Cities 28 (2011) 251–259

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Cities

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Large scale development projects and star architecture in the absence ofdemocratic politics: The case of Abu Dhabi, UAE

Davide Ponzini ⇑Department of Architecture and Planning, Politecnico di Milano, Via Bonardi 3, 20133 Milano, Italy

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 1 April 2010Received in revised form 25 December 2010Accepted 12 February 2011Available online 16 March 2011

Keywords:Abu DhabiUrban developmentStar architectureCultural districtStructure plan

0264-2751/$ - see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Adoi:10.1016/j.cities.2011.02.002

⇑ Tel.: +39 02 23992603; fax: +39 02 23992610.E-mail address: davide.ponzini@polimi.it

a b s t r a c t

In the last decade, scholars and policymakers have paid greater attention to the role of famous designers’pieces of architecture not only in regenerating urban areas but also in defining a positive and communi-cative image in the global economic competition among cities. Taking into account the general back-ground of and socio-economic changes in Western countries, this rationale assumes that the use of awell-known architect’s name can give a competitive advantage to a city in many ways. Following thislegitimizing narrative, cities now strive for signature architecture, sometimes with little regard to theirurban context, their size and role in the global market, the democratic decision making process andthe urban effects. Although moderate success in urban regeneration, tourist attraction and economicdevelopment may be achieved in some cases, the high expectations of policymakers are often not met.In this sense, a better understanding of this urban issue is relevant for the current debate on urban plan-ning. The manuscript draws on an extensive case study of Abu Dhabi, describing the local institutionalframework and planning system, analyzing the oligarchic network and key actors in urban developmentand providing an in-depth analysis of the Saadiyat Island mega-development project, which includes acultural district, hotel, retail and residential areas, with spectacular architecture. The local economicand institutional conditions of Abu Dhabi are not common elsewhere, but the city is a significant caseof the political, economic and urban criticalities of planning large scale development projects and ofcollecting pieces of branded architecture in a democratic vacuum.

� 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Super-branded-mega-development projects in contemporary However, similar extreme expressions are now evident in many

cities

‘‘We already have 11 time-lapse cameras on the island that havebeen recording an image every 15 minutes for the last threeyears. A photographer that has been commissioned to do 45 daysa year, and visits the island 4 times over a twelve month period.We shoot the island from above by helicopter once a month fromfixed GPS points. And on top of that we are working with a filmcompany that is doing a three year documentary on the buildingof Saadiyat Island. I think we have most angles covered. My otherproblem is that the Island is the biggest building site in the worldand all visitors have to be accompanied for tours and need a 4wheel drive vehicle to traverse the temporary roads. I wouldsuggest you visit the experience centre’’.

The above reply by one of the managers of the Saadiyat Islandproject following a request for permission to photograph the devel-opment site in 2010 does not require further explanation. It isalready well-known that urban development megaprojects andcontemporary architecture have become a global spectacle forlocal image creation, city branding and real estate marketing.

ll rights reserved.

global and second or third tier cities. After production and commu-nication technology innovations induced relevant delocalizationand re-modulation dynamics, cities assumed new roles in integrat-ing innovative production and in providing specialized services.The cities undergoing massive change are not only metropolitanareas, but also the centers of the global flow of material and imma-terial goods, typical of post-industrial markets (among others:Amin, 2000; Sassen, 1994; Short & Kim, 1999). Taking into accountthe general background and changes in the global economy (e.g.,the growing role of services, immaterial production and knowl-edge-based economy) and of Western society (e.g., more time forleisure, growing expenditure for culture, entertainment and tour-ism, open and cosmopolitan society) (Florida, 2002, 2005; Scott1997, 2000), policy makers started to brand and market citiesthrough attractive images, cultural amenities and spectaculararchitectural artifacts (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Clark, 2004;Evans, 2003; Lash & Urry, 1994; Lloyd & Clark, 2002).

Cities compete by using the political and economic engine ofurban development projects with the objective of attractingproduction and workers and of specializing in consumption andentertainment, economic control and wealth redistribution. Bycarefully observing Baltimore’s urban affairs during a period ofrapid and spectacular transformation, Harvey (1989a, 1989b) noted

252 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259

a connection between entrepreneurial tendencies in city manage-ment and the presence of post-modern architecture, conferenceand retail centers, cultural and entertainment facilities and of sitesfor hosting sports, expos or other spectacles in potentially de-con-textualized facilities. Given that other monopolies have been facingdifficulties due to higher financial mobility and availability, the cre-ation of such spaces and the economic appreciation of their real es-tate has become increasingly important (Harvey, 2002). Thejustification of this growth machine in terms of potential wealthredistribution to actors who are not involved in real estate, espe-cially lower-income groups, has been soundly contested in Westerncountries since the 1970s (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976).

Large-scale projects are not a new formula for infrastructure andfor developing large areas in a city (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothen-gatter, 2003); the dramatic problems related to such projects due tovarious kinds of political and economic constraints, uncertaintiesand unbalanced effects have been widely acknowledged (Hall,1980; Moulaert, Swyngedouw, & Rodriguez, 2002; Altshuler &Luberoff, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2005). The use of cultural attractors fortriggering urban development is more recent, and it has often beencoupled with the spectacular artifacts and flamboyant perfor-mances of star architects (Easterling, 2005; Gospodini, 2002; Jencks,2005; Saunders, 2005; Sklair, 2006; Sudjic, 2005; Urry, 2007).

Globally, cities apparently compete to collect new pieces ofarchitecture as if they were pieces of art,1 sometimes without tak-ing into account their urban meaning and contextual functions. Sec-ond and third tier cities have often adopted this strategy as well. Forexample, the flagship project of the new Guggenheim Museum byFrank Gehry in Bilbao was interpreted as the supposed trigger fora broader process of branding and revitalizing the city. A numberof urban and infrastructural projects appeared in subsequent yearsdesigned by stars such as Foster, Isozaki, Pelli and Calatrava. A closerlook at the process of economic development shows that this narra-tive is too simplistic (Del Cerro Santamaría, 2007; Plöger, 2007;Ponzini, 2010). However, the ‘‘Bilbao effect’’ narrative had a tremen-dous effect on urban decision makers. The examples of star archi-tects designing spectacular megaprojects are countless, althoughnot always as successful in urban regeneration, tourist attractionand economic development as costumers tend to believe (Rybczyn-ski, 2002). Among countless examples, two recent processes showedsome of the typical political shortcomings.

The developer Forest City Ratner and the public agency EmpireState Development Corporation outlined a 4 billion dollar, 22-acreproject in Brooklyn called the Atlantic Yards, which included sportfacilities, offices, hotels, retail spaces and housing. The master plan,designed by Frank Gehry, was heavily contested and never took off(Ockman, 2008). A typical culture-led city-branding megaprojectfor the West Kowloon Cultural District was envisioned and grantedwith HK$21.6 billion budget by the Government of the Hong KongSpecial Administrative Region and finally designed by the ‘‘archi-star’’ Norman Foster. The project was intended to promote tourismand media visibility of a world-class financial city through interna-tional museums such as the Guggenheim and through spectaculararchitecture (e.g., the world’s largest outdoor roof and the Foster-designed museum facility), but it was heavily contested, and, in2006, a new and lengthy process of public consultation and newproject selection began (Lui, 2008). As of 2010, three proposals(by Foster and Partners, Rem Koolhaas-OMA and Rocco Yin) were

1 Sudjic anticipated and mocked some characteristics of this global homogeniza-tion trend in architecture: ‘‘There is now an international flying circus which travelsthe world leaving signature buildings in its wake. The major cities of the world share aneed to collect them, in the same way that art galleries from Osaka to Liège needHenry Moore, David Hockney and Julian Schnabel. So Richard Meier builds essentiallythe same building in Frankfurt and The Hague, and Michael Graves builds apartmenttowers in Yokohama and offices in Atlanta’’ (Sudjic, 1993, 76).

at stake, while some smaller scale cultural and leisure activitieswere being promoted on the site.

In these two cases, despite massive economic resources, amend-ments of urban regulation and the aura of a star architect, the pro-jects could not overcome political confrontation and localcommunity positions. Of course, a number of megaprojects in Amer-ica as well as in Europe or Asia do not face such shortcomings. Therising capital of consumerism can count on massive economic re-sources, such as Doha’s flamboyant sport stadiums and facilities, ico-nic office towers and hotels, various projects signed by internationalfirms such as Pei, Isozaki, Correa, Arup, KEO and others, and in thesubsequent accumulation of urban spectacles (Adhan, 2008). How-ever, one can also notice that branded Olympics and European Cap-ital of Culture or World Expo developments have been mushroomingin cities on the five continents and tend to be affected by fewer lim-itations than most. Significant economic resources are provided byfinancial acts and special contributions, ad hoc powers are grantedto task forces having the mission to plan and complete these inter-ventions, and development projects and master plans can join theopportunities of dispensations from ordinary planning cogency, pro-cedures and actual plans. This may reduce political interaction andmutual adjustment among different actors who may be involvedor affected by the development project itself. Although success in ur-ban development and regeneration may be achieved in some cases,sometimes the special economic, planning and legal powers re-quired cannot be justified when compared with the inadequate oreven paradoxical urban effects.

Effects, such as urban landscape homogenization, marginal in-creases in tourist attraction, short term economic effects but longterm binding of cultural management resources and others arenot only contrary to collective goals but also to the interests ofthe promoters of interventions such as the ones mentioned aboveand the ones this article will consider in Abu Dhabi. A better under-standing of this urban issue is relevant to urban policy making, butit requires avoiding the consideration of isolated cultural artifacts(e.g., flagship projects, artsy blockbusters) to explicitly study theurban development process and the implications of the use of largescale architectural spectacles. The use of legitimizing narrativesand discursive constructions such as the ‘Bilbao effect’ are centralin contexts of democratic governance to mobilize actors and inter-ests for urban development (Swyngedouw, 2006). However, littleattention has been given to conditions where political interactionis heavily constrained, assuming that democratic network coordi-nation in local politics is crucial to collect the needed political, legaland economic resources and to induce a shared urban outcome.

Abu Dhabi, the place described in the initial quotation, is cer-tainly a peculiar case of a capital city using megaprojects and spec-tacular architecture on a massive scale for global marketingpurposes, even compared with the abovementioned snapshotexamples or other rising capitals of Asia (see, among others, Kong,2009). Despite the growing institutional and political complexity inmost national contexts, Abu Dhabi’s decision-making regarding ur-ban development and implementation processes are reduced tothe basic essentials in terms of rules and power concentration,planning procedures and veto points, and the number of actors.Huge capitals are available and concentrated in extremely smalland cohesive networks. The analysis of emblematic projects inAbu Dhabi’s accelerated economic and urban development showsthe critical limits of coupling megaprojects with spectacularizedarchitecture in a democratic vacuum.2 These elements seem

2 The paper is based both on desktop and field research undertaken in Europe, theUSA and in the United Arab Emirates between May 2008 and October 2009. The casestudy draws both on documentary evidence (publications, official documents,newspaper articles, organizations’ newsletters, and websites) and on primary data:in-depth interviews with 36 qualified informants and the key actors in Abu Dhabi’sdevelopment as well as participant observation.

D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259 253

relevant when reflecting on economically, politically and institution-ally more complex situations in Western countries and beyond.

Programming the urban growth machine in Abu Dhabi

With the precise intention of being the pinnacle of brandedlarge scale development projects, Abu Dhabi has recently been atcenter stage in newspapers and architectural magazines. Fromthe few descriptions available in the literature, it is necessary to se-lect some local historic, institutional and socio-economic informa-tion to better understand the current of spatial planning and urbandevelopment trends (for a detailed report, see Elsheshtawy, 2008).

For centuries, Abu Dhabi was a small village whose economywas based on fishing and pearl diving. In the early 1960s, the dis-covery of immense gas and oilfields gave impetus to a series of pro-jects and transformations. After the demolition of the originalsettlement, in the second half of the 1960s, an infrastructural planand a development and land-use scheme were conceived.

By grouping into the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the seven sul-tanates became a single independent sovereign unit in 1971, withAbu Dhabi as their capital city. Until 2004, the founding father ofthe nation, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, guided the countrythrough a simple and concrete approach, providing the region withbasic structures and facilities: streets, an airport, a stadium, andthe Cultural Center. Development has systematically been com-bined with the planting of millions of palm trees to mitigate theclimatic conditions. Following a simplified classification based onstyles, Abu Dhabi experienced four trends in architectural produc-tion: besides the generic ‘‘architecture without architects’’ consist-ing of the required office and housing buildings, the 1970–1980switnessed the interpretation of vernacular styles (e.g., ArchitectsCollaborative for the Cultural Center), followed by the international

Fig. 1. Self-referential government advertisement and

style by corporate firms (e.g., KPF for the ADIA headquarters) andmore recently some spectacular architectural exponents (Koolhaas,2007a).

The population doubled between 1986 and 2005 due to the in-crease in temporary workers. The current population is over 1.4million, among which less than 10% is native. It is the highestper capita income country in the world despite dramatic socialdualism (Gimbel, 2007). Openness towards Western economiesand business models dramatically accelerated after the successionof Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The new generation of theruling elite has a Western education and a strong orientation to-wards faster economic diversification and growth. In 2006, AbuDhabi’s GDP was approximately 87 billion dollars, about 60% ofthat of the UAE. It has most of the gas and oilfields in UAE andtaxation is as low as 1.7% of the GDP, due to the huge amount ofnatural resources (ADCED, 2008). Beginning in 2005, a season ofreforms in real estate regulation introduced new rights for non-emirate individuals and companies. A partial liberalizationwelcomed foreign investments, and the strong building expansionnotwithstanding, the supply did not encounter problems withvacancies, both in the housing and in the office sectors. Combinedwith a very weak regulation framework, it induced highly specula-tive trends (Credit Suisse, 2008).

Abu Dhabi’s economy is based on a solid oil economy and candevelop long term strategies, leveraging the great amounts ofliquidity as well. In the public discourse, Abu Dhabi is often op-posed to Dubai’s chaotic development (Davis, 2006; Mustafa,2007; Katodrytis, 2007). Sometimes this rhetoric stresses therepresentativeness of the capital’s urban environment or its carewith sustainability, as in the 22-billion dollar investment of thecarbon neutral Masdar City, a 50,000 inhabitant expansionfinanced by the government and designed by Norman Foster. Forexample, Davidson (2007) and Elsheshtawy (2008) systematically

typical urban landscape (picture by the author).

3 Retrieved from http://www.aldar.com on May 28, 2009.

254 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259

noted differences in Abu Dhabi’s urban historic layering, territorialdimensions and population, property rights, cultural orientationand pace of (post)modernization but confirmed strong similaritiesin real estate strategies with Dubai (Acuto, 2010), despite the con-sideration that the city aims at keeping its traditional position as apolitical and financial center in the Emirates (Fig. 1).

After two years of consultations, in 2008, the Abu Dhabi Councilfor Economic Development, the Department of Economic Planningand the Executive Council delivered a vision for the coordination ofplans and policies for the long term development of the region. The2030 Economic Vision includes shared common principles regard-ing institutional transparency, private sector empowerment, theimportance of sustainability, welfare and public infrastructure indevelopment. The stated objective is economic diversification to-wards high added-value sectors, with clear allusions to global com-petition rhetoric. The dominance of the mining and oil industry(59% of the GDP) should be counterbalanced by the aerospaceand military, pharmaceutical and biotech, media and communica-tion, education and tourism industries (Sharpley, 2002). The latteris highly emphasized, forecasting a positive trend in visitors: AbuDhabi airport was expected to double its passenger flow between2005 and 2010 (from 6.3 to 12.2 million); similarly, visitors shouldincrease from 1.6 to 3.4 million between 2006 and 2013 (ADCED,2008). Several interviewees noted that the hotel, retail and leisureactivity structures currently do not respond to the expected expan-sion trends.

Urban structure and the planning process in Abu Dhabi

The Economic Vision has been interacting with and influencingurban expansion strategies. Once the urban development pro-grammed in the 1980s general master plan was completed, aninternational team developed the Urban Structure Framework Planin 2007 to drive the sustainable development of the city until 2030.The Prince declared:

‘‘This plan provides a strong and comprehensive foundation forthe development of the city of Abu Dhabi, in a strategic andcoordinated way. [. . .] while building a global capital with hisown rich cultural heritage’’ (AD, 2007, 2). The plan states:‘‘Abu Dhabi will manifest its role and stature as [. . .] a globalcapital city’’ (UPC, 2007, 21) and ‘‘Abu Dhabi’s urban fabricand community infrastructure will enable the values, socialarrangements, culture and mores of this Arabic community’’(UPC, 2007, 21).

The task force designing the plan naturally recommended carry-ing out a socioeconomic analysis of the demand and driving factorsin the real estate market. However, the most critical aspect seemsto be the definition of legally binding planning powers, a moretransparent and long-term planning process, and creation of anauthoritative planning department capable of interacting withthe actual urban development processes and actors.

The plan forecasts a population of 3 million in 2030. The currentstrategy of urban development is supported by a public investmentof over 200 billion dollars between 2008 and 2013 (Colliers, 2007).The Structure Plan expects hotel rooms to double within the firstfive years, reaching 21,000 units. The islands surrounding the cityhave been assigned tourism related functions. Urban developmentis supposed to be guided by ten policy statements in the Abu Dhabi2030 Urban Structure Framework Plan, some structural frame-works and a regulation hypothesis that has no legal power, explic-itly waiting for a more specific planning document. Financialfunctions and government offices should be concentrated in theCentral Business District and in the Capital District, where it isexplicitly mentioned that the use of international iconic and

branded architecture is to express local identity. Even if the Planincludes land use regulation statements, it does not have any stat-utory power. Each map in the document contains the followingnote: ‘‘These plans represent themes to be refined in further plan-ning and design. Land uses, street patterns, and exact alignments inall areas are conceptual, and to be subjected to detailed evaluationand confirmation. Under no circumstances should these plans beconstrued as final directives for specific sites or areas’’ (UPC,2007). In the mean time, referring to infrastructural and environ-mental invariants, urban development simply happens by dividingthe land into precincts with general use, density and typology (so-called building block) features and assigning them to a few devel-opers. The mega-development master plans are juxtaposed accord-ing to specific interests and, in fact, contradicting the statementsabout new urban expansions to be gradual and continuous withexisting areas. On the contrary some areas are destined for disin-vestment while highly valuable island-like plots are going to beaccessible and appreciated thanks to new infrastructure.

In this temporary development framework, a unitary vision ismissing. The actual planning process leaves little influence to theplanning powers, established by Decree 23 in 2007. The UrbanPlanning Council (UPC) has the mission of fostering a public–pri-vate dialog regarding the urban vision. However, even if it has re-cently been given higher visibility, the number and dimension ofthe dozens of ongoing megaprojects has been an overwhelmingworkload for the one hundred officers. After particular parcelsare designated to key players in the real estate market and relevantbasic development principles are deduced from the StructureFramework Plan (regarding functions, density, accessibility, publicspace and services), the UPC typically negotiates directly withdevelopers. The lack of legally binding planning tools and the lim-ited number of large real estate operators who are typically well-connected to the government and royal family dramatically curtailthe influence of the UPC.

The urban implications of this planning system are not consid-ered nor publicly discussed because all the real estate sectors aresupposedly undersupplied, assuming the 2005–2009 trend as a ref-erence and not taking in consideration the fact that Abu Dhabi hasnot yet had a full cycle in the real estate market or that a marketslow-down phase is generally possible. Moreover, the possibilityof scheduling delivery to avoid risks of oversupply is not even ta-ken into account.

Precincts, key actors and large scale development projects

Abu Dhabi’s urban development is based on a narrow oligarchicsystem. Large-scale projects are discussed and decided by the royalfamily and a cohesive network of relatives, publicly funded agen-cies and development corporations. Compared to typical westerndemocratic contexts, the separation between public and privatesectors in Abu Dhabi is practically nonexistent because the sameactors have key positions in public decision making and in themanagement of private companies. The tactic of attracting foot-loose investments, tourism and specialized tertiary activities inskyscrapers or mega-development compounds tends to make realestate values increase towards higher values of other, perhaps geo-graphically distant, office, hotel or leisure space. In recent years,this tactic has been combined with mega-development projectsand the use of star architects.

In 2005, Aldar Properties was ‘‘established primarily to createworld-class real estate developments for the nation of Abu Dha-bi’’.3 Among the shareholders are, the government vehicle, MubadalaDevelopment Company; the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority; theNational Bank of Abu Dhabi through its Investment Company; the

Fig. 2. The Central Market site and its media representation (picture by the author).

4 Retrieved from http://www.abudhabitourism.ae on May 12, 2009.5 Retrieved from http://www.tdic.ae on May 12, 2009.

D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259 255

Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company; and the National Corporationfor Tourism and Hotels, together with other private emirate inves-tors. Aldar has a large land stock of about 38 million square metersvalued at 12 billion dollars (Credit Suisse, 2008). The Yas Island pro-ject covered a surface of almost 25 square kilometers, valued at 39billion dollars. It has completed a Formula 1 circuit, a Ferarri themepark, a hotel by Asymptote and other sport, retail, leisure and tour-ism related facilities. Aldar completed the 360 billion dollar projectfor the Central Market by Foster and Partners, located downtownand including luxury retail and housing facilities (Fig. 2). The devel-opment required demolition of a pre-existing and extremely popularmarket to replace it with this exclusive complex, displacing both thelower income shop-owners and users (Elsheshtawy, 2008). The pro-ject for Al-Raha Beach, over 5 million square meters, is a 120,000person medium density settlement along eleven kilometers of coastline. Asymptote designed the Strata Tower for this particular projectof Aldar.

Sorouh is the largest public real estate company to be listed onthe stock exchange in Abu Dhabi, and it was created in 2005 withan initial capital of 500 million dollars and overall 22 millionsquare meters in development programs. It is involved in thedevelopment of Al Reem Island, where the highest density of officebuildings will comprise the Central Business District, with residen-tial, retail and service facilities. The private company Tamouh is in-volved in Al Reem and in the creation of the nearby Fantasy Island,a dolphin-shaped development dedicated to entertainment. Otherrelevant actors in the real estate market are Hydra and Al Qudra.Among public companies with complex development missions,Mubadala was created in 2002 to manage an articulated portfolioand to interact with international partners in projects such as theSorbonne University campus and the expansion of ZayedUniversity.

To better target economic diversification goals, the govern-ment created the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority (ADTA) through

Decree 7 of 2004. The president of this authority is Sheikh SultanBin Tahnoon Al Nahyan, who is appointed, among other posi-tions, a member of the Council, of the environment agency andof the Board of Etihad National Airlines and a patron of the Mid-dle Eastern chapter of the Urban Land Institute. ADTA can pro-pose new regulation and intervention policies in the field oftourism development and is in charge of managing specific pro-grams in support of touristic expansion and consolidation interms of tourism licensing, infrastructure and product develop-ment.4 In this sense, it has a direct influence in city and regionalplanning. To better manage urban interventions and real estateoperations, ADTA created the private vehicle Tourism Development& Investment Company (TDIC), with the mission of ‘‘assisting theprovision of a world-class infrastructure which will fulfil theemirate’s ambitions of becoming a truly global destination ofdistinction’’.5 The Chairman is Sheikh Sultan Bin Tahnoon AlNahyan. Significant land stock has been transferred from the gov-ernment to the TDIC, composed of a large portfolio including theGrand Cornice Hotel, the Lagoon Hotel as well as infrastructure,resorts and the development of entire islands, such as SaadiyatIsland.

Large scale project on a global stage: Saadiyat Island and thecultural district

The objective of diversifying Abu Dhabi’s oil economy and theopportunity for the government to obtain higher financial creditcompared to the one of natural resources has signaled a shift in fo-cus regarding business and luxury tourism and, more recently, cul-tural and leisure activities. The government intends to reachbeyond the Gulf area and to compete with other global destina-

Fig. 3. Spectacularization of architecture in an on-site Saadiyat Island project advertisement (picture by Michele Nastasi).

256 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259

tions. For this reason, marketing and branding through spectaculararchitecture have been perceived as crucial. The analysis and dis-cussion of a significant large scale project highlights the modesof planning and intervention in this context.

Saadyiat Island (literally the ‘‘Island of Happiness’’) is a 27square kilometer development by TDIC, which is in the processof creating about thirty hotels, three marinas, 8000 villas and38,000 housing units along twenty kilometers of coastline with a28 billion dollar investment. The project includes the creation ofa Cultural District as an icon in the international scene. One ofthe public officers interviewed stated:

‘‘Abu Dhabi is trying to use international contemporary archi-tecture in order to express the newborn identity of the UAEnation: ‘Abu Dhabi is a global capital city’ is the message andit is certainly different from the mere business of Dubai!’’.6

From the beginning, the creation of a collection of iconic build-ings in a short period of time has been the driving idea. In the man-agers’ expectations, star architects were supposed to grant identityto the city and to link their fame and style to Saadiyat Island. Thechoice of collecting different branded facilities in a highly visiblemegaproject was also intended by TDIC as a way of distinguishingthe project in the overcrowded real estate market (Fig. 3).

Two years after the 2004 Gensler master plan, the Booz AllenHamilton consulting firm confirmed the hypothesis of creating acultural district to attract global tourism flow based on the factthat the nearby Gulf cities did not have any exceptional culturalattractions. In 2006, SOM designed a canal along which pavilions

6 Adhan (2008, 248) brought a similar paradoxical argument about Doha’sdevelopment by quoting the Head of Qatar’s tourism Agency: ‘‘This [Dubai]gigantomania is precisely what we want to avoid. Of course the speed of developmentmake it seems like Dubai. But we have a different plan. We want it more exclusive’’[retrieved from Follath, E. (2006), ‘‘Taking on Dubai Natural Gas Is Catapulting Qatarinto Modernity’’, Spiegel online International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,428963,00.html.

were to be created in order to be complementary to five large cul-tural facilities along the coast. In agreement with the Guggenheimfoundation and the French government, Abu Dhabi started longterm art programs and will host part of their collections in signa-ture architect buildings. TDIC directly contacted and selected FrankGehry for the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Museum, Jean Nouvel for theLouvre, Zaha Hadid for the Performing Arts Centre and Tadao Andofor the Maritime Museum. Norman Foster was selected for theSheikh Zayed National Museum in a competition with other twelvefirms. For the pavilions along the canal, the architects are SOM,Greg Lynn, Hani Rashid of Asymptote, Pei-Zhu, Charles Correa,Shigeru Ban, Khalid Al Najar and, once again, Frank Gehry. The planis to create a 670-acre Cultural District.

From the beginning, this operation espoused the ‘‘Bilbao effect’’strategy literally, involving the protagonists of the Bilbao deed, thedirector of the Guggenheim, Thomas Krens, and the ‘‘archistar’’Gehry. The Cultural District project was based on simplifiedeconomic and urban evaluation, a rosy analysis of the potentialmarket, the study of successful cases (e.g., Guggenheim Bilbaoand Millennium Park in Chicago) and forecasting direct and indi-rect impacts on the real estate market and the local economy. TDICexpects 1.5 million visitors per year once the whole CulturalDistrict is completed in 2018. In a more realistic interview, Krensrecognized that Gehry’s museum would be irrelevant in generatingany impact if it were not integrated with accessibility, economicand cultural policies (Koolhaas, 2007b).

In 2007, the EDAW consultancy group refined the master planfor the island including the Cultural District, Saadiyat Beach (a lux-ury hotel and golf resort complex), Al Marina and another beachwith luxury hotels (about 7000 rooms), commerce, leisure activi-ties, and a lagoon area with lower density, that is, the Wetlandsand Eco Point. The megaproject scheme includes a traditionaldevelopment density and typological scheme, following the natu-ral and artificial morphology of the area, and a general grid forhosting about 150,000 people. TDIC will complete the infrastruc-ture and the cultural facilities and will leave other developmentto be carried out by smaller private partners. The cultural facilities

D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259 257

are expected to be managed by an organization that is yet to becreated and international partners, corroborating the criticismsregarding the neo-colonial and franchising attitudes of culturalinstitutions such as the Guggenheim and the Louvre. The construc-tion site is ongoing, and the Guggenheim, Louvre and Sheik ZayedMuseum are expected to be completed by 2013.

The spectacularization of architecture and urban developmentis evident in the initial quotation. The media and marketing goalshave certainly been achieved, fostering the image of a contempo-rary global capital city open to western culture and business. Theuse of famous architects and international cultural institutionsfunctions to consolidate the cultural and financial credibility ofthe operation. The Saadiyat Island megaproject attempts to appre-ciate the value of the desert area in an unprecedented and, at thesame time, very traditional way. The creation of such a cultural dis-trict and of such a development in the desert has not been testedanywhere else. However, the planning, financing and value captureprocesses are grounded in the real estate, retail and tourism activ-ities in the schematic Saadiyat Island master plan, avoiding anyopportunity for a richer interpretation of the places and their ac-tual uses after they are completed. In the master plan, the distribu-tion of density and functions are intended to be exclusive andexclusionary of lower income dwellers or users. The location ofcoast line resorts and lagoon low rise housing, the intersection ofcultural and hotel facilities and the canal pavilions will probablyinduce the alienating effect of a high-culture-but-spectacularizedtheme park in a Western-style luxury suburbia.

Large scale development projects and star architecture in theabsence of democratic politics

Even if Abu Dhabi has particular economic and institutionalconditions, this borderline case amplifies several problems thatare common in contemporary large scale development projectsand in the use of star architecture.

From the political point of view, the number of actors takingpart in urban planning and development decision making is very

Fig. 4. View of Al Sowwah Island, 20

limited. In most cases, it is a government agency or company withall the necessary material resources, land or financial means. Polit-ical consensus and legitimization seem symbolically important butirrelevant in actual terms: laws and rules can be adapted both inthe markets (the agencies can strongly influence law making –the example of tourism activity regulation was already discussed)and in the urban planning field, where the competent office of theUrban Planning Council has little or non-existing power in guidingthe growth engine. Here, the entrepreneurial city is more than ametaphor because the government is at the same time a publicauthority and a private enterprise. It is no different from problem-atic cases of public–private partnerships that have frequently ap-peared in Western countries (Codecasa & Ponzini, in press).

The marketing of projects and their link to Western architectureis dominant. The public debate over choices is irrelevant. Urban de-sign decisions are almost entirely made by developers or theirWestern consultants, proposing simplified formulae and masterplans for complex development processes. In this sense, one cansee the extreme urban effects of removing some of the local gov-ernments’ political preoccupation with global competition mantras(Beauregard & Pierre, 2000; Ponzini & Rossi, 2010). The statedurban policy goals can be addressed in merely symbolic and evi-dently contradictory terms. For example, Abu Dhabi’s environmen-tal sustainability targets can be superficially stated in the light ofthe branded Masdar City project, but the pertinent questionsregarding immense land consumption have never been raised inthe local public debate (Fig. 4).

The economic diversification goals now need to immobilizehuge capitals in the real estate market and in future urban devel-opment. The higher the value of localized capital, due in part tosome star architect’s signature, the more credit the governmentcan realize from the international financial system for futureinvestments in urban and local development. The only evident lim-it is the overall credibility of the development operations, whichare guaranteed by the presence of international actors and culturalinstitutions. The future virtual city seems to be a government’scommodity to be boosted by the spectacularization of star

10 (picture by Michele Nastasi).

258 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251–259

architects’ work. This kind of operation in a weak urban planningframework aims to increase the value of desert areas and inducelong-term mechanisms of rent and monopoly for the retail, hoteland residential components that will supposedly benefit from thepositive externalities of the cultural and entertainment amenities(Harvey, 2002; Zukin, 1991). The strong resource centralizationin the decision making process will require a single actor to createand manage new sectors of the city and to program their activities.The role of important cultural and economic institutions is cur-tailed with reference to management but not other aspects – e.g.,spatial organization, the modes and conditions of urban growthor the localization of other complementary functions – on whichthe future management will partially depend (Ponzini, 2009).

The symbolic dimension of the Cultural District and many otherlarge-scale projects is linked to the image of the nation andstrengthened by the artistic aura of international iconic architec-ture in a contradictory way (McNeill, 2000; Sudjic, 2005). Gener-ally, the representation of cities already has hierarchies andrankings deriving from the long term accumulation of culturaland reputational capitals, which might be difficult to change, de-spite massive investments in cultural and specialized services orin spectacularizing the urban environment. Even if one believesthat global economic and touristic fluxes depend on the localiza-tion of one spectacular cultural facility, it would be crucial to notethat the creation of more or less homologous functions or pieces ofdesign in different cities will reduce the flux in a given place (Plaza,2000). Furthermore and more generally, the multiplication of sim-ilarly aesthetically striking artifacts all over the world have hadand will have the paradoxical effect of internationally homogeniz-ing the urban landscape, while individual cities expect to distin-guish themselves by hiring one star architect and creating aspectacular and unique place (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004; King,1996; Muñoz, 2008). The dimension of the Saadiyat Island masterplan and the need for media exposure of the Cultural District showthe enormous difficulty of matching global objectives with localidentities, environments and functions, which is typical in Westernflagship projects (McNeil & Tewdwr-Jones, 2003). The difficultiesof a weak land use regulation system in the face of interventionsdriven by competitiveness are evident (Chorianopoulos, Pagonis,Koukoulas, & Drymoniti, 2010; Palermo & Ponzini, 2010). Further-more, the poor and uneven social impact can be easily linked tothese kinds of planning arrangements in political vacua (Elshesh-tawy, 2008).

Under similar conditions, the ‘‘archistar’’ or the ‘‘urbanistar’’ isasked to produce a spectacle and to allow his aura to be linkedto projects and developers (Foster, 2002) without having theopportunity to critically intervene in the capitalization objectivesor the creation of urban rent and monopoly. The architect can onlyperform a legitimizing role and reassert the fame for which he washired (McNeill, 2009; Ponzini & Nastasi, 2011).

Acknowledgements

In this paper I present part of the results of a research project Icarried out while I was Visiting Scholar at Columbia University, inthe Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation. Igratefully acknowledge financial support of the International Re-search Scholarship in Memory of Giovanni Agnelli funded by Uni-Credit Private Banking and the Agnelli Foundation. I alsoacknowledge Michele Nastasi for his precious help with the photo-graphic body and Jill Diane Friedman for linguistic advice.

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