legal ethics digest.pdf

8/20/2019 Legal Ethics Digest.pdf

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LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

1 | Block C 2012Justice Hofilena

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

1. Banogan v. Zerna2. Ledesma v. Climaco3. Cui v. Cui

4. Alawi v. Alauya

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the landand promote respect for law and legal process.

5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho6. Chua v. Mesina7. Soriano v. Dizon8. Stemmerik v. Mas9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC10. Cordon v. Balicanta

CANON 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and

convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity andeffectiveness of the profession.

CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

11. In re Tagorda12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo13. Canoy v. Ortiz14. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system byinitiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of theadministration of justice.

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate incontinuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve higheststandards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students andassist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in thedischarge of their official duties.

15. Suarez v. Platon16. Ramos v. Imbang17. Catu v. Rellosa18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of thelegal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar.

19. In re Galang20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas21. Samaniego v. Ferrer

22. Arnobit v. Arnobit23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz24. Advincula v. Macabata

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candortoward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics againstopposing counsel.

25. Reyes v. Chiong26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro27. Alcantara v. Pefianco28. Camacho v. Pagulayan29. Torres v. Javier

30. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorizedpractice of law.

31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.32. Cayetano v. Monsod33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio34. Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. CIR 35. Aguirre v. Rama36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courtsand judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon38. Rivera v. Corral39. Johnny Ng v. Alar40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan

CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assistin the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

42. Berbano v. Barcelona


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43. Sebastian v. Bajar44. Hegna v. Paderanga45. Plus Builders v. Revilla46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez

CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain fromany impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of

influencing the court.

CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao

CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all hisdealings and transactions with his clients.

49. Hilado v. David50. Nakpil v. Valdes51. Hornilla v. Salunat

52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo53. Quiambao v. Bamba54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clientthat may come into his possession.

56. Licuanan v. Melo57. Posidio v. Vitan58. Lemoine v. Balon59. Re: Atty. Maquera60. Reddi v. Sersbio61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall bemindful of the trust and confidence in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

64. Hernandez v. Go65. PANELCO v. Montemayor66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut67. Belleza v. Macasa68. Overgaard v. Valdez

69. Angalan v. Delante70. Santon-Tan v. Robino71. Somosot v. Lara

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds oflaw.

72. Briones v. Jimenez73. Pena v. Aparicio

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER

74. Manalang v. Angeles75. Garcia v. CA76. Santiago v. De los Santos

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

77. Sesbreno v. CA78. Bautista v. Gonzales

79. Gamilla v. Marino80. Pineda v. De Jesus81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his clienteven after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.

83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan84. Pfleider v. Palanca85. Mercado v. Vitriolo86. Genato v. Silapan87. Hadjula v. Madianda88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.

Canon 22 – A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and uponnotice appropriate in the circumstances.

89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA90. Venterez v. Cosme91. Santero v. Vance92. Francisco v. Portugal93. Metrobank v. CA94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA95. Sesbreno v. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT


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96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza97. Santos v. Llamas98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput100. Barrientos v. Daarol101. Berbano v. Beltran

102. Tabas v. Malicden103. Sesbreno v. CA

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1 – Independence

104. Libarios v. Dablos105. Go v. CA106. Sabitsana v. Villamor107. Tan v. Rosete108. Dimatulac v. Villon

CANON 2 – Integrity

109. Fernandez v. Hamoy110. Dawa v. De Asa111. In re judge Marcos112. Lachica v. Flordeliza113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero

CANON 3 – Impartiality

115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan116. Pimentel v. Salanga117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.118. Oktubre v. Velasco119. Sandoval v. CA120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.

CANON 4 – Propriety

121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10

Malolos City126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda

127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo

CANON 5 – Equality

CANON 6 – Competence and diligence

128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.

129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Di lag


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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

BANOGAN V. ZERNA

Facts: The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court wayback on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision wasfiled on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later . This was followed by an amendedpetition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto onMarch 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismissthe petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and themotion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners thencame to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. Therespondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 onthe ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches,it was held, had operated against the petitioners.

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final andexecutory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the

private respondents. The said judgment would become so only “after one year fromthe issuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guilty of laches, it was theprivate respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the landregistered in their the pursuant thereto.

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9,1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed bythe petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years beforeit occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.

It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrinethey should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was notonly for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Theirposition is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

Issue: W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.

Held:YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that

litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essentialto an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment hasbecome final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of thefruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated tobring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courtsshould frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greaterawareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of thisCourt, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from

commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling forvindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the waysome of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort toachieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at thesame time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the

law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to becondemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must expressits disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely tocircumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assistin the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filingpointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law shouldadvise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merelyclutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of lawor their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deservethe attention of the courts.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

Facts: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before

the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judgedenied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed aselection registrar, which was still denied.

Issue:Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held:No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is

no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. Theappointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers infact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the sameway, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the communitythat the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment ofhis fees.

CUI V. CUI

Facts:The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by

the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free ofcharge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquiredcorporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial


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management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “suchpersons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, beingthe sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and DonaBenigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned infavor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was

embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of eitherthe “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was notcomplied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUEWho is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be

preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age

may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimatedescendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), shouldbe a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses,should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member ofthe Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is amember of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academicdegree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a lawschool upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holderto exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence ofcompliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in allof the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and alicense to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, tothe office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antoniowas disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact,that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. Hisreinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than thatrequired for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from hisprevious disbarment were wiped out.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA

Facts:Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,

Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is theincumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City,

They were classmates, and used to be friends.Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on

installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, ahousing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage FinanceCorporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa& Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed thathis consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation,deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to theVice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaintagainst him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney,"which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers havea rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" isoften mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal " or the Maranao term "consial ," connoting alocal legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of

Attorney

Held:He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine

bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had

occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledgedmembers of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admittedto the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that theygive counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." Thetitle of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree inthe study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted tothe Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

CANON 1

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO


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FACTS:The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case

against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former foundthat the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored inthe court’s safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he

should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Khocomplied with the directives.

Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with hiscommon-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employeesmoney in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interestearned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he keptthe funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that itsreport be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.

ISSUE/S:W/N Atty. Kho is liable.

HELD:

YES. OCA recommendations VALID.

RATIO:Dishonesty Conduct

Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failureto remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. Itdiminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of agrave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even ifcommitted for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he wasnevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciaryfunds.

Unlawful conductLawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the

Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’sresponsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with thelaw. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engagingin unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is notessential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 whichspecifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

CHUA V. MESINA

Facts:

Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses’ legal counsel and adviser uponwhom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building(Burgos Property) owned by Mesina’s family, and another property (MelencioProperty), also owned by Mesina’s family where the Chua spouses constructed theirhouse. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesina’smother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan sheobtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina

convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation inconsideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq.m.

The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs.Mesina’s bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Saledated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 wasthereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as “Felicisima M.Melencio,” in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of theamount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it.Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should beexecuted, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the paymentof capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Saleantedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again

appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of co mplainants wherein thepurchase price was also indicated to be P

85,400.00. After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses “in the redemption

of the MESINA properties,” Mrs. Mesina was found to have “an existing balance” duethe spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advisedrespondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit “acknowledged such obligation” to behis and undertook to settle it within two years.

Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencioproperty.

Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua,Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, forFalsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In hiscomplaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property

and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary totheir agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant,to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did notreflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated “to evade paymentof capital gains tax.” Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9,1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.

Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification chargeagainst Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate adeed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs.Mesina.

Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to “Felicisima M. Melencio” the Melencioproperty for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of “Felicisima


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M. Melencio,” the owner’s copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecsonsubsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging thathis filing of the criminal complaint “arose out of mere misunderstanding anddifference” with herein complainants and their co -respondents and he had nosufficient evidence against them.

Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them thathe would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the undertaking that he

would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencioproperty in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a writtenundertaking dated May 2, 1990.

In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died “in the early part of 1991.” Despiterespondent’s repeated promises “to effect” the transfer of title in complainants’ name,he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property wasbeing offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant MarcelinaHsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale andReconveyance of Real Property.

ISSUEWhether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?

HELD This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale

antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty topromote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed atdefiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private partybut the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute anotherdocument, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear thatcomplainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committeddishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chuaspouses, into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon themisrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his

mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business

transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measureof good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client isa much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties tradeat “arms length.”

In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon1, Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.

SORIANO V. DIZON

Facts:

A taxi driver (Soriano) f iled an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, onthe grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, andviolated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself

(treachery);d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver,

binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindidin tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);

f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to thevictim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

Issues:(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving

moral turpitude(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?

Held: (1) Yes.Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to j ustice, modesty, or

good morals…” Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not

only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attemptto wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incidentclearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.

(2) Yes.His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil

liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, heis bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungratefulperson!)

Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essentialqualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral characterincludes at least common honesty.

Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS:Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its

beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him thathe could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of propertythat he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted allof the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went


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back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found theowner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M.Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing upthe necessary paperwork.

When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in hisname, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed anothe rlawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and

that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT caseagainst Atty MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBDruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommendedthat he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.

ISSUE/S:W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

HELD:YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buyingPhilippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted afundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and grossignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew werevoid and illegal.

Deceitful ConductBy advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire

real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property wasalienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard tothe trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.

Illegal ConductBy pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for

the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminalin nature.

DE YSASI III V. NLRC

Facts:Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm

administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision ofdaily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such othertasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived onthe farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod Citywith his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and washospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November,1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deepsinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he wasconfined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis fromDecember, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent tookcare of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation.However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay thelatter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for thesudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Issues:(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not

he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay andother benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.

Held:

The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to paypetitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualificationor deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) monthfor every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1)whole year.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that"(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it willadmit of a fair settlement."

Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to representtheir clients with zeal

goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes

in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert allreasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court andespecially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between

their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but toavoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be amediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso oftechnicality in the conduct of litigation.

Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite theiravowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took painsto initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. Onthe contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbatedthe situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of theirrespective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled thisregrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Codemandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement


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of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the

thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of anyreflection of the same.

CORDON V. BALICANTA

FACTS:

Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from herhusband with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them toform a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed,and the properties were registered in the corp.’s name. Atty Balicanta was the onewho single-handedly ran the corp.’s affairs, by being it’s Chairman, President,General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts:1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA tosell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts:1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold theCorp’s right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished t he ancestralhome of the Cordon’s and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicantadid not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.

The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back theproperties and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands wereunheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicanta’s services and filed a complaint fordisbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report,recommended for Balicanta’s disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governorsresolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.

ISSUE/S:W/N Balicanta be disbarred

1.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:Deceitful Conduct

The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thoughtof plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. Hestarted his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board,Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited fromassuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also enteredinto dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanorsreveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his ownpersonal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

1 By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this resolution is

automatically elevated to the SC for final action.

Side Doctrine:Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such

character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and theresolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vastinterests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust andconfidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”

CANONS 2 & 3

IN RE: TAGORDA

Facts:Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to

the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containingthe fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of I sabela & offeringservices as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.).He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his homemunicipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant tomake known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (includinghis services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).

Issue:W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising

Held:Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the

Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations isunprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigatingcircumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.

The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek orobtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly,solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and

integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incentingto strife otherwise peaceful citizens).

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

FACTS A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which

reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of theSupreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. Sheclaims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment casesand can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involveseparation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisementswere also published.


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An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP forinvestigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in theadvertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he shouldnot be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition againstadvertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by theprohibition.

ISSUEWhether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELDYes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the

primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondaryconsideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should beprimary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.

Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” heerodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct ---he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.

Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper itmust be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law listwhere the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc. , nor may alawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive orinjure the public or the bar.

CANOY V. ORTIZ

Facts: A complaint was fi led on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing

him for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint forillegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel forCanoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty.

Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitfulvisits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000,Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of thecase.

Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that theperiod within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes hisfailure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor ofBacolod City, “he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a localgovernment official and as a practicing lawyer.”

Issue:W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?

Held:Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month. Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes

fidelity to his client’s cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence

reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. Hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, therelationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present needfor the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case andshould not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant forfailing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyer’s duties.

The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz ascouncilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyerto withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public officesince councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts: A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitationof clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentinowith the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legalrepresentation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of theirclaims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. Tosupport his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorioattesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship withLinsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICECONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICESW/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. LabianoParalegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01Tel: 362-78206th Ave., cor M.H. Del PilarFax: (632) 362-7821Grace Park, Caloocan CityCel.: (0926) 2701719


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Back

SERVICES OFFERED:CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCETO OVERSEAS SEAMENREPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD.In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing andcirculating of said calling card.

Issue:W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services

Held:Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and

16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a

business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertisetheir wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization ofthe practice of law (degrading the profession in the public’s estimation).

With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases forpurpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, whichproscribes “ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through anagent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.

As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence byLinsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professionalcapacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable lawlists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;(c) address;(d) telephone number and(e) special branch of law practiced.

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” Thephrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to changecounsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled tolure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of theirfinancial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded theintegrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

CANONS 4, 5 & 6

SUAREZ V. PLATON

Facts:Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in

turn filed a case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case washanded to Judge Platon following several changes in trial judge and several refusalsby fiscals to prosecute the case.

Issue:Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?

Held:Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must

reinvestigate in order to properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept inmind that a prosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only inthe fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to prosecute if theinnocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-foldaim is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty tostrike foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to uselegitimate methods of prosecution.

RAMOS V. IMBANG

FACTSIn 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent

Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roqueand Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latterissued a receipt for P5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases againstthe Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom andalways told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to informher that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six timesand for each “appearance” in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious.

She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan andSan Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any caseagainst the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney'sOffice (PAO).

HELD Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of

attorneys.Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and

integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be moreconscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are notonly members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to publicservice.


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Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to publicservice. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts andomissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution andexisting laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any publicofficial and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials andemployees during their incumbency shall not:xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by theConstitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their officialfunction.

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for theyare expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant andissued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-clientrelationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant

and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between himand the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted thecomplainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearlyviolated the prohibition on private practice o f profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. ThePAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigentlitigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised AdministrativeCode provides:

Sec. 14. xxxThe PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending

free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative andother quasi-judicial cases.

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees fromthe complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent

violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the

observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondentwhen he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees inconsideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of thecases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitybecause the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him fromacting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases andaccepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant.Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first placehe should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that hereally filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the

cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his “appearance fees” forhearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of thelawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moralcharacter required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers inpublic office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend tolessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the

dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty andfair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with ahigh degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violatingRule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold themoney for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. Heneither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered bythe sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was itgiven to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bailbond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a governmentlawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.

CATU V. RELLOSA

FACTSCatu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the

units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignoreddemands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try tosettle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over theconciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitionerbrought the case to court.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor.This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act ofimpropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosaviolated Rule 6.03

2 and RA 6713

3. The committee recommended Rellosa’s

suspension from practice for 1 month.

ISSUEW/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03

HELD No.

2 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in service3 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees


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Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has lef t government serv ice . Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the actcomplained of.

As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71604, which

actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he isalso governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain awritten permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed

to do.SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to uphold and obey law),

Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shalluphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys lawdisgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him tolook up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. __________

Hof i lena quest ion: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?Answer : Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officershowever are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from

their department head.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTSGeneral Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial

difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then

Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court inGENBANK's liquidation.

After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose ofrecovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with theSandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting anddamages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of

sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by takingadvantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.These respondents were represented by Mendoza.

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel forrespondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then SolicitorGeneral

and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of

GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting

4 Local Government Code of 1991

'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he hadintervened while in said service.

ISSUEW/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

respondent Mendoza?

HELDNO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as

Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how toproceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidationwith the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising theCentral Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within theconcept of 'matter’ under Rule 6.03.

The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank onthe procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing thenecessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not thesame nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.

The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation

of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged interventionwhile a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matterdifferent from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case isnot significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks theassistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the courtin this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims ofcreditors against the GENBANK.

Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a deadissue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filedmore than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari , prohibition andinjunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to theSandiganbayan . At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to

disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect. It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness

for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides'carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidentialofficial information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in thecase at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing theCentral Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter fromthe subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of theshares of respondents Tan, et al ., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for therewere no sides.

CANON 7


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IN RE GALANG

Doctrine:That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar

examinations of the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as aground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled.

IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS

FACTS Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was

precluded from taking the lawyer’s 1996 oath, pending approval from theSupreme Court

This stems from petitioner’s participation in the initiation rites of the LexTalionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as aresult of hazing.

Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May

1995 May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyer’s oath and

attached to his petition certifications attesting to his “righteous, peaceful andlaw abiding character.”

ISSUEMay Cuevas take the lawyer’s oath, taking in consideration the certifications

attesting to his “righteous, peaceful and law abiding character”?

HELDYes.Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of

that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give thepetitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that hehas a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he hastaken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for thedeath of Raul Camaligan.

SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an

illegitimate child)

Facts:Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship

became intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They livedtogether as "husband and wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affairended in 2000 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.

Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in arelationship but did not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appearduring the hearing since he did not want to see Samaniego.

Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a positionpaper. He also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10children to cohabit with Samaniego.

IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months

suspension for his refusal to support his daughter. Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will

further cause extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty.Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer forreduced penalty was denied.

Held:SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended

for 6 months. Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit

relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Althoughit is true that Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrer’swife, it does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether both are

in pari delicto. Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V.ATTY. DELA CRUZ

Facts:Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS

against Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent:

criminal case for child abuse; admin case for unethical acts ofmisappropriating money for teachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHSFaculty for illegal deduction of salary.Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite

the existence of his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-facta year after. 7 years after, he contracts another marriage, but this was annulled forbeing bigamous.

Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97despite the expiration of his notarial commission in 87.

Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, butadmitted his second marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admittedhaving notarized documents when his notarial commission had already expired.However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentionsin doing the complained acts.

IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamousmarriage and 1 year also for notarizing without commission (2 years total)


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before dropping her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula viatext messages immediately after the 2nd kissing incident.

Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on theground of grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula.

ISSUE

Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit hisdisbarment?

HELD The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly

immoral character.Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,

or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under suchscandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. Tomerit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.

Atty. Macabata’s act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kisswas not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabata’s immediateapology and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to

prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata wasreprimanded and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advinculaas distasteful.

(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)

CANON 8

REYES V. CHIONG

FACTSTwo Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business

venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually,Xu discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money

back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes,who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). Thecomplaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued asubpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear andsubmit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan inthe RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTCof Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, andfor the dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty.Reyes then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit,alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty.Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was

impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. TheSC referred the case to the IBP.

ISSUEW/N the civil complaint was groundless W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the

civil complaint

HELDYes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty.

Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa

case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since theywere not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint wasimproper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. Infiling the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension

SC: affirmed IBP’s recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned somealternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true.Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of

Salanga’s decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa casewas also available if it was indeed filed without basis.

Relevant Provisions:Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towardshis professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposingcounsel.Lawyer’s Oath – “not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false orunlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.”

ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

Facts: Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a

private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’soffice to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already beenremanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in thatcase.

Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since acertified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondentretorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainantreplied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents.Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainantexplained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered,respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. Hethen returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of yourmother, you woman!”)


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Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearingof the case in view of the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgivenalready.

Held:Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His

explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records werealready transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of recordrespondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02,because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.

His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of courtwas not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in frontof the complainant’s subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 andCanon 8.

The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to thecomplainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, thatrespondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for theconsequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.

ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

Facts: Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a

complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for usingimproper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assaultcomplainant. This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in thePAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for asettlement. Moved by the plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby,scolded and shouted at Salvani to not settle the case and to have his clientimprisoned so that he would realize his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantarareproached Pefianco, but this ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was anidiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara andeven shouted at him, “Gago ka!”

The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue:W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8

Held:Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,

fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefianco’s meddling in a matter inwhich he had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco wasmoved by the woman’s plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him theright to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down.

Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to expresshis indignation.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTS AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for

expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles inthe school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelledstudents filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violationof Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer shouldnot in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party representedby counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matterwith him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer mostparticularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented bycounsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint wasbased on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelledstudents and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived allkinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal andadministrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were

procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camachogiven that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred thatthe acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal professionwarranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUEWhether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of

Professional Ethics

HELDYES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law

for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and

effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the

students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty.Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan stillproceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at leastcommunicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students werebeing represented by counsel.

Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is aninexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of aduty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demandsrequired of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan isalso in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which statesthat "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professionalemployment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or


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favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithfulor neglectful counsel."

TORRES V. JAVIER

Facts: Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross

misconduct in office as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyer’s oath. This stemmedfrom the remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of allfunds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion toExpedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft ofUEFA’s funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.’s fees case, Javier in his Replyused abusive and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to theintegrity of the profession (“not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries askingtheir family members to sign for them”).

Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreadingreports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. Withrespect to the atty.’s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, did not confrontthe issues but mocked and made malicious accusations against his wife.

The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Issue:W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code

Held:Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial

proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutelyprivileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, howeverfalse or malicious they may be (must be material and relevant). This privilege doesnot extend to those matters not related to the controversy.

The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but notthose in the Reply. The SC does not countenance Torres’ incorporation of criticismsagainst Javier’s wife as past president of UEFA, but this does not justify Javier’s

retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies through his teeth).Canon 8 instructs that a lawyer’s arguments in his pleadings should be

gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may beproperly addressed by one gentleman to another.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

FACTSTolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by

offering, in some instances, a 50K loan.

ISSUE

Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, therebyviolating rule 8.02 which provides that, “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,…”?

HELDYes.Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client n or

induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reducedfees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.

CANON 9

MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS:This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist

from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law professionother than those allowed by law.

The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquireabout secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also saysthat they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.

Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of theconfidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of thebar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, therespondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claimsthat it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal supportservices through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should beallowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements

complained of.

HELD/RATIO:Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engagein the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of theprofession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of servicethat involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includeslegal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract bywhich legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in acourt. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he isin the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legalrights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the


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case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding thelegal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes apractice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in andout of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised,engaged in the “practice of law”.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legalinformation to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will

necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him orher on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it willconsequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudentialdefinition of "practice of law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisementof his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertisehis talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Theonly exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary,simple professional card.

The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow thepublication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve toaggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whoseintegrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.

CAYETANO V. MONSOD

FACTSRespondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for

the position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed bypetitioner Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not possess the requiredqualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a memberof the Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10years. Despite Cayetano’s opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmedthe nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition,basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsod’s nomination.

ISSUEIs Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?

HELD YES.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of

law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside ofany court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embracesconveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and thepreparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of businessand trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no directconnection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in

litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experiencewith men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complexsituations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear anintimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,

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