Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales

was filed for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly

committed. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be reminded

that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to

delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has

repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets

and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable

either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and

promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and

efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court

processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo

S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013

Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly

deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a “preparatory” Deed of Sale that respondent

converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of

his client that may come into his possession.” Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties

owned by another – an act that could result in damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While

it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the

respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the

respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence

in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.

Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,

and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or

negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the

Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per

se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a

violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent

clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to

Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya.Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475.

January 30, 2013

Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for violating

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The

court held that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants’ case. His acts in the

present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the

Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall serve his client with

competence and diligence.” It further states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” In addition, a lawyer has the duty

to “keep the client informed of the status of his case.” Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as

shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within the

period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the RTC directing him to submit a

formal offer of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or

avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision; (4) He failed to file an appropriate motion or

appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision which was adverse to

complainants.

Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer

warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege

bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are

expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,

integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts

and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the

Code of Professional Responsibility.” Sps. Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C.

No. 5530. January 28, 2013.

Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial

clemency; good moral character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the

following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to

certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges

or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A

subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a

strong presumption of non-reformation.

(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him

that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or

contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other

relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for

admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.

In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a

bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one Constantino while his first

marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral

conduct.

In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his

indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by

complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached

pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his

time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was

appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of

Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he

continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and

F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-

civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

Certain documents also attest to Respondent’s reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.

Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from

the Municipal Local Government Office.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by

his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual

practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.

Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit

was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the

Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and

recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen

(14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission;

Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and  State  Prosecutor  of the  Department  of Justice. From the

attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his

transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly

contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever

mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show

compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this case.

Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that such

privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral

uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.Florence Teves

Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L.

Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013

Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court

Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times.

Clerks of Court are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and

writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of

keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and

giving certified copies of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high degree of

discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is

done without delay.

As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence

in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the

imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs

of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she

failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the

orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name,

constituting an implied admission of the charges.Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of

Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013

Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is

replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative

functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through

available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or

substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies

accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.

Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach

upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or

hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither

was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or

prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the

same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a

party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality

was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus,

the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re: Verified

complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J.

January 15, 2013

Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law,

manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not commit gross

ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of

familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode

the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. The complaint states

that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own September 25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res

judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jr’s. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011

Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment

on compromise agreement.

Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him since there

is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom

he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent

court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC,

Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013

Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be

connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as

distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant

disregard of an established rule must be established.

In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment

against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Court’s action on the various

petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear intent

to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the Sandiganbayan Justices administratively

liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco

H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013

Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary

appointment. Complainant, a former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that

she was entitled to a permanent position. Other than her allegation that she was given two “very

satisfactory” and one “satisfactory” rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met the

prescribed qualification standard for the position. “Such standard is a mix of the formal education,

experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical health and attitude that the job requires.” Respondent

judge, who is the immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to observe the fitness,

propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be impressed upon complainant that

her appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply for

the reason that she had been in the service for almost two years.

The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests

complainant’s propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants. Such attitude

should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will

threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their judges.

Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be

dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as

not to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagñob vs. Judge Genie G.

Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013

Here are select November 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial

ethics:

Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the

registration and eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel

of land (subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel

Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of P15,000 and P39,000 to cover for the

litigation and land registration expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to fulfil his

undertaking and failed to return the money to complainant. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Lawsin’s

failure to properly account for and duly return his client’s money despite due demand is tantamount to a

violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainant’s purported act of “maligning” him

does not justify the latter’s failure to properly account for and return his client’s money upon due demand.

Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent

upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. Azucena Segovia-

Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013.

Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for

dishonesty against respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements

in the complaint he filed against them. The Supreme Court held that in administrative cases,

the only issue within the ambit of the Court’s disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit

to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On its

face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez

does not merit an administrative case. In order for the Court to determine whether Atty.

Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be settled. The issue of

ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not administrative, case. Sps. David

Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013.

Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious

misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of

respondent to handle her case before the CA but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her

case was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that this is a clear violation of Rule 18.04,

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their

clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the

clients’ request for information. Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP is not

only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow

lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to

obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with

court directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A.

Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013.

Attorney; Mishandling of Client’s Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case

against Atty. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case.

The Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records

show that the 10-day period given to him to submit his formal offer of documentary

evidence pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03.

Respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file the formal offer of exhibits

because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and the same would be refused

admission by the RTC. However, if respondent truly believed that the exhibits to be

presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw

from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as

“[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is

handling” or “[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these

canons and rules.” Thus, Atty. Dublin was imposed the penalty of suspension from the

practice of law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M.

Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013.

Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty.

Kilaan for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty.

Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public

Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB. Complainants

also alleged that the Verification in Batingwed’s application for CPC was notarized by Atty.

Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon

verification of Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the said notarial entry

actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed’s application. It is

settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the

entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s explanation that

he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial

acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of

Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he

will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his

notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial

commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register, his

notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar

Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013.

Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect

to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with

the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate

language in his pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the

court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several

opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue

them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be

extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our

Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not

because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.

Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the

court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-

Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No.

8954, November 13, 2013.

Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct,

dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly

acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme Court held that respondent is guilty of simple

dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave

misconduct. Dishonesty is “intentionally making a false statement on any material fact” and

“a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of

honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition

to defraud, deceive or betray.” Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted

by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless,

respondent’s acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and

straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government

agencies/officials. Respondent’s deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent appears to have illegally

forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court

procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions

of the courts. Heirs of Celestino Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and

Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.

Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the

respondent failed to execute the decision in a land registration case despite receiving an

amount for the implementation of the Alias Writ. The Supreme Court held that the deposit

and payment of expenses incurred in enforcing writs are governed by Section 10, Rule 141

of the Rules of Court, as revised by A.M.  No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the

sheriff executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, and such

estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party shall

then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be

disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation upon the

return of the writ. In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and received

from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as

it was not even accounted for earlier in his Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of

the P20,000 in his liquidation of expenses only after complainant demanded an accounting

and in compliance to Judge’s directive. The Court has ruled that any amount received by the

sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and

renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A.

Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013.

Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk

II of MTCC, for stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial

defense to refute the charges against her, Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the

forgery of De Ocampo’s signature, leading to the check’s encashment. The case against Ibay

is bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between her

handwriting in the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there

is substantial evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the

Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that dishonesty

is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service even when committed for the

first time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the

lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness,

honesty and diligence in the public service. The Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty,

for the judiciary deserves the best from all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte,

RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela v. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-

3100, November 12, 2013.

Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel

until February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing

an extension of his authority to travel abroad. This happened again for a second time. The

Supreme Court held that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel

Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an

extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA

ten (10) working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so

would make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge

Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay abroad.

Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, states

that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to

receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re:

Unauthorized Travel Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio

City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.

Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively

liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and

for violation the Code of Judicial Conduct. He then filed  a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The

Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:

(1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be

limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community

with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for

the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation; (2)

Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of

reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has

productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to

redeem himself; (4) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,

learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the

legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public

service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may  justify

clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalna’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his

professed repentance and therefore, must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali

Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013.

Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for

retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due

to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act

No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946 which provided for more benefits, including

survivorship pension benefits, among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for

survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January 17,

2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received ₱1,026,748.00 for

survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012. Later, however, the

Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held that

the law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved

gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled

to the survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not

entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer needs to return the survivorship

pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April 2012 amounting to ₱1,026,748.00.

The Supreme Court, in the past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who

received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such

pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A.

Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-

Ret. November 19, 2013.

Here are select October 2013 cases on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual

harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the

complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her

hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Given the

circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but

repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this

regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as

to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting

circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was

aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to

indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as

a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of

her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted

out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone

Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013.

Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court

held that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the

decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands

that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous

manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a

lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the

court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.

Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the

falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Thus, the Court

disbarred the respondent. Atty. Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732,

October 22, 2013.

Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable

negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were

convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to

evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in

preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any

testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in

performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause

of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty.

Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The

Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to

employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the

authority of the law to support his client’s cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C.

No. 7922, October 1, 2013.

Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of

the law and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship

between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this

regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and

accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part,

the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to

devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and

whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and

honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule

18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court found that the

respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since

he: (1) failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering

professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his client’s cause

while the grave coercion case against them was pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v.

Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013.

Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct

and/or gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held

herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest

her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice

and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate

transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal

services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any

kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the

attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional

employment is established.

Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence

reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records

disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her

clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another

person. It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must

always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was

disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania “Fanny” Obias, A.C. No. 4945,

October 8, 2013.

Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of

receiving payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the

Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December 2010. The Supreme Court held that the

respondent violated the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for

Government Officials and Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for

advance payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees.

Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of

copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be

made to respondent, as it is an official transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk

of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for judicial

fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the issuance of an

acknowledgment receipt cannot be construed as having been done in good faith,

considering the fact that respondent only remitted the payment for the TSN five (5) months

after her receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had  been

filed against her. Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe

Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October

21, 2013.

Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this case

is whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA)

10154 applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision

which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of

administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the

Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of

administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to

secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which

makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state

policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary

administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains

with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be

imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court

personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision. Re:

Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring

Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil

Service Commission,A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.

Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to

serve summons to the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and

despite being given an amount. The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons

to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of

the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court,

it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person serving court processes to

serve the summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so

constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give one’s

attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from

carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments

from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just

unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the proper

procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir

Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court,

Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013.

Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the

law and violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the

complaint for lack of merit since the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated

and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of

the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances

mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by

Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch. Further, contrary to the

allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that the respondent Judge was very much

concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day

Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact

that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty.

Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23,

2013.

Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing

him of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a

judgment which was already final and executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains

finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that

Judge Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the

final and executory judgment of conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are

comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any

auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is

ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement

the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly

in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricio’s acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance

of the law. Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.

Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny

that Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his

house, had a “drinking spree” with him and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court

held Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judge’s acts of

meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff

to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct

when he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits given by the litigant.Atty. Jessie

Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie

Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and

Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No.

05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25, 2013. 

Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty.  Grave

misconduct, gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and

Aventurado are found guilty, even if committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries

with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the  perpetual

disqualification for reemployment in the government service. As to Judge Salubre and Edig, however, in

view of their deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed on them anymore. It is only the

penalty of dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are not in the service anymore, but

it is still within the Court’s power to forfeit their retirement benefits.Report on the financial audit conducted

in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ismael L. Salubre,

et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013.

Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law,

grave misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The

Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the

proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the

norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not

be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies

which can be availed of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of

preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking

cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end

involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the

exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with,

except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E.

Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George

E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22,

2013.

Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial

ethics:

Attorney; Attorney’s Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the Court

of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement with the

respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to

Protect Attorney’s Rights.

The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients

compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or

completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for

Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right to his stipulated

professional fees. The Court did so in the interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering

professional services on contingent fee basis.

Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the

counsel’s adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement

of the litigation without the counsel’s participation and conformity. He remains entitled to

the compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its members are

officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition

of fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel.

In other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper

and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the

compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent

withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the

legitimate compensation for professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods

Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013.

Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent

Atty. Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held

that Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new

clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they

are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on

the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate

the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for

only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of

paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos’ justification that no

confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the rule on conflict of

interests provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing

parties in the same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to

the latter’s opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C.

No. 9860, September 11, 2013.

Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18

and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated

his oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with competence and diligence” when he filed a

criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil

case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, Atty.

Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and

damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount

involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty.

Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism

in dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is

not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal

and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and

study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has

defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of

the Lawyer’s Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.

Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the

Attorney’s Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because

he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such Notice and

realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of

Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a

person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law

cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its

consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar candidates. Medado was

imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Court’s

Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.

Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash

shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk

of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether

personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and

control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable

for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash

clerk, Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting

money belonging to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such

responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages. The Supreme Court held that no

position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a

judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to

the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration

of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must

bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,

official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Office of the Court Administrator v.

Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.

Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of

the Motion to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss

beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the purpose without filing any request for the

extension of the period. The Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a

sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the

Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do

so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or

resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an

awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the

circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the

Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with

the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume of her official

workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for the extension of the

90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P.

Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.

Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the

twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it

has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and

expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every

judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in

the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and

confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.

Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes

gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting

judge. Judge Baluma’s gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases

within the reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases

Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court,

Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.

Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for

decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily

retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of

his judicial duties. Judge Soriano’s unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving

incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory

retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to

decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the

imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Soriano’s inefficiency

in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of

the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted

despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his

court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services, especially the speedy

disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross

ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from his

retirement benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano,A.M. No. MTJ-07-

1683, September 11, 2013.

Here are select July 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for

gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship

between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are

led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required

degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high

standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,

regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s duty of competence

and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound

legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending

scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled

cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to

prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the

Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se

a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar

v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013

Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent

situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his

present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving

the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former

client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.

Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the

client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in

the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not

only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-

dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is

paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and

confidence of the highest degree.

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the

termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to

or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once

given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the

severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in

any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use

any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule

15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the

practice of law for two (2) years.Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16,

2013.

Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in

disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court

exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant

evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal

presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney

is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In

this case, complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving that respondents ordered their

secretary to stamp a much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending the

ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant

evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. Jaime

Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July

31, 2013.

Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court,

called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting

and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings,

especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing

or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover,

they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those

who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the

conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.

Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal

profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in

the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels

and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to

the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel

Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013.

Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a

court stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility

where she was accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her

stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme Court

held that the respondent’s resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to

proceed against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening

resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act

complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office

render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative

liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.

Respondent’s dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her

retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service

to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no

longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is

subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer

III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.

Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in

the Civil Service; Effect of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is “a transgression of

some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior,

wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior.” A misconduct is “grave” or gross” if it is “out of all

measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful” or “such conduct as is not to be excused.” Respondent

Ong’s and Buencamino’s acts of using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their

safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. These are flagrant and shameful acts

and should not be countenanced. Respondents’ acts warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule

10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for respondent

Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him. Respondent

Buencamino’s acts take away the public’s faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned

despite his death.

Sheriffs are reminded that they are “repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the

duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities.” Being “frontline officials of the

justice system,” sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance

of their duties.” Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No.

P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.

Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases; Mitigating circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged

respondent Sheriff lV Famero with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to

implement the Writ of Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme Court held that the

respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on

the writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

For the respondent’s lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was

found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the task

expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense  punishable by suspension from office for one (1)

month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the

imposition of the appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to

consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of service in

the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family circumstances, among others, in

determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to the following mitigating circumstances:

(1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than for the present

infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear

for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he could not undertake any demolition without the

appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court

also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the respondent’s work were to be left

unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of suspension

from service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43,

Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.

Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a

frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-

bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of

excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain

the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.

The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless, the

Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may hinder

them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to

decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension

of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonell’s

failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons,

constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor

health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial

judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduced the recommended

penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide

Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La

Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013

Here are select June 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes

inexcusable negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to

file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence.  In this case, the

Court cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide him a

copy of the case records.

In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juan’s control and is a task

that the lawyer undertakes.

Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellant’s brief

within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of

the appellant’s brief are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of

Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental

to the perfection of his client’s appeal.

Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the progress

of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for the Court

of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for reconsideration, or

otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his client’s interest.

Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to “conduct

[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well

to the courts as to (his) clients[.]“  He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3,

2013.

Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers

are only recommendatory. IBP’s recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the

practice of law is not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant

the imposition of a stiffer sanction.  The following acts and omissions of Atty. San Juan were considered:

first, the negligence in handling his client’s appeal; second, his failure to act candidly and effectively in

communicating information to his client; and more importantly, third, the serious and irreparable

consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client of legal remedies in addressing his

conviction.

In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on a

lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his client’s case.

With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from the

practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case.

Moreover, IBP’s findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the

power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until finally

acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty imposed cannot attain

finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper

subject of implementation or compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No.

7944, June 3, 2013.

Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Shari’a Circuit Court,

represented that he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence showed

that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the

use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others. Dishonesty is a malevolent

act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required

of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil Service

Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Civil

Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.

Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by

a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,

weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error

of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance

of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or

failure to discharge the duties of the office.

Dishonesty is the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;

lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.”

In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the legal

representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that,

complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the

premises.

In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br.

28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court

stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual

obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the court held that court

employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official

conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial transactions to avoid

becoming the court’s albatross of infamy.

More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the

people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,

especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall

refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public

safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25,

2013.

Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction

of their courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court

from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale

is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the

relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. “In so providing, the

Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can

and must be done.”

For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency

of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no

violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No.

14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be

said that the property is no longer “in litigation” at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges

Estate then under settlement proceedings.

A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from

the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the

estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order

declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the

distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed

and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the

payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the

same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.

Here are select April 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and “a lawyer

owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and

to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of

justice – as an officer of the court.” Accordingly, ‘”lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard

of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.”

Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.

“Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public

instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity

and due execution.”

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers

and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. Respondent

committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent’s conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of

morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should be

sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013

Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined

dishonesty as “intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to

practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus,

dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention.

In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of

the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state

of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose

of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that

moment.” Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional

Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, stressed that its employees

should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the esteemed institution which they

serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service

Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013

Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court records

failed to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period due to the alleged

“heavy workload.” The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the

Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their duties properly and with

diligence at all times. The administration of justice is an inviolable task and it demands the highest degree

of efficiency, dedication and professionalism.

The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases filed and

pending before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot

serve as an “excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every government employee faced with

negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to evade punishment, to the detriment of

the public service.”

Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper attention

to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or

indifference.

In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances

attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has mitigated imposable

penalties for various special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary,

acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among others, in determining the

applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second time offender for simple neglect of duty, her

long years of service in the judiciary and the admission of her negligence are circumstances to mitigate

her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et

al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013

Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency.

In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in

the performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act

or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm

of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were

incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held

that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees.

The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a

task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances,

the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage

documents show that official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was

made for marriages performed on different dates.

Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a

certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect

of duty of the judges.

Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with

respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as

the minority status of one party.

On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can facilitate the

marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for

a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel

from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such

gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as “a grave offense that carries the

extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs.

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013

Judge; Gross ignorance of the law.  The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the Canons

of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties.

Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance

thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the administration of

justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary

mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. Office of

the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013

Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the solemnizing

officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly

issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been

issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official

has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The visible superimpositions on the

marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of

the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al.A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013

Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law.  Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or

giving professional advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private

practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of

public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are

inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting

judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent

them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the

performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to

promote the public interest.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as

a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the

entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases

in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in

anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the

preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of

papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his

wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the

hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C. Decena and Rey

C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8,

2013

Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times

be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and

efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a

Cashier II in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving the

Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court held that public office is a public trust.

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Those

charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be

circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be

characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the

judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly

administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave

misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first

offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such

as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the

various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. Office

of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2, 2013

Here are select March 2013 rulings of the Philippine Supreme Court on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law.  Atty. Bancolo admitted

that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name

by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the

communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with

his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),

which provides:

CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any

task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the

signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules

of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of

his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for

delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to

certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty.

Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E.

Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20,

2013.

Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face,

lacks merit.  For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal

of the Complaint for disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers.  Complainant claims he was

denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual

procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been

submitted for resolution.

The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is

clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief

Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and substance,

dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit.  In the instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright

the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then,

after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainant’s

favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective

Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to

respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since

it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case

based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainant’s mistaken notion, not all petitions

or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has

the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective

responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the case

without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution.  Jasper Junno F.

Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.;  A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.

Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence.  The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v.

Capistranothat “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in

protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good

father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him

answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.”

Respondent’s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD’s directives for him to file his

pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also

his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is

called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court

directives as an officer of the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of

the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere

requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.  Gloria P.

Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.

Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client.  Money entrusted to a lawyer for a

specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should

be returned to the client immediately.  The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyer’s failure to

return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latter’s demand, gives rise to the presumption that

he has appropriated the same for his own use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and

professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.

Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain

a general docket.  Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a

general docket of cases assigned to their branch.  As such, he failed to comply with his duty under

Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Sec. 8. General docket. – The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be

numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein

all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and under the

heading of each case, a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of

each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by

reference a single page the history of the case may be seen.

With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty.  Office of the Court

Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),

Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-

1818. March 12, 2013.

Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the

promulgation of cases.  In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation,

just gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was

serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:

Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the

presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the

conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his

counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the

judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.

Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the

case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in

fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated

first.  Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial

Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same

court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.

Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty.  Simple neglect of duty is defined as

the “failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a

duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for

one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second.

In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves’ past administrative cases.

Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be

dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained undeterred in disregarding

the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received. Mr. Teves’

repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service which the Court can no

longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all

benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch

or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the

Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;  A.M. No.

MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.

Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases.  The OCA found that

the court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty is

vested with Mr. Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the

members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted

inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their court. This is brought about by their

failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of

Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of

cases to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper

order.

Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply

with her duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation

and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court

Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),

Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-

1818. March 12, 2013.

Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it

constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the

Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and

given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules

on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial

number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every

judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to

simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short,

when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Office of the

Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;  A.M. No.

MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.

Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties.     Under Rule 140 of

the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of

Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious

charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not

less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding

P20,000.00.

Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the

Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1)

Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and

disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or

controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include

accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three

(3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding

P40,000.00.

In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work history which reflects

how she performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases already filed

against her, with most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her inability to

properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number

of irregularities she committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal

from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with

prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-

owned or controlled corporations.  Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,

Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.

Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;  A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.

Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds.  As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, “an inhibition must be

for just and valid reason.” Complainant’s mere imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of

the Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded.  Jasper Junno F. Rodica v.

Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.

Judges; undue delay in deciding cases.  The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured

not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which

disputes are resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve

cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate,

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to

perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly

dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before

the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms

of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative

sanction against the defaulting magistrate.  Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,

Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,

Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court

Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge

Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-

2318. March 6, 2013.

Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending

in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and

poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding

cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an extension granted by the

Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that

merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br.

49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran

City;  A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.

Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions.  An inexcusable failure to

decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition

of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge.

The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not

decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3)

the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5)

other analogous circumstances.

In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his

more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent

judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Court’s directives as contained in the

resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City /

Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.

Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the

delay.  Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension orders

issued against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months.

Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed

a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to

justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to avail of this

excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to dispose of had been

overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said suspensions.  Office of the Court Administrator v.

Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City

and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12,

2013.

Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings.   An administrative matter was instituted

against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement. According to

the Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be

filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an

administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service.

However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or

employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case.

In present case, Judge Grageda’s retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant

administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less

the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and

regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the

service.  Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed.Office of the Court

Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.

Here are select February 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition

for contempt against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that “proceedings against attorneys shall be private

and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in

other cases.” The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its investigations free from

any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of

attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and

litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without

authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints

against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication

constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the

Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the

press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate

news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment

complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its

pendency.

In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public concern

considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty.

Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao

Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, media had a right to

publish such fact under freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et

al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.

Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the

cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his client is

entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense – including the institution of an ejectment

case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the court held that in the

full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may

displease the general public.

Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform

their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense when they believe it

to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarin’s act of issuing demand letters, moved

by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice

to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud

or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision

lots.

However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an illegal occupant

when the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer.

Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in

keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful

objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false. Verleen

Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty.

Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013.

Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiant’s personal appearance; nature of

notarization; penalties when a notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should

not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed

and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.

Without the personal appearance of the person who actually executed the document, the notary public

would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain

that the document is the party’s free act or deed.

The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it

admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to

full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care

the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity

of a notarized document would be undermined

Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly

affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in

degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a

notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity

of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because

of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood

or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with

fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public

interest.

Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his

duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from

being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law

for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013.

Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public

office is a public trust. “It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people.” As

front liners of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in

the performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are “called upon to discharge their duties with

due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court’s writs and processes and implementing the

orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient

administration of justice.”

Sheriff Gelbolingo’s failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple note

as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their

belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a

sheriff’s schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the information to the other court staff

to address Sasing’s concerns.

The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official duties

which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1), is

a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the first offense, a

suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public service for the third

offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part

to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C.

Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-

12-3032. February 20, 2013.

Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the

Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility,

integrity and efficiency, for public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who

work in the Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they must discharge

their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law.

“Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public

accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be

countenanced.”

In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction of

Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil

Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008

Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a Friday, “he should not have proceeded to

mail the same; but instead, should have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the

herein complainant.” Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September

19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts

clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1,

Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that “Court personnel shall at all times

perform official duties properly and with diligence.” Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the performance

of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office. Esguerra’s acts displayed a

conduct falling short of the stringent standards required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs.

Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967.

February 13, 2013.

Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of

Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that “[T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is

satisfied with the issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to

comment on the said application within the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.”

In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive

writ, since the so-called “new and substantial matters” raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No.

122784 and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents Ricafort, and

they had already been previously ordered to comment on the said application, at the time when the said

“subsequent” matters were already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S.

Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-

201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.

Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of

indubitable integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,

anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of

indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be

offered by the complainant.

Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests

with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven

during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to

prove his defense.

In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no

public records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made

against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks.

For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons of

the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting,

however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting,

he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas

should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the

respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as

burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the

judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as

they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so

as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and

the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and not only

while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the

personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he

represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis

Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.

Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or

with another member present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would

have required the Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present

regular members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe. The complainants would

have been correct if the absent member of the Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other

members. This implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or with another

member present, provided that the action or resolution “is submitted on the next working day to the

absent member or members of the Division for ratification, modification or recall.”

A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final

judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive

remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and

for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo

until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional

remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a

case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by

the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere

interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of things prior to the RTC’s Order of

December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals

Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19,

2013.

Judge; government employee vis-à-vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement

claims of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the

government service which he rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of

Education, its Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can meet the

present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits.

Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government “employee” includes any person in the

service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government “officer,” on

the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the

functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and now,

did not require a specific job description and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in

a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ Panganiban’s government

service as legal counsel and consultant.

The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon

retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of

disability or death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to

the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement

service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of

retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counseling

work for a government body or institution as creditable government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-

Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013.

Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the

exercise of judicial functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the

law. To be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only

be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud,

dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule

140, Section 8, and is punishable under Section 11.

Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity within the

sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as

mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil

actions for damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do

in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers and

jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe

Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge

Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,

Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24,

Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal

City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-

2652-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-

IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.

Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of

Court, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices of the

CA and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme

Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal

knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3)

upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the

CA’s former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not

permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ

was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every

discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that “a Judge cannot be held to account

civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.” The

issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions was discretionary,

interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action

of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an administrative, civil or criminal

action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson

& Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA

IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.

Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground

for disciplinary action against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross

misconduct for failure to return an amount arising from a transaction.

The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials and

employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its

officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section provides that willful

failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and justices. Just debts, as

defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1)

claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted by

the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a

serious charge.

While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official

transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials’ private lives; they simply look at their

actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official. These

rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with public duties and who,

even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their status as public servants. Employees

of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but

also in their personal and private dealings with others so as to preserve at all times the good name and

standing of the courts in the community. Here, the complainant’s claim is a just debt. The willfulness of

Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his continuous failure to settle despite demand letters sent to him.

Thus, the court imposed the penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC,

Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013.

Judge; judicial audit; court’s jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of

regularity. The OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10

July 2012 — more than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his

incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme

Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has not commenced any formal

investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge

Grageda must be dismissed.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that “this Court concedes that there are no

promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve

as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were

never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit

reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of

action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid

similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judge’s

compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a judge’s observance of the time limits

required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited resources.

These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantua’s right to due process.”

For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the

incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s

cessation from office. In this case, Judge Grageda’s compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right

to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no

longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative case against him after he

has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against him

for the alleged transgression.

Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed an

offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the

Court held that, “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has

regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate

is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent.” Missing Exhibits

and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-

RTC. February 27, 2013.

Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a

Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure,

Section 10 which provides that “within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position

papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.” This provision

is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is

classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other

benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not

exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as

factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan,

Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.