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'Coloured Revolution' as a Political PhenomenonDavid Lane

Online publication date: 18 November 2010

To cite this Article Lane, David(2009) ''Coloured Revolution' as a Political Phenomenon', Journal of Communist Studiesand Transition Politics, 25: 2, 113 135

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13523270902860295URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523270902860295

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Coloured Revolution as a PoliticalPhenomenon

D A V I D L A N E

Different forms of political change from putsch to revolution are described andcoloured revolutions are analysed as revolutionary coups detat. Conditions promot-

ing and retarding the success of such movements are discussed and cases of decremen-tal relative deprivation are discovered which predisposed the public to insurgency.Conditions for success involved a united and organized opposition with an alternativeideology and political policy. Counter-elites when in power neither carry out revolu-tions nor promote democratic development. An unintended consequence of democracypromotion is that autocratic regimes learn to counteract it and in so doing weakengenuine civil society associations.

Following the transformation of the European state socialist countries in theperiod after 1989, the East European countries formed several distinct

blocs: the new members of the European Union, those that aspired to

membership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) and a group of only

partially reformed countries (Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). In several of these countries coloured revolutions

have occurred: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan

(2005). These public protests have adopted a colour (orange for Ukraine, rose

for Georgia) as a symbol to identify their supporters and the character of the

movement, although Serbia is referred to as a bulldozer revolution. In 2005,in other countries with a similar economic and political trajectory (Russia,

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) comparable events were initiated although they

were thwarted before they occurred or were successfully suppressed. Such

phenomena, moreover, are not restricted to the former state socialist societies,

Lebanon had its cedar revolution in 2005 and George W. Bush referred to

David Lane is a Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. His previous posts include Professor ofSociology at the University of Birmingham, and Reader in Sociology at the University of Essex.He has written extensively on the USSR and state socialism, Marxism and socialism, class andstratification; his more recent writings have focused on transformation of state socialism, globa-lization and civil society, and the enlargement of the European Union. Research in this articlewas supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.23, JuneSeptember 2009,pp.113135ISSN 1352-3279 print/1743-9116 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13523270902860295# 2009 Taylor & Francis

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the purple revolution in Iraq as the coming of democracy after the 2005

elections.

These processes have been linked to the earlier wave of transitions from

autocratic rule.1 Portugals Revolution of the Carnations of April 1974 is

seen as the beginning of this movement, which crested with the collapse

of communist regimes in 1989.2 However, the Portuguese revolution was

more like a military coup in which, to express solidarity with the people,

soldiers carried carnations in the muzzles of their rifles and tank guns. This

coup-like character continued, I shall argue, in the later coloured revolutions.

The activities given the popular appellation of coloured revolutions all

had in common a proposed socio-political transformation intended to intro-

duce democracy from below. Although differing in content, they shared a

common strategy: mass protests occurred within the constitutional frameworkto widen forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as

a movement for greater democracy: they were all targeted on removing the

incumbent political leaderships; electoral procedures, allegedly fraudulent,

were a regular focus for the insurgents; the public gatherings were constituted

from a mass base of young people, particularly students. In comparison with

traditional political demonstrations, a novel feature was the orchestration of

events through the use of modern media technology mobile phones, the

internet and assistance from local and foreign media. The demonstrations,

in support of a supposedly democratic champion, once under way wereaccompanied to a greater or lesser degree by mass cultural events: rock and

pop music, which helped mobilize, create solidarity, and entertain mass

audiences.

The promotion and organization of these popular manifestations required

considerable resources propaganda, musicians, entertainers and even the

organizers and participants received payment and subsistence during the

events. While these protests were legitimated in democratic terms, whether

they achieved democratization is another matter. It is also debatable

whether this type of political event constituted a peoples revolution or aform of coup detat.

The International Perspective

It is clear that these public events were cumulative and sequential in the sense

that the earlier successful protest activity (particularly in Serbia and Ukraine)

acted as positive models for subsequent demonstrations.3 However, they each

had their own peculiarities dependent on local circumstances, the configur-

ation of elites, and the predispositions of people to mobilization. Such con-

ditions provided the opportunity for public demonstration, the lack of such

opportunity, or the suppression of it.

114 JOUR NAL OF C OM M UNIST STUDIES AND TR ANSITION POLITIC S

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Analysis of the coloured revolutions requires an international perspective.

Proponents of democracy promotion have widely utilized the work of, and

protest techniques defined by, Gene Sharps From Dictatorship to Democ-

racy.4 All had moral and financial support from external sources, particularly

Western foundations supporting democratic institutions and processes. A form

of soft political power was utilized by the West to undermine established

governments. Such policy is derived from the ideas of writers such as

Joseph Nye, who have advocated a shift from the use of military force and

coercion to the promotion of internal change through manipulation of the

norms and values of citizens.5 Through the use of multiple channels of com-

munication, the projection of the domestic achievements and international

performance of the West is likely, claims Nye, to be to the advantage of the

USA and Europe. Attraction can refer to political values (democracy,freedom, justice), cultural artefacts (pop music, art) and consumption articles

(McDonalds food, mobile phones). Promotion of internal change through

manipulation of the norms and values of citizens is a major strategy.

The countries that are likely to gain from soft power are those closest to

global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the

most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose

credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.

These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States

and Europe.6

Foreign policy, derived from this standpoint, involves support of civil-

society associations to pursue, by peaceful and legitimate means, regime

change in authoritarian states. This position has been adopted by successive

American administrations. George W. Bush, in his inaugural address in

2005, made clear that it is the policy of the United States to seek and

support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation

and culture.7 Policies of democratization abroad are an important part of

the neo-conservative value of creating an international order of values associ-ated with American (and its allies) ways of doing things. Support of coloured

revolutions that contest allegedly fraudulent elections in authoritarian states are

forms of soft power. Unlike the 1974 Revolution of Carnations in Portugal,

which had a leftist orientation advocating not only democratic reforms but also

the nationalization of property, the political complexion of the coloured

revolutions has been right-wing. The insurgents have emphasized freedom,

rights to private property, market mechanisms and opposition to state regulation.

Moreover, in appropriate cases, they have advocated support for joining Western

alliances such as NATO and the European Union (EU).

Most Western interpretations of the coloured revolutions, academic and

journalistic alike, have emphasized their positive intentions and consequences

C O L O U R E D R E V O L U T I O N A S A P O L I T I C A L P H E N O M E N O N 115

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and legitimated them as part of the Third Wave of democratization identified

by Samuel P. Huntington.8 They remov[ed] authoritarian leaders from politi-

cal power . . . What we have witnessed in the postcommunist world, therefore,

is an unexpectedly successful diffusion of electoral revolutions . . . where illib-

eral leaders were replaced by their liberal counterparts.9 Such writers project

the electoral model of regime change.10 [E]lections are the indicator of

democracy a form of government that has become a global norm.11 Such

writing borders on the political authorization of an electoral process that is

a tool in neo-conservative politics. By limiting the definition of democracy

to a narrowly conceived political mechanism,12 the concept is emptied of any

policy outcomes on, and continuous deliberation of, public issues.13

Critics argue that what appear to be popular revolutions are disguised

coups detat. Opposition forces counter-elites who are unable to mobilizeeffectively against incumbent governments, organize revolutionary events to

galvanize support and legitimate a transfer of power through popular elec-

tions. Natalya Narochnitskaya14 argues that the voice of the people is an

illegitimate use of modern media technology (television, radio and the

press) to create public opinion to force political change. Non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), with powerful sponsors, become political bodies

working through networks and the media rather than being rooted in civil

society and acting on behalf of citizens. Sponsors,15 directly or indirectly

financed by outside governments, become involved in insurgent activity,defining democracy in terms of their own conceptions and magnifying election

frauds to promote and legitimate a coup detat to their political advantage.

The accusation of fraud is sometimes made before the election results

are counted and follows a campaign of discrediting the incumbent power-

holders. Exit polls are an instrument of politics, and once election fraud is

declared it is amplified by the media. The initial claim of election fraud

in Ukraine, for example, was based on exit polls in October 2004 and

again in the following month showing the challenger, Yushchenko, as

victor. These claims set the political scene the taken for granted politicalassumptions that election fraud had taken place. In the case of the failed

revolution led by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia in

February 2008, despite statements by international observers that the elec-

tions were close to European standards and that few irregularities took

place, opposition media reports asserted that the election was accompanied

by brawling, threats and manipulation.16 Like the other phenomena dis-

cussed here, the Armenian disturbances had the character of an attempted

coup detat by a former politician supported by crowds estimated at

between 10,000 and 50,000 in number.

What is portrayed in the media as peoples power is in reality an elite-

manipulated demonstration. While the masses may be captivated by euphoric


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revolutionary ideology, they are in political terms instruments of indigenous

counter-elites, often encouraged by foreigners with their own agendas. If

successful, rather than such revolutions leading to significant socio-political

change, a circulation of elites follows the ousting of former rulers or their

co-option into a new elite structure. The coloured revolution phenomenon is

a new type of political movement that needs to be fitted into a paradigm of

political change. In this essay, I first consider different forms of political

change. Second, I conceptualize the coloured revolutions as novel types of

revolutionary activity: a combination of public protest and coup detat a

revolutionary coup. Third, I consider the conditioning factors leading to the

rise of the phenomenon of the coloured revolution. Finally, I consider the

extent to which coloured revolutions might be a success or a failure.

Types of Political Change

In analysing political change, one may distinguish between a putsch, a coup

detat and a revolution. The criteria used to define these types of political

change are:

. type of organization of political activity;

. level of public participation;

. intentions of the insurgents and counter political elitism; and

. the consequences.

The definition of various types of political change in terms of organization,

level of public participation and intentions of insurgents and counter-elites

is summarized in Table 1. A putsch may be defined as a sudden illegitimate

overthrow of a ruling elite by another competing elite (for example, the

installation of a military regime in place of a political one); the level of

public participation is low, the objectives of the insurgents are to replace

the existing elite with a new one. A coup detat is an illegitimate replacementor renewal of one governing set of personnel by another (e.g. the substitution

of a ruling faction of a political party by another from that party or another

party). For both of these political processes relatively little public participation

is needed, either in the overthrow or in the defence of the incumbents; and they

have by intention no significant social or economic effects.

A revolution is a more complex process. Charles Tilly defines a revolu-

tion as a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at

least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control

the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the

states jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc.17 This definition

is similar to that of Goodwin,18 who defines a revolution as any and all


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instances in which a state or government is overthrown by a popular move-

ment in an extra-constitutional or violent manner. However, these approaches

ignore the type of social movement, the level of popular participation and the

policy intentions of the insurgents. There are different kinds of revolution.19

A maximalist definition of a social or political revolution requires not only

mass participation but also an ideology on which is predicated a fundamental

replacement of the political class and socio-economic system. Moreover,

major changes take place in the social and economic system consequent on

the political transformation of the ruling elites by a new political class

taking power. Theda Skocpol is the best-known articulator of this position:

she emphasizes the transformation of a societys state and class structures.20

After the event, we know that the coloured revolutions were more than

palace putsches but they were not revolutions in the classic sense, and forseveral reasons. First, the thrust for radical change did not come from

below, but from elites or counter-elites in the existing political classes.

Top down social transformations do not qualify to be termed revolu-

tions21 as by definition the contenders for power cannot be part of the state

administration. Second, the outcomes involved changes in personnel of the

state and led to shifts in foreign policy and international alignments, but

they did not cause a system change: ownership of property remained the same.

Coloured revolutions do not fall into the models described above. Leader-

ship by counter-elites with the objective of replacing the dominant elite is

characteristic of a putsch and a coup detat. Unlike those two processes,

coloured revolutions have the distinguishing characteristic of a high level of

TA B LE 1

T Y P E S O F P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E : P U T S C H , C O U P D E T A T , P O L I T I C A L/S O C I A L

R E V O LU TIO N

Type of

PoliticalChange

Type ofOrganization

Level of PublicParticipation

Intentions of

Insurgents orCounter-elites

Consequences, ifsuccessful

Putsch Counter-eliteled

Low Elite replacement New elite

Coup detat Elite orcounter-elite led

Low Governing eliterenewal

New personnel inruling elite

ClassicalPolitical/Social

Revolution

Counter-eliteled

Very high:mass pushfrom below

Redress publicgrievancesthrough

fundamentalreplacement ofpolitical class andsocio-economicsystem

New political class,reconstitutedinstitutions,

includingproperty relations


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public participation. They do not fall into the category of classic revolutions

because they have no political theory of major social change. The political

objective is replacement of an elite rather than the substitution of a new

ruling class for the existing one and the transformation of property relations.

With the possible exception of Serbia, the coloured revolution insurgents

sought a change of leadership that would fulfil the promises of the transform-

ation from communism to capitalism and democracy. The existing post-

communist elites had not delivered what they had promised. Major differences

from a normal coup detat are to be found in the role of leadership, the high

level of public participation, and finance from external sources. Unlike

classic revolution, these phenomena lack a revolutionary class pushing from

below for socio-political change.

Coloured revolutions may fit into yet another type of political category:that of a revolutionary coup detat. The coloured revolutions did not entail

any system changes of regime type (despite such demands by many of the

supporters), but were intended to install new political incumbents. Mass

involvement takes place which makes the movement more than a coup

detat. We may distinguish between such a coup and a social or political

revolution. Whereas in a revolutionary coup detat public participation is of

a passive audience type, in a political revolution, the public (in the form

of autonomous civil-society associations) has a positive input to political

activity, requiring significant social change. Finally, the outcomes arecrucial. If the intentions of the insurgents are not subsequently realized in

structural transformation, a political revolution cannot be said to have

occurred. In this way, we may distinguish a social or political revolution

from a coup detat that is a consequence of public protest.

Revolutionary Coup detat

A revolutionary coup detat is a change of the political leadership instigated by

internal or external counter-elites through the agency of mass popular support.Such an event has high elite (or counter-elite) participation, and high public

(mass) involvement but of an audience type. The intentions of the insurgents

are to redress public grievances, to promote the objectives of transformation,

and to do this through elite renewal, not through the reconstitution of the social

economic order. Real economic and social grievances about falling living

standards, health care, distribution of wealth and land, and unemployment

may underpin the protests for the mass participants.22 This type of activity

is illustrated in Table 2.

Evidence for the successful revolutions to be considered as coups is

found in the background of the leaders who came to power after the events.

In Serbia, the opponents of Milosevic were leading politicians. Vojislav


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Kostunica, for example, who stood as the candidate opposing Milosevic, hadbeen the founder of the anti-communist and pro-Western Democratic Party.

Another prominent member of the opposition was Tomislav Nikolic who had

been a deputy prime minister in the coalition government of Yugoslavia in

19992000. In Georgia, those who came to power as a consequence of the dis-

turbances were Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and Mikheil Saakashvili: all

had held posts in parliament and Saakashvili had been a minister (of justice)

under Shevardnadze. In Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko had been head of the

national bank as well as prime minister under Kuchma; he was joined by

Yulia Tymoshenko, herself a leading economic oligarch. In Kyrgyzstan aformer prime minister with roots in the Soviet period, Kurmanbek Bakiev,

and Roza Otunbaeva, previously foreign minister, played leading parts in the

movement to bring down the government of Askar Akaev. Much of the positive

evaluation of the peoples revolutions ignores the literature on elite compe-

tition and the clan-like nature of politics in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan23 and Ukraine.

Viewing the coloured revolutions as a revolutionary coup, we may fit into

place the domestic elite-led as well as the foreign character of these events.

It gives a place for organizations such as the OSCE,24 USAID and foreign

sponsored NGOs to set the agenda, and thus act for the West as agents ofsoft politics democracy promotion. The OSCE and related organizations

such as ODIHR25 have given priority to democracy promotion which it

defines in terms of electoral rights and government corruption. These bodies

have said very little about social security or rights to work or welfare, and

made no criticisms of economic fraud, which occurred on a massive scale

in the process of privatization.

The coloured revolutions were sequential in character, and the success of

one precipitated action for others to follow.26 However, the structural and

psychological predispositions of the population are also important determi-

nants. The mobilization of mass support against the regime is shaped by

underlying social and economic inadequacies, or unfulfilled expectations on

TA B LE 2

R EV O LU TIO N A R Y C O U P D ET A T

Type ofPolitical Change

Type ofOrganization

Level of PublicParticipation

Intentions of Insurgents/Counter-elites

Consequences,if successful

Revolutionarycoup detat

Elite or counter-elite led

High: audienceparticipation

Redress publicgrievances. For elites,renewal of governingelite; for massparticipants, changesof leaders andpriorities

New personnelin rulingelite


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which the counter-elites capitalized. Differences in these structural and

psychological attributes help explain the success and failure of the coloured

revolutionary coups.

Outcomes of Revolution

The problem for analysis, however, is how much of an example the early

upsurges were for those that followed: how is the example of others

copied, modified or ignored in host countries? We need also to analyse the

extent to which, and why, people may be predisposed or prone to follow the

example. One might re-group the various political phenomena by different

criteria to explain why some have succeeded and others have failed.

Table 3 distinguishes between the different outcomes of coloured revo-lution activity. It distinguishes between changes in political elite composition

and consequent political and economic developments, and it differentiates the

countries by the extent of mass participation. Mass participation should not

be conflated into peoples democracy promotion: such participation might be

motivated by other grievances of a regional, ethnic, class or generational

kind or it may be emotional or mercenary.27

To fit countries into these various boxes requires a considerable research

exercise. Five countries (Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and

Uzbekistan) experienced failed popular protests against the regime. In 1989,China had a relatively high-level protest (in the sense that the centre of the

capital was paralysed by demonstrators), but there was no significant change

of regime. In Ukraine, the demonstrators succeeded in changing a major actor

in the political elite, through the election of President Viktor Yushchenko,

but subsequent political change was minimal. In Kyrgyzstan, the Akaev

clan was ousted as a consequence of a protest movement originating in the

south of the country and other clans came to power. In that country, the

TA B L E 3

O U TC O MES O F C O LO U R ED R E V O LU TIO N S

Change ofRuling Elite

Level of Public Participation in Mass Activity

Subsequent PoliticalSystem Change Low High

Nil Belarus, Russia,Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan

China Nil

Some andcontinuity

Ukraine,Kyrgyzstan

Low

High Serbia, Georgia High


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Tulip revolution was driven by independent business interests, informal net-

works and patronage ties [that] remained strong after [the exit of President

Akaev].28 The aftermath of the revolution did not reverse the previous pat-

terns of corruption: the March events appear . . . mostly to have worsened

Kyrgyzstans political instability, with rising numbers of assassinations and

unruly crowd actions.29 Akaevs successor, Bakiev, recognized a dubiously

elected parliament (the election results of which had been invalidated by the

supreme court), and the new regime acted as a means to protect its members

private interests.30 As Scott Radnitz puts it, there was not a regime change,

but a transfer of power.31 Even in terms of electoral procedures, the 2007

election was faulted the governing party received 71 of the 90 seats after

receiving only 49 per cent of the vote, and the main opposition party received

no seats at all. These results were derived from an electoral system that requireda qualifying threshold for seats of 5 per cent and another 0.5 per cent in each of

the regional voting constituencies: such a system clearly discriminated against

regionally based parties. The OSCE preliminary report tamely described the

election as a missed opportunity and the electoral system as unusual.32

The opposition in Serbia and Georgia was successful in effecting a major

change of government personnel. In Serbia, a significant Westward shift of

orientation in foreign affairs occurred. In Georgia under Saakashvili, a more

neo-liberal course was followed concurrently with the strengthening of the

state. While President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power as a lauded democraticreformer, he was soon castigated by the opposition for persecuting opponents and

curbing media freedom.33 Following the unsuccessful offensive against the

separatist South Ossetia in 2008, opposition leaders organized demonstrations

of some 20,000 calling for presidential and parliamentary elections, election

legislative reforms, media freedom and the freeing of political prisoners.34

The opposition, led by the United National Movement, has alleged political

killings, on top of the taking of political prisoners by the Sakaashvili regime.35

Clearly, regime change following the coloured revolutions has not unequi-

vocally led to greater democratization, even in terms of a narrowly definedelectoral politics.

Conditioning Factors for Success and Failure

The political and sociological puzzle is to explain why, if the objectives of the

insurgents were similar (namely, democracy promotion), the outcomes were

different. Three major conditioning factors are singled out that help to

explain the success or failure of democracy promotion, as proposed by

coloured revolution activity: (i) elites and a population predisposed to

radical change; (ii) ideological mobilization and policy promotion; and (iii)

practical political alternatives to the status quo. If we examine these three


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factors in relation to the post-socialist countries, we are able to understand

why coloured revolutions occurred and were either successful or unsuccessful.

Public PredispositionsPredisposition for change is to a considerable extent a consequence of the

effects of transformation. It is assumed that where transformation policies

have led to unemployment, poverty and a decline in living standards, then

there is a predisposition by the population for change. Of the countries

under discussion, Belarus and China have had least disruption to economic

life and have retained many of the economic and political structures of state

socialism. Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia all initially suffered substan-

tial declines in GNP and a large proportion of the population lived in poverty.

Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 2005 GDP had increased in most ofthe former state socialist countries; only Uzbekistan had suffered a decline.

However, these figures ignore the distribution of wealth and income which,

under state socialism, was relatively egalitarian and comparable to European

welfare states.

As shown in Figure 1A, several of these countries (China, Turkmenia,

Georgia and RF) currently have levels of inequality at similar (or higher in

the case of China) levels to the USA and very much higher than welfare

states such as Denmark.

Figure 2 shows that life expectancy declined considerably even during

these four years: only China, Belarus and Kazakhstan had an increase in life

expectancy.

F I G U R E 1

G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T P E R P E R S O N 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 5

Sources: 2005: Human Development Report 200708, pp.22830, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/HDR_20072008, accessed 13 Sept. 2008. 2000: Human Development Report 2002 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2002). pp.14950.Note: Kyrgyzstan 2000 data not available, 2003 data shown in table; HDR 2005, p.219; RF,Russian Federation.


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Figure 3 shows the relationship between GDP and national wellbeing,

measured in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). The index sub-

tracts the rank of human development from the rank of GDP: hence a low

rank in GDP (say, 100) minus a high rank in HDI (say 25) gives an index

of 75. The higher the index, the better the use made of GDP to promote

human development. We note that with the exception of Kazakhstan and

the Russian Federation, all the post-socialist countries had a relatively high

index. Moreover, with the notable exceptions of Uzbekistan and Belarus,

both of which have retained a considerable role for state redistribution, all

suffered considerable reductions between 2000 and 2005.

F I G U R E 1 A

LEV ELS O F IN C O ME D I ST R IB U TIO N : G IN I I N D EX ES 2001 3

Source: Human Development Report 200708, pp.2814.Notes: A gini coefficient shows the ratio of the richest 10 per cent to the poorest 10 per cent. A ratio

of 0 indicates absolute equality, one of 100 absolute inequality.

F I G U R E 2

L I F E E X P E C T A N C Y 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 5

Source: As Figure 1.


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These data indicate that general social conditions were worsening in all the

countries with the exception of Belarus and to some degree China although

income differentials in China rose at an alarmingly high rate. Russia is a par-

ticularly striking case: its income has risen, but it has experienced a fall in lifeexpectancy and its GDP HDI index is negative. These figures would lead one

to suppose that there has been a rise in the condition of decremental relative

deprivation as defined by Ted Robert Gurr.36 Peoples expectations remain

constant (or may even rise, in anticipation of gains to be made from the end

of communism) but, despite a general rise in GDP between 2000 and 2005,

the capabilities to meet them have fallen. In Gurrs terms, welfare (that is,

economic), political and inter-personal value opportunities have declined,

and constituted conditions predisposing people to political protest. There

has been a weakening in the levels of loyalty and trust in government and acritical fall in support for the regime. (This is evidenced in public opinion

poll data, not included in this study.) Not all the states we have examined

here have experienced insurgency; in those that have, the experience has

varied in intensity. Relative deprivation, however intense, may predispose

to insurgency, but is not sufficient to cause it. For Lenin a spark (in

Russian, iskra) was necessary, and the activists behind the coloured revolu-

tions provided this spark to ignite supposed election fraud. The strategy of

the coloured revolutions is Leninist in conception. As one youth organizer

has put it, the resistance movement has three components: unity of opposition,

discipline and a good strategic plan.37 Both organization and people predis-

posed to participate in civil strife are necessary for protests to succeed.

F I G U R E 3

G D P P E R C A P I T A ( P P P U S $ ) R A N K M I N U S H D I R A N K , 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 5

Source: As Figure 1.


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How then did levels of inequality, indicated by the gini indexes, correlate

with the extent of public protest? This relationship is depicted in Figure 4, in

which inequality is shown by the top line. The measurement of public protest

is taken from numbers participating in protest as measured by OSCE38

(to which I have added China). Although such data may have many inaccura-

cies, they probably capture the relativity of popular protest between different

countries. The trend line is plotted against the rising curve of inequality.

Data show the ranking of demonstrations, 1 (Ukraine) being the highest

number of demonstrators and Mongolia the lowest. Correlation betweeninequality and numbers of demonstrators are 0.09 (Pearson) and 0.02

(Spearman), indicating no significant correlation at all. The results are strongly

influenced by two extreme cases. China has the highest level of inequality

(46.9) and witnessed the second highest level of demonstrations. At the

other extreme comes Ukraine which has the highest number of demonstrations,

but the lowest level of inequality (29.1). If we excluded Ukraine, the corre-

lation rises to 0.29, indicating a much stronger relationship between

inequality and protest. If we remove both these extremes (China and Ukraine)

we have a more robust (negative) correlation: Pearson 0.41 (p 0.21,n 10) and Spearman 0.30 (p 0.40, n 10).39 Thus, our results are positive,

showing a distinct relationship between the levels of public demonstration and

inequality the higher the inequality (1 being low), the larger the public

demonstration (1 being high). Clearly, high levels of inequality associated

with poverty at one end of the scale and wealth at the other, concurrent with a

fall in living standards, predispose people to insurgency.

The data may need further interpretation. Possibly estimates of pro-Orange

public protest in Ukraine are too high. The demonstrators include those who

favoured the Orange activists and those who opposed them. It is also possible

that Orange activity politicized the population to a higher extent than would

otherwise have occurred a demonstration effect.40

F I G U R E 4

G I N I I N D E X A N D P O P U L A R P R O T E S T


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Ideological Mobilization and Policy Promotion

The protagonists of coloured revolutions not only de-legitimated the existing

regimes usually through electoral irregularities but provided an alterna-

tive set of values an ideological rationalization of radical change. Democ-racy promotion means, as Andrew Wilson approvingly points out, The West

promoting its own values [and] . . . help[ing] other countries [to] live up to

these values.41 This involves influencing elections and backing those

parties approved by the Wests leaders. What is ignored in much of the

diffusion of democracy literature is the power of Western governments

and international organizations to influence political outcomes in host states.42

Consider, for example, Serbia. While Valerie J. Bunce and Susan

L. Wolchik point out that international diffusion does not occur when a

powerful international actor orchestrates changes in weaker states,43

theysee change in Serbia as a case of collaboration between local and international

actors.44 However, the US and EU pursued an aggressive policy of system

change. As Christopher Lamont points out, both the USA and the EU coordi-

nated their efforts to

push Milosevic out of power, out of Serbia and in[to] the custody of the

war crimes tribunal. Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister

Joschka Fischer formulated a strategy that combined economic sanc-

tions with engagement with opponents to Slobodan Milosevic in theSRF itself. The United States not only invested heavily in funding oppo-

sition groups, but also opened a proxy office in the US embassy in Buda-

pest to coordinate efforts to bring about regime change in Belgrade.45

Moreover, the policy advocated by the EU presidency made clear that

elective sanctions aimed at the regime will remain a necessary element of

EU policy as long as President Milosevic stays in power. The European

Council appeals to the Serbian people to take their future into their ownhands and to reclaim their place in the family of democratic nations. The

EU for its part will not only continue to support the democratic opposi-

tion, but will also develop a comprehensive dialogue with civil society.46

System change was promoted, with financial support, by such organizations as

the German Marshall Fund, the Project on Transitional Democracies, the

Westminster Foundation and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

Money follows interests, and interests and ideology follow money. The

lack of foreign support for resistance and democracy promotion may occur

in countries where the US and its allies have economic interests (particularly

stakes in energy companies). Opposition to governments supporting the

terms of foreign extraction of energy supplies does not receive the same


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level of foreign support. As Ostrowski has pointed out, in Kazakhstan, Nazar-

baev at the time of the coloured revolutions was seen as the best guarantor of

Western investments and interests. Thus from the Western and most impor-

tantly the US perspective political change at the apex of power in Kazakhstan

was undesirable.47 Testimony to this effect is also available from Azerbaijan.

In the documentary film The Democratic Revolutionary Handbook,48 the

youth movement Magam was turned down for financial support by Western

foundations, including the Programme on Transitional Democracy, whose

director, Bruce Jackson, explained that Washington was not completely sure

that it was the opposition. An alternative explanation advanced by Magam

was that the President Aliev had negotiated oil deals with the multinationals,

which needed political stability: if a change in power took place, all contracts

would be worthless. The upshot of demonstrations in Azerbaijan in 2005 (andalso in Kazakhstan) was a complete rout of the democratic opposition.

For mobilization of the population in support of democracy promotion to

take place, there must be a counter-elite available and willing to accept financial

and moral support from both internal and Western sources. By the same logic,

those in the host countries who lose as a consequence of Western policy will

oppose the imposition of alien values. They will assert their own values and

seek their own champions, including those located outside the country. The

political and economic processes of the West, and particularly the image of

the USA, are not universally acclaimed, making questionable the assumptionsof soft politics theorists, such as Nye, that the West is likely to win a soft

politics war. American hegemony, which threatens some countries, is seen in

a negative light by the elites and public opinion in Russia, Belarus and China.

The reaction of authoritarian regimes in those three countries in pre-

empting dissident movements has been widely covered in the press in the

West. Measures taken against potential organizers of coloured revolution

include the banning of exit polls and the repression of opposition parties

and leaders. In Russia, under Putin and Medvedev, it has become increasingly

difficult for anti-statist (and pro-Western) counter-elites to organize andarticulate an alternative ideology. None the less, however reprehensible

repression may be, it alone cannot explain social stability. Repression can

only be carried out in the context of the predisposition of elites and publics

either to support collective anti-regime activity or to oppose it.49 As Elena

Korosteleva, with respect to Belarus, puts it: The specificity of Lukashenkos

regime lies with the electorate: it is the contentmentof many Belarusians and

their identification with the president that defines the regimes most enduring

feature its genuine legitimacy. Citing Max Weber, she points out that rule

is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so.50

Public opinion polls in Ukraine also show a very high rating for

Lukashenko and Putin as leaders consistently higher than even the


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champion of the Orange revolution, Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenkos stand-

ing after his election was 5.6 compared with President Kuchmas 2.7 in 2005

(based on the average of respondents answers on a ten-point scale51). In 2006,

however, Yushchenkos score had plummeted to 3.8, whereas Putin in both

2005 and 2006 was higher (6.0 and 6.3 respectively) even after the conflict

over the price of energy between the two countries. Yet more remarkable is the

popularity of the Belarusian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, who had higher

standing in Ukrainian public opinion in 2005 (5.8) and 2006 (6.3) than Yush-

chenko even in 2005. A statist national welfare regime has considerable

public appeal in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.

Political Alternatives

Elite consensus and division are important components of a revolutionarysituation. In Ukraine and Serbia there were divisions, whereas in Georgia

there was a fairly united elite who regarded Western support as a condition

for economic and political security. Moreover, joining the West, through mem-

bership of the European Union, was a positive attraction for Serbia, especially

given the economic consequences of the sanctions imposed by the EU. Alterna-

tive political strategies that might be followed by post-communist countries

involve possible membership of NATO, the EU, or both. Joining these insti-

tutions provides a positive end-game for democracy promotion an option

not open to countries such as Russia and Belarus. In Serbia, the elite was(and is) divided between, on one side, those favouring the market and stronger

links with the European Union and, on the other, the traditional leftist leaders

supporting state redistribution and a nationalist ideology. Kyrgyzstan has no

real options to join either the EU or NATO; democracy promotion occludes

a form of clan or interest politics, with a distinctive regional character.52

Ukraine is a more complicated case. Juxtaposed between Russia and the

European Union, there is a choice even if the pro-Western elite magnifies

and distorts the political possibility of EU membership. The interests of differ-

ent economic elites with bases in different parts of the country overlap withforms of ethnic identity: Western Ukrainians are oriented to the West, and

Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east look to Russia.53 The country has a

major ethnic and political division aligned along an eastwest axis. Moreover,

youth leadership in Ukraine was radicalized against the regime, and Western-

sponsored civil society organizations have been used positively in support of

the Orange tendency. The youth movement PORA (Its time), for example,

supported by the Westminster Foundation, brought in Serbian agitators to train

200 activists to organize the events that have later become known as the

Orange revolution.54

In Russia, Belarus and China, organized opposition to the incumbent

regime is severely restricted, whereas in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia there


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were particularly strong pro-Western groups that were able to coordinate

opposition interests, and whole strata in the population were predisposed to

these values. Conditions enabling mass demonstrations to take place were

present in Ukraine. It is widely believed that demonstrations are not possible

in Russia, although this is a questionable assumption. Massive demonstrations

have been held in Russia in support of pensioners rights, in opposition to the

monetarization of social service benefits and proposed reductions in the size of

the Russian army, as have smaller political rallies in support of candidates

opposing the present regime. The latter may not have been effective, but

they were held.55 But coloured revolution activity would certainly be

broken up by the authorities, and they would have the authority, in terms of

public sentiment, to do so. The political elite under Putin and Medvedev

has greater unity and would be able to suppress such demonstrations.Although the effects of transformation have led to relative deprivation in

Russia, the regime under Putin has enjoyed widespread popular support. The

demonstration effect of the coloured revolutions does not work. The lack of

success in Russia is connected with the legitimacy of the political elite and the

formation of an elite consensus.

Table 4 shows the combinations of predispositions, affinity to the West

and possibilities for political and social mobilization.

Countries in which elites (or counter-elites) have a strong affinity to the

EU or to NATO are clearly targets for successful democracy promotion as aform of soft power. Even where the predisposition for change may be

strong, as in Russia, a counter-elite has no alternative policy objective in

the form of a closer relationship with the leading institutions of the West

the EU and NATO. The failure of the market to enhance living standards,

TA B L E 4

C O N D ITIO N IN G FA C TO R S PR O MO TIN G/R ETA R D IN G D E MO C R A C Y PR O MO T IO N

Elite Affinity to EU

Negative or N/A

Predisposition for Change Consequent on

Effects of Transformation

Popular Affinity toNATO The West

Strong Strong Weak

KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA BELARUS Negative

Divided UKRAINE, SERBIA Divided

Positive GEORGIA Positive

High Low Low

Mobilization of Public for DemocracyPromotion


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and the illegitimacy of the privatization process, have weakened the standing

of neo-liberal capitalism. In Georgia, however, predispositions as well as

mobilization of the public are strong, and the economic and political elites

can advocate a viable alternative membership of NATO and the EU.

Belarus has weak predispositions and public mobilization for democracy

promotion, and no policy option of membership of either NATO or the EU.

The initial success of coloured revolution is where these four factors have a

positive effect: strong public dispositions for change and high public mobiliz-

ation, together with an alternative political policy usually in terms of

membership of NATO and or the EU; or more generally, a Western type of

modernization based on the market and private property.

Conclusion: Future Scenarios

What is common to all the Central and East European countries outside the

European Union is disappointment with the consequences of the transform-

ation. The coloured revolution is one way to correct the transformation

outcome: opposition to the corrupt incumbent elites concurrent with a

renewed effort towards modernization along Western lines greater pluralism,

strengthening of the market and a Western political alignment. For regimes such

as Belarus, Uzbekistan and Russia, there is a move back towards a statist frame-

work involving limitations on pluralism and greater statist redistribution.Many accounts provide a rather simplistic version of events promoting

democratic change, in terms of electoral revolutions. They envisage a push

from below from liberals seeking to introduce democracy, civil rights and

well-being against an illiberal autocratic regime riddled with corruption. The

push is relatively autonomous, although stimulated by the pull of the movers

of the coloured revolutions Western-sponsored civil society organizations.

The reality is that the thrust for change comes from counter-elites, either

from within the ruling political class, or from outside, who seek to replace

(or join) the existing elite. Legitimacy is achieved through democracypromotion. Where internal regime change is precluded by the institutional

structure, counter-elites sponsor and utilize a mass movement, and they legit-

imate protest as democracy promotion. Regime weakness is greatest at times

of elections which then become a focus for political change. Allegedly frau-

dulent election results are the trigger for protest. Success leads to the fall of

the incumbent elite and its replacement with another. The consequences,

however, are far from revolutionary: existing institutions retain their struc-

tures, although the personnel may change. The democratic revolution

often fails to democratize the electoral structure, and may even lead to new

forms of electoral discrimination (as in the case of Kyrgyzstan). The new

elites act in a similar way to their predecessors, albeit sometimes (as in


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Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia) with a more pronounced Westward-leaning

policy orientation. Successful coloured revolutions involving elite replace-

ment and policy change can occur not only when the population is predisposed

to, and mobilized for, change but also when there are alternative policy options

on offer particularly a move to join the economic and security organizations

provided by the West. The revolutionary coups detat that I have described

involve the rise of different elite groups, clans or families, which seek to redis-

tribute the assets of the previous regime. Electoral revolutions are one of the

means used to install them in power. Western interests are involved in these

processes in support of groups, in Margaret Thatchers terms,56 with

whom we can do business, or from a geo-strategic point of view, to change

allegiances in favour of the West.

There are two unintended consequences to the efforts of democracypromotion. First, incumbent governments learn from their opponents methods

and their use of media technology; they also learn from their opponents

mistakes. In strengthening their own hold over their populations they too

create their own youth and student organizations, and they define the

hostile others in terms of rapacious Western interests and aggressive US-

led military offences. A consequence of the coloured revolution movements

has been the closure of genuine benevolent and positive non-confrontational

forms of civil society development: the curtailment of open press and televi-

sion, and of genuine religious associations.57

Incumbent governments concocttheir own counter-ideologies: they condemn the global hegemony of the West

and advocate their own forms of sovereignty, democracy and civil society.

Second, internal resistance to Western democracy promotion increases.

Citizens of many states (among those discussed in this study, Russia,

Belarus, Uzbekistan and Serbia) do not share many of the assumptions of

Western democracy. It is widely believed in the countries concerned that

the oppositions allegations of vote rigging are fabrications.58 Hence, the

promotion of electoral democracy is undermined as a political strategy.

Public opinion polls in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have shown an affinitywith a different type of national welfare democracy a political system

that ensures stability in the form of the provision of work, health, educational

services and welfare for the unwaged. Where conditions were not appropriate,

attempts to instigate coloured revolutions have been counter-productive and

have strengthened incumbent states.

NOTES

1. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy is. . .

and is Not, in LarryDiamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore,MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.4962 (p.49).

2. Ibid.


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3. Mark Beissinger, for example, considers them to be modular political phenomena in thataction was based on the emulation of the prior successful example of others: MarkR. Beissinger, Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion ofBulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No.2 (2007),pp.25976 (p.259).

4. Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003).5. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs,

2004).6. Joseph Nye, Why Military Power Is No Longer Enough, The Guardian, 31 March 2002,

available at ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1., accessed 19 Feb. 2009.7. George W. Bush, Inauguration Speech 2005, available at ,http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html., cited in Aidan Hehir, The Myth of theFailed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.1, No.3 (2007), pp.30732.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

9. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, International Diffusion and PostcommunistElectoral Revolutions, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, No.3 (2006),pp.283304 (p.284).

10. Ibid., p.288.11. Ibid., p.295.12. See the discussion in M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2005), p.18.13. John Dunn, Capitalist Democracy: Elective Affinity or Beguiling Illusion? Daedalus,

Vol.136, No.3 (2007), pp.513 (p.10).14. Natalya Narochnitskaya (ed.), Oranzhevye seti: ot Belgrada do Bishkeka [Orange Networks:

From Belgrade to Bishkek] (St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2008).15. Active in Ukraine, for example, were Soross Renaissance Foundation, United States Agency

for International Development (USAID), Freedom House, the Carnegie Foundation, theNational Endowment for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund, the National Center onNonviolent Conflict, the Project on Transnational Democracies, the Westminster Foundationfor Democracy.

16. Ascot Manutscharjan, State of Emergency in Armenia, available at ,http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14423-544-2-30.pdf., accessed 11 Nov. 2008. Other commentators haveasserted that the opposition led by Levon Ter-Petrossian claimed victory even before the elec-tion took place: Vicken Cheterian, From Reform and Transition to Coloured Revolutions,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2 3 (2009), pp. 136 60(p.146).

17. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions 14921992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.234.18. Goodwin defines a revolution as any and all instances in which a state or government is over-

thrown by a popular movement in an extra-constitutional or violent manner: Jeff Goodwin,NoOther Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 19451991 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001).

19. Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, A Theory of Revolution, Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol.11, No.3 (1967), pp.26480, for example, define four different types ofrevolution: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup, palace revolution (p. 265).

20. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press,1979), p.4.

21. Tilly, European Revolutions, p.9.22. Radnitz points to the uneven distribution of land in Kyrgyzstan as a cause of discontent and

protest: Scott Radnitz, What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?, Journal of Democracy,

Vol.17, No.2 (2006), pp.132 46 (pp.142 3); see also, on unemployment in Ukraine,David Lane, The Orange Revolution: Peoples Revolution or Revolutionary Coup?,British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), pp.52549.


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23. Radnitz contends (in line with the reasoning of this essay) that local elites, losing candidates,their acquaintances, neighbors and extended families were the driving forces in the Kyrgyzrevolution: see Radnitz, What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?, p.137.

24. OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.25. ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, based in Warsaw.

26. Beissinger, Structure and Example, p.260.27. See Lane, The Orange Revolution, for an account taken from focus groups of the motives of

participants in Ukraine.28. Radnitz, What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?, p.132.29. Ibid., p.133.30. Ibid., p.140.31. Ibid., p.133.32. Based on report by election observers, Clive Payne, A Visit to Kyrgyzstan, Nuffield News-

letter, Nuffield College (Oxford), 2008, No.4.33. Laurence Broers, After the Revolution: Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating

Democracy in Georgia, Central Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.3 (2005), pp.33350 (p.334).

34. Opposition leader Eka Beselia, quoted inMorning Star

(London), 8 Nov. 2008.35. Eka Beselia, Accidental Murders, Coincidence or Not?, interview, availableat,http://www.humanrights.ge/rss/index.php?amore&ranalytical&id2444&langen., accessed 19Feb. 2009.

36. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), Ch.1.37. This strategy was used in the Serbian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Azerbaijan protests and

illustrated in a documentary film by Tania Rakhmanova, The Democratic RevolutionaryHandbook, France, 2006.

38. Data cited in Beissinger, Structure and Example, p.264.39. My thanks here to David Stuckler for comments and suggestions on my earlier draft.40. See estimates of the support for the Oranges in Lane, The Orange Revolution.41. Andrew Wilson, Ukraines Orange Revolution (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University

Press, 2005), p.187.42. Other writers have emphasized the role of international links, even considering the inter-

national element to be a fourth element in transformation: see M.A. Orenstein, S. Bloomand N. Lindstrom (eds.), Transnational Actors in Central and East European Transitions(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

43. Bunce and Wolchik, International Diffusion, p.266.44. Ibid., p.291.45. Christopher Lamont, Contested Sovereignty: The International Politics of Regime Change in

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,Vol.25, Nos.23 (2009), pp.18198, p.190.

46. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 24 March 2000, cited in Lamont,Contested Sovereignty, which is also the source of the other quotations.

47. Wojciech Ostrowski, The Legacy of the Coloured Revolution: The Case of Kazakhstan,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.23 (2009), pp.34768.

48. See note 37.49. See, for example, Beissinger, Structure and Example, pp.268 70, who calls the process

elite learning to limit the spread of insurgency; the crucial question is why some elitesshould learn and seek to restrict revolutionary success, whereas others may copy theprocess. On Belarus, see Vitali Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4 (2005), pp.83 97; on China see Jeanne Wilson,Coloured Revolutions: The View From Moscow and Beijing, Journal of CommunistStudies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2 3 (2009), pp.369 95.

50. Elena Korosteleva, Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 Presidential

Election, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.23 (2009),pp.324 46; the quotation from Max Weber is cited from Ian Clark, Legitimacy ina Global Order, Review of International Studies, Vol.29, special issue (Dec. 2003),pp.7995 (p.79).


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51. How would you evaluate L. Kuchmas actions as president? 1 as lowest grade and 10 themaximum; source: N. Panina, Ukrainske suspilstvo: sotsiologichni monitoring 19922006 [Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring 19922006] (Kyiv: Institut sotsiologiiNAN Ukraini, 2006); data for some of the tables are available only in the edition for 2005.

52. On the clan-like nature of political power see Kathleen Collins, Clans, Pacts and Politics in

Central Asia, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.3 (2002), pp.13752.53. See Lane, The Orange Revolution.54. Ukrainian PORA leader speaking on the documentary, The Democratic Revolutionary

Handbook (see note 37).55. See for example, the website of A-INFOSNEWSSERVICE, available at,http://ainfos.ca..

It carried accounts of demonstrations in Murmansk in 2005 attended by 2000 participants andorganized by the Party of Pensioners and the Communist Party, and also anarchists: ,http://www.ainfos.ca/index24/index24-05/index.html., accessed 19 Feb. 2009.

56. Margaret Thatcher famously described Mikhail Gorbachev, a few months before his accessionto power in March 1985, as a man with whom she felt she could do business.

57. This is detailed for Russia and China in Wilson, Coloured Revolutions: The View from

Moscow and Beijing.58. IISEPS poll, available at ,http://www.nisepi.by/pres1.html., cited in Vitali Silitski,Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4(2005), pp.8390 (p.90).


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lane, d.-coloured revolution as a political

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