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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2

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Condensate Storage Tank Rupture Due to High StressD f' C1

EVENT DATE(5t LER NUMSER t5 REPORT DATE I7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDIll4Dh DAv YEAR YEAR SKQUKrtctn

~t UMSE 4RCV6i04ii 'MOS4 MD%Tin OA" YEAR

N/A

~ AC, ~ i DAMES DOCKET NUVSER'5'

5 0 0 0

28 87 87 075 00 02 12 88 N/A 0 5 0 0 0

OPERATINCMODE IS) 4

POWERLEVEL PPP

110i

THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTED PVRSVANT T

20,C02(ol

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20.l05 Ic I ( I I Ii)t

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Voluntary

ttAME

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Robert E. Jenkins, Assistant Supervisor TechnicalSupport

TEI.EPHONK 'i MSER

A4EA CODE

3 I5 349-4220COMPLETE QoiK LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRISEO IH THIS REPORT (13

CAUSE SYSTEM CQMPONKNn MANUFAC CREPDRTAS E

TVRER(

C 444 So CAUSE SYSTEM DVonhEh *I i MRER

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EPORTASLTO HPRDS

SVPPLEMEIITAL REPORT EXPECTED (ll'XPECTEDSUBMISSION

DATE IISI

MOh DAY YEA4

YES IIIyct, comprcrc EXPECTED SUSMISSIOiY DATE HC

ASSTRACT ILimit to Ic00 cpccct I c,. cppronimcrcty Iiftocn c np ~ conte rypcttnctcn I.nnr llli

On November 28, 19B7 at 1824 hours, Control Room operators at Nine Mile PointUnit 2 (NMP2) were informed that one of two Condensate Storage Tanks(2CNS-TK1A) was leaking water from a large crack near its bottom. At thetime, NMP2 was in the cold shutdown condition with reactor coolant atapproximately 114 degrees Fahrenheit and ambient pressure. The leaking watercaused a sump pump to overflow and a secondary containment penetration seal tofail, which established a flow path to the Reactor Building (RB) 175 footelevation. Flooding on RB 175 foot elevation caused the failure of a seismicmonitor.

The cause of the rupture of 2CNS-TK1A was a construction deficiency. Thecause of the penetration seal failure was assumed to be improper workpractices/personnel error.

The construction deficiency has been corrected and 2CNS-TKlA has been refilledand retested. The penetration seal and flooded seismic monitor have beenrepaired. Procedures will also be developed to ensure that watertightpenetration seals are verified operable once per 18 months.

This event has been determined to not be reportable per lOCFR21, "Reporting ofDefects and Noncompliance", nor 10CFR50.73, "Licensee Event Report System",but is being submitted as a voluntary LER.

8808010Zy5 880~~~SPDR ADO S000410

DCDNRC Form 355

NRC Fo.t I 366AI983 ~

LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU NU.S NUCLEAR REQULATORY COUMISSlCFl

A»ROVEO OMS NC 3I5 ~" AEXPIRES. S 3IISS

FACILITYNAME 111

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

TlXTl/awe Neet N nyo&4 ~ e4SNnal HIICAnn~ 6 I IITII. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

OOCKET NUMSER 13

4100 5 0 0 0

vE J ~

87

LER NUMSER (Si

SEQUENTIA~luMeER

075

PACE 3

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00 02

On November 28, 1987 at 1824 hours, Control, Room operators at Nine Mile Point Unit2 (NMP2) were informed that one of two Condensate Storage Tanks (2CNS-TK1A) wasleaking water into the Condensate Storage Tank pit area. At 1842 hours, operatorsverified that 2CNS-TKlA was leaking from a large crack near the bottom of thetank. At the time of the event, NMP2 was in the cold shutdown condition with thereactor mode switch in the "SHUTDOWN" position. Reactor temoerature and pressurewere approximately 114 degrees fahrenheit and 0 pounds per square inch gauge(psig), respectively..

The Condensate Storage and Transfer System (CNS) contains two 450,000 galloncapacity reinforced fiberglass storage tanks 2CNS-TKlA and TK1B. The tanks are 53feet in height and 40 feet in diameter. The safeguard reserve capacity for theHigh Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling(RCIC) system is 135,000 gallons in each tank. The condensate storage tanks arereinforced fiberglass tanks manufactured by Metal Cladding, Incorporated.

Upon verification that 2CNS-TKlA was leaking, operators performed the followingactions:

Started transfer of water from 2CNS-TKlA to 2CNS-TKlB via minimum flow linesfrom Condensate Transfer Pumps 2CNS-PlA and 2CNS-P1B.

Isolated all condensate input lines to 2CNS-TK1A.

Manually opened RCIC minimum flow valve (2CNS-TKlA holds the safeguardreserve condensate capacity for RCIC) to establish. a flow path from2CNS-TKlA to the suppression pool.

Contacted the Chemistry Department and requested the water in the CondensateStorage Tank pit area be sampled.

At 0000 hours on'ovember 29, operators noted that 2CNS-TKlA inventory was beingreduced via three flow paths; the large crack, condensate transfer to 2CNS-TK1B,and the RCIC minimum flow line. The level of water in 2CNS-TKlA was noted as 23feet (original level was 44 feet).

The cracked condensate storage tank continued to leak unti 1 its water level reachedthe level of the crack (1 foot above the bottom of the Condensate Storage Tank).The rupture of 2CNS-TK1A was in the form of a large circumferential crack ( 18 feetlong by 1 inch wide). Water flowed from 2CNS-TKlA into the Condensate Storage TankDit area. As the pit area fi lied, condensate began to flow into the floor drainsin the area which lead to the Condensate Storage Tank Building sump (20FM-TKl)located in the adjacent room.

NRC FORM 366AI&831

~ U.S QPO. I QSSO83+636 AM

NIIC Pena 444A0441I LICENSEE NT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINU N

U.4. NUCLEAR /IEOULATORYCOMMI441ON

APPROVEO OM4 40 JISOWIOdEXP/RES: 4/31/IEI

S*CILITYNAME (1l OOCKET NUM4ER L11

v EAR

LER NUMEER I41

$ EOVENT'ALRvu d ~

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2

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The condensate flow rate through the Condensate Storage Tank pit area floordrains into the 2DFM-TKl was estimated to be 350 .to 400 gallons per minute(gpm). The pumping capacity of each Condensate Storage Tank Building sump

pump (2DFM-P4A and B) is 50 gpm for a total pumping capacity of 100 gpm. Thus

2DFM-TKl quickly filled and overflowed into the room in which it is located.The room in which 2DFM-TKl is located is connected to a pipe tunnel which runsto the Reactor Building. Water flowed down this tunnel to the northwest sideof the Reactor Building. About 12 feet away from the outside of the ReactorBuilding exterior wall the pipe tunnel turns downward and falls 40 feet inelevation from floor elevation 244 feet to 204 feet. Water flowed over a

three inch curb at the top of the 40 foot drop-off and into the pit. The pit(12 feet x 20 feet x 40 feet) started to fillwith water.

Located four feet above the pit floor (at elevation 208 feet) are foursecondary containment penetrations. These penetrations are sealed insidesecondary containment as shown in Figure l. As the water level in the pitincreased above the level of these penetrations, one failed (penetrationW-3045-C). The failure was noted in the control room at 0200 hours. The

penetration is a 24 inch wall sleeve containing a 20 inch pipe. The failureoccurred as a result of the rubber boot slipping off of the penetration sleeveas water filled the sleeve. The penetration seal failure allowed water toflow into the Reactor Building (RB) at Elevation 208 feet and down to the RB

sump level at elevation 175 feet. The water flooded a seismic monitor locatedat RB 175 foot level and caused it to become inoperable. The seismic monitorwhich failed is a Triaxial. Response Spectrum Recorder manufactured by Engdahl-

Enterprises, Model RSR-1600-H/V-16A.

The water then proceeded to flow into the RB sumps at a rate which exceeded

the sumps pumping capacity. Water began to accumulate on the RB 175 footfloor elevation until 2CNS-TKlA was empty. Water levels were noted as

reaching approximately 6 inches on the RB 175 foot floor level. The RB sumps

were pumped to the Radwaste system for treatment prior to being discharged toLake Ontario.

The water in the Condensate Storage Tank pit area was sampled for gamma

radiation emitters, oil and greases, tritium, pH, and suspended solids,Results of the analyses of the samples showed. that the water contained no

gamma radiation emitters. Oil and grease, pH, suspended solid, and tritiumlevels were all within Federal Limits.

The Radwaste system could not immediately process the amount of water flowingfrom 2CNS-TKlA. Thus, water in the Condensate Storage Building sump and RB

sumps could no longer be pumped to the Radwaste System. To preclude excessiveflooding on RB 175 elevation it was decided to pump water from the Condensate

Storage Tank pit to the storm drains outside. The storm drains flow directlyinto Lake Ontario. The Chemistry Department continued periodic water analysesduring the time the water was being pumped through this non-normal liquideffluent discharge path. Approximately 200,000 gallons of condensate storagewater was discharged to the HMP2 storm drains.

4RC +ORV $dddi94$ i

~ V EuPO:944 ~ . d '.14

RRC Pen» SBBA(042(

LICENSEE 'ENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINU ONV.S, NUCLEAR RTOULATORY COMMISBIOP(

APPIIOVBO OMB RO 2(50&((HEXPIRES: 4/ill

SACILITY HAMS (II OOCKET HVMBSR (2l

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LBR NUMBER Iel

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The Radiation Protection Department was notified of the failure of 2CNS-TKlAat 1845 hours on November 28, 1987. A Radiation Protection Technician wasimmediately sent to survey the Condensate Storage Tank pit area. Noradioactivity was detected. Personnel from this department continued tomonitor the water and radiation levels in flooded plant areas so thatpreparations could be made for cleanup. At 0445 hours on November 29, 1987smear samples were taken in the dry open areas of RB elevation 175 feet afterit was clear of water. The smears showed contamination levels were low enoughso that no special precautions were needed to perform cleanup activities.

On November 30, 1987 at 1015 hours, a survey of the remaining contents of2CNS-TK1A was performed. The survey showed no radioactive contaminants in thewater and only slight contamination in the sludge at the bottom of the tank.

„ The remainder of the water was pumped into the Condensate Storage Tank pitfloor drains for processing through the Radwaste system. The tank was thenposted as a contaminated area and cleanup activities were started.

This event has been determined to not be reportable per 10CFR21, "Reporting ofDefects and Noncompliance", nor 10CFR50.73, "Licensee Event Report System",but is being submitted as a voluntary LER.

II.. CAUSE OF EVENTS

Root cause analyses for the events have been completed per Site SupervisoryProcedure S-SUP-l, "Root Cause Evaluation Program". Two root cause analyseswere performed, one addressing the failure of 2CNS-TK1A and one addressing theReactor Building penetration seal failure. At the time of the tank failurethe water level in the tank was at 44 feet, its highest point since the tankwas tested.

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK FAILURE:

During the erection of 2CNS-TKlA it was identified that the concrete slabunder the tank contained uneven areas which left two large areas under thetank's ring girder with gaps between the ring girder and the concrete slab.One of these two ar eas correlates exactly with the area of the tank failure.

During filling of-the tank for the initial hydrostatic test (Nay 1984) bucklesoccurred in the upper portions of the tank over the uneven slab areas when thetank reached a little over half full. The uneven support of the tank's shellcaused excessive vertical deflections in the areas of uneven support. Thesedeflections put the top of the shell over these areas in compression whichresulted in buckling of the thinner panels at the top of the tank shell. Tocorrect the buckling problem, the tank was drained and the horizontal seambetween the fourth and fifth tank courses (24 feet above tank bottom) was cutover the areas of uneven support and freed of the weight of the bottom half ofthe tank. The top of the tank returned to round and left gaps at the seamsthat were cut. To close these gaps, the bottom of the tank was jacked up atthe ring girder. Shims were added under the ring girder and the cut seamrelaminated. This action relieved the buckling condition experienced whilefilling the tank. The tank was then completely filled and a hydrostatic testwas satisfactoril corn leted.

VRC +O>IM SSSA(942>

iv 9 opo I Bee c e. -.. --

IIC Pena 38EA$43 I LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU N

U.E. NUCLEAR IEOULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVEO OMS NO, 3(5OWIOd

EXPIRES: 8/31/(6

SACILITY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (3l

YEA/I

LER NUMSER (81

SEOVENTIALVVMSER

+5 V'SIC NVVMddA

PACE ~ 3)

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

TEKT u ~ Nedd N~ ~ d(E(NRd/8/acr asac d/nn

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The knuckle between the tank wall and floor had been installed before jacking,which left the floor of the tank in the shimmed areas without proper support

.(see Figure 2). Due to the hydrostatic load on the floor of 2CNS-TK1A, thetop of the knuckle was subjected to much greater stresses than those for whichit was designed. This ultimately led to failure of the bonded joint of theknuckle to the tank wall. Thus, the cause of the failure of 2CNS-TKlA hasbeen attributed to a construction deficiency (improper installation of thetank).

REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATION SEAL FAILURE:

The air/water boot seal for penetration M-3045-C was installed as shown inFigure 1 on November ll, 1985. The boot seal was inspected and accepted byquality Assurance personnel on December 2, 1985. After December 2, 1985, theboot could have been damaged and not identified because boot installations ofthis type have not yet been reinspected at NMP2. It is the EngineeringDepartment's opinion that the boot seal was damaged sometime between October28 and November 12, 1986 when a work request (MR 113492) was being performedto reposition a junction box directly above the penetration seal. It isassumed that the boot was damaged while the conduit was being installed. Thedamage consisted of the boot sealing material being loosened around the sleevepenetration extension. Thus, the assumed cause of the air/water boot sealfailure for penetration M-3045-C was improper work practices by the personnelwho used permanent plant equipment as a place to stand or support otherequipment while performing work.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

There are no safety related portions of- the Condensate Storage and Transfer(CNS) system. The two safety related systems which may draw water from CNS

(RCIC and HPCS) are also capable of drawing suction from the suppressionpool. Thus, the CNS system has no safety design basis and the loss ofcondensate storage capacity of 2CNS-TKlA had no.,adverse safety consequences.

The Condensate Storage Tank pit area is connected to the pipe tunnel area by a

water tight door and a drain line to 2DFM-TKl. The design of the water tightdoor is to prevent.a large volume flow rate of water between the two areas inthe event of a flash flooding scenario on either side of the door. The drainline is designed to drain the CST pit area of normal water leakage from theCondensate Transfer pumps located in the area. The water tight door/drainline combination are not designed to prevent the water flow path from the pitto the pipe tunnel which occurred in this event. The water tight door wasclosed for the duration of the event.

FSAR section 3C.5.5.4 presently states that there are no non-seismic storageareas within or hydraulically connected to the piping tunnels. This statementis incorrect because if 2CNS-TKlA or 1B ruptures, there is a hydraulicconnection to piping tunnels via .floor and equipment drains. The FSAR isbeing revised.

saC +0/IM 3ddd'833

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NRC dna SEEAl04$ )

LICENSEE ~NT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU NU.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCANA)ES/ON

APPROyEO OME I/O S;SG~IGAE){P/RES: E/Sl/{El

FAC{LITYNAME {l)

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

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The Reactor Building penetration seal -failure was evaluated per NuclearEngineering and Licensing Procedure NEL-029, "Notification Under 10CFR21".The conclusion of this evaluation (Evaluation F87-017) was that the NMP2 plantand safety systems were not impaired due to the penetration seal failure andthat the incident did not present a substantial safety hazard. No equipmentin the Reactor Building was damaged other than the seismic monitor previouslynoted.

The Reactor Building penetration, seal which failed (W-3045-C) is an air/waterboot seal; The seal is designed to maintain secondary containment integrityper Plant Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.6.5,'"Secondary ContainmentIntegrity", and act as protection against water inleakage to the ReactorBuilding during a Probable Maximum Flood. All penetrations through RB

exterior walls below elevation 261 foot level at NMP2 have water tightpenetration sleeves. Pipe penetrations such as W-3045-C through exteriorwalls of Category I structures have water tight seals designed to withstandthe flood loads. Boot seal W-3045-C is designed for air at 0.18 psig andwater at 28 psig. Boot seal W-3045-C is not required to be fire rated.

Had the event occurred during full power operation, a plant shutdown wouldhave been required per TS 3/4.6.5 because failure of penetration seal W-3045-Cis considered a loss of secondary containment integrity. However, the eventoccurred in an operational condition in which secondary containment integrityis not required to be maintained (Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, no irradiated

- fuel being handled in the reactor building).

Much of the condensate in the Condensate Storage Tank pit area was pumped tosite storm drains. The storm drains flow directly into Lake Ontario. TheChemistry Department performed water analyses before, during, and after thewater was pumped out of these areas. The analyses were designed to detectgamma radiation emitters, oils and greases, tritium, pH and total suspendedsolids. Results of these analyses showed that the condensate which was pumpedto the storm drains contained no gamma emitting radionuclides and was withinand Federal limits for oils and greases-, pH, suspended solids, and tritium.Details of pumping this liquid effluent to the storm drains shall be addressedin the next NMP2 Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent. Release Report.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action after the water drained to the crack level was todrain and clean up all affected plant areas so that equipment repairs could bestar ted.

As stated in Section II, the cause of the knuckle failure was determined to beimproper support of tank floor in the area where the tank shell had beenshimmed at the time of original tank erection. Since this shimming had alsobeen performed elsewhere around the tank, disposition of this concern was tocut the entire floor free from the knuckle 360'round the tank. This wouldallow the 1/4" thick floor panels to return to the concrete slab for supportas intended by the design. The entire existing knuckle was then removed and a

new knuckle was laid up.

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LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU ONU.S. NUCLEAR IIECULATOIIYCOMMISSION

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SACILITYNAME Ill OOCKET NUMSEII I2I LEA NUMSEA Idl

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After the new fiberglass resin was allowed three days to cure, the tank wasfilled with demineralized water to a depth of 51 1/2 feet and held at thatlevel in excess of six hours with no signs of any tank leakage.

In addition to the hydrostatic test of the tank, acoustic emission monitoringof the tank was also performed while the tank was filled. This monitoring wasperformed at the suggestion of the tank manufacturer to supply additionalassurance of a sound repair of the tank. Preliminary interpretations of thedata accumulated by representatives of Acoustic Testing Corp. (ATC) ofCharlotte, NC was that the tank was sound and showed no signs of degradationduring refill.The construction documents for the other condensate storage tank (2CNS-TKlB)have been reviewed to determine if a similar situation exists for it. It wasfound that the foundation for 2CNS-TKlB was poured independently of thefoundation for 2CNS-TKlA. The Engineering Department has concluded that2CNS-TKlB is not subject to the same type of failure experienced by2CNS-TKlA. To lend an additional degree of confidence to this conclusion,2CNS-TK1B was fully drained, cleaned, visually inspected and refilled while

" performing an acoustic emission test. This test found no unusual stresses onthe tank during the refill..The Reactor Building penetration seal W-3045-C has been repaired per MorkRequest (MR 127678). The work was completed and accepted by December 7, 1987.

As the 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation F87-017 suggested, several signs were postedaround M-3045-C and the four other penetrations near it. The signs read, "DO

NOT STEP OR STAND ON PENETRATION SEAL".

The condensate transfer pumps 2CNS-P1A and PlB which are located in theCondensate Storage Tank pit area were not flooded, but were exposed to anenvironment of high moisture. As a precaution, the pump motors have beenmegger tested (MR'29836) to assure that no condensation collected in themotor windings.

The flooded seismic monitor has been repaired per Work Request 129313. 'hework was completed and accepted by January 27, 1988.

A Licensing Document Change Notice (LDCN U-187) has been issued to change FSAR

Section 3C.5.5.4 so that it no longer states that there are no non-seismicstorage areas hydraulically connected to the piping tunnels.

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NRC For~ 886A943

FACILITYNAME 'lI)

LICENSEE T REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINU N

OOCKET NUMBER I2I

U 5 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APFROYcO OIIB NO 3I 50&IOIEXPIRES: 8'31. 88

LEA NUMSER 16I

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The General Employee Training (GET) course is required to be satisfactorilycompleted by all personnel who have access to the NMP2 site. This courseemphasizes that personnel are not to climb on permanent plant equipment andstresses the importance of using the proper equipment (ladders, scaffolding, workplatforms) to perform work at elevated heights.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No previous similar events have occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.

The Condensate Storage Tank at NMP2 are reinforced fiberglass tanks manufactured byMetal Cladding, Incorporated. The seismic-monitor which failed is a TriaxialResponse Spectrum Recorder manufactured by Engdahl Enterprises, ModelRSR-1600-H/V-16A..

Component

Identification of Components Referred to in this LER

IEEE 803EI IS Funct

IEEE 805System ID

Condensate Storage Tank (2CNS-TKlA and TK18)Condensate Transfer Pump (2CNS-PlA and 8)Reactor Core Isolation Cooling(RCIC) SystemSuppression PoolCondensate Storage Tank PitLow Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) SystemPenetrationSeismic MonitorSump Tank 2DFM-TK1Sump Pumps 2DFM-P4A and 8Floor DrainWater Tight DoorReactor Building SumpsWaste Water Disposal System

TKP

NA

NA

NANA

PENMON

TKP

DRN

DR

TK, P

NA

KAKABN

BTKABM

NA

INWK

WK

WK

NA

WK

WH

NRC FORM 366A%43 I

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FIGURE 1

Secondary Containment Wall PenetrationW-3045-C Design Detail

2 TYP

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FIGURE 2

Condensate Storage Tank Joint ConfigurationCase Resul ting From Uneven Concrete Foundation

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FIGURE 3

Condensate Storage Tank Joint ConfigurationIdeal Design Case

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