legal research cases

LEGAL RESEARCH CASES

G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed UYGUANGCO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO, respondents.

Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioners.

Anthony Santos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.

The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 1 The latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. 2 Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. 3

Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. 4

In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. 6

Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. The said article provides as follows:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting the petitioners to seek relief in vain from the respondent court. In the case now before us, the petitioners reiterate and emphasize their position that allowing the trial to proceed would only be a waste of time and effort. They argue that the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child, which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said provisions. The private respondent insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family."

We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified, by the corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on August 3,1988.

Under the Family Code, it is provided that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate. 7

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.

In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead." 9

Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are among those affected by the following articles in the Family Code:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,18,19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred under the said article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby DISMISSED. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 84647 May 23, 1991

MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents.

Sumulong Law Offices for petitioner.

Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p

Petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural daughter of Ana Maglanque and Pablo Leuterio, having been conceived at the time when her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other; that the evidence presented by her before the Probate Court after her natural father's death, was adequate basis for judicial declaration of the compulsory recognition of her status as said Pablo Leuterio's natural child; and that, therefore, she must be deemed to have been legitimated by the marriage of her parents some nine years after her birth. However, neither the Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals accorded credit to the proofs submitted by her to prove that she had indeed been recognized by Pablo Leuterio in his lifetime as his daughter. Indeed, not only did the former pronounce Maria Alicia's evidence as insufficient to establish her cause, "unhesitatingly" rejecting in the process certain documents introduced by Maria Alicia Leuterio as "being forged . . . and incompetent . . .," it also declared that "there are facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record which consistently and clearly indicate that the late Pablo Leuterio desisted to acknowledge Maria Alicia Leuterio as his own child with Ana Maglanque." 1

Maria Alicia is now before this Court in a third attempt to persuade acceptance of her theory.

The antecedents are largely undisputed.

Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950, leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in Pampanga. 2 His widow, Ana Maglanque—who had been one of his domestic servants and later his mistress, and whom he had married a few months before his death, more precisely, on February 25, 1950—took possession of his estate and administered it. 3

On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo Leuterio. 4

On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator. 5 Benito Leuterio's petition pertinently alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without leaving a will; that he was survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio, but also by:

a) the children of Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the full blood of the decedent, namely:

1) Consolacion Apostol

2) Jose Apostol

3) Patrocinio Apostol

4) Consejo Apostol

5) Luis Apostol

6) Jesus Apostol and

7) Margarito Apostol;

b) Vicente D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of the full blood of Pablo Leuterio;

that Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that the claim of Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had left a legitimate daughter, supra, was "without foundation in fact and in law."

The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio (the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol). After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate.

The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October 19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana Maglanque. 6

In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his capital;" and that the only issues left for determination were:

1) whether Vicente Leuterio is the legitimate child of Gregoria Leuterio; and

2) whether Maria Alicia Leuterio is the legitimated daughter of the late Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque. . . . 7

Maria Alicia Leuterio thereafter filed an "Amended Petition for Confirmation of Acknowledgment and Legitimation," under date of December 4, 1962, in which she claimed that since her birth up to the death of Pablo Leuterio, she "was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the decedent and her mother," and detailed the facts that she considered as "confirming or establishing her possession of said status . . .," including the existence of "indubitable writings . . . discovered only a month ago, wherein the decedent expressly acknowledged his being . . . (her) father. . . ." 8

The first issue was mooted by the withdrawal by Vicente Leuterio of his application as a prospective heir. Hence it was only as regards the second issue that trial was had and evidence presented by the parties.

The issue was resolved by the Probate Court adversely to Maria Alicia Leuterio. By Order dated March 10, 1971, 9the Court dismissed "the petition for confirmation of acknowledgment and legitimation of Maria Alicia Leuterio . . . for lack of basis and merit." 10 As already stated, the Probate Court disbelieved Maria Alicia's evidence, after lengthy and extensive analysis thereof, considering it to be largely incompetent, spurious and unpersuasive. 11

Maria Alicia's appeal from this Order of March 10, 1971 to the Court of Appeals met with failure. In a Decision promulgated on November 12, 1986, the Appellate Tribunal affirmed "the appealed order . . . in all respects (as) being in full accord with the evidence and the laws" 12 It overruled Maria Alicia's contentions that the Probate Court had erred—

1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the record of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga;

2) in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gervacio Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who are school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant Maria Alicia Leuterio was studying;

3) in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;

4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia Leuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural child before and after the marriage of her parents . . . .

The Court of Appeals said in part:

In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there was an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognized Maria Alicia as his natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate, baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signatures of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have been born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain this by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo has no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he looked upon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside his residence. Upon these considerations, the court a quo was correct in rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and Gervacio Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed their demeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. With respect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he and Pablo were very close friends.

What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the lapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950.

In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it was "clear and patent error" on its part—

1) to surmise that the action of the petitioner for legitimate petition is based on voluntary recognition, and

2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al.vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for legitimation."

The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.

It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking—whether it be voluntary, or compulsory, recognition—quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment." 13 It said:

There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is the action that should be instituted by the child against the father to compel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385).

The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at the time. 14 In fact, it is consistent with the statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.:

The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by a voluntary recognition (Art. 131. civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code).

A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument. (Art. 131, Civil Code).

An involuntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) by an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code).

It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have understood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 "must be precise, express and solemn" (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the status of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter.

Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review, specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar.

The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes or under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all" provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is hisfather." 15 While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal is concerned.

Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety—as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious—petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either voluntary of compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence, sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding that of the Probate Court, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.

Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for petitioner.

Domingo Antigua & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:p

The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.

Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita. 1

Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's land. 2

Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. 3

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista. 4

Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.

Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father. 5

The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a mechanic. 6

The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious children. 7 The said article provides:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father.

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:





(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.


In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor declared:

In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived with her mother, together with her sister Paulina. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the defendant. At most, only their son, Lolito Tufiacao was allowed to construct a small house in the land of the defendant, either by the defendant himself, as claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as claimed by the witnesses of the defendant. The defendant never spent for the support and education of the plaintiff. He did not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname. The instances when the defendant gave

money to the plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly periodic. They were made at considerable intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but through a third person. Thus, while it may be conceded that: a) the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa Miroy"; c) that Teopista would kiss defendant's hand when she met him; d) that the defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the passenger truck as well as the proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate child.

On appeal, however, the respondent courts 8 disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion as follows:

Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status. Although the court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the various witnesses presented, We consider the witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased. No proof was shown to render them otherwise. There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They were disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the people actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their testimonies.

By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming to be the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against his own sister and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista although both of them have been living in the same barangay since birth.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto of the private respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died on May 1986. He immediately informed the respondent court build the motion for reconsideration was denied without any substitution of parties having been effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.

The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, reading as follows:

Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. — Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, guardian or other legal representative.

Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo, 9 it was settled that:

The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during Ms lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate succession.

Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate

son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.

Now to the merits.

We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the Civil Code.

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. 10 The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). 11 There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. 12

With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.

The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting her. 13

But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14

The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts

occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. 15

Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 16 Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. 17

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 18

The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.

If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20, 1990 1 which affirmedin toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6

Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following assignment of errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and

2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.

Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 11

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.

The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. 13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment.14

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. 15

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;

5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since birth;

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILESand by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its

intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 21

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;

3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;

. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.

. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the child sake.

. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.

. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.

. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product of our love.

5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;

6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos;

7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;

8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;

10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides

WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court now resolves:

No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.

No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.

No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.

The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body of the complaint.

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:

a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari;

b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and

c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had

been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, etal., 12 wherein we said:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:


xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:


The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.

Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.

The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:

Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less that a year's time, she resigned from her work.

Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her three or four times a week.

The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water bills. 1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.

In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4

The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) 5 or thru Merceditas herself; 6 and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, 7 the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. 8 Both petitioner and his daughter admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9

During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia. 11 Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. 13

When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong." 14

In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.

Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. 15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.

Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column 16 of the death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged to have been received from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas' Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. 16 He does not understand why this case was filed against him. 17

Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with another which he eventually did in September, 1963.

Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by Melencio which were received by Leoncia.

Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes with him.

Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her

husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.

After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following:

1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas' conception;

2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;

3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;

4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and

5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to Merceditas.

Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18

Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.

Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.

Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs.

SO ORDERED. 19

The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26, 1992. 20

Hence, the present petition.

We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent court:

1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;

2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and

3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this Court.

Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to

his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was part of his family.

The petition utterly lacks merit.

Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, 22 she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 23and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. 24 However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity 25 either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.26 The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize the child as his naturalchild, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children . . . under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.

In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:

Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs mother.

The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant with a monthly salary

of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.

As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services needed in the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for liquidation of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).

At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73).

Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's Brief)

Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3") and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from defendant were the following:

Exh. "F-1"

"Dear Ne,

Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.

Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.

Sgn."

"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.

Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.

Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-2"

"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-3"

"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-4"

"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.

Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong makarating dian sa Jueves.

Sgn."

The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne". Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period of conception.

The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing the same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.

xxx xxx xxx

Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were true that there was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff's mother.

Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio foisted on the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there was really no such relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with plaintiffs mother. 27

Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:

The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).

To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)

It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33,

5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).

Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.

Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3", and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).

During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and "H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .

xxx xxx xxx

When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.

It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. 28

Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:

. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess.

The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.

Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as lacking in credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that defendant is the father since the Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.

While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the interview the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:

The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958] andBerciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all the data about his daughter's birth. . . .

. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.

As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.29

The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. 30 This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation. 31

As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account the following:

The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)

The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a

month. She attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she attained the age of majority.

This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 32

We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily.

The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in this petition. 33

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

EUTIQUIO MARQUINO and MARIA TERENAL-MARQUINO Survived by: LUZ. T. MARQUINO, ANA T. MARQUINO and EVA T. MARQUINO, petitioners, vs.THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION, BIBIANA ROMANO-PAGADORA, Survived By: PEDRO PAGADORA, EMY R. PAGADORA, JUNE R. PAGADORA, EDGAR R. PAGADORA, MAY R. PAGADORA, MAGO R. PAGADORA, ARDEN R. PAGADORA, and MARS R. PAGADORA,respondents.

Lenin R. Victoriano for petitioners.

Herminiano D. Silva for respondents.

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are the following issues: (1) the effect of the death of the natural child during the pendency of her action for recognition; and (2) the effect of the death of the putative parent also during the pendency of the case.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed Civil Case No. 5197, an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on January 10, 1971 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Also impleaded as defendants, were Maria Terenal-Marquino, wife of Eutiquio Marquino, and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva, all surnamed Terenal-Marquino.

The records show that Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi, Dumaguete City, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. 1 At that time, Eutiquio was still single. Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Luke Wright Street, Dumaguete City. She always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct

and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.

During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence, she died on March 17, 1979. On March 23, 1979, her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. On May 17, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. 2 The trial court dismissed the case.

Respondents appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). On August 20, 1983, Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. On June 17, 1985, respondent court invoking the case of Banaga vs. Pascacio, (No. 4848-R, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. No. 12, p. 5908) reversed the controverted order. It ruled:

[A]fter the death of the natural child, the heirs of said deceased natural child, cannot bring the action to compel recognition, but may however, continue the action already filed to compel recognition.

xxx xxx xxx

Summarizing, We hold that the death of the putative parent while the case against him for recognition of his alleged child is pending will not extinguish the action but the same can be continued with the heirs substituted for said deceased parents because:

a) the law does not require that the case be brought and decided while the putative parent is alive;

b) that would be adding another requisite for the action which is not sanctioned by the law or jurisprudence;

c) it would be unfair to the plaintiff child to have his action for recognition depend on the speed of the Court in disposing of the case and on a fortuitous event. This is because if the court takes, let us say, 10 years to decide the case, the chances that the defendant parent would survive the case is very much less, especially if he was already of advanced age at the time the action is brought;

d) there are no compelling reasons not to allow substitution of the deceased parent with his heirs, for with the death of the defendant parent, the effects of recognition will practically be limited to successional rights.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in this appeal, we hereby SET ASIDE the Order of the trial Court dated August 13, 1983 and remand the case to the Court of origin for continuation of the trial by the heirs of plaintiff against the heirs of defendant Eutiquio Marquino, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 3

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1985. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners hold respondent court to be in error, in these respects:

I

IN RULING THAT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE NATURAL CHILD, THE HEIRS OF SAID DECEASED NATURAL CHILD, CANNOT BRING THE ACTION TO COMPEL RECOGNITION, BUT THEY MAY HOWEVER, CONTINUE THE ACTION ALREADY FILED TO COMPEL RECOGNITION.

II

IN RULING THAT THE DEATH OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT WHILE THE CASE AGAINST HIM FOR RECOGNITION OF HIS ALLEGED CHILD IS PENDING WILL NOT EXTINGUISH THE ACTION BUT THE SAME CAN BE CONTINUED WITH THE HEIRS SUBSTITUTED FOR SAID DECEASED PARENT. 4

The Court writes finis to this controversy after twenty-three (23) years of protracted litigation.

The first issue to be resolved is whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:


(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the document.

The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be heard. The reason for the exceptions is to protect the heirs. 5

In Conde vs. Abaya, 6 we held that the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which Article 285 (Article 137, Old Civil code) refers, can never be transmitted. The reason is that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. 7

In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock on December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility. As explained in the case of Conde vs. Abaya, 8 viz.:

It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation that the right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule to his heirs, while the right to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants, is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a child is not better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.

This ruling was reiterated in the recent case of Heirs of Raymundo C. Banas vs. Heirs of Bibiano Banas 9thus:

Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Banas Raymundo could file an action for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs, still plaintiffs-appellants cannot invoke Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child.

The second issue for resolution is whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former.

We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 10 The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent court erred in ruling that the action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio. 11

Our public policy at that time supports the rule limiting actions for recognition during the lifetime of the presumed parents, to quote:

Public policy, indeed public necessity, demands that before an illegitimate child be admitted into a legitimate family, every requisite of the law must be completely and fully complied with. No one should ever be permitted upon doubtful evidence to take from legitimate children the property which they and their parents have, by industry, fidelity, and frugality, acquired. To do so would in many instances where the legitimate children had "labored unsparingly in order that they might have the comforts of life and joys of home," be manifestly contrary to every plainest principles of justice. And again, if this can ever be done upon oral testimony alone, after the lips of the alleged father and mother have been closed by death, such testimony must be clear, strong, and convincing. 12

Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition, however, has been superseded by the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now provided:

The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five (5) years within which to institute the action.

The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime (not during the lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. 13

Be that as it may, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. "Vested right" is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. 14 It expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action. 15

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1985 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 5197 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996]

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

On March 7, 1983, a Complaint[1] for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/mar1996/112193.htm#_edn1

In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.

The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children” as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:

“6. The plaintiffs’ father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs’ and their mother’s family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:

(a) Regular support and educational expenses;

(b) Allowance to use his surname;

(c) Payment of maternal bills;

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;

(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;

(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;

(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.”[2]

Petitioners denied all these allegations.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -

1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;

2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;

3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:

x x x x x x x x x

4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to ½ portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;

5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;

6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;

7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiff’s (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as atty.’s fee;

8. Cost against the defendants.”[3]



Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.

Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out of time.

A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, datedOctober 13, 1993.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:

A

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

B

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.

C

RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED, OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.

D

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.[4]

Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which states the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:

“Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; x x x.”

Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription. The law cited reads:


“Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:





(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”

“Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”

In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:

“This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be: Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?

The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. “The Committee did not define what is meant by a ‘vested or acquired right,’ thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future.”[5]

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,[6] a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as “Claim for Inheritance” but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” we had occasion to rule that:

“Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.”




Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.[8]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


legal research cases

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