layer model for reducing malware jamming attacks

International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) – volume 4 Issue10 – Oct 2013

ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page3450

Layer Model For Reducing Malware Jamming Attacks S.Ramesh, (M.Tech)

Student, CSE Dept, VBIT

Abstract — Wireless connectivity huge range results it

exposed to selective interference attacks, well known as

jamming. The thought of interrupting with wireless

transmissions will form as a platform and increases of

Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless connectivity. As a

critical situation, jamming has been known under an

external threat model. Moreover, antagonist of perfect skills

of protocol requirements and network confidential things

makes invisible jamming attacks that won’t come under

notice. In this paper, we identify crisis of selective jamming

attacks in wireless connectivity. Such attacks, the attacker

work on these attacks very less time only, gives most

preference to the information which was passed through

messages. Explanation of benefits of choosen jamming

based on network performance was presented in two real

time applications or case studies. A chosen attack on TCP

and another is on routing. We explore that selecting

jamming attacks are cause of doing packets which of real-

time were declared at physical layer. To make cautious

about the attacks, we created three schemes that restrict

packet in reality classification by attaching cryptographic

primitives with physical-layer attributes. We guess the

security of our approaches and calculate their

computational and communication in future.

I. IN TRO DU C TI ON

In Wireless networks nodes have to interconnect with

each other in wireless connectivity to process continuously

without any interruptions. Moreover, the open nature of this

security threats. Attackers with a transceiver can easily

create some interruptions on wireless transmissions, like

adding some un wanted messages, or jamming. While

monitoring and message injection we are capable of

preventing those attacks with the help of cryptographic

Prof. Ch. Anil Carie, M.Tech Asst. Professor, VBIT

methods, jamming attacks are critical to prevent. Those create

most Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks opposite wireless

networks. They create it as normal jamming, that we think but

they usually send uninterrupted jamming signal and they used

to send unwanted messages continuously. If jammer is not a

part of the jammer then it is treated as external threat. Cause of

this model, jamming makes uninterrupted or random

transmission of exotic interference signals. The concept of

“always-on” results many problems. First thing it has to

transmit continuous transmission signals to the nodes

continuously which they are in need. And next one is due to

continuous high transmission there will be problem of

attacking. The purpose of anti-jamming method based on

spread-spectrum communications, or may be like jamming

evasion. SS techniques works on by providing bit-level

protection by exploring bits based upon a secret pseudo-noise

code, well known in the communicating parties only. These

types of techniques can only protect wireless transmissions case

of external threat model. Hiding of secrets due to node

adjusting neutralizes the advantages of SS. Broadcast

communications are have to be aware of all secret bits to

prevent the internal jamming threats. As per technique

adjustments a single receiver is capable to reveal relevant

cryptographic data. In this paper, we mention the crisis of

jamming under an internal threat model. We under taken a

sophisticated adversary who is aware of network secrets and

taking into process or reality details of network protocols not

only in physical layer at any one in the stack of network. The

method adversary was developed based on internal knowledge

is only for launching chosen jamming attacks in which

particular messages of “high Importance” are triggered. Those

situations in reality are be like as, a jammer can target route-

request or reply messages at the routing layer to block route



discovery, or target TCP updates in a TCP session to

critically degrade the result of an end-to-end flow. To

create chosen jamming attacks, the adversary must be

efficient of developing a “classify-then-jam” position

before the finishing of a wireless transmission. Those

situations can be declared by two ways one is classifying

transmitted packets using protocol semantics and another

way is by decoding packets. In last method, the jammers

have chances by decode the initial few bits

of a packet for backup and useful packet identifiers such as

packet type, source and receiver address. After declaring,

the adversary must induce a perfect number of bit errors so

that the packet is not able to backup at the receiver. Chosen

jamming needs acknowledgement knowledge of not only

physical (PHY) layer at the same time of upper layers in

network stack.

II. SY S TEM EV A LU A TI O N

Network module We identifies the crisis of blocking interruptive jamming

node from allocating m in real time, thus moderating J’s

performance to do work on jamming. The network

contains a collection of nodes attached through wireless

communications. Nodes is of free to interact directly in the

case of they are within communication premises, or

indirectly through number of hops. Nodes interaction will

be done in uncast mode and also in another broadcast

mode. Communications are in two ways those are

unencrypted and encrypted by nodes. For encrypted

broadcast communications, symmetric keys are spreader

range of receivers. These keys are created using preshared

pair wise keys or asymmetric cryptography.

Real Time Packet declaration/Classification

As a point of view generic communication system

characterized in Fig. In Physical layer, a packet m is gone

be encoded, interleaved, and modified before it is converted

over the wireless channel. At the destination node which is

nothing but receives, the signal is demodulated, deinterleaved,

and decoded, to backup the original packet m.

Even in the case of key has to be remained as a secret; the

static portions of a sent packet could capable to packet

classification. All of this is cause for computationally-efficient

encryption techniques like block encryption; the encryption of a

prefix plaintext with the same key yields a static cipher text

prefix. After all, an adversary who is known of the underlying

protocol declares that can use the static cipher text portions of

a transmitted packet to classify it.

a) Selective/chosen Jamming Module

We explored the impact of selective jamming attacks on the

network capability. Develop selective jamming attacks in two

multi-hop wireless network ways. In the first way, the attacker

pointed a TCP connection created over a multi-hop wireless

route. In another way, the jammer pointed network-layer

control messages passing during the route creating process

selective jamming would be the encryption of transmitted

packets with help of static key. Anyway, for broadcast data

transactions, this static decryption key must aware to all

receivers which are in need and hence, is affected to adjust. An

adversary in possession of the decryption key can start

decrypting as fast as the reception of the first cipher text block. Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (SHCS)

We explored a high definition one that is strong hiding

commitment scheme (SHCS), which works on symmetric

cryptography. Our key motto is to fulfill the strong hiding

property while making computational and transmission

efficiently. The computations have to done of SHCS is one



symmetric encryption at source and one symmetric

decryption at destination. Reason cause is the header

information is permuted as a trailer and encrypted, all

receivers in the vicinity of a sender have to gain the

complete packet and decrypt it, before the packet type and

destination can be determined. However, in wireless

protocols such as 802.11, the whole packet is received at

the MAC layer before it is fixed if the packet must be

terminated or be used for further applications. If some parts

of the MAC header are deemed not to be useful information

to the jammer, they kept constant unencrypted in the header

of the packet, thus avoiding the decryption operation at the

receiver.

Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme (CPHS)

We present a packet hiding scheme based on

cryptographic puzzles. The main idea behind such puzzles

is to force the recipient of a puzzle execute a pre-defined

set of computations before he is able to extract a secret of

interest. The time required for obtaining the solution of a

puzzle depends on its hardness and the computational

ability of the solver. The advantage of the puzzle based

scheme is that its security does not rely on the PHY layer

parameters. However, it has higher computation and

communication overhead. We consider several puzzle

schemes as the basis for CPHS. For each scheme, we

analyze the implementation details which impact security

and performance. Cryptographic puzzles are primitives

originally suggested by Merkle as a method for

establishing a secret over an insecure channel. They find a

wide range of applications from preventing DoS attacks to

providing broadcast authentication and key escrow

schemes.

III. RELA TED WO R K

Selective jamming attacks The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it

vulnerable to jamming attacks. Jamming in wireless

networks has been primarily analyzed under an external

adversarial model, as a severe form of denial of service (DoS)

against the PHY layer. Existing anti-jamming strategies

employ some form of spread spectrum (SS) communication, in

which the signal is spread across a large bandwidth according

to a pseudo-noise (PN) code. However, SS can protect wireless

communications only to the extent that the PN codes remain

secret. Insiders with knowledge of the commonly shared PN

codes can still launch jamming attacks. Using their knowledge

of the protocols specifics, they can selectively target particular

channels/layers/protocols/packets. We describe two types of

selective jamming attacks against WMNs, which employ

channel and data selectivity.

Channel-Selective Jamming

In a typical WMN, one or more channels are reserved for

broadcasting control information. These channels, referred

to as control channels, facilitate operations such as network

discovery, time synchronization, coordination of shared

medium access, routing path discovery and others, without

interfering with the communications of STAs with MAPs. An

adversary who selectively targets the control channels can

efficiently launch a DoS attack with a fairly limited amount of

resources (control traffic is low-rate compared to data traffic).

To launch a channel selective jamming attack, the adversary

must be aware of the location of the targeted channel, whether

defined by a separate frequency band, time slot, or PN code.

Note that control channels are inherently broadcast and hence,

every intended receiver must be aware of the secrets used to

protect the transmission of control packets. The compromise of

a single receiver, be it a MAP or an MP, reveals those secrets

to the adversary. Example: We illustrate the impact of channel

selective jamming on CSMA/CA-based medium access control

(MAC) protocols for multi-channel WMNs. A multi-channel

MAC (MMAC) protocol is employed to coordinate access of

multiple nodes residing in the same collision domain to the

common set of channels. A class of MMAC protocols

proposed for ad hoc networks such as WMNs follows a split-

phase design (e.g., [5]). In this design, time is split into



alternating control and data transmission phases.

Fig The cryptographic puzzle-based hiding scheme.

Countering Channel-Selective Attacks

Several anti-jamming methods have been proposed to

address channel-selective attacks from insider nodes. All

methods trade communication efficiency for stronger

resilience to jamming. We give a brief description of such

anti-jamming approaches.

Assignment of unique PN codes: An alternative method

for neutralizing channel-selective attacks is to dynamically

vary the location of the broadcast channel, based on the

physical location of the communicating nodes. The main

motivation for this architecture is that any broadcast is

inherently confined to the communication range of the

broadcaster. Hence, for broadcasts intended for receivers in

different collision domains, there is no particular advantage

in using the same broadcast channel, other than the design

simplicity. The assignment of different broadcast channels

to different network regions leads to an inherent

partitioning of the network into clusters. Information

regarding the location of the control channel in one cluster

cannot be exploited at another.

Data-Selective Jamming

To further improve the energy efficiency of selective

jamming and reduce the risk of detection, an inside

attacker can exercise a greater degree of selectivity by

targeting specific packets of high importance. One way of

launching a data-selective jamming attack, is by classifying

packets before their transmission is completed. MPA

transmits a packet to MPB. Inside attacker MAPJ classifies the

transmitted packet after overhearing its first few bytes. MAPJ

then interferes with the reception of the rest of the packet at

MPB: Referring to the generic packet format. A packet can be

classified based on the headers of various layers.

Countering Data-Selective Jamming Attacks

An intuitive solution for preventing packet classification is to

encrypt transmitted packets with a secret key. In this case, the

entire packet, including its headers, has to be encrypted. While

a shared key suffices to protect point-to-point-

communications, for broadcast packets, this key must be

shared by all intended receivers. Thus, this key is also known

to an inside jammer. In symmetric encryption schemes based

on block encryption, reception of one cipher text block is

sufficient to obtain the corresponding plaintext block, if the

decryption key is known. Hence, encryption alone does not

prevent insiders from classifying broadcasted packets. To

prevent classification, a packet must remain hidden until it is

transmitted in its entirety. One possible way for temporarily

hiding the transmitted packet is to employ commitment

schemes. In a commitment scheme, the transmitting node hides

the packet by broadcasting a committed version of it.

Selective dropping attacks

If selective jamming is not successful due to anti jamming

measures, an insider can selectively drop packets post-

reception. Once a packet has been received, the compromised

node can inspect the packet headers, classify the packet, and

decide whether to forward it or not. Such an action is often

termed as misbehavior. Post-reception dropping is less flexible

than selective jamming because the adversary is restricted to

dropping only the packets routed through it. Nonetheless, the

impact on the WMN performance can be significant.

Examples: Consider a compromised MP targeting the routing

functionality in WMNs. By selectively dropping route request

and route reply packets employed by the routing protocol, as

defined in the of the 802.11s standard, the compromised MP

can prevent the discovery of any route that passes through it,



delay the route discovery process, and force alternative,

possibly inefficient paths. Alternatively, the compromised

MP can allow the establishment of a route via itself, but

throttle the rate of the end-to-end connection at the

transport layer. This attack can be actualized by selective

dropping of critical control packets that regulate the end-

to-end transmission rate and effective throughput. For

example, the dropping of cumulative TCP

acknowledgments results in the end to end retransmission

of the entire batch of pending data packets.

A Layered Model for Jamming

Together jamming and sensing can be broken down into a

layered model similar to the OSI stack. We break it down

into three levels for convenience as shown. The

Link/Physical layer directly interacts with the media. If a

higher layer requests a packet to be jammed, then this

lower layer generates the physical signal and ensures that a

packet and each of its link layer retries are jammed. This

layer also provides the basic sensing capability of packet

duration and timing.

If sophisticated enough it could shield the upper layer from

Link, MAC, and Physical layer control packets such as

RTS/CTS and only report the higher OSI layer packets to

the higher layer sensing and jamming. The

Transport/Network Layer interacts with the corresponding

Ad Hoc, IP, TCP, and UDP protocols.

This layer senses packet types and traffic flows which can

then be targeted by jamming. The Application layer senses

HTTP sessions, VoIP set up and the like and targets

specific user activities for jamming.

Size: The physical layer could measure the transmission start

and stop times or use other signal processing techniques to

estimate the packet size in bytes.

Timing: Similarly the packet start time can be estimated.

Source Token: While the actual address of the transmitter

source may not be known. Analysis of the transmitter signal

(signal strength, angle of arrival, etc.) could distinguish

different transmitters so that each transmitter could be assigned

a unique token.

Destination Token: As noted before, receiver ACKs can be

identified in many protocols by the unique timing. Similarly by

analysis of which node ACKs a transmission, the destination

might also be identified.

Unicast vs. Broadcast: In many MAC and Link protocols,

broadcast packets are not acknowledged while unicast packets

are acknowledged. This could be used to identify whether a

packet is unicast or broadcast. While all of these are possible,

only the first two Size and Timing are assumed available in

this paper since these make the fewest assumptions about the

underlying network.

Sensing & Jamming in Ad Hoc Networks In network protocols, certain critical packets are necessary for

operation. Jamming TCP-SYN or TCP-SYN-ACK packets will

prevent a TCP connection from being established. Jamming

ARP-REQUEST or ARP-RESPONSE packets will prevent IP

from associating IP and MAC addresses. Jamming a few

protocol control packets can prevent or delay connections;

preventing the connection when the goal is to shut the

connection down and delaying the connection when the goal is

to inhibit communication without being detected. As suggested

from the above, knowing which packet to jam is the key to

getting significant jamming gains. A sensor needs to identify

the key control packets from different protocols.

Sensing can be online or offline. In online sensing packets are

identified as they are received. This can be difficult since in



some cases a packet is identified within a protocol

sequence that has not yet completed. Offline sensing is

allowed to classify packets received in the past based on

packets received both before and after the packet in

question. Offline sensing is not directly useful for

jamming. However, it can provide data that allows the

attacker to better characterize the victim network and

improve its online sensing. Ad hoc networks add another

protocol that can be attacked. Jamming AODV-RREQ or

AODV-RREP packets will prevent ad hoc routes from ever

being established. Ad hoc network protocols add additional

packet types that can be detected.

V. CON C LUSI O N

We identified the crisis of selective jamming attacks in

wireless networks. We under took an internal adversary

model. The advantage of this model is that the jammer is

part of a network. Which is a better part then the making

the progress about protocol specifications and public

network confidential matters. Here in our application

transmitted packets in real time were classified by jammers

only in the way by decoding the initial few symbols of

processing transmission. We explored the result of selective

jamming attacks on TCP and routing protocols. Our

researches explained that a selective jammer have impact

on efficiency with less effort. We created three schemes

that converts a selective jammer to a random one. This is

gone work in the way by blocking real-time packet

classification. The schemes which we define in this paper

attaches cryptographic primitives such as commitment

schemes, cryptographic puzzles, and all-or-nothing

transformations (AONTs) with physical layer features. We

estimated the security of our schemes and computed the

performance which benefits future works a lot.

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First A. Author: M. Vijay Kumar have done B.Tech

From Sri Sai Jyothi Engineering college, from JNTUH

Kukatpally, passed out in 2009, from two years he has

been working as a lab programmer in VBIT, Currently he

is student of M.Tech from VIDHYA BHARTHI

INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, NEAR JANGOAN. His

Research interests are in the areas of Wireless and Network

Security, with current focus on pocket security system.

Second B. Author: M. MADHAVI Associate Professor

received his B.Tech degree in Information Technology

from Ramappa Engineering College Warangal in

year2006. He received his M.Tech degree from Karunya

university Coimbatore in year 2010. He is currently

working as assistant professor in Vidya barathi institute of

technology in Warangal AP. He is having 4 year of

teaching experience. His areas of interest include tcp/ip,

routing protocols.

layer model for reducing malware jamming attacks

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