A Legacy of Fascism: The Jobbik Phenomenon

By Samuel James Chapman

Professor András Bozóki

Central European University

Winter, 2010

Author’s Note

I have lived in Hungary for 8 months now, exposed to the architecture, theatre, gastronomy, art, social

issues and of course the politics. When one hears of Jobbik, as a foreigner, it conjures up only what is

heard through cafe conversations and intellectual rants; that this emerging party is a neo-fascist

movement, gaining in popularity. Considering this tautological description, I decided to examine this

party as an outsider to see what was truly at work. It is the aim of this paper to examine the

appearance of fascist ideology that shapes the radical political party Jobbik through an Eastern

European framework of the extreme-right. To do so I will analyze Jobbik’s guide to their parliamentary

electoral manifesto in terms of fascist, ultra-nationalist, and populist rhetoric in Hungary’s unique

historical, socioeconomic, political and ideological context.

Introduction

The ideological structure of Jobbik, or the Movement for a Better Hungary is not restricted to the

secular and explicit political doctrines usually associated with ideology, because it incorporates

religion, culture, and the complex moral values underlying society.[i] How should an ideological

analysis be approached in the age of post-ideology? While ideologies may be dead, that does not mean

that they are not still a part of our sociopolitical existence; in fact that they are so deeply engrained in

global and national politics there is a sense that this is only the beginning of the end. With the rise and

prominence of the extreme-right wing parties throughout Europe there is a lingering presence of a

revivalist fascism aimed a better future, defined by the past and in the face of globalization where the

return to a solidified national identity, original borders and forming a new people on the basis of

national exclusiveness takes precedent. These fundamental principles of sociopolitical organization are

the synthesis of ideological remnants of the fascist era, combined with current trends in the discourse of

Europe’s extreme-right. Jobbik exemplifies the absorption of ideas from the age of ideology into a

continuously evolving history of political thought.[ii] An extreme-right political party, with radical

elements and policy driven by a fusion of ideological foundations such as fascism, populism and

nationalism, Jobbik’s core values represent the impact of fascism on the contemporary politics of the

region.

Considering all of these aspects of the Jobbik platform it can be classified in many ways: extreme-right,

radical right, proto-fascist, neo-fascist, and so on, but in relation to the political space in which it

occupies. The party represents the political platform -the rationale, while the effects, as seen in the

action of their supporters represent the ideological underpinnings of a resurgent form of inter-war

fascist thought as the embodiment of the party’s visceral sentiments. Additionally, the political climate

in Hungary is unique to this analysis as it follows an inclusionary approach to extreme-right wing

parties. Jobbik’s aim is legitimacy- winning seats and votes, thus they shy away from some of the more

extreme or radical aspects of neo-fascism and extreme-right vocabulary in their manifesto.

In this paper I plan to address the following questions: Does Jobbik indicate a revival of the Fascist era

or is it indicative of the inclusionary approach to extreme right parties that absorbs them into the

democratic system, thus dulling their sharp edges over time? What accounts for the successful political

mobilization of Jobbik?  Is Jobbik’s platform an expression, or new version of, extremist movements of

inter-war fascism? What is the nature of Jobbik’s ideological discourse? And what does this have to say

about fascism’s revival and continuous presence in contemporary political life? To do this I will be

using Jobbik’s 2010 Campaign manifesto along with contemporary articles found in the news media,

bolstered by theoretical and historical background of fascism and it’s related ideological counterparts,

concluding that despite the move towards legitimization, the party it is essentially based on fascist

ideology in the Eastern European framework of the extreme right.

Defining terms: Fascism & the Extreme-Right

The nature of fascism is the assemblage of intellectual ideas, historical claims and rightful ownership of

the past and the future. This complex nature permits its survival in contemporary political theory and

rationale. Fascism is based on core tenets, but flexible in its composition of content; in this case

ranging from interpellations of nationalist, ultra-nationalist, right wing populist ideologies. While it is

tempting to define the party within these ideological structures, the very nature of fascism is it’s

protean ability; it’s spirit and force that runs throughout the composition of modern culture, rhetoric,

discourse and political action. I am inclined in this paper to use Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism

because it is the most relevant in Central Eastern Europe’s fractionalized party structure and vast array

of historical, socio-economic, political and ideological combinations: “Used generically, fascism is a

term for a singularly protean genus of modern politics inspired by the conviction that a process of

national rebirth (palingenesis) has become essential to bring an end to protracted social and cultural

decadence, and expressing itself ideologically in a revolutionary form of integral nationalism (ultra-

nationalism).”[iii] There are slight to moderate differences between the extreme right in Western

Europe and those in Eastern Europe, while it is in not the task of this paper to compare West and East,

it is important to note that the movements of Eastern Europe are more closely related to the inter-war

fascism and thus we can continue further with Griffin’s definition in this sense:

“Fascism also draws on the tradition of elite theory, though the self-appointed activist and paramilitary

vanguards of its interwar variants were convinced on their mission to revolutionize society not just

‘from above’ but from below through a mass movement capable of transforming the alleged chaos and

degeneracy of modern society into a coordinated and healthy national community.”[iv]

Classifying Jobbik begins with identifying the links with fascist ideology but it should be kept in mind

that this is connected to other variables within the political system. We can base our analysis on

Jobbik’s location on the extreme right and the ideology provided by fascism, while keeping in mind

that fascist theory is an ideological labyrinth[v], a loosely bound aggregation of ideas, rather

disorganized and inchoate, composed of a large number of diverse ideas originating in different

cultures.[vi]

In defining European extreme-right wing parties, Peter Merkl aptly states, “calling a candidate or a

movement ‘fascist’, ‘neo’...or ‘quasi-fascist’...sheds no more light on the matter than did old charges of

‘communist’...‘quasi-communist’, ‘communist sympathizer’ in the not too distant past. On the other

hand, a situational definition leads to other difficulties. Not only is it perfectly possible for a party or

movement that is at the right-most end of the political spectrum on one important issue to be moderate

on other issues that it may make it more difficult to classify. An extreme-right position may also pertain

to the space available within a moderate or even an extreme left-wing party or movement.[vii] Labeling

something ‘fascist’ these days has little explanatory power. While there is a primacy of ideology in

classifying parties we do not want to limit the analysis to a singular political family of neo-fascists.

Rather using the term extreme-right has a certain logic behind it, “the location in the political space

along the left right continuum is essential for identifying linkage to a political area.”[viii] Therefore the

terminology is not limited just to fascism in the sense that it incorporates beliefs such as traditionalism

Christianity, national populism, conservative-right values, reactionary, radical and post-war extremism,

but in the understanding that fascist ideology is the cornerstone that supports these beliefs. Therefore

the “extreme-right” refers to the political and ideological space where fascism is the key reference. The

extreme-right is categorized by a fundamental chauvinistic nationalist orientation (an ultranationalist

outlook), an ascriptive understanding of ethnicity, xenophobia, intolerance, non-rejection of violence,

irredentism, statism, distrust of the West, suspicion of foreign participation in economy, far reaching

populism and demagogic slogans.[ix]

Historical - Jobbik as a revival of interwar fascism

Jobbik was founded in 2003 on a Gypsy-Crime and irredentist platform that encouraged nostalgia for

Hungary’s history of far-right parties stretching back to 1930s, including Gyula Gömbös’ Hungarian

National Defence Association and the Arrow Cross movement, which received direct funding from

Nazi Germany.[x] In the historical context, marked by the 1920’s-30’s period and the post-communist

transition to democracy, can the emergence of Jobbik on the extreme-right spectrum be considered a

revival of the interwar fascist era? In many ways the emergence of Jobbik signifies the continued

revival of inter-war fascism in Eastern Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989

nationalist politics, ultranationalist sentiments and movements returned with zeal. The internationalism

of the communist era now reversed, there was a critical move back to neo-fascist organizations and

party formations that resembled inter-war predecessors. Other inter-war factors re-emerged in radical

and potent issues such as ethnic rivalries and anti-Semitism, anti-government and xenophobic

sentiments, foreign conspiracy theories, and a return to core Christian values. In its manifesto, Jobbik

places notable emphasis on this return to Hungarian National tradition and compulsory religious

education in the form of Christian ethics.[xi]

In the 1990’s of Hungary, fascistic nationalist politicians like Istvan Csurka emerged with anti-Semitic

and extreme-right populist rhetoric characterized by the “Hungarian Road” movement and their attack

on professional politicians of his party the MDF and the entire democratic system. In his manifesto

Csurka invoked fascist, even Nazi ideology such as ‘Lebensraum’, genetic deterioration of the

population by ethnic mixing, Western liberal financial conspiracies intertwined with Jewish interests

and the mobilization of the hinterland.[xii] Furthermore, the Hungary of the 1920’s and 30’s in the post

WWI setting was coping with territorial losses administered by the Treaty of Trianon in 1919. This

inflicted a deep-seeded sense of struggle and wounded nationalism that played into class struggles,

ownership of industry, labor and production disputes, which all factored into the genesis of fascist

movements.  For Csurka and comrades the people had to be lifted up and re-educated through a new

outlook on history. Not surprisingly today’s the extreme right’s relationship to this not too distant past

is a mimetic one.[xiii]

During the 1930‘s almost all the countries in Eastern Europe sought authoritarian and quasi-fascist

solutions to deal with their social, economic, political tensions and economic pressures created by the

unstable climate at the time.[xiv] The rise of the new right, just as in the 20’s and 30s emerged out of

political and economic crises. The revival of  inter-war fascism in the 2000’s set to reestablish a

connection to fascist legacies for inspiration and a new way forward. Jobbik’s manifesto calls for a

revitalized interest in agriculture and rural renewal, designed to serve the common good. Reminiscent

of the Volkisch platform of the Third Reich, “the ultimate objective of our rural restoration policy is a

countryside populated by the young...” to revitalized economic activity and build the country up from a

new conceptualization of agriculture and the rural folk who till it’s land.[xv] The right-wing populist

rhetoric continues throughout the Manifesto as one of the fundamental principles in frequent reference

to “the motherland”, or “mother country” and the “protection of the country’s hinterland [that which]

necessitates the creation of a territorial defence of some 20,000 - 22,000 persons strong.” [xvi]

Echoes of interwar fascism are apparent in Jobbik’s call to bolster not only a centralized, robust state

police force, but a “foundation of a dedicated rural police force, or Gendarmerie” as well. This policy

initiative is in direct relation to their classification of Gypsy people as criminals and “that certain

specific criminological phenomena are predominantly and overwhelmingly associated with this

minority, and that as a result such phenomena require the application of fitting and appropriate

remedies. Law enforcement initiatives therefore, must go hand in hand with the reform of social,

educational and employment policy..."[xvii] The Manifesto continues to place emphasis on a restored,

authoritarian police state, that will bring respect and appreciation back to the policing profession,

enjoyed before the war that is “fitting of social prestige.” The Hungarian Guard or Magyar Guarda is

another aspect of Jobbik’s radical defense policy for the defense of the hinterland, civil defense and the

maintenance of order. As set forth in the Manifesto, “The Hungarian Guard, established by civilians,

and brought into existence entirely in accordance with the law; has been abolished as a result of

government pressure. And yet the members of the Hungarian Guard have proved themselves willing

and able to come to the country’s defense even under the most difficult circumstances."[xviii] To many

the Hungarian guard is a red flag - glorified violence, racism and intolerance that all undermine the

already weak institutions of democracy. The Guard pledged to train it’s members in the use of firearms

and military tactics, and beyond this the members wear a uniform of black pants and vests, white shirts

and caps and bands emblazoned with the medieval coat of arms, the Arpad stripes. This symbol is

centuries old and used by the Arrow Cross, which was a pro-Nazi party that ruled Hungary for a time

following the end of World War II. The Arrow Cross was responsible for the murder of thousands and

deportation of hundreds of thousands of Jews to Nazi concentration camps.[xix]

Similar to the 90’s and the 30’s, Jobbik’s draw is attractive to disenchanted individuals and groups

previously marginalized in the party-system. But recent changes and the fractionalization has provided

new space for the manifestation of fascist leanings and expressions. The mentality borne from the

resurgent 20th century phenomenon of the extreme-right is characterized by Jobbik’s stance on

globalization, Euroscepticism, illiberal and extreme nationalism, racism, activism, all tending towards a

centrist, statist, authoritarian form of governance and mobilization. The appearance of Jobbik and its re-

cultivation of inter-war political style and ideology “reinforce the impression that there is a direct

correlation between the extreme nationalism of the present and that of the interwar period.” In this

historical context, the rise of parties like Jobbik on the political scene in Eastern Europe is related to a

country catching up with their capitalist regime, changing socio-economic, political and ideological

conjuncture, globalization and the predominance of western ideas and values.[xx]

Socio-Economic

While once again it may seem desirable to say that Jobbik’s arrival in 2003 was a product of

globalization fears, unemployment, rampant capitalism, foreign direct investment, economic recession

and inequalities, the implication may be premature since the appeal of Jobbik was, and is, it’s

simplistic, catch-all rhetoric despite the reality of the socio-economic context of the 21st century. That

being said, it came at a time when the further rise of intellectual, technological, white collar work and

the increased presence of foreigners taking desirable jobs seriously impeded Hungarian males that were

working low skill jobs, facing unemployment and the threat of a looming economic recession. In a

sense, echoing the early fascist rhetoric, physical strength has been eclipsed by training and intelligence

in the modern economy.[xxi] Economic recession, unemployment, insecurity and a general climate of

disaffection in the context of global capitalist economies provides the groundwork for a revival of

fascistic impressions in the extreme-right parties of Eastern Europe, reminiscent of post-industrial

changes that spawned the historic genus of radicalized political movements.

Although the international circumstances are different, or have shifted over time, the structural changes

and social effects are similar in that in times of economic recession and the perceived growth of

inequality people tend to gravitate towards extreme right solutions.[xxii] Are the socio-economic

policies set forth by Jobbik indicative of a persistent dissatisfaction and frustration among individuals

and social groups, or are they just offering empty “solutions” that pander to those that feel they have

been marginalized in the post-transitional context of globalization and EU integration, whereby

nationalistic choices that are anti-capitalist and xenophobic are seen as legitimate alternatives? Jobbik

wants to protect national capital and national wealth, promote a self-sufficient economy with limited

reliance on Western influences and a focus on strengthening ties to Eastern relations and markets.

Springing forth from the pages of the Manifesto are re-localized initiatives towards agricultural models

that used to exist, as well as the prevention of foreign ownership of farmland. The independence from

foreign influence is a key aspect of Jobbik’s energy, employment and foreign policies. They support

increasing employment levels while critically scrutinizing European Union employment directives in

order to increase the influence and independence of unions, and the abolishment of illicit employment

arrangements.[xxiii] Regarding foreign policy-issues, Jobbik is clearly promoting cooperation with the

Far East and South-East Asian region, which signifies a turn away from what they perceive as an

overbearing and detrimental relationship with the West. In this sense it is actually skillfully adapting to

contemporary shifting geo-politics. They propose a partnership with Russia, China, Japan, Kazakhstan

and Turkey in the hopes of Hungary’s capacity to be a geographical bridgehead in the region. There is a

singular mention of United States relations in their intention to develop a bilateral relationship

providing it consistently and transparently promotes national interests. Yet immediately following this

is the policy that outlines a widening diplomatic relationship with Arab nations, as well as the

promotion of the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but while also accepting a greater role in

promoting the continued existence of Christian communities in the Middle East. In regard to EU

integration it stands firm in the belief that the Lisbon Treaty is entirely wrongheaded. Jobbik rejects a

United States of Europe and the system of EU institutions on the grounds that they are anti-democratic,

further stating that the true European culture is constructed on the pillars of Greek thinking, Roman

law, and Christian morality.[xxiv] Though the fascistic tone of these statements is muffled in party

rhetoric in the socio-economic context, the protest politics represented by Jobbik supporters is more

palpable.

Political: Jobbik as protest politics

The political landscape in Hungary is such that there is space for extreme-right wing parties, not only in

terms of the political spectrum of left and right, but in the demand of voters who would potentially

support anti-establishment and authoritarian ideologies. “In Hungary the number of potential right-

wing extremists more than doubled from ten percent in 2003 to twenty-one percent in 2009.... while the

proportion of people who were angry with the establishment nearly quadrupled from twelve to forty-six

percent in those six years.[xxv] Not only potentiality towards the far right and distrust of government

but growth in prejudice, xenophobia and anti-system sentiments have jumped from thirty-seven percent

in ’03 to fifty-five percent in ’07. Add to this a spreading deterioration of public morale that extends to

all institutions. Jobbik is capitalizing on these fears and sentiments with the recipe consisting of two

prime ingredients: an excessively simple diagnosis of the world’s ills and a conviction that there are

identifiable villains at the back of it all, which is fundamental to neo-fascist movements. The penchant

for simple diagnosis is evident in Jobbik’s rhetoric; they are creating a popular ideology out of

“everything and everyone is bad.”[xxvi] This is clear in the sub-heading of one of Jobbik’s policy

solutions: Ousting the political elite. The protest politics behind Jobbik are characteristic of extreme-

right parties, the title of the manifesto is “Radical Change” and exhibits a call to action from those

disillusioned by the lies of politicians, a way out from crisis and a possession of the future.

It must be mentioned that this is all taking place in a stable democratic framework. The presence of the

extreme right in this context connotes political activity that attempts to undermine the legitimacy of

democratic regimes and an ideological structure that does not share the values of the political order in

which it operates.[xxvii] The question here is whether Jobbik has distanced themselves from the

“backward-looking, reactionary politics of the traditional neo-fascist right.” Of course it has dulled

some of its ideological edges, but Jobbik still represents protest politics in a climate of corruption and

scandalous behavior among elite politicians. Jobbik’s success and ascendancy towards legitimate party

base is directly related to the growth of public pessimism, anxiety and genuine disaffection.

[xxviii] This climate of disaffection and suspicion of corrupt officials reached an apogee in the fall of

2006 when then Prime Minister Ference Gyrucsany spoke at private meeting of senior MSZP members

without knowing it had been recorded. In September the recording was released, in it Gyruscany said,

“obviously, we lied throughout...we lied morning, night and evening…” in reference to his previous

administration's deliberate misrepresentation of crucial economic data in order to secure reelection.

[xxix] The release of the recording sparked nationwide protests and put the corruption in the

international spotlight. Viktor Orban, leader of the Fidesz party called on Gyurcsany and administration

to resign. The sentiments were drawing on echoes of past communist power tactics and as the feeling

spread it galvanized nearly every anti-government group in the country. The following protests that

ensued were just the cause celebre Jobbik needed to mainstream their ultra-nationalist, right wing

populist platform.

The political spectrum was skewed with the platforms of Fidesz center-right policy that only further

provided space on the far-right to draw from the pool of disappointed voters. Within a democratic

system there are two strategies for approaching the extreme-right- either incorporate them into

mainstream politics, or exclude them from it. In Hungary, in terms of Jobbik, the inclusive line of

thought prevails, following the logic that the extreme-right’s presence in the political landscape will

force them to compromise some of their hard-line policies, thus stripping them of their appeal or render

them harmless to the democratic process. [xxx]

Ideological- Jobbik’s xenophobic, irredentist, intolerant, populist discourse

Jobbik’s political impetus is derived from its ideological origins. Fascist in nature and ultra-nationalist

in rhetoric there is no easy distinction between the ideological foundations and the political rationale

from which it operates. Despite a discourse that leans towards the far-right rather than to the extreme or

radical, the culmination of their political platform outlined in the manifesto is clearly based on

xenophobic, irredentist, intolerant and right-wing populist sentiments, as well as national redemption as

one of its main platforms- a national reawakening and recovered national solidarity. There is a certainty

of the truth in Jobbik’s concept of radical change that is peculiar to extreme-right and neo-fascist

parties; an entitlement to political discussion of what they view to be the truth. Jobbik’s manifesto

decrees that it is a “a document for every sensible, respectable and fair-minded Hungarian.” In seeking

the achievement of order, productivity, justice and self-determination it clearly marks this entitlement

to truth: “The more that people become aware of Jobbik’s conceptions, the more they end up

discovering that they have always been Jobbik supporters, and have simply not realized this

beforehand.” The party leader Vona concludes this thought with the wish that “God grant the manifesto,

sooner rather than later, the achievement of its ultimate goal, namely, Hungary’s revival.”[xxxi]

The element of myth is evident in Jobbik rhetoric as well, using systems that strike the imagination of

the nation as a whole - even those living in international Hungarian minority communities. From

traditional symbols of Turul, Arpad Stripes, to the post-modern pop culture fashion of skinhead punk

garb, neo-Nazi militant dress and imagery and the iconization of musicians and celebrities. For Jobbik

this is the kind of mythical hysteria that can rally an electorate. In its manifesto, they decree the

protection of ancient national symbols (that have been the victim of baseless attacks) such a the Holy

Crown, historic flags, emblems of Turul, while also proposing the removal of statues that originate

from “negative periods in history” as well as ceasing to use names of individuals from the same periods

for public locations.

Strength in leadership and arrogance masked by boldness magnetizes the youth, the disillusioned, the

economically marginalized, the extremists, all order of strange political beasts gravitate towards

Jobbik’s call. The Jobbik phenomenon is composed of multiple-issues but at its heart is an idiosyncratic

ideological character, culturally specific and unique to its particular national setting. Its radical platform

is marked, albeit not openly in terms of the manifesto, by hostility towards the Roma, or Gypsy people,

often using the issue of Gypsy crime as an ad hoc diversion from the core issues that face the

Hungarian people, thus obfuscating potential voter disparity to rally around a common investment in

the pervasive racism of the extreme-right. In the wording of the manifesto the Gypsy problem is

directly addressed as a potential time bomb that requires direct intervention by the state to assimilate,

gentrify and re-educate lest the national mutual home sink into a state of civil war.[xxxii] This is

housed under a form of moral traditionalism, preservation of the family nucleus, the role and support

for women in the home and a negative stance towards abortion and homosexuality. Jobbik’s family and

population policy is based on a reactionary stance against attacks by liberalism, “whose objective is to

put the family on equal footing with every conceivable living arrangement or deviant lifestyle,” clearly

in reference to homosexual behavior and perhaps indirectly to mixed-race marriages.[xxxiii]

In addition to its ideological ethnic intolerance, the Jobbik confabulation is verbally aggressive, playing

on fears of foreign domination and it’s direct emphasis on irredentism.

“Jobbik considers the most important task to be the reunification of a Hungarian nation unjustly torn

apart during the course of the 20th century…we will strive perpetually for the collective rights of the

Hungarians of the Carpathian basin, and for the realization of their territorial, economic and cultural

self-determination…the affairs of the territorially-maimed mother-country must first be put to right;

that the Hungarian state must be restored to the prominence history demands, and most crucially of all,

that the plight of our disjointed nation – the Hungarian Question – finally become widely known and

discussed both at the EU and on the international stage.”[xxxiv]

These territorial claims spring forth from a deeply wounded national pride as previously mentioned.

Irredentist claims are common among the domestic political propaganda of the Eastern European

extreme-right. “A strong national state presents the highest value for most extreme right-wing

organizations in the modern world.”[xxxv] Within the rhetoric and platform of Jobbik is the direct and

dedicated support to the communities of Hungarian minorities who live beyond the borders. Echoes of

the a unified and righteous living space, or Lebensraum are present in Jobbik’s cause as well as the

concept of “Great Hungary” which has its roots in post WWI period (Trianon) as well as the Vienna

Arbitrary in 1939. Jobbik supports the annexation of territories in Southern Slovakia, the Ukraine,

Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina) and Croatia, with the ultimate goal of reuniting the greater

Hungarian state within the borders prior to 1920; calling outright for the defense of the rights of

Hungarian minorities in these neighboring states in its radical claim for national self-determination.

[xxxvi]

Jobbik stands firm on it’s euroscepticism of the contemporary EU mostly because of it’s multi-cultural

and anti-national character, but it supports the European identity as “Europe for Europeans”, which

includes the exclusion of liberal left-wing values, Jews, Gypsies and immigrants from the third world.

[xxxvii] Attempts have already been made at creating a pan-European extreme-right party from a

variety of countries in both East and West. But what is important to note here is the transvaluation of

interwar and post-communist neo-fascist ideologies into contemporary mentalities. Some have argued

that the extreme-right is not as connected to the fascist, totalitarian discourse of the inter-war period,

however with case that has been made and the holistic nature of this analysis there is a strong link to

these underpinnings in the volatile, highly opportunistic, at times fanatical, exclusionary discourses of

the Movement for a Better Hungary.

Conclusion

To conclude, the political mobilization of Jobbik is flanked by the inclusionary aspect of Hungarian

democratic politics thus the task of getting votes and supports draws them away from the more radical

and extreme elements at least in terms of rhetoric, however their supporters actions draw out the

negative effects of a political party based on a legacy of fascism. Jobbik’s platform clearly indicates an

expression and, or, a reversion to the extremist movements of interwar fascism. The ideological nature

of their discourse, their platforms, policy and rhetoric of their ultra-nationalist manifesto clearly

supports this in that extreme-right parties all exhibit an opposition principle that seeks to undermine the

constitutional framework of the existing regime. The manifesto, and Jobbik as a phenomenon revives

the palingenetic myth of fascism. Avidly supporting irredentism, a deep concern with the condition of

rural folk and the hinterland, xenophobic, anti-western and authoritarian in nature, favoring more state

regulation, state and corporatist control over social welfare and distribution, Jobbik expounds a return

to neo-fascist sentiments aimed at reclaiming the future.

NOTES

[i] Fukuyama, Francis (1997) The End of History? In P. Schumacher, D.C. Kiel, T.W. Mieze

eds., Ideological Voices: An Anthology of Modern Political Ideas. New York: McGraw-Hill, 409-417

[ii] Shklar, Judith (1997 [1966]), Political Theory and Ideology. In P. Schumacher, D.C. Kiel, T.W.

Mieze eds., Ideological Voices: An Anthology of Modern Political Ideas. New York: McGraw-Hill, 4-

14.

[iii] Griffin, Roger (1998), Fascism, In R. Griffin, ed., International Fascism. London: Arnold pp. 31-

32.

[iv] Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism. London/New York: Routledge), p.

[v] Ignazi, Piero (1997) The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey. In P.H.Merkl & L. Weinberg eds., The

Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass & Co.

[vi] Wilford, Rick Fascim (2003), In Ecceshall, R. et al., Political Ideologies: An Introduction. London:

Routledge, p. 123.

[vii] Merkl, Peter H. Why are they So Strong Now? Comparative Reflections of the Revival of the

Radical Right in Europe (1997) The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey. In P.H.Merkl & L. Weinberg

eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass & Co. p.19

[viii] Ignazi, Piero (1997) The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey. In P.H.Merkl & L. Weinberg

eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass & Co. 50

[ix] Szayna, Thomas (1997) The Extreme-Right Political Movements in Post-Communist Central

Europe. In P.H.Merkl & L. Weinberg eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties.

London: Frank Cass & Co. p 113-114

[x] Zaitchik, Alexander,(2009) Why Hungary’s Fascist Party Came to Power; The Faster

Times;http://thefastertimes.com/protofascistmovements/2009/07/12/brutes-in-budapest/

[xi] Merkl, Peter H. Why are they So Strong Now? Comparative Reflections of the Revival of the

Radical Right in Europe (1997) The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey. In P.H.Merkl & L. Weinberg

eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass & Co. p.7

[xii] Bozoki, Andras (1994) An Outline of Three Populisms: The United States, Argentina and

Hungary. Working paper #5. Budapest: CEU, Dept of Political Science, p. 29

[xiii] Karsai, Laszlo (1999) The Radical Right in Hungary. In Ramet, S. ed.,  The Radical Right In

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[xiv] Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent Trends. The

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[xv] Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary; Radical Change, for national self determination and

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[xvi] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p.  19

[xvii] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 11

[xviii] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 20

[xix] Neo-Fascist Magyar Guarda is ‘Hungary’s Shame’ (2007) Spiegel Online International:

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[xx] Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent Trends. The

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[xxi] Merkl, Peter H. Why are they So Strong Now? Comparative Reflections of the Revival of the

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[xxii] Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent

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[xxiii] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 11

[xxiv] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 21

[xxv] DEREX : Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Index: measures and compares people’s

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[xxvi] Back by Popular Demand; Riskandforecast.com | In-Depth Analysis.p4,

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[xxvii] . Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent

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[xxviii] Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent

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[xxix] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_a_Better_Hungary. March 28, 2010; Recording

available at Youtube.com: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZGbz00n8-Q

[xxx] Anastasakis, Othon (2000), Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent

Trends. The Hellenic Observatory- The European Institute, London School of Economics and Political

Science, p. 31

[xxxi] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 1

[xxxii] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 11

[xxxiii] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, p. 9

[xxxiv] Jobbik, Radical Change: A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto, pp. 15, 20

[xxxv] Mares, Miroslav (2009) The Extreme Right in Eastern Europe and Territorial Issues. Central

European Political Studies Review: Part 2-3, Volume XI, spring-summer/ISSN 1212-7817. P 3,

available at: http://cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=367

[xxxvi] Mares, Miroslav (2009) The Extreme Right in Eastern Europe and Territorial Issues. Central

European Political Studies Review: Part 2-3, Volume XI, spring-summer/ISSN 1212-7817. P 5

[xxxvii] Mares, Miroslav (2009) The Extreme Right in Eastern Europe and Territorial Issues. Central

European Political Studies Review: Part 2-3, Volume XI, spring-summer/ISSN 1212-7817. P 11. (See

Mudde 2007: 158)