Abstract

The European Union has advanced further down the road of regionalism andeconomic integration than the Asian Pacific region, which has begun todevelop new forms of regional identity. This paper broadly compares andcontrasts European and Asian perceptions and practices of regionalism,arguing that while both regions share some common goals, there are in factimportant differences in evolution, format and kind which differentiate the twoexperiences. In addition, the paper examines some of the key characteristicsand issues faced by the Europeans in their regionalist experiment, such asinstitutionalisation, leadership, economic challenges and popular support, andexamines the extent to which they might be relevant to what is happening inthe Asian Pacific region.

Introduction

Social, economic and technical change and the emergence of trends towardsgreater regionalization and globalization have both complicated the structuresunderlying the global order and undermined, though certainly not totallydestroyed, the autonomy of national governments. However, the linkagesbetween the international, the regional, the national and indeed the localremain strong. Within that context, there are two important conceptual issuesto consider. The first relates to regionalism itself, for the debate aboutregionalism, or regionalization, and globalization has become multi-faceted,particularly as scholars have moved away from conceptualisations which focusexclusively on the economic dimensions (Higgott, 1999, pp. 91–106; Liu 2003).It has to be said that there is no consensus on the exact definitions of‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’ and the distinctions between them are oftenvague (see the discussions in Gilson 2002, Camilleri 2003 and Liu 2003). In thispaper a broad conceptualisation is adopted, in which cohesive cooperationamongst geographically proximate states is promoted, with regionalizationreferring to the processes of interaction within a region and regionalism to thetendency to create institutions or at least mechanisms to assist in the

Learning from Europe.Lessons for Asian Pacific regionalism?

Brian BridgesDepartment of Politics and Sociology, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun,New Territories, Hong Kong(e-mail: bbridges@ln.edu.hk)

ASIAEUROPE

JOURNAL� Springer-Verlag 2004

Asia Europe Journal (2004) 2: 387–397DOI: 10.1007/s10308-004-0107-7

interaction. Regionalism and/or regionalization have been cast both as afactor- a stepping stone - encouraging eventual globalization and therebycontributing to global order and, alternatively, as an obstacle or diversion - aroad bloc - along that path.

The second relates to the differences between integration and cooperation,for economists remind us that that there is a spectrum, or continuum, todescribe the moves from loose to tight economic relationships betweencountries: from preferential trade agreements, to customs unions and commonmarkets, through to economic and monetary union and ultimately fulleconomic and political union. However, the two terms - integration andcooperation - do tend to be used rather loosely in practice in non-academic aswell as even in academic circles.

Clearly the European Union, of all regional organisations around the world,has advanced furthest down the road of regionalism and economic integration.The Asian Pacific region has lagged behind, but is beginning to develop newforms of regional identity. This paper has two objectives. Firstly, to broadlycompare and contrast European and Asian perceptions and practices inregionalism. Secondly, to raise up some of the key characteristics and issuesfaced by the Europeans in their regionalist experiment and examine the extentto which they might be relevant to what is happening in the Asian Pacificregion.

Thinking regionally: The European model

What kind of Europe is emerging at the beginning of this new century ? The EUhas of course developed a long way from the vision of the founding fathers whoset out back in the 1950s to build a new Europe through a process of economicintegration worked out within the framework set by Soviet hostility and USsponsorship. The development of the single market - the 1992 process - markeda significant step forward in implementing that vision, but since the late 1990sEuropean policy-makers have been forced to address more urgently along-standing dilemma - whether to enlarge the community further or whetherto deepen its functions or even whether to try to attempt to do both - in thecontext of where Europe really wants to go to and how Europe relates to thechanging global order. Widening has now taken place, with 10 new membersjoining the EU in May 2004. However, enlargement cannot be completelydivorced from deepening, not least because without substantial institutionalreform in the near future, policy-making in an EU of 25 members will grind toa halt. Democracy needs to be balanced with efficiency.

Since the mid-1990s deepening has found expression in two key aspects :the move to economic and monetary union (EMU), which took a significantstep forward in January 1999 with the introduction of the single currency, theeuro, for 12 of the current 25 members (now known as the ‘eurozone’), and theaspiration for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). While monetaryunion is not, of course, political union, EMU naturally introduced a new set ofconstraints on policy-making and as such represented a crucial step on the wayto greater integration. It is an economic project designed to bring net economicbenefits (European businessmen have been broadly optimistic on this point,while ordinary citizens have been more sceptical), but it has also brought

388 B. Bridges

political benefits, particularly in reducing uncertainty and suspicion amongstmembers, and more generally in enhancing Europe’s status in the internationalarena. The EU’s treaties have always served as a form of constitution, but now,more by way of a tidying up exercise than a radically new dimension ofdeepening, the EU is getting close to promulgating its own Constitution, somarking another stage in the gradual political development of the EU.

Even though the EU has gradually extended its competence from purelyeconomic policy matters to some aspects of political and even security affairs,it is not yet a fully-fledged actor in the international arena. EU decision-makingprocesses involve not just the European Commission and member govern-ments but also European and national parliaments and a wide range of sub-state organisations; this makes the EU into a kind of multiple coalition systemand inevitably detracts from both internal and external policy consistency.However, there has been an important linkage between internal and externalliberalisation in the economic sense which is paralleled by linkages betweenpolitical coordination within the EU and external policies. Individual membercountries not only develop their own relationships with countries outside theEU, but also on particular issues exhibit cross-cutting tendencies whichundermine European coherence. The move towards CFSP is intended toreduce, even eliminate, such problems. One of the four main stated aims of theEU’s 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, in itself an attempt to consolidate and amplifycertain aspects of the earlier 1993 Maastricht Treaty, was to give Europe astronger voice in international affairs. However, as one official EU publicationfrankly acknowledged, ‘it would be naı̈ve to think that a few amendments to thetexts on European cooperation in this area would, as if by magic, cause Europeto speak with a single voice and send the world a coherent message’(Commission 1997, p.10). The Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 tended to reinforce thesedoubts, but it should be noted that there is an underlying degree ofconvergence beginning to occur amongst EU member countries for movingtowards more rather than less activism in global crisis management.

Asian Pacific regional cooperation

By comparison with the European conceptualisation and practice of region-alism and regional integration, the Asian Pacific experience has been somewhatdifferent. While I am aware that regionalism has developed in the South Asianregion (specifically through the South Asian Association for RegionalCooperation), the focus of this discussion will be on the Asian Pacific region.

Although the concept of broad Asian Pacific regional cooperation can bedated back to the Pan-Asian ideas of the early part of the twentieth century orthe Japanese wartime ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, it was themid-1960s which saw the first flowering of regionalist ideas within the AsianPacific region, especially with the establishment of one sub-regional organi-sation ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) of originally fivecountries, now expanded to ten. Subsequently Asian Pacific regionalism movedthrough academic and business-led initiatives to the founding of the inter-governmental Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989(originally 12 but now 21 countries on both sides of the Pacific Ocean), thecounter-proposal of an East Asian Economic Grouping (the exact participant

Learning from Europe 389

countries were never clearly laid out), and more recently the ASEAN plusThree (ASEAN+3) forum of the 10 ASEAN members and Japan, China andSouth Korea (Camilleiri 2003). It is important here, however, to note that theAsia Pacific encompasses a huge variety of countries which differ from eachother in terms of political systems, resource endowments and economicdevelopment levels, and ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. This inturn has led to a desire to approach regional ‘community’ building through aprocess of gradual, step-by-step consensus-formation. One by-product of thishas been the emergence of different conceptions of the region and regionalcooperative organisations, which have yet to be fused into a singleover-arching organisation. Indeed, recent years have seen a certain tensionemerge between East Asian and Asian Pacific conceptualisations of regional-ism. While the strong rhetorical flourishes of the 1999 Manila ASEAN+3summit, when calls were made by the host President Joseph Estrada for ‘AnEast Asian common market. One East Asian currency. And one East Asiancommunity’ (South China Morning Post, 29 November 1999) were clearlypremature, they do at least suggest a greater awareness of and interest inthinking through issues relating to an East Asian - as opposed to an AsianPacific or pan-Asian-regional identity or consciousness which may ultimatelybe more satisfying for the East Asian elites.

Regionalism in the Asian Pacific, therefore, has tended to be characterisedby academics and practitioners within the region as a form of ‘newregionalism’ (by contrast with the ‘old regionalism’ of Europe) or even,reflecting the post-Asian financial crisis mood, the ‘second wave of newregionalism’. The following section will discuss in a comparative manner someways in which these descriptions might be valid.

Comparing the two �models’

By generalising for the purposes of simplicity, some broad similarities anddifferences between the European approach and the Asian approach toregionalism and regionalization can be proposed.

Firstly, for similarities, in both areas exists the belief that regionalorganisations can contribute to the security and stability of individual membernations, the prosperity of the peoples, and the elimination of conflict and war.Secondly, both areas take a broad approach to regionalism in the sense thatthey favour not simply a narrow economic synonym for regional trademechanisms but rather a means for providing what is sometimes called‘comprehensive security’. This term, used more commonly in the Asian Pacificbut nonetheless applicable to Europe too, implies a concern with the economic,political, social and even cultural elements which impact on a country’s (or aregion’s) existence and security.

Next for differences. Here, firstly, there is a difference in timing and format.The Asian approach has both been more laggardly and more multi-layered,with more varied and often over-lapping examples of regional and sub-regionalcooperation. In Western Europe, the regionalist tendencies started earlier andthe European Community (now EU) has developed progressively since the late1950s to become the paramount organisation. The inter-governmental Councilof Europe (1949) continues to exist but it is rather an obscure and

390 B. Bridges

non-influential body, while the West European Union (1954) has been anotherlow-profile institution in the security field which was revitalised - though onlytemporarily - as a result of the end of the Cold War. In the Asian Pacific,ASEAN was formed in 1967, the two business-led regional organisations thePacific Basin Economic Council and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Councilin 1967 and 1980 respectively, but APEC was not established until 1989 andASEAN+3 has become formalised only since 1997. The outgrowth of AsianPacific regionalism, therefore, has appeared strongest in the post-Cold Warworld which differs from the Cold War framework within which Europeancommunity-building began. Moreover, the final format of Asian regionalism isnot finally decided, as East Asian and Asian Pacific organisations compete forattention.

Secondly, a difference in leadership and initiative. In the European case,whilst intellectuals did undoubtedly contribute, it was the vision of certain keyindividual politicians and officials, especially in France and Germany, whichcontributed to getting the European project off the ground and flying. WhileEuropean businessmen have encouraged and supported (and, arguably, at leastpart of the 1992 process of creating the single market was driven by the needsof companies who wanted to get rid of hampering restrictions), the keydecisions have still been made by politicians, governments and the EuropeanCommission. However, in the Asian Pacific case, there has almost been aprogression from concepts raised by intellectuals, especially economists,through businessmen developing their own regional organisations and thengovernments becoming indirectly and finally directly involved (I am aware thatASEAN did benefit from some far-seeing politicians in its early days, but itshould be better counted as a sub-regional not a truly regional organisation).

Thirdly, a difference in focus, which partly follows on from the previouspoint. European regionalism has had both economic and political (or political-security) agendas. Clearly the perception of economic benefits to be derivedfrom integration was conducive to the EC/EU’s development, but so too wasthe desire to create a new community amongst peoples divided by pastconflicts and to build new institutions which would give direction to a shareddestiny (Wallace 1990, p. 2). West European integration was also influenced byits positioning in the Cold War, within a framework set by Soviet hostility andAmerican sponsorship, which meant that the EC was also a ‘political’ project inconception. European countries saw themselves involved in a political processwhereby, step by step, they put aside sovereignty to facilitate regionalintegration (Mostura and Beuth 2003). Europe’s subsequent evolution,therefore, has been the result of an ‘interaction between political ideals,security considerations, economic and technical developments, and socialevolution’ (Wallace 1990, p. 5). However, for the Asian Pacific regional leaderseconomic objectives have been paramount and only occasionally, though morefrequently in recent years (for example, as terrorism has raised its ugly head),have overtly political and even security-related issues emerged on the agenda.Under the mantra of ‘open regionalism’, the Asian Pacific route has favouredmarket-driven economic cooperation and has focused on measures andpolicies to favour economic development and interdependence, with atendency to avoid political and security issues, so as to create a sense ofcommunity without a sense of threat. The Asian Pacific region’s first attempt tocreate a region-wide body to talk about security issues was not made until the

Learning from Europe 391

ASEAN Regional Forum was set up in 1994, but its actions have tended toremain low-key and it functions primarily as a talking-shop. Moreover, unlikethe EU’s aspirations for CFSP, there is no intention that Asian regionalorganisations should have a common foreign policy, even though achieving a‘consensus’ on certain external political and security issues is often consideredimportant and the weight that a regional organisation might informally be ableto bring to bear in international economic discussions or negotiations isconsidered useful.

Finally, a difference in kind. The European approach is built on a highlyinstitutionalised, highly legalistic form of supra-nationality, with ‘integration’as an ostensible target, and involves countries which share a relativehomogeneous cultural background (although as the EU expands this lastassumption is slightly less strong). The EU seems to represent the progressiveempirical operation and implementation of regional integration theory in amajor region over time. On the other hand, the Asian experience so farinvolves a much more culturally diverse set of countries, has tended toinformality, relied on minimal amounts of either institutionalisation ornational sovereignty derogation, has tended to non-legalistic and voluntaryapproaches and has deployed a rhetoric which emphasises ‘cooperation’ and‘open regionalism’ rather than ‘integration’. Indeed, integration seems a‘process rather than an ultimate objective’ (Liu 2003, p. 8). To take that onestep further, it has been argued, Asian thinking about and practice ofregionalism seems to be more interested in the processes rather than thesubstance or structure of multilateral interactions within a region ( Dosch2003, p. 46).

Issues faced by Europe and their relevance to Asia

In this section, four major challenges faced by the Europeans during the pastdecades, which are still relevant today, will be examined and so suggestionsabout the relative importance of these for the Asian Pacific region will bediscussed.

Institutions

In the European experience, institutional patterns have helped to shapeattitudes and outcomes. With early on the EC being given limited powers ofdecision-making in certain policy areas, ministers and officials were broughttogether; by a process of socialization, the member countries found the contextof their cooperative efforts changing (Wallace 1990, p. 79). Over succeedingdecades the institutional framework has gradually evolved, so that now the EUhas central institutions with broad policy-making powers, an extensive body ofEuropean law, a directly-elected European Parliament (EP), and intenseinteractions amongst European governments within these institutions.

In theory, of course, institutions or organisations should serve a project,not the other way around. In Europe the debate about institutionaldevelopment or reform has been dominated by two opposing camps: thosewho see the nation state as the only level at which political responsibility can or

392 B. Bridges

should be exercised and those who argue for a federalist governmentanswerable only to a powerful European Parliament. In practice, of course,the European experience has been and remains somewhere in between thesetwo extremes. This leads to the question of the competences and interactions ofthe major institutions of the EU. There is a mix between those policy areaswhich are the exclusive competence of the EU (such as in trade, competitionand monetary policies), those which have shared competences (such as fiscal,environment, research and development policies), and those where the EU actsin a supporting and/or coordinating role for national policies (education,innovation, social protection and social inclusion policies) (Jones 2001).Enlargement directly impinges on the decision-making process for these policyareas, not least because 25 will find it less easy to agree than 15, hence themoves towards qualified majority voting on more policy areas.

For the Asian Pacific region, both the desire for and the reality ofinstitutionalisation has been very different. The approach adopted by ASEANand now, by extension, other Asian Pacific regional organisations has beentowards informality and minimal institutionalisation. Indeed, arguably,cooperation within ASEAN ‘was pursued as a means of assuring nationalindependence and mutual benefits for all participants’ (Chirathivat 1997, p.216). The region-wide reluctance to lose national identities through establish-ing supra-national institutions and mechanisms means that there has beenlittle support in the broader Asian Pacific region either for any institution-building along the lines of the European Commission or the EuropeanParliament. The secretariats of both ASEAN and APEC are small operations,with limited manpower and budgets and limited influence, and ASEAN+3 doesnot have any secretariat at all. The ASEAN Secretary-General has had slightlymore influence since the limited ASEAN institutional reforms of the mid-1990s, but this post is still far away from resembling anything like, for example,the European Commission President. In the broader regional Asian Pacificorganisations there is simply no-one such individually powerful post. Linkedto institutionalisation is the organisation of decision-making. In the AsianPacific region, coordination and policy development is still done almostexclusively at the inter-governmental level, usually relying on whichevercountry is designated as the lead country of that organisation for a particularyear. This is a much more independent and de-centralised process than, forexample, the ‘troika’ system used by the European Council. In practice,consultation and consensus have been the core of ASEAN’s decision-makingprocess; these methods have established certain norms for interaction whichare often dubbed ‘the ASEAN way’ and which have spread at least to someextent into other Asian Pacific regional organisations. Consequently, there islittle enthusiasm for voting on policy decisions. Institutional development haslagged well behind the EU experience, both at the ASEAN level and at thebroader regional level, and that could prove a handicap to the futuredevelopment and consolidation of Asian Pacific regionalism.

Leadership

Some scholars have argued that one important precondition for successfulregional integration is an undisputed leadership, which serves to coordinate

Learning from Europe 393

rules, regulations and policies, and to resolve distributional conflicts amongstparticipating countries. Oran Young, for example, has argued that ‘leadershipis a critical determinant of success or failure in the processes of institutionalbargaining that dominate efforts to form institutional regimes or, moregenerally, institutional arrangements in international society’ (Young 1991, p.281).

In the EU context, despite the occasional important interventions by otherstates, it is clear that the Franco-German relationship has been at the core ofthe European story, right from the early days of Monnet, Schuman andAdenauer. In the words of two diplomats: ‘France and Germany have beenjointly dubbed the engine of Europe - when it is running, Europe movesforward; when it is not working properly, Europe stalls’ (Mostura and Beuth2003). Certainly there are closely-knit ties between France and Germany thatdo not exist between any other two European countries, even though in recentyears the number of common actions within the EU seems to have become lessthan during the hey-day of Franco-German cooperation in the late 1970s andthe 1980s. Britain, always a reluctant European, has been slowly coming outwith a higher profile in recent years; despite disagreements about the Iraq war,there are actually signs of an emerging informal triumvirate (dubbed a‘directorate’ by some observers) leadership, which in turn has aroused concernamongst other member countries that they may be left out of key decision-making processes. However, the perceived difficulty that Britain has in fullycommitting itself to Europe, such as the resistance to joining the euro, acts as aconstraint on how far this triumvirate can really run Europe. In effect, theFranco-German link is likely to remain crucial.

But what of Asian Pacific regionalism; can we talk about any countriesbeing the leader(s)? In the more specifically Asian dimension, it would besensible only to think of China, Japan and just possibly ASEAN (or Indonesiaor even Singapore within that organisation). Both Japan and China areobviously major economic powers but are they able or willing to exertleadership? Can they work together in the same way as France and Germanyhave done?

Japan, although arguably not threatening militarily to the region now, doespossess potential economic hegemonic power and the means to mediate andresolve distributional conflicts in the region. On the other hand, a seriouslimitation on Japanese regional leadership is its own domestic economy; Japanhas not been able to provide a vibrant domestic market for imports from theregion during the post-Asian financial crisis period of regional economicretraction and it still shows only slight signs of pulling out of its decade-longrecession. Instead, it is China, if the present high rates of economic growth aresustained, which will appear a more attractive economic market and partner tothe rest of the region. It has been argued that ‘ the most important single factorinfluencing East Asian regional development today is China’s internaldevelopment and attitude towards the region’ (Liu and Regnier 2003, p. xv).In this context, regional concerns do exist over the rise of China’s military aswell as economic power; not all countries in the region are reconciled to the‘peaceful rising’ rhetoric emanating from China. Moreover, Sino-Japaneserivalry in both the economic and the political sense could be an insidiousobstacle to closer East Asian integration. For example, differences betweenJapan and China over political issues, such as Japan’s past aggression, the

394 B. Bridges

situation in Taiwan, Japan’s close alliance with the United States and territorialclaims, do bring tension to that bilateral relationship and make it difficult foreither to accept the other as the undisputed leader of a new regional grouping.In view of these political realities, therefore, it seems that both China and Japanwould for the time being prefer to dodge the issue of leadership inasmuch as anunchallenged leadership has not yet emerged. Both countries understand that aworking relationship has to be built up first. Much may depend on the gradualemergence of increasingly pragmatic leaders in both countries. In themeantime, the lack of clear leadership may be another constraint on AsianPacific regionalism.

Economic and technological change

Concern about promoting European commercial and industrial competitive-ness inside Europe and in global markets has been important to the Europeanproject. First this was seen in relation to American multinationals, but later bythe 1980s in responses to the Japanese corporate successes, particularly incontrast to the slowness of the European adjustment to the economic shocks ofthe 1970s (Wallace 1990, pp. 83-91). While sometimes hesitant and incoherent,the moves in the 1992 process to clear away remaining obstacles to a fullinternal market were aimed at a creating a stronger and more competitiveEurope, in part by overcoming the technology gap. Despite the ‘success’ of the1992 process, by the end of the 1990s EU leaders were again beginning to worryabout the European ability to rise to the new challenges resulting fromglobalisation and technological change - the newly emerging paradigm inwhich knowledge and innovation seemed likely to become so important indifferentiating between companies, countries and regions. The so-called‘Lisbon Strategy’ of 2000 set out a new strategic goal for the EU of becomingthe ‘most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’.The difficulty has been to carry out these worthy ambitions, for asCommissioner Pascal Lamy has argued, the EU has ‘oversold hopes andunderinvested in results’ (Lamy 2004). The enlargement process, of course,adds to European concerns, since dealing with the economic and technologicalimbalances between Western and Eastern Europe are fundamental to the futuredevelopment and effective integration of Europe. Perhaps one of the lessons ofthe 1992 process and the introduction of the euro is that only when Europeputs major political will into a project can it succeed (Lamy 2004).

Whereas the European development is predicated on a role, indeed astrengthening role, for the Commission and other EU institutions in helping orforcing the European economy to adjust to the changing external environment,for the Asian Pacific region much more responsibility lies at the doors ofindividual governments or so-called market forces rather than concertedpolitical actions from any regional organisation. Asian Pacific regionalorganisations have espoused the principles of free trade and financial andindustrial deregulation as part of the neo-liberal agenda to promote nationaland regional economic resilience. However, member states have often haddifferent ideas about ‘how principles would be interpreted, objectives defined,and strategies implemented’ (Camilleri 2003, p. 147). Moreover, when facedwith the greatest challenge to the regional economies, arguably, since the

Learning from Europe 395

Second World War, namely the Asian financial crisis, the regional organisa-tions such as ASEAN and APEC proved incapable of providing any realsupport to the suffering Asian countries. The crisis brought home to the Asianstates their fragility in the face of external pressures and acted as a catalyst forthe development of ASEAN+3 as a regional organisation with a much deeperEast Asian identity.

Public support

Regional integration in the EU has touched the lives of all the citizens ofEurope, but that does not mean that it has won their hearts and minds. Lack ofpublic involvement in, and understanding of, EU affairs can be blamed on thedomination of European policy-making by a technocratic elite, a complex setof rules and regulations, a lack of information (or large doses of misinfor-mation), revelations of bureaucratic waste and even corruption, and thestrength of prevailing national identities (Jones 2001, pp. 355–356). The EU isnot a ‘participatory democracy’ since the citizens feel themselves far removedfrom what is going on in Brussels. Despite the growing powers of the EuropeanParliament, there is little enthusiasm for voting in EP elections; in the June2004 EP elections the overall voting rate was only 45% continuing thedownward trend of past elections.

Eurobarometer public opinion polls show a depressing downward trend, sothat by the end of 2003 only 41% of the EU’s citizens expressed confidence in theEU. The Swedish referendum of September 2003 on whether to join the euro waswon by the ‘no’ vote by a significant margin. The British government hasrecently committed itself to holding a referendum on the new EuropeanConstitution, when finalised, but public opinion polls so far suggest a significantmajority of the British population would vote against it. Paradoxically, the newentrant countries, through their referendums, have shown that their citizens aremuch more pro-Europe than those of the existing members. Nevertheless, theEU faces a problem of trying to improve its image and make itself seem morerelevant and more vibrant to the man in the street across Europe.

Similarly, in the Asian Pacific region, regional organisations also face thedanger of being seen as out of touch with their citizens’ daily life. In fact, AsianPacific organisations seem to be even more distant from - and even moreirrelevant to - the ordinary people than their European counterparts. AlthoughAPEC has gone out of its way to draw in business inputs (through the APECBusiness Council), there are no effective ways for non-governmental organ-isations, trade unions or individuals to have a voice in its deliberations. Muchthe same could be said about other regional organisations such as ASEAN orASEAN+3. In the end, making a reality of regional organisations meansobtaining legitimacy or at least a measure of credible support from the citizensof the member countries.

The way forward

Governments, companies and peoples are striving to cope with the continuingchanges in international society and international order. The end of the Cold

396 B. Bridges

War provoked extensive discussion about a new international securityarchitecture; similarly the Asian financial crisis has led to widespreaddiscussions about a new international financial architecture. The earlierdebate on security has not been resolved satisfactorily and the ‘new worldorder’ has yet to arrive. In a similar fashion, the more recent debate on globalfinancial governance has yet to reach a conclusion and, indeed, also seems tobe falling by the wayside. Global structures can, therefore, be expected toremain unsatisfactory. In such circumstances, it is likely that regions - andregional organisations - will have a continued attraction and an enhancedrelevance. The new 25-member EU is a large regional grouping by any measure.As it struggles to deal with its new challenges, the past record in Europeprovides both inspiration and warning to Asians in their own efforts to buildregional identity.

References

Bridges B (1999) Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific. Cheltenham: Edward ElgarCamilleri J (2003) Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order: The Political Economy of the

Asia-Pacific Region, Volume II, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarChirathivat S (1997) What Can ASEAN Learn from the Experience of European Integration?

An ASEAN Perspective, In: Chia Soiw Yue and Joseph L.H.Tan (eds), ASEAN and the EU:Forging New Linkages and Strategic Alliances, Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 206–233

Dorsch J (2003) The post-Cold War development of regionalism in East Asia In: Fu-Kuo Liuand Philippe Regnier (eds) Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm shifting? London:RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 30–51

European Commission (1997) Amsterdam: A New Treaty for Europe, Brussels: Directorate-General for Information

Gilson J (2002) Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting,Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Hanggi H (2003) Regionalism through interregionalism: East Asia and ASEM, In: Fu-Kuo Liuand Philippe Regnier (eds) Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm shifting? London:RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 197–219

Higgott R (1999) The political economy of globalisation in East Asia: The salience of ‘regionbuilding’. In: Kris Olds et al. (eds) Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories,London: Routledge, pp. 91–106

Jones R (2001) The Politics and Economics of the European Union, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarLamy P (2004) A 25-member EU: is there a pilot in the plane?, speech at College of Europe,

Bruges, 8 March [available from European Commission website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla212_en.htm]

Liu Fu-Kuo (2003) East Asian regionalism: Theoretical perspectives In: Fu-Kuo Liu andPhilippe Regnier (eds) Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm shifting? London: Routledge-Curzon. pp. 3–29

Lui Fu-kuo, Regnier P (2003) Prologue: Whither regionalism in East Asia?, In: Fu-Kuo Liu,Regnier P (eds) Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm shifting? London: RoutledgeCurzon,pp. xiii–xxxi

Mostura S, Beuth HW (2003) Europe’s big two may be a model for Asia, South ChinaMorning Post, 22 January

Wallace W (1990) The Transformation of Western Europe, London: PinterYoung O (1991) Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions

in international society, International Organisation, 45 (3): 281–308

Learning from Europe 397