Myths and legends often form a community's view of its own history

The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance*By Fawaz A. Gerges [http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br5/gergesbr5pt1.html#top]

Myths and legends often form a community's view of its own history. Historical truth is the first casualty not only of war but also of nation-building. Only cohesive and united societies can afford the luxury of historical self-deception. Fragmented societies indulge in such fanciful invention at the their own peril, for, to survive, they need to know and comprehend the real and full truth of their past and accommodate themselves to political realities. The Lebanese, in particular, have resisted coming to terms with their own history. They have failed to learn from their tragic past and have continued to entertain illusions about their national identity and their importance in the world.

The Conflicting Histories of LebanonIt was from this perspective that Kamal Salibi diagnosed the genesis of the bloody and prolonged war that erupted in 1975 and that almost destroyed the political and socio-economic fabric of Lebanon. He argued that the upheaval was basically a civil war fought between Lebanese factions flying different historical banners: the Christian Lebanese particularist banner on one side, and the Arab nationalist/Islamist banner on the other. To him, both sides were misguided; contrary to the claims of the particularists, the concept of a historical Lebanese nationality is not well founded. As a country, asserted Salibi, Lebanon is a modern creation; it was established and organized by the colonial powers. Although Lebanon's history is somewhat different from that of its Arab neighbors, Salibi rejected the idea of Lebanon as an entity separate and distinct from Arabism: the Lebanese case fits comfortably into the general pattern of Arab history.[1]

This does not mean that Salibi subscribes to the Arab nationalist Islamist interpretation of Lebanon's history. While he emphasized the basic Arabism of Lebanon, he warned against blindly adhering to the tenets of Arab nationalist doctrine. This highly idealized vision, contended Salibi, is problematic since it distorts the evolution of Arab history by confusing Islam and Arabism. By refuting the different theories of Lebanon's history and setting the record straight, he hoped to inject the Lebanese with a dose of realism and remind them of their humble origins. [2] If they failed to come to terms with their historical origins and the differences among them, Salibi feared, the Lebanese would continue to act as tribes:Each tribe forever suspicious and distrustful of the others; each tribe always alert, extending feelers to the outside world in different directions, probing for possible sources of external support in preparation for yet another round of open conflict.[3]Still, Salibi did not deal directly or explicitly with the foreign policy prescriptions and implications of these two main poles of thought. This omission needs to be rectified, given the close linkage between domestic and foreign politics in Lebanon. Nassif Hitti has argued that, since independence, the controversial issues that plunged the country into the abyss of instability and violence belong to the realm of external rather than internal politics. For example, the crisis of 1958, the protracted conflict with Palestinian guerrillas after 1969, and the all-out war that erupted in 1975 can all be seen as products of irreconcilable differences over Lebanon's relationship with its environment, differences arising from contradictory perceptions of Lebanon's place in the region and beyond.[4]

What are some of the perceptions that have had such considerable impact on Lebanon's relations with the outside world? The Asile du Liban constituency, with its emphasis on the Phoenician origin and special historical character of the Lebanese, perceived of Lebanon as a "shinning example of liberal democracy and general social advancement in the Arab world.[5] The Arab world was seen as a tribal domain, inferior to that of the civilized, European-like, and materially successful Lebanon. Small wonder that this particularist, Lebanonist school identified itself culturally and politically with the West rather than with the Islamic world. It called for a reorientation of Lebanon's foreign policy and for a strategic alliance with the Western powers. An idealized view of the West fostered exaggerated expectations: it was assumed that the latter would fight to protect the "only Western model" in the Arab region.[6]The Lebanonist adherents thus came to overvalue Lebanon's place on the Western strategic chessboard and set goals beyond their capabilities. The result was the adoption of confrontational policies that alienated and clashed with the objectives of the Arab nationalist and Islamist segment of Lebanese society. The latter saw the political destiny and future of Lebanon in a different light. Their point of reference was the Arab/Islamic world rather than the West. The interests of Lebanon were subordinated to those of its immediate environment. In a sense,. this constituency served, consciously or unconsciously, as a conduit for and mirror to other ideologies, whether Nasserism, the Palestinian nationalism of the PLO, or the militant Islamism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[7] Not surprisingly, Lebanon became a theater for inter-Arab rivalries and regional conflicts.

The Crisis of 1958:The Risks of Inflated Self-ImportanceThe purpose of this paper is to analyze how the perceptions of the particularist and Arab nationalist/Islamist schools affected Lebanon's external relations, and how they adversely influenced the formation of its foreign policy. It will be argued that the inflated images held by the two constituencies distorted their world views and led to an over-estimation of their own and Lebanon's importance in the international system. The failure to maintain a balance between goals and means produced reckless policies based on miscalculation and improvisation. At no time was this truer than in the conflict of 1958, when the clash between the differing views of the two groups culminated in a bloody confrontation and outside intervention.

As a case study, the crisis of 1958 sheds much light on the foreign policy misperceptions of both constituencies. Contrary to popular perceptions, American military intervention in Lebanon did not reflect any strategic commitment by Washington to the Lebanonist agenda or to Lebanon's future. In addition, Beirut was not the main target of U.S. action; rather, Cairo and Moscow were. Shocked by the success of the July 1958 Iraqi evolution, although accepting it as a fait accompli, American officials used Lebanon as a theater to project their military power and demonstrate their will to protect their vital regional interests, mainly the supply of oil. They wanted to signal to their adversaries their readiness to use force, if necessary, to arrest the further crumbling of the Arab conservative order. As one U.S. policymaker put it, "Lebanon was a test case in the eyes of the others."[8]

The Eisenhower administration probably would not have sent troops to Lebanon if the Iraqi revolution had not occurred. Prior to the July revolution, and notwithstanding the repeated requests for U.S. intervention by president Camille Chamoun and his foreign minister, Charles Malik, president Eisenhower was reluctant to become entangled militarily in the quagmire of Lebanese politics. But in U.S. eyes, the dramatic events in Iraq introduced a dangerous new element in that it threatened to destroy the whole Western security structure in the Middle East. Eisenhower felt that the time had come to intervene in the region to "stop the trend toward chaos."[9]

In this sense, the U.S. action should be viewed within a broader context than merely that of the situation in Lebanon. Lebanon served as a convenient place for the United States to send signals to its adversaries. Far from being seen as a proof of Western commitment to the security of Lebanon, American intervention was part of the struggle between the West and revolutionary Arab nationalism. the Lebanonist constituency failed to realize that Lebanon was not high on Washington's global priority list. They duped themselves into believing that their alliance with the Western powers was mutual and strategic. How else can one explain Chamoun's anger and bitterness toward the U.S. government when it ultimately abandoned him in favor of his nemesis, Gamal Abd al-Nasser?[10]

Likewise, the Arab nationalist/Islamist adherents fell victim to the same misconceptions, and they suffered, like their Lebanonist compatriots, from a similar geostrategic myopia. The problem was that they digested uncritically the slogans of radical Arab nationalism emanating from Cairo and Damascus. To them, Lebanon had to march with the Arab caravan whatever the consequences and costs. They were obsessed with Nasser who became (in the words of Shaykh Nadim al-Jisr, a leading opponent of President Chamoun), "to all Arabs and Moslems, and object of worship next to God."[11]

As a result, the lines between national and regional politics blurred. Not only did the Arab Cold War play itself out in Lebanon, but so too did the rivalry between the Arab Nationalist Movement and the West. The crisis of 1958 was a case in point, Nasser's Egypt was asserting its leadership in the Arab arena by attempting to punish and subdue regional enemies. It was also battling the Western powers to force them to recognize Egyptian hegemony in the area. In a sense, Arab nationalists were pawns sin the Egyptian game of regional and international politics. They had a blind faith in the authenticity and historical inevitability of Nasser's brand of Arabism and in their own important role in achieving it .They never questioned the real motives behind Egypt's drive for Arab unity or realized that they were being used as tools to achieve Nasser's objectives.

The irony was that at the height of the 1958 war Nasser was secretly negotiating with the Americans to strike a deal. One wonders whether the Egyptian leader took the time to consult with his junior allies in Beirut to get their approval for such a course of action. According to the existing evidence, the answer is no. In local conflicts where the interests of small actors tend to be sacrificed to those of bigger powers, it was no surprise to see that in Lebanon both the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies endured the same treatment by their more powerful patrons.

The Genesis of the Lebanese CrisisInternal CausesThe Lebanese conflict, which broke out in the spring of 1958, had internal, regional, and international dimensions, all closely related to one another.[12] It is only by surveying events in Lebanon up to the 1958 crisis and examining these three dimensions that the Lebanese war can be understood.

On the domestic front, a struggle for power between the opposition and President Camille Chamoun was polarizing Lebanese politics and society. Chamoun, a staunchly pro-Western Maronite politician, was determined to assert his political will at all costs. As early as May 1957, the Commander of the Lebanese army, General Fouad Chehab, privately told U,S. representatives that Chamoun's "dictatorial" style was driving the opposition into a corner and splitting the political elite across sectarian and religious lines. Chehab contended that he had often warned Chamoun against tampering with the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 1957. According to the General, the balance of the system was such that it would not be possible to eliminate opposition.[13] This balance between Christians and Muslims, maintained Chehab, would not allow Chamoun to become a "dictator". Hence, in the General's eyes, the solution lay in a compromise which would save face for the government and "give the opposition a slice of the cheese." He implored his American interlocutors not to view the internal power struggle in Lebanon in terms of East-West rivalry. Most of the men opposed to Chamoun, concluded Chehab, were patriotic Lebanese: "If [Suleiman] Franjieh or [Kamal] Joumblat are Communists then I am afraid you must consider me one also," he is reported to have said.[14]

In a similar vein, the secretary general of the Moslem National Organization, Abd al-Wahab Rifa`i, informed a U.S. official that Chamoun's handling of local political issues and personalities was at the heart of the problem. He accused Chamoun and Malik of being egocentric, adding that they "sought to impose their personal convictions upon the people without sufficient spadework."[15]

This showed clearly that opposition to Chamoun was broadly based, and included some of the important members of the ruling establishment. They blamed the president personally, and argued that his authoritarian approach was responsible for alienating a large segment of the political elite. In Chehab's words, Chamoun was the problem.[16] Given the level of opposition to his administration, one would have expected Chamoun to try to placate his opponents and come to terms with them. But the tenacious president and his combative foreign minister were not prepared to tolerate dissent. They were determined to win the battle of wills against the opposition by counting on the physical and political support of the Western powers. Their overestimation of Lebanon's strategic importance to the West and their overconfidence would prove their undoing.

This strategy was translated initially into a resounding victory of the pro-Chamoun forces in the 1957 parliamentary elections, which further polarized Lebanese political life. The opposition bitterly contested the magnitude and legality of the government 's triumph, and alleged that Chamoun wanted to amend the constitution so that he could be re-elected. The president's refusal to publicly deny these allegations convinced his opponents and supporters alike of his intention to seek a second term, and both the CIA and the U.S. embassy in Beirut concluded that Chamoun had fixed the elections in such a way as to ensure his re-election.[17]

The opposition also accused Washington of financing the pro-Chamoun candidates. There was some truth in this charge. The main CIA contact with Chamoun, Wilbur Eveland, claimed that the CIA provided 'massive' funding to the pro-government deputies, and he portrayed the elections as a CIA-run operation.[18] According to Eveland, the United States did so in the knowledge that the new parliament would elect a new president in 1958. Although no specific U.S. documents relating to Washington's influence on the elections have been released yet, recently declassified sources hinted that the United States "played an active role." They also showed that Foreign Minister Malik sought American assistance to influence the results of the elections.[19]

Regional CausesIt would be misleading, however, to think of the Lebanese crisis as simply an internal struggle for power, or as a clash of temperaments and personalities. Internal dissatisfaction with Chamoun was fueled mainly by the government's pursuit of regional and international policies which were seen to be provocative and divisive. In the second half of the 1950s the polarization of the Arab world exacerbated internal divisions within Lebanon.

Two currents were competing for influence and dominance on the Middle East scene: while Nasser's Egypt led the revolutionary pan-Arab nationalist movement, Iraq, representing the pro-Western Arab states, spearheaded the conservative opposition to Egypt's quest for regional dominance. The Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry poisoned inter-Arab relations, and the flames of the Arab Cold War engulfed the regional order. Lebanon was no exception. Chamoun's pro-Iraqi policy manifested itself in his flirting with the idea of joining the Baghdad pact, which antagonized Egypt and later Syria. Not only did Nasser and Chamoun hold conflicting views on the major issues that divided the Arab world, but they also had a serious clash of personalities.[20]

Chamoun's stand on other regional issues added further to the straining of relations between Egypt-Syria and Lebanon, and the deepening of Lebanese internal divisions. When Britain and France invaded Egypt in 1956, Chamoun refused to sever diplomatic relations with the two European powers. 'The rulers of Lebanon," Nasser declared later, 'stabbed us in the back during our time of stress."[21] During the Syrian crisis of 1957, Chamoun and Malik received the U.S. envoy, Loy Henderson, without consulting Syria. Malik exhorted the Eisenhower administration to topple the Syrian regime. He told Henderson that -pro-Western Lebanon could not coexist with a neutralist or communist-oriented Syria: "Sooner or later one or the other must disappear."[22] In return, the Syrian foreign ministry denounced Chamoun for serving 'imperialistic and Zionist designs."[23]

The Lebanese president was not deterred, however. He perceived radical Arab nationalism as a threat to the regional conservative order of which Lebanon was an integral part. Chamoun and Malik were prepared to take risky decisions to combat the rise of Nasser's pan-Arabism. For example, when in February 1958 Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), Chamoun initially refused to recognize the new entity.[24] Neither the president nor his foreign minister seemed to take much account of the domestic implications of pursuing an anti-Egyptian policy. Instead, they swam against the current of public opinion, thus undermining the bases of their political legitimacy.[25]

The opposition resented Chamoun's lukewarm attitude toward the UAR. After the conclusion of the union, Damascus became a virtual pilgrimage site for many Lebanese politicians and citizens wishing to pay homage to Nasser. The speaker of the Lebanese parliament, Adil Usayran, declared that "Lebanon will march with the Arab caravan, and anyone who thinks of working for interests other than those of the Arabs will have no room in Lebanon."[26] In their zeal for Arab unity under Nasser, Muslim demonstrators trampled the Lebanese flag in the streets of Tyre.[27]

Given the diametrically opposed views of the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist/Islamist constituencies, the stage was set for a confrontation in which each side sought external support to consolidate its position. While Chamoun and Malik courted Washington, the opposition welcomed with open arms Egyptian and Syrian political and material assistance. Both sides played a dangerous game: they mortgaged the future of their country to foreign creditors.

International CausesChamoun's pursuit of a pronounced pro-Western policy only compounded his difficulties internally and regionally. He, Malik, and Prime Minister Sami Solh tied Lebanon's fortunes to American policy in the Middle East. Their strategy could have been beneficial but for the steady deterioration of relations between the West and the forces of revolutionary Arab nationalism since the mid-1950s. This development confronted the Chamoun government with a problematic choice.[28] Beirut had to choose between a close association with Washington, thus risking domestic instability and regional isolation, and a low-key and neutral approach in order to appease pan-Arab nationalist forces. Chamoun hoped to preempt the opposition by aligning Lebanese foreign policy with that of the United States.

Chamoun and Malik quickly seized on the Eisenhower Doctrine to request U.S. military assistance. It was Malik, rather than Chamoun, who was the driving force behind Lebanon's active alignment of its foreign policy with Washington.[29] Even before Congress approved the doctrine in March 1957, Malik informed Eisenhower that Lebanon welcomed his initiative and was ready to combat communist subversion in the region. He also asserted that Egypt and Syria were gradually falling under Soviet domination. "It [is] essential," added Malik, "that political change take place in Syria and Egypt."[30]

With the exception of Libya, Lebanon was the only Arab country officially to endorse the doctrine. The other pro-Western Arab governments recognized the inherent danger in such a move. Chamoun's opponents believed that, by aligning Lebanon with the West against Egypt and Syria, the president had violated not only Beirut's traditional neutrality but also the delicate balance among the various Lebanese factions. As two of the opposition leaders, Kamal Junblat and Shaykh Jisr, put it, the 1958, intifada was a direct response to foreign influence and to Lebanon's dependence on the West.[31] More than any other issue, Lebanon's international alignment and its estrangement from the Arab fold brought the crisis to a head. This reflected the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies' contradictory perceptions and irreconcilable differences over Lebanon's relationship with its environment.

The ShowdownThe scene was thus set for a confrontation between the regime and the opposition. The balance of power was clearly not in Chamoun's favor since General Chehab refused to commit the army on the president's side. The General was opposed to involving the army in an internal struggle lest it be torn apart by the contradictions of Lebanese politics. In discussions with U.S. representatives. Chehab ,could not hide his "sincere disgust" with Chamoun and his collaborators.[32]

The neutralization of the army was important in two respects. First, it exposed basic divisions within the Lebanese government and the precarious position of Chamoun himself. Second, it enabled the opposition, with material and political assistance from the UAR, to expand and consolidate its presence in large areas of the country. Chamoun was forced to rely on local militias and on the police for resistance. To him, this was not a viable option since he was not interested in a stalemate. Chamoun needed to defeat his opponents and their regional sponsors, and for this he required the intervention of a superior Western force.

As tensions increased in the early months of 1958, Chamoun and his government tried to emphasize the external nature of the crisis and to impress on Washington the need for decisive action. They portrayed the conflict as a struggle between pro-Western Lebanon and radical Arab nationalism, which was allied with communism.[33] In three separate statements in May, Chamoun, Solh, and Malik accused the UAR of interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs with the intention of overthrowing its democratically-elected government. Beleaguered at home, Chamoun and Malik began looking for outside support.

In his meetings with U.S. officials, Malik lamented the incapacity of the West to deal with the communist threat. By emphasizing the external menace and by playing the Cold War card, Chamoun and Malik wanted to internationalize the dispute and involve the Americans on their side. In contrast, the opposition was adamantly against the internationalization of the crisis since the configuration of forces was in their favor. In contrast to Chamoun, they asserted that the roots of the conflict were internal and had nothing to do with the ambitions of the UAR. Nevertheless, they relied heavily on the moral and physical support of the UAR.[34]

At the end of may 1958 the Lebanese government lodged two complaints against the UAR before the Arab League and the UN Security Council. To Chamoun and Malik, however, the League was not equipped to resolve the crisis. Instead, they focused their efforts on the Security Council, which voted to send an observer team to Lebanon.[35] By mid-May, Nasser broke his silence and denied any responsibility for events in Lebanon. He accused Chamoun of trying to convert a purely internal affair into an external problem in order to "deceive the Big Powers and induce them to intervene." In the meantime, the Voice of the Arabs radio station, a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government, was attacking Chamoun and calling on the Lebanese people to topple him.[36]

The Initial U.S. ResponseRecently declassified American documents show clearly that, initially, U.S. officials disagreed in their assessment of the Lebanese crisis. Three points of view can be discerned: the first, shared by Eisenhower and Dulles, argued that the problem in Lebanon was "Communistic in origin." To them, America's influence and presence inn the Middle East were at a critical point since the USSR was instigating instability throughout the region. Eisenhower wrote later: "Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the communists were principally responsible for the trouble."[37]

A second view established a connection between radical Arab nationalism and communism, thus emphasizing the destabilizing role of the UAR. The "Communist incitement to revolt" was linked closely with Nasser's efforts to destabilize the pro-Western regimes in the Middle East including Lebanon. Egyptian and Syrian aid to the Lebanese opposition reported U.S. representatives in Beirut, was prolonging and aggravating the situation. According to this view, Nasser's latest offensive was designed to inflict maximum damage on Western prestige in the area.[38]

In contrast, a third view held by American officials argued that the crisis was political; in nature. In their eyes Lebanon was not threatened by external aggression, since the UAR, which had confined its activities to propaganda, was not a member of the Socialist bloc. For example, the U.S ambassador to Beirut, Robert McClintock ,saw largely domestic political causes at the heart of the conflict. To him, questions of foreign policy were less important than questions of personality.[39] However, this was a minority opinion within the U.S. administration.

Before the escalation of the crisis in early May, the U.S. government was forthcoming in its commitment to Chamoun's policies and even with regard to his quest for reelection.[40] This represented a low-risk strategy for Washington since political discontent had not erupted yet into an allout rebellion against the Chamoun regime. As the situation further deteriorated following the assassination of a leading opposition journalist, Nassib al-Matni, the Eisenhower administration reconsidered its previous undertaking to Lebanon. The intensity of the riots which broke out in the country sobered U.S. officials. The latter recognized the inherent danger getting entangled in internal Lebanese politics, which would have pitted them against the forces of radical Arab nationalism.

It was within this context that McClintock advocated the adoption of a cautious U.S. approach to the Lebanese crisis, unless "we desire to use the Lebanon issue as a means for carrying out a conscious policy of enmity toward Nasser and the UAR with a view to splitting off Syria and trying a 'neo-Suez' against Nasser."[41] But Eisenhower and Dulles were not prepared to risk a confrontation with the UAR over Lebanon. American officials did not see Lebanon as intrinsically important in itself. Chamoun and Malik, to their dismay, later discovered this truth, and it shattered their somewhat idealistic view of the West.

Accordingly, on May 13, in response to a tentative request by Beirut for possible U.S. intervention, McClintock was instructed to inform Chamoun that Washington considered the introduction of American forces into Lebanon as a 'grave" step which could have the most serious and far-reaching consequences. At this stage, the Americans were uneasy about military intervention. The stakes were low and the potential political costs very high. The U.S. administration impressed on Chamoun the need to rely on his own resources to resolve the conflict. American officials hoped that Chamoun could still deal with the evolving crisis by putting his house in order.[42] The consensus in Washington was that armed intervention could have regional repercussions which would be inimical to Western interests.

For example, during a National Security meeting, the director of the U.S. Information Agency, George Allen, warned against the sending of American troops because this would be regarded as an intervention on behalf of the Christian community. As he put it: "The Lebanese had for so many years tended too much to place reliance on the protection of outside powers - the Turks, the French, the British, and, lately, ourselves." Instead, Allen concluded, the Lebanese should depend on themselves for protection.[43] In response to a lowering of tension towards the end of may, Dulles stated publicly that the administration did not consider Lebanon to be threatened by international communism under present conditions.[44] Although the U.S. airlifted police arms to Beirut and moved elements of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, American officials were reluctant to commit themselves to any decisive action.

Meanwhile, Moscow's initial response to the Lebanon crisis was limited and confined to rhetoric. An official Soviet statement protested the dangerous attempts by foreign powers to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs. Western intervention, warned the statement, could result in "serious consequences" for the future of peace in the Middle East.[45] Moscow did not, however, undertake an active diplomatic 9offensive in Lebanon as it had done during the Syrian crisis the previous year.[46] This reflected the marginal position which Lebanon occupied in Soviet policy, and indicated that Soviet officials did not see their vital interests to be involved there.

By mid-June the security situation in Lebanon took a turn for the worse. Chamoun instructed Malik to re-inquire whether the U.S. would be willing, if requested, to send troops to Beirut. Malik impressed on American officials the urgency of the situation and put them on notice that a request for intervention might be imminent. He emphasized the external dimension of the crisis by accusing Nasserism and communism of unleashing their fury upon Lebanon. Malik told Dulles that the conflict transcended the boundaries of Lebanon to encompass the Middle East as a whole. It was a contest, he asserted, between Chamoun and the West on the one side, and Nasser and the Eastern bloc on the other; hence the real fight was between capitalism and communism. Western efforts to tackle the crisis, concluded Malik, should not be restricted to Lebanon; they should be broad enough to resolve the underlying problems in the region.[47]

The Eisenhower administration held a serious of meetings at the highest levels to discuss Chamoun latest overtures and define a course of action toward Lebanon. The consensus in Washington was still against intervention. Eisenhower doubted that intervention could be justified under the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was directed only against external aggression - an admission that the causes of the crisis were internal.. he felt that the United States should be subjected to the same criticism that its European allies had faced during their invasion of Suez. Eisenhower lamented the lack of strong leadership and the deep divisions within the Lebanese ruling elite: thus he "had little, if any, enthusiasm for our intervening at this time."[48]

Dulles echoed Eisenhower's opinion by noting that to intervene at this point would be catastrophic to U.S. allies and interests in the Middle East. Such an action, he added, should take into account the divisiveness of Lebanese politics and the general weakness of the pro-Western governments in the region. He was particularly worried about the unstable Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad. Dulles suggested that Washington must pressure the Lebanese into solving their problems themselves and induce Chamoun to make concessions. He was blunt with Malik: Chamoun should be under no illusion that by inviting the U.S. to intervene he could win the battle against Nasser; " on the contrary, he would lose it." In other words, the United States was not prepared to fight Nasser and the forces of Arabism to please Beirut.[49]

In fact, U.S. officials were secretly negotiating with Nasser to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis. This amounted to an implicit recognition by Washington of the Egyptian leader's transnational status and power in the Arab world. At the end of may, Nasser approached the Eisenhower administration and offered to use his influence to help end the conflict. A series of meetings took place in Cairo between Nasser and the U.S. ambassador. But when the State Department communicated to Chamoun the outline of the Egyptian leader's proposal, Chamoun rejected it out of hand. He refused to accept any compromise that would signal the end of his political career. What was puzzling was that American officials did not even attempt to convince Chamoun of the merits of Nasser's plan as a starting point for negotiations. They dismissed the proposal as a ploy to impose a solution "not desired by Lebanon." The irony was that two months later the Eisenhower administration would use the terms of the Egyptian plan as the basis for a settlement of the Lebanese crisis.[50]

On June 19, Dulles requested McClintock to urge Chamoun to do everything in his power to avoid a situation in which a request for intervention might be required. The ambassador told Chamoun that sending Western troops to Beirut would not solve the present crisis. Instead, it would have the opposite effect and arouse popular feelings which could destabilize and possibly overthrow the moderate Arab regimes; it could even lead to "Lebanon's ultimate territorial partition or truncation." This would result in the weakening of the Western position and an increase in the prestige and influence of Nasser.[51]

Chamoun was not convinced by these arguments. To him, a political solution was unattainable because, he believed, the initiative was no longer in the hands of local leaders; Nasser now was the driving force behind the rebellion. He left it to his foreign minister, however, to articulate the regime's position. Meeting with Dulles on June 30, Malik reiterated the view that the main cause of the conflict was not internal; it had a larger dimension. If Lebanese independence were undermined, he noted, other pro-Western governments would collapse: "Lebanon is holding the dike and this is a battle not for Lebanon alone but [for] the West. If Lebanon goes, the West will go down too."[52] Malik argued that neither Nasser nor his pro-Lebanese sympathizers were interested in a political compromise. At any rate, he added, Chamoun was not prepared to make any concessions because he believed that Nasser should not be permitted to have a say in Lebanon's domestic and foreign affairs: "Chamoun will fight this battle until he wins or collapses because this is a battle for freedom and for stability and peace in the Middle East. It transcends Lebanese interests."[53]

The apocalyptic language and the absolute terms in which Malik portrayed the conflict reflected a desire on his part to entice the West to intervene militarily in the crisis. But on a higher level, it also expressed an inflated conviction of the significance of Lebanon on the Western strategic chessboard. Yet how realistic were Malik's claims? And to what extent was the survival of the West really and inextricably linked to the survival of Lebanon?

Dulles, for one, was not impressed by Malik's presentation. Military intervention would be "disastrous," he told his Lebanese counterpart. By now, American officials were beginning to see Chamoun as the major obstacle to a peaceful settlement since he was "stubbornly unwilling to take those last measures of personal sacrifice which might assure a political compromise averting his own defeat. "It was in this context that Dulles proposed to Malik the need to think seriously about a successor to Chamoun.[54] Soon, however, bloody developments in Iraq would prompt American policy-makers to question their initial doubts about intervening in the Middle East, and cause them to pursue a contrary course of action.

The Iraqi RevolutionConservative Arab rulers were worried about the escalation of the Lebanese crisis and the increased strength of the pro-Nasser forces there. No one was more anxious than the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Said, who was aware of the precarious position of the Iraqi monarchy. The struggle over the Baghdad Pact had convinced him that everything in the Arab order was interlinked. Political survival in Arab politics required a constant balancing and counterbalancing act.

Hence, in Iraqi eyes, an Egyptian victory in Lebanon would further contribute to the isolation of Baghdad in Arab circles. Such a shift in the regional balance of power would threaten the survival of the conservative Arab regimes. Given the weak foundations on which their rule was built, the Hashemites in Iraq would be the first to collapse. Inevitably, therefore, Nuri al-Said took the lead in trying to devise ways to support Chamoun.

According to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar Gallman, Nuri expressed his dismay with Washington failure to adopt a positive approach toward Chamoun. He implored the West to take the initiative in actively supporting the beleaguered Lebanese president. Furthermore, Nuri informed Chamoun that Iraq and Jordan were willing to conclude a defensive military or political agreement with Lebanon. Britain also supported an Iraqi-Lebanese defense link.[55] Iraqi officials encouraged Chamoun to stand firm and refuse to make any concessions to the opposition. "They assured him that Lebanon could rely on Western intervention as a last resort, Iraq went further and publicly attacked Nasser, accusing him of using communist methods of subversion from within in order to control the Arab world. To demonstrate their determination to help Chamoun, members of the Baghdad pact scheduled a meeting in Istanbul on July 14 to discuss, primarily, the Lebanese crisis.[56] But in the early hours of that day, a group of army officers, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, moved on Baghdad and overthrew the Hashemite royal family. Two decades of unpopular policies had antagonized large segments in the army and society, and the old order was swiftly demolished.[57]

The Western Response:Intervention in Lebanon and JordanThe revolution in Baghdad shocked Western leaders and took them completely by surprise. It also delivered a devastating blow to the British position in the Middle East, since Iraq was the last major bastion of British influence in the region. In U.S. eyes, the defection of Baghdad from the pro-Western camp threatened to weaken the region's defenses and undermine the security of the conservative Arab regimes. By its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, Iraq was the only Arab state to align itself openly with the west against Soviet communism. As Eisenhower put it, Iraq "was the country that we were counting on heavily as a bulwark of stability and progress in the region."[58] In other words, the United States could not afford to be passive.

The coup in Iraq posed a direct threat to Washington's interests and to its allies in the region. Panicking leaders in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia urged the U.S. to act forcefully to contain the revolutionary currents sweeping their societies. To Chamoun, the Iraqi revolution signaled a broad offensive by Nasser, with Soviet backing, to unseat all pro-Western Arab governments. Accordingly, a few hours after the coup, he summoned McClintock and requested Washington's prompt military intervention. He said he would interpret the administration's intentions by its deeds rather than by its rhetoric.[59]

Likewise, King Hussein met the U.S. representative in Amman with a similar request. King Saud also contacted the Eisenhower administration and asked for Western intervention in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Unless the West acted decisively, Saud warned, the U.S. and Britain would be finished as major powers in the Middle East; Saudi Arabia also would be forced to acquiesce in Nasser's ambitions - a veiled threat that Saud would realign his regional and foreign policies.[60]

On July 14, Eisenhower held a series of meetings with his cabinet the NSC, and congressional leaders to formulate U.S. strategy. To Eisenhower, the Iraqi revolution changed U.S. objectives from stabilizing a precarious situation in Lebanon to preventing the possibility of "a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East." Dulles, echoing the sentiments of the pro-Western Arab leaders, stated that the real authority behind the new Iraqi regime was Nasser, and that behind Nasser was the Soviet Union. The fear of a domino effect was high in the minds of American officials, and CIA Director Allen Dulles warned that the coup would set up a chain reaction which would endanger the survival of the conservative Arab regimes.[61]

Eisenhower seemed to have made up his mind about the necessity of taking strong action to avoid the collapse of the whole Western security structure. He told the NSC that "we must act or get out of the Middle East entirely." Secretary of State Dulles concurred with the president. He said that U.S. prestige and credibility were at stake not only in the Middle East but throughout the world.[62] U.S. officials believed that the United States must provide a psychological boost to its friends in the area by asserting itself militarily. The consensus within the administration was that to do nothing would be disastrous to Washington's interests and to its local allies. In a key meeting attended by the heads of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, the consequences of U.S. inaction were summarized as follows: (1) Nasser would dominate the whole Arab arena; (2) Washington would lose influence throughout the area, and its military bases there would be in jeopardy; and (3) the reliability of U.S. commitments would be brought into question around the world. [63]

To American leaders, the crisis and its implications were not confined to the Middle East. They saw the conflict in broader, global terms through the prism of their rivalry with the Soviet Union.[64] To them radical Arab nationalism was supported and had been penetrated by communism, and Nasser was no more than an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Union. Dulles went further, comparing Nasser and his pan-Arabism with Hitler and his pan-Germanism.[65] The connection was thus easily established between Cairo's involvement in the Lebanese and Iraqi crises and the Kremlin's indirect aggression. The hidden hand of Moscow was seen to be pulling the strings. Yet, there was no hard evidence to implicate Moscow.

During their deliberations over the question of whether Washington should intervene or not, however, American policy makers were not terribly concerned about Lebanon. As Dulles put it, Lebanon was "not very important in itself";[66] it was no more than a battleground where the United States could assert its leadership against radical Arab nationalism and communism. McClintock was not even sure about this, however. After his meeting with Chamoun on July 14, the ambassador advised his superiors against intervention; such a decision could only be taken in light of broader political and strategic concerns affecting the American position in the whole region. "So far as Lebanon alone is concerned," added the ambassador, "we cannot as of midday discern need for so portentous a step."[67]

Yet having concluded that intervention in Lebanon was necessary to project American military power and political will, Washington sent U.S. marines to Beirut on July 15; meanwhile, British troops were dispatched to Jordan. Moscow and Cairo were the two main targets of the U.S. action. By engaging militarily, the Eisenhower administration hoped to force the Soviets to put a brake on Nasser's drive. In a meeting of the NSC, Dulles said that the real problem in the Middle East was not Nasser but the Kremlin's unwillingness to limit his actions. To Dulles, if Soviet leaders could be persuaded that Nasser's policies could lead to war, they would surely act to restrain him.[68]

At the heart of U.S. thinking lay a misperception that Nasser was Moscow's man rather than his own. American officials erred both in accusing the Egyptian leader of engineering the coup in Baghdad and in exaggerating Soviet influence on him, and a few months later events would prove them wrong. Qasim's Iraq asserted its independence from Nasser and effected the first major split in the Arab revolutionary movement. Concurrently, a heated and bitter propaganda campaign erupted between Cairo and Moscow, thus shattering the myth of Nasser's subservience to the Soviet Union. The problem with U.S. policy was that it looked at the Middle East through the lenses of the Cold War rather than in terms of its own internal dynamics. This distorted American perceptions of regional politics and complicated Washington's relations with the Arabs. Ironically, the Soviet Union was the main beneficiary of this policy.

Although U.S. officials had discounted the possibility of Soviet counter-action, they refused to sanction a military operation in Iraq. While the British advocated a full-scale armed campaign to clean up the whole area, Eisenhower was unwilling to go along. He was aware of the political and military implications inherent in such a move. U.S. officials recognized the futility of promoting a counter-revolution in Baghdad, since "the situation in Iraq was hopeless."[69] Furthermore, in deliberating whether or not to intervene in Lebanon, U.S. officials could not neglect the possibility of a Soviet reaction. The balance of terror had served to influence the superpowers against precipitate acts. They would sooner neglect their local allies than endanger the international balance of power.

U.S. strategy was also designed to avoid a costly confrontation with radical Arab nationalism. Robert Murphy, who was sent to Lebanon as Eisenhower's personal representative, visited Egypt and Iraq and assured Nasser and Qasim that Washington had no intention of attacking their countries. He made it clear that the U.S. was keen on maintaining good relations with the Arab nationalist movement. Moreover, the administration reported its intervention in Lebanon to the UN Security Council and stated its willingness to cooperate with the UN to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces.[70]

By promptly dispatching a presidential envoy to the region, Washington signaled its interest in a political solution. Indeed, during their deliberations, American decisionmakers displayed a realistic appreciation of the limits of force. They believed that armed intervention was unlikely to provide a quick and easy answer to the problems of Lebanon or the Middle East. In their opinion, using Western troops to stem the tide of nationalism would simply not work. "We have no illusion," noted Dulles, "that this response will solve the problems of that area - in fact it may make them worse." This view served to limit U.S. objectives to the restoration of political stability in Lebanon.[71]

Accordingly, while in Lebanon Murphy opened a channel of communication with all the warring Lebanese factions. In his meeting with the opposition leaders, Murphy reassured them that U.S. intervention was not designed to prop up Chamoun or to impose a settlement.[72] This was a clear signal from Washington that Chamoun was dispensable. Murphy's discussions with Lebanese politicians led him to report to Eisenhower that "much of the conflict concerned personalities. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection. The outside influences came mostly from Syria and Egypt."[73]

The importance of recognizing this was that Washington could now deal directly with the internal sources of conflict in Lebanon. Its efforts would no longer be diverted by focusing on an imaginary communist threat. By placing the crisis in its own context, U.S. officials would find the contending parties amenable to a political compromise. Hence the main key to a solution of the Lebanese puzzle lay in addressing and smoothing over the clashing views and claims of the government and the opposition. By coming to terms with this reality. Washington was able to facilitate a settlement in Beirut.

Egyptian and Soviet ResponsesNasser heard about the Iraqi coup and the subsequent American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan while visiting Tito in Yugoslavia. He was concerned mainly that Washington would use the Turkish military machine to crush the new regime in Baghdad and threaten Damascus. In contrast, Lebanon did not figure very highly in Nasser's thinking.

In Nasser's view, the USSR was the only power capable of counter-balancing Washington. The Egyptian leader decided to leave Yugoslavia and go to Moscow to consult with Soviet leaders and ascertain whether he could rely on them in the event of confrontation with the West. Nasser urged Khrushchev to prevent any Western or Turkish move against Iraq or Syria by delivering an ultimatum to the West.[74] His request was refused. "Frankly," Khrushchev was reported to have told him, "we are not ready for a confrontation./ We are not ready for World War Three.". He emphasized that Egypt would have to move with the tide because Dulles was determined to get his way. However, the Soviets had to do something to mollify their Arab friends. As a gesture of solidarity, Moscow ordered general troop maneuvers on the Bulgarian-Turkish border.[75] Khrushchev also privately warned Eisenhower against attacking Iraq. Such an eventuality, he implied, would trigger a "world conflict."[76]

Although Nasser left Moscow empty handed, Khrushchev's symbolic act of ordering troop maneuvers enabled the Egyptian leader to use the Soviet card in his propaganda campaign. As soon as he arrived in Damascus, he announced to the crowds that the Soviet Union was "fully behind us." Rhetoric aside, however, Cairo's and Moscow's responses were very restrained and Nasser's options were limited. Nasser's meeting with Khrushchev came as a real awakening to him. He could barely defend his interests, and far less mount a credible resistance to the Western powers, without active Soviet participation. In the post-world War II era, one of the implicit rules governing U.S.-Soviet relations was the avoidance of a direct armed clash. It was one thing to threaten the British, the French, and the Israelis, as Moscow had done during the Suez crisis, but quite another to threaten a superpower. Soviet leaders would not force themselves into a corner lest Washington call their bluff; superpower miscalculation could lead to global war. Local actors, who deluded themselves into believing otherwise did so at their peril. Like Nuri and Chamoun, Nasser did not seem to have learned this important lesson. The ultimate manifestation of this misunderstanding was Nasser's behavior during the Egyptian-Israeli crisis of 1967, when his gamble on superpower support would prove disastrous.

Soviet strategy toward the Lebanese crisis was similar to that which was adopted during the Suez and Syrian conflicts, its purpose being to force the West to recognize the Soviet presence and role in the region. In other words, Moscow wanted to lift the Western veto on its participation in Middle Eastern diplomacy. To do so required an active approach which would, on the surface, champion the rights of Arab states while, in essence, seeking a compromise with Washington. In a letter to Eisenhower on July 19, Khrushchev called for a summit conference of the five major powers in the UN security Council, with the participation of the UN secretary general, to seek a comprehensive solution to Middle East problems.[77] A great power summit would allow Moscow to become an integral part of any regional settlement. Washington would not tolerate this, however. It was determined to exclude Moscow from Middle Eastern diplomacy and, inevitably, Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev's proposal. The two leaders then engaged in a bitter and hostile exchange of letters.[78] As a result of superpower bickering, the UN Security Council could not find a formula to end the crisis.

Khrushchev and Eisenhower finally reached a compromise to place the Lebanese dispute before the UN General Assembly.[79] Again, no agreement could be reached on any draft resolution introduced by other members, and the result was a stalemate. The stalemate was broken in August, however, when the Arab states sponsored their own resolution which was unanimously adopted by the UN. This showed that despite the intensity of the Arab Cold War, inter-Arab feuds could still be tackled successfully within a regional framework.

The Soviet Union emerged as a passive player throughout the Lebanese crisis. It had neither the military capabilities nor the will to confront the United States. The events in Lebanon proved beyond any doubt that Washington was the dominant actor in the Middle East. The main challenges to the Western powers emanated from the region itself rather than from any external sources. Moscow's role was secondary.

Meanwhile, Murphy's mediation efforts among the Lebanese factions bore fruit. With U.S. backing, General Chehab emerged as the consensus candidate for the presidency. From the outset Washington was keen on Chehab as the successor to Chamoun since he was "immune to the charge of being forced on Lebanon with American bayonets."[80] At the end of July he was elected president, and in October the State Department announced that American troops would be completely withdrawn from Beirut by the end of the month.[81] This withdrawal marked the end of the Lebanese crisis.

ConclusionThis paper has tried to show how the inflated self-images held by the Lebanonist and Arab/Islamist constituencies distorted their view of foreign affairs and led them to over-estimate their own and Lebanon's importance in the world. These images blinded them to the realities of power politics and to the inconsequential role played by Lebanon in the international system. Newly declassified U.S. documents show that during the crisis of 1958, far from being strategically indispensable to the West, Lebanon took a back seat in U.S. strategy. To American officials, the significance of Lebanon ebbed and flowed depending on their perception and calculation of broader U.S. regional and global interests. Before the Iraqi revolution, the Eisenhower administration was not inclined to send troops to Beirut. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq, however, U.S. policymakers changed their minds, and Lebanon acquired a temporary special status in the East-West struggle.[82]

While Chamoun and his adversaries enticed external actors to intervene on their behalf, they lost sight of the fact that the external actors were using them as proxies to fight their own wars. Instead, Lebanon was turned into a theater of the Cold War. For example, Chamoun and Malik requested Western intervention to counterbalance what they perceived to be an Egyptian-Syrian attempt to unseat them. They hoped to use the West to strengthen their own ranks and defeat their opponents. They had no appreciation, however, of the limits of Lebanon's power and influence in relation to Egypt's and Syria's. In U.S. eyes, Cairo, not Beirut, was the nerve center of the Arab world. Here lies the explanation behind Washington's unresponsiveness to Chamoun's repeated initial requests to intervene militarily on his behalf and put an end to the insurrection against his regime.

In the final analysis, American officials sacrificed Chamoun at the altar of their wider regional interests. After dispatching the marines to Beirut, Washington saw Chamoun as a liability, and so ignored him and dealt directly with Chehab and the opposition. Eveland drew an illuminating picture of Washington's contempt for the Lebanese president, and McClintock and Murphy were less than cordial to Chamoun. He was bluntly told not to count on U.S. support since Washington would not do his work for him. Small wonder that Chamoun felt bitter toward the administration for the way it had treated him. He believed that, in the end, Washington had deserted him to appease Nasser, when all the while he had seen himself as fighting on behalf of the West against the kind of radical Arab nationalism propounded by the Egyptian leader.[83]

Like the monarchists in Iraq, Chamoun had expected the West to sustain and maintain his regime in power. This miscalculation casts light on the nature of the relationship between small and large states. In their dealings with the United States, Lebanese and Iraqi leaders behaved as if they were strategically indispensable to Western security. They also had a blind faith in the capability and reach of their superpower ally. But they failed to remember a crucial principle in world politics: big powers have no permanent friends, only perpetual interests. The importance of local actors depends on how the major powers perceive the configuration of power on the regional and international scenes at a given historical moment.

Dulles' response to Chamoun's predicament was indicative of this thinking. Far from sympathizing with Chamoun's plight, Dulles pinned the blame for the debacle on the Lebanese president. He declared that Chamoun's difficulties could be explained by the fact that he went too far in embracing the Eisenhower Doctrine. The problem with Chamoun, he noted, was that he had adopted an extreme pro-Western policy"; so extreme that at one time Dulles had even suggested modifications in Chamoun's approach.[84]

Dulles was correct in one respect: encouraging client states to ally themselves too closely and openly with the West tended to undermine the legitimacy and security of these states. But the secretary of state was distorting the historical record by eschewing any responsibility for Chamoun's problems. Washington actively encouraged Lebanon to join the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the U.S. embassy in Beirut played a critical role in helping to unseat all the Lebanon deputies who had voted against accepting it.[85] In its crusade against Soviet communism and in its pursuit of vital economic interests, Washington had enlisted the support of whichever state was willing to sign up, regardless of the costs involved in such a transaction.

The Lebanese opposition, conversely, tied the future of Lebanon to that of Egypt. In this sense, knowingly or unknowingly, they reflected and carried out Nasser's policies. The fact remained that neither Washington nor Cairo was prepared to jeopardize its relationship with the other for the sake of their allies in Beirut. Despite the deterioration of U.S.-Egyptian relations since the mid-1950s, both sides recognized the importance of preserving mutual relations and avoiding a major confrontation. Before the Lebanese crisis was over, U.S. officials recognized the futility of trying to oppose radical Arab nationalism. Eisenhower proposed coming to terms with Nasser. As he argued, since "we are about to get thrown out of the area, we might as well believe in Arab nationalism."[86]

In the aftermath of the Iraqi revolution and U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration embarked on a major reappraisal of its strategy in the area. To the United States, the virtual collapse of conservative resistance to radical Arab nationalism made the latter appear to be the driving force in the region; it was the "wave of the future," U.S. officials believed that collaboration with Nasser's brand of pan-Arabism was an 'essential element in the prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area." They began to recognize Nasser as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and to deal with him as such. Egypt became the focus of Washington's relationship with the Arab states.[87]

In a similar vein, Nasser came to appreciate more deeply U.S. power and influence in the region. The rise of communist influence in the Arab East, coupled with the clash between communism and nationalism, and the subsequent Soviet-Egyptian quarrel, motivated Nasser to revive the American connection. In a gesture of goodwill, the UAR relaxed its criticisms of U.S. policy and actively sought U.S. cooperation in a number of fields. Relations between Washington and Cairo showed a marked improvement, and Nasser himself soon viewed the relationship as normal.[88]

The U.S.-UAR rapprochement came as a slap in the face for both the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies in Lebanon. The Lebanese crisis might not have escalated so dangerously had Chamoun's regime and its opponents not over-estimated their strategic importance. If both sides had kept a proper perspective of their place in the world, they would have been forced to come to terms with each other. Instead, they relied on foreign intervention to tilt the balance of power in their favor. The result was to exacerbate domestic problems and to turn Lebanon into a battle-ground for foreign rivalries. This proved to be another example of the linkage between internal wars and external interventions which have helped to shape the course of Lebanon's troubled history.[89]

It can be argued further that a similar inflated self-image was at work during the prolonged civil war which erupted in 1975. The inability of the Lebanese system made them vulnerable to outside influence and exploitation. Only by ceasing to entertain illusions about their national identity and their exaggerated importance in the world can the Lebanese rid themselves of the deadly ghosts of their tragic past. Lebanon's significance does not lie in its strategic or economic position, but in the solidarity and cohesiveness of its people and the willingness of the Lebanese to coexist in peace and harmony. The greatest challenge confronting the Lebanese is to construct one nation-state out of their myriad tribal, sectarian, and religious loyalties. Only then will the Lebanese assume their proper place within the community of nations.

*I wish to acknowledge the critical feedback of several scholars on an earlier version of this paper. In particular, I would like to thank the late Mr. Albert Hourani and Dr. Avi Shlaim of St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and Professors Philip Khouri of MIT and Zachary Lockman of Harvard University.*Fawaz A. Gerges, who completed his doctorate in Politics and International Relations at Oxford University, is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. This year he is completing a book on the relationship between the great powers and the Arab world.Endnotes1. Kamel Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp.16, 31, 70-71, 139, 150-51,216-17, 226, 230.

1. Ibid., pp. 17-18, 219, 231.

1. Ibid., pp. 217-18.

1. Nassif Hitti, "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimensions," Papers on Lebanon, No. 9 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, April 1989), p.3.

1. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, p. 165.

1. Hitti, "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon," pp. 13-14.

1. Ibid., pp.14-15.

1. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.4; and Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1956-1958, JCS History, Chapter IX, subject: "The Lebanon Crisis and After," p.469. This paper relies heavily on recently declassified U.S. documents obtained, by the Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford; from the Dwight Eisenhower library, Abilene, Kansas; Marine and Naval Corps Historical Centers; Central Intelligence Agency; and National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., and Suitland, MD

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p.270.

1. Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1963), pp. 424-31. An Interview with Raymond Hare, Oral History Transcripts, 28 August 1972, pp.68-9.

1. See the speech by the deputy from Tripoli Shaykh Jisr: the Roots of the Lebanese Revolution, Beirut to Department of State, No. 4006, 14 October 1958, p.10.

1. Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p.30.

1. Beirut to Washington, DA Intelligence Report, prepared by Robert C. Works, Subject: Opinions of Commanding General Chehab, No. R-189-57, 31 May 1957, pp.1-3.

1. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

1. McClintock to Department of State, Beirut, 27 March 1958, Foreign Service Dispatch, no. 547.

1. Beirut to Washington, DA Intelligence Report, p. 2. JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.421.

1. Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, 1, 15, 29 May 1957, p.10 of 20; Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Historical Studies, Subject: The United States and Lebanon, 1958, No. 6, p.2; and U.S. Embassy, Beirut, 25 June 1958 [no identification]. (The Lebanese constitution limits the presidency to one six-year term).

1. Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (London: W.W. Norton, 1980), pp. 248-58, 266.

1. The Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, 17 January 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: Lebanon and Jordan. Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government printing Office, 1992), p.4. (henceforth, this series will be referred to as FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI.] The Lebanese Foreign Minister's call on the President, 6 February 1957, p.3.

1. Nadim Dimechkie, "The United States Intervened Militarily by Sending the Marines to Lebanon in 1958: Why did this Happen," paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s, 10-13 September 1992, pp.10-13, 19. Agnes G. Korbani, US intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1992: Presidential Decisionmaking (New York: Praeger, 1991), p.34. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, pp.36-7.

1. President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1958), p.197.

1. Beirut to Secretary of State, 28 August 1957. Quoted in David W. Lesch, "Prelude to American intervention in Lebanon: The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis," a paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950's, 10-13 September 1992,p.18.

1. Quoted in Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, 19 September 1957, p.1.

1. US Ambassador to Department of State, 14 February 1958, p.2 of 6. M. S. Agwani, the Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp.3-4.

1. Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in political Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 104.

1. Quoted in the Egyptian Gazette, 5 March 1958.

1. Kamal Salibi, "Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s," a paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s, 10-13 September 1992, p.26.

1. Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.1; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420.

1. Dimechkie, "The United States Intervened Militarily," p.18 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.245.

1. The Lebanese Foreign Minister's call on the President, 6 February 1957, pp.2-3; JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420; and Richards to Secretary of State, Beirut, 16 March 1957.

1. Beirut to Department of State, "The Roots of the Lebanese Revolution," 14 October 1958, pp.2, 10; Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.2; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420. Kamal Jumblat, Fi Majra al-Siyasa al-Lubnaniya [In the Course of Lebanese Politics] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali`a, n.d), p.57. B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, a Modern Political History (London Zed Books, 1985), p.100.

1. Department of State, Office of Historian, 1958, p.2; and McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 3191, 25 March 1958, pp.1-2.

1. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, Nos. 4115, 4272, 5108, 22, 27 May and 25 June 1958; and Beirut to Department of State, the Roots of the Lebanese Revolution, 14 October 1958, p.4. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp.58, 85.

1. Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, p.11. Beirut to the Department of State, 9 January 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2. Department of State, Office of Historian p.2. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 24-25. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp. 256, 276. New York Times, 17 July 1958.

1. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 4438, 4 June 1958; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, pp. 435-39.

1. The New York Times, 11, 13, 23 May and 7 June 1958. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), pp. 196-98.

1. Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, shared Eisenhower's and Dulles' views that the Soviets were in the Lebanese picture. Diary, 14 July 1958; Memorandum for Record, 15 May 1958, p.2; Memorandum of conversation with the President, Department of State, subject: Lebanon, 15 June 1958, p.4; and Eisenhower to Paul Hoffman, 23 June 1958, p.2. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.266. Stephen J. Genco, "The Eisenhower Doctrine: Deterrence in the Middle East, 1957-1958," in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 317, 339.

1. Beirut to Secretary of State, No. 3647, 4 may 1958; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.421. Alan Doty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp.25-27, 32-34.

1. Beirut to Department of State, 2 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 88. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, Chapter IV, Subject: Intervention in the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Country to Assure a Friendly Government, [n.d.], p.2.

1. Secretary of State to Beirut, No. 3629, 18 March 1958; and McClintock to Dulles, No. 3709, 7 May 1958.

1. Beirut to Department of State, 2 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI.p.88.

1. Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 13 May 1958, in ibid, p.49.

1. Editorial Note, 29 May 1958, in ibid., p.80.

1. Department of State to Beirut, 13 May 1958. Department of State Bulletin, 9 June 1958, p.945.

1. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 25 June 1958, p.22.

1. Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, 19 June 1958, p.3 of 6.

1. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, 15 June 1958; Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 18 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.83, 131, 153.

1. Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, White House, Washington, 15 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p.136.

1. Ibid. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington 18 June 1958, in ibid., pp.153-54.

1. In his memoirs, Eisenhower blamed Chamoun's mistrust of Nasser for the failure to respond to the Egyptian proposal. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 268. The Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 20 May and 7 June 1958; the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 27 May, 5 and 9 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.68-70, 76-77, 91-93, 103-04. William Rountree to Embassy, Beirut, Washington, No. 4710, 10 June 1958. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), p.399.

1. Chamoun was also reassured that Washington had full confidence in him personally as the symbol of Lebanon's determination to defend its independence. Secretary of State to Ambassador McClintock, Beirut, No. 11077, 19 June 1958, pp.1-4.

1. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 20 June 1958; Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, 30 June 1958, in Ibid, p.186.

1. Memorandum of conversation, Washington,30 June 1958,in Ibid, p186.

1. Ibid., pp. 187-88. the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 19 June 1958, in ibid., p.158.

1. To Chamoun, the Iraqi proposal was no more than an empty offer since Iraq had traditionally avoided using its army against other Arabs. In his view, the conclusion of a treaty between Iraq and Lebanon at this time would have been more of a political liability than of any military value. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 4642, p.1-2. W.J. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 164-65. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 282. Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 256-59.

1. Current Intelligence Weekly Review, CIA, Subject: Lebanese Situation (part I) 10 July 1958, p.1 of 4. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp.188-92.

1. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 776, 805.

1. Eisenhower, Waging peace, p. 269. JCS, subject: Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries, Note by the Secretaries, No. 1887/347, March 1957, p.2650.

1. McClintock to Secretary of State, No. 358, 14 July 1958; Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles in a Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, 14 July 1958, p.3.

1. The irony was that a few days later Saudi Arabia would refuse to permit Western overflights to transport fuel to Jordan. Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, 14 July 1958, pp.5-6; Synopsis of Reports Relating to the Mid-East Crisis, 14-9 July 1958, pp.1-2; and Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.5. Thayer, Diplomat, p.28.1. Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, 14 July 1958, p. 8; Telephone Call from Ambassador Lodge to Dulles, 14 July 1958; Dulles Remarks at Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.2; and 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p.3. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.269. Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Praeger, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963), pp. 164-65.

1. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.212-14. Timetable of Events of Week of July, 14-19, 14 July 1958. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.270.

1. Conference with the President, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.212-14. Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting Regarding Iraq, 14 July 1958.

1. Erika G. Alin, The 1958 United States intervention in Lebanon (The American University: Ph.D. thesis, 1990), p.393.

1. This Interpretation influenced America's perceptions of the Arab nationalist movement until 1959, when Cairo and Moscow had a falling out. Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, pp.212-14. Memorandum of Conversation, subject: Lebanon and the Middle East, 1 July 1958, p.3.

1. Memorandum of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Embassy (Lord Hood), Washington, 14 July 1958; and conference with the President, 14 July, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, pp.212-13, 238.

1. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 14 July 1958, in Frus, 1958-60, vol.XI,p.216.

1. 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p.11. William Quandt, "Lebanon 1958 and Jordan 1970," in B. Blechman and S. Kaplan (eds.), Force Without War: The US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), p.230.

1. The Chairman of the JCS, N. Twining, was one of the few voices within the administration to propose that the United States, in conjunction with Britain, Israel, Turkey, and Jordan, should attack Egypt and Syria and defeat the Iraqi free Officers. There was hardly any support for Twining's proposal, however, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p.232. Memorandum for the Record, Dulles and Eisenhower, 14 July 1958; Conference with the President, 15 July 1958; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.5; Telephone call from Dulles to Eisenhower, 19 July 1958, p.469; and Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.4.

1. Moscow to Secretary of State, 15 July 1958; Oral History Transcripts, Interview with General Goodpaster, 2 August 1967, p.90; Dulles to all Diplomatic Posts, 15 July, p.2; and Conference with the President, 14 July 1958.

1. Conference with the President, 14 July 1958; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.4; Dulles's Remark at Cabinet, 18 July 1958, p.3; and Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.5.

1. Beirut to Secretary of State, No. 835, 30 July 1958, pp.1-2.

1. Department of State, Office of Historian, p.5 Department of State Bulletin, 27 October 1958, pp.650-51.

1. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), p.212. Abdel-Latif al-Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat (Memoirs), Vol. II (Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-hadit, 1977), pp.52-3. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972), pp.122-24.

1. News and Views from the Soviet Union, 19 July 1958, pp. 2-3. v. Micunovic, Moscow diary (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980), pp. 409-10. Mohamed Heikal, Madha hadatha fi Suriyya (What Happened in Syria) (Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyya, n.d.), pp.92-3.

1. Moscow to Secretary of State, 23 July 1958, No.216 (Section one of two), p.2.

1. Moscow to Secretary of State, No. 135, 16 July 1958 and No. 170 (two sections), 19 July 1958. Helen Denkos, Al-Siyasa al-Sufyatiyya fi al-sharq al-awsat, 1955-1975 [Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 1955-1975] (Beirut: Dar alkalima al-Arabiyya, 1983), pp.67-8.

1. Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, p.7; Eisenhower to Khrushchev, the White House, 22 July 1958, p.3; and Moscow to Secretary of State, No.216 (two sections), 23 July 1958; and No. 264 (three sections), 28 July 1958.

1. Department of State Bulletin, 1 September 1958, p.342.

1. CINCSPE COMME to CNO, NO.5854 (two parts), 25 July 1958, See Richard Murphy's informative account of his mission to Lebanon, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 398-418.

1. Department of State Bulletin, 22 October 1958, pp.650-51.

1. As Dulles put it: "Up to the time of the Iraq coup we had not felt that there would be a need for our action. It was the coup in Baghdad, with the disclosure of a similar plot in Jordan, which modified the situation and led us to believe that it was imperative to preserve the morale of the smaller nations around the perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese bloc into Africa, and we should without hesitation respond to Chamoun's request." Quoted in Korbani, US Intervention in Lebanon, p.40.

1. Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, pp. 11, 424-31. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp.278, 296-99. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, p.260

1. 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p. 10; and 381 Meeting of the NSC, 2 October 1958, p.5.

1. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp.248-50.

1. Discussion at the Meeting of the NSCA, 25 July 1958, pp. 7, 10; and Conference with the president, 23 July 1958, p.2.

1. General Consideration Affecting U.S. Policy toward the Near East (Annex A), pp.40-43.

1. Malcolm kerr, The Arab World War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.19. Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, Vol. II., p.100. Operation Coordinating Board, Report on the Near East, 3 February 1960 [period covered from 4 November 1958 through 3 February 1960], p.6.

Marwan R. Buheiry, "External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770-1982." in Lawrence I. Conrad (ed), The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan Buheiry (Princeton, N.J.: The Darwin Press 1989), pp.129-38. PAGE 1