legitimacy in the arab world

8/4/2019 Legitimacy in the Arab World

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The substance of government legitimacy, then, Coicaud argues, is norms and values, the very

core of which makes up the societys identity. An abuse of those inalienable norms will be

perceived as a grave psychological assault. As a way to institutionalise such values, and to ensure

reciprocity, the societys identity must be reflected in lawat least as a credible aim of

achievement.3 Furthermore, conformity to the law is more important than the exact application.

As the base of authority, the sovereign leader has to be subordinated to the lawhis actions

restricted. If not, and if laws are not reflecting identity, their rejection is plausible; worse, the

societys identity risks being discredited. 4Although it may seem obvious that authority and law

must reflect mass identity, it is clearly at odds with, for example, the Weberian approach, which

declares that legality and solid institutions, rather than norms, drive government legitimacy.5 For

Weber, however, the colonial assault and its full implications in the Arab World was unknown.6

Because of the confusion, violence, and resentment towards government that ensued from it,

Colonialism has demonstrated the necessity of a coherent normative foundation to achieve

government legitimacy.

The Analysis

To analyse the relevance of Coicauds definition to the Arab World, the broad characteristics of

the indigenous Arab identity must first be outlined. Generally, as far as a common language,

traditional culture (very broadly), and religion (Islam) are concerned, people in the Arab World

seem to share an identity. Most importantly, the Umma, religious community dating back to the

prophet, still constitutes a pervasive Muslim collective consciousness of fundamental

Gustav Mansson

Student no: 41124235

3Coicaud, Legitimacy and politics,pp. 15-18.

4Ibid.,pp. 19-25.

5 Max Weber,Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1978), p. 36; For a similar, more contemporary approach, see also: Samuel P.Huntington,Political order in changing societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.

8-12.

6 Max Weber died in 1920 at the height of European Colonialism.


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significance.7 The argument, however, is not that the population of the Arab World is

homogenousthe cultural differences in the region are huge, demonstrated, for example, by the

failure of the Arab-Unity project.8 Rather, given the predominance of Islam and its significant

influence on the lives of Muslims, Islams great importance as a unifying, normative factor in the

Arab World is stressed.

But during European Colonialism, secular values, institutions, and leaders were brutally forced

upon the Arab World, with little consideration taken to such an Islamic identity. The ensuing

crisis in government legitimacy was further exacerbated by the lack of reciprocity between the

new secular governments and the masses. Therefore, Paul Salem speaks of a psychological crisis

precipitated by the challenge of Western secularism; William E. Shephard forewarns of

secularisms weak roots in Islamic tradition; and Tariq Al-Bishri, an Egyptian intellectual, states

that European laws "drove a wedge between governments and their people.9 But is this true even

today, more than half a century later? That contemporary, still predominantly secular, Arab

governments are increasingly forced to seek legitimacy from Islam suggests that. So does the

challenge of radical Islamism, epitomised by the extraordinary rise of the Muslim Brotherhood

a popular, Islamic movement in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, working to achieve a social justice that

Gustav Mansson


7 Michael C. Hudson,Arab politics : the search for legitimacy (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1977), p. 37-39; Roger Owen, State, power and politics in the making of the modernMiddle East(London: Routledge, 2004), p.57; John L. Esposito, The Islamic threat : myth or

reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 30, p.33. For another example of thestrong collective consciousness of contemporary Muslims, see: Lori Peek, Becoming Muslim:The Development of a Religious Identity, Sociology of Religion, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Autumn 2005),

pp. 215-242.

8 For example, see: Michael C. Hudson, Middle East dilemma : the politics and economics ofArab integration (New York: Columbia University Press, in association with the Center for theContemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University; 1999), pp. 1-32.

9 Paul Salem,Bitter legacy : ideology and politics in the Arab world(Syracuse, N.Y: SyracuseUniversity Press, 1994), p. 15. See also: Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and

politics, in Shahram Akbarzadehand Abdullah Saeed (eds) Islam and Political legitimacy(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 4. Tariq al-Bishri,Dirasat fi-l-Dimuqratiyya al-Misriyya(Studies in Egyptian Democracy) (Cairo: Dar al-Sharouq, 1987), pp. 174-175; William E.

Shepard, Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology,International Journal of Middle EastStudies, Vol.27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 323-324. See also: Hudson,Arab Politics,pp.123-125.


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has been denied by the state.10 With a prevailing discrepancy between Arab governments and

popular identity based on Islam, the substance of government legitimacy in Coicauds definition

is undermined.

Furthermore, popular rise of Islamism has often been brutally quelled. Syria, ruled by the

secular Baath-party, has suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood; the same policy has beenand is

used by the Western-backed Egyptian president Mubarak.11 The vicious circle undermining

legitimacy becomes clear: To legitimise suppression, Coicaud stresses that governments require a

strong consent. In fact, since it has been suggested that popular identity is poorly reflected in

government, consent is weak. As discontent rises, more force is necessary to sustain the

government, further eroding the basis for consent and, thus, government legitimacy. A more

successful, reconciliatory approach towards Islamists is evident in Jordan; and in Kuwait, even

more tolerant governments have contributed to a relatively legitimate, stable system with limited

discontent.12 Clearly, to brutally quell discontent rooted in the substance of legitimacy, the

Islamic identity, only undermines long-term prospects for government legitimacy.

There is, however, a growing realisation among Arab governments that law has to reflect

popular Islamic identity. In Egypt, the constitution has been amended, declaring Islamic law

(Sharia) the principle source of legislation; in Syria, a bill to further secularise the constitution

has been scrapped.13 But as suppression continues, such legal measures seem to have been only

Gustav Mansson


10 On the rise of Islamism and legitimacy sought from Islam, see: Shahram Akbarzadeh, Statelegitimacy, in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds) Islam and Political legitimacy(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 169. See also: Ilan Papp, The modern Middle East(London: Routledge, 2005),p. 277. On the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, see: Esposito, TheIslamic Threat,p. 112; Owen, State, Power, and Politics, p. 164; Papp, The Modern Middle

East,pp. 272-273; Hesham Al- Awadi, Mubarak and the Islamists: why did the "honeymoon"end?, The Middle East Journal, Vol . 59 No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 62-81, The Move toCoercion. About the prevailing lack of reciprocity in the Arab World, see for example: Aburish,A brutal friendship,pp. 70-72.

11 On Syria, see: Papp, The Modern Middle East,p. 276. On Egypt, see: Esposito, The IslamicThreat,p. 244; Owen, State, Power and Politics,pp. 166; Sad K Aburish,A brutal friendship :the West and the Arab elite (New York: St Martins Press, 1998), p. 65; For a recent update on theEgyptian crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, see also:BBC NEWS: Egypt Islamists' wait forpower, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7335410.stm.

12 On Kuwaits experiment with democracy, reconciliation with Islamists, and its welfare state,see: Hudson,Arab Politics,pp. 182-189. Modern Reconciliatory Kuwait: Katherine Meyer,Helen Rizzo and Yousef Ali, Changed Political Attitudes in the Middle East: The Case of

Kuwait,International Sociology Vol. 22 (2007), pp. 289-324.

13 Akbarzadeh and Saeed, Islam and politics, pp. 7-8; Papp, The Modern Middle East,p. 277.


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aimed at thwarting the rise of Islamism. So their adoption will certainly not enjoy the same level

of religious legitimacy as, say, the Sharia of Saudi Arabia (SA).14 In SA, however, the rulers

conformity to the law is inadequate. While Coicaud stresses that law should define the

sovereigns powers, in SA, as in many other Arab states, leaders are in practise above the law,

wielding absolute paralegal veto powers.15 Interestingly, in 1992, a clergy sponsored reform

memorandum made plain such lack of legal restriction.16 Similarly, in Egypt, prominent

theological scholars are questioning and demanding their rulers accountability.17 Although much

remains to be done for law to better reflect identity and to improve leadership accountability, the

debate about conformity to the law in SA and Egypt is encouraging.

All-Arab issues

Partly because of the pervasiveness of an Islamic identity, and partly because of events unique

to the region, all-Arab issues are crucial for short-term government legitimacy. First and arguably

most important is Palestine. Ever since Britain, the old colonial power, betrayed the Arabs by

supporting the creation of a Jewish Homeland, Palestine has been high on the agenda. Zionist

settlements in Palestine, however, had been under way since 1882, culminating in the creation of

the Jewish state in 1948, followed by subsequent expansion far beyond the original borders.18

Today, the Palestine question is still as important as ever for Arab governments legitimacy. An

injustice of epic proportions, the Palestine conundrum is seen as the last remnant of imperialism,

which the Arab World is still struggling to come to terms with. 19 Notwithstanding Fouad Ajamis

assertion that Arab unity has failed, Palestine is still one of few issues on which the Arab League

has been able to show a united front.20 A united front, however, is still just that. It is possible to

Gustav Mansson


14 Larbi Sadiki, Saudi Arabia: re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11, inShahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds)Islam and Political legitimacy (London:Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 31.

15Ibid.,pp. 32-33.

16Ibid., p. 40.

17 Bruce K. Rutherford, What do Egypt's Islamists want? Moderate Islam and the rise of Islamicconstitutionalism, The Middle East Journal, Vol 60, Issue 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 707-732.

18 Papp, The Modern Middle East,p. 19.

19 Hudson,Arab Politics,p. 118, p. 124; Salem,Bitter Legacy,pp. 28-29.

20 Fouad Ajami, The End of Pan-Arabism,Foreign Affairs (Winter 1978/79), p. 368; Hudson,Middle East dilemma, p. 10.


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see a connection between the failure to coerce Israel into ending the occupation and the rise of

Islamism, challenging government legitimacy partly because of that failure.21 In that context,

active support for Palestine is vital.

A second and related all-Arab issue is the aversion to external presence and influence. This, of

course, has partly to do with the fairly recent memory of Colonialism, but also with humiliating

Western interference in historical rises of pan-Arabism.22 In later years, interference by the West

has taken the form of a supposed struggle between civilisations, exacerbated by the attacks of

September 11 and the subsequent United States (US) War on Terror.23 Despite this, many Arab

states are strong allies to the US, which is inducing strong regional, anti-Western discontent. As

with Palestine, a rift between government and masses can be observed. Whilst there are several

all-Arab issues, these are the most serious because they draw on the same grievances as with the

substance of government legitimacy. While not strong enough alone to build long-term

government legitimacy, all-Arab issues certainly have the power to undermine such efforts.

Towards legitimacy, a plan of action

Based on the analysis, a three-step rationale for achieving greater government legitimacy in the

Arab World will now be offered. As there seems to be no doubt that a strong Islamic identity

exists in the region, it is fundamental that all spheres of authority reflect and realise that identity.

The first step to achieving this would be to initiate a thorough revision of the law. This should be

done in a framework of Ijtihadthe practise, within Islam, of independent thinking and

reinterpretation of the sacred texts. For all the differences between mass, radical, moderate and

traditional Islamic identity, support for Ijtihad is largely a uniting force.24 Thus, by revising the

law in this traditional, Islamic way, not only would the swath of popular Islamic identity be

incorporated, but the problematic issue of how to cope with modernity couldand shouldbe

Gustav Mansson


21 Akbarzadeh and Saeed, Islam and politics, pp. 4-5.

22 Ian S. Lustick, The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness inHistorical Perspective,International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 653-683.

23 See for example: Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations?,Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72,Issue 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

24 Shepard, Islam and Ideology, pp. 307-336. Islamic constitutionalists: Rutherford, What doEgypt's Islamists want?, Chapter 2, The Source and Purpose of Law.


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legitimately addressed. Furthermore, the revision of law should entail improved government

accountability. That would be in accordance with calls, as demonstrated by the Saudi and

Egyptian examples, for the executive to be separated from, and held accountable to, Sharia. It

would also acknowledge the Islamic principle of Shura, or consultation, which obliges the ruler

to consult with the Umma.25

Second, through the framework of the revised law, government reciprocity, and fair distribution

of wealth must be ensured. The analysis has shown that apart from relying on their Islamic

credentials, Islamist groupsHezbollah, The Muslim Brotherhood, etc.are hugely popular for

their grassroots actions to achieve the social justice that governments have failed to deliver.26

Rather than trying to suppress groups that better reflect the Islamic identity of the people,

governments should let them participate in the political process. More importantly, aspects of

their formula for success should be mimicked; especially their work towards social justice

through the framework of Islam. Doing so would not only improve government legitimacy, but

further radicalisation of Islamists groups would arguably be avoided. The example of Kuwait

demonstrates this logic to have basis in reality.27

Finally, in order to guarantee long-term government legitimacy, Arab governments must secure

short-term legitimacy through staying faithful to core all-Arab issues. On Palestine, however,

they must do more than just demonstrate a united frontsympathy with the Palestinians is not

enough. As no end to the conflict is in sight, united Arab efforts must be made to put pressure on

all parties. As has been shown, not doing so would risk exacerbating the rift between masses and

government.28 In addition, Arab governments must avoid unconditional support for Western

powers. Instead, they must balance the need for Western investment with the vital short-term

legitimacy that ensues from staying critical. Consequently, unconditional support is not a viable

option. Most importantly, Arab governments must realise that core all-Arab issues have the

power to undermine genuine efforts towards long-term government legitimacy.

Gustav Mansson


25 Rutherford, What do Egypt's Islamists want?, Chapter 3, Constraints on State Power.

26 See point 10 and 11

27 See point 12

28 See point 21


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Conclusions

The intention of this essay is not to have outlined the only possible means of achieving

government legitimacy. Performance legitimacy and state nationalism, for example, are also

important; as is charismatic leadership in rallying a population behind a legitimate cause. Nor has

it been suggested that all Arab governments are equally illegitimate or necessarily illegitimate in

exactly the same way. What this essay has suggested is that the prevailing Islamic identity is the

most viable substance for long-term government legitimacy in the Arab World. It all boils down

to working towards a reciprocal government that reflects the identity of its people. In the

contemporary Arab World, it seems like Kuwait has come closest to achieving that. The caveat is,

of course, political will. Although the plan of action may sound logical, it will be hard to

implement if the leadership has strong incentives to be opposed. And they probably will be. One

of the common prevailing legacies of Colonialism is a leadership with a vested interest in

maintaining status quo. 29 That is the single greatest obstacle to the realisation of the three-step

plan for achieving greater government legitimacy in the Arab World.

Gustav Mansson


29 See for example: Hudson,Arab Politics,pp. 107-125; Owen, State, Power and Politics,p. 31;Aburish,A Brutal Friendship,pp. 13-18; Papp, The Modern Middle East,pp. 291-292.


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Dar al-Sharouq, 1987)

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Meyer, K, Rizzo, H and Ali Y., Changed Political Attitudes in the Middle East: The Case ofKuwait,International Sociology, 22 (2007), 289-324.

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Gustav Mansson



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Salem, P.,Bitter legacy : ideology and politics in the Arab world(Syracuse, N.Y: SyracuseUniversity Press, 1994)

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Gustav Mansson


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