Zhenbin Sun

Language, Discourse, and Praxis in Ancient China

Language, Discourse, and Praxis in Ancient China

Zhenbin Sun

Language, Discourse, andPraxis in Ancient China

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Zhenbin SunSchool of Art and Media StudiesFairleigh Dickinson UniversityTeaneck, NJUSA

ISBN 978-3-642-54864-2 ISBN 978-3-642-54865-9 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-54865-9

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to the Journal of Chinese Philosophy, the journal American Review ofChina Studies, and Shongwu Yinshu Guan to allow me to include in this book thefollowing articles: “Yan: A Dimension of Praxis and Its Philosophical Implications”(in the Journal of Chinese philosophy, 1997, Vol. 24, No. 2); “Bian: The Conceptof Argument in Ancient China” (in the journal American Review of China Studies,2002, Vol. 3, No. 2); “Discourse as a Method of Philosophy” (in Chinese Phi-losophy and the Trends of 21st Century Civilization, ed. Fang Keli, 2003, Beijing:Shongwu Yinshu Guan); “The Discourse on Language and Reality in Pre-QinChina” (in the journal American Review of China Studies, 2003, Vol. 4, No. 2); and“Reason in Ancient Chinese Philosophy” (in the journal American Review of ChinaStudies, 2005, Vol. 6, No. 2).

I want to thank the anonymous reviewers of my work. My sincere gratitude goesto my editor Leana Li for her enthusiasm as well as her timely help. I would like tooffer my thanks to the excellent creative, production, and marketing teams atSpringer.

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Context of the Discourse on Ming and Shi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 Four Notions of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.1 Rectification of Names (Zheng Ming) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.2 Abandonment of Names (Wu Ming) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202.3 Analysis of Names (Bian Ming) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.4 Examination of Names (Shen Ming) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 Synthesis of Language and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333.1 Shi as a Practical Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333.2 Ming as a Theoretical Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363.3 Ming-Shi as a Synthetic Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393.4 Practice and Praxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4 Moral Practice and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474.1 Humanity (Ren) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474.2 Rightness (Yi). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504.3 Propriety (Li) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534.4 Truthfulness (Xin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5 Sociopolitical Practice and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615.1 Government (Zheng) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615.2 Benefit (Li) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645.3 Law (Fa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685.4 The Ming-Shi Issue and Sociopolitical Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

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6 Linguistic Practice and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 776.1 Pragmatic Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 776.2 Semantic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796.3 The Paradigm of Ming-Shi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826.4 Chinese Language and Chinese Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

7 Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917.1 Confucian Perspective on Yan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917.2 Daoist Perspective on Yan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957.3 Moist Perspective on Yan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

8 Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038.1 The Roots of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038.2 Great Argument and Small Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078.3 Criteria of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

9 Dao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179.1 Dao as Way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189.2 Dao as Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239.3 Dao as Saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259.4 Dao as Guiding Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

10 Practical Zhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13310.1 Action and Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13510.2 Discourse and Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14110.3 Dao: Chinese Wisdom and Worldview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

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Introduction

Since language is a primary medium of communication and even a form of humanlife, its relationship to reality and its role in the formation of culture and thinking-mode is always a significant issue interesting scholars in different study areas. Forexample, Piaget illuminates the connection between language and cognitivedevelopment; Sapir explores how grammatical categories shape world views;Geertz enquiries into the influence of symbolic forms on patterns of culture;Foucault reveals how serious speeches give rise to discipline and power. This issuehas also drawn much attention from philosophers in the past 2,500 years.Parmenides stresses the correspondence among Being, thought, and speech;Heraclitus interprets reason, truth, and law in light of logos which impliesconversation; Plato thinks of names as the starting point of obtaining knowledge;Aristotle treats language as the reflection of the structure of logic and existence.The linguistic turn in twentieth-century Western philosophy goes much further bysuggesting philosophical problems being first and foremost linguistic ones. It notonly causes revolutionary changes in philosophy, but also inspires reinterpretationsof traditional problems in other disciplines of humanities and social sciences.

To understand the vital impact of the linguistic turn on philosophy and itsinfluence on any study area that concerns language, reality, thought, and behavior,one may look at the works of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche is probably the first thinkerwho systematically and thoroughly rejects the Platonic tradition by criticallyreviewing the role language plays in basic metaphysical categories (includinguniverse, subject, object, reason, truth, meaning, logic, and knowledge). Amonghis original and insightful points on language and philosophy, the following is verythought-provoking: because of the guidance of similar grammatical functions,Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing experience similar development. Thus,“It is highly possible that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaiclanguages (where the concept of the subject is least developed) look otherwise‘into the world,’ and will be found on paths different from those of the

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Indo-Germanic peoples and the Muslims.”1 This point actually raises an issue incomparative philosophy; moreover, it challenges us to think about such questionsas: To what extent or in what respects do different languages lead the philosophicaldiscourse of various countries to different orientations? Can people philosophizingin different languages reach similar or even universal understandings of the world?Is it the structure of language alone or the actual employment of language thatgives meaning to reality and makes it present to mankind? What are the differences(and similarities) among the ways different philosophical traditions handle therelationship of language to realty? How do different interpretations of thelanguage-reality relationship shape different world views and cultural patterns?

This book aims not to give a detailed answer to every one of the abovequestions; instead, it focuses on Chinese understanding and treatment of languageand reality and sets for itself three tasks: (1) exploring how Chinese thinkers livingin pre-Qin times (551–221 BCE2) analyze the two concepts: ming3 名 (language)and shi 實 (reality) as well as their relationship in various settings; (2)investigating relevant issues in ontology, epistemology, ethics, axiology, andlogic as addressed and developed in an ancient Chinese discourse on language andreality; (3) discussing how this discourse shapes a central characteristic of Chineseculture, which I call “practical zhi” 實踐知智4 (practical knowledge, intelligence,and wisdom) and distinguishes Chinese culture from Western culture in ancienttimes. Furthermore, this book is in nature not a comparative study of Chinese andWestern theories of language, although it would be very significant to involve anequal analysis of Western discourse on words and objects and to reveal thedifferences and similarities between the two discourses. Nevertheless, in somecases it mentions Western philosophers’ ideas. My goal of doing so is twofold: onthe one hand, to display effectively the meaning and significance of certainChinese ideas by setting Western ideas as a reference; on the other hand, to helpthe reader better comprehend Chinese ideas since he/she might be familiar withWestern theories of language.

By fulfilling the above tasks and goal, I hope, the book will shed light on theabove questions one way or another. Specifically, it makes five main points among

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: VintageBooks, 1966), 27–28.2 In 551BCE Confucius was born and Lao Zi was about 20 years old. In 221 BCE, the Qindynasty, the first Chinese Empire, was established. Whenever referring to this period of time, I use“China in ancient time” or “pre-Qin times.”3 Throughout this book, Chinese characters are presented in the pinyin system. Chinese people’snames are also spelled in terms of this system except those names that have been known popularlyamong English readers. By the same token, whenever citing a Chinese passage directly, I use theoriginal book title plus its chapter title. In addition, unless otherwise indicated, English translationsof passages quoted from ancient Chinese texts are my own. The reason why I do not use existingEnglish translations is simple: translation is interpretation, and my interpretations of the quotedChinese passages are sometimes different from that of English translators.4 實踐知智 does not sound correct grammatically; but, I delivery use 知 to replace 之 toemphasize the difference and connection between 知 as knowledge and 智 as wisdom.

xii Introduction

others. First, the character of Chinese language does affect the way Chinese peoplepresent and understand some complicated ideas and abstract statements; this canbe seen in the texts of the School of Names and in the criticism of this school.Second, the linguistic limitation does not block Chinese people from conceptualthinking or restrict them from addressing metaphysical issues popular in Platonictradition; this is exemplified in the works of the neo-Moists and Gongsun Long.Third, regarding the relationship between language and reality, ancient Chinesethinkers share some ideas with certain Western philosophers; Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi,and Heidegger, for instance, study language in terms of dao (道 way), illuminatingthe ontological nature and cognitive function of language. Fourth, Chinese theoryof language is characterized by its practical orientation and even the intellectualdiscourse on language and reality is aimed to help resolve sociopolitical problemsin the lifeworld; moreover, language in ancient China is a pragmatic issue morethan a semantic one, both the use of language and the understanding of languagefall into the category of praxis; this distinguishes Chinese theory of language fromWestern theory of language. Fifth, a key to language and philosophy is discoursefor not only are meaning, truth, and knowledge shaped and reshaped by discourse,but reason as a human faculty and philosophy as an intellectual enterprise aremanifested and developed in discourse; with the framework of discourse, one canbetter understand the Chinese mind and clarify some popular misinterpretations ofChinese culture.

This book consists of 10 chapters. The first chapter introduces the method ofthis work; discusses the meaning and usage of the two Chinese words ming andshi; explores the social, political, and cultural background of the discourse on mingand shi. The second chapter examines the process of the discourse and its majorarguments by presenting four ancient notions of ming, i.e., rectification of names,abandonment of names, analysis of names, and examination of names. The thirdchapter enquires into how the participants of the discourse treat the relationshipbetween ming and shi as well as theory and practice in a synthetic way. Takentogether, the first three chapters provide the reader with a detailed description ofthe ancient Chinese discourse on language and reality.

The next three chapters make a further analysis of language by exploring itsrelationship with Chinese praxis. Specifically, the fourth chapter investigates theconnection between the ming-shi issue and morality, studying the Confucian viewon the role language plays in self-cultivation. The fifth chapter deals with threesociopolitical issues: government, benefit, and law, addressing how language getsinvolved with and impacts social and political affairs. The sixth chapter reviewsthe entanglement of semantics with pragmatics as well as the influence of Chineselanguage on Chinese thought, discussing why language is a vital theme in Chinesethinkers’ communicative practice. Since schools of thought in ancient Chinadevelop their understanding of language and reality by refining their own doctrineand criticizing other schools’ theories, it is quite necessary for them to review thebasic dimensions of academic dialogues; consequently, their review becomes asignificant component of the discourse on ming and shi.

Introduction xiii

Thus, Chaps. 7–9, respectively, examine three dimensions of discourse, i.e., yan言 (speaking), bian 辯 (arguing), and dao 導 (guiding). In particular, the seventhchapter focuses on the Confucian, Daoist, and Moist perspectives on speech; itreveals the relationship of speech to action in pursuing morality, knowledge, andan ideal society. The eighth chapter centers on the roots, characteristics, andcriteria of argument; it displays a Chinese theory of rhetoric that is constitutedthrough the ming-shi discourse. The ninth chapter is an in-depth analysis of theroot metaphor, dao, in Chinese culture; it stresses the creative tension between daoas a noun and a verb as well as interprets the term as way, pattern, speech, andguiding dialogue.

The last chapter functions as a conclusion, characterizing the ming-shi discourseby the term “practical zhi,” analyzing how practical zhi and its theses grow out ofand pervade the discourse and why the Chinese way of dealing with language andreality is itself an example of practical zhi.

It is important to point out that language, discourse, and praxis stand out as themost basic themes of ancient Chinese philosophy, and practical zhi represents thespirit of Chinese culture. In understanding Chinese philosophy and culture,scholars of different backgrounds and traditions have presented various interpre-tations. Some of the interpretations are insightful, some are controversial, andsome problematic or misleading, while almost all of them recognize the practicalas a major, if not the major, character of the Chinese mind. Yet, how to construeand evaluate this character remains a serious problem; moreover, how to treatChinese philosophy in the context of world philosophy is still a topic under study.In this regard, I suggest that it is very helpful to compare Chinese philosophy topragmatism and that pragmatism is, in one way or another, a modern echo ofancient Chinese philosophy.

As we know, “pragmatic writers have laid more stress than any previousphilosophers in human action.”5 In their eyes, theory cannot be separated frompractice for theory derives from human experience and in turn guides humanconduct. Moreover, the meaning and truth-value of theory or knowledge lies in itseffect on behavior and environment; in other words, “to develop a thought’smeaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conductis for us its sole significance.”6 The reason that action centers on pragmatism isbecause it is in fact a vital axis that links together and shapes the humankind andthe environment, the agent and the change, the knower and the known, the desireand the outcome, the means and the end, and so forth. As such, action involves notonly material production and artistic creation, but intellectual contemplation andcritical reflection as well. The unification of practice and theory causes areconstruction in Western philosophy in the sense that pragmatism powerfully

5 William James, The Writings of William James, ed. John McDermott (Chicago: The Universityof Chicago Press, 1977), 448.6 Charles Peirce, quoted in James, 377.

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undermines Cartesian philosophy, which is characterized by dualism of body andmind, object and subject, value and fact, and conduct and thought.

To be sure, pragmatism is not limited to America in the late nineteenth and theentire twentieth century (featuring Peirce, James, Dewey, Lewis, Rorty, Putnam,and Brandom); instead, its orientation and extension can be clearly found incontinental philosophy. According to Richard Bernstein, we can see a “pragmaticturn” that has lasted for 150 years and is displayed in the works of such leadingphilosophers as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Apel, and evenDerrida to some extent.7 To my understanding, while we can gain enlightenmentsfrom the pragmatic turn in thinking about the situation after the “linguistic turn”and in answering the questions regarding the “end of philosophy,” the pragmaticturn itself can be better understood by exploring how ancient Chinese philosophydeals with the relationship of practice to theory.

Although an in-depth analysis of the similarities (and differences) between thepragmatist notion of action and the Chinese notion of action exceeds the scope ofthis book, a study of the discourse on ming and shi, I believe, can help peopledeepen their comprehension of both Eastern and Western culture. For example,after reading this book, the reader should be able to realize that God has never helda central position in Chinese culture but humankind does and that when talkingabout humankind, Chinese thinkers are mainly concerned with the good life in anideal society. Surely, both life and society depend on behaviors, activities, orexperiences. To understand human action, Chinese thinkers investigate the causes,features, effects, rules, and values of human action in all walks of life; theirinvestigation derives real theories. Furthermore, when rethinking or contemplatingthese causes, features, effects, rules, and values, Chinese thinkers framephilosophical theories. Yet, the ultimate goal for them to conceptualize orphilosophize human action is not to seek for and stop at a kind of pure knowledgeor ultimate truth; instead, they aim to use knowledge and truth to serve and guidehuman action. Thus, practice and theory are treated in Chinese culture not asseparated matters, but as a unity, a continuation, an interaction, and a mutualtransition. This treatment and the relationship of practice to theory display adialectic paradigm of yin and yang. In turn, this paradigm leads the Chinese mindto see the world as a diverse, ever-changing, and interactive process in which allhuman conduct shall follow the same pattern, namely, Dao.

It is the emphasis on action and the position of anti-dualism that stands for thesimilarity between and alliance of Chinese thought and Western pragmatism. Onecan better understand this point by reviewing the discourse on ming and shi.

7 See his book The Pragmatic Turn (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010) for detail.

Introduction xv

Chapter 1Methodological and Historical Inquiry

Before tracing the appearance and development of the discourse on ming and shi aswell as addressing its significance and effect, I shall introduce the method I employto interpret the classical texts related to the topic and the sociopolitical and intel-lectual background of the discourse.

1.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy

Following the linguistic turn in twentieth-century Western philosophy, discoursehas become an essential concept emerging from contemporary humanities andsocial sciences. More and more scholars in history, sociology, anthropology, lin-guistics, literature, communications, and so forth have used discourse as a newparadigm to reexamine the basic topics or issues of their discipline. Consequently,discourse studies have turned out to be an interdisciplinary field. It is philosophy,however, that advances the more profound and far-reaching discourse theories.Philosophers specialized in classical studies, for instance, enquire into the rela-tionship of intellectual conversations to truth and knowledge by discussing whyPlato writes dialogues. Postmodernist thinkers examine the function of discourse inthe interpretation of cultural tradition and in the deconstruction of Platonic phi-losophy. Based on their common understanding that reason, meaning, andknowledge cannot be isolated from intellectual dialogues, I would suggest thatphilosophy originates in, lives by, and develops through discourse; hence, discourseis a method not only of doing philosophy but also of interpreting philosophy.

“Discourse” refers to written conversations and spoken texts in general andintellectual dialogues in particular; and intellectual dialogues consist of differentmodes of discourse such as stating, reasoning, and arguing. The relationshipbetween discourse and philosophy can be construed from the fact that both“discourse” and “philosophy” in the Western history of ideas originate from logos;

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015Z. Sun, Language, Discourse, and Praxis in Ancient China,DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-54865-9_1

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essentially, discourse is the form of philosophy. It can also be construed prag-matically in that discourse shapes and reshapes philosophy.

It may not be wrong to say that as Greek philosophy establishes itself, at least inpart, as the foundation of Western culture, the Greek word logos paves a way forthe originality of Western philosophy. As a noun logos is initially derived from theroot found in the verb lego (“I say”) and literally means “speech,” “story,”“argument,” “statement,” “reason,” “principle,” and “doctrine”, it is then changedfrom a general term into a specific one, referring only to philosophical discourse.1

Heraclitus believes “first and foremost in a Logos” and thinks of it as “both humanthought and the governing principle of the Universe.”2 In his view, words, thoughts,meaning, reality, and values cannot be separated from the logos.3 Socrates agreeswith Theaetetus that knowledge is true belief together with a logos, stressing that tohold the logos of a thing indicates the real understanding of that thing.4 Plato tries toformulate “an abstract language of descriptive science to replace a concrete lan-guage of oral memory” by transforming “logos” into a philosophical term.5 Aris-totle thinks of “form” as the inner nature of a thing and claims the form is stated in aformula or logos.6 He also holds that true knowledge can only come from scientificdiscourse.7 Taken together, the above philosophers suggest a position that it makesinevitable to do philosophy with logos since the principles of nature and thought aswell as truth and knowledge can be reached only through logos. In other words,discourse and philosophy are symbiotic, both resting on logos: On the one hand,discourse is rooted etymologically in logos and logos covers all modes of discourse;on the other hand, philosophy is derived historically from logos and logos gives riseto the understanding of the world.

Coming to the twentieth century, some philosophers, influenced by LudwigWittgenstein’s works, direct their attention to metaphilosophy, which refers to “theinvestigation of the nature of philosophy.”8 This kind of investigation replacesquestions about reality with questions about the relationship between language andphilosophy. And a basic proposition these philosophers hold is that philosophyshould be seen as argumentative action enquiring into knowledge, reason, and

1 Walter Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value,and Action (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina, 1987), 5.2 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1962), 419 and 428.3 James Wilbur and Harold Allen, eds., The Worlds of the Early Greek Philosophers (Buffalo,NY: Prometheus Press, 1979), 63.4 Plato. Theaetetus, 201d8–202c5.5 Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress, 1963), 236.6 John Luce, An Introduction to Greek Philosophy (New York: Thames and Hudson Inc., 1992),119.7 Fisher, 7.8 Chales Griswold, Jr. ed. Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (New York: Routledge, 1988),144.

2 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

meaning; knowledge, reason, and meaning are actually manifested and formulatedthrough philosophical dialogue. In this sense, discourse is indeed the form ofphilosophy. Jurgen Mittelstrass, for example, reviews the Socratic–Platonic dia-logue and makes the following points: First, philosophy is a dialectical praxisconducted under the perspective of reason; it is through philosophical discourse thata philosophical orientation is realized. Second, questioning/answering and proving/refuting are basic elements of philosophy; through the reciprocity of these elements,a philosophical subject of knowledge is acquired. Third, reason cannot be dem-onstrated or taught in just any way; instead, it is performed or activated in intel-lectual discourse only; reason is in nature dialogical and dialectical. And fourth, theSocratic form of philosophizing treats dialectics as “coming together and conferringwith one another”; in this dialectical process, mutual understanding and conceptualclarity are achieved and combined together.9

To be sure, discourse not only determines the appearance and orientation ofphilosophy but also directs the development and reform of philosophy. In MichelFoucault’s view, human sciences, including philosophy, “constitute a system ofcontrol in the production of discourse”; and he sees his “archaeology of knowl-edge” as a series of “practices that systematically form the objects of which theyspeak.”10 What Foucault suggests here and throughout his works is that a disciplineconsists of various logoi, which diachronically institutionalize the discursive acts ofthe professionals involved in that discipline; and in turn, the discursive acts as thepower and form of that discipline synchronically give diverse interpretations toconcepts and issues of common concern to the professionals. As discursive actsmove forward, the meaning of the basic concepts and issues keeps open to allpossible interpretations; and consequently, the discipline keeps developing. It issignificant to note, however, that the orientation of a discipline is not rigid, and acertain paradigm cannot control all discursive acts forever. This is why Foucaultstresses the “discontinuity” of intellectual history and why Jacques Derridaemphasizes the word difference as manifested in linguistic practice. To Derrida, theuser of language does not always follow grammatical rules; and even the repeatedtype of linguistic action is differential and deferred over different points in time;thus, the meaning of terms and statements (and tradition, culture, etc.) “unceasinglydislocates itself,” to borrow his words, “in a chain of differing and deferring sub-stitutions.”11 In this sense, Derrida’s deconstruction can be understood as reinter-pretation and reconstruction of Western philosophy. Actually, both archaeology anddeconstruction can be thought of as intellectual discourse in two senses: First, eachof them is a series of statements rethinking Platonic problems; and second, each is adialogue with and within traditional philosophy as a text and context.

9 Jurgen Mittelstrass, “On Socratic Dialogue,” in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed.Chales Griswold (New York: Routledge, 1988), 126–142.10 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sherridan Smith (New York:Pantheon Books, 1972), 224 and 49.11 Jacques Derrida,Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 1982), 26.

1.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy 3

In reviewing Chinese philosophy in pre-Qin times, one can find that it consists ofa series of discourses, each focusing on a pair of concepts such as tian 天 (heaven)and ren 人 (mankind), ming 名 (language) and shi 實 (reality), yi 義 (rightness) andli 利 (benefit), xing shan 性善 (good human nature), and xing e 性惡 (evil humannature). Among these discourses, the one on ming and shi is of special significancefor the following reasons. First, it involves more schools of thought than any otherdiscourses. Second, it lasts about 200 years, longer than other discourses. Third, itcovers almost all areas of philosophy: onto-cosmology, epistemology, axiology,logic, and ethics. Fourth, it remains as a crucial issue throughout the 2,500-yearhistory of Chinese philosophy. Fifth, it parallels not only ancient Greek philoso-phers’ discussion of language but also the linguistic turn in twentieth-centuryWestern scholarship. Therefore, it is natural for this study to stress the methodo-logical function of discourse.

Generally speaking, every method has its own perspectives, procedures, andcharacteristics. Then, what makes discourse different from any other methods andwhat benefits can discourse bring to philosophical inquiry?

First of all, discourse as a method treats philosophy not merely as a series ofconceptual statements, but more importantly, as a system of institutionalizedpractice. Here, institutionalization refers to two formative processes: the formationof action and the formation of knowledge. When conducting philosophical inves-tigations, one cannot focus only on a certain issue/theory. Instead, he has to con-sider (1) the relationship between that issue/theory and philosophy as a system ofknowledge; (2) the relationship between the philosopher and others; and (3) therelationship between that issue/theory and its social, cultural, and political impli-cations. That means, in order to participate in philosophical dialogue, to have one’svoice heard, and to be accepted as a professional, one has to learn the language andrule of the dialogue in advance. Eventually, when all participants speak the samelanguage and follow the same rule, the collective practice becomes organized andmeaningful. Following this process is the formation of knowledge. The nature ofknowledge and truth is not private but social, not purely semantic but pragmatic aswell.12 Only those assertions that are commonly verified and believed to be helpfulto human life can be recognized as knowledge and truth.13 Philosophical dialogue isa collective and intellectual practice that not merely promotes knowing andadvances ideas, but refutes and defends assertions. In other words, it is throughphilosophical dialogue that knowledge and truth become legitimated; the verymeaning of philosophy as a walk of life lies in the practical character of philosophyrather than in its metaphysical significance.

Defining philosophy as a kind of practice, we may overcome two biased ten-dencies: One is to limit philosophy to an intellectual game playing with words onlyand the other is to thinks of rationality as transcendental. Surely, it is wrong to

12 Pragmatists are characterized by this position.13 Nietzsche repeatedly stresses this point. I believe pragmatists share with Nietzsche the sameunderstanding of the nature of truth and knowledge.

4 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

expect philosophy to resolve concrete sociopolitical problems, but it is equallywrong to separate philosophy from the lifeworld. Because when doing philosophyone has to consider the three, especially the last two, relations mentioned above, herinvestigation is, in one way or another, inevitably influenced, if not directed, bysociopolitical affaires. This is exactly the case when ancient Chinese thinkers definethe terms ming and shi. What they are concerned most is not the connection of theirown proposition to that of other persons but the realistic referents of these twoterms. Though the School of Names and the Moist School concentrate on semanticand logical analysis, their final purpose is to set theoretical standards and criteria forevaluating ethical and sociopolitical behaviors instead of seeking pure knowledge.Practical concern and purpose play a key role in orienting and leading thesethinkers’ theoretical investigation. On the other hand, when trying to characterizeancient Chinese culture, some researchers focus their attention on ancient textsonly. What they look for from these texts is whether there are direct statements onreason and the counterpart of the Western word “reason.” Because they do not findwhat they look for, they announce that Chinese philosophy lacks abstract reason14

or appears as a kind of “unreason within reason.”15 This is not a proper way tounderstand and interpret Chinese culture. Because reason cannot be spoken ortaught, rather, it manifests itself in discursive practice. Though we can distinguishamong various types of reason such as substantive, formal, objective, subjective,instrumental, technological, analytical, and practical, we should not reduce reasonto any one of its variants.16 And to be sure, in the final analysis, reason is dialogicaland aimed at choosing, as Bertrand Russell holds, “the right means to an end thatyou wish to achieve.”17 Undoubtedly, choosing the right means is not predeter-mined or randomly selected. Rather, it results from purposeful discussion, com-parison, demonstration, and argumentation, in short, from intellectual performance.Certainly, the ming-shi discourse is nothing, but an intellectual performance aimedat finding out the truth and knowledge of ming and shi and at resolving sociopo-litical problems by rectifying the theoretical–practical relationship between the twoconcepts and realms.

The second characteristic of discourse as a method lies in linking individualphilosophical theories together by revealing their interactive relationship; by sodoing, the formation of philosophical knowledge and the development of philos-ophy will appear not as a list of isolated conceptions, but as a flux of discursive and

14 Chad Hansen holds this position. See his “Should the Ancient Masters Value Reason?” inChinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. (La Salle: Open CourtPublishing Company, 1991), 179–208.15 See Angus Graham’s book Unreason within Reason (La Salle: Open Court PublishingCompany, 1992).16 Martin Jay correctly points out that “Too often, in fact, such a reduction occurs, with the resultthe reason is rejected out of hand” (“Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?” 1982,110).17 Russell Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.,1955), vi.

1.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy 5

interpretive discussions. In Plato’s view, the nature of philosophy is dialogical anddialectic (they are interrelated and thus interchangeable), that is, why he writesdialogues. In the case of forming philosophy, Platonic dialogues aim to establishprinciples by transforming true opinions into real knowledge. They do not merelyseek understanding of true opinions, but find out how to improve inadequate andpartial statements. Accordingly, the function of discourse analysis is to discover (1)how and under what theoretical and practical conditions ideas or propositionsemerge; (2) how points that relate to the same issue or problem reciprocate anddifferentiate from each other; and (3) how related and various conceptions amountto an influential or popular theory. In the case of developing philosophy, Platonicdialogues are “always pressing to find an interpretation that will represent notsimply some historically accurate thought from an earlier period but one richenough and flexible enough to provide insight into problems current in his owntime.”18 Accordingly, the function of discourse analysis is to illuminate (1) in whatway earlier thinkers influence later thinkers when dealing with the same issue orproblem; (2) in what way and for what reason a philosophical dialogue crossesdifferent periods of time; and (3) in what way an earlier concept is reshaped in termsof changed intellectual and sociopolitical contexts.

Reviewing modern works on ancient Chinese philosophy or ancient Chinesethought of logic and focusing on the terms ming and shi, however, what we can seevery often are the following situations: First, these two terms are treated as separatedpieces attached to different thinkers or schools under various categories such asepistemology, ethics, logic, or linguistics.. Second, when defined as the core con-cepts of an independent study area (like Chinese logic or studies of names), the richand diverse meaning of the two terms is simplified or blotted out. And third, eventhough it is necessary and justified to limit the two terms’ meaning to a certain area,their dialectic and developing trajectory is replaced by a static and isolated state.

These situations should and can be changed through discourse analysis. Spe-cifically, we shall construe the ming-shi issue as a philosophical problem that has itsown meaning and value and bring together various schools of thought in pre-Qintimes; while each involved thinker represents his own thought on this issue, thediscourse refines and deepens each thinker’s philosophy. In other words, the ming-shi issue is not a secondary or marginal problem derived from some fundamentalproblems; instead, it is a core paradigm that drives each involved thinker’s inquiryinto onto-cosmology, epistemology, axiology, ethics, and logic. In this sense, theming-shi issue is a focus through which many philosophical problems are criticallyexamined; it is also a nexus where different intellectual conceptions display theircorrelations. One may ask: Why is this issue so comprehensive? The answer residesnot merely in the nature of ming and shi themselves and the character of Chinesemode of thinking, but also in the function of discourse itself. The ming-shi discourse(and any other philosophical discourses) requires reference and demonstration;

18 Rosemary Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play,” in Platonic Writings, PlatonicReadings, ed. Chales Griswold (New York: Routledge, 1988), 123.

6 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

this broadens the sphere of the ming-shi issue and promotes both philosophicaltheories and real theories19 of this issue. The discourse also necessitates refuting andcritique; this deepens the understanding of ming and shi as a pair of category,stimulates the performance of analytical reason, and enhances the quality ofsemantic analysis. Moreover, the discourse generates consensus and difference; thisunites individual thinker’s investigations and enlivens dialogues on the ming-shiissue. In short, discourse analysis stresses the interrelationship between differenttheories and schools and represents this interrelationship as a meaning systemexisting only in dialogical practice.

Last but not least, discourse as a method also displays its character in stressingthe openness of each text and context. It suggests that philosophy as discursiveaction opens texts and contexts to diverse interpretations; because of the opennessand diverse interpretations, the meaning of a text (including its concepts andstatements) can be rich and present, and its truth-value will be acknowledged anddeveloped. As Hans-Georg Gadamer suggests, the meaning of a text resides neitherin the text itself nor in the reader’s mind, but comes out of the interpretations of thetext.20 The interpretations themselves actually amount to dialogues about the text.Yet, the formation of a text’s meaning does not stop at these interpretations becausethe interpretations also need to be examined, i.e., reinterpreted in various spatial–temporal settings.

Thus, we may distinguish three levels of discourse: The first level can be calledtextual discourse—a conversation between the text itself and its references; thesecond level can be called interpretive discourse—a conversation between the textand its reader; the third level can be called metadiscourse—a conversation abouttextual and interpretive discourses. Because “the fusing of horizons”21 occurs at allthe three levels, the meaning of a text becomes diverse and keeps changing.Nevertheless, talking about the meaning of a text within the scope of the three-levelconversation is still interior and hence limited. That is why we have to take thenotion of “context” into account. It is context that makes a text not only meaningfulbut also more importantly present. Here, the context refers both to intellectualtraditions, which can be called a theoretical context, and to sociopolitical realities,which can be called a practical context. Because any interpretation takes place in acurrent context, i.e., in the fusing of intellectual tradition and sociopolitical reality,the meaning of a text bears present significance. While the context makes a text goacross the boundary of time, the present makes it alive.

The modern history of the studies of mingand shi fully displays the third charac-teristic of discourse analysis. Starting from the Han dynasty and down to the very endof the Qing dynasty, for example, Chinese scholars’ interpretation of ming and shi

19 According to Rorty, “philosophical theories” means those theories that address metaphysicalissues; on the other hand, “real theories” refers to those theories that deal with practical problems(Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982), 166–169.20 See his Truth and Method (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985).21 Ibid, 273.

1.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy 7

mainly focused on its epistemological, ethical, and sociopolitical dimensions. Thetradition of semantic analysis of the School of Names and the logical investigation ofthe Neo-Moists almost totally disappeared from Chinese intellectual history (with theWei-Jin period as an exception). Yet, after the 1910s, a number of modern scholarspublished works on ancient Chinese thought of logic; among them, Liang Qichao, HuShih, Tan Jiefu, and YuYuwere more influential. A common feature of their works isthat they reinterpret the ancient concepts of ming and shi in light of the categories ofWestern logic. Their interpretations are an interpretive discourse. A consensusgrowing out of this interpretive discourse is that pre-Qin thinkers’ theories of mingand shi amount to an independent system of logic, paralleling Western and Indianlogic. It is essential to note that the introduction of Western logic, which becamepopular after the 1880s, inspires and enlightens modern Chinese scholars. As for theinfluence of context on the interpretation of a text, Herbert Fingarette’s work is a verygood case in point.22 When discussing Confucius’s theory of rectifying names, hecompares it to John Austin’s theory of performative utterances, suggesting that bothgo beyond the truth-value of statements and illuminate the pragmatic function oflanguage. In so doing, he reveals a significance of Confucius’ theory, which has neverbeen touched before. This is because he puts that theory in the context of the linguisticturn in twentieth-century Western philosophy. Recently, more and more Chinesescholars claim that studies of ming and shi should be independent from that of logicbecause ancient Chinese thinkers’ ideas on this issue are not limited to logic. Theseancient ideas, they argue, can be classified into two areas of inquiry: One is studies ofnames and the other is studies of argument. Zhou Yunzhi, for example, suggests thatthe former includes a philosophy of rectifying names, criteria of names, and stoppingthe misuse of names, while the latter includes the principles and rules of statement,reasoning, and argumentation.23 Although lacking the awareness of metadiscourseand ignoring the importance of shi, what these scholars do is to critically reviewtextual and interpretive discourses in the past while bringing studies of names andargument to a higher and more synthetic level.

Among postmodernist thinkers, Foucault is probably most famous because of hisdiscourse analysis. In Clifford Geertz’s view, he is “a counter-structuralist struc-turalist.”24 This label can be construed in such a way that Foucault stresses theconstructive influence of discourse (the “discourse” refers to serious speeches in adiscipline or even the discipline itself) on those professionals who work in thatdiscipline. Here, the discourse is a sociopolitically formalized ideology that func-tions as a system, and as a system, it sets the scope, direction, rule, method, andlanguage for the professionals. Yet, a critical point of postmodernism is toencourage differences and to reject centralism. Logically, the hegemony of anydiscourse is against the spirit of postmodernism. So, while Foucault acknowledges

22 See his Confucius: Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972).23 See his Ming Bian Xue Lun (On Studies of Names and Argument) (Shenyang: Liaoning JiaoyuChuban She, 1996), 6–7.24 See his “Stir Crazy” (The New York Review of Books, January 26, 1978).

8 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

the influence of discourse on the people involved in discourse, he also values thosepeople’s deconstructive influence on discourse. It is these people, more specificallytheir serious speeches, that make differences, and it is the differences that prevent adiscipline from being rigid and an ideology from being centralized. When talkingabout discourse as a method of philosophy, it is vital to keep in mind that the natureof philosophy is a discursive practice more than a system of concepts. As a sort ofhuman praxis, it performs instead of demonstrating reason; it aims at seekingknowledge more than knowledge itself. A principle can be derived from this point:Whenever reviewing philosophical works, our focus is not merely on a particularconcept or theory, no matter how influential it is, but more importantly on itsrelationship to other concepts or theories, questioning from what theoretical andpractical context it grows out, how it interacts with other texts, and in what way it isreshaped. The relational character of philosophical texts is indeed determined byphilosophy as an organized dialogue. Because it is organized, philosophy keeps itsidentity as an independent discipline, which holds individual investigations togetherand promotes consensus among them. Because it is dialogical, different conceptionsand theories have equal chances to be heard, verified, and refined so that they arealways open to diverse and renewed interpretations. In short, philosophy cannot livewithout discourse, because discourse is the basic way doing philosophy; conse-quently, interpreting philosophical texts in light of the concept of discourse is theprimary method of understanding philosophy.

1.2 Context of the Discourse on Ming and Shi

To better comprehend the discourse on ming-shi, we need to know first the contextwithin which this discourse occurred. Here, attention is focused primarily on twoaspects of the context: the etymology of ming and shi and the historical backgroundof the discourse, including the collapse of Zhou li 禮 (propriety), the conflictbetween ming and shi, and the relative view of shi–fei 是-非 (right–wrong).

According to Xu Shen’s (ca. 58–147 CE) ShuoWen Jie Zi,25 the first etymologicaldictionary in Chinese history, ming means “self-naming” or “self-introduction.”Its form is a combination of two characters: xi 夕 (night) and kou 口 (mouth).Xi signifies the nether world, and a person in the nether world cannot be seenby living people; therefore, he introduces himself using his mouth, i.e., by words.

25 Besides Xu Shen’s Shuo Wen Jie Zi and Duan Yucai’s Shuo Wen Jie Zi Zhu (Commentaries tothe Shuo Wen Jie Zi), the references I consulted in searching the etymology of the Chinese wordsdiscussed in this book include Ding Fubao’s Shuo Wen Jie Zi Gu Lin (Collected Commentaries tothe Shuo Wen Jie Zi); Gao Shufan’s Zhongwen Xing Yin Yi Zonghe da Zidian (A ComprehensiveDictionary of the Shape, Pronunciation, and Meaning of Chinese Language); Gui Fu’s Shuo ZenJie Zi Yi Zheng (Commentaries to the Shuo Wen Jie Zi), Shangwu Yinshu Guan’s Ciyuan (TheEtymology); Zhang Xuan’s Zhongwen Changyong Sanqian Zi Xing Yi Shi (The Etymology of3,000 Chinese Characters in Common Usage).

1.1 Discourse as a Method of Philosophy 9

Why does Xu Shen interpret ming (names) in terms of ming 冥 (the nether world)?And what are the grounds on which Xu Shen interpreted ming as “self-naming”? Tomany people, Xu Shen’s interpretation seems quite obscure.26 But Duan Yucai(1735–1815) helps to clarify it by linking the term “ming” with a custom in earlyhistory. He suggests that in ancient times, copper vessels carried inscriptions, calledming 銘, that attested to the reputation of a deceased person as well as to hisancestors’ merits and virtues. Hence, the inscriptions functioned as a self-introduc-tion by someone dead, i.e., in the nether world.27

While Xu Shen thinks of xi as the nether world, other scholars interpret it as“evening,” suggesting that people meet in the evening but cannot see each otherclearly, so they use words to introduce themselves.28 Although the two interpre-tations are different in regard to the meaning of xi, both confirm the function ofming, namely self-introduction. Moreover, both tally with the denotation of ming asan associative character appearing on animal bones and tortoise shells, that is, themoon sheds light through a window and makes the room bright.29 In this sense, aming is a name or word that enables the named thing known to people or introducesit to the world.

To further understand ming, we need also to see how it was actually used in pre-Qin times. Among its diverse usages, the following are most popular. First andforemost, it indicates the name of various things. For example, 多識于鳥獸草木之

名 [the Shi Jing can help you] “learn the names of birds, beasts, plants, and trees”(Lun Yu–Yang Huo). 名可名, 非常名 “The name that can be talked about is not aneternal name” (Dao De Jing—Chap. 1). Second, it signifies one’s title or reputation.For instance,有不貢則修名 “if some minorities do not pay tribute, the king needs toreview whether ranks/titles are clear enough” (Guo Yu–Zhou Yu 1). 大徳…必得其

名 “Those who possess great virtue must gain their reputation” (Li Ji–Zhong Yong).Third, it means naming and talking. For example, 生穆公, 名之曰蘭 Yan Ji “gavebirth to Duke Mu and named him Lan” (Zuo Zhuan–Xun Gong 3rd Year). 蕩蕩乎,民無能名焉 King Yao’s virtue is “so great that people cannot describe it” (Lun Yu–Tai Bo). Fourth, it refers to written words. For instance, 屬瞽史喻書名 The king’srepresentative “calls together the musicians and historians from different states to tellthem the meaning of words in books” (Zhou Li–Qiu Guan). 百名以上書于策 Apassage of “more than 100 words is written on pieces of wood/bamboo” (Yi Li–PinLi). Fifth, it is interchangeable with ming 明 (to make clear, to understand).

26 Zhang Xuan claims that ming written “in the tortoise shell, the bestial born, and the ancientvessel is derived from kou and xi, and is the same as written in the seal; but its meaning is notunderstandable. It is quite obscure that Xu Shen interpreted ming in terms of ming (dark)”(Zhongwen Changyong Sanqian Zi Xing Yi Shi, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968),141.27 Quoted in Ding Fubao, ed. Shuo Wen Jie Zi Gu Lin (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshu Guan,1959), 578.28 Gao Shufan, ed. Zhongwen Xing Yin Yi Zonghe da Zidian (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1989),203.29 Ibid.

10 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

For example,聖人…不見而名 “The Sage understands things without seeing them”(Dao De Jing—Chap. 47).名,明也;名實事使分明也 “Names are to bring things tospotlight; in others words, to make actual things recognizable by naming them” (ShiMing–Shi Yan Yu).

On the other hand, shi is interpreted by Xu Shen as fu (wealth) in the Shuo WenJie Zi, for this character consists of a radical 宀, meaning a “house”, and a character貫, meaning “money and goods.” Duan Yucai follows Xu Shen, suggesting “ahouse that is full of goods” is shi. He also indicates that shi is later extended tomean “the seed of grass and the fruit of trees.” According to Xu Shen and DuanYucai, the original meaning of shi is “wealth”; no matter where the wealth comesfrom, either from money or from goods, wealth is what one personally holds and isa kind of real possession. This is the basis of Xu Shen and Duan Yucai’s inter-pretation of shi and most likely the basis for all the usages of shi in ancient texts.

To be specific, shi has four basic meanings. First, it refers to wealth or richness.For instance, 君之倉廪實 “Your (Duke Hui’s) barn is full of grains” (Meng Zi–Liang Hui Wang 2). 公家虛而大臣实 “The state is poor, but senior officials arerich” (Han Fei Zi–Wang Zheng). Second, it designates the actuality of things andpeople’s real situation. For example, 名不得過實, 實不得延名 “Names should notexceed the actuality of things, things should not expand the scope of what namesdefine (Guan Zi–Xin Shu 1). 循名责實, 君子之事也 “The ruler’s duty is to reviewofficers’ actual performance in terms of their title” (Deng Xi Zi–Wu Hou 1). Third,it means to fill with or actualize something. For instance, 狗馬實外厩 “The outsidestable fills with dogs and horses” (Zhan Guo Ce–Qi Ce 4). 實其言, 必長晉國 “Toactualize these words must strengthen the Jin State” (Zuo Zhuan–Xuan Gong 12thYear). Fourth, it stands for what names signify. For example,夫名,實謂也 “Namesare what people use to call things” (Gongsun Long Zi–Ming Shi Lun) .名定而實辨

“Once names are established, things become distinct” (Xun Zi–Zheng Ming).Taken together, ming and shi as two terms indicate two realms: one is the realm

of words including names, characters, signifiers and the other is the realm of non-words including objects, ideas, and things. In the final analysis, the two Chineseterms share the same meaning, category, and function with the two English terms:language and reality. While the term language is commonly recognized as a set ofsymbols used in daily communication, the term reality is a little bit controversial.For some people such as the nominalist, reality refers to physical and concreteobjects only; for some other people such as the idealist, however, it includes bothphysical and abstract objects. Apparently, ancient Chinese thinkers treat “classes,attributes, propositions, numbers, relations, and functions as typical abstractobjects.”30 In their view, everything that can be named or talked about in wordsfalls into the category of shi; in the meanwhile, ming does not limit itself to the

30 Willard Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1960), 233.

1.2 Context of the Discourse on Ming and Shi 11

domain of proper names; rather, it can symbolize anything, no matter it is concrete,real or abstract, and virtual. To the modern mind, names are merely a part of, thusdo not equal to, language. Yet, to the ancient mind, names stand for language.31

This case derives from two situations: First, the vocabulary and grammar of ancientlanguage are not as rich and meticulous as that of modern language; moreimportantly, names are original metaphors, and the evolution of language is innature a kind of metaphorical development of names. Ancient Chinese thinkers’discussion of ming and shi demonstrates the validity of translating ming-shi intolanguage-reality.

The term Zhou li is key to understanding early Chinese history and ancientChinese thought (particularly Confucianism). In its broadest sense, “Zhou li” refersto a complex system of “proprieties” or code of correct social behaviors, thatevolved over nearly 850 years of the Zhou dynasty (about 1100–256 BCE). Itserved as detailed rules of human behaviors in everyday life and as establishednorms of people’s role in family, group, and society.

As a code of social conduct, Zhou li had three aspects. First, it consisted of sometraditions rooted in the culture and history of very early China, that is, in theprimitive rites of Chinese clan society. But during the Western Zhou dynasty(1100–771 BCE), these rites, customs, and traditions were systematically reworkedand reformed. Their religious flavor was largely reduced, and the secularized corpusof traditions was extended to political and economic area. Thus, the second aspectof Zhou li appeared as a system of social, political, and economic institutions thatconstituted a social estate structure, which combined social and family order. Andfinally, Zhou li comprised a set of immensely detailed regulations, both oral andwritten, for the management of everyday affairs at every level, and within everyinstitution, of Chinese society.

The content and function of Zhou li have been studied by both ancient andcontemporary scholars. Li Dongfang, for example, suggests that Zhou li comprised,at the same time, the culture and history of early China, its institutional structureand dynamics, its moral and ethical code, and its system of social “proprieties.” Inhis view, since the king administered his country in terms of li, li also had thefunction and significance of Chinese “constitution”; beyond that, Zhou li served asa guide to and judge of historical experience, from which people took their directionand enlightenment. He further points out that Zhou li held a central position in theliterature, arts, and education of Zhou society: Zhou poetry represented li, Zhoumusic assisted li, and Zhou dance displayed li; since poetry, music, and dance werethe main content of education in Zhou society, education, literature, and artstogether strengthened and spread li.32 In a similar vein, Zou Changlin compre-hensively enquires into the origin, development, content, function, and significance

31 It is significant to point out that regarding the term “name(s)” ancient Greek thinkers share thesame position with ancient Chinese thinkers, both treat names as nouns in particular and languagein general.32 Li Dongfang, Zhongguo Shanggu Shi Ba Jiang (Taibei: Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue ChubanShe, 1983), 67.

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of li. According to him, li came into being earlier than writing and functioned as acarrier of culture; in early Chinese history, li linked together politics, laws, religion,thought, custom, literature, arts, and even economy and military; thus, it wasnothing but li that stood for the basic character of ancient Chinese culture.33

Confucius (551–479 BCE) took the interpretation and protection of Zhou li ashis lifelong mission. To him, the most important function of Zhou li is to build up asocial estate system; if everyone plays his or her different roles and behaves in allsituations in terms of li, an ideal society would come into being. Confucius thoughtof the establishment li as the most significant historical contribution the Zhoudynasty made; he claimed that “Zhou had the advantage of viewing the two pastdynasties. How complete and elegant are its regulations! I follow Zhou.”34 Needlessto say, the “complete and elegant regulations” were the ones based on li, and by“following Zhou,” Confucius meant following Zhou li.

However, in Confucius’s time, Zhou li faced serious challenges: people nolonger respected Zhou li’s authority, and the social order based on Zhou li started todecline. Confucius himself gave us two examples to illustrate this condition. Thefirst is that according to Zhou li, only the king is permitted to offer a sacrifice toancestors; a lord may not. But a Lu lord broke this rule.35 Second, Zhou li stipulatesthat the king may have eight rows of pantomimes, a lord six rows of pantomimes,and a senior official four rows. But a Lu official had eight rows of pantomimes.Confucius strongly criticized these discrepancies as violations of Zhou li andtherefore intolerable.36

The two examples reflect the sociopolitical states of the Eastern Zhou dynasty(770–256 BCE): The king lost his power, lords and officials overstepped theirpositions, and sons killed their fathers. As Zhou li began to break down, the societybecame disordered, and one clear expression of this disorder was the conflictbetween ming and shi.

Perhaps the simplest way to grasp the relationship between the collapse of Zhouli and the origins of the ming-shi discourse is to understand that Zhou li definessocial roles (i.e., king, lord, father, son, etc.) in terms of the behavior proper to eachand to their relations. The collapse of Zhou li, therefore, can be understood as abreakdown in the “proper” meaning of such names as “king,” “lord,” “father,”“son,” etc., as well as of such terms as “honor,” “obey,” “govern,” and the like. Inshort, the collapse of Zhou li made the correspondence between ming (names,terms, words) and shi (things, behaviors, relations—that which names mean)problematic and therefore a matter of attention and major concern among thinkersof the time. In particular, the collapse manifested itself, toward the end of theEastern Zhou dynasty, mainly in three types of ming that are discussed by Xun Zi

33 Zou Changlin, Zhongguo Gu Li Yanjiu (Taibei: Wenjin Chuban She, 1992), 10–13.34 Lun Yu–Ba Yi, James Legge, trans. Confucian Analects, the Great Learning and the Doctrineof the Mean (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1970), 160.35 Li Ji–Li Yun.36 Lun Yu–Ba Yi.

1.2 Context of the Discourse on Ming and Shi 13

(ca. 313–238 BCE): san ming 散名 (common terms), xing ming 刑名 (legal pro-visions), and jue ming 爵名 (ranks and titles).37

San ming refers to a term that is used to denote a class of things that share thesame features. But very often, a san ming was used to denote something not fallinginto the same category. Confucius once complained about “A cornered vesselwithout corners—a strange cornered vessel! A strange cornered vessel!”38 WhatConfucius complained of was the conflict between the name of a thing and the thingbeing named: The name gu was originally used for a kind of wine vessel withcorners, hence meant literally “cornered vessel.” But Confucius’s contemporariesused gu for the wine vessel of their own time, which had no corners at all.

Xing ming refers to the terms of legal provisions that people must obey. Xingming were thrown into disorder not only by actions that went against the legalprovisions named, but also by creating (i.e., putting into words) legal provisionsthat violated Zhou li. From the Confucian point of view, Deng Xi (ca. 545–501BCE) appeared as a good example in case. Deng Xi acted against the law bytwisting the meaning of the law: When a law prohibited hanging up pamphlets, headvised that they be delivered; when delivering pamphlets was prohibited, headvised that they be smuggled among other articles. Moreover, Deng Xi alsodisrupted xing ming by creating bad laws. The ideal means of controlling society, toConfucians, was li (proprieties) instead of xing (criminal laws); yet, Deng Xi madea law for his native state that undermined the ruler’s authority to make laws as wellas encouraged ordinary people to fight with each other and even with nobles, thusundermining Zhou li.

Jue ming refers to terms for the ranks of nobilities and to the titles of officials. Arank or title indicates a social position defined by a set of clear regulations thatpeople are not allowed to go against. A rank or title also implies duties which theperson who has the title must undertake. Jue ming were disrupted when nobles andofficials overstepped their boundaries and did not perform their duties. WhenConfucius’s two students told him that the ruler of Wei State was going to attackZhuan Yu, he criticized both the ruler and the students for not dissuading the rulerfrom his planned attack.39 To Confucius, military attack could only be undertakenby the king, not by a lord or ruler of a state. If a ruler of a state made an attack, notonly was the ruler wrong for going beyond the limit his title indicates, but hissubjects were also wrong for not following their duty as subjects and dissuadingtheir ruler from his wrongful act.

In Confucius’s view, the collapse of Zhou li was to a large extent due to theconflict between ming and shi. For Zhou li, as a system of social rules and insti-tutions, set up positions and duties for each member of a family and of society, andthese positions and duties were embedded as well as defined in varied ming, which

37 Xun Zi also used the notion of wen ming (ceremonial names). This notion actually means li(proprieties); thus, it is not necessary to discuss it as a type of names.38 Lun Yu–Yong Ye, trans. James Legge, 1970, 92.39 Lun Yu–Ji Shi.

14 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

functioned as a kind of norms. Thus, to follow Zhou li was to follow ming, and tofollow ming was to conduct oneself in keeping with the regulations and responsi-bilities given by ming. Once everyone acted in terms of the regulations andresponsibilities that defined their ranks, titles, roles, i.e., their names, ming and shi,attained correspondence, and once ming and shi corresponded to each other, li wason the right track and society was in order. In this sense, mistaking ming was notsimply a semantic problem, but a pragmatic one. To put it somewhat differently, itwas not a linguistic problem, but a sociopolitical one. Of course, in ancient Chineselanguage and thought, the linguistic and the sociopolitical domains were notseparated.

In Confucius’s time, Zhou li was not the only standard for judging shi (right) andfei (wrong) and solving social conflicts. Laws (mainly criminal laws) were widelydrawn up and carried out. Interestingly enough, while the use of ming was asociopolitical issue disguised in the trappings of language, the use of laws was alinguistic issue disguised in the trappings of sociopolitical affairs. In other words, tosolve a ming problem depends, ultimately, on sociopolitical means, whereas tosolve a legal problem depends, ultimately, on language. This is true at least in DengXi’s case.

Deng Xi once was a senior official of Zheng State. In his state, more and moremerchants participated in political events, intellectuals fought against nobles, andordinary people got together at local schools to criticize the government andpolitical affairs. These activities broke down Zhou li as well as encouraged studiesof xing ming (legal provisions) and arguments between the government and thepeople. In the face of this great social change, Deng Xi advocated ruling society bylaw instead of Zhou li. He not only made laws, but also taught people how to playwith words in their lawsuits.40

The Lü Shi Chun Qiu (Lü’s Spring and Autumn), a text from the SyncretistSchool, introduces Deng Xi as a man who “could argue a right to be wrong and awrong to be right. With him right and wrong had no fixed standard, and ‘yea’ and‘nay’ changed every day. What he wished to win was always won, and whom hedesired to punish was always punished.”41 As mentioned earlier, when Zi Chan, aminister of Deng Xi’s native state, prohibited the practice of “hanging up pam-phlets” in public places, a practice which had become so prevalent as to causedisquiet on the part of the government, Deng Xi evaded the law by “delivering” thepamphlets. So Zi Chan prohibited the “delivering” of pamphlets, whereupon DengXi adopted the device of “smuggling” them among other articles. “The governmentordinances were inexhaustible, but his devices to evade them were equallyinexhaustible.”42

40 Deng Xi’s deed mentioned here comes from the Zuo Zhuan and the Lü Shi Chun Qiu–Li Wei.41 Lü Shi Chun Qiu, quoted in Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China(New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1968) 13.42 Ibid, 12.

1.2 Context of the Discourse on Ming and Shi 15

On the surface, what Deng Xi did in this story was to play with words against thegovernment. But on a deeper level, Deng Xi called attention to an aspect of therelationship between ming and shi that is problematic. There is always a gapbetween a thing signified by a word and the word that signifies the thing, and thisgap makes both the thing and the word open to different interpretations. In DengXi’s case, the real meaning of the government’s orders was to prohibit pamphlets,but the two words (i.e., “hanging” and “delivering”) used in the orders were toospecific to fully express this meaning. Thus, names, here, enabled Deng Xi tochange what was essentially illegal into what was literally legal using the gapbetween the word and the thing.

A basic function of laws is to make clear the distinction between right andwrong. Obviously, the distinction can be clear only when legal provisions are clear,and the clarity of legal provisions depends on the clarity of words employed inlaws. Yet with Deng Xi’s interpretations, legal provisions that seemed clear losttheir clarity. Ironically, the more precisely the law specified what was “wrong”, themore it failed to achieve its intent, and the more easily Deng Xi evaded it by“obeying” to the letter. Thus, laws lost their authoritative power, and the ruler’scontrol of society was shaken.

Because of his interpretation of right and wrong as relative to the specific wordsused in law (and, of course, the intent of the “receiver”), Deng Xi was ultimatelyexecuted by the ruler of his native state. But the problem he raised was not solvedby his death. On the contrary, it provoked scholars for generations to come toexamine the nature of ming and its relationship to shi.43

43 Scholars have different views on Deng Xi and the text under his name. I treat Deng Xi as ahistorical figure. According to the Zuo Zhuan, Xun Zi, and Lü Shi Chun Qiu, Deng Xi was one ofthe first members of the School of Names. He paid much attention to language analysis, argumentskill, and logic; in so doing, he advanced some propositions which seem to go against commonsense but imply deep thinking and ingenious demonstration. We can safely believe that Deng Xiwas a real person in history; what he did aggravated the conflict between li and law, and what hesaid encouraged an epistemic, if not epistemological, inquiry into ming. On the other hand, Isuggest that though the Deng Xi Zi may not be a text written by Deng Xi himself, it does reflect histhought on ming and shi, which coincide with other ancient thinkers’ ideas of the same issue.

16 1 Methodological and Historical Inquiry

Chapter 2Four Notions of Names

As analyzed in the first chapter, the collapse of Zhou li was the basic sociopoliticalsituation of Eastern Zhou dynasty, and the conflict between ming and shi was asharp symbol of the collapse of Zhou li; moreover, Deng Xi’s relative view of rightand wrong went beyond the area of legal affairs and raised a deep epistemicproblem. Under these conditions, the relationship between ming and shi became akey issue that had both practical meaning and theoretical value and forced states-men and scholars to think about and seek for answers.

It was Confucius who first advanced a theory of rectifying names and thought ofrectifying names as an important means in solving sociopolitical problems. Fromthen on, many thinkers proposed their theories of names; consequently, a discourseon ming-shi occurred. Starting from Confucius’s rectifying names, ending at LüBuwei’s examining names, this discourse lasted about two hundred years andattracted all major schools of thought in pre-Qin times. By reviewing these schools’theories of ming-shi, we can find this discourse developed along with four notionsof ming, i.e., zheng ming 正名 (rectification of names), wu ming 無名 (abandon-ment of names) , bian ming 辨名 (analysis of names), and shen ming 審名

(examination of names). In this chapter, I shall review this discourse in terms of thefour notions.

2.1 Rectification of Names (Zheng Ming)

The notion of zheng ming comes from the Lun Yu論語 (The Analects of Confucius).When answering the question: What would be the first thing to do if he is asked toadminister Wei State, Confucius said that 必也正名乎 “It must be to rectifynames.”1 This notion was quite popular in pre-Qin times. For example, the Guo Yureads: 正名育类 “to clarify names and promote virtue.”2 The Guan Zi reads: 守慎

正名 “to stay cautious and correct names.”3 All the three messages refer to the same

1 Lun Yu–Zi Lu.2 Guo Yu–Jin Yu 4.3 Guan Zi–Zheng Di.

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015Z. Sun, Language, Discourse, and Praxis in Ancient China,DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-54865-9_2

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