Rosario-Igtiben and his predecessors-in-

interest have indeed possessed Land X from 1958 to 1998.

Issue

Does Del Rosario-Igtiben have a right to Land X?

Held

No.

Del Rosario-Igtiben claims ownership under the Property Registration Decree but his pleadings

establish hes applying for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act.

Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and Public Land Act are:

1.

Against the whole world2. Judicial proceedings

3. The decree of registration is conclusive and final

4. Have the same goal, namely a Torrens title.

The confirmation of imperfect titles may be done two ways under the Public Land Act namely:

1. Administrative legalization or free patents

2. Judicial legalization.

Application for free patents requires a prescriptive period of 30-years possession. Meanwhile, for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title the possession of land by applicants, either by themselves or

through, their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This requirement conforms to

the Property Registration Decree.

In this case, Land X is alienable public land and the only dispute is the period of possession. Del

Rosario-Igtiben and his predecessors-in-interest have occupied Land X at the earliest only in 1958, 13

years short of the requirement in both the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree.


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14

Republic vs Manna properties

Facts

Manna properties applied to register Land X. The Government opposed on the ground the

Constitution prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of public domain except by

lease.

Issue

Has Manna properties or its predecessors-in-interest sufficiently established possession of Land X for

the period required by law converting the same into private land?

Held

No.

The Public Land Act requires the applicants to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Once the Public Land Acts requirements are

fulfilled, the disputed land is converted into private land by operation of law.

In this case, Manna Properties or its predecessors-in-interest has failed to prove they satisfy the

requirements under the Public Land Act. Consequently, said land is still alienable land of the public

domain.

Manna Properties presented a tax declaration issued in 1950 that allegedly replaced one issued in

1945. However, the 1950 tax declaration fails to state if the 1945 tax declaration was issued before or

after 12 June 1945. Further, the 1950 tax declaration itself is marred by irregularities. At most, Manna

Properties can prove possession only since 1952, 7 years short of the requirement.


15/68



15

Republic of the Philippines vs Hanover World

Facts

Hanover World applied to register Land X under the Property Registration Decree. The application

states Hanover World acquired Land X in fee simple as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. The

Government opposed the application arguing Hanover World and its predecessors-in-interest havent

fulfilled the required period of possession under the Property Registration Decree.

Issue

Does Hanover World have a right to Land X?

Held

No.

In applying to judicially confirm imperfect title over alienable land of the public domain under the

Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree, the applicant must have possessed the disputed

land since 12 July 1945 or earlier. Further, the burden of proof in land registration cases rests with the

applicant who must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he satisfies the laws requirements

for registration.

In this case, Hanover World and its predecessors-in-interest have proved through evidence possession

of Land X only from 1965 onwards. Further, Hanover World failed to provide evidence the DENR

Secretary has declared Land X as alienable and disposable. Hanover Worlds CENRO certification

isnt enough proof to certify Land X as alienable and disposable.


16/68



16

Spouses Llanes vs Republic

Facts

Eugenia possessed Land X since 1930. In 1965 Servillano bought Land X from Eugenia. In 1995

Spouses Llanes bought Land X from Servillano. Eugenia, Servillano, and the Spouses Llanes all

belong to the same family.

In 1996, Spouses Llanes sold Land X to ICTSI Warehousing (ICTSI). ICTSI filed an application

under the Property Registration Decree to register Land X. However, the sale between ICTSI and

Spouses Llanes didnt push through. ICTSI amended the application substituting the applicants as the

Spouses Llanes. The Government opposed the application.

Issue

Do Spouses Llanes have a right to Land X?

Held

Yes.

Under the Property Registration Decree the applicant must prove:1. The disputed property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain

2. The applicant or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continues, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation

3. Such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier

In this case, the Spouses Llanes proved Land X was declared alienable and disposable on 26 March

1928 through the DENR and CENRO certification. Further, the Spouses Llanes proved they and their

predecessors-in-interest have possessed Land X from 1930 onwards, well before 12 June 1945.

Lastly, generations of the Llanes family have declared Land X under their names and paid real

property taxes on it, giving evidence of possession in the concept of an owner.


17/68



17

Heirs of Roxas vs CA

Facts

Respondent Maguesun Corp. filed an application to register 2 parcels of unregistered land. The case

was filed before the RTC and in support of its application Maguesun Corp. presented a Deed of

Absolute Sale in its favor with Melliza as vendor. Allegedly, Melliza acquired the properties from

plaintiff Trinidad Roxas 2 months earlier evidenced by a Deed of Sale.

The Land Registration Authority sent notices of the initial hearing to interested person that didn't

include Trinidad because she wasn't named as an adjoining owner, occupant, or adverse claimant.

Publication was made in the Official Gazette and Record Newsweekly. While the RTC was hearing

Maguesun's application for registration, the LRA reported the properties were already the subject of a

Land Registration Case by Trinidad but no decision was rendered yet.

Eventually, the RTC granted Maguesun's application for registration and ordered Trinidad's

registration case dismissed. Trinidad learned only of the sale and registration in Maguesun's name

when she was asked to vacate the property. Trinidad filed a case before the RTC to set aside the

decree of registration on the ground Maguesun Corp. committed actual fraud.

Issue

Is Maguesun Corp. guilty of actual fraud?

Held

Yes.

Adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case doesn't become final and incontrovertible until

the expiration of 1 year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains

under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree. The law recognizes actual

fraud as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. Such petition

however must be filed within 1 year from the date of entry of said decree, the petitioner has a real and

dominical right over the property, and such property hasn't been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

Actual fraud proceeds from an intentional deception through misrepresentation or concealment of a

material fact. A type of actual fraud is extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud prevents a party from having a

trial, from presenting his entire case to the court, or operates upon matters pertaining to the manner in

which judgment is procured.

In this case, Maguesun Corp. committed actual fraud in obtaining its decree of registration. Maguesun

Corp. knew of Trinidad's ownership over the property because Trinidad is the grandaunt of Maguesun

Corp's president. Further, Maguesun Corp. failed to produce Melliza at trial to prove the sale's

legitimacy. Also, it's reasonable to expect Maguesun Corp. would've inspected the property prior to

the sale with Melliza and discovered Trinidad's caretaker occupying the property.

Maguesun Corp. may have referenced Trinidad during the registration proceedings but this isn't

sufficient compliance with the law. Disclosure of Trinidad's adverse interest must be made at the

appropriate time, namely at the time of application for registration.

Further, the notice of hearing was published in the OG but not in a newspaper of general circulation.

Admittedly, publication in the OG is sufficient to confer jurisdiction but omitting to publish in such

newspaper is relevant in assessing the applicant's right to the land.


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18

Republic vs Herbieto

Facts

The Herbieto brothers filed before the MTC an application to register 2 parcels of land located in

Cebu. They claimed to be the owners in fee simple of the subject lots, which they purchased from

their parents. Along with their application, they filed the necessary documents. The Government

opposed the brothers application to register the lands.

The MTC set the initial hearing, notices were sent to the adjoining owners, notice posted in

conspicuous places on the lands themselves as well as the municipal building, and published in the

OG and newspaper The Freeman Banat News. The MTC issued an order of special default with only

the Government opposing the application.

Later, the MTC promulgated its judgment granting the application and directed the LRA to issue the

decree of registration. The Government appealed and hence this case.

Issue

Did the brothers comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration

Decree thereby vesting the MTC with jurisdiction?

Held

No.

The Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the OG shall be sufficient to

confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. But the SC still affirms its declaration that

publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to

validly confirm and register the applicants title. The notices publication in a newspaper of general

circulation is essential and must be strictly complied with.

In this case, the initial hearing was on September 3. The notice was published in the OG on August 10

but it was published in a newspaper of general circulation only on December 19, 3 months after theactual date of hearing. Such publication is ineffective and deprived adverse claimants of due process.

Its as if there was no publication at all.


19/68



19

Vergel vs CA

Facts

Vergel and co-petitioners filed an application to register a piece of land in the Laguna RTC. Only the

Government represented by the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application.

Consequently, the RTC issued an order of general default against the whole world except the

Government.

Afterwards, respondent Gonzales filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of

General Default alleging in her affidavit that shes claiming the land in question as an owner. The

RTC denied Gonzales motion but the CA reversed settings aside the RTCs decision.

Issue

Did the CA err in setting aside the RTCs decision without making a specific finding of fraud,

negligence, accident, or excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and speedy

determination of the controversy would be better attained in reversing the RTC?

Held

Yes.

In this case, the CA arbitrarily set aside the RTCs order of general default without factual basis save

for its own gut feeling. Gonzales reason she failed to timely file an opposition because she missed

reading the OG and newspaper that contained the notice of hearing cant be considered excusable

negligence.

Gonzales alleges petitioners are aware of her claim of ownership over the disputed property and the

latter were in bad faith, having filed the application surreptitiously and without notice to her.

However, the CA didnt make any specific finding on this.

Hence, the case is remanded to the CA in order to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or

excusable neglect sufficient to reverse the order of general default in the land registration case.


20/68



20

Heirs of Lopez vs Enriquez

Facts

Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application to register title before the Pasig RTC. The RTC issued an

order of general default and hearings on the application followed. In May 1966, the RTC granted the

application and in March 1991 the decision became final and executory with the RTC issuing a

certificate of finality. In October 1997, the LRA issued the corresponding decrees. In August 1998,

the Register of Deeds issued the corresponding OCT.

In 1997, the heirs herein filed a motion alleging Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the land to them on

September 1970. Petitioners prayed the RTC issue a decree of registration in their names taking into

consideration the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. The RTC gave due course to the motion and

conducted hearings.

In November 1998, the heirs filed another motion to declare the decree and OCT void but the LRA

denied the request. The heirs then applied before the Register of Deeds to annotate the OCT with a

notice of lis pendens on the ground they filed a motion to declare the OCT void before the RTC. The

Register of Deeds and LRA denied the request to annotate.

Issue

Do the heirs have standing to file a motion to annotate lis pendens on the OCT and declare void the

registration decrees the LRA issued to the applicant?

Held

No.

A party declared in default loses his standing in court and he cant appear in court, adduce evidence,

be heard, or be entitled to notice. Such party cant even appeal from the judgement rendered by the

court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in the Rules

of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the heirs filed their motion to have the decree and OCT declared void long after the RTC

decision in the land registration case became final and executory. The heirs didnt present their claim

while the case was still pending. The heirs motion before the RTC which the latter gave due course is

insufficient to give them standing for filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. The heirs have

no standing due to the order of general default.

However, contrary to the LRAs assertion, the heirs didnt need to file a motion to lift the order of

general default because such order should be filed before entry of final judgement. Any motion to lift

the order of general default would be set aside because it was filed out of time.


21/68



21

SSS vs Chavez

Facts

Respondent Sps. Obedencio filed a civil case for specific performance at the RTC praying the SSS be

ordered to:

1. Cancel the mortgage on their properties

2. To release the documents covering said properties

3.

And pay damages. SSS replied saying the spouses had an unpaid obligation to it.

The RTC set a pre-trial but it was cancelled because the judge was indisposed and the pre-trial was

reset. At the 2nd pre-trial, SSS counsel failed to attend because he was on an official mission

involving SSS cases. The RTC judge, on motion of the spouses counsel, declared SSS in default and

allowed the spouses to present their evidence ex-parte. SSS appealed and hence this case.

Issue

Did the RTC judge err in declaring SSS in default for failure to appear at pre-trial?

Held

No.

In this case, the records reveal SSS failed not only to appear at pre-trial but failed to comply with the

requirements concerning the motion for reconsideration to lift the default order. SSS motion for

reconsideration was fatally flawed because it lacked verification, notice of hearing, and affidavit of

merit.

Procedural rules arent to be dismissed simply because their non-observance would prejudice a

partys substantive rights. Like all rules, theyre to be followed except only for the most persuasive

reasons can they be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of

his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. SSS failed to provide a

persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules.

However, a judgment of default doesnt imply a waiver of all their rights, except the right to be heard

and to present evidence to support their allegations. The non-defaulting party is still required to

substantiate their allegations in the complaint. Consequently, the spouses still have to prove they

already fully paid their obligation to SSS.


22/68



22

Del Rosario vs Republic

Facts

In 1997, Del Rosario filed an application to register a parcel of land. He alleges that he and his

predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim

of ownership since 1920 or earlier. He presented numerous documents and a witness to prove his

claim.

Issue

Should the land be registered in Del Rosarios name?

Held

No.

First, submitting in evidence the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in

applications for original registration land is a mandatory requirement. Failure to comply with such

requirement is fatal to an application to register. Del Rosarios claim hes excused because he

submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the clerk of court, who then forwarded it to the LRA iswithout merit. He shouldve retrieved the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and presented it as

evidence in court. Also, the advance survey plan isnt sufficient to comply with the laws requirement.

Second, the court proceedings cant be reopened for Del Rosario to present the original tracing cloth

plan in evidence. For this to happen it requires:

1. Evidence was discovered after trial

2. Such evidence couldnt have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence

3. The evidence is of such weight that it will probable change judgment.

In this case, the original tracing plan cant be considered new evidence because it was available when

the application to register was filed. Further, Del Rosario failed to exercise reasonable diligence by

failing to retrieve the plan from the LRA. He cant even offer the sepia copy of the cloth planbecause he shouldve submitted it in evidence during trial.

Third, the mere planting of bamboo trees isnt sufficient to prove possession because such trees dont

need much tending. Further, its doubtful if mango trees were even actually planted on the land. Even

if the mango and bamboo trees did exist, such would constitute mere casual cultivation and not

possession under claim of ownership.

Fourth, the land was declared for taxation purposes only in 1997, and taxes due covered only from

1988-1997. Tax declarations arent conclusive evidence of ownership but good indicia of a claim of

ownership. Further, the land was classified into alienable and disposable only in 1971 and 1983

respectively (land was divided into 2 portions). Meaning, Del Rosarios period of occupation for

purposes of the 30-year prescriptive period is only 26 years at most.


23/68



23

Spouses Recto vs Republic

Facts

The Spouses Recto filed an application to register a parcel of land located in Batangas under the

Property Registration Decree or in the alternative under the Public Land Act. The Rectos allege they

purchased the land from the sisters Guevarra and Torres who in turn inherited it from their parents.

Torres declared their parents owned the land since 1945 and possessed it in the concept of an owner

since 1930. Guevarra corroborated Torres testimony testifying their parents owned the land since

1935. The Spouses Recto also showed additional evidence showing the land was classified as

alienable and disposable since Dec. 31, 1925 pursuant to the CENRO and DENR certification.

The RTC granted the application but the CA reversed on the sole ground the Rectos failed to offer as

evidence the original tracing cloth plan.

Issue

Should the application be granted?

Held

Yes.

In this case, the Rectors predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land well before 1945 as shown

by the sisters testimony. Further, the fact the earliest tax declaration was only in 1948 doesnt

militate against the Rectos because that doesnt necessarily mean possession didnt commence in

1945 or earlier. Also, said tax declaration actually cancelled a prior tax declaration. The land was also

sufficiently proven as alienable and disposable since Dec. 31 1925 through a CENRO and DENR

certification.

As to the absence of the original tracing cloth plan, the submission of the original tracing cloth is a

mandatory requirement for registration. However, while the best evidence to identify a piece of land

for registration is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other

evidence could also provide sufficient identification. A blueprint copy of the cloth plan together withthe lots technical description duly certified by the Bureau of Lands is sufficient to identify the land

applied for registration.

In this case, the land was sufficiently identified by the plans blueprint copy and technical description

both approved by the DENR.


24/68



24

Santiago vs CA

Facts

The MWSS filed an application to register title under the Torrens system 11 parcels of land located in

Rizal. Long before WWII, MWSS buried a steel aqueduct pipeline under the disputed lands. Later,

MWSS filed an amended petition alleging ownership over the lands because it and its predecessors-

in-interests, NAWASA and MWD, have been in open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

The following oppositors appeared alleging ownership over a portion of the disputed lands:

Heirs of Modesto Manahan; evidence are TCT, related papers, and documents

Heirs of Vicente Manah; evidence is an OCT

Carmelino Santiago; evidence is a TCT

Issue

Should the application be granted?

Held

Yes.

A Torrens title covers only the land described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if

any, and nothing more.

In this case, the documents proving ownership such as TCT and OCT are the legs on which the

oppositors claim stands. However, the titles themselves show ownership over the adjoining parcels of

land, not of the lands claimed. Such titles defeat, rather than support, their claim.

Further, MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership over the land. Tax declarations

dont prove ownership but are strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a

period sufficient for prescription.

Also, if its true the oppositors merely tolerated MWSS' occupation of the land, they would have taken

steps to register title to it. 60 years is too long a time to not do so, they slept on their rights.

Consequently, MWSS acquired the lands prescription because it possessed said lands for more than

30 years.


25/68



25

Ranola vs CA

Facts

The respondents are the heirs of Alforque and they inherited from Alforque 2 parcels of lands. Later,

the heirs mortgaged the 2 lands to the Rural Bank of Talisay to secure a loan. The heirs failed to pay

the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgaged property. The Bank sold the foreclosed property to

defendant Ranola. The sold property was 285 sq. meters big. Ranola however couldnt take

possession of it because one of the heirs, Angeles, claims the house built on it wasnt part of the

property sold to Ranola. Ranola then filed an ejectment suit against Angeles but they entered into a

compromise agreement with the latter agreeing to vacate the premises and the house given to Ranola.

Later, the lands were cadastrally surveyed and the heirs received a survey notification showing their

property and declaring as adjoining owner Ranola with a property 285 sq. meters big. Ranola also

received a survey notification but this one included the property being claimed by the heirs. Ranolas

property in her version of the survey was 500 sq. meters big. Pursuant to his survey notification,

Ranola had a sketch plan prepared.

Consequently, the heirs filed an action to quiet title against Ranola praying they be declared the true

owners of the land in excess of Ranolas 285 sq. meters.

Issue

Who has the better right to the disputed property?

Held

The heirs.

While tax receipts and tax declarations arent conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute

credible proof of a claim of title over property.

In this case, the property the heirs are claiming is distinct from the lot Ranola bought from the Bank.

This is clearly shown by the tax declarations covering the claimed lot from year 1950 until 1980. Allthese tax declarations show the claimed land was formerly owned by Alforque and later by his heirs.

Coupled with Alforques actual possession of the property since 1947, the tax declarations become

strong evidence of ownership.

Also, its undisputed the Bank only sold to Ranola a lot 285 sq. meters big as evidenced by a deed of

absolute sale. Further, the lots tax declarations described it as only 285 sq. meters big. Ranoles

himself admitted in the ejectment suit that the lot he bought was only 285 sq. meters big.

Consequently, the tax declarations coupled with the deed of absolute sale and Ranoles judicial

admission proves Ranoles lot is only 285 sq. meters big.


26/68



26

Santiago vs SBMA

Facts

Plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir of Hermogenes Rodriguez. During the lifetime of

Hermogenes, he owned Land A registered in his name under a Certificate of Title denominated as

Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree.

Later, Victoria leased the Land A to Santiago and Mateo. However, SBMA is claiming possessory

and proprietary rights over Land A and demanded Santiago and Mateo vacate Land A. Further, its

actually using Land A for commercial and other purposes. Victoria then filed a complaint to recover

possession of Land A from SBMA.

Issue

Can Spanish Title still be considered evidence of ownership over real property?

Held

No.

Spanish titles have been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property.The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish

Titles and grants should register their lands under the Land Registration Act. Otherwise, non-

compliance will result in their lands being classified as unregistered.

In this case, Victoria and co-petitioners anchor their right to recover possession of Land A on a claim

of ownership by Victoria being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes, in the Spanish Title.

However, since Spanish Titles no longer have any evidentiary value, Victoria and co-petitioners have

no legal or equitable title to Land A.


27/68



27

Vencilao vs Vano

Facts

The heirs of Reyes filed an application to registers parcels of land the former allegedly inherited from

Reyes. The application was granted and an OCT issued.

Later, Vencilao filed a complaint for reconveyance of real properties before the CFI. Vencilao alleges

hes the lawful owner of the parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or

inheritance, and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession publicly,

continuously...for more than 30 years. However, the parcels of land were included in the heirs

application either by mistake or fraud. Vencilao discovered the registration in the heirs name when

the latter attempted to enter the parcels of land claiming ownership.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of res judicata. Further, the RTC issued writs of

possession against Vencilao. However, Vencilao refused to comply with the writ of possession and

the RTC cited Vencilao and co-petitioners in contempt upon Vanos motion.

Later, the RTC likewise issued a writ of demolition upon Vanos motion even while the 2nd case was

on appeal.

Issue

Is Vanos petition barred by res judicata? Was the writ of possession and demolition properly issued?

Held

Res judicata:Yes || Writ of Possession: Yes || Writ of Demolition: Yes

Res Judicata

The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and

cadastral proceedings.Res judicatamakes judgment in one case conclusive in another case provided

the requisites are met.

There are 4 requisites namely:

1. A former judgment which became final

2. Such judgment was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties

3. It must be a judgment on the merits

4. There is between the 1st and 2nd action: identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of

action.

a. Identity of parties: parties in the 2nd case must be the same parties in the 1st case, or

at least, must be successors in interest or heirs.

Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he doesnt want to

participate, and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title hasbeen issued does he file an action for reconveyance, to give due course to such action is to nullify the

registration proceedings and defeat the laws purpose.

In this case, all the requisites for res judicata are present:

1. A final former judgment: The CFIs judgment granting the application became final

2. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties: The CFI had jurisdiction

3. Judgment on the merits: The CFIs judgment was on the merits.

4. Identity

a. Parties: The petitioners in the 2nd case are children of the oppositors in the case

b. Subject-matter: The lands subject of the 2nd case are part of the lands adjudicated in

the 1st case

c.

Cause of action: ownership over parcel of lands although the forms of action are

different. Namely one is an ordinary land registration while the other is reconveyance


28/68



28

Writ of possession

In a registration case, the judgment confirming applicants title and ordering its registration in his

name necessarily carries with it delivery of possession. Existing laws sanction the issuance of the writ

of possession. Such writ of possession may be issued not only against the person defeated in the

registration case but also against anyone unlawfully occupying the land during the land registration

proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.

The Writ of possession directs the sheriff to deliver possession of the property to the rightful owner.

In the process, the sheriff can eject the losing party from the property. Its the sheriff alone who has

the duty to enforce the writ.

Hence, Vencilaos admission they occupied the lands long before the 1st case was filed worked

against them. It proved they unlawfully occupied the lands during the land registration proceedings.

However, Vencilao isnt guilty of contempt. A person can be cited for contempt only when after being

ejected from the property, he enters it again or disturbs the rightful owners possession. Vencilao has

nothing to do with the delivery of possession and he couldnt have prevented the sheriff fromenforcing the writ if the latter knew how to perform his job.

Writ of demolition

In this case, the writ of demolition was properly issued pending resolution of the case.

A writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of land

to the rightful owner. A writ of demolition must likewise issue especially considering the writ of

demolition is but a complement of the writ of possession.


29/68



29

Alba vs CA

Facts

Respondent Lachica filed an application for title to Land X claiming he bought Land X from a certain

Raz. At the initial hearing, Alba and 2 other oppositors, Braulio and Raz, opposed the application.

The oppositors oppose the application on the ground they are the rightful owners of a portion of Land

X.

Later, the RTC ruled in Lachicas favor and dismissed the opposition.

Issue

Is Lachica entitled to confirm his ownership in fee simple over Land X worth 4.8 thousand sq.

meters?

Held

No.

In this case, with the exception of 620 sq. meters, there is no satisfactory showing how Lachica

acquired the remainder of Land X. Lachica alleges he acquired the parcels of land making up Land Xfrom 3 sources namely:

1. Sale from Martirez covering 840 sq. meters

2. Sale from Raz covering 300 sq. meters

3. And the rest through a Sale from Eugrocino Alba.

Alba doesnt challenge the sale from Martirez but only the other 2 purchases from Raz and

Eugrocino.

The story goes Regado originally owned Land X. Regado then sold 1.3 thousand sq. meters to Raz

and 2.9 thousand sq. meters to Eugrocino. Later, Raz conveyed 840 sq. meters to Martirez and 240 sq.

meters to Braulio. Later, the heirs of Eugrocino sold 676 sq. meters to Alba.

Based on the foregoing transaction, Lachica failed to produce documents to prove the sale from Raz

and Eugrocino in his favor. He relied merely on secondary evidence to prove the sale. Further, there

are glaring variances in the identity and technical description (adjacent owners, tax declarations, land

description, size).

Also, the tax declaration Lachica presented is unreliable because it wasnt satisfactorily explained

how it ballooned from 620 sq. meters to 4.8 thousand sq. meters. All the previous tax declarations

going back to 1947 merely declared 620 sq. meters and then suddenly in 1956 the latest tax

declaration declared 4.8 thousand sq. meters. Further, the sudden increase happened right before the

application for registration was filed. These circumstances raise doubts on Lachicas ownership over

the 4.8 thousand sq. meters of land.

On the other hand, Alba and co-petitioners have provided overwhelming evidence to ownership over

the lands they claim. The evidence clearly indicates Lachica owns only 620 sq. meters. They were

able to clearly trace the transfer of ownership from Regado all the way to them through the Deeds of

Sale.


30/68



30

Tumibay vs Soro

Facts

This case centers on Land X, originally titled under an OCT in Sacdals name, Soros grandmother.

Later, the OCT was cancelled and TCT issued in Tumibays name through a Bilihang Tuluyan ng

Lupa. Tumibay subsequently sold Land X to his co-petitioners in this case and TCT issued in the

latters name. Later, Soro filed an action to annul and recover ownership over Land X against

Tumibay.

The RTC ruled in Soros favor ordering Tumibay and co-petitioners return the land to Soro. The

decision however didnt expressly order the removal of improvements thereon and later became final.

Soro then filed a motion to be restored possession over Land X and to demolish the improvements

thereon. The RTC denied the motion but the CA reversed ordering the RTC to fix the time for

petitioners to remove the improvements on Land X.

Issue

Did the CA err in declaring void the RTCs denial of Soros motion?

HeldNo.

A judgment isnt confined to what appears on the decisions face, but extends to those necessarily

included therein. Further, the writ of execution to enforce such judgment must conform strictly to

such judgment.

Under the RoC Rule 39 Sec. 10: removing the improvements placed by the obligor on the property

subject of execution requires a special court order upon the obligees motion after due hearing and

after the obligor has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

In this case, a judgment of delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the

prevailing party in possession of the property. If the obligor refuses to surrender possession, thesheriff has the authority to oust him and an express order to this effect doesnt need to be stated in the

decision. As to removing improvements on the land, such authority is deemed read into the decision,

subject only to the issuance of a special court order to remove the improvements.


31/68



31

Gomez vs CA

Facts

Jose Gomez filed an application to register several lots. The lots were originally part of Land X that

the SC adjudicated to Consolacion in another case, Government of the Philippines Islands vs Abran.

Jose is the heir of Teodoro Gomez, Consolacions son. Jose inherited the lands after Consolacion and

Teodoro died and when Consolacions other son, Teodoro Gomez, executed a quitclaim in his favor.

Land X was further divided and such division duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The divided

lands are the subjects of this application.

The RTC issued an order of general default and granted the application. It promulgated judgment

expressly ordering the proper Government officer to issue the corresponding decrees of registration.

The judgment became final.

Later, respondent Perez, Chief of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,

submitted a report to the RTC stating homestead patents already covered some of the lands. Perez

recommended the RTC set aside its judgment. The RTC set aside its decision.

IssueDid the RTC err in settings aside its earlier order on account of Perez report?

Held

No.

Judgment in a cadastral or land registration proceeding doesnt become final until after the expiration

of 1-year after the entry of final decree of registration. Before the 1-year period expires, the title isnt

finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the courts

control and sound discretion. Here, the decree of registration hasnt been even entered yet.

Further, the duty of land registration officials to render reports isnt limited to the period before the

courts decision becomes final, but even after its finality until before the expiration of the 1-yearperiod. Here, theres nothing wrong with Perez submitting the report in the manner he did to the RTC.

Also, Jose cant use the Abran case to his advantage because the Abran case didnt adjudicate to

Consolacion the lots covered by the homestead patent. The homestead patents were registered in 1928

while the Abran case was decided 1931. A homestead patent, once duly registered, becomes

indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title.


32/68



32

CSC vs Asensi

Facts

The CSC dismissed Asensi from the Bureau of Internal Revenue after an investigation revealed the

latter falsified information relative to her personal background. The CA set aside the CSC resolution

dismissing Asensi. The OSG then filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing a petition for review

of the CA decision. The SC granted such motion.

Meanwhile, CSC, unaware of the OSG actions, filed its own petition for certiorari before the SC. The

OSG, surprised by the CSC's moves, didn't file a petition for review anymore and allowed the CSC to

actively pursue its own case.

Asensi moved to dismiss the certiorari petition on the ground it's an improper remedy, it should've

been a petition for review. Further, the period to file a petition for review had already elapsed.

Issue

Should the petition be dismissed?

HeldYes.

In this case, the proper remedy is a petition for review and not a certiorari petition. The OSG was

aware of the proper procedure of appeal and took the necessary steps to file the petition for review. If

the CSC had only relied on its counsel, instead of going by its lonesome, it would've avoided this

predicament.

As a general rule, the OSG is primarily responsible for representing the Government in appellate

proceedings. The exception is if the OSG takes a position adverse to that of the pertinent government

office. Here, there's no showing the OSG took a position contrary to the CSC's.

Further, even if the CSC were allowed to represent itself, the instant petition would still be dismissedbecause it's an improper remedy. With the period for filing a petition for review already elapsed, CSC

is now barred from challenging the CA decision.


33/68



33

Vda. De Barroga vs Albano

Facts

In a Cadastral Proceeding, the CFI rendered a decision adjudicating a parcel of land in Delfinas

favor. One of the oppositors was Ruperta, declared in default. However, the decree of registration

didnt issue until after 14 years and an OCT issued in Delfinas name only after 24 years.

After the registration decree was issued but before the OCT, Rupertas heirs, petitioner Barroga, filed

suit against Delfinas heirs alleging possession of the land since 1941 and they were the real owners

thereof. Further, Delfinas title encroached upon Cesars land and so the latter intervened in the case.

The lower court dismissed Barrogas complaint and granted Cesars petition.

Delfinas heirs motioned for a writ of possession that Barroga opposed. The lower court granted the

writ of possession and Barroga appealed.

Issue

Can a writ of possession still issue despite the considerable lapse of time?

HeldYes.

Res Judicata applies in Barrogas case to recover the land due to the earlier decision in the cadastral

proceeding affirming Delfinas ownership over the land. The judgment in the cadastral proceeding is

in rem and binding against the whole world. The 2 judgments taken together satisfy the requirements

of res judicata.

Delfinas heirs are entitled to a writ of possession against Rupertas heir, Ruperta herself being a party

to the original cadastral proceeding, and despite the lapse of time because the right to a writ of

possession is imprescriptible.


34/68



34

Valisno vs Plan

Facts

Sps. Valisno purchased from Blanco a parcel of land. Later, Valisno declared the land in their names

for taxation purposes and installed a caretaker on it. Later, respondent Cayaba ousted the caretaker

and took possession of the land. Cayaba claims hes the lands owner by virtue of a deed of sale

executed in his favor by a certain Verano.

Valisno filed suit against Cayaba to recover possession but the courts ruled in Cayabas favor. Cayaba

then filed an application to register in his name the title to the land that Valsino opposed. Cayaba filed

a motion to dismiss on the groud of res judicata against Valsino that the lower court granted. Valsino

appealed and hence this case.

Issue

Is the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata allowed in land registration proceedings?

Held

Yes.

The RoC applies in a suppletory character to land registration proceedings when practicable and

convenient. Answers in a cadastral proceeding partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are

involved therein. Further, res judicata applies in a cadastral case to defeat the alleged rights of another

claimant.

Here, res judicata applies:

1. A prior final judgment - the earlier case for action reinvidicatoria became final

2. Court with jurisdiction satisfied

3. Judgment on the merits satisfied

4. Identity of parties, subject matter, cause of action

a. Same parties are involved

b.

Same landc. Issue is ownership over the land

Consequently, Cayaba can successfully have Valisnos opposition dismissed because the latter is

already barred by prior judgment.


35/68



35

Heirs of Labrada vs Monsanto

Facts

This case involves a land covered by the Catbalogan cadastral survey contested by petitioners and

respondents.

The Heirs of Labrada claim their grandparents and parents have possessed the land since 1932 when

the answer was filed in 1984. Further, they have continued to possess the land until the present.

However, the lower court ruled in favor of Monsanto. Within 2 days from receipt of the adverse

decision, the Heirs filed their appeal by filing a notice of appeal with prayer for records to be elevated

to the IAC. Meanwhile, Monsanto filed a motion for the issuance of a decree arguing the Heirs failed

to perfect their appeal in failing to file a record on appeal. The lower court granted the motion and

issued the decree.

Issue

Can an appeal by a conflicting claimant to a lot in cadastral survey proceedings be taken by filing a

simple notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period? Or must an appeal still be filed by

filing a record on appeal within the 30-day period provided?

Held

A notice of appeal will suffice.

The general rule applies in this case where simply filing a notice of appeal within the 15-day

reglementary period can suffice. The exceptions, which apply to special proceedings and cases where

multiple appeals are allowed must be strictly construed.

The exception applies in cases where the original record has to remain with the original court in

connection with other pending matters. This isnt the case in a cadastral proceeding because after

judgment the court can elevate the records of the case referring to the lots covered by its judgment,

while retaining records of the lots not covered by its judgment.

Here, the court can readily elevate the records of the disputed lot subject of judgment and appeal.


36/68



36

Eslaban vs Onorio

Facts

Onorio owns Land X on which Eslaban, as Project Manager of the National Irrigation Administration

(NIA), approved an irrigation canals construction. Onorio agreed to the construction but he should be

properly compensated for the portions of Land X affected.

Later, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between NIA and Onorio. The same year, Eslaban

offered P35 thousand as compensation Onorio refused demanding a higher compensation from

Eslaban but the latter refused.

Issue

Does the Irrigation Canal constitute a valid encumbrance on Land X despite not appearing on the

Torrens title?

Held

No.

Here, Land X is covered by a TCT duly registered and originally covered by an OCT.

True, the Land Registration Act provides as an exception to the noted in said certificate requirement

the following:

Any public...or any government irrigation canal...where the certificate of title doesnt state

the boundaries of such...irrigation canal..have been determined.

However, such exception doesnt apply in this case because it applies only when the easement has

been pre-existing at the time the land was registered. If the easement was built only after the land was

registered, then proper expropriation proceedings and just compensation are in order.

Here, the irrigation canal was constructed after Land X was registered. Consequently, the exceptiondoesnt apply.


37/68



37

NIA vs CA

Facts

Vicente Manglapus received a free patent over 3 hectares of Land X and registered under an OCT.

The grant was subject to the following proviso:

and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and

prescribed by law especially those mentioned in CA 141 Sec. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and

114.

Later, respondent Dick Manglapus acquired Land X from Vicente and had a new TCT issued in his

name. Afterwards, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Corp. The contract

stipulated that NIA was to build canals and NIA entered a portion of Dicks land to make diggings.

Dick then filed suit against NIA.

Issue

Should NIA pay Dick just compensation for taking a portion of Land X for use as easement of a right

of way?

Held

No.

Here, both the OCT and TCT covering Land X contained a reservation granting the government a

right of way over Land X.

The TCT itself states the Title shall be subject further to such conditions contained in the original

title as may be subsisting. Under the OCT, there was a reservation under CA 141 Sec. 112 that

provides ...subject to a right of way not exceeding 20 meters in width for...irrigation ditches... Such

reservation isnt limited by any time period and therefore is a subsisting condition.

The canal NIA constructed was only 11 meters in width.


38/68



38

Republic vs Orfinada

Facts

This case is a complaint for annulment of title against the Sps. Orfinada. The Republic alleges the

Sps. Orfinada obtained their TCT by making it appear that it originated from an OCT in Guillermos

name. However, the OCT was actually issued in Paulinos name. Paulinos OCT was issued pursuant

to a Free Patent covering Land X that the Governor General issued in 1932.

Meanwhile, Guillermos OCT was based on a Free Patent covering Land Y that the Philippine

President granted in 1935. However, the Free Patent was issued under the Public Land Act that took

effect only in 1936.

In their defense, the Sps. Orfinada claim that Guillermos Free Patent was actually issued in 1937.

Further, they bought the land from Guillermo in 1955 under a Deed of Absolute Sale duly registered

with the Registry of Deeds. Later, they sold the land to Insurance Savings and Investment Agency

(ISIA).

Issue

Is the Sps. Orfinadas TCT spurious due to the alleged conflicting OCTs?

Held

No.

The Republic itself admitted that only the Free Patent is on file with the Registry of Deeds while

Paulinos OCT itself is no longer available. While the Governor General may have issued a Free

Patent in Paulinos name, it doesnt follow an OCT was actually issued as well.

Further, fraud isnt immediately presumed just because there are 2 conflicting copies of the same

OCT. This is because the Free Patents that are the basis of the 2 OCTs respectively cover 2 different

lands, namely Land X and Land Y. In other words, theres no overlapping of boundaries.

Also, Republics allegation that Guillermos Free Patent was defective because the same was issued

in 1935 while the Public Land Act was passed only in 1936 is untenable. The Sps. Orfinadas TCT

itself stipulates the Free Patent was issued in 1937.

Lastly, even assuming Guillermos OCT was defective, the Sps. Orfinada are buyers in good faith and

have acquired rights over Land Y.

A Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred therein, and a strong

presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is

incontrovertible against any other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the

Torrens title. Moreover, a person dealing with property covered by a Torrens title isnt required to go

beyond what appears on its face provided he has no knowledge of any circumstance which wouldraise the suspicion of a reasonable man.


39/68



39

Spouses Laburada vs LRA

Facts

The Sps. Laburada applied to register Land X that the RTC granted. The decision became final and

the RTC issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration.

However, the LRA refused the order because Land X was already covered by another Torrens title.

The Sps. Laburada then filed this action for mandamus to compel the LRA to issue the decree.

Issue

Can the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue the corresponding decree?

Held

No.

First, the judgement isnt executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.

Consequently, the Sps. Laburada dont have any clear legal right to implement it. A judgement of

registration doesnt become executory until after the expiration of 1 year after entry of the final decree

of registration.

Second, its possible the RTCs judgement is void and the LRAs refusal to issue the corresponding

decree is reasonable. The RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a Torrens title over registered land. The

LRA is mandated to refer to the RTC any doubt it may have in issuing the corresponding decree. In

this sense, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as court officers, and their act is the

courts act. The LRA is specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and

cadastral land registration proceedings.

Third, issuing the corresponding decree is part of the courts judicial function and isnt a mere

ministerial act which can be compelled through mandamus. Such act involves exercising discretion.

Fourth, the instant action takes the form of a prohibited collateral attack against the 1st Torrens title.

A Torrens title must be attacked in a proceeding for that purpose.


40/68



40

De Pedro vs Romasan

Facts

The Sps. Pedro filed a complaint for damages against respondent Romasan. The complaint alleges the

Sps. Pedro own Land X evidenced by an OCT in their name. Later, Romasan installed fences on the

perimeter of the adjacent property and during construction the Sps. Pedros farm house and

plantations were destroyed. Further, Romasan claimed a portion of Land X and prevented the Sps.

Pedro from entering such portion.

Meanwhile, Romasan defended itself by presenting a TCT in its name that includes the disputed

portion.

A relocation survey on Property X was conducted which revealed that the disputed portion was

indeed part of the OCT. However, the TCTs technical description also included the disputed portion.

In short, there is an overlapping of boundaries.

Issue

Who really owns Land X? Sps. Pedro through their OCT or Romasan through its TCT?

Held

Undetermined || The case is a prohibited collateral attack on a Torrens title.

Here, resolving the issue will involve altering, correcting, or modifying either the OCT or TCT. If the

property belongs to the Sps. Pedro, Romasans TCT technical description will have to be corrected. If

its the other way around, then the property covered by the Sps. Pedros OCT will have to be

corrected instead.

However, the correction of both titles can be made only through an action for said purpose because a

Torrens title isnt subject to a collateral attack. It cant be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a

direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The Sps. Pedros action is one to recover possession of Land X and damages. However, such action is

a collateral attack of the TCT. Even Romasan collaterally attacked the OCT by setting up as defense

the fact Land X was already covered by the TCT.


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41

Leyson vs NanciansinoBontuyan

Facts

Calixto owns Land X that was later divided into X-1 and X-2. Calxito then sold both Lands to Tabal

who in turn sold them to Noval and in turn sold them to Leyson. But the Tax Declarations for both

Lands remained in Novals name.

Gregorio Bontuyan, Novals father-in-law, then filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a

free patent over both Lands. The Bureau of Lands granted the application and Free Patents were

issued leading to an OCT over both Lands registered in Gregorios name. Gregorio then sold both

Lands to Nanciansino Bontuyan and TCT for both Lands were issued in Nanciansinos name.

Later, Nanciansino discovered Leyson living on the Lands and demanded he vacate the property.

Leyson refused causing Nanciansino to file suit against Leyson to quiet title and damages.

Issue

Can Leyson demand the OCT and TCT of respondents be nullified and the Lands reconveyed to him?

HeldYes.

Here, Nanciansino had the burden of proving Gregorio owned the Lands and the latter acquired the

property in good faith and for valuable consideration. However, Nanciansino failed to discharge this

burden.

The evidence shows un unbroken line of sale starting from Calixto ending in Leyson. At no point

were the Lands sold to Gregorio. Consequently, Gregorio, not being the Lands owner, cant sell the

same to Nanciansino. Gregorio cant feign ignorance of Novals ownership over the Lands because:

1. Noval was his son-in-law

2. He received the Tax Declarations covering the Lands issued in Novals name.

In short, Gregorio was in bad faith when he acquired the Lands.

In contrast, Leyson produced in evidence Tax Declarations issued since 1945 as well as the Deeds of

Absolute Sale tracing ownership from Calixto to him.

Next, Leyson directly attacked the OCT over Land X-1 because in Leysons answer to the complaint,

he inserted a counterclaim alleging Gregorio secured the OCT through fraud and deceit and prayed

for its nullification.

An action is an attack on title if the object is to nullify the same thus challenging the proceeding

pursuant to which title was decreed. The attack is direct when the actions object is to annul or set

aside the proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is collateral when theaction is to obtain a different relief, and the attack on the proceeding is merely an incident thereof.

Such direct attack on a Torrens title may be in an original action or a counterclaim. A counterclaim is

considered a new suit where the 2 parties, plaintiff & defendant, switch places. Its as if it were an

independent action. Here, Leysons counterclaim constitutes a direct attack because the actions

object is to annul the OCT alleging fraud on Gregorios part.


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42

Herce vs Cabuyao

Facts

Juanita Carpena applied to judicially register Land X consisting 44 parcels of land. The RTC granted

the application and directed the decree of registration be issued for Land X. However, only 42 of 44

parcels of land were issued decrees of registration. Parcel 43 was subjected to a Cadastral proceeding.

Herce opposed in the Cadastral proceeding claiming ownership over Parcel 43, arguing he purchased

the same from Jose Carpena, Juanitas predecessor-in-interest. The RTC awarded Parcel 43 to Herce

but the decree of registration couldnt be issued because it was previously included in in the judicial

registration case.

Herce then filed a petition to modify the decision in the judicial registration case to exclude Parcel 43

that the RTC granted. With no more legal impediments, a decree of registration was issued in Herces

favor. However, the Municipality of Cubao petitioned to reopen the decree of registration issued in

Herces favor claiming a decree of registration over Parcel 43 was issued in its name since 1911. The

RTC granted Cubaos petition and set aside the decree of registration in Herces favor.

IssueIs Cubao precluded from reopening the decree of registration?

Held

No.

Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Once a

decree of registration is issued and the 1-year period from date of record has passed, Title is perfected

and cant be collaterally attacked later on.

Here, the evidence shows a decree of registration was issued in Cubaos name since 1911 and

therefore has become indefeasible. Cubaos claim of ownership is based on the entry in the Ordinary

Decree Book that is a public document and is prima facie proof of the entires appearing therein.Consequently, its presumed the decree of registration was regularly issued in the absence of contrary

proof. Herces decree of registration was issued in 1997 and clearly, more than 1 year has elapsed

since Cubaos decree of registration was issued.

Further, Parcel 43 isnt susceptible to prescription because the same is registered land. Also, estoppel

or laches isnt a defense against the Government asserting its own rights or recovering its own

property.

Finally, land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cant again be the

subject of adjudication. Cubao rightfully owns Parcel 43.


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43

Araneta Foundation vs RTC

Facts

The Government expropriated Gonzales estate with the understanding the estate would be sold to the

occupants. However, the Government failed to sell the estate causing the occupants and tenants to file

suit to compel the sale. In this suit, Araneta Foundation intervened on the ground it and the tenants

entered into a Kasunduan with the latter conveying to the former the priority rights to purchasing the

estate.

On the basis of this Kasunduan, a Compromise Agreement (Agreement) was reached. The Agreement

included Lots 1 & 2, originally awarded to Gregorio. On the basis of the Kasunduan, Araneta was

able to secure in its name a TCT for both lots. However, it turned out the Kasunduan was forged and

subsequently declared void. The Heirs of Gregorio then filed a motion to nullify Aranetas TCT over

Lots 1 & 2 and have the same reconveyed to them. The RTC granted the motion canceling Aranetas

TCT and issuing another TCT for Lots 1 & 2 in Gregorios name.

Araneta then filed suit alleging the RTCs orders nullifying its TCT and issuing another in Gregorios

name was a prohibited collateral attack.

Issue

Is the nullification of Aranetas TCT a prohibited collateral attack?

Held

No.

True, the civil case was originally an action for specific performance and damages; nonetheless the

case cant constitute a collateral attack that to begin with was illegally issued.

Here

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