Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 Facts: The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for appealing a decision which is final and executory, deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from the client allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal the illegal act. Respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal and asserted that it was the latter who initiated the action to delay the execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two other charges. Trial procedures were instituted before the IBP. Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before RTC Makati, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of $2,555. Having been acquitted in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for Dismissal of the IBP case. Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the ground that the criminal case for estafa is completely different from the proceedings before him. Acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555. He was suspended by the IBP for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative proceeding since he was acquitted of the criminal charge. (2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the decision of the POEA knowing it to be final and executory. Held: (1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. x x x Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. (2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on Figueroa vs. Barranco

Facts: Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens. Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son born out of wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and because for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various civic organizations and has acquired a good standing within his community while the case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its delay. Issue: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusations of Figueroa. Held: Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom had no impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a grossly immoral conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship. His previous acts may be said to be a question to his moral character but none of these are so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by her continuedcohabitation with him even after their child was born in 1964. The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been prevented from entering the profession he has worked so hard for. Almirez vs Lopez Atty. Arturo Lopez became a lawyer in 1957. In 1958, he courted Virginia Almirez; they becamesweethearts. In 1960, Lopez manifested his intention to marry Almirez. Almirez believed in the promise and so they had multiple carnal knowledge in the following months. Eventually, Almirez got pregnant. Lopez then urged to her take some pills which he said would hasten her menstrual flow. When this didnt work, Lopez advised her to see an abortion doctor but no abortion was done because Almirez was against it. Thereafter, Lopez refused to marry Almirez even though they already secured marriage license. Almirez then filed a disbarment case against Lopez. Lopez in his defense denied that the baby was his; that he did not promise to marry Almirez. While the case was pending in the Office of the Solicitor General, Almirez filed an affidavit of desistance. But later on, she withdraw said affidavit. She also confided that the reason why she made the affidavit withdrawing the case was that Lopez promised to marry her finally. BUT then Lopez did not and the latter actually married another woman instead hence, Almirez revived the case. Further, Almirez

also testified that the affidavit withdrawing the disbarment case was procured by Lopez by letting her sign a blank sheet. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lopez should be disbarred. HELD: Yes. Lopez is guilty of gross immoral conduct. Lopez denied that he promised to marry Almirez but such denial is belied by the fact that they secured a marriage license. Therefore, it is evident that he breached that promise when he did not marry her. His urging Almirez to have an abortion is highly reprehensible. His procurement of the affidavit by letting Almirez sign a blank sheet also bolsters his being unfit of being a member of the bar. Hence, the Supreme Court disbarred him from the practice of law. De Roy vs CA De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration. On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct. HELD: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. Cojuangco vs Palma Facts: A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite hissubsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.Thus, the latter filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved todismiss the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for investigation andrecommendation. The Assistant Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the

complainant and his witness in the presence of respondents counsel. On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied. The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, theater found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. In his motion for reconsideration, Respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity. Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage. Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction when he declared before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held: xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous and criminal.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the

name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his

membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.

Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of

his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to

maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to

pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial

support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is

being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the

Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule

and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:

WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO

Held:

All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally

sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed

with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but

also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in

one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an

officer of the court.

When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and

his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)

subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as

might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent

of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such

reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an

interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend

or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its

elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of

annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in

elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of

improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of

the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The

right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject

to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is

recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be

avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.] JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v.

ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent. Jose M. Castillo for

complainant. Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice;

and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact

prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by

the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional

Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. 2.

ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN

THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que

bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt

complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the

court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but

also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to

measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal

profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first

time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial

proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in

offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of

his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is

directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of

the offense will be dealt with more severely.

R E S O L U T I O N

PLANA, J.:

Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from

the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial

proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library As the material facts are not in

dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the

pleadings of the parties. Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and

at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for

forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent

was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981,

while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say

"bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking

at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence

of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence.

The court proceedings had to be suspended. While admitting the utterance,

respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that

what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was

trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record"

while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.

Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ". . . The only

reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for

ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation

called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming

that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation

like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to

the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a

yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right

then and there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library Among the

duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the

courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to

advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness

unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of

Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics

likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering

evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for.

Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark

while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of

respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of

intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct

required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves

reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed

offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously

been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and

warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R.

No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent

unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words. WHEREFORE,

respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to

observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the

offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary

chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982 RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, OSCAR S. ATENCIO, and POLICARPIO MAPUA,petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, Presiding Judge, Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, ADEZ REALTY, INC., PILAR I. VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, and VICTORINO GASKELL, respondents.

Raymundo Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar S. Atencio for petitioners.

Senen S. Ceneza for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 in a motion to dismiss an action for damages flied by petitioners as defendants failed to obtain an affirmative response from respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima. Hence this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding, assailing on jurisdictional grounds the order denying such motion. The alleged grievance of private respondents 2 as plaintiffs in a case then pending before respondent Judge 3 arose from the first two paragraphs of the answer of petitioners 4 as defendants, worded as follows: "[Defendant], through counsel, by way of answer to the complaint, respectfully, represents: 1. The averments of plaintiff's alleged due organization and existence (par. 1, Complaint) is denied it falsifies the fact of its creation and operation as an instrument and front for illegal and oppressive usurious loan transactions; the averments on defendant's personal circumstances (supra) are admitted, with the qualification that his dealings with plaintiff were based on good faith and reliance on his part, but taken advantage of by scheming plaintiff. 2. That averments on the alleged loan secured on 3 December 1971 in the sum of P7,270.00 and

accessory sums thereon, the supposed demands for payment and requests for extensions, the alleged failure of defendant to pay (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, supra) are specifically denied as fraudulent distortions of the facts and apparent disguises to confuse and conceal the true agreements between the parties," 5 after which came the affirmative defenses. The privileged character of such words employed in a pleading on a matter impressed with relevance, usury being the defense, is not difficult to discern, if, as should be the case, there be recognition of the basic constitutional right of free expression. So it would be in accordance with an unbroken line of decisions of this Tribunal. It does appear, therefore, that petitioners are entitled to the remedies prayed for.

The facts are undisputed. This litigation had its origin in a suit for collection filed by plaintiff Adez Realty, Inc., now one of the private respondents, seeking the payment of P7,270.00 with 12% interest and 25% of such amount as liquidated damages. 6 The principal allegation was that plaintiff, now respondent, Adez Realty, Inc. agreed to extend to the defendant, now petitioner, Policarpio Mapua and did deliver to him a loam in the amount of P7,270.00 on the condition that failure to liquidate such loan on the date due would result in paying not only the principal with interest but the equivalent to 25% as liquidated damages. 7 It was then stated that defendant Mapua had not paid such overdue debt, hence the filing of this case for collection. 8 The answer was filed with the alleged offending paragraphs thereof as duly noted at the outset of this opinion. 9 Moreover, the affirmative defenses contained the following allegations: "3. The transactions between plaintiff and defendant are in reality a loan of P5,000.00 secured way back in 1969 earning usurious interest at the rate of 5% monthly, or 60% per annum to the extent that defendant was unable to pay said usurious interest and at the same time liquidate the principal amount of P5,000.00 by December 3, 1971, such that 4. On 3 October 1971, plaintiff's jargon and double-talk caused defendant to sign the alleged promissory note Annex A, Complaint, which plaintiff managed to facelift and veneer as a lawful deed and agreement, but stripped of its gloss, it is null and void, for being contrary to the laws policy against usury. 5. Considering the payments by defendant of 5% interest monthly on the principal since 1969, or P250.00 monthly, until 3 December 1971, defendant had fully paid the principal indebtedness. 10 The language employed in such answer resulted, as had been stated, in a complaint for damages filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila before respondent Judge. 11 Then came the motion to dismiss, which as set forth, was predicated on the matter complained of being absolutely privileged. 12 When after an opposition to such motion 13 and a reply to such opposition 14 were submitted, the lower court issued the order denying the motion to dismiss, 15 this petition was filed with this Court, a motion for reconsideration having proved futile. 16

To repeat, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. "The prevailing rule," according to Justice Malcolm in the leading case of Santiago v. Calvo," 17 is that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case." 18 Such doctrine was foreshadowed in the earlier case of Zurbito v. Bayot, 19 decided in 1911. In the language of Justice Johnson: "If the persons presenting the claim are, in the opinion of those opposing it, attempting to have a claim allowed which should not be snowed, they have a right to state their reasons therefor, even though such opposition may incidentally reflect upon the honor and credit of the person presenting the claim." 20 A year after the Santiago ruling, a similar pronouncement came from the pen of another eminent jurist, Justice Street in Baron v. David. 21 Thus: "It is clear that with respect to these damages the cross-action cannot be maintained, for the reason that the affidavit in question was used in course of a legal proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a legal remedy, and it is, therefore, privileged." 22 The then Justice, now retired Chief Justice Concepcion in the leading case of Sison v. David 23 restated the principle: "It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are already absolutely privileged." 24 As so emphatically

stressed by the late Chief Justice Castro in Deles v. Aragona:" 25 The doctrine of privileged communication is not an Idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and experience." 26

2. It is undoubted likewise, as held in Tolentino v. Baylosis, Justice J.B.L. Reyes being the ponente, 27 that as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary for the invocation of this absolute privilege, "the courts favor a liberal rule."28 He added: "The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial." 29 He likewise quoted from the aforesaid Santiago v. Calvo decision: "For, as aptly observed in one case, 'while the doctrine of privileged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships.'"30 The language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon in Dorado v. Pilar 31 is apropos: "Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase." 32 It bears mentioning that in Deles, 33 such sentiment was pharaphrased by Chief Justice Castro in this wise: "Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language." 34

3. The language of this Court on the question of what pleadings enjoy absolute immunity is not swathed in obscurity. Nor has there been only change of mind - far from it. This Court has consistently adhered to what it had stated with clarity as far as 1911. If at all, the later decisions had been even more emphatic to dissipate any lurking doubt that the rule of liberality so unequivocally set forth must be upheld. The principle that calls for application is crystal-clear. The immunity parties and counsel enjoy is absolute as long as the test of relevance is met. There is need, it would seem, to keep in mind that as Hokfeld pointed out, the correlative of immunity is disability. Respondent Judge failed to heed such an imperative. It ought to have granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners, to repeat, are entitled to the remedies sought. So this Court has ruled in the aforecited cases of Zurbito and Baylosis as wen as People v. Andres. 35

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss is annulled. Respondent Judge or whoever may be acting in his stead is prohibited from taking any further action in Civil Case No. 94551 except to dismiss the same. To that extent, mandamus lies. No costs.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Guerrero, J., is on leave.

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S.

BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc.,

complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial

Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously

admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to

admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:

1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the

Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking

the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the

amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his

Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No.

8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the

Honorable Supreme Court, included the respondent as among those taking the

Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request dated

July 23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for

my turn to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my

Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while

waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable

Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy

(Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told

me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my

Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer

that the Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the

Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme

Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the

Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City

Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General

Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and

my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court

did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I

paid my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326

and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional

Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No.

4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City

Chapter also included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the

election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on

January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent

submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on

April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein

respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his

1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned

paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363,

... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown

by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing

with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do

not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law

thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer

still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this

Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19,

Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule

71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00)

pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he

shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.