Indulged since ciiildhood, we of theMe Generation never experienced thehardships of economic depression orworld conflicts. We grew up in the yearsadorned by the Space Age. Barbie Dolls,military superiority, and designer jeans.As teenagers and young adults, wc foundourselves in an era that witnessed the fi

nancial instability of the social supportsystem created by the earlier generation,a time compromised by the confusion ofpublic scandals from Watergate toIranscam. and repetitive negative predictions on the decline of the United States

in the world arena. Gone are the post-World War II years of dominant powerwith the concomitant ties that bonded our

parents' generation with a sense of sharedcause.

For us, Vietnam exists as an uncertaincloudy memory relived through technicolor films and the occasional remote

banter of the senior officers in the readyroom. We watch as the only assured foefrom our youth, the Communist Bloc,crumbles in its yearning for democracy.

And who wouldn't crave our life-style?Freedom beyond our wildest expectations, with more discretionary incomcthan ever before and a multitude of products to spend it on. Enraptured with living for the moment, we proclaimed "If itfeels good, do it" and "Charge now, paylater." Unlike our previous counterpartscontemplating the draft, we were able tochoose our profession and bring into itthe new sensitivity of personal "rights."Ideal, isn't it? Why, then, are we facingpersonnel management problems in ourNavy today?

Somewhere along the way, our leadership traits drifted away or were shelvedback behind the more desirable skills thatearned us instant reward or financial gratification. Leadership depends on promoting the good of the group over the specific wants of the individual. It requiresfairness for all involved rather than ac-

Proceedings/ Januarj 1991

Leadership Forum

Second Honorable Mention

1990 Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest

What's in It for Mel^By Lieutenant A. B. DiLucente, U.S. Naval Reserve

commodation of exclusive interests.

Conducting a 1979 poll for the DuPontCorporation, the James B. LindheimCompany assessed, the United States'syouth as "an increasingly self-centeredindividual with a greater emphasis onself-interest, self-discovery, and an insistence on freedom to decide whether

many of the traditional rules of personalconduct are proper or necessary."' Admiral Thomas B. Hayward reflected sim

ilar sentiments in his CNO Situation Re

port for 1980. remarking, "I think therehas been an unfortunate—not an inten

tional—migration of the permissivenessof our American society that has sprungup over the last ten or fifteen years intothe military in general, and clearly, intothe Navy."-

The United States's rise to become a

great world power was based on hardwork, sacrifice, and perseverance. To be

ev ocooocs i

#•

69

a leader, particularly in the military,meant being on the crest of a waveformed by an underswell of supportivefollowers. Certain of their goals andjointly dedicated to being Number One,Americans forged ahead, unlimited byeconomic considerations. They madeunprecedented gains and achieved theirdominant-power status in less than 100years.

A hundred years ago, leadership consisted of attending to the physical needsof the men and rewarding heroic accomplishments. Motivational speeches werenice, but not required, as the forces werealready inspired by a shared patrioticgoal.

However, as the United States slipsfi-om its previously enjoyed hegemony toits place as one among many prominentcountries, the thrust changes. Leadershipnow requires recognizing the diversity ofindividuals and convincing them that thedecline of prevalence does not negatetheir efforts as commanders. In fact,these circumstances demand more of

them.

As we determine what tack we need to

take, we should first assess where we arestarting. Historian Richard D. Lammnoted, "Great civilizations don't suddenly collapse; they get inefficient, dysfunctional, and lose the stem virtues thatmade them great in the first place. Inthe 1950s the United States had over 44

percent of the world's economic product,the world's highest productivity rate, andcontinual trade surpluses. By 1989 thegeneration in charge of the United Statesin the 1960sand 1970shad run up a $2.6trillion dollar deficit and the nation had

slipped to the lowest rate of productivitygrowth of any in the industrialized world.As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihancrisply puts it, "It is an iron law of history that power passes from debtor tocreditor."

If our demise is inevitable, there'snothing we can do to alter it, right? Howcan our simple personal dedication andwork ethic possibly swim against the economic tidal wave?

By remembering the importance of theindividual. In 1776, a single vote gavethe United Stales English as a nationallanguage instead of German; in 1845, aone-vote margin brought Texas in as the28th. state; in 1923, Adolf Hitler wonleadership of the German Nazi party byone vote.

Economically devastated by war andspiritually shamed by surrender, Japanhad only its personal virtues on which torebuild. And yet:

"With an irony that defies descrip

70

tion, the U.S. and Japan, in 40 years,traded reputations. When the 1980sbegan, the world's largest corporations were in the United States; whenthe eighties ended they were in Japan.When the eighties began, the world'slargest bankers were American; whenthe eighties ended they were Japanese. When the eighties began, theworld's largest stock market was WallStreet; when the eighties ended it wasin Tokyo. . . . While Japan trainedengineers and scientists, the U.S.trained lawyers and accountants. Onein 400 Americans was a lawyer; onein 10,000 Japanese was a lawyer.Japan trained 1,000 engineers forevery 100 lawyers; America, the reverse. . . . Japanese students went toschool 240 days a year; U.S. studentswent 180 days. In 1985 Japan graduated 96 percent of its students fromhigh school; the U.S. graduated lessthan 75 percent. . . . There was a terrible breakdown in the American fam

ily; the U.S. had a divorce rate 25times that of Japan.

If each one of us contributed a small

effort to improve our world and ourNavy, the collective results would beoverpowering. It's time to put away ourselfishness and devote ourselves to the

betterment of the next generation. ThePhiladelphia Inquirer had a splendid cartoon last year: Uncle Sam perched on aladder, watching the Communist worldthrough field glasses and exclaiming,"Imagine! Communism just self-destructing like that!" Behind him arehomeless people, dilapidated schools,soup lines, drug sales, and hold-ups.^Instead of worrying about our fitness report marks and career ticket-punches, weshould return to the basic tenets of leader

ship—personal responsibility, obedience, courage, and loyalty.

We are inheriting uncharted waters totravel: low-intensity conflicts, fraud,waste, and abuse. We must be able todeal with these moral dilenmias. Omis

sion or silent consent is a gross violationof the special trust and confidence bestowed on us as a result of our commis

sions.' As recommended by MarineLieutenantColonel ChristopherGregor inhis 1988Chase Essay, "The most important action to be taken is to maintain the

high standards we learned as newly commissioned officers. Keep the fire alive!So many officers become old in spirit aswell as body as they progress in their careers."® In our own Fundamentals ofNaval Leadership, we are reminded that"Personal integrity has always beendemanded of U.S. officers, and in an age

.V

of rapid scientific and technological development, the leader must never forgetthat this is still the prime ingredient of thenaval officer."

But what's in all this for me, you mayask. The payoff is a Navy and a woridmade just a little bit better and a lot moreenjoyable by your contributions. As thejourney of a thousand miles begins with asingle step, so does one move on the roadof improvement. If government procurement atrocities are too much to handle,start smaller—how about returning allthose black Skilcraft pens that have foundtheir way into your desk drawer at home?You may laugh at the idea, but multiplyone or two pens by thousands of sailors,by years, and we're looking at our owntax dollars vanishing.

Do you lecture your troops on the standards of conduct annually and then reproduce your income tax returns "at government expense"? Are you inclined to lookthe other way when your yeomen use theship's computers to play video games?What about the squadron tool room control on weekends when the corrosionteam is refinishing someone's car insteadof an aircraft wing? Do you counsel yourworkers about their lackadaisical attitudeone minute and gripe about the "oldman" the next? Are you taking the timeto invest in discipline when it is needed,or are you also delegating that as someone else's problem? We are probably allguilty in some fashion.

High expectations and leadership byexample are what's in it for us. We getthe invaluable gift of self-satisfaction, asense of worth, and the legacy of providing for future generations. These are assets we can retain throughout our lives,and neither falling interest rates norstockmarket crashes can take them fromus.

'James A. Nathanand James K. Oliver, The Futureof U.S. Naval Power, Indiana University Press,Bloomington and London, 1979, pp. 167-168.-VADM William P. Mack. USN, Retired, and CDRAlbert H. Konetzni, Jr., USN, Command at Sea.Fourth Edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,1982, pp. 156-157.^Rich^D. Lamm, The Rise and Fall ofthe American Civilization, from a commencement address,1989.

•"Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Wall Street Journal,Friday, 22 December 1989.®Lamm, op. cit.''Schlesinger, op. cit.^Captain Alfredo t^ngoria, Jr., USMC, "Ethics inI-ow-Intensity Conflict." Marine Corps Gazette,April 1989.^Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Gregor, USMC,"Of Clerks and Marines," Marine Corps Gazette,Volume 73, Number4, April 1989.

Lieutenant DiLucente is serving as the Air Intelligence Officer at Fighter Squadron 124, Naval AirStation Miramar, San Diego.

Proceedings / January 1991

CommandBy Captain Gerald G. O'Rourke, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Every sailor since Noah has servedunder a captain. I suspect that

many more of these skippers actuallyfailed as commanding officers than iscommonly believed.

The most obvious evidence of a fail

ure of command is poor mission performance; much harder to assess is theoverall attitude within the ship or thesquadron. Even with a record of acceptable mission performances, if theatmosphere is one of mistrust, withsubordinates constantly checking theirdays until rotation and their personal"sixes," that command is failing.

Aside from those rare failures that

culminate in a mutiny or a well-publicized disaster, failures of command arerarely evident outside the immediatesociety of those who served. Successfulcommands, moreover, are not alwaysreflected in official accolades or even

in the actions of promotion boards.Most often the decision is publicly discernible only in what the U.S. Navycalls the "service reputation" of thosewho commanded, whose primary inputis the opinions of former shipmates.Ironically, then, those who serve become the ultimate judges of the performance of those who command.

Humans have an innate need for personal security, which tends to dominatetheir thinking in a hostile environment.For those constantly reminded ofhuman fragility during the furies of astorm at sea, not to mention duringcombat at sea, personal security becomes a tremendous motivator of indi

vidual behavior. Every sailor immediately looks to his shipmates for survivalsupport. If he finds it, fear recedes; ifhe doesn't, insecurity sets in, spreadsquickly, and the command spirals toward failure.

In any ship, and even more so in anaircraft squadron, a failing commandcauses pervasive insecurity and frequentmistrust of the motivations of shipmates; in this atmosphere, hesitantself-assessment precedes the executionof most orders. On board a ship orsquadron in which command is succeeding, the fear is suffused by communal self-confidence. Orders seem to

be anticipated as welcome events, interpersonal sniping is eschewed, a spiritof teamwork prevails, and both individ

Proceedings / January 1991

ual and group professionalism growdramatically. To the casual observer,this sometimes comes across as juvenile cockiness; more likely it's simplyevidence of a solid sense of individual

security and self-worth within a close,rapidly maturing society.

Every sailor and officer on boardunderstands that he must be "loyal"(that is, he must consciously subjugate

many of his own desires to the common purpose of his society). If the captain has a reasonable level of native

intelligence, professional education, andprior experience, and assuming hedoesn't run the ship aground too oftenor entertain dancing dollies in drunkenbrawls in his cabin, he will probablyget along just fine. If he has sometechnical, tactical, or even personalityshortcomings, his crew will cover forthem and do their best to make him

look good. They all understand thatevery ship has to have a captain, andthat a captain has to make decisionsquickly, courageously, and withoutbenefit of referendum. And, of course,they know full well that their own personal security may be at stake in anyone of a thousand of those daily command decisions.

One of the more common failings in

command occurs when a captain grievously misreads the loyalty of his subordinates in personal, as opposed to societal terms. Egos arc the culprits here.You have to have a fair-size ego toeven be interested in command, and themilitary profession has a proclivity foroverfeeding egos; worst of alt egos andcharisma seem to go hand in hand, andalmost any subordinate (or voter) likes

''̂ A successful commandmg ofTicerexudes self-confidcnce which per

meates/a ship or aircraft squadron.

NAVY (M 0, P. n.VNN>

to see a little chutzpah in his boss.Any man or woman who aspires to

command at sea assumes a veritable

world of personal challenges. Increasingly nowadays, many of these lie intechnical and scientific areas. Others

are tactical, calling for a good mix ofcommon sense and imagination; andsome are purely physical, of whichstamina is paramount. The toughest ofall, however, are purely mental. Because these are frequently more emotional than rational, they can't be overcome by either a high l.Q. or a Ph.D.in psychology. The ultimate key to surmounting the unpredictable combinationof simultaneous and interdependentchallenges posed by command seems tobe desire.

The captain must want to be the captain, at all times and in any situation.The crew can't elect him, nor can they

71

impeach him. They don'l even have tolike him. But for his command to be

successful, they must respect his innatedesire to be their captain. They constantly measure this desire in terms ofhow hard he's willing to work at beingtheir captain of iheir ship. They wantthat ship to succeed, and it probablywon't unless the captain is ready andwilling to give it his best shot.

That's the way it has been done atsea ever since Noah, and that's theway it will be done as long as mangoes to sea. Someone has to be incommand, and everyone else has toaccept this fully.

Despite all the years of preparation,once a person has actually assumedcommand, he or she invariably goesthrough a period best described as"bone-marrow shock." when the full

extent of the awesome responsibilitiesfor people, principles, and performanceare fully comprehended. The captain'sreactions thereafter pretty well determine success or failure.

This period of shocking realizationcan be quite brief, a matter of secondsbrought on by an isolated incident andquickly committed to indelible memory. Or it can last for a long time. 1knew some who walked on eggs

through entire command tours. It's agood bet that every new skipper goesthrough the experience, is deeply surprised by it, but actually welcomes itsreappearance with a successive command as a comfortable reminder to getup on the step and stay there.

From the retrospective of 16 years ofretirement and almost half a century ofswapping sea stories, 1 often muse withcolleagues about why one of my peersdid so well while another did so poorlyon some seagoing command tour of thepast. The results are still pertinenttoday:• Some talented officers came completely unglued, turned into Queegs orBlighs and, of course, failed miserably.• Some widely acknowledged moronswere fantastically successful.• The worst failures were those whoconcentrated on "looking good aroundthe ship." They rarely fooled anyone,senior or junior.• Personal charisma, within limits.helps a lot. Oversize egos don't.• Three senses are mandatory: commonsense, a sense of humor, and a senseof fairness.

• Smarts in some specialty don't seemto contribute much one way or another.• A parental attitude works well for

senior flag officers, but it only rarelysuits a captain and is patently incredible for a commander CO. You have toact your age as well as be yourself.• Neither a salesman personality norworkaholic dedication nor even friends

in higher places do any good at all.The judges are shipmates, not bosses,so such talents are more harbingers offailure than success.

• A curious consistency is that honest-to-God disasters only strike the failures. The successful COs magicallytransformed every looming disaster intoa challenge, and treated it heroically.• A captain's strong, persistent desirefor the command to do well was a

pretty good guarantor of success.The bottom line for all you young

tigers now being tested out there seemsto be ridiculously simple: No matterwho you are. if you do the very bestthat you can, you're almost sure tosucceed and avoid any disaster. But ifyou allow that innate desire to cool,you're almost sure to fail—and yourisk a real catastrophe in the fallout.

Cupiuin O'Rourkc enjoyed two officer-in-chargeassignments (VC-4 Ekt 44N and VF-IOIA). andfour commands (VF-102, VF-121, the USS Wran-gell lAE-12]. and the USS Independence |CV-62]).

The United States Naval Institute and the \rmcentAstorFoundation lake pleasurein announcing theSeventeenth Annual Vincent Astor Memorial Leader

shipEssayContest(orJuniorOlflcers andOfficer Traineesol theU.S.Navy. Marire Corps, andCoast Guard. Ttie contest isdesigned to promote re-seardi, thinking, andwriting ontopicsofleadership inttteU.S.Navy. MarineCorps,andCoastGuanj.

FIRSTPRIZE:$1,500, a NavalInstitute Gold Medal, and a LifeMembership In the NavaJInstitute.

FIRSTHONORABLE MENTION: S1.000 and a Naval Institute Silver Medal.

SECOND HONORABLE MENTION: (two to be awarded)S500 and a Naval Institule BronzeMedal. The firstpria essay will be publistied in the U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings. TlieInstitute's Editorial Boardmayelect to publish any or allof Ihe honorable mentionessaysin any giveny«ar.but is not obligated to do so. The Editorial Boardmay. from time totime, publish collections of Uie award winningessays and Mher essays in book or pamphlet fomi.

The contest Is open to:

1. Commissioned officers, regularand reserve.Inthe U.S. Navy, Marine Cons, and CoastGuardin paygrades 0-1,0-2, and 0-3{ensign/2nd lieutenant;lieutenant(juniorgr3de)/1stlieuien^t: and lieutenant/captain) at the time tlie ess^ is submitted.2. U.S. Navy. Marine Corps,and CoastGuardofficertraineeswithinone year of receivingtheir commission.

VINCENT ASTOR MEMORIAL

\\ I J\ ^1. Essays must be original and maynotexceed 4,000words.2. Allentries should be directed to: Executive Director

(VAMLEC), U.S. Naval Instibite, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.1 Essays must be received on or before 15 l^ruary 1991 atthe U.S. Naval InsStute.4. Thenameoftheauthorshallnotappear on(heessay. Each authorshall assigna mottoIn addiQon toatitle totheessay. This motto shall appear (a)onthetitle page oftheessay,withthe title. Inlieuof the author'snameand (b)byitselfon the outside ofan accompanying sealed envelope This sealed envelope should cotioin a typed sheetffving thename, rank, branch of service,biographical sketch, socialsecurity number, address,andoffice andhome phone numbers (ifavailable) oftheessayist, along with thettle olthe essay and the motto.Hie identity ol the essayistwill notbe known of the judgingmembersofthe Editorial Board until theyhavemadetheirselections.5. The awards will be made known andpresented to the successful competitors duringthe graduation awards ceremonies at theirrespective schools, ifappropriate, or at otherofficial ceremonies. Mrs. Astor or her perasnal representaUve will be invited to presentthe first prize each year.6. Essaysmustbe typewritten, double-spaced, onpaper approximately 8'/?x 11". Submittwo complete copies.7. Essays will bejudged bythe Naval Instihrt^s Editorial Board fordepthof research, analytical andinterpretive qualities, andori^nal thinking on thetopic of leadersttip. Essaysshould not be mertiy expositionsor personal narratives.

DEADLINE: 15 FEBRUARY 1991

UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301) 268-6110

Nobody asked me, but...

Working around the sealift problem

The August deployment of U.S.forces to the Persian Gulf area demonstrates to the dubious, as nothing elsehas been able to in the past, the inability of the United States to project andsustain forces at extreme distances.

One hopes, for the sake of the forcesinvolved, that we won't be found wanting. But why must we always wait forthe fire to discover if the hose works?Each year millions of dollars are spenton research and analysis—seeminglyonly to bolster arguments during budgetary battles and turf fights.

The reports of the Commission onMerchant Marine and Defense are a

case in point. The Commission, established by an Act of Congress in October 1984, produced four major reportsbetween February 1987 and January1989. In the third one (September1988), the Commission concluded,based on extensive analysis of DefenseDepartment scenarios, "There was insufficient strategic sealift, both shipsand trained personnel, for the UnitedStates, using only its own resources asrequired by defense planning assumptions, to execute a major contingencyoperation in a single distant theatersuch as Southwest Asia." But few inpositions of authority listened andfewer seemed to care about somethingas plodding and mundane as strategic

NEWLYCOMMISSIONED?

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AH newly commissioned offkers and vxirmntofficers in theNavyMarine Corps, andCoastGuard are eligible.

For information and sign up,contact:

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Proceedings / January 1991

By Lieutenant Colonel Ky L. Thompson, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

sealift. Two years later. OperationDesert Shield provides an unwelcomeopportunity to test the Conmiission'sconclusions.

To meet the sealift demands of

Desert Shield, the Navy requested thatthe Maritime Administration activate 40ships from the Ready Reserve Force(RRF). These 40 ships augment the 13Marine Corps-associated maritime pre-positioning ships, 13 afloat preposition-ing ships preloaded with multiservicemateriel, and 8 Algol (T-AKR-287)-class fast sealift ships previouslycommitted.

The RRF policy has not provided thenation with modem, immediately de-ployable ships that incorporate the latest in militarily useful technology, argued the Commission. Instead, it hasencouraged the buying up and maintaining of a large fleet of obsolete,unmannable, and nondeployable ships;"The effort to address the sealift short

fall by increasing the number of inactive reserve ships is an insufficient andinadequate response to the strategicsealift problem." The Conmiission concluded that by the year 2000, and probably sooner, "the United States merchant marine workforce will be

insufficient, both in numbers and inskills, to man, operate, and deploy theships, whose reliability may be increasingly suspect because of age and material condition."

Initial reports from Desert Shieldappear to confirm the Commission'sconclusions. An interview on ABC's

"Nightline," on 29 August, betweenSam Donaldson and Defense SecretaryDick Cheney, offered this example:

Donaldson: "There are reports thatthe buildup has been delayed andinterrupted because ships have broken down at sea. There's one ship,the Antares [T-AKR-294], carryinga load of, what, M-1 tanks, thatboth boilers blew up. Is this a significant retrograde effort?"Cheney: "There's no question thatwe are overcoming obstacles as weundertake this deployment. I wouldnot want to say that it's an absolutely flawless operation, it's not."Donaldson: "Well, you couldn'tsay that!"

Cheney: "... We've never donethis kind of thing before in terms ofmoving this much, this fast, thisfar, and we'll learn a lot of lessonsfrom that. I think the amazing thingis that it's gone as well as it has,and that our people, given their creativity and flexibility, are able towork around these problems. We'vegot some 95 or 96 ships in what arecalled the ready reserve fleet [sic], . . now we're bringing some ofthose back to haul troops to theMiddle East. We've called upwhat's called the fast sealift ships,about eight of those, and in manycases, in terms of trying to findcrews to man them with the appropriate training, or to have themfunction 100 percent effectiveness,or course, they're not able to dothat. And we are, in fact, workingaround those problems."

Virtually all of the troops dispatchedin support of Desert Shield have flownto the Gulf, but 90 to 95% of theirequipment and supplies are going bysea. This percentage is not unusual, butthe sealift is not arriving in a timelyfashion. On 14 August the media reported, "Most of the heavy armor andother mechanized equipment needed forground defenses has only begun to beloaded on ships. Military officials saidit could be 30 to 45 days before adequate ground forces are in place." On30 August, the projection was worse,"U.S. armed forces will not have

amassed a fully credible defensiveforce for another six to eight weeks."General Charles Homer, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Central Contmiand,was quoted as follows: "Every nightwe say, 'What if they attack tonight?What do we do?'" Would SecretaryCheney advise General Homer "towork around these problems"?

Secretary Cheney is correct, we will"learn a lot of lessons" from Desert

Shield. It's too bad we have to leam

them the hard way.

Colonel Thompson's 25-year career included command, staff, and joint st^f assignments. His lastassignment, before retirement in 1989, was as astaff member of the Commission on MerchantMarine and Defense.

73

Comment and Discussion

"He Only Won Once"(See M. Miwradian. p. 91. November 1990Proceedhifis)

Thomas C. Hone. Naval Historian, author of Power and Change; The Administrative History of the Chief of Naval Operations. 1946-1986 (Naval HistoricalCenter, 1989)—Colonel MooradMooradian's critique of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto expresses a dangerous prejudice; thai wars are not wonby admirals who man desks. This dangerous assumption tosses aside the efforts ofthose officers who prepare their naviesfor war. 1( assumes that what really matters is command in war—not management and planning in peacetime.

Yet if any navy understands the errorof this position it is the U.S. Navy. Before World War II, some of the Navy'smost successful wartime commanders

manned desks, including Admirals ErnestKing, Willis Lee, and John Towers.These officers understood that the institu

tion they nurtured in peacetime would bethe one they took to war. its strengths, itsweaknesses, and its ability to solve theterrible problems of war would be determined by them in time of peace. If theydid their peacetime work well, they andtheir institutions would be prepared forwar.

These lessons must not be lost. Offi

cers who manage the development of newtechnologies, or pioneer new and bettermethods of training, or perform outstanding service as arms negotiations advisorsin peacetime contribute directly to success in war, They also prepare themselves for war as they prepare the Navyfor war. In the modern world, "fightinggeniuses" are. like Admiral Yamamoto.also officers able and willing to buildtheir services in peacetime through service behind a desk.

Dust Off That Active Sonar!*

[See R. D. Ncwell, p. 78. June 1990; R. S,Mathews. p. 28. August 1990 Proceedings]

inventory with the AN/SQS-53C sonar:the USS Slump (DD-978).

Open-source material describes the ons at extended ranges. Additionally, the experience.

typical composition of a battle group andthe current mix of ASW sensors make it

unrealistic to use more than one surface

ASW platform. The relatively short-range capability of the older sonar systems makes it impractical to have morethan two ships search and/or track a submarine. Current tactics that limit the operation of antisubmarine screen ships totheir designated stations increase thechances of losing contact. If the situationrequires more than one sensor, it is morepractical and tactically prudent to use airborne assets.

The AN/SQS-53C was designed andy proved to be a long-range sensor. This

capability allows us to position the AN/* .jRiJ SQS-53C platform farthest away from the

- ''W. contact and act as the detection and track-ing^ship; we^can^

HAW AN/SQS-26/53 series, there is a dra-

The USS Stump (I)D-978) is the only matic difference in technology and utili-U.S. ship equipped with AN/SQS-53S zation between the AN/SQS-53C and itssonar, which enables her to conduct predecessors. The only similarities be-both active and passive ASW by tween them are the frequency bands andherself. the beamforming principles. It uses

1980s technology. Also, we would beAN/SQS-53C as a long-range/multi- curious to find out what Senior Chiefconvergence zone sensor. This capability Mathews's idea of what a 1990 sonar dis-was consistently proven to be a reality play would look like and whether itduring the Stump's recent Mediterranean would really be more effective than whatdeployment. we have.

The statement that one-on-one engage- Some of the Slump's sonar techniciansments represent a mismanagement of as- have also served on board the USSsets needs to be clarified. If the definition Mooshrugger (DD-980) when she wasof asset is a surface ship, then wc dispute the only AN/SQR-19 ship in the fleet,the statement. With the reduction in the The Stump-dnd Mooshrugger made ASV^size of the fleet, one-on-one engagements history when they proved that a ship can

Chief Quartermaster D. J. Michalowski. will become a necessity under ccrtain cir- successfully conduct active or passiveU.S. Navy, and Senior ChiefSonar Tech- cumstances. LAMPS is an integral part of ASW by herself.nician B. F. Rufo, U.S. Navy—To date the surface ship sensor systems that en- Anyone who has had the opportunity tothere is only one ship in the U.S. Navy ables detection of surface and subsurface conduct meaningful ASW operations

contacts at extended ranges as well as knows that the art of ASW cannot be ef-delivery of antisubmarine warfare weap- fectively explained without the benefit of

Proceedings / January 1991