learning lessons from the past power system blackouts and
TRANSCRIPT
Learning Lessons from the Past Power System Blackouts and using Advanced System Technologies to prevent future ones
Presented by:
Bharat Bhargava
Consulting Engineer
Advanced Power System Technologies, Inc.
Copyright © 2016 Advanced Power System Technologies, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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PRESENTATION OUTLINE
Project Objectives
Review of some Past Blackouts
November 9/10, 1965 – Northeast US
August 10, 1996 - WECC – Western US
August 14, 2003 – Northeast US and Canada
November 4, 2006 – Europe
September 8, 2011 – WECC – SDGE, CFE and IID
July 30/31, 2012 – Northern, Eastern and Northeastern India
Steps we can take to avoid the next big one
Application of New Technologies – SPMS
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Power System Blackouts
Power System Blackouts
though rare but do occur
result in massive dislocation of services
can be a threat to life
result in excessive economic losses
should be prevented as much as possible
If they occur, the power should be restored as soon as possible
can be and should be avoided / reduced by using New Advanced Technologies
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TABLE I Impact and Restoration Times of some Power Grid Blackouts(1)
Date Area Load lost Number of Restoration MW People Affected Time (Hours) Remarks 11/9/1965 North America 20,000+ 30 M 13 7/13/1977 US- NY 6,000 9 M 13 12/22/1982` US (California) 12,350 2 M 07/2-3, 1996 US-NW 11,850 7.5 M 13 8/10/1996 US- Western 28,000 15 M 9 6/25/1998 US - NW 950 0.15 M 19 3/11/1999 Brazil 90 M 8/14/2003 NE America 61,800 50 M 48+ 9/13/2003 Italy 57 M 9+ 9/13/2003 Sweden +Denmark 5 M 5 11/4/2006 Europe (2) 15,000 5 M 2 11/10/2009 Brazil, Paraguay 17,000 80 M 7 2/4/2011 Brazil 53 M 8 9/11/2011 US -SD 4,300 5 M 12 7/30/2012 India 300+ M 12 Est. 7/31/2012 India 660 M 12 Est.
(1) Some of this information has been extracted from EPRI documents (2) Europe islanded into three islands and controlled the frequency decay in the low frequency island by automatic under-frequency load shedding (3) The blackouts shown in yellow have been discussed in this report
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Major Power System Blackouts in Last Fifty Years
Some of the major Blackouts
Northeast US – November 9/10, 1965
Western US (WECC) – August 10, 1996
Northeast US / Canada – August 14, 2003
Europe – November 4, 2006
San Diego / CFE / IID (WECC) – September 8, 2011
Northern India - July 30, 2012
Northern, Eastern and Northeastern India – July 31, 2012
Northeastern US/Canada – (2003) was longest – over 48 hours
Northern, Eastern and Northeastern blackouts in India (2012) impacted most people – over 600 million
Northeast US Disturbance – November 9/10, 1965
First Major wide area System Blackout Complete report submitted to President on December 6,
1965 Restoration helped by a gas turbine in New York area The entire system was restored within nine hours New York restored in less than two hours
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From: “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE POWER FAILURE IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES AND THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO ON NOVEMBER 9-10, 1965”
Power System Blackouts – November 9/10, 1965
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• Caused by overloading of lines out of Niagara and some faulty relay settings
• Some areas restored within fifteen minutes
• A gas turbine in New York area enabled power restoration very fast
• Total time taken to restore power about 9 hours
From: “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ON THE POWER FAILURE IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES AND THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO ON NOVEMBER 9-10, 1965”
WECC System Disturbance – August 10, 1996
Highly stressed system conditions and hot weather Transmission lines overload and sag into trees and trip one after
the other in Pacific Northwest As the lines trip, system weakens but Operators do not have wide
area situational awareness and system stress information Generators are over stressed and trip sequentially System continues to see increase in stress but operators can not
monitor and hence no corrective action is taken Large power swings occur between Northwest and Southwest
leading to system separation System splits into multiple islands
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WECC August 10, 1996 Event
As a result of this disturbance, the WECC system split in to four islands with major loads being dropped in Arizona and California TOTAL WECC System IMPACTS
Load lost: 30,489 MW
Generation lost: 27,269 MW
Customers affected: 7.49 million
Outage time: Up to 9 hours
Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996
4000
4200
4400
4600
0 20 40 60 80
TimeinSeconds
ObservedCOIPower(DittmerControl Center)
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August 10, 1996 - COI Power Oscillations at Malin [Source: BPA]
Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996
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August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Source: BPA]
Oscillations growth increases when a capacitor bank is switched in Malin substation to provide voltage support
Growing oscillations seen on 500 kV busses at various substations
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August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Simulations]
A very closely matched simulation conducted by WECC Modeling and Validation Group
Switching capacitor bank at Malin causes oscillations to grow faster both in reality and in simulations
Growing oscillations seen on 500 kV busses at various substations – Simulations
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• Maximum voltage amplitude oscillations occur at Malin substation
August 10, 1996 Oscillation in 500 kV bus voltages at Malin and other susbtations [Simulations]
Estimating damping from the above recorded chart
1. It is easy to calculate damping, if the oscillations are of single mode 2. Plot the x and y points, must ensure to include the max and min for each cycle.
Minimum two points per cycle 3. Calculate the amplitude of each cycle and the time when the peaks occur 4. Determine the number of cycles (n) and the start (T1) and the end time (T2). 5. Calculate the frequency of oscillations f = Cycles/Time = n/(T2-T1) 6. Calculate A2/A1 ratio for each cycle. If A2 is larger than A1, the oscillations are
growing and if A2 is less than A1, the oscillations are damping 7. Take natural log of each ratio A2/A1 8. Calculate the average of natural logs, that is (ln1+ln2+ln3+ln4+ln5)/5 for five cycles.
This is the average damping constant (z). If the oscillations are damped this average will be negative, but if the oscillations are growing it will be positive. This constant is known as “Damping Ratio” that is damping per cycle.
9. The “Damping Constant” is the damping per second and can be calculated by multiplying Damping Ratio (z) by frequency that is a = z * f
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Estimating growth rate of oscillations before and after capacitor switching
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August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Malin 500kV Voltage [Source: BPA]
Estimating growth rate of oscillations before and after capacitor switching
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August 10, 1996 Oscillation – Estimated Malin 500kV Voltage
Notice the increased growth of oscillations after a capacitor bank is switched in Malin area
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500
505
510
515
520
525
530
535
540
545
550
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
ki lo Vol t s
Time in seconds
Analysis of Growing power oscillations seen at California - Oregon border at Malin substation on August 10, 1996
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1. Notice the increase in growth of oscillations after a capacitor bank is switched in Malin area
2. System is already unstable, but switching capacitor made it worse
Time Voltage Cycle Frequency Amplitude A2/A1 Ratio z a Average Remarks
Seconds kV Numbe
r f A ln(A2/A1) f*z Damping
1 531 1 0.24324
3 522 0.24324 9
5 530 2 0.24324 8
7 520 0.24324 10 1.1111 0.1054 0.0256
9 530 3 0.24324 10 1.2500 0.2231 0.0543 Before
12 519 0.24324 11 1.1000 0.0953 0.0232 0.0295 Capacitor
14 530 4 0.24324 11 1.1000 0.0953 0.0232 switching
16 518 0.24324 12 1.0909 0.0870 0.0212
18 538 5 0.24324 20 1.8182 0.5978 0.1454
20 527 0.24324 11 0.9167 -0.0870 -0.0212
22 537 6 0.24324 10 0.5000 -0.6931 -0.1686
24 524 0.24324 13 1.1818 0.1671 0.0406
26 538 7 0.24324 14 1.4000 0.3365 0.0818
28 518 0.24324 20 1.5385 0.4308 0.1048 After
31 540 8 0.24324 22 1.5714 0.4520 0.1099 0.0962 Capacitor
33 512 0.24324 28 1.4000 0.3365 0.0818 switching
35 543 9 0.24324 31 1.4091 0.3429 0.0834
37 498 0.24324 45 1.6071 0.4745 0.1154
Oscillation Growth before and after Capacitor Switching in Malin area (From Excel sheet using analysis results)
X = A.e-at Sin(wt-q), where A1 = 10 Ac = 525 a= +0.0259 & +0.075 = 1.57 f= 0.25 Hz q= 0 t = Time in seconds
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400
450
500
550
600
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Seconds
kV
Western System (WECC) US Disturbance
- August 10, 1996
What can we learn Disturbance caused by increasing stress and lack of voltage support
at critical (Malin & Captain Jack) substations Increased stress resulted in reduced system damping and growing
oscillations Cross tripping islanding scheme was put back into service Models were inaccurate in predicting system behavior Considerable efforts spent by WECC Modeling and Validation group
helped in improving simulations and matching actual performance and the modelled performance
Wide area monitoring using SPMS could have alerted the operators of the increasing stress 22
Northeast US-Canada System Disturbance - August 14, 2003
Hot weather and highly stressed system conditions Transmission lines overload and sag into trees and trip one after the
other in Michigan and Ohio System stress continues to increase and the system weakens but
operators do not have wide area situational awareness Generators are over stressed and trip sequentially System continues to see increase in stress but no corrective action is
taken Large power swings occur between Midwest and Eastern US and
Canada System separates resulting in blacking out part of Northeast and
New York
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Northeast US-Canada System Disturbance - August 14, 2003
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Date/ Time of Occurrence August 14, 2003; 16.11 Impacted Area North Eastern US and Canada Number of People Impacted 50 Million Load Lost 61.8 GW Hours for Restoration 48 + Estimated cost $ 50 Billion
Growing angle separation between Cleveland and West Michigan
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Point of no return
From NASPI RAPIR Report
Some lessons we can learn from the blackouts/restoration efforts
New York (2003) restoration challenges Restoration took about 48 hours Hydro units at Pumped Storage Gilboa Power Plant were available within 20 minutes, but power could not be restored for three hours because of voltage mismatch at a substation PJM/NY system could not be reclosed because of voltage mismatch and delayed restoration effort Step by step procedure for system restoration could have helped. Wide Area Monitoring & Control Technology such as Synchronized Phasor Measurement Systems could have helped in avoiding cascading and in restoration
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European System Disturbance – November 4, 2006
Highly stressed system conditions because of heavy wind generation in Northeast and heavy winter load in Southwest Europe
Two major 400 kV lines opened for a planned outage Opening the lines resulted in overloading and overstressing the
transmission system (Increased Wide Area System stress) Corrective action resulted in stressing the system more separating the
System into three islands System disturbance controlled by dropping approximately 15000 MW
load thru Under Frequency relays Large amount of wind generation is dropped to control frequency System normalized in about two hours
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San Diego Gas & Electric, IID and CFE System Blackout on September 8, 2011
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San Diego - WECC System Disturbance September 8, 2011
San Diego system imports power on two major import paths Hassyampa – N. Gila- Imperial Valley – Miguel 500 kV South of SONGS – Five 230 kV lines (Path 44) Power also flows thru the underlying 220/115/92 kV system from
Devers bus to IID and Western Administration – Lower Colorado SDG & E has established individual path ratings
Hassyampa – N. Gila – 2200 MW Path 44 south of SONGS – 1800 MW
SDG & E monitors these thru the EMS / SCADA system SDGE may have been operating beyond safe operational limit
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San Diego - WECC Disturbance September 8, 2011 – Sequence of Events
Heavily loaded and stressed system conditions and hot weather (115 degrees in IID)
Safe operation and (N-1) criteria requires that loss of a path should not result in exceeding the normal rating of other paths.
RTCA are generally employed to ensure that the system is operating with in safe operating region
The Hassyampa – N. Gila line tripped at 15:26 hrs while carrying 1394 MW load due to an operational error
Loss of this line resulted in increase of power flow on Path 44 from 1302 MW to 2386 MW which exceeded the path 44 rating of 2200 MW.
This indicates that SDGE was operating beyond the safe operational limit
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San Diego - WECC Disturbance September 8, 2011 – Sequence of Events - 2
IID flows also increased from 90 MW to 240 MW and resulted in overloading the IID transformers which tripped and increased power flow on path 44 to 2600 MW
No action was taken by SDG&E, Cal ISO or WECC to reduce loading on path 44 after H-NG line trip
Increased Loading on path 44 also resulted in low voltages in CFE area and tripping of generating units in CFE system which increased loading on path 44 above 3200 MW (15:32:385)
Path 44 has relay settings at SCE end that isolate the SDGE, IID & CFE system if the current exceeds 8000 amps or 3186 MVA
Power flows continued to stay above 3200 MW and resulted in separation at SONGS.
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Power flow on path 44 after Hassyampa – N. Gila line (from FERC/NERC Report)
Source: NERC Phase Angle Report – May, 2016
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Power flows to SDG&E, CFE and IID before the N. Gila-Hassyampa line trip
SDGE CFE IID
APS/SRP
Devers busses 90 MW (239 MW)
N.Gila
SCE 1800 MW (30 deg.)
1302 MW Path 44 (2200 MW) Relay operation set at 3186 MW
1397 MW (20 deg. ) (1800 MW)
SONGS
SDG & E / CFE
Arizona
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Power flows to SDG&E, CFE and IID after the N.Gila -Hassyampa line trip
SDGE CFE IID
APS/SRP
SCE 2000 MW (30 deg.)
2386 MW On Path 44 (2200 MW) Relay operation set at 3186 MW
- 400 MW (20 deg. ) (1800 MW)
Devers busses 184 MW (239 MW)
SONGS N.Gila
SDG & E / CFE
Arizona
Power flows /Current on Path 44
Before line trip
After line trip
45
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
1
2
3
4
5
Normal
Rating
Trip level setting
Path 44 Current
E v e n t S e q u e n c e
Power flow in MW
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800 3200 3600 4000
Power / Current on Path 44
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Recommendations and “Lessons learnt” from San Diego Blackout that occurred on September 8, 2011
A Wide Area Monitoring System could have warned SDGE operators to take appropriate action with large angle separation and heavy
power flow from north on Path 44.
Better Coordination with neighbouring Utility (SCE) for Relay settings
is necessary
Advanced analysis of operating conditions (RTCA) could have alerted
operators
that they are operating in an unsafe operating zone
Large angle difference across the breaker will block the re-closure
Inadequate information on restoration issues, however, the system
was restored within twelve hours
North Indian Blackouts of July 30 / 31, 2012
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Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012
Disturbance occurred at 02:33:00 on July 30, 2012 High loading in Northern Region
load of 38226 MW Generation of 32640 MW Imports of 5836 MW – mostly from the Western Region
Several 400 kV lines out of service because of Planned outages (10) Unscheduled outages (5) Voltage control (6)
Western – Northern grid connected on Bina-Gwalior-Agra 400 kV line – line loaded to 1355 MW (2.2 SIL) Three 230 kV lines
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Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids before Blackout
A
Northern
Region
Western
Region
Eastern
Region
32636 MW
+5686 MW
33024 MW
- 6229 MW
12452 MW
- 239 MW
North Eastern
Region
535 MW
1367 MW
- 53 MW
Total Load : 79479 NW
B
C
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Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012
Amount of Load lost – 38,200 MW (Estimated)
Areas impacted
Northern region
People Impacted – 300 + million
Estimated cost – $ 6 Billion
Time to restore power – 12 - 18 hours
Ties lost – A & B – NR separated from WR and ER
Separation initiated by tripping of Bina-Agra circuit on Zone 3
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Northern India Grid and Regional Interconnections Effected Area Northern Region – July 30, 2012
Source: Indian Blackout
Investigation Report dated
August 16, 2012
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Indian Blackout – July 30, 2012
Increased loading on Bina-Gwalior-Agra caused tripping of this line on Zone 3, the other line was out of service
Tripping of Bina-Gwalior-Agra line resulted in tripping all 230 kV WR-NR lines separating WR and NR
Separation of WR-NR resulted in tripping of all Ties between ER and NR
NR left with a deficit of 5686 MW ( 18 % generation deficiency in NR Resulted in rapid frequency decline and NR blackout Power restored in 18-24 hours
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Power Flows in Indian Regional Grids at the time of Blackout
A
Northern
Region
Western
Region
Eastern
Region
32636 MW
+ 5686 MW
33024 MW
12452 MW
North Eastern
Region
5686 MW
535 MW
1367 MW
53 MW
Total Load :79,479 MW Load Lost: 38,000 MW Ties Lost: A and B
B
C
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Indian Blackout – July 31, 2012
Occurred in after-noon about 1:20 Hours, shortly after the first one, while the system was still being put together
Amount of Load lost – 48600 MW Areas impacted
Northern region Eastern Region North Eastern region
People Impacted – 680 + million Estimated cost – $ 10 Billion (Estimated) Time to restore power – 12 - 18 hours (Estimated) Ties lost – A & C separating NR, ER and NER regions from WR
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Indian Blackout – July 31, 2012
Increased loading on Bina-Gwalior-Agra again caused tripping of this line on Zone 3, the other line was out of service
Tripping of Bina-Gwalior-Agra line resulted in tripping all 230 kV WR-NR lines separating WR and NR
Separation of WR-NR resulted in tripping of all Ties between ER and NR
NR left with a deficit of 5686 MW ( 18 % generation deficiency in NR
Resulted in rapid frequency decline and NR blackout Power restored in 18-24 hours
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Northern India Blackout Effected Areas – July 31, 2012 (From Indian Blackout Investigation Report )
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Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids before July 31, 2012 Blackout
A
Northern
Region
Western
Region
Eastern
Region
29884 MW
+4016MW
32612 MW
- 6240 MW
13524 MW
- 345 MW
North Eastern
Region
1014 MW
+212
212 MW
Total Load : 76934 NW
B
C
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Generation, Imports/Exports in Indian Regional Grids after July 31, 2012 Blackout
A
Northern
Region
Western
Region
Eastern
Region
29884 MW
+4016MW
32612 MW
- 6240 MW
13524 MW
- 345 MW
North Eastern
Region
1014 MW
+212 212 MW
Total Load : 76934 NW Load Lost : 48000 MW Ties Lost : A & C
B
C
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Indian Blackout Investigation Report
Very comprehensive Investigation report – details all sequence of events, system configurations
All facts and figures are provided – making it easy to review and comment Suggests steps that may be taken to improve situation and prevent future blackouts Original reports blamed the states of withdrawing too much power, but indicates that the system had several lines out resulting in reduced inter-region transfer capability Simulations may be improved for better analysis
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Steps Suggested to avoid Blackouts
Better Wide Area Visualization using SPMS Internal External – at least adjoining areas/critical areas of Grid should be
observable ES and EMS in operation Establishing Limits on power flows Use of RTCA Use of Synchronized Phasor Measurement technology
Angle measurements and other metrics Withstand loss of ties and maintain frequency within the acceptable band
Monitoring Impedance relays zone encroachment`
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Common causes between the SDG&E and Indian Blackouts - 1
Both Systems have two major inter-connections Hassyampa-North Gila & SCE SONGS Path 44 WR and ER
Safe operation requires that loss of one interconnection should not result in exceeding the rating of the other path
Readjustment necessary after loss of one tie Both systems were clearly operating beyond safe limits No SOL established or being monitored based on the system conditions No adjustments of loading for line outages Excessive imports compared to local area generation
Load 4400 MW, imports of 2698 MW (No possibility of survival when both ties are lost ) Load of 38322 imports of 5686 – loss of tie-line would result in a frequency decline of about 16 % No frequency control by UFLS
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Common causes between the SDG&E and Indian Blackouts - 2
No Situational Awareness, EMS or RTCA in operation Relay setting resulting in system separation
Zone 3 relay settings in India Path 44 overload setting at SONGS
No system stress monitoring (Angle separation) No previous analysis to define safe operating regions
Power flows (Path 44 ) Angle differences (Bina-Gwalior)
No use of advanced technologies for real time dynamics monitoring
• Need for Wide Area Monitoring System - We just can’t afford wide
area blackouts - We need to operate the power systems efficiently and economically - We now have tools available that can help us manage the grid better – Synchronized Phasor Measurement Technology
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A state of the art high-speed grid monitoring system which measures and compares voltages, currents and phase angles between different electric system points simultaneously* and let’s you know “what the heck is happening to the power system”
*All Measurements taken at the same precise time
What is “Synchronized Phasor Measurement Technology (SPMT)”
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Synchronized Phasor Measurement System Technology
References (1 & 2): 1. “Use of Synchronized Phasor measurement System for Enhancing AC-DC Power System Transmission Reliability and Capability” by John Ballance, Bharat
Bhargava and G. D. Rodriguez, Southern California Edison Co., United States of America presented at the CIGRE General Meeting Session, 2004, Paris, France
2. “Dawn of the Grid Synchronization” by Damir Novosel, Vahid Madani, Bharat Bhargava, Khoi Vu and Jim Cole published in IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, January/February, 2008, pages 49-60
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What is SPM Technology?
Measures positive sequence time stamp voltage and currents at different locations
Information is transmitted and collected at a central location
Information can be received and processed within six cycles
Operators can view following system information Wide Area visibility
Wide and Local Area System Stress
Static and Dynamic stresses
Voltage support at critical locations
System dynamics
Frequency excursions
Oscillations and their damping
Zone encroachment
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Synchronized Phasor Measurement System (SPMS) Capabilities
SPMS Technology has been identified as the key Technology for avoiding blackouts in
the February 2, 2006 DOE report to US House and Senate
can provide synchronized event recording during disturbances at multiple points
can monitor system dynamics in real-time
can enable instantaneous assessment of system performance and stability (Situational Awareness)
can assist in avoiding major system disturbances
can enable quicker restoration of systems after major system disturbances
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Synchronized Phasor Measurement System (SPMS) Capabilities
SPMS can
Enable increased power transfers on existing paths
Potentially enable determination of available transmission capacity in “real time”
monitor:
Static/dynamic phase angle limits (system stress)
Comparing phase angle measurements with bench marked cases and keeping adequate dynamic margin
Modal oscillation frequencies and damping
Voltage support at critical locations when operating at large phase angles separations
Event reconstruction and model validation
Invented by Dr. Arun Phadke, Jim Thorp and Mark Adamiak
during 1978-82
Applied in Western US during 1992-2012 thru an EPRI project
Southern California Edison 1995-2016
Bonneville Power Administration 1992-2016
PGE and others 1992-2016
American Electric Power 1982 - 2016
Eastern Interconnection, PJM, NYPA, Others
India – Major thrust after 2012 Blackouts
Major rollouts in China, Russia, England, Europe, Mexico etc.
Synchronized Phasor Measurement System Technology
Historical background and World Wide Usage / application
Large Investments have been made and extensive research has been conducted
Technology is fully matured for application
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Historical Background and Worldwide Implementation
Technology is fully matured for application
Has been implemented at several locations in US
WECC / Peak Reliability
Eastern Interconnection – PJM, NY ISO, ISO-NE, MISO ,
Southern Co. , Entergy, Dominion, Duke etc.
ERCOT (Texas)
Some of the above organizations are mostly looking at their own
system and not taking advantage of wide area applications, which
is a must for successful application
North American Synchro Phasor Initiative (NASPI)
organization in US is trying to advance the applications
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Can we avoid the next Big One ?
For successful Technology Application, we need to see the
entire “Operational Control Area”
Data interchange is essential to understand Complex System Dynamics
May need a organization for a specific Control area such as
WECC / Peak Reliability
Eastern Interconnection – PJM, NY ISO, ISO-NE, MISO
ERCOT
India has an Organization dealing with entire system – POSOC
The individual organizations need to be aware of things
happening in other area and should have access to information
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Are we Prepared to avoid the next Big One ?
For successful Technology Application, we need to
Have “Excellent Data Quality” with 99.9999 percent reliability
Have minimum latency and have data available in less
then six cycles for processing
Train operators to be able to accept and use the technology
Develop faster and efficient processing programs
Understand what we need to monitor and at what locations
Understand and analyze weak spots of the power systems
Develop simulated Events for Training
The list is long and will continue to grow on and on
Although, we have taken some “Baby Steps”, the challenges
are many, many more
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Are we Prepared to avoid the next Big One ?